CONFLICT CRIMINOLOGY

"History without sociology is like hard work with the brains taken out, and
sociology without history is like brains with the hard work taken out." (Raymond
Michalowski)

    Conflict criminology is best understood by reference to the various domain

and background assumptions behind the various traditions (Gouldner 1970). 
All conflict theorists have in common a conflictview of society, that is, that
society is held together, not by consensus, but by competition and conflict
between incompatible values and interests.  One implication of this idea is that
people with less power are more likely to be defined and processed as deviants
and criminals.  We'll see why in a minute, but it is important to realize there's
a variety of conflict theories that can be classified in various ways.  Although
some would argue it's unimportant how conflict theories can be classified, for
learning purposes, this lecture classifies them by their affinity, or closeness, to
the ideas of Karl Marx (1818-1883), Max Weber (1864-1920), and Georg
Simmel (1858-1918), three of perhaps the greatest dead sociologists.  It was
Marx (1867) who said "There must be something rotten in the very core of a
social system which increases its wealth without diminishing its misery, and
increases in crime even more than its numbers."

THE MARXIST TRADITION

    Regardless of whether it's called "radical", "new", "materialist",

"dialectical", "socialist", "critical", or "conflict" criminology, there is a
fundamental if not partial adherence to Marxism (Garofalo, 1978; Bernard,
1981; Bohm, 1982; Hawkins, 1987).  While in the popular imagination,
Marxism is associated with communism, Marxism as a scientific tradition is
best distinguished by a particular ontology (view of human nature) and
epistemology (way of knowing). The various adherents can then be
distinguished by methodology and models. The closer one gets to models of
society and crime, the more theoretical differentiation can be made.

    Marx held to an ontology of homo faber, not homo sapiens (Engels, 1845).
Quinney (1965) elucidates this conception best as the idea of human nature
being essentially unfinished and constantly realizing its potential.
Explanations of crime based on socialization experiences, normative
structures, and cultural demands are therefore incompatible with Marxism
because humans are never completely socialized, claim higher loyalties than
societal norms, and are culture-builders not culture-products. This ontology,
like Rousseau's conception of native goodness, is a rejection of both classical
(free will) and positive (determinism) traditions. It's also part of the deep
structure of romantic thought in Western philosophy (Gouldner 1970).
    Marxian epistemology is realism, not the philosophical kind like Plato, but
the skepticism or disenchantment of the legal realism tradition that exists in
jurisprudence. It's a mature coming to grips with the facts of constant change
and the inevitable loss of idealism.  Think of it at a kind of skepticism, if you
will.  In many ways, it's the basis of the idea that nothing is morally neutral,
that people retain the right to critique, expose, pass judgment, and demystify
(Quinney 1974).  Critique for the sake of critique is important to followers of
Marx.

    The methodology of Marxism is dialectical historical materialism. Hegel

was the idealist philosopher who first popularized this method, and it is
sometimes said Marx turned Hegel on his head. Hegel was interested in
looking forward to a progressive future when thesis and antithesis would
result in synthesis.  Turning Hegel on his head means that the starting point
for Marxian analysis involves looking backward, and tracing the centuries-old
conflict between the group that produces the means of material survival and
the group that lives off that production (Chambliss 1976; Reiman & Headlee
1981). This methodology attempts to discover the total, fundamental, and
indispensable source of conflict -- economic relations. Such economic
reductionism is at the heart of the Marxian tradition. The invention of
capitalism is often taken as a starting point in Marxism because capitalism is
believed to be inherently contradictory, and the point in history where the
forces of production (equipment, technology) increased while the relations of
production (means of distributing produced goods) remained fixed (Marx
1859).

    Lastly, the evolving, non-organic whole model of society and criminal
behavior in the Marxian tradition is utopian and revolutionary. Social
institutions such as laws and the state as well as ideologies are only reflections
of economic realities. Because the surplus population created by an
increasingly efficient capitalism is seen as a threat, the economically powerful
use the laws and state to protect their interests.  Economic powerlessness
translates into political powerlessness.  In response to the expropriation of their
labor and the exploitation of their potential in commercialized relationships,
criminals come to recognize their true objective interests and engage in
protorevolutionary action to bring about the end of capitalism and the start of
socialist or guaranteed freedom from want and misery. Marxist scholarship is
strongly committed to age-old as well as new, as-yet-undiscovered humanistic
values (Kramer 1985), keenly aware of the dangers of having ideas co-opted
by other reformists (Platt 1974), and thoroughly partisan inasmuch as
theorizing is intended to bring about the politicization of criminals who have
not yet recognized their rightful place in history (Quinney 1977). Treating
criminals as protorevolutionaries is sometimes called the primitive
rebellion thesis.  Here's what Marx (1867) said about criminals on page 734 of
Volume One of Capital:
      The proletariat created by the breaking up of feudalism and the forcible
expropriation of people from the soil could not possibly be absorbed by the
newly-created capitalist manufacturers.  At the same time, the proletariat
could not suddenly adapt to the discipline of their new conditions, and so
were turned into beggars, robbers, and vagabonds, partly from inclination,
but in most cases from the stress of circumstances.  Hence, by the end of
the 16th century, the whole of Europe engaged in a bloody war against
vagrancy, and legislation was created to treat them as criminals.  It was
also assumed that their criminal behavior was voluntary and the result of
free will, when in actuality it was because they could not adapt to the new
economic conditions.

Conflict Criminology in the Marxist Tradition

    There are many interpretations about what Marx said or meant.  The two-
class model of social stratification, while still popular as an explanation of
fiscal crisis (O'Connor 1973), is today seen as a form of vulgar
Marxism (Poulantzas 1969). Similarly, only instrumental Marxism views law
as a tool of the ruling class (Chambliss 1989). Structural Marxism denies
deliberate intention to the ruling class and believes it rules by ideas (Althusser
1966) or conspiracies (Mills 1956).  The Frankfurt School (Jay 1973)
incorporated Freudian psychoanalysis into Marxism. In addition, neo-
Marxism (Friedrichs 1980) makes use of the fact that Marx implied most
criminals were lumpenproletariat who could not be counted on for
revolutionary purposes.

    Bonger (1916), a traditional Marxist, saw capitalism as breeding social

irresponsibility. The dialectical interplay between capitalist business cycles
and crime rates was his focus. Using a two-class model, Bonger saw conflict as
likely to continue indefinitely because capitalism creates a climate of
motivation for crime. Offenders are motivated by self- rather than social
interests.  Criminologists today regard Bonger's ideas as too psychological.

    Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939) took a broader historical focus to examine
imprisonment rates and the fluctuations of capitalism.  It is indeed both a
historical and statistical fact that imprisonment rates vary in synch with the
booms and busts of capitalism, adding some element of truth to the surplus
labor hypothesis.  Marxist penology (Adamson 1984) pays little attention to
the abolishment of crime, but very definitely wants to abolish prisons.
Rehabilitation of prisoners is rejected as a strategy because it would only
serve bourgeois interests (Scull 1977).  Almost all criminologists today regard
the Marxian focus on prisons as appropriate, and prison and punishment
studies is where you'll find most Marxist scholarship.

    Gordon's (1971) theory sees crime as a rational response to the political and
economic structure of institutions. He claims that what are traditionally
viewed as noneconomic goals (status, respect) are tied to chances for material
survival. Taking an instrumentalist view of the State, he argues that token
enforcement of upperworld crime, a major concern of conflict criminology
(Pearce 1976), is explained by protection of power and profits, and more
violent street crime is explained by protection of self from greater risk of
arrest and incarceration.  Almost all criminologists today regard the Marxian
focus on upperworld (white collar, corporate, state) crime to be an
appropriate application of Marxism. 

    Taylor, Walton, and Young (1973) had substantial impact with their call for
a "new criminology." Their revisionist account of criminology even made
Durkheim out to be a radical. They were strongly committed to a non-
atomistic view of humans, instrumental as well as expressive rationality, a
dialectic of resistance and control, and the elimination of all crime. They were
dedicated to decriminalization of lifestyle diversity, and claimed that micro-
processes of interaction are conditioned by macro-structures, particularly the
social totality, or political economy. Their points gave rise to what might be
called social psychological or marginalization theories of Marxism, starting
with ideas that mode of production determines mode of self-formation
(Michalowski & Bolander 1976; Michalowski 1985), gender differences
(Balkan, Berger, & Schmidt 1980; Schwendinger & Schwendinger, 1983;
Messerschmidt 1986), peer group formations (Greenberg 1977; Schwendinger
& Schwendinger 1985), and opportunities for social bonding (Colvin & Pauly
1983). Certain offshoots of labeling theory, such as controlology (Ditton 1979)
and amplification theory (Cohen 1980) were inspired by new criminology
insights.  Many criminologists like this approach because it allows the study of
micro-structure (how the ruling class uses covert discrimination by look and
gesture) as well as macro-structure (how the ruling class lobbies the
legislature for tougher laws).

    Chambliss (1975) formulated a theory of lawmaking, lawbreaking, and law

enforcement based on ideas that law expands as class gaps widen and both
crime and crime control divert attention from real economic problems. His
theory, elaborated in Chambliss & Seidman (1982) and to some extent
encapsulated in Reiman (1984), presents a picture of confused humans
pretending to think in terms of living law while the logic of capitalism curtails
any new institution-building. The view is one of the State presenting images
and ideologies that function as bread and circuses for the population.  Erikson
(1966) had a similar idea in Wayward Puritans when he said societies only
really debate their norms and values through celebrity cases of some
notoriety.  In any event, the net result of anything like this is that the status
quo is constantly maintained, and only laws that protect the system as a whole
are passed.  Within criminology, most of these ideas are referred to as
behavior of law studies, or sometimes as a form of structuralist or constitutive
criminology (Krisberg 1975; Pepinsky 1976; Platt 1977).
    Spitzer (1975) focuses upon surplus populations created by capitalism.
Skid-row alcoholics and others who do not pose a threat to the system are
called social junk. Dangerous acts and people who do pose a threat are
called social dynamite. The contradiction is that the more capitalists try to
control these populations, the more exposed becomes the fiscal crisis. Social
dynamite are seen as protorevolutionary.  Spitzer's analysis has led to a
variety of loosely-connected studies on the safety net of capitalism, including
welfare and mental health reforms (Liska 1992).  Sometimes, you'll see
Marxist criminologists study the medicalization of deviance, which takes them
into such topics as the insanity defense and so forth.

    Quinney's writings (1974; 1977) tend to center upon the notion of class
fragmentation, or how the ruling class gets the lower classes to fight amongst
themselves.  Quinney is critical of the increasing efficiency of repression.
Increased repression brings increased resistance. Repression also results
in manipulation of consciousness, another of Quinney's (1974) main concerns.
Resistance can also be accommodating, a concept Quinney (1977) uses to
argue that all working class crime is more-or-less conscious rebellion.
Politicization of prisoners will pave the way for a crime-free socialist
future.  Pepinsky & Quinney (1991) have recently suggested that new ideas, like
peacemaking, and religious or moral thought, may bring about desired
change.

THE WEBERIAN TRADITION

    Weber held to an ontology of homo sociologicus (Rheinstein 1954) where

humans are seen as benevolent and brotherly. Flesh and blood (realpolitik)
individuals are both actors and agents of society. They pursue a variety of
ends, not always in a rational manner. The most important of these ends is
the power to affect decisions of authorities. Norms and values are internalized
to the extent that authorities have legitimacy. Legitimacy can be obtained by
personal charisma, an appeal to past tradition, or by what Weber (1964)
considered the most important, rational-legal authority, appeal to value
systems or practical consequences. He believed bureaucracy to be the finest
example of rational-legal authority. The Weberian tradition squarely
implicates authority structures and how they act in socialization and social
control processes.

    Weberian epistemology is neo-Kantianism, defined as the use of a priori

categories to make sense of the multiplicity of matter leaving behind only the
residual explanation of spirit. This is illustrated by Weber's way of writing in
which he retains ideas "in solution" until fully matured. As a formal model-
builder, Weber attempted to devise concepts that would supply regulative
unity to phenomena, and these are called ideal-types. He also believed
in value-free science, the exclusion of ideological or nonscientific assumptions
from research. Facts should not speak for themselves. Ideal types should
provide a basis for interpretation.

    Ideal-type methodology involves being completely holistic with respect to

examining every phenomenon, even anomalies, that bear on the subject at
hand. In fact, Weber's central questions concerned anomalies, why one form of
social organization would develop here and not there. Rigidly historical and
comparative, Weber attempted to develop ideal-types that were abstracted
from different contexts to get at the essential elements of a concept. This often
involved highly particularistic analyses followed by probabilistic statements
about the tendencies of human action. Weber was no determinist. He did not
look for universal laws. He was interested in finding the historical or
situational contingencies for the origins of conflict, power, and success.

    Weber's model of society and its implications for criminal behavior is
pluralistic and pessimistic. Societies develop in episodic ways conditioned by
historically contingent circumstances, the most important of these
being inward- or outward-worldly orientation. To be sure, Weber (1964) held
structuralist ideas about political and economic stratification, distinguishing
between class, party, and status, the last being most strongly related to
perception of life-chances. Conflict is not limited, however, to these structural
features, as humans also fight over ideas and values. This focus opens the door
to socialization and motivational explanations based on resistance to the iron
cage of rationalization, the master trend where every area of life becomes
subject to calculation and administration. His emphasis on the behavior of
authorities makes struggle over political, especially legislative, power (to
improve the life chances of one's status group) his central contribution to
conflict criminology.  Weber's approach is pessimistic in the sense that
capitalism can only try to remain flexible in face of the permanence of conflict
and its tendency to become routinized.

Conflict Criminology in the Weberian Tradition

    Although consensus theorists at heart, Shaw and McKay's (1942) work has
some affinity with Weber's ideas, as others have pointed out (Meier 1977).
Another group of look-alikes would be the elite theories of Veblen (1934) and
Mills (1956). Elite theorists tend to analyze the struggles between authorities
as these impact on the maintenance of authority-subject relations. 

    Gerth and Mills (1953) take a Weberian approach that ties not only
motivation but character development to symbol manipulation by authorities
at the institutional level of society (polity, economy, religion, military, and
kinship). People are seen as adding and dropping roles in response to
increasing compartmentalization of life. Weber (1930) had much to say about
personality characteristics, and one can easily find more clinical treatment of
his Protestant Ethic idea (Mirels & Garrett 1971).

    Dahrendorf (1959) presents a theory of interest group formation which is

quite consistent with the Weberian tradition. His approach relies on concepts
such as "quasi-groups" and "imperatively coordinated associations"
(Dahrendorf 1959, p. 167 & 173). The former concept describes a fragmented
and multidimensional stratification system, and the latter describes if and
when classes would form. Dahrendorf uses Weber's concepts of power and
authority to state the conditions when interest groups form. These include
sharing a culture and the requirement of a liberal State. Conflict is inevitable
given competing interests and occurs systematically in the struggle to obtain
the prize of State power. Norms are simply reflections of these power
struggles, not of consensus (Dahrendorf 1958b). Mobility systems de-intensify
conflict, and the absence of conflict is due to effective coercion. 

    Turk's (1966) theory of criminalization is an account of how people are

conditioned into roles of domination and deference and capable of more-or-
less conscious disagreement with laws or the way they are enforced. Turk's
focus is on realistic conflict with moves and tactics increasing chances for
success. Conflict between authorities and subjects leads to the opening up and
closing off of probabilities for success, and in a later work (Turk 1969)
examines the anomalous category of mental disorder as a substitute for
criminality. He adds the concept of sophistication to his theory which
increases conflict when either subject or authority is less sophisticated.
Criminalization is explained by a pluralist conflict model of statuses and
norms rather than class (Turk 1977).  These ideas are similar to the notion of
status contests or stigma contests in labeling theory.

    The sociologist Collins (1975) offered a Weberian theory of social

organization. People are seen as preferring to give rather than receive orders,
with prestige being their main interest, and conflict is inherent in competition
for scarce resources. Collins makes use of game theory, especially zero-sum,
negotiated, and compliant relationship games. A pluralist, non-utopian
model of society is presented which is based on factional fights between
occupational, educational, and political groups. The analysis of ideology and
symbol manipulation is similar to Weber's conception of worldly outlook.
Rational-legal authority is analyzed in terms of ritual, which stabilizes
conflict, but at the individual level, people tire from receiving too many
orders, and credential inflation results (Collins 1979). Cosmopolitan outlooks
are assumed and everyone is treated as belonging to a large-scale,
bureaucratic organization.

    The Weberian tradition also gave rise to a number of behavior of

law theories. The most well-known of such theorists is Black (1976) whose
theory of social control styles is an elaboration of Weber's charismatic,
traditional, coercive, and rational-legal typology. The model is one of a
planned and increasingly organized society similar to Weber's with an
emphasis on respectability, which explains criminal offenders as status and
power seekers. Law is seen as a quantitative variable, so there can be more or
less of it at different times and places.  Law can be penal, compensatory,
therapeutic, or conciliatory.  One of Black's hypotheses is that penal law is
greater in a direction toward less culture than more culture. Hence, the law
will be used more severely against the poor and uneducated. Law is also
greater where other forms of social control (like etiquette, custom, folkways,
and ethics) are weak.

    Hagan's (1989) power-control theory and structural criminology focus on

the fact that criminal acts as well as the defining of crime represent power
relations.  People are seen as conditioned to be more-or-less risk-takers,
perceiving better chances for pursuing their interests the more egalitarian the
power structures they find themselves in. According to this view, juvenile
delinquency is more likely to be found in homes where the parents are lenient,
but sometimes also when parents are strict, for the same reason that it is the
consistency in power structure which matters.

    McGarrell and Castellano (1991) provide a theory

of differentiation consistent with the Weberian tradition.  Differentiation is
defined as a societal condition where people are vastly different in race,
ethnicity, religion, urbanization, and inequality.  Greater differentiation is
associated with greater interpersonal and intergroup conflict.  The higher the
level of conflict, the greater the use of criminalization as a method to deal with
the conflicts.  Media accounts of this criminalization result in more fear and
vicarious victimization within the population, leading to more repressive
police measures to stem the fear, and a more unstable political arena in which
any vocal opportunist can trigger events to enact crime policy.  This approach
provides a good example of how fear of crime studies are tied in with conflict
criminology.

THE SIMMELIAN TRADITION

    Simmel (1908) wrote extensively on the sources of conflict, and is a

neglected founding father of sociology (Frisby 1984). Some of his approaches
became part of the basic underpinning for symbolic interactionism, but he
also fostered a conflict tradition unique for its idealistic tendencies
and intuitive proclivities.

    Simmel held to an ontology of homo homini lupus, where people are seen as
wolves to others (Wolff, 1950). Their true selves are only visible as fragments
that come out in the course of group involvement, that is, when they want
something from somebody.  The self is always situated, and there are as many
selves as there are layers of situations or groups in society. Because the self is
social, there can be no antisocial interests because this would be self-
destructive. People experience feelings like love and contempt at the same
time. Anytime they think they are being a loner, they are really thinking of
others. These insights led Simmel to focus on group conflicts where envies,
wants, and desires are expressed. Groups provide more-or-less enduring
interaction and relative constancy of pattern, but they do not exhaust all there
is about an individual.

    Form, rather than content, is important for Simmel (1900) who
studied money and found that comparison of quite different contexts yielded a
number of stable and recurring social types, such asthe stranger, the enemy,
the criminal, and the pauper.  Strangers, or immigrants, are often societal
scapegoats. Content varies, but forms are the stable, permanent patterns of
interaction. Intuitionism is used to find the inner nature of things without
being distracted by sensory observation of what goes on in the contexts being
drawn from. Units of analysis did not matter to Simmel as the forms of
interaction open to three nation-states were the same options open to three
people. He was also fascinated with numbers, providing excellent analyses of
dyads and triads (Simmel 1908).

    Simmel believed that aesthetic appreciation would avoid a static picture.
Everything from Simmel's perspective was dynamic. This appreciative stance
is a form of phenomenology, detaching the scholar from value judgements and
positions on public issues. A scholar would do well to look at the empty space
in the boundaries between antagonistic social groups (Simmel, 1908, p. 18).
The forms he said you would discover there are: super/sub-ordination,
competition, conflict, imitation, parties, division of labor, art, fashion, ritual,
and secrecy. The origin of power is skill at spontaneity, and it cannot exist
without the complicity of the powerless.

    Sociation, the real object of society, is viewed as an art, a game, or play.
Social groups are everywhere in (internal) conflict because no one group
would exhaust one's individuality, and constantly in (external) conflict
because of cross-cutting allegiances. Collins (1988, p. 123) has not so
charitably called this "the grid-lock model of social conflict".  However, it's
best seen as the ongoing expression of selves, and not a conception of conflict
as the opposite of consensus or order. Because people deceive themselves and
others every time they try to express their individuality, social structures are
distinguished by their relative permissibility of lying, and society itself is a lie,
a fiction (Simmel 1906) A criminal offender is one who has given up too much
integrity and lost their real self, or on the contrary, one who is seeking too
much individuality or anonymity; i.e., the criminal social type (Simmel 1900). 
Conflict Theories in the Simmelian Tradition

    There are few successors to Simmel's tradition.  Symbolic interactionists

borrowed extensively from him, and conflict as an identity characteristic is
most closely associated with identity theory(Strauss 1959; McCall & Simmons
1978), social worlds analysis (Shibutani 1962; Unruh 1980), labeling theory,
and role theory (Biddle & Thomas 1966). Theories, in particular, that make
use of the model of society as play and game and/or crime as fun tend to be
consistent with the Simmelian tradition.

    Sellin's (1938) culture conflict theory falls in the Simmelian tradition

because of an emphasis on group codes or rules for behavior in certain
situations. While not the first to extract the concept of culture conflict from
Simmel's interests in assimilation and ethnicity, Sellin (1938) differed from
Wirth's (1931) emphases on psychological reactions and vision of a
homogeneous, crime-free future by saying that conflicting cultural norms just
simply give more occasion for crime and deviance to occur. This was largely a
sociological re-expression of the Simmelian idea that society exists as a fiction
in people's minds. Sellin's key concept was conduct norms, certain rules about
what a person is supposed to do if they find, for example, their wife in bed
with another man. While a few less modern societies might specify exactly
what you're supposed to do (kill your cheating wife and the other guy), more
modern societies offer less by way of guidance.  This state of confusion
and contradiction is what causes crime in modern societies.

    Coser (1956), a functionalist, also comes close to Simmel's position. Several
of Coser's propositions have to do with the intensity of conflict which is
increased when conflict is suppressed, when fighting is on behalf of a group,
and when parties are in close proximity. Closeness begats intensity because
that is when love and hate occur together, clearly a Simmelian insight. Other
propositions have to do with constructing social forms, like stability and
rigidity, which are drawn from comparing cross-cutting group memberships.
Nonrealistic conflict is found to have safety-valve functions. Coser's necessity
for hierarchy is drawn from a need to manage group size and complexity. The
image of the ever-present and always-emerging offender is also consistent
with the ideas of Simmel, except that Coser follows a more "crime is
functional" approach.

    Vold's (1958) group conflict theory consists of the idea that continually

competing interest groups come into conflict with one another, and those that
oppose the interests of dominant groups are more likely to violate the law. 
Groups are continuously being formed and at risk of displacement by other
groups. Group contact is described as the expression of force-ratios between
dominant and minority interests. Law formalizes these ratios as positions of
strength to positions of weakness. Society is seen in uneasy equilibrium. Vold
model of offending is "minority group behavior out of sympathy with and in
more or less direct opposition to dominant groups" (Vold 1958, p. 211). Crime
is always in defense of one's group interests, and Bernard (Vold & Bernard,
1986) presents aunified conflict theory of crime, unified because it attempts to
explain law as well as behavior. It substitutes vicariously learned
reinforcement schedules for person-to-person interaction, and explaining law
enforcement by the principle of least effort.

    Quinney (1969; 1970) provided important group conflict ideas. His social

reality of crime model (Quinney 1970) builds on Simmel's psychic nature of
society. The social types of "villain", "hero", and "anti-hero" are analyzed in
terms of "reactive norms" and rules on spontaneity. Segments or socio-
demographic aggregates are seen as providing conflicting normative systems,
behavioral learning opportunities, and self-conceptions. Crime is explained by
the conceptual conflict inherent in these competing definitions of behavior,
realities, and self. The powerless will have their definitions labeled criminal by
agents of social control, and law enforcement is seen as an extension of law
enactment. The image is of an innocent offender who happens to conform too
much to the belief system of the "wrong" social group. This is exactly the
thrust behind Simmel's lament that secrecy, strangeness, marginality, and
deceit were likely to be our collective fate.
INTERNET RESOURCES
Critcrim.org
DeMelo's Criminology Page
Global Criminology: Marxism and Crime
Postmodernism and Social Justice
Red Feather Institute
Sociological Theories of Deviance

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