Case 95

Hontiveros v. RTC, GR No. 125465, June 29, 1999

Facts: Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio
Hontiveros (Gregorio) and Teodora Ayson (Teodora) before RTC. Petitioners alleged that they
are the owners of a parcel of land pursuant to a land registration case filed by Gregorio, and
that they were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration
case. Private respondents denied that they were married and that Gregorio was a widower and
Ayson was single. Private respondents likewise denied that they deprived petitioners of
possession and income from the land and that earnest efforts had been made to reach a
compromise between the parties but were unsuccessful. The trial court then denied the
petitioner’s motion and dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint was not verified
as required by Art. 151 of the Family Code and that it did not believe that earnest efforts had
been made to arrive at a compromise. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the provisions of Art. 151 of the Family Code apply to this case.

Held: No. Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply to this case since the suit is not exclusively
among family members. The inclusion of Teodora as defendant and Maria Hontiveros as
plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151. Under this provision, “members of the
same family” refers to husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants,
and brothers and sisters, whether full or half blood. As held in the case of Gayon v. Gayon, the
enumeration of “brothers and sisters” as a member of the same family does not comprehend
sisters-in-law. Consequently, Teodora, described in the complaint as spouse of Gregorio, and
petitioner Maria Hontiveros, spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers
to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151.
Case 105
Babiera v. Catotal, GR No. 138493, June 15, 2000

Facts: Respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of the petitioner with the
Regional Trial Court. Respondent asserted that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa (spouses), and that a baby girl was delivered by hilot in the house of
the spouses, where, without the knowledge of Hermogena, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a
housemaid of the spouses, made to appear that the child was a legitimate child of the spouses.
Respondent asserted that the birth certificate of petitioner was void as it was a totally simulated birth:
a) Hermogena’s signature was forged; and b) the child’s real mother is Flora Guinto and her status was
an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that respondent’s petition states no cause of action it being a
direct on the her legitimacy; that respondent has no legal capacity to file under Art. 171 of the Family
Code; and that petition has prescribed under Art. 170 of the Family Code.

Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent has no legal capacity to file the petition under Art. 171 of the Family
Code
2. Whether or not the proceeding is barred by prescription under Art. 170 of the Family Code
3. Whether or not the ancient public record of petitioner’s birth is superior to the self-serving oral
testimony of the respondent

Held:
1. No. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action, as the interest of
respondent in the civil status of the petitioner stems from an action for partition which concerns
the properties inherited by respondent from her parents. Art. 171 of the Family Code cannot
apply to the present case as this only applies to instances where the father impugns the
legitimacy of his wife’s child, which presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of
the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to the
petitioner, to which the prayer is not to declare illegitimacy of petitioner, but rather to establish
that she is not a child of the spouses at all.
2. No. The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner’s birth certificate; it does not
impugn her legitimacy. Thus, Art. 170 of the Family Code does not apply.
3. No. While the birth certificate enjoys presumption of regularity, the specific facts and the
totality of evidence presented for the case at bar sufficiently negates such presumption. Relying
merely on the assumption of validity of the birth certificate, petitioner did not present no other
evidence aside from the said document to show that she really is Hermogena’s child and that
she has not provided any reason why her supposed mother would make a deposition stating
that she was not Hermogena’s child at all.
Case 115
Puno v. Puno, GR No 177066, Sept. 11, 2009

Facts: Petitioner, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint for specific
performance against respondent to allow him to inspect respondent’s corporate book, render
an accounting of all the transactions it entered into from 1962, and give him all profits,
earnings, dividends or income pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno. Petitioner averred that
he is the son of the deceased Carlos L. Puno with the latter’s common-law wife and as surviving
heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges of his father as a stockholder of
respondent. Respondent contended that petitioner did not have legal personality to sue
because his birth certificate names him as Muno and that there was yet a need for judicial
declaration that Puno and Muno were one and the same. The trial court granted the petition,
while the Court of Appeals reversed the same on the ground that petitioner was not able to
establish the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno since his birth certificate was
prepared without the participatory acknowledgment of paternity by Carlos L. Puno. Hence, this
petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has a legal standing to sue as an heir of Carlos L. Puno.

Held: No. Petitioner was not able to prove satisfactorily his filiation to the deceased Carlos L.
Puno, thus, he cannot claim to be an heir of the latter. A certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not a competent evidence of paternity when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. The local civil
registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a
third person. While only the petitioner’s mother supplied the data in the birth certificate and
signed the same, there was no evidence that Carlos L. Puno acknowledged petitioner as his son.
Case No. 125
Lahom v. Sibulo, GR 143989, July 14, 2003

Facts: Petitioner and her spouse decided to legally adopt respondent. In 1972, an order
granting the petition was issued and in keeping with the court order, the civil registrar changed
respondent’s name from Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Eventually, in December
1999, petitioner commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption due to respondent’s
acts of ingratitude. Prior to the institution of the case, RA No. 8552, Domestic Adoption Act,
went into effect, which removes the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
Respondent moved for dismissal of petition, contending that petitioner had no cause of action
in view of RA No. 8552. Trial court dismissed the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may rescind the decree of adoption notwithstanding the
provisions of RA No. 8552.

Held: No. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Similarly, in Republic v. Miller,
the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was
filed. It was months after the effectivity of RA No. 8552 that petitioner filed an action to revoke
the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law had already repealed the right of
an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
Consistent with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for
rescission of the adoption decree, having been filed after RA No. 8552 had come into force, can
no longer be pursued.
Case No. 135
Santos v. CA, GR No. 113054, March 16, 1995

Facts: Petitioner and Julia Bedia were married in 1986 and had begotten only one child, Leouel
Santos, Jr. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he
had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, Julia’s parents (private
respondents). Thereafter, Julia left for the United States to work, and continued to send
financial support to her son. Petitioner was not aware of her whereabouts and alleged that his
efforts to locate her in the United States proved futile. In 1990, private respondents contended
that petitioner abducted the boy. Hence, private respondents filed a “Petition for Care,
Custody, and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos, Jr.” before the RTC. Petitioner contended
that private respondents failed to show that he is an unfit and unsuitable father which makes
Art. 214 of the Family Code inapplicable to his case.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may claim custody of his minor son notwithstanding the
provisions of Art. 214 of the Family Code.

Held: Yes. The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental
authority. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. In case of absence or death of either parent, the
parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. While under Art. 214 of the Family
Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper when both parents are dead,
absent, or unsuitable, such cannot apply to the case at bar as the considerations provided by
the private respondents are found to be insufficient to defeat petitioner’s parental authority
and that he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. The fact that he was
unable to provide financial support for his minor son should not be a sufficient reason to strip
him off his permanent right to the child’s custody because his inattention cannot be construed
as abandonment.
Case No. 145
Cabales v. CA, GR No. 162421, August 31, 2007

Facts: Rufino Cabales died in 1966 and left a parcel of land to his surviving wife, Saturnina, and
children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto, and petitioner Rito. On 1971, brothers
Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the property to Dr. Corrompido with a right to repurchase
within 8 years. The three siblings divided the proceeds of the sale among themselves. Alberto
also secured a note, “vale”, from Dr. Corrompido. In 1972, Alberto died, leaving his wife and
son, petitioner Nelson. Within the 8-year period, the two siblings tendered their payment to Dr.
Corrompido while Saturnina paid for the share of the deceased Alberto, including his vale. On
even date, Saturnina and her children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the parcel
of land to respondent-spouses Feliano. Rito, then 24 years old, received his share in the
proceeds of the sale of the subject property from respondent Feliano. In 1988, Saturnina died.
Nelson learned of the sale of the subject property and subsequently filed a complaint for
redemption of the subject land plus damages in 1995, contending that the vendors could not
have sold their respective shares in subject property when they were minors. In reply,
respondent-spouses argued that petitioners were estopped from claiming any right over the
subject property. The trial court ruled against the petitioners. On appeal, CA affirmed the trial
court’s decision with modification, ruling that Nelson is co-owner to the extent of 1/7 of the
subject property as Saturnina was not subrogated to Alberto’s rights when she repurchased his
share of property, but denied Nelson’s claim for redemption.

Issue: Whether or not Saturnina is authorized to sell the shares of (1) Rito, and (2) Nelson, in
the subject land.

Held:
1. In the case of Rito, no, Saturnina is not authorized to sell the share of Rito in the subject
land. While Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code provide that the father, or in his
absence, the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child
under parental authority, which makes Saturnina his legal guardian, Saturnina as the
legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration over the minor’s property.
It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial authority. Thus, when
Saturnina sold Rito’s share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do so.
2. In the case of Nelson, no, Saturnina is not authorized to sell the share of Nelson in the
subject land. When Alberto died prior to repurchasing his share, his rights and
obligations were transferred to and assumed by his heirs, his wife and Nelson. Hence,
Saturnina was not subrogated to Alberto’s or his heirs’ right to the property when she
repurchased the share. Saturnina and all the other co-owners were not his legal
guardians with judicial authority to alienate or encumber his property. Hence, Saturnina
does not have the legal authority to sell Nelson’s share in the subject land.