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UST v. Board of Tax Appeals: The Rule-Making Power Must Be
UST v. Board of Tax Appeals: The Rule-Making Power Must Be
Maceren (1977) However, these rules cannot extend the law to include something it
clearly does not contemplate. In case of discrepancy between the
Doctrine:The rule-making power must be confined to details for basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the
regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond
been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or the terms and provisions of the basic law
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not In RA 5440, electric fishing was not one of the penalized acts. In
covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be fact, an amendatory law PD 704 (promulgated 1975) would later
sanctioned. include electric fishing as a punishable act. This was held to
demonstrate that RA 5440 was deficient in that it failed to
FACTS: contemplate that mode of fishing.
1. In 1969, Buenaventura et. al were caught “electro fishing” in the AO 84 in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such
waters of barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz. They were charged with an offense falls within the category of “other violations” because the
having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty
2. Municipal court quashed the complaint. CFI affirmed dismissal. Case for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, and
came to SC on appeal by the prosecution under RA 5440. is not the same as the penalty for “other violations” of the law and
3. Said law penalizes: (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous regulations fixed in the Fisheries Law.
substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deep-sea While there is no questioning the authority of the Secretary to
fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of
promulgate the orders, since this is clearly established in Sec. 4 of
sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and
the Fisheries Law, it is apparent that he exceeded his authority in
quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.
promulgating FAO 84.
4. As a defense, they argued that the law only contemplated the use
UST v. Board of Tax Appeals: The rule-making power must be
of “any obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing,” and that use
of an electric current was not punishable under it. “(6) Other confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry
violations”, was construed by the SC to only be acts analogous to into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be
the five preceding it). extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or
a. Fisheries Law does not expressly punish electro fishing. to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resource’s Fisheries the statute cannot be sanctioned.
promulgated AO 84, which expressly prohibited electro The case of State v Miles offers a similar situation where a person
fishing in all Philippine waters. was charged with displaying game (a deer), but the law only
b. This provision was later amended by Fisheries AO 87, which penalized taking game. The doctrine was that in a prosecution for a
limited the regulation to fresh water fisheries. Buenaventura violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the
et. al. now contest the validity of said orders. order is one which falls within the scope of the authority conferred
upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with
ISSUE: WON the Fisheries Administrative Order 84 was within authority special care.
of Secretary to promulgate (NO) Since the Department Head exercise the rule-making power by
delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should
RATIO: NOT transcend the bounds demarcated by the statute for the
NO, the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro exercise of such power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the
fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the lawmaking body.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources cannot penalize
it. The AOs are devoid of legal basis. DISPOSITIVE: Case dismissed
The rule is that law-making bodies cannot delegate to an executive
official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense.
It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of
the penalty provided for in the law itself, in consideration of the fact
that the legislature cannot be expected to contemplate all possible
details and scenarios.
Toledo v. CSC (1991) possesses special qualifications and his services are
needed.”
Doctrine: The power vested in the rule making bodies is to implement While the statute itself (RA 2260) contained no provisions
the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect prohibiting appointment for reasons of age, it did allow the CSC to,
or execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it. The rules cannot “with the approval by the President, to prescribe, amend, and
amend an act of Congress. enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the
FACTS: provisions of ... the Civil Service Law.”
1. In 1986, Augusto Toledo (57) was appointed by COMELEC Chairman In 1975, PD 807 repealed and amended RA 2260. The assailed
Ramon Felipe as Manager of the Education and Information CSRPAP was promulgated to implement this new law. However, PD
Department of COMELEC. 807 makes no mention whatsoever of age limitations in Government
2. No prior request for exemption from the provisions of Sec. 22 xxx service.
was secured. Respect for the legislature necessary involves the belief that then-
3. He had already been reporting to work when the CSC learned of his President Marcos knew of the age prohibition but chose not to
age, prompting them to file a resolution declaring Toledo’s include it. This demonstrates the intention not to continue the
appointment as void. provision in effect.
4. The CSC posits that he was in violation of Section 22, Rule III of the Thus, the inclusion of the provision in the CSRPAP was an act of
Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP), which “supererogation” since the rule has no relation to or connection
with any provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect. The
states:
section was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a
“SEC. 5. No person shall be appointed, reinstated, or re-employed in
mode of carrying it into effect.
the service if he is already 57 years old, unless the President, or the The power vested in the CSC is to implement the law or put it into
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in the case of employees in the effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not
judiciary, determines that he possesses special qualifications to supply perceived omissions in it. The rules cannot amend an act
urgently needed by the hiring agency.” of Congress.
CSRPAP was not properly promulgated and thus not binding on
5. When Toledo’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied, he goes to Toledo.
Even assuming it were valid, the provisions therein only allows the
the SC by certiorari.
President and the CJ of the SC as the bodies that can allow the
ISSUE: WON Sec. 22 Rule III of the CSRPAP was a valid exercise of the hiring of those past 57. This was taken to mean that the provision
CSC’s rule-making authority. NO only considers those offices under the direct supervision of the
President and the SC, which naturally excludes the independent
RATIO: COMELEC.
NO, Said section had no basis in law, and thus cannot stand.
There is no provision at all in the law regarding any manner with the DISPOSITIVE: Petition Granted
appointment, reinstatement or re-employment in the Government
service of any person of any particular age. The provision on 57
years of age was purely a creation of the Commission, having no
reference to any provision in the decree intended to be
implemented.
The first iteration of Sec. 22 Rule III was in the first CSRPAP (1962),
then found in Sec. 5 Rule VI. This version reads:
o “SEC. 5. No person shall be appointed or reinstated in the
service if he is already 57 years old, unless the President of
the Philippines, President of the Senate, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, or the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, as the case may be, determines that he
Commission of Internal Revenue v. CA (1995) taxes, to the martial law regime. It should be understandable then
that those who ultimately took over the reins of government
Doctrine: A rule that restricts the scope of a law is invalid. following the successful revolution would promptly provide for a
broad, and not a confined, tax amnesty.”
FACTS:
1. In 1986, EO 41 was promulgated, granting a tax amnesty on unpaid Disposition: Decision of CA, sustaining that of CTA, is affirmed in toto.
income, estate, donor’s and business taxes from 1981-1985.
2. ROH Auto Products was assessed as deficient in tax payments by
the CIR, and thus availed of this amnesty, and paid the amnesty
dues.
3. When ROH made notice that it had already availed of the amnesty
and asked that the assessment be withdrawn, the CIR refused.
4. It cited Revenue Memorandum Order No. 4-87, dated 09 February
1987 (which implemented EO 41). Said order construed the
amnesty coverage to include only assessments issued by the BIR
after the promulgation of the EO on 22 August 1986 and not to
assessments theretofore made.
5. ROH protested this, and the CTA and CA ruled in ROH’s favor. The
CIR now asks the SC to uphold the Memorandum Order.
RATIO:
NO, the memorandum order unduly restricted the scope of EO
41 to assessments made after its promulgation, since there is
no mention of this in the law proper.
Issuances of the Minister of Finance (now Secretary) must not
override, but must remain consistent and in harmony with, the law
they seek to apply and implement. Administrative rules and
regulations are intended to carry out, not to supply nor to modify,
the law.
The relevant provisions of EO 41 read as follows:
“Sec. 1.Scope of Amnesty. — A one-time tax amnesty covering
unpaid income taxes for the years 1981 to 1985 is hereby
declared.
The scope of the law expressly considers all unpaid income taxes
from 1981 to 1985. If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order
No. 41 had not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities
already assessed (administratively) prior to 22 August 1986, the law
could have simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not.
The conclusion is that the EO has been designed to be in the nature
of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the
cases specifically excepted by it.
Obiter: “It might not be amiss to recall that the taxable periods
covered by the amnesty include the years immediately preceding
the 1986 revolution during which time there had been persistent
calls for civil disobedience, most particularly in the payment of
Land Bank of the Philippines v. CA (1995) commit GAD since it merely exercised its power to promulgate
rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of
Doctrine: The rule-making power must be confined to details for RA 6657.
regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has SC: RA 6657 is clear and provides the details as to how it should
been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the be enacted. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides that deposit
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds.
statute. It cannot be inferred that deposit can be made in any other
form.
FACTS: The function of promulgating rules and regulations may be
1 Petitioners DAR and LBP, filed their respective motions for legitimately exercised only for the purpose of caring the
reconsideration for a decision denying their petition for review on provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative
certiorari contending mainly that, the opening of trust accounts in agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into
favor of the rejecting landowners is sufficient compliance with the effect.
mandate of Republic Act 6657. Administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a
2 Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were
legislative enactment because as a rule, administrative
acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified
regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law.
beneficiaries under CARL.
In case there is discrepancy between the basic law and an
3 Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and LBP with respect to
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.
the valuation and payment of compensation for their land, private
DAR overstepped its limits. There is no basis in allowing the
respondents filed petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer
for PMI. opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as
4 Respondents question the validity of DAR AO No. 6 s. 1992 compensation for his property because RA 6657 is very clear
[provides formulas for the valuation of land expropriated] and DAR that the deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds.
AO No. 9 s. 1990 [provides for the opening of trust accounts in the Implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of
LBP instead of depositing in an accessible bank, in cash and bonds, the law.
the compensation for land expropriated by the DAR];
5 Ps sought to compel DAR to expedite the pending summary Issue 2: WON respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts
administrative proceedings to finally determine the just deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of
compensation of their properties, and LBP to deposit in cash and the cases involving the final valuation of their properties. YES.
bonds the amounts respectively reserved and deposited for private
respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. There must be full payment of JC before title to the expropriated
6 In the CA, DAR maintained that property be transferred.
a AO No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the
RA6657. amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for
b "the deposit contemplated by Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657, their properties simply because they rejected the DAR’s
absent any specific indication, may either be general or special, valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been
regular or irregular, voluntary or involuntary (necessary) or other deprived of the possession and use of their properties, is an
forms known in law, and any thereof should be, as it is the general oppressive exercise of ED.
rule, deemed complying." No need to distinguish between provisional compensation and
7 CA granted the petitions for certiorari and mandamus and declared final compensation for purposes of exercising the landowners’
AO No. 9 null and void; ordered LBP to immediately deposit in the right to appropriate the same.
name of the landowners the just compensation…
Disposition: Petition denied.
Issue 1: WON AO No. 9 is valid. NO.