PROPERTY Review Case Doctrines | 1st Semester S.Y.
2018-2019
Compiled by Danielle Lavares | Ateneo de Davao University College of Law
CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
DAVAO SAWMILL vs. CASTILLO (1935)
GENERAL RULE: The machinery only becomes immobilized if placed in a plant
by the owner of the property or plant. As a rule, therefore, the machinery
should be considered as Personal Property, since the owner of the said land
did not place it on the land.
EXCEPTION: The tenant, usufructuary, or temporary possessor acted as agent
of the owner of the premises; or he intended to permanently give away the
property in favor of the owner.
With respect to the machineries placed by Davao Sawmill (tenant), they
retained ownership thereof. Thus, they were considered as personal
property applying the general rule. Hence, it may be the subject of replevin.
SERG’S PRODUCTS vs. PCI LEASING (2000)
Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered
as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently
estopped from claiming otherwise. As a party to the contract of lease,
wherein the parties treated the machines as personal properties, Serg is
estopped from denying of the characterization of the machines as personal.
Therefore, they are proper subjects of writ of seizure and an action for
replevin.
NAVARRO VS. PINEDA (1963)
The parties to a contract may by agreement, treat as personal property that
which by nature would be real property. The matter depends on the
circumstances and the intention of the parties. The view that parties to a
deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal
property for the purposes of said contract is good only insofar as the
contracting parties are concerned. Nevertheless, with respect to third
persons who are not parties to the contract, and especially in execution
proceedings, the house is considered as an immovable property.
LEUNG YEE vs. STRONG MANCHINERY
If the doctrine of estoppel applies, it does not convert or transform real
properties into movables. They are still considered as immovables just
treated as personal in so far as the lease contract is concerned. Here, the
entity that questioned it was a third person, and therefore the Court applied
Art. 415.
The mere fact that the parties decided to deal with the building as personal
property does not change its character as real property. Thus, neither the
original registry in the chattel mortgage registry, nor the annotation in said
registry of the sale of the mortgaged property had any effect on the building.
However, since the land and the building had first been purchased by “Strong
Machinery” (ahead of Leung Yee), and this fact was known to Leung Yee, it
follows that Leung Yee was not a purchaser in good faith, and should
therefore not be entitled to the property. “Strong Machinery” thus has a
better right to the property.
STANDARD OIL vs. JARANILLO
When parties present to the registrar of property a document of chattel
mortgage, the registrar must record it as such even if in his opinion, the
object of the contract is real property. This is because his duties in respect to
the registration of chattel mortgages are of a purely ministerial character, as
long as the proper fee has been paid.
However, this registration produces no effect. In many cases, the SC said that
it is a useless effort; the chattel mortgage is void if somebody else will
question it. If only the parties are involved, then it is valid as chattel
mortgage. But not when a third person questions it.
BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS vs. MERALCO
The steel towers or electric poles of MERALCO are merely placed on the
ground connected by bolts and can actually be moved from place to place.
They are not immovables under Art. 415. Thus, they are not subject to realty
taxes.
CALTEX vs. CBAA (1982)
Those underground tanks, elevated tanks, air compressors, gasoline pumps,
etc. cannot fall under any provision of Art. 415, but the SC said that they are
IMPROVEMENTS subject to realty tax. The SC ruled that they are taxable
merely as improvements.
BENGUET CORP. vs. CBAA (1993)
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From the Lectures of Atty. Melissa Romana P. Suarez
The tailings dam is a real property under par. 1 because it is a construction
adhered to the soil and par. 3 since it is a real property by incorporation.
Therefore, it is subject to realty taxes.
MERALCO vs. CITY ASSESSOR (2015)
The transformer and electric post, transmission lines, insulators and electric
meters owned by MERALCO are subject to realty taxes pursuant to the LGC.
As between the Civil Code, a general law governing property and property
relations, and the LGC, a special law granting local government units the
power to impose real property tax, then the latter shall prevail. Thus, while
they may not be immovables under the Civil Code, they are considered
immovables under the Local Government Code.
CAPITOL WIRELESS vs. PROVINCIAL TREASURER (2016)
From FT: Submarine or undersea communications cables are akin to electric
transmission lines which this Court has recently declared in Manila Electric
Company v. City Assessor and City Treasurer of Lucena City, as "no longer
exempted from real property tax" and may qualify as "machinery" subject to
real property tax under the LGC. To the extent that the equipment's location
is determinable to be within the taxing authority's jurisdiction, the Court sees
no reason to distinguish between submarine cables used for communications
and aerial or underground wires or lines used for electric transmission, so
that both pieces of property do not merit a different treatment in the aspect
of real property taxation. Both electric lines and communications cables, in
the strictest sense, are not directly adhered to the soil but pass through
posts, relays or landing stations, but both may be classified under the term
"machinery" as real property under Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code for the
simple reason that such pieces of equipment serve the owner's business or
tend to meet the needs of his industry or works that are on real estate.
Even objects in or on a body of water may be classified as such, as "waters" is
classified as an immovable under Article 415 (8) of the Code. Besides, the
Court has already held that "it is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed
as real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be
considered personal property.
Note: Atty. Suarez just said that submarine cable systems are not realties
under Art. 415 but may be classified to be as such (?).
PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR vs. FILIPINAS PALM OIL (2016)
Mini haulers (trucks that haul trailers and the like) and road equipment are
realties under Section 199 (o) of the LGC since they are physical facilities for
production that are mobile and are actually, directly, and exclusively used to
meet the needs of Filipinas’ industry. Thus, they are subject to realty taxes
pursuant to the LGC.
LAUREL vs. JUDGE ABROGAR (2009)
Intangible property such as electrical energy is capable of appropriation
because it may be taken and carried away. A telephone call, therefore, is
electrical energy. Electricity is personal property under Article 416 (3) of the
Civil Code, which enumerates "forces of nature which are brought under
control by science.
Although business or interest of business was not specifically enumerated as
personal property in the NCC, it is still considered to be personal property
since it is capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of
real properties (Art. 416, par. 1).
LAUD vs. PEOPLE (2014)
All things which can be transported from place to place are deemed to be
personal property (Article 416). Considering that human remains can
generally be transported from place to place, and considering further that
they qualify under the phrase "subject of the offense" under Section 3(a),
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court given that they prove the crime’s corpus
delicti, it follows that they may be valid subjects of a search warrant.
SIBAL vs. VALDEZ (1927)
The sugar cane, although considered as “growing fruits” and therefore
ordinarily real property under par. 2 of Art. 415 must be regarded as
PERSONAL PROPERTY for purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, and also for
purposes of attachment, because the right to the growing crops mobilizes
the crops by ANTICIPATION.
MERCADO vs. MUNICIPAL PRESIDENT OF MACABEBE
The canal, constructed by Mercado, should be opened for public use. While
the use and enjoyment of the waters could have been acquired by
 PROPERTY Review Case Doctrines | 1st Semester S.Y. 2018-2019
Compiled by Danielle Lavares | Ateneo de Davao University College of Law
prescription, still when he allowed others to use the canal, he lost the
exclusive right to use the same. Moreover, although the hacienda is
registered under his name under the Torrens System, this does not confer
upon him any right to the river or creek since these are properties of public
dominion, and cannot be registered.
HEIRS OF MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC (2007)
Classification of lands according to ownership: public dominion or of private
ownership; Classification of public lands according to alienability: Property of
public dominion (inalienable) or Patrimonial property of the State (alienable).
Under Art. 422, property of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or public service, is not automatically converted to patrimonial
property. There is a process.
CEBU OXYGEN vs. BERCILLES
The abandoned road was converted to patrimonial property. The act of the
city council in issuing a resolution withdrawing that portion of the road for
public use and another resolution authorizing the mayor to sell it effectively
converted the property from public dominion to that of patrimonial property
of the State, hence open to disposition and alienation.
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD vs. UP
RA 3990 effectively converted government land to patrimonial property
giving absolute, full, and entire ownership to UP.
LAUREL vs. GARCIA
The Roponggi Property in Japan was not converted to patrimonial property.
There must be a legislative and executive concurrence in the issue of
converting property of public dominion to patrimonial property. This
property is classified as property of public dominion as it is for public service.
In this case, there was only the executive concurrence.
CHAVEZ vs. PEA (2002)
Reclaimed area is automatically a property of public dominion which is
beyond the commerce of man, regardless of who reclaims it. In this case,
there was an implied conversion to patrimonial property when titles were
issued to the name of PEA. However, there must still be a declaration by the
Bureau of Lands that the property is no longer needed for public use and for
public service and there must be a classification that these are now alienable
and disposable lands open to disposition before they may be converted to
patrimonial property.
With respect to foreshore lands, it can be converted following the
procedures and then later it can be alienated even if not reclaimed. But with
respect to the submerged areas, it cannot be converted unless reclaimed.
PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE vs. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA
Property for public service is also of property of public dominion when it
comes to LGUs.
OWNERSHIP
PEOPLE VS POLINAR (now abandoned)
For a person who owns property to be able to invoke Art. 429, there must be
an attack vs. his person coupled by an attack to his property. That’s the only
time you can use reasonable force.
PEOPLE VS NARVAEZ
As long as the force used is reasonably necessary, there is no need for an
attack on one’s person so that he can defend his property.
CAMARINES NORTE VS QUEZON (2001)
The Province of Quezon and Governor Eduardo Rodriguez are bound by the
said final decision (declaring Camarines Norte as owner of the disputed
areas) of this Court and that the boundary dispute there resolved is no longer
a dispute and that all the attendant legal issues have been resolved with
finality. That decision of this Court constitutes res judicata in respect of all
offices and agencies of the Executive Department. Accordingly, the province
of Camarines Norte is entitled, not to a status quo prior to the controversy,
but rather to the prompt enforcement of the decision of this Court.
MWSS VS ACT THEATER (2004)
In this case, there was no actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property as the stealing of the water was already
consummated. The remedy of MWSS is to charge them with Theft, rather
than invoking Art. 429 to cut off the water supply.
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From the Lectures of Atty. Melissa Romana P. Suarez
VILLAFUERTE VS CA (2005)
Art. 429 cannot be invoked. In this case, Villafuerte is already in possession of
the property as the operator of the gas station, although his possession was
unlawful. Therefore, Art. 429 is not the proper remedy, but to file an action
for unlawful detainer.
ANECO VS LANDEX (2008)
There were no constituted servitudes on the land. The alleged road lots were
only road lots on paper, the subdivision plan. They were not real road lots
that were constituted and it was very clear in the sale of the property that
these lots were sold as mere ordinary lots. Therefore, the general rule here
applies.
VSD REALTY VS UNIWIDE (2012)
The proper way of recovering property: First, describe it specifically and give
your proof or evidence of possession/ownership.
NPC vs. IBRAHIM (2007)
Ibrahim owns the sub-terrain area because of Art. 437. Presumably, the
landowner’s right extends to such height or depth where it is possible for
them to obtain some benefit or enjoyment, and it is extinguished beyond
such limit as there would be no more interest protected by law.
PLEASANTVILLE DEV’T VS CA (1996)
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on
is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is
presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee.
At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was
what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to
him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee is in good faith. Petitioner failed to prove
otherwise.
IGNACIO VS HILARIO
Limited right of removal: upon choosing option 2nd option (oblige the B/P to
pay the price of the land and the S, the proper rent and the value of the land
is NOT considerably more than the value of what was BPS), but the builder
cannot pay, then the LO can remove the improvements/buildings
constructed by the builder.
Choice always belongs to the LO because he is the owner, and by principle of
accession, he is given the options to appropriate or not. The Court cannot
impose on the LO to choose an option. Once the choice has been made and it
was communicated to the Court and the BPS, the LO can no longer change
his mind.
If the landowner chooses the second option and the price of the land is not
considerable more than the price of the building, the builder cannot reject
that. The builder has to pay the price within 15 days.
IGNAO VS IGNAO (1991)
A has a house on the property. When they subdivided the property, it turned
out that his house exceeded the portion allocated to him after the partition.
Part of his house was on the lot of B. B has those options under Art. 448.
Atty. Suarez: The more practical thing is just to sell that portion of the land
which was encroached upon by another.
PECSON VS CA (1995)
Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the
builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale
or donation. Nevertheless, the SC held that Art. 448 can be applied by
analogy.
Set-off is not possible because if the LO wants to exercise the first (2nd?)
option, he must pay the Fair Market Value, and not the construction cost.
Moreover, if he wants to apply 448 in relation 546, then the LO who chooses
to appropriate must indemnify the builder. If he does not indemnify, then
the builder has the right of retention. Since he has not yet paid Pecson a
single centavo, the Pecson has the right of retention over the building.
PARRILLA VS PILAR (2006)
Art. 448 does not apply to lease contracts. Article 448 covers only cases in
which the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be owners of
the land or, at least, have a claim of title thereto, but not when the interest is
merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary. A
tenant cannot be said to be a builder in good faith as he has no pretension to
 PROPERTY Review Case Doctrines | 1st Semester S.Y. 2018-2019
Compiled by Danielle Lavares | Ateneo de Davao University College of Law
be owner. Clearly, it is Article 1678 of the NCC which applies in cases of lease.
However, in the present case, Article 1678 still cannot be applied as there
was no lease contract between Parrilla and Pilar. The lessee was Shell.
ALVIOLA VS CA (1998)
To fall within Art. 448, the construction must be of permanent character and
attached to the soil with an idea of perpetuity; but if it is of a transitory
character or is transferable, there is no accession, and the builder must
remove the construction. The proper remedy of the landowner is an action
to eject the builder from the land. The copra dryer is not a permanent
construction. Hence, there can be no accession. Consequently, LO can do
whatever he wants like remove/eject the builder and have the construction
or building demolished after obtaining a special writ of demolition.
REPUBLIC VS JUDGE BALLOCANAG (2008)
The 2nd option is not available to the State since what is involved is a
timberland which cannot be subject to any disposition or acquisition under
any existing law and is not registrable. Hence, there is no choice but to
appropriate the improvements made by Reyes.
NARVAEZ VS ALCISO (2009)
Art. 448 is not applicable in a Sale with Right to Repurchase. If it is
repurchase, then there is transfer of ownership back to the repurchase (if the
right is exercised). What applies in the case at bar is Art. 1606, in relation to
Art. 1616. If Alciso wants to exercise the right of redemption, then he must
pay Narvaez the price of the sale, the expenses of the contract, the
legitimate payments made by reason of the sale, and necessary and useful
expenses of the thing sold.
FUENTES VS ROCA (2010)
The sale was void ab initio and the buyer did not really become the owner of
the land. The buyer merely thought that he was the owner and he built in
good faith his house. Therefore, if the sale is nullified and the LO wants to
have his land back, then he must exercise those rights under 448.
BRIONES VS MACABAGDAL (2010)
Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner
of the building to remove the building from the land without first exercising
either option. It is only if the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder
or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not more than the value of
the improvements, that the owner may remove the improvements from the
land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen
to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
(See page 18 of 2018 TSN for complete procedure)
VSD REALTY vs. UNIWIDE
Art. 448 does not apply because the one who constructed the building did
not think that it owned the land. It was a lessee.
ZAPATA V. DIR. OF LANDS (1962)
The accretion had been formed gradually due to the effect of the water
current of creek. The fish traps might have brought about the accretion but
there is no evidence to show that the fish traps were erected for the purpose
of trapping the soil and the main cause of the accretion was the current of
the creek. The appellee may still invoke the benefit of the provisions of
Article 457 to support her claim of title thereto. Thus, Zapata was entitled to
the increase in his property brought upon by the accretion.
VDA. DE NAZARENO V. CA (1996)
Where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water
current of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the
direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made
accretion and, as such, part of the public domain. Alluvion must be the
exclusive work of nature.
HEIRS OF NAVARRO V. IAC
Art. 457 does not apply because the deposits were caused not by the current
of the river but by the current of the sea. Under Art. 420, when it comes to
the sea, the littoral owner does not own whatever it is that is pushed by the
current of the sea. This is property of public dominion. In this case, the 3rd
requisite is lacking, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of
claimant’s land which is adjacent to the river bank. Here, the disputed land, is
an accretion not on a river bank but by a sea bank, or on what used to be the
foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined Pascual’s own tract on the northern
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From the Lectures of Atty. Melissa Romana P. Suarez
side. As such, the applicable law is not Art. 457; but Art. 4 of the Spanish Law
on Waters of 1866.
SIAIN ENTERPRISES VS. FF CRUZ (2006)
Article 4 of Spanish Law on Waters recognizes the preferential right of the
littoral (riparian according to paragraph 32) to lease the foreshore land
formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea. The
reason for the preferential right is the same as the justification for giving
accretions to the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers by
reason of the destructive force of the waters. So, in the case of littoral lands,
he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession.
GRANDE VS. CA (1962)
Accretion may be subject to prescription. Even though one is the owner of
the alluvial deposits by principle of accession, ownership is one thing and
registration is another. If as an owner, he didn’t do anything to protect the
ownership as when he don’t register the land under his name, the ownership
of the unregistered land can be acquired by prescription.
HEIRS OF NARVASA VS. IMBORNAL (2014)
Alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a river do not form part of the
public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of
the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for
by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same
under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to
acquisition through prescription by third persons.
AGUSTIN vs. IAC (1990)
Arts. 461 and 457 are both applied. The owners of the land thus affected are
not entitled to compensation for any damage sustained thereby. The owners
of the new bed shall be the owners of the abandoned bed in proportion to
the area lost by each. This is the kind of ownership that does not require any
transfer document. This is automatic. It is by virtue of the law: Art. 461 and
P.D. 1067.
PD 1067: The owners of the affected may undertake to return the river or
stream to its old bed at their own expense. But in order to do that: 1. He
must get a permit from the DPWH and the DOTC; and 2. Work pertaining
therefor must commence the work within 2 years.
US vs. OREGON
Rivers are navigable in law if navigable in fact for some purpose beneficial to
trade and commerce.
QUIETING OF TITLE
MAMADSUAL VS. MOSON (1990)
Actual, continuous, and adverse possession since time immemorial in the
concept of owner is enough to establish equitable title on the part of the
plaintiff. All the requisites of an action to quiet title are present.
FERNANDEZ VS. FERNANDEZ (1990)
B is the owner because the lot was delivered to her. She has proof that she
paid 50% and that she is a part owner of the lot. Thus, she has equitable title.
All the requisites of an action to quiet title are present.
METROBANK VS. ALEJO (2001)
The subject “judgment” cannot be considered as a cloud on petitioner’s title
or interest over the real property covered by TCT No. V-41319, which does
not even have a semblance of being a title. It would not be proper to
consider the subject judgment as a cloud that would warrant the filing of an
action for quieting of title, because to do so would require the court hearing
the action to modify or interfere with the judgment or order of another co-
equal court.
PORTIC VS. CRISTOBAL (2005)
Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper party to bring an
action to quiet title. However, it has been held that this remedy may also be
availed of by a person other than the registered owner because, in the Article
reproduced above, title does not necessarily refer to the original or transfer
certificate of title. Thus, lack of an actual certificate of title to a property does
not necessarily bar an action to quiet title.
PHIL-VILLE vs. BONIFACIO
An action to quiet title is characterized as a proceeding quasi in rem. In an
action quasi in rem, an individual is named a defendant and the purpose of
the proceeding is to subject his interests to the obligation or loan burdening
 PROPERTY Review Case Doctrines | 1st Semester S.Y. 2018-2019
Compiled by Danielle Lavares | Ateneo de Davao University College of Law
the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability
of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these
questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not
to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The
judgment therein is binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.
GREEN ACRES HOLDINGS, INC. VS. VICTORIA P. CABRAL (2013)
The DARAB decision in favor of Cabral satisfies all four elements of a cloud on
title. The said decision was ineffective and unenforceable because in the
decision, the defendant was not impleaded. Thus, the petitioner's proper
recourse was either an action for quieting of title or an action for
reconveyance of the property.
CO-OWNERSHIP
SPOUSES SY VS. CA
In a co-ownership, there is no definite share. It does not matter that there’s
only one title. There is no co-ownership when the different portions owned
by different people are already concretely determined and separately
identifiable.
PUNSALAN v. BOON LIAT (1923)
Twenty-three persons caught a whale and the ambergris (found in the
abdomen of the whale) is automatically co-owned by the persons through
occupation.
HERRERA VS. FANGONIL (2007)
The redeemed lot is co-owned property which the children inherited from
their parents through intestate succession. Carmen, who redeemed the
property, does not become the full owner thereof. She just becomes a
creditor of her siblings who are obliged to pay their respective proportionate
shares of the redemption price.
BALUS V. BALUS (2010)
The bank was able to consolidate the title of the property then after that,
Rufu (the father) died. Rufu actually lost ownership of the land. There was
nothing for the heirs to inherit. Therefore, they did not become co-owners of
the property as there was no succession – no source of co-ownership.
PASCUAL v. BALLESTEROS (2012)
Under Article 1620 of the Civil Code, a co-owner has a right of legal
redemption. Under Article 1623 of the Civil Code, there is a 30-day period
given to the co-owners to redeem the property. The 30-day period will only
start to run from the notice in writing from the prospective vendor which is
the co-owner who will sell the lot. She must inform her other co-owners in
writing that she is selling the lot to third person. In this case, Margarita never
informed them in writing. So, it does not matter if Lorenza knew of the sale
or not – it is the notice in writing that causes the 30-day period to run.
VICTORIA V. PIDLAOAN (2016)
Mere construction of a house on another's land does not create a co-
ownership. There is no source of co-ownership. There is co-ownership if you
own one undivided thing. But a house is separable from a lot. So, it is Rosario
who owns the house and Elma owns the lot. There is no co-ownership.
AGUILAR v. CA (1993)
The purpose of the house was for the father of the co-owners to live in. If
one of them lives there, then he must pay rent.
CRUZ v. CATAPANG
A co-owner can use the property but the interest of the co-ownership must
not be injured or prejudiced. By allowing a third person to encroach upon the
co-owned lot, the interest of the co-ownership is prejudiced. The consent
given by Norma in the absence of the consent of Leonor and Luz did not vest
upon respondent any right to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry
into the property still falls under the classification through strategy or
stealth.
CONDOMINIUM ACT
SUNSET VIEW V. CAMPOS
Under Article 484 of the Civil Code, what governs co-ownership is the
agreement between the parties. The buyer signs the agreement where he
agrees that he will only become a shareholder of the condominium
corporation after he pays the full purchase price. This law only comes in if
there is no agreement. And under the law on sales, the buyer becomes the
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owner because of the delivery, ownership is different from being a member
in the condominium corporation.
LILIA SANCHEZ v. CA
Teria is only co-owner of 5/6 of the property; 1/6 thereof is still owned by
Lilia because she did not participate in the sale made by the other five co-
owners.
Under Article 486, a co-owner has the right to use the property co-owned.
Therefore, even though Lilia owns only 1/6 of the property, she has the right
to use the entire property, and so does Teria. As long as there is no partition
made between the co-owners, both co-owners can use the entire property.
METROBANK v. PASCUAL
Termination of conjugal property regime does not ipso facto end the nature
of conjugal ownership. They should have done the liquidation and partition
process to end the coownership. Since the property is still conjugal, Florencia
has the right has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2)
undivided interest in the disputed property. The rights of Metrobank, as
mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia
owned. The mortgage is still valid but only as to ½ of the mortgaged
property.
DE LIMA v. CA (2011)
When the property was registered in 1954 in his name alone, that was
already notice to the whole world. Therefore, the new title constituted an
open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten
(10) years of adverse possession by Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954
was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription. Hence, when the other
heirs filed their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on
February 29, 1968, such action was already barred by prescription.
TRINIDAD v. CA
There was no clear repudiation on the part of Felix and Lourdes. Not only
that, they did not make it known to Inocentes or his heirs that they were
repudiating the coownership. In fact, they even impliedly recognized the
coownership by allowing him to live in the land and by sharing the produce
of the land to him. Thus, the prescriptive period did not run in favor of the
child of Inocentes.
AVILA v. BARABAT (2006)
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to
be a partition. Since there is already a specific portion sold, there was already
an implied partition. Here, the co-owners decided and agreed among
themselves to partition the property (extra-judicial partition).
HEIRS OF PADILLA v. MAGDUA (2010)
It must be clearly shown that he had repudiated the claims of X, Y, and Z, and
that they were apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership,
before the prescriptive period begins to run. However, it only started to run
in 1998, the date when X, Y, and Z received the notice of Ricardo’s
repudiation. Since they filed an action in 2001, which is three (3) years only,
it falls short of the ten (10) year prescriptive period.
POSSESSION
TACAS V TUGON
X is deemed a possessor in bad faith only in 1916, when Y actually filed an
action against X for the recovery of the land. Because that was the only time
facts existed which showed that X was not unaware. But before that, without
proof, there is that presumption that X was in good faith.
BUKIDNON DOCTOR'S HOSPITAL v MBTC
When the lots were still mortgaged to Metrobank, the possession of BDH
was that of an owner but when they entered into a lease contract, the
possession was transformed to that merely of a holder and ownership
pertaining to another. When a mortgagee consolidates its title over the
foreclosed property, issuance of a writ of possession is not necessary
because Metrobank was already in possession thru its lessee, BDH. What
should be done here is to file an ejectment case against BDH.
EXTREMADURA V EXTREMADURA (2016)
This is similar to the BDH case. Jose, the owner, is in possession thru Manuel.
Under Art. 524, possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that of
another.
ALVIOLA v CA
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Alviola, the possessor, was definitely a possessor in bad faith because he
constructed copra dryer and a store fully knowing that the land did not
belong to him.
WONG vs. CARPIO
Even if he did not step in the land but by entering into some kind of
document, the deed of sale, possession is already acquired.
EQUATORIAL REALTY vs. MAYFAIR
The execution of a contract of sale as a form of constructive delivery is a legal
fiction. It holds true only when there is no impediment that may prevent the
passing of properties from the hands of the vendor into those of the vendee,
when there is such impediment, the fiction yields to reality, delivery has not
been effected. Mayfair's opposition to the transfer of property by way of sale
to Equatorial was a legally sufficient impediment that evidently prevented
the passing of the property into Equatorial's hands.
RP SSS vs. DAVID (2004)
Under the SSS law, possession is different from actual occupancy. Actual
occupancy connotes something real or actually existing as opposed to
something merely possible or something that is a fiction of law. Unlike
possession, occupancy can only be actual or real and not constructive. Since
David allowed another person to actually, physically possessed the premises,
he violated the terms and conditions of the deed of conditional sale. HE DID
NOT ACTUALLY OCCUPY. He cannot use the provisions of the Civil Code to
circumvent the provisions of the conditional sale.
SUMODIO vs. CA
Sumodio already acquired possession over the property by planting trees and
starting the construction of his house. Possession in the eyes of the law
doesn't mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said he is in possession.
PAJUYO vs. CA AND GUEVARRA
To actually leave them as they are, would make the informal settlers to do so
would make them receive better treatment under the law than the actual
owners of the property. To apply the principle of pari delicto would give
them free rein to dispossess fellow informal settlers or violently retake
possession of the properties, usurped from them. The court should not leave
them with their own devices involving recovery of possession.
WONG vs. CARPIO
Between two present possessors, who has better right? It is Mercado
because he acquired possession first. He executed a document which at that
time there was no objection whatsoever. Therefore, by legal fiction acquired
possession of the land. So, he is the one longer in possession by Art. 538. He
is the possessor in the eyes of the law.
CEQUENA v BOLANTE
There is no need to prove just title but Honorata still has to prove that she
possessed it for the required number of years i.e. 10 or 30 years to prove
ownership by acquisitive prescription under the NCC. Note that acquisitive
prescription under the NCC has different requirements as that in PD 1529.
The NCC only says possession in the concept of an owner and 10 or 30 years
(no need to prove OCEAN possession like in PD 1529). Under the NCC, there
is a presumption that the 10 or 30 years is continuous.
TACAS v TUGON
His possession was only legally interrupted in 1916. Whatever he harvested
from 1912 to 1916 belongs to him because of the presumption of good faith.
He was presumed to be in good faith for those 4 years but his good faith
turned into bad faith in 1916 and he is only required to return the value of
the fruits from 1916 to 1930 upon the decision of the court.
U.S. VS. REY
For the abandonment to be the cause loss of possession, there must be no
more spes recuperandi (expectation to recover), and the animus revertendi
(intent to return or getting back) since in this case, the bank went out its way
to look for the lost cash and other precious gifts. This is evident from the fact
that a search party had looked for the money. Hence, the owner can still
recover, less the necessary expenses for salvaging the same.
YU VS. DE LARA (1962)
The circumstances adverted to are insufficient to constitute abandonment,
which requires not only physical relinquishment of the thing but also a clear
intention not to reclaim or reassume ownership or enjoyment thereof.
According to Manresa, abandonment converts the thing into res nullius,
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ownership of which may be acquired by occupation. This cannot apply to
land, as to which said mode of acquisition is not available (Art. 714, Civil
Code), much more to registered land.
DEL ROSARIO vs. LUCENA (1907)
Pia can recover the jewelry without necessity of reimbursing Teresa simply
because this case falls under the exception to the general rule under Article
559 of the Civil Code. Pia may not have lost the jewelry but she is considered
to have been unlawfully or illegally deprived of the jewelry which is evident
by virtue of the conviction of Praxedes Flores for the crime of Estafa.
AZNAR vs. YAPDIANGCO (1965)
It is essential that the seller should have a voidable title at least. It is very
clearly inapplicable where, as in this case, the seller had no title at all. The
title of Aznar was void. The car was stolen. The original owner was unlawfully
deprived of the car. Therefore, Santos can recover the car from Aznar
without reimbursement.
TAGATAC vs. JIMENEZ
As long as no action is taken by the party entitled, either that of annulment
or of ratification, the contract of sale remains valid and binding. When
plaintiff appellant Trinidad C. Tagatac delivered the car to Feist by virtue of
said voidable contract of sale, the title to the car passed to Feist. Of course,
the title that Feist acquired was defective and voidable. Nevertheless, at the
time he sold the car to Felix Sanchez, his title thereto had not been avoided
and he therefore conferred a good title on the latter, provided he bought the
car in good faith, for value and without notice of the defect in Feist's title
(Article 1506, N.C.C.). There being no proof on record that Felix Sanchez
acted in bad faith, it is safe to assume that he acted in good faith.
EDCA PUBLISHING vs. SANTOS (1990)
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership
over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private
respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a
matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the
private respondents to the books.
BPI FAMILY BANK vs. FRANCO (2007)
While Article 559 permits an owner who has lost or has been unlawfully
deprived of a movable to recover the exact same thing from the current
possessor, BPI-FB simply claims ownership of the equivalent amount of
money, i.e., the value thereof, which it had mistakenly debited from FMIC’s
account and credited to Tevesteco’s, and subsequently traced to Franco’s
account. Inasmuch as what is involved is not a specific or determinate
personal property, BPI-FBs illustrative example, ostensibly based on Article
559, is inapplicable to the instant case.
USUFRUCT
ELEIZEGUI VS MANILA LAWN TENNIS CLUB (1903)
Usufruct is a right of superior degree to that which arises from a lease.
Between a usufructuary and a lessee, the former has more rights. Usufruct is
a real right and includes jus fruendi and jus utendi. A lessee is only entitled to
use.
MORALIDAD V. PERNES (2006)
Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy
another’s property. It is also defined as the right to enjoy the property of
another temporarily, including both the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, with
the owner retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the same. It
is undisputed that petitioner, in a document dated July 21, 1986 made
known her intention to give respondents and her other kins the right to use
and to enjoy the fruits of her property.
Spouses Pernes are not entitled to reimbursement because Art. 448 does not
apply. It only applies to a BGF – one who builds upon a property in the belief
that he is the owner thereof and he does not recognize the ownership by
another. Here, the Pernes Spouses knew for a fact that the property is owned
by Moralidad and they recognize it. Under Art. 579, they have no right to be
indemnified therefor. Given the foregoing perspective, respondents will have
to be ordered to vacate the premises without any right of reimbursement.
The maintenance of the peaceful and harmonious relations among the kin
constitutes an indispensable condition for the continuance of the usufruct is
clearly deduced from the provisions thereof. In fine, the occurrence of any of
the following: the loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering or the
cessation of harmonious relationship between/among kin constitutes a
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resolutory condition which, by express wish of Mercedes, extinguishes the
usufruct.
Set-off is only allowed if there is damage caused. Since there is no damage
caused, then set-off is not possible.
BACHRACH V. SEIFERT (1950)
The 54,000 shares of stock dividend are civil fruits of the original investment.
They represent profits, and the delivery of the certificate of stock covering
said dividend is equivalent to the payment of said profits. Said shares may be
sold independently of the original shares. Mary is entitled to the stock
dividends. The property subject to the usufruct is the 108k shares of stock in
the mining company.
BISLIG BAY V. GOVERNMENT OF SURIGAO (1956)
A real tax, being a burden upon the capital, should be paid by the owner of
the land and not by a usufructuary (Mercado vs. Rizal, 67 Phil., 608; Article
597, new Civil Code). Appellee is but a partial usufructuary of the road in
question. The owner of the land is Government. Therefore, Bislig Bay has no
obligation to pay for the RPT thereon.
MERCADO V. REAL (1939)
The second paragraph, 2nd part of Art. 597 only applies if he voluntarily paid
for the taxes. That was not the case. The naked owner deducted, the
usufructuary did not voluntarily advance. And therefore, the first part is
applicable. It is at the expense of the owner. So the owner must reimburse
her right away and not wait until the termination of the usufruct.
HEMEDES V. CA (1999)
Applying Art. 581 and Art. 600, as the naked owner may valid alienate the
property. Art. 600 allows the naked owner to mortgage the said property.
But in this case, Maxima is liable for the loss of Justa, the usufructuary. In the
event that the property is lost because of some other law, then Art. 600 is
very clear. The original naked owner is liable, the one who constituted the
usufruct is liable for whatever the latter may lose by reason thereof.
LOCSIN VS. VALENZUELA
Art. 609 contemplate a case of expropriation by the government. But in this
case, the second choice in Art. 609 i.e. to pay the usufructuary the legal
interest on the amount of the indemnity for the whole period of the usufruct
was applied by analogy. Helen Schon is entitled to a portion of such payment
as legal interest applying Art. 609 as she had lifetime usufructuary over the
property.
RIVERA-CALINGASAN VS. RIVERA
There will be no substitution of a party since the usufruct annotated in the
title of the property was extinguished upon the death of Wilfredo, the
usufructuary. This deprives the heirs of Wilfredo to right to retain possession
over the property even if the judgment in the case directs its restitution.
Even if they win the case, the wife of Wilfredo cannot take possession over
the disputed property because the usufruct was extinguished upon the death
of Wilfredo (exception to substitution of parties under the Rules of Court).
NUISANCE
HIDALGO V BALANDAN
Water in any form is not an attractive nuisance. Nature in itself has created
streams, lakes and pools which attract children. There is always the danger of
drowning. If you only have a mere imitation of the work of nature, like a
swimming pool, it’s the same thing as the river. Those kinds cannot be
considered an attractive nuisance.
CANLAS VS AQUINO
You can actually file an action to prevent a possible nuisance. Not really to
abate an existing one, but to prevent it from happening.
CITY OF MANILA VS. GARCIA
Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city
officials will elevate it into a lawful act. The houses and constructions
aforesaid constitute public nuisance per se. They hinder and impair the use
of the property for a badly needed school building, to the prejudice of the
education of the youth of the land. The public nuisance could well have been
summarily abated by the city authorities themselves, even without the aid of
the courts
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL VS. JAC LINER
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In this case, the terminal was not a nuisance but rather, it was the buses who
obstruct free passage of road. Even if it is a nuisance, it still cannot be abated
via an ordinance. The physical abatement of the nuisance can be done by
any government entity but the courts have to declare that to be a nuisance
first. Unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be abated by an
ordinance without judicial proceedings.
ILOILO ICE AND COLD STORAGE VS. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
Before the council can close it down or summarily abate it, there must be
first a declaration from the court that that is a nuisance.
GANCAYCO VS. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON AND MMDA
The wing walls of the building are not nuisance per se in this case because
Justice Gancayco was given an exemption by the city council. Thus, the wing
walls cannot be summarily demolished. Only courts of law have the power to
determine whether a thing is a nuisance. The MMDA, and even the city
council, does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a
nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se. It cannot authorize the
extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its
nature, situation or use is not such.
A nuisance per se can be summarily abated based on the UNDEFINED LAW
OF NECESSITY.
RANA V. LEE WONG (2014)
A ramp which obstructs the use of public road is a nuisance. The filling up of
soil against the perimeter wall is also a nuisance because it endangers the
safety of the neighbor since the soil is putting pressure on the perimeter
wall. Thus, the remedy of extra-judicial abatement of the nuisance is proper.
When one files a civil action to abate a nuisance, he cannot extra-judicially
abate. Or even if you can, you must get the approval of the proper
government entity.
AQUINO V. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY (2014)
The mayor was correct in issuing the executive order and demolition order,
not based on the Civil Code, but rather Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which
empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of illegally
constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits.
RP V. MIJARES (2009)
Informal settlers are nuisance because they impair the use of property. They
can be summarily abated or removed without going to court pursuant to P.D.
Nos. 1845 and 1848 (special laws) which declared that area as a security zone
to ensure its security and uninterrupted operation considering the vital role
of the earth station in the country’s telecommunications and national
development.
EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES
BORBAJO V. HIDDEN VIEW (2005)
An easement is an encumbrance that is imposed upon an immovable for the
benefit of another immovable that belongs to a DIFFERENT owner. Since
Borbajo is a co-owner of the roads and the owner of the lots behind the
subdivision, then there is no easement. Borbajo may be allowed to use the
roads since a co-owner can use the property owned in common as long as
she was using it for the purpose for which it was intended.
COSTABELLA VS. CA (1991)
An easement of right of way is discontinuous because it depends on the
usage of man. Thus, it can never be acquired by prescription. It can only be
acquired by virtue of a title.
LIWAG V. HAPPY GLEN LOOP (2012)
An easement of water facility, like an aqueduct, is apparent and continuous.
Thus, it can be acquired by title and by prescription. The title could either be:
by law or by voluntary will of the parties. In this case, the easement was
established by voluntary will of the owners and prescription.
BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING V. CA (2003)
An easement of right of way is discontinuous. Thus, it cannot be acquired by
prescription. Even arguing that it can be acquired by prescription, BOMEDCO
still did not acquire the same because their possession was not adverse i.e.
not in the concept of owner. BOMEDCO recognized ownership by Santillan
then Valdez.
DELA CRUZ V. RAMISCAL (2005)
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It must be the owner of the servient estate, not a mere caretaker, who shall
give consent to establish an easement.
FE VELASCO V. CUSI (1981)
The City of Davao acquired the easement of right of way by title, which is Act
496 (law) and not by prescription. Such title of the Government existed even
before Velasco acquired her OCT.
CARGANTOS V TAN YANON
The existence of the doors and windows on the eastern side of the house is
equivalent to a title. When the law declares that an easement is to continue,
the easement actually arises for the first time ONLY UPON ALIENATION of
either estate in as much as before that there is no easement to speak of
applying Art. 624.
TANEDO V BERNAD
The septic tank cannot be blocked because there is an apparent sign of an
easement. The apparent sign of an easement does not have to be seen. The
use of the septic tank is continued by operation of law. The new owners of
the servient estate cannot impair in any manner whatsoever the use of the
easement.
ANECO v LANDEX
At the time of the sale, the lots sold by FHDI were not subdivision lots
anymore by express stipulations in the deed of sale. Alleged road lots in the
plan ceased to be road lots. The existence of an apparent sign of easement
already ceased. Thus, there was no easement acquired by title.
PRIVATIZATION v LEGASPI
When the property was assigned to APT, no easement arose or was
voluntary created from the transfer of ownership considering that the parties
agreed that it was assigning, transferring and conveying the subject property
free from all liens and encumbrances (like an easement).
VALDERAMA V NORTH NEGROS SUGAR (EN BANC)
What is prohibited by Art. 627 is that North Negros in extending the road
repairing, it should occupy a greater area of land of the servient estate or
deposit excavations or building materials outside of the area of 7-meter. In
this case, there was no expanding of the easement. Thus, the hacienda
owners do not make the easement more burdensome.
PILAR v DUMADAG (2013)
Art. 630 is subject to special laws. Although the land is still owned privately,
the owner of the land cannot file action publiciana or an ejectment cases
against anyone who is occupying therein. The proper remedy is to file an
action for mandamus to compel the local government to remove the
informal settlers because there is an existing easement of 3 meters pursuant
Art. 638.
CABACUNGAN v CORRALES
Merger must be complete to extinguish an easement. In this case, he did not
become the full owner of the estate. He is merely a co-owner/partial owner.
Therefore, the easement was not extinguished.
BENEDICTO V CA AND HERAS
Non-use must be indubitable i.e. proven that or no doubt that it was not
used anymore. If it is just an allegation, that is not enough to establish to
start the running of the 10-year period. Even if there was non-use, it only
started in 1946 when the easement was blocked.
Non-necessity as a ground for extinguishment of easement (Art. 655) only
applies to legal easements. If it was voluntarily established by the owner, the
non-necessity thereof will not extinguish the voluntary easement.
LEGAL EASEMENTS
PILAR VILLAGE v LAS PINAS
Special laws govern easements for public use. In the absence thereof, the
provisions of the NCC shall govern.
ESTATE OF BANZON v MARIANO BANZON
The easement of canal can be closed because it was not proven that a
voluntary easement was established by the owners. There was no annotation
of the voluntary easement in the title. With respect to legal easements, it
does not have to be annotated in any title of an estate because it is
established by law. The law itself says that the easement should exist. A legal
easement cannot be closed if the requisites thereof are complied.
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VALISNO V ADRIANO (1988)
The easement of aqueduct was acquired under Art 624 since the existence of
an apparent sign of an easement is equivalent to a title. The easement was
not acquired under Arts. 642 and 643.
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY
FLORO V LLENADO
The easement was only by mere of tolerance. There was no proof or
document, no admission, nothing. No voluntary easement. There was also no
legal easement as the isolation was due to his own acts.
NAPOCOR v MANUBAY
The term "value of the land" under Art. 649 refers to the market value of the
land. Thus, the full market value should be paid instead of an easement fee.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. BENJAMIN ONG CO (2009)
The "full market value" does not only refer to the area occupied by the tower
but also includes the area beneath the transmission lines.
ENCARNACION vs. COURT OF APPEALS (1991)
Under Art. 591, the width of a legal easement may be modified depending on
the necessary needs of the dominant owner. This provision does not apply to
voluntary easements.
DE GUZMAN vs. FILINVEST (2015)
In this case, the Court modified the easement of right of way from 10m to
3m only, for purposes of computing the indemnity. Payment of the value of
the land for permanent use of the easement does not mean an alienation of
the land occupied.
FAUSTO R. PREYSLER vs. COURT OF APPEALS (2006)
A temporary easement after the payment of the proper indemnity may be
established for construction purposes under Art. 656. But with respect to the
installation of electric power lines, it is not covered by Article 656 since it is a
permanent easement.
EASEMENT OF PARTY WALL
EDWIN CASE vs. THE HEIRS OF TUASON Y SANTIBAÑEZ (1909)
In case of doubt between a title and exterior sign, the title prevails. It was
shown that in the purchase of the property, the wall by which the land was
enclosed was necessarily included.
DRAINAGE OF BUILDINGS
CABACUNGAN vs. CORALES (1954)
The roof was positioned in such a way that the water would fall on the
neighbor’s land. This is a legal easement. Article 674 of the New Civil Code
specifically provides "that the owner of a building shall be obliged to
construct its roof or covering in such a manner that the rain water shall fall
on his own land or on a street or public place, and not on the land of his
neighbor, even though the adjacent land may belong to two or more
persons, one of whom is the owner of the proof.
LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT
CASTRO vs. MONSOD (2011)
The easement of lateral and subjacent support exists. Thus, Castro is obliged
not to make any excavations or diggings that would cause the collapse of the
wall of Monsod.
The ROD cannot be compelled to annotate it in the title because it is a legal
easement. It exists whether or not it is annotated or registered. A judicial
recognition of the same already binds the property and the owner of the
same, including her successors-in-interest. Only voluntary easements need to
be annotated in the title of the servient estate.
VOLUNTARY EASEMENTS
TRIAS vs. ARANETA (1965)
Removal and cancellation of easement in the title is not proper. Every owner
may validly impose conditions on the property under Art. 688. It is in reality
an easement, provided he does not contravene the law, public policy or
public order. The limitation is essentially a contractual obligation, which the
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seller imposed, and the purchaser agreed to accept.
NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO. vs. SERAFIN HIDALGO (1936)
North Negros has a right to its use upon paying the passage fees required by
the plaintiff. The latter may close it at its pleasure, as no period has been
fixed when the easement was voluntarily constituted, but while the road is
thrown open, the plaintiff may not capriciously exclude the defendant from
its use. Either you close it, or you allow everyone. Unless from the beginning,
it was established there that someone isn’t allowed to use the road.
JABONETE, ET AL. vs. JULIANA MONTEVERDE, ET AL (1966)
The easement of right of way acquired was a personal servitude under Article
614 of the Civil Code, and not a pre-dial servitude that inures to the benefit
of whoever owns the dominant estate. Thus, it cannot pass onto the
plaintiffs' successors-in-interest.
LA VISTA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (1997)
Non-necessity is not a cause for the extinguishment of easement of right of
way if the easement is voluntary.
There was a voluntary easement of right of way, which was acknowledged on
January 1976 even by the predecessors in interest. Being such, the 4
requisites for a compulsory easement need not be met. And like any other
contractual stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished except by voluntary
recession of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the
owner of the dominant lots.
There are no judicial easements. The Court cannot create an easement but
can merely declare one.
DONATION
HEIRS OF MARAMAG VS DE GUZMAN
The insurance proceeds did not come from the father, but from the
Insurance Company. Thus, there was no donation by the father to the
children. If ever there was a donation, it would only be limited to the value
of the premiums paid by the father during his lifetime. There must be a
decrease in the patrimony of the donor and a resultant increase in the
patrimony of the donee to constitute a donation.
The insurance policy in favor of the mistress is void pursuant to Article 739
(1).
ABELLO VS. CIR
There was intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi was present
since each of the petitioners gave their contributions without any
consideration. Donative intent is presumed present when one gives a part of
one's patrimony to another without consideration. It is not negated when
the person donating has other intentions, motives or purposes which do not
contradict donative intent. The fact that their purpose for donating was to
aid in the election of the donee does not negate the presence of donative
intent.
LAGAZO VS. CA
It does not matter if he pays the taxes. What matters is the intent of the
donor. The reason for donating, which is the love and affection of the donor
to the donee, is enough to show that this is a simple donation. However, the
donation was not perfected because there was no knowledge by the donor
that the donee accepted it.
Article 744 only applies when there is double donation (there are 2
donations). If there is 1 donation and 1 sale, you have to look at the validity
of the first contract. In this case, since the donation was not perfected, what
is valid is the sale.
Acceptance of a donation of an immovable must be made in a public
instrument. If made in a separate instrument, there must be notification and
notation in both instruments pursuant to Article 749. In the absence of these
requirements, the acceptance has no value and the donation is still deemed
not accepted.
RP VS. LLAMAS
One cannot speak of donation and compulsion on the same breath. A
donation is an act of liberality. To be considered a donation, an act of
conveyance must necessarily proceed freely from the donor's own,
unrestrained volition. A donation cannot be forced: it cannot arise from
compulsion, be borne by a requirement, or otherwise be impelled by a
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From the Lectures of Atty. Melissa Romana P. Suarez
mandate imposed upon the donor by forces that are external to him or her.
If the owner does not want to donate, then it will have to be expropriation,
and when properties are expropriated, there must be just compensation.
CITY OF ANGELES VS CA
The general law on donations does not prohibit the imposition of conditions
on a donation so long as the conditions are not illegal or impossible. In such
case, the void condition should be considered as not imposed.
DEL ROSARIO VS FERRER
In donations inter vivos, there is an automatic transfer of ownership even
though he has the right to dispose. In mortis causa, it will be transferred to
the donee after the death of the donor. In donations mortis causa, there is
no need to for acceptance.
QUILALA VS ALCANTARA
There is already substantial compliance. The lack of mention of the donee in
the acknowledgment before the notary public does not render the donation
null and void in this case. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It
cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in
another part.
Registration of donation in the Register of Deeds is not a requirement for the
validity of the donation of real property. Registration is just to bind the whole
world.
DE LUNA VS ABRIGO (1990)
Art. 764 does not apply to onerous donations because it is governed by the
rules on contracts. Thus, the prescriptive period is 10 years.
YULO VS. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP
Art. 764 does not apply to onerous donations because it is governed by the
rules on contracts. Thus, the prescriptive period is 10 years. Further, the
donation cannot be revoked since the breaches were merely casual and not
material breaches.
RP VS. LEON SILIM
Purpose is defined as that which one sets before him to accomplish and
attain an end, intention or aim or object, plan or project. The condition for
the donation was not in any way violated when the lot donated was
exchanged with another one. The exchange of the lot for a much bigger one
was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. Thus,
there was no violation of the condition.
DOLAR VS. BARANGAY LUBLUB
The automatic rescission or revocation clause only applies only when there is
absolute failure to comply with the condition. If the donee insists that there
is substantial compliance, then the automatic revocation clause will not
work.
SECRETARY VS. HEIRS OF DULAY
Since there was an absolute failure to comply with the condition, then the
donation may be revoked.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE
PHILIPPINE PHARMA WEALTH (PPW) VS. PFIZER (2010)
The denial of the motion for extension of the writ of preliminary injunction
by the Director of Legal Affairs is an interlocutory order which is not
appealable. Hence, the proper remedy is to file a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 before the CA.
E.I. DUPONT vs. DIRECTOR FRANCISCO (2016)
The denial by the Dir. of Patents of a petition for revival of the patent
application is a final order and thus, appealable to the Director General.
(Other issues were decided under the old law/procedure)
ROMA DRUG vs. RTC OF GUAGUA (2009)
R.A. No. 9502 amended R.A. No. 8203. R.A. No. 9502 now grants private third
persons the unqualified right to import or otherwise use such drugs. There is
no more prohibition on importation of medical drugs.
MAGUAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS (1986)
Powder puffs are not patentable as they were already publicly known and
used as early as 1963 - long before petitioner was issued the patents in
question. An invention must possess the essential elements of novelty,
 PROPERTY Review Case Doctrines | 1st Semester S.Y. 2018-2019
From the Lectures of Atty. Melissa Romana P. Suarez
Compiled by Danielle Lavares | Ateneo de Davao University College of Law

originality and precedence and for the patentee to be entitled to protection.

The invention must be new to the world.

SMITH KLINE BECKHAM CORP. vs. CA

The doctrine of equivalents requires satisfaction of the function-means-and
result test, the patentee having the burden to show that all three
components of such equivalency test are met. The burden of proof is on the
patentee - the one who is invoking infringement. The principle or mode of
operation must be the same or substantially the same for Doctrine of
Equivalents to apply.

ANG vs. TEODORO

General Rule: Those which consist exclusively of signs that are generic for
the goods or services that they seek to identify ("Ang Tibay" for shoes and
sandals) are non-registrable.

Exception: Doctrine of Secondary Meaning/Distinctiveness - A doctrine

wherein a word or phrase is originally incapable of exclusive appropriation
with reference to an article in the market, because it is geographical or
otherwise descriptive but might nevertheless have been used for so long and
so exclusively by one producer with reference to this article that, in that
trade and to that group of the purchasing public, the word or phrase has
come to mean that the article was his product.

Respondent's long and exclusive use of said phrase with reference to his
products and his business has acquired a proprietary connotation and thus,
may be registered.

ASIA BREWERY vs. CA (1993)

The question of infringement of a trademark is to be determined by the test
of dominancy. Similarity in size, form and color, while relevant, is not
conclusive. If the competing trademark contains the main or essential or
dominant features of another, and confusion and deception is likely to result,
infringement takes place. Duplication or imitation is not necessary; nor is it
necessary that the infringing label should suggest an effort to imitate.

PRO SOURCE INTERNATIONAL vs. HORPHAG RESEARCH (2009)

The question is whether the use of the marks involved is likely to cause
confusion or mistake in the mind of the public or to deceive purchasers.
Courts will consider more the aural and visual impressions created by the
marks in the public mind, giving little weight to factors like prices, quality,
sales outlets, and market segments.

In contrast, the Holistic Test entails a consideration of the entirety of the

marks as applied to the products, including the labels and packaging, in
determining confusing similarity. The discerning eye of the observer must
focus not only on the predominant words but also on the other features
appearing on both labels in order that the observer may draw his conclusion
whether one is confusingly similar to the other.

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