Doctrine: Property

“The business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service are

personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of
engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said article.”

Case Title: Luis Marcos P. Laurel v. Hon. Zeus C. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076,
(J. Ynarez-Santiago.) (January 13, 2009)

Facts:

The petitioner is one of the accused who was charged with theft under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code, who willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and use
the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT and with intent to gain and
without the knowledge and consent of PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale
(ISR), which is a method of routing and completing international long distance calls
using lines, cables, antenae, and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the
local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined, effectively
stealing this business from PLDT while using its facilities in the estimated amount of
P20,370,651.92. Petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash on the ground that the factual
allegations in the Amended Information do not constitute the felony of theft since
international long distance calls and the business of providing telecommunication or
telephone services are not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone

service is considered as personal property, thus, can be the object of crime of theft.

Held:

Yes, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service is

considered as personal property and can be the object of crime of theft.

Jurisprudence provides that any personal property, tangible or intangible,

corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of theft

The act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment

or apparatus to private respondent PLDT’s telephone system, through which petitioner
is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using respondent PLDT’s
facilities constitutes the acts of subtraction. The acts of "subtraction" include: (a)
tampering with any wire, meter, or other apparatus installed or used for generating,
containing, conducting, or measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service; (b)
tapping or otherwise wrongfully deflecting or taking any electric current from such wire,
meter, or other apparatus; and (c) using or enjoying the benefits of any device by means
of which one may fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any telegraph or
telephone service.

Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone

service are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act
of engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said article.
Doctrine: Property

“Submarine or undersea communications cables are akin to electric

transmission lines which the SC has recently held as "no longer exempted from real
property tax" and may qualify as "machinery" subject to real property tax under the
Local Government Code.”

Case Title: Capitol Wireless, Inc. v. The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas,

G.R. No. 180110, (J. Peralta) (May 30, 2016)

Facts:

Petitioner Capitol Wireless Inc. (Capwire) is a Philippine corporation in the

business of providing international telecommunications services.  As such provider,
Capwire has signed agreements with other local and foreign telecommunications
companies covering an international network of submarine cable systems. The
agreements provide for co-ownership and other rights among the parties over the
network. 

On May 15, 2000, Capwire submitted a Sworn Statement of True Value of Real
Properties at the Provincial Treasurer's Office, Batangas City, Batangas Province, for the
Wet Segment of the system. Capwire claims that it also reported that the system
"interconnects at the PLDT Landing Station in Nasugbu, Batangas," which is covered by
a transfer certificate of title and tax declarations in the name of PLDT. 

As a result, respondent Provincial Assessor of Batangas (Provincial Assessor)

issued the Assessments of Real Property (ARP) against Capwire. The Provincial Assessor
had determined that the submarine cable systems described in Capwire's Sworn
Statement of True Value of Real Properties are taxable real property, which was
contested by Capwire arguing that the cable system lies on international waters outside
of Philippine territory.

Issue:

Whether or not Capwire is taxable under the Local Government Code.

Held:

Yes, Capwire is taxable under the Local Government Code.

As declared in Manila Electric Company v. City Assessor and City Treasurer of

Lucena City, submarine or undersea communications cables are akin to electric
transmission lines which the SC has recently held as "no longer exempted from real
propety tax" and may qualify as "machinery" subject to real property tax under the Local
Government Code. To the extent that the equipment's location is determinable to be
within the taxing authority's jurisdiction, the Court sees no reason to distinguish
between submarine cables used for communications and aerial or underground wires or
lines used for electric transmission, so that both pieces of property do not merit a
different treatment in the aspect of real property taxation.

Both electric lines and communications cables, in the strictest sense, are not
directly adhered to the soil but pass through posts, relays or landing stations, but both
may be classified under the term "machinery" as real property under Article 415(5) of
the Civil Code for the simple reason that such pieces of equipment serve the owner's
business or tend to meet the needs of his industry or works that are on real estate. Even
objects in or on a body of water may be classified as such, as "waters" is classified as an
immovable under Article 415(8) of the Code. A classic example is a boathouse which, by
its nature, is a vessel and, therefore, a personal property but, if it is tied to the shore and
used as a residence, and since it floats on waters which is immovable, is considered real
property. 

Thus, absent any showing from Capwire of any express grant of an exemption for
its lines and cables from real property taxation, then this interpretation applies and
Capwire's submarine cable may be held subject to real property tax.
Doctrine: Property

“After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable property be

considered as personal or movable, a party is estopped from subsequently claiming
otherwise. Hence, such property is a proper subject of a writ of replevin obtained by
the other contracting party.”

Case Title: Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., G.R. No.
137705, (J. Panganiban) (August 20, 2000)

Facts:

On February 13, 1998, respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. filed with the
RTC-QC a complaint for a sum of money with an application for a writ of replevin. On
March 6, 1998, upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing, respondent judge issued a
writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment
to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.

On March 24, 1998, in implementation of said writ, the sheriff proceeded to

petitioner’s factory, seized one machinery with the word that he would return for the
other machineries. On March 25, 1998, petitioners filed a motion for special protective
order, invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend
and control its processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of
the writ of replevin.

This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing on the ground that the properties were
still personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ of replevin. Petitioners
asserted that the properties sought to be seized were immovable as defined in Article
415 of the Civil Code, the parties’ agreement to the contrary notwithstanding. They
argued that to give effect to the agreement would be prejudicial to innocent third
parties. They further stated that PCI Leasing was estopped from treating these
machineries as personal because the contracts in which the alleged agreement were
embodied [were] totally sham and farcical.

On April 6, 1998, the sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take
possession of the remaining properties. He was able to take two more, but was
prevented by the workers from taking the rest.

Issue:

Whether or not said machines are personal which may be a proper subject of a
writ of replevin.

Held:

Yes, the subject machines are considered personal property which may be a
proper subject of a writ of replevin.

While it is true that subject machine is an immovable property in contemplation

of Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code, nevertheless, the Court has held that contracting
parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After
agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.
Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from
denying the truth of any material fact found therein.
 Clearly, petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the subject
machines as personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subjects of the
Writ of Seizure.
Doctrine: Property

“The exemption from real property taxes given to cooperatives applies

regardless of whether or not the land owned is leased. This exemption benefits the
cooperative's lessee. The characterization of machinery as real property is governed
by the Local Government Code and not the Civil Code.

Case Title: Provincial Assessor of Agusan del Sur vs. Filipinas Palm Oil
Plantation, Inc. G.R. No. 183416, (J. Leonen) (October 05, 2016)

Facts:

Filipinas Palm Oil Plantation Inc. (Filipinas) is a private organization engaged in

palm oil plantation with a total land area of more than 7,000 hectares of National
Development Company (NDC) lands in Agusan del Sur. Harvested fruits from oil palm
trees are converted into oil through Filipinas' milling plant in the middle of the
plantation area. Within the plantation, there are also three (3) plantation roads and a
number of residential homes constructed by Filipinas for its employees.

The Provincial-Assessor of Agusan del Sur (Provincial Assessor) assessed

Filipinas' properties found within the plantation area, which Filipinas assailed before
the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA) contending that the provincial assessor
erroneously included haulers and other equipment which are immovable as taxable real
properties.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent's road equipment and mini haulers are movable
properties and have not been immobilized by destination for real property taxation.

Held:

Yes, respondent’s road equipment and mini haulers are considered as real
property subject to real property tax.

Under the definition provided in Section 199(o) of the Local Government Code,
the road equipment and the mini haulers are classified as machinery. Machinery
includes the physical facilities for production, the installations and appurtenant
service facilities, those which are mobile, self-powered or self-propelled, and those
not permanently attached to the real property which are actually, directly, and
exclusively used to meet the needs of the particular industry, business or
activity and which by their very nature and purpose are designed for, or necessary to
its manufacturing, mining, logging, commercial, industrial or agricultural purposes .

Petitioner is correct in claiming that the phrase pertaining to physical facilities

for production is comprehensive enough to include the road equipment and mini
haulers as actually, directly, and exclusively used by respondent to meet the needs of its
operations in palm oil production. Moreover, "mini-haulers are farm tractors pulling
attached trailers used in the hauling of seedlings during planting season and in
transferring fresh palm fruits from the farm or field to the processing plant within the
plantation area. The indispensability of the road equipment and mini haulers in
transportation makes it actually, directly, and exclusively used in the operation of
respondent's business.
Doctrine: Property

“Machinery, to be deemed real property subject to real property tax, need no

longer be annexed to the land or building as these "may or may not be attached,
permanently or temporarily to the real property, and in fact, such machinery may
even be "mobile.”

Case Title: Manila Electric Company vs. The City Assessor and City
Treasurer of Lucena, G.R. No. 166102, (J. Leonardo-De Castro) (August 5,
2015)

Facts:

On October 29, 1997, MERALCO received letter from the City Treasurer of
Lucena, which stated that the company was being assessed real property tax
delinquency on its machineries beginning 1990, in the total amount of P17,925,117.34.

The City Treasurer of Lucena requested that MERALCO settle the payable
amount soon to avoid accumulation of penalties. MERALCO appealed the subject Tax
Declaration before the Local Board of Assessment Appeal (LBAA), of Lucena City on and
posted a surety bond to guarantee payment of its real property tax delinquency.
MERALCO asked the LBAA to cancel and nullify the Notice of Assessment and declare
the properties covered by Tax Declaration exempt from real property tax.

In its Decision regarding Tax Declaration, the LBAA declared that Sections 234
and 534 (f) of the Local Government Code repealed the provisions in the franchise of
MERALCO and Presidential Decree No. 551 pertaining to the exemption of MERALCO
from payment of real property tax on its poles, wires, insulators, transformers, and
meters.

The LBAA though instructed that the computation of the real property tax for the
machineries should be based on the prevailing 1991 Schedule of Market Values, less the
depreciation cost allowed by law. The LBAA held MERALCO, among others, to pay the
realty tax on the questioned properties, because they are not exempt by law, same to be
based on the 1991 level of assessment, less depreciation cost allowed by law.

Issue:

Whether or not said the transformers, electric posts, transmission lines,

insulators, and electric meters of MERALCO are considered machineries, thus, subject
to real property tax under the Local Government Code.

Held:
Yes, the transformers, electric posts, transmission lines, insulators, and electric
meters of MERALCO are considered machineries and now subject to real property tax
under the Local Government Code.

The Court finds that the transformers, electric posts, transmission lines,
insulators, and electric meters of MERALCO are no longer exempted from real property
tax and may qualify as "machinery" subject to real property tax under the Local
Government Code.

MERALCO is a public utility engaged in electric distribution, and its

transformers, electric posts, transmission lines, insulators, and electric meters
constitute the physical facilities through which MERALCO delivers electricity to its
consumers.
 The Court highlights that under Section 199(o) of the Local Government Code,
machinery, to be deemed real property subject to real property tax, need no longer be
annexed to the land or building as these "may or may not be attached, permanently or
temporarily to the real property," and in fact, such machinery may even be
"mobile." The same provision though requires that to be machinery subject to real
property tax, the physical facilities for production, installations, and appurtenant service
facilities, those which are mobile, self-powered or self-propelled, or not permanently
attached to the real property (a) must be actually, directly, and exclusively used to meet
the needs of the particular industry, business, or activity; and (2) by their very nature
and purpose, are designed for, or necessary for manufacturing, mining, logging,
commercial, industrial, or agricultural purposes.

The Court reiterates that the machinery subject to real property tax under the
Local Government Code "may or may not be attached, permanently or temporarily to
the real property;" and the physical facilities for production, installations, and
appurtenant service facilities, those which are mobile, self-powered or self-propelled, or
are not permanently attached must (a) be actually, directly, and exclusively used to meet
the needs of the particular industry, business, or activity; and (2) by their very nature
and purpose, be designed for, or necessary for manufacturing, mining, logging,
commercial, industrial, or agricultural purposes.
Doctrine: Property

“Public lands not shown to have been classified, reclassified or released as

alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of
the inalienable lands of public domain.”

Case Title: Republic vs. Spouses Ildefonso Alejandre and Zenaida Ferrer
Alejandre G.R. No. 217336, (J. Caguioa) (October 17, 2018)

Facts:

On July 18, 1991, Spouses Alejandre filed an application for the registration of Lot
No. 6487 under P.D. No. 1529 with an area of 256 square meters. They alleged that they
are the owners of the subject property by virtue of a deed of sale or conveyance and the
subject property was sold to them by its former owner Angustia Lizardo Taleon by way
of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on June 20, 1990. The said land is presently
occupied by the applicants-spouses.

On June 1, 2000, the Republic filed its Opposition to the application based on the
following grounds: (1) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the land in question since June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073.(2) that
applicants failed to adduce any muniment of title and/or the tax declarations with the
petition to evidence bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or of its open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of
an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier; that the tax declaration adverted to in the
petition does not appear to be genuine and the tax declaration indicates pretended
possession of applicants to be of recent vintage; and (3) that the subject property
applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines
which is not subject to private appropriation.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject land is registrable land under P.D. No. 1529.

Held:

No, the subject land is NOT registrable land under under P.D. No. 1529.

It is a well-entrenched rule that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private

dominion or ownership presumptively belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been classified, reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable lands of public
domain. Therefore, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests
with the applicant.

Respondents, based on the evidence that they adduced, are apparently claiming
ownership over the land subject of their application for registration by virtue of
tradition, as a consequence of the contract of sale, and by succession in so far as their
predecessors-in-interest are concerned. Both modes are derivative modes of acquiring
ownership. Yet, they failed to prove the nature or classification of the land. The fact that
they acquired the same by sale and their transferor by succession is not incontrovertible
proof that it is of private dominion or ownership. In the absence of such incontrovertible
proof of private ownership, the well-entrenched presumption arising from the Regalian
doctrine that the subject land is of public domain or dominion must be overcome.
Respondents failed to do this.

The real property tax declarations, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20,
1990, and the technical descriptions of the subject property are insufficient evidence to
overcome the presumption that the land subject of the registration is inalienable land of
public domain or dominion. Thus, respondents' application for land registration should
not have been granted.
Doctrine: Ownership

"ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated
may be the object of possession."

Case Title: Teofilo C. Villarico vs. Vivencio Sarmiento, G.R. No. 136438,
(J. Sandoval-Gutierrez) (November 11, 2004)

Facts:

Petitioner Teofilo C. Villarico, is the owner of a lot in La Huerta, Parañaque City,

Metro Manila with an area of sixty-six (66) square meters and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (T.C.T.) No. 95453 issued by the Registry of Deeds, same city.

Petitioner’s lot is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue (highway) by a strip
of land belonging to the government. As this highway was elevated by four (4) meters
and therefore higher than the adjoining areas, the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) constructed stairways at several portions of this strip of public land
to enable the people to have access to the highway.

Sometime in 1991, Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie Sarmiento and her
husband Beth Del Mundo, respondents herein, had a building constructed on a portion
of said government land. In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property,
petitioner acquired a 74.30 square meter portion of the same area owned by the
government. The property was registered in his name as T.C.T. No. 74430 in the
Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City.

In 1995, petitioner filed with the RTC, Branch 259, Parañaque City, a complaint
for accion publiciana against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-044. He
alleged inter alia that respondents’ structures on the government land closed his "right
of way" to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue; and encroached on a portion of his lot covered by
T.C.T. No. 74430.

Respondents, in their answer, specifically denied petitioner’s allegations,

claiming that they have been issued licenses and permits by Parañaque City to construct
their buildings on the area; and that petitioner has no right over the subject property as
it belongs to the government.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner and respondents have right of possession over the
subject property.

Held:

No, both petitioner and respondents have NO right of possession over the subject
property.

It is not disputed that the lot on which petitioner’s alleged "right of way" exists
belongs to the state or property of public dominion.

Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1)
cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot
be acquired by prescription against the State; (3) is not subject to attachment and
execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement. 7
 Considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a property of
public dominion, it can not be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor
of herein petitioner. In fact, its use by the public is by mere tolerance of the government
through the DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself. Verily, he can not claim
any right of possession over it. This is clear from Article 530 of the Civil Code which
provides:

"ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated
may be the object of possession."

Hence, neither petitioner nor respondents have a right of possession over the
disputed lot where the stairways were built as it is a property of public dominion
Doctrine: Ownership

“Payment of real property taxes is, nevertheless, "good indicia of possession in

the concept of an owner, and when coupled with continuous possession, it constitutes
strong evidence of title."

Case Title: Kawayan Hills Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 203090, (J.
Leonen) (September 05, 2018)

Facts:

Kawayan Hills is a domestic corporation dealing with real estate. [10] It is in

possession of a 1,461-square-meter parcel of land identified as Cad. Lot No. 2512 (Lot
No. 2512), located in Barangay No. 22, Nagbacalan, Paoay, Ilocos Norte. All other lots
surrounding Lot No. 2512 have been titled in Kawayan Hills' name.

On August 7, 2001, Kawayan Hills, through its President, Pastor Laya, filed an
application for confirmation and registration of Lot No. 2512's title in its name before
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Paoay-Currimao. Kawayan Hills claimed to have
acquired Lot No. 2512 on December 27, 1995 through a Deed of Adjudication with Sale
executed by Servando Teofilo and Maria Dafun, the successors-in-interest of Andres
Dafun (Andres). Andres had been Lot No. 2512's real property tax declarant since 1931.
Andres, with his eight (8) children, had also allegedly possessed, cultivated, and
harvested Lot No. 2512's fruits.

On September 4, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic), through

the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Opposition to the application. It asserted that
Kawayan Hills failed to comply with the requirements of Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court ruled in favor of Kawayan Hills, confirmed its title
over Lot No. 2512, and ordered Lot No. 2512's registration in Kawayan Hills' name
considering that Lot No. 2512 has been continuously declared in the name of Andres
Dafun since 1931, coupled with actual occupation and tillage without disturbance or
adverse claim is enough to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 and even prior thereto
pursuant to Section 14 (1) of [Presidential Decree No.] 1529.
On appeal before the Court of Appeals, it reversed the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court July 8, 2010 Decision. It maintained that Kawayan Hills failed to establish its or
its predecessors-in-interest's bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
as to enable confirmation of title under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. It added that Kawayan Hills could not, as an alternative, successfully claim title
by acquisitive prescription under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. It
reasoned that Kawayan Hills failed to show that there has been an express declaration
by the State, whether by law or presidential proclamation, that Lot No. 2512 "is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial use."

Hence, the present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Kawayan Hills Corporation is entitled to have title over
Lot No. 2512 confirmed and registered in its favor.

Held:
 Yes, petitioner Kawayan Hills Corporation is entitled to have title over Lot No.
2512 confirmed and registered in its favor.

In the case of  Republic v. Hanover Worldwide Trading Corp.,  an applicant for

land registration or judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title under Section
14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 must prove the following requisites: "(1) that the
subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and
(2) that [the applicant has] been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier."

Thus, two (2) things must be shown to enable registration under Section 14(1).
First is the object of the application, i.e., land that is "part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain." Second is possession. This possession, in turn,
must be: first, "open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious"; second, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership; and third, has taken place since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

In Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, the applicant must satisfy the following

requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree, to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in
possession and occupation of the property subject of the application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and

notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or
earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public
domain.

Under Section 14 (1), applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish
first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third,
that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945, or earlier.
Here, the Court of Appeals conceded that the first and second of its identified
requisites is availing here. Indeed, the February 9, 2004 CENRO-Laoag City Report
stated that the entire area of the land applied for registration was within the alienable
and disposable zone as classified under Land Classification Map No. 1008, Project No.
13, released and certified on 25 May 1933 by the Bureau of Forestry (now the Forestry
Management Service).

Kawayan Hills had likewise met the second requirement as to ownership and

possession. The MCTC found that it had presented sufficient testimonial and
documentary evidence to show that from its first known predecessor-in-interest,
Andres Dafun, up to itself, they were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Andres was asserted to have been in possession of Lot No. 2512 since 1931, when
he started declaring it for real property tax purposes. The Court of Appeals'
acknowledgment of his "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation," which it considered to be the second requisite, is a concession of the
duration of possession that is even prior to June 12, 1945.

On the third of its identified requisites, CA faulted the evidence presented by

petitioner as failing to establish a bona fide claim of ownership that dates to June 12,
1945, or earlier. It decried petitioner's reliance on tax declarations, even if they dated to
as far back as 1931, as these supposedly did not prove ownership.

Well-settled is the rule that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The
fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the
name of the applicant for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not
necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. [48]

Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept
of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in
his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

Here, since Andres' documented possession in 1931, no one has come forward to
contest his and his successors-in-interest's possession as owners. It was only on
September 4, 2001, about a month after petitioner's filing of its application, that the
Republic came forward to contest the confirmation and registration of title in his name.
By then, title to every single lot surrounding Lot No. 2512 had been issued in petitioner's
name. Throughout the intervening time, Andres and his successors-in-interest tilled Lot
No. 2512.
Doctrine: Ownership

“Under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529, it is necessary that: (a) the land or
property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; (b) the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (c) it is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.”

Case Title: Republic vs. Spouses Guillermo Alonso and Inocencia

Britanico-Alonso, G.R. No. 210738, (J. Reyes, J. Jr.) (August 14, 2019)

Facts:

Spouses Guillermo Alonso and Inocencia Britanico-Alonso filed a petition for

registration of Lot 2209 (subject land), Cad. 24, Iloilo Cadastre, AP-06-005399, situated
in Poblacion, Oton, Iloilo, with an area of approximately 724 square meters.

Spouses Alonso claimed that the subject land being an alienable and disposable
land of public domain, was previously owned and possessed by spouses Rafael C.
Montalvo and Manuel a Garnica (spouses Montalvo) way back in 1945. After the latter's
death, their heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs with Waiver of
Hereditary Shares and sold the subject land in their favor evidenced by a Deed of
Sale dated January 27, 1998. As such, spouses Alonso asserted that tacking their
possession with that of their predecessors-in-interest, they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject land under a bona fide
claim of ownership since time immemorial, thereby warranting the registration of the
property in their names.

The RTC of Iloilo City dismissed the petition. The RTC ruled that spouses Alonso
failed to prove that their and their predecessors-in-interest's possession has been open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since time immemorial or earlier than 1945. On
appeal to the CA, it approved the registration of the subject land. The CA found that the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession requirement was met for the
registration of the subject land.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject land is a registrable land under P.D. 1529.

Held:

No, the subject land is NOT a registrable land under P.D. No. 1529.

Under Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529, the following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. 

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by
right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by
law.

Under Section 14 (1), it is necessary that: (a) the land or property forms part of
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; (b) the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and (c) it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Anent the first element, jurisprudence is replete with cases which emphasize that
a positive act of the Executive Department, specifically certifications from the
Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) or Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary, is indispensable for the determination of the
nature of land as alienable and disposable.

The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within
the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In
addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.

In this case, records of the case reveal that the only basis for the RTC in
considering the subject lot as alienable and disposable is the testimony of Henry
Belmones as the Chief of Land Evaluation Party of the DENR, who merely relied on
Control Map No. 18, which was not offered and presented in evidence and a survey plan.
Notably, the pieces of evidence are deficient to prove the nature of the property as
alienable and disposable. Spouses Alonso failed to submit a CENRO or PENRO
certification and an issuance by the DENR Secretary signifying his approval for the
release of the subject land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. Ergo,
spouses Alonso fail to discharge the burden of proof.

As the first element is clearly lacking, the occupation and possession of the
subject land by spouses Alonso, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership.
Consequently, a title cannot be issued in their favor.
Doctrine: Ownership

“To convert a barrio road into patrimonial property, the law requires the LGU
to enact an ordinance, approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Sanggunian
members, permanently closing the road.”

Case Title: Teofilo Alolino vs. Fortunato Flores, G.R. No. 198774, (J. Brion)
(April 04, 2016)

Facts:

On February 14, 2003, petitioner Alolino filed a complaint against the

respondents with the RTC for the removal of the encroaching structure, enforcement of
his right to easement of light and viewand (3) the payment of damages against
respondent Spouses Flores. Alolino claimed that the respondents' encroaching structure
deprived him of his light and view and obstructed the air ventilation inside his house.

Spouses Flores argued that they had occupied their lot where they constructed
their house in 1955, long before the petitioner purchased his lot in the 70s. They further
alleged that plaintiff only has himself to blame because he constructed his house up to
the very boundary of his lot without observing the required setback and the wall of their
house facing Alolino's does not violate the latter's alleged easement of light and view
because it has no window.
They also claimed, however, that on March 1, 2004, the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig
(the Sanggunian) reclassified the property as a residential lot from its prior
classification as a barrio/municipal road.

On April 20, 2009, the RTC rendered a judgment ordering the respondents to
remove their illegal structure obstructing Alolino's right to light and view. On July 8,
2011, the CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject lot was validly declared as reclassified property from
barrio/municipal road to residential lot.

Held:

No, the subject lot was NOT validly declared as reclassified property from
barrio/municipal road to residential lot.

There is no dispute that respondents built their house/sari sari store on

government property. Properties of Local Government Units (LGUs) are classified as
either property for public use or patrimonial property. Article 424 of the Civil Code
distinguishes between the two classifications:

Article 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities,
consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by
said provinces, cities, or municipalities.

All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed
by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

From the foregoing, the barrio road adjacent to Alolino's house is property of

public dominion devoted to public use.
 The Court find no merit in the respondents' contention that the Local
Government of Taguig had already withdrawn the subject barrio road from public use
and reclassified it as a residential lot. The Local Government Code (LGC) authorizes an
LGU to withdraw a local road from public under the following conditions:

Section 21 Closure and Opening of Roads. -

(a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or

temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling
within its jurisdiction; Provided, however, That in case of permanent
closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the
members of the Sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the.
public facility that is subject to closure is provided.

(b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed without
making provisions for the maintenance of public safety therein. A property thus
permanently withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for
any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local
government unit concerned may be lawfully used or conveyed. x x x

To convert a barrio road into patrimonial property, the law requires the LGU to
enact an ordinance, approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Sanggunian members,
permanently closing the road.

In this case, the Sanggunian did not enact an ordinance but merely passed a
resolution. The difference between an ordinance and a resolution is settled in
jurisprudence: an ordinance is a law but a resolution is only a declaration of sentiment
or opinion of the legislative body.

Properties of the local government that are devoted to public service are deemed
public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, LGUs cannot control or
regulate the use of these properties unless specifically authorized by Congress, as is the
case with Section 21 of the LGC. In exercising this authority, the LGU must comply with
the conditions and observe the limitations prescribed by Congress. The Sanggunian's
failure to comply with Section 21 renders ineffective its reclassification of
the barrio road.

As a barrio road, the subject lot's purpose is to serve the benefit of the collective
citizenry. It is outside the commerce of man and as a consequence: (1) it is not alienable
or disposable; (2) it is not subject to registration under Presidential Decree No. 1529 and
cannot be the subject of a Torrens title; (3) it is not susceptible to prescription; (4)
it cannot be leased, sold, or otherwise be the object of a contract; (5) it is not subject to
attachment and execution; and (6) it cannot be burdened by any voluntary
easements.
Doctrine: Ownership

The resolution of a boundary dispute - by reason of the issue therein being whether or
not the contested portion pertained to one or the other of the parties - is not within the
province of the summary action of forcible entry under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. It
can be taken proper cognizance of in the context of accion reivindicatoria

Case Title: Jessica Lio Martinez vs. Heirs of Remberto F. Lim, G.R. No.
234655, (J. Bersamin) (September 11, 2019)

Facts:

This case emanated from an action for Forcible Entry with Prayer for Issuance of
Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by herein respondents heirs of Remberto Lim
against petitioner Jessica Lio Martinez.

Respondents are the heirs of Remberto Lim who, during his lifetime, owned,
possessed, and cultivated a parcel of land located in Sitio Banga, Barangay VI, Coron,
Palawan, designated as Assessor's Lot 065 and covered by Tax Declaration No. 006-
0515-A.

Adjoining Remberto's land is the land of his brother - Jose Lim - registered under
OCT No. E-9487 with an area of Twenty Eight Thousand and Six square meters (28,006
sqm.). It is worthy to note that per the technical description in said title, the property is
bounded on both the east and west by the properties of the Heirs of Socorro Lim, which
were later on acquired by the late Remberto Lim.

As it happened, Jose sold his land covered by OCT No. E-9487 to a certain
Dorothy and Alexander Medalla who, thereafter, subdivided the same into two (2)
smaller lots, designated as Lots 1 and 2. Lot 2 was further subdivided into nine (9)
smaller lots, this time designated as Lots 2-A to 2-1, inclusive. Lots 2-D, 2-E and 2-F
were thereafter sold to herein petitioner Martinez, pursuant to three (3) separate Deeds
of Absolute Sale, and by virtue thereof, petitioner Martinez was issued TCT Nos. 065-
2010000259, 065-2010000260, and 065-2010000261 in her favor.

On 10 August 2010, petitioner Martinez and her father entered into the property
and uprooted some of the acacia mangium trees that were previously planted thereon by
the late Remberto Lim and his son, Alan Lim. To further delineate their claimed
property, petitioner fenced the same and placed signs thereon that read "NO
TRESPASSING" and "NOTICE THIS PROPERTY IS OWNED BY THE MARTINEZ
FAMILY." Respondents demanded petitioner for the removal of the fence that she built
on respondents' land as well as to turn over peaceful possession of that portion of
property to the petitioner. Unheeded, respondents filed a complaint for Forcible Entry
with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction against petitioner before the
MCTC of Coron-Busuanga.

Issue:

Whether or not an action of forcible entry under Rules 70 of the Rule of Court is
the proper remedy in the case at bar.

Held:

No, an action of forcible entry under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court is NOT proper
remedy in the case at bar.

The jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or only some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary
consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses
set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for, otherwise, the matter of
jurisdiction will become almost entirely dependent upon the defendant. If the nature of
the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint determines the
jurisdiction of the court, the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought are to be ascertained. Verily, the body of the complaint, not its title, fixes the
nature of an action.

The ruling of the MCTC as affirmed by the RTC and CA was erroneous. What the
MCTC should have quickly seen was that the dispute did not concern mere possession of
the area in litis but the supposed encroachment by the petitioner on the portion of the
respondents. In other words, the question focused on whether the property being
claimed and occupied by the petitioner had really been part of her registered properties,
or of the respondents' property. The proper resolution of such dispute in favor of the
respondents could be had only after a hearing in which the trial court was enabled
through preponderant proof showing that, indeed, the disputed area was not within the
metes and bounds appearing and stated in the TCTs of the petitioner.

The Court reiterates that a boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily

through the action for forcible entry covered by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible
entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue
centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de
facto.32 If the petitioner had possession of the disputed areas by virtue of the same being
covered by the metes and bounds stated and defined in her Torrens titles, then she
might not be validly dispossessed thereof through the action for forcible entry. The
dispute should be properly threshed out only through accion reivindicatoria.
Accordingly, the MCTC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and resolving
the dispute as one for forcible entry.
Doctrine: Ownership

“The mere material possession of the land was not adverse as against the owner
and was insufficient to vest title, unless such possession was accompanied by the intent
to possess as an owner.”

Case Title: Department of Education vs. Mariano Tuliao, G.R. No. 205664,
(J. Mendoza) (June 9, 2014)

Facts:

On October 8, 2002, Mariano Tuliao (Tuliao) filed an action for recovery of

possession and removal of structure with damages against the Department of Education
(DepEd) with the MCTC of Tuguegarao City. He alleged that he was the registered
owner of the subject parcel of land and that a portion of the said property was allowed
by his predecessors-in-interest to be used by the Atulayan Elementary School (AES) as
an access road for the schoolchildren in going to and from the school.

In March 2000, upon discovering that a structure was being constructed on the
land, he demanded that the DepED cease and desist and vacate the property. The
petitioner, however, refused. Tuliao likewise demanded payment for reasonable rent,
but his demand was also ignored.

In its defense, the DepEd denied the material allegations of the complaint and
averred that it did not state a cause of action. Even if there was, the same was already
barred by prescription and/or laches. Its occupation of the subject land was adverse,
peaceful, continuous, and in the concept of an owner for more than fifty (50) years. It
also alleged that it did not receive a notice to cease and desist or notice to vacate. As
owner of the school site, it could not be compelled to pay rent or its reasonable value.

On January 26, 2010, the MTCC rendered its decision, ruling that Tuliao was the
registered owner of the subject property and, thus, had a right of action against the
holder and possessor of the said property. Further, it found that petitioner’s possession
of the subject property was merely tolerated by Tuliao. For said reason, his right to
recover it was never barred by laches. Both RC and CA affirmed the ruling of MTCC.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent is a lawful possessor of the subject land.

Held:

Yes, respondent is a lawful possessor of the subject land.

The Court agrees with the CA that the said pieces of evidence were sufficient to
resolve the issue of who had the better right of possession. As between a certificate of
title, which is an incontrovertible proof of ownership, accompanied with a tax
declaration and a tax receipt on one hand, and a testimony of a lone witness who is a
retired teacher on the other, the former prevails in establishing who has a better right of
possession over the property, following the rule that testimonial evidence cannot prevail
over documentary evidence.

The Court once ruled that mere material possession of the land was not adverse
as against the owner and was insufficient to vest title, unless such possession was
accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner.
Doctrine: Ownership

Case Title: Heirs of Paciano Yabao v. Paz Lentejas Der Kolk, G.R. No.
207266, (J. Mendoza) (June 25, 2014)

Facts:

On March 8, 2001, Heirs of the late Paciano Yabao (Heirs of Yabao), represented
by Remedios Chan, filed a cornplaint 3 for ownership and possession before the MTCC of
Calbayog City (MTCC), against respondent. The complaint alleged, among others, that
petitioners were the sole surviving heirs of the late spouses Paciano Yabao and Mercedes
Cano and the absolute co-owners of the parcel of land situated at Brgy. Capoocan,
Calbayog City declared in Declaration of Real Property ARP No. 96-01015-00398 in the
name of the late Paciano Yabao.

Sometime in 1996, respondent asserted claim of ownership and allowed a person

to possess the above-described property, notwithstanding vehement opposition thereto
by petitioners notwithstanding demands for the respondent to vacate the premises
usurped and occupied by her, she refused and still continue to refuse, to leave the said
premises. Aside from taking possession of the premises in question, respondent also
applied for free patent for the property in question with the DENR Office of Samar, to
which petitioners have filed a timely opposition. Petitioners prayed, inter alia, that they
be declared the co-owners and possessors of the subject lot. The MTCC declared
respondent as the lawful owners of the subject lot which was affirmed by the RTC. The
CA reversed the decision of the RTC and declared respondent as the lawful owner.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners sufficiently prove as lawful owner of the subject
lot.

Held:

No, petitioners did not sufficiently prove as the lawful owner of the subject lot.

The Court agrees with the CA that the MTCC erred when it granted the reliefs
prayed by the Heirs of Yabao because the same were not warranted by the allegations in
the complaint. The Court notes that the allegations pertinent to the petitioners’ cause of
action, particularly on their claim of ownership and right to possession over Lot 2473,
were not supported by any document annexed to the complaint. Mere assertions, as
what the petitioners proffered, do not suffice. In this regard, the Court quotes with
approval the observations of the CA on this score:

Ownership by the heirs cannot be established by mere lip service and bare
allegations in the complaint. As in all matters, a party must establish his/her averments
in the complaint by sufficient evidence necessary to prove such claim. In the case at
bench, the respondents, as plaintiffs in the MTCC, merely alleged that they are the heirs
of Paciano Yabao without presenting any proof why they are the latter’s heirs and in
what degree or capacity. xxx

It is significant that the basis of respondents’ claim of ownership was a mere tax
declaration that was supposedly in the name of their putative ancestor Paciano Yabao.
However, a tax declaration is not a proof of ownership; it is not a conclusive evidence of
ownership of real property. In the absence of actual, public, and adverse possession, the
declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. It can only be a
strong indication of ownership if coupled with possession. In the case at bench, it was
the petitioner who was in possession of the property and not the respondents.
Consequently, the tax declaration, standing alone, is not an acceptable proof of
ownership.
Doctrine: Action for Reconveyance (Ownership)

“In an action for reconveyance, however, a party seeking it should establish not
merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the
land sought to be reconveyed is his”

Case Title: Baltazar Ibot vs. Heirs of Francisco Tayco, G.R. No. 202950,
(J. Reyes) (April 06, 2015)

Facts:

The respondents are the heirs of deceased Francisco Tayco (Francisco) who
presently occupy Lot No. 299, while the petitioner is the registered owner of Lot No. 299
in whose name OCT No. P-62053 was issued by the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Cotabato on October 23, 1997.

On September 23, 1999, respondent filed a complaint for reconveyance of real

property before the RTC against the petitioner grounded on their claim as owners of Lot
No. 299 because of their actual, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thereof
since 1964 through their predecessor-in-interest, Francisco.

The respondents traced their claim of ownership of the subject property from the
year 1960 when their parents, the spouses Tayco, allegedly purchased the lot from
Amelita for P1,200.00. To support their claim of ownership over Lot No. 299, the
respondents presented uncertified photocopies of Francisco's Miscellaneous Sales
Application No. XII-12-94 dated September 8, 1986 and the Community of
Environment and Natural Resources Office Appraisal Report dated April 9, 1987 and the
explanation that their father Francisco lost the Deed of Sale and the other documents
pertinent to his application as he would just normally insert them all at the back of his
pants.

On the other hand, the petitioner adduced certified copies of documents, such as:
OCT No. P-62053 issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds, Province of Cotabato on
October 23, 1997, a tax declaration dated in 1998, his free patent application and
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) order wherein Amelita
requested for the rejection of her free application in favor of the petitioner. According to
the petitioner, Lot No. 299 was registered in his name after Amelita, his aunt,
transferred all her rights to him. Moreover, he argued that the respondents cannot
become owners of the lot because their stay is merely tolerated by his aunt who
consented to Calixta and Francisco's stay on the property in 1964. Thus, the respondents
cannot become its owners by acquisitive prescription.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents are the lawful owners of the subject lot.

Held:

No, respondent are not the lawful owners of the subject lot. It belongs to the
petitioner.

In an action for reconveyance, however, a party seeking it should establish not

merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the
land sought to be reconveyed is his.

In the case at bar, the petitioner presented the following pieces of evidence, to
wit: (1) OCT No. P-62053 dated October 23, 1997; (2) Tax Declaration No. 11-002-96-
00778 dated in 1998; (3) demand letter to vacate dated May 25, 1999; (4) Barangay
Certification to file action; (5) application and notice to file for Free Patent dated July 7,
and 24, 1987, respectively; (6) the Order of the DENR dated December 11, 1996 wherein
Amelita requested for the rejection of her free patent application in favor of the
petitioner; and the testimony of his aunt Amelita on how the respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest started to occupy Lot No. 299 and her acquiescence to their
occupation until she transferred all her rights over Lot No. 299 in favor of the petitioner.
Hence, as compared to the evidence of the respondents, the evidence of the petitioner
clearly and convincingly proved his exercise of ownership over the disputed property.

A mere claim of ownership will not suffice. An action for reconveyance should be
maintained by the true owner. It will not suffice that the respondents are in possession
of the land subject thereof. Thus, the scale of justice should tilt in favor of the petitioner
and not the respondents

Here, the respondents failed to dispense their burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that they are entitled to the reconveyance of Lot No. 299.
Doctrine: Just Compensation (Ownership)

In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair

equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not
the taker's gain, but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of
the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.  The
constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be a sum equivalent to
the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open
market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair
value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed
at the time of the actual taking by the government.

Case Title: Republic v. Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc., G.R. No. G. R. No.
185124, (J. Sereno) (January 25, 2012)

Facts:

National Irrigation Administration (NIA) needed some parcels of land for the
purpose of constructing the Malitubog-Marigadao Irrigation Project. Thus, On 08
September 1994, NIA filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint for the
expropriation of a portion of three (3) parcels of land covering a total of 14,497.91
square meters, such as: 1) Lot No. 3080 – covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-61963 registered under the Rural Bank of Kabacan; 2) Lot No. 455 – covered by
TCT No. T-7451 registered under the names of RG May, Ronald and Rolando, all
surnamed Lao; and 3) Lot No. 3039 – registered under the name of Littie Sarah
Agdeppa et. al. The trial court rendered judgment ordering expropriation of the subject
lots and the payment just compensation including the trees and excavated soil. The CA
affirmed the ruling of the trial court but deleted the payment for the excavated soil.

Issue:

Whether or not the excavated soil is included in the payment of the property
expropriated.

Held:

No, the excavated soil is NOT included in the payment of the property
expropriated.

The SC upheld the ruling of CA which deleted the inclusion of the value of the
excavated soil in the payment for just compensation. The SC ruled that there is no legal
basis to separate the value of the excavated soil from that of the expropriated properties,
contrary to what the trial court did. In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil
has no value separate from that of the expropriated land. Just compensation ordinarily
refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner actually loses. Such
value could only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking.

As provided in Article 437 of the Civil Code, the owner of a parcel of land is the
owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works
or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment
to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the
reasonable requirements of aerial navigation. Thus, the ownership of land extends to the
surface as well as to the subsoil under it.

Also,the law does not limit the use of the expropriated land to the surface area
only. NIA, now being the owner of the expropriated property, has the right to enjoy and
make use of the property in accordance with its mandate and objectives as provided by
law. To sanction the payment of the excavated soil is to allow the landowners to recover
more than the value of the land at the time when it was taken, which is the true measure
of the damages, or just compensation, and would discourage the construction of
important public improvements.

Doctrine: Recovery of Possession (Ownership)

“It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong
hand, violence or terror.  Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover
such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles
him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better
right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.”

Case Title: German Management & Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 76217, (CJ. Fernan) (September 14, 1989)

Facts:

Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of

Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio
Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal.

The spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner

German Management Services to develop their property into a residential subdivision.
Part of the property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons,
petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused.
Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property which
included the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents.

Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the
Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal alleging, among others, that petitioner deprived
private respondents of their property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly
removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without
notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of private
respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and
(3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject private
respondents from their respective farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815,
and 1028. 

Issue:

Whether or not respondents have better right of possession over the subject
property.

Held:

Yes, respondents have better right of possession over the subject property.

Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to

develop the subject property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a
forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is
merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not
involved. 
 In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the
property, private respondents were already in possession thereof. There is no evidence
that the spouses Jose were ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary,
private respondents' peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even
planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act
of destroying their crops.

Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the

muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of
prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless
of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror.  Thus, a party
who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner
himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor
priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he
is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. 

Doctrine: Sub-terrain Portion of the Land (Ownership)

“The owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height.”

Case Title: National Power Corporation vs. Ibrahim, G.R. No. 168732, (J.
Azcuna) (June 29, 2007)

Facts:

On November 23, 1994, respondent Lucman G. Ibrahim, in his personal capacity

and in behalf of his co-heirs instituted an action recovery of possession of land and
damages against petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur.

In their complaint, Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were owners of
several parcels of land described in Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278 consisting of 70,000
square meters, divided into three (3) lots, i.e. Lots 1, 2, and 3 consisting of 31,894,
14,915, and 23,191 square meters each respectively. Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR,
through alleged stealth and without respondents’ knowledge and prior consent, took
possession of the sub-terrain area of their lands and constructed therein underground
tunnels. The existence of the tunnels was only discovered sometime in July 1992 by
respondents and then later confirmed on November 13, 1992 by NAPOCOR itself
through a memorandum issued by the latter’s Acting Assistant Project Manager. The
tunnels were apparently being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao
and in the operation of NAPOCOR’s Agus II, III, IV, V, VI, VII projects located in
Saguiran, Lanao del Sur; Nangca and Balo-i in Lanao del Norte; and Ditucalan and
Fuentes in Iligan City.

On September 19, 1992, co-respondent Omar G. Maruhom requested the Marawi

City Water District for a permit to construct and/or install a motorized deep well in Lot
3 located in Saduc, Marawi City but his request was turned down because the
construction of the deep well would cause danger to lives and property. On October 7,
1992, respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay damages and vacate the sub-terrain
portion of their lands but the latter refused to vacate much less pay damages.
Respondents further averred that the construction of the underground tunnels has
endangered their lives and properties as Marawi City lies in an area of local volcanic and
tectonic activity.

Petitioner maintains that the sub-terrain portion where the underground tunnels
were constructed does not belong to respondents because, even conceding the fact that
respondents owned the property, their right to the subsoil of the same does not extend
beyond what is necessary to enable them to obtain all the utility and convenience that
such property can normally give. In any case, petitioner asserts that respondents were
still able to use the subject property even with the existence of the tunnels, citing as an
example the fact that one of the respondents, Omar G. Maruhom, had established his
residence on a part of the property. Petitioner concludes that the underground tunnels
115 meters below respondents’ property could not have caused damage or prejudice to
respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner’s contention is correct.

Held:

No, the contention of petitioner is NOT CORRECT.

The CA’s findings which upheld those of the trial court that respondents owned
and possessed the property and that its substrata was possessed by petitioner since 1978
for the underground tunnels, cannot be disturbed. Moreover, the Court sustains the
finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain portion of the property similarly belongs
to respondents. This conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code which
provides:

ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of
everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any
plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without
detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He
cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.

Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under
it.
Doctrine: Duties of Finder of Movable Property (Ownership)

“When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the owner
takes the thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only and does not become
vested with legal possession.”

Case Title: Edna Palero-Tan vs. Ciriaco I. Urdaneta, Jr, A.M. No. P-07-
2399, (J.Chico-Nazario, Jr.) (June 29, 2007)

Facts:

Edna Palero-Tan (complainant), Court Stenographer III of the Regional Trial

Court (RTC), Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte, filed an admin case against Ciriaco I. Urdaneta,
Jr. (respondent), Utility Worker I of the same court, for Conduct Unbecoming a Court
Personnel, for stealing her ring and bracelet.

Complainant claimed that it has been her practice to keep her and her sister’s
pieces of jewelry in the locked drawer of her table at her RTC office because she fears
that they might be lost at the boarding house she is renting. However, on 8 July 2005,
she discovered that her ring and bracelet worth fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00)
were missing.

On 28 July 2005, an officemate, Anecito D. Altone (Altone), confided to her that

he heard from his landlady, Anastacia R. Nable (Nable), that respondent and his wife,
Milagros, had a quarrel because the latter discovered a ring and a bracelet in
respondent’s coin purse. Milagros suspected that respondent bought the jewelry for his
mistress. Complainant approached the RTC presiding judge, Judge Absalon U. Fulache
(Judge Fulache), and relayed to him the information she gathered. Judge Fulache
advised her to invite Nable and Milagros to his chambers so he could confirm the
information.

Respondent, on the other hand, in a separate meeting with Judge Fulache,

respondent confessed that he found complainant’s jewels in the court’s premises, but he
could no longer return them because he already threw them away. Also, respondent
denied that he stole complainant’s jewelry. He claimed, instead, that in the afternoon of
29 June 2005, a Friday, he found a small plastic sachet containing a ring and a bracelet
under his table, at the side nearest the adjacent table of the complainant, and thinking
that the jewelry belonged to one of the litigants who approached him that morning, he
took them for safekeeping with the intention of returning them to whoever was the
owner. He thought that the ring and bracelet were "fancy" jewelry as they were merely
placed in an ordinary plastic sachet. When nobody claimed the jewelry, he placed them
inside his coin purse and took them home.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of grave misconduct.

Held:

Yes, respondent is guilty of grave misconduct.

When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the owner takes
the thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only and does not become vested
with legal possession. In assuming such custody, the finder is charged with the
obligation of restoring the thing to its owner. It is thus respondent’s duty to report to his
superior or his officemates that he found something. The Civil Code, in Article 719,
explicitly requires the finder of a lost property to report it to the proper authorities,
thus:

Article 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not treasure, must return it to its
previous possessor. If the latter is unknown, the finder shall immediately deposit
it with the mayor of the city or municipality where the finding has taken place.

The finding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for two consecutive weeks
in the way he deems best.

If the movables cannot be kept without deterioration, or without the expenses

which considerably diminish its value, it shall be sold at public auction eight days
after the publication.

Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner having
appeared, the thing found, or its value, shall be awarded to the finder. The finder
and the owner shall be obliged, as the case may be, to reimburse the expenses.

Contrary to respondent’s claim, this Court is convinced that respondent had the
intention to appropriate the jewelry to himself had these not been discovered by his
wife. His claim that the ring and bracelet were worthless "fancy" jewelry is immaterial
because the basis for his liability is his act of taking something which does not belong to
him.

By admittedly finding complainant’s ring and bracelet without returning them to

the rightful owner, respondent blatantly degraded the judiciary and diminished the
respect and regard of the people for the court and its personnel. Every employee of the
judiciary should be an example of integrity, morality and honesty. Like any other public
servant, respondent must exhibit the highest sense of trustworthiness and rectitude not
only in the performance of his official duties but also in his personal and private
dealings with other people, to preserve the court’s good name and standing as a true
temple of justice. It cannot be overstressed that the image of a court of justice is
mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work there, from
the judge to the lowest employee.