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Proce check for undates ings of the ASME 2019 Pressure Vessels & Piping Conference PVP2019 July 14-19, 2019, San Antonio, Texas, USA. PVP2019-94074 IMPLEMENTING B31J-2017 SIF AND FLEXIBILITY FACTOR CHANGES FOR B31 PIPING SYSTEMS Mr. Anthony W. Paulin Jr., PE. Paulin Research Group Houston, Texas, USA Houston, ABSTRACT ‘This paper discusses when new SIF and k-Pactors from ASME B311-2017 should be used for operating and new piping systems. Screening guidelines are provided to help plant owners know when current operating facilities may be subject {0 through-wall leaks as they approach given life milestones, ‘The paper also shows when these same guidelines can be used ‘in new system designs to require the use of mote applicable SIF data, of qualified vendor lists and additional inspections. INTRODUCTION ‘A new set of more applicable stress intensification factor C°SIF") data was released by the ASME in 2017 as a revised B3IJ. (Ref. 1) B31.3 (Ret. 2) states that the SIF and flexibility factors in B31.3 Appendix D, (the "OLD" SIFs), should only be used in the absence of more applicable data. Clearly, “inore applicable data” is now available in B31J (Ref.1). ‘This paper addresses the following commonly asked implementation questions related to the new, mote applicable ‘SIF data ineluded in B31J-2017: 1) What steps should be taken if more applicable data in BB31J shows that an existing piping system designed using the OLD SIFs from B31.3 is overstressed? Have there been failures associated with the OLD. B31.3 Appendix D factors that warrant these changes? Should B31J SIFS and flexibility factors be implemented immediately? Do all older piping systems need to be reevaluated using the new B31J SIFs and flexibility factors? ‘As data shows that over 40% of explosions in plants ‘occur due to leaks from piping systems, could my 2 3) 4) 5) Ms. Lorna Carpenter, PLE. Dr. Charles Becht IV, PhD, RE. Becht Engineering Liberty Corner, New Jersey, USA BP Texas, USA piping system cause an explosion if the design and analysis is based on the wrong SIF? NOMENCLATURE SIF ~ Stress Intensification Factor k—Flexibility Factor «Branch Pipe Outside Diameter D—Run Pipe Outside Diameter (Branch Pipe Thickness ‘T— Run Pipe Thickness Se — Expansion Stress Sq Allowable Stress fq ~ Maximum value of the stress range factor N-Cycles BACKGROUND Figures 5,6, and 7 (In ANNEX A) show the typical ‘Schneider" problem sited in B31.3 Appendix D where out-of- plane branch SIFs are not conservative when the @/D ratio is between 0.5 and 1.0 in the "OLD" B3I.3 Code Appendix D. As ccan be seen in these Figures, the SIFs in the OLD B31.3 Code were non-conservative by between [,5 and 2.0 times, Figures 3 and 4 in ANNEX A show the branch connection SIF undulation due to the VT ratio not included in the OLD B31.3 SIF equations that was also corrected in B31J-2017, Figure 2 in ANNEX A shows the run and branch side flexibility factor locations for branch connections added in B31J which \Were also not included in the OLD B31.3 Appendix D. Stress calculations forall piping systems that used the OLD B31 Code SIFs prior to the release of more applicable data in B31J-2017 contained nonconservative SIFs that were equal 10 ‘of less than the intended safety factor on through-wall cracking ' Copyright © 2019 ASME j i i : i i : i i i i : i i reason uo san ssa Duara fae rR 4D zB NSLLSOONE YEE present in the B31.3 Code. Most piping systems are not practically affected by these nonconservatisms because most piping systems are not highly loaded (SE > 0.6SA), and because ‘most piping systems do not operate beyond the threshold cycle limits identified in Table A. Nonrancervative SIRe in a highly lnsded, eyetio piping system, when coupled with poor quality material and fabrication ccan result in unexpected through-wall cracks during the life of hve piping system. If dhe dhrough-wall eracks ean be handled routinely, then SIF, material, welding, heat treat, or forming. ferrors are not important. If unexpected through-wall cracks create hazardous or significant economic situations, then effort should be expended to detect or prevent the unexpected theough-wall crack, POTENTIAL FOR IMPACT AAs detailed in the Marsh Report (Ref. 7), 15 of the 100 ‘most consequential hydrocarbon incidents that occurred in the last 40 years were initiated by leaks from piping systems. The average business interruption cost for each of these incidents is $269MM, and the average cost of all accidents per year in refineries is $700MM. (In years where there is not a single large accident, there is a higher number of small accidents.) To the author's knowledge, there has not been any particular pipe Teak: incident tracked back to a single pipe stress nonconservative SIF, but nonconservative SIFs and pipe system cycling produce leaks as seen repeatedly in the lab, and the Marsh report shows how even the smallest leak can cause much larger incidents, (Ref. 7) At the design stage: highly loaded, cyclic piping systems ccan be easily identified, and accurate SIs and eyele counts used for these relatively few systems, Highly loaded size-on- size B16.9 welding tees for cyclic piping systems should only bbe purchased from vendors that have demonstrated an ability t0 provide fittings comparable to those used in B31.3 Appendix D and! B311-2017 fatigue tests. (See Table C in ANNEX A.) Note: there is always the alternative to design the system so that itis not highly loaded. Recent tests and Finite Element Analysis (FEA) conducted by Paulin Research Group in 2018 show that B31.3 and B31J- 2017 SIFs based on Markl B16.9 size-on-size welding we geometries can be too low by 1.7 to 2.2 times. These corrections are not yet incorporated in B31 as of October 2018. The tees used to verify the FEA calculations are shown in Figure 8 in ANNEX A. The NPS 4 and NPS 20 tees have ‘been tested and confirmed observations Kodabaugh made in WRC 329 and will require changes to B31J and B31.3 Appendix D. FAILURES, MAINTENANCE, AND CRITICALITY ‘The majority of the world’s process piping systems are designed to the B31.3 Piping Code or some derivative thereof. While there have not been piping systems failing uniformly around the world due to through-wall cracks and fatigue, itis prudent to ask if any of them will fail, and what ean be done 10 identify and provent these failures since a large number of plans around the world have been in operation for many years and continued operation is planned. From a cycle life perspective, some may be reaching end of life. Failures in piping system components usually occur due 10 the simultaneous occurrence of multiple events. ‘The fact that a large number of the pipe flexibility analyses condueted around the world for the last half century has been performed with known non-conservative SIFs is cause for increased awareness ‘on the part of owners as plants age and damage duc to cycles accumulates. The designer should eliminate this concer in future systems, and the owner should identify critical, highly Toaded, eyelie systems in plants that are running, ‘The owner should also determine the consequence associated with an unexpected through-wall erack in a loaded, cyclic piping system. If an unexpected leak from a eyclie piping system could be dangerous, toxic, or have an otherwise significant economic impact, itis reasonable to determine if the cyclic nature of the system was properly evaluated when the system was designed, and if nonconservative SIPs, low grade material, or any other life degrading mechanisms, exist in the system. If multiple nonconservative conditions exist at highly loaded components that are subject to significant thermal cycles, then inspection is warranted after some duration (often a decade or more) of cyclic service, (Refs. 14, 15, 16). IMPACT OF MORE APPLICABLE DATA After comparing the results from hundreds of piping system analyses using the current B31.3 SIFs (Ref.2) and the new B31J-2017 SIFs, itis the opinion of the authors that most piping systems analyzed using the current B31.3 Appendix D SIFs and flexibilities are not subject to failure as they approach the number of eycles they were designed for, which could be the ‘default 7,000 cycles, nor is their “safety factor” jeopardized by the use of known, non-conservative SIFs because they are not beyond threshold cycle Timits and because the stresses in the systems are generally low, ie. the piping is flexible, well supported and the number of actual cyeles is generally far less than the 7.000 threshold cycles used in the Code. Unfortunately, “most” piping systems are not “all” piping systems. There are almost certainly some piping systems ‘operating today where the current non-conservative SIFS will alfect the life oF safety factor of the system resulting in through- Copyright © 2019 ASME 5a neste acorn szeeraeCOETISOONEERSALOzanAMNsDopsunsEo HUN VOR UR HN WOH PAIR i wall cracking before the end of life. This condition is exacerbated when additional life shortening factors exist simultaneously, sueh as: Corrosion ‘Transient thermal gradients not accounted for in design Dynamis lo Occasional system overloading not included in the fatigue analysis © Weld defects missed during random inspections required by the Code © Incorrect evaluation of stress ranges oF cumulative damage mechanisms Ignoring ID root pass inspection Poor quality material or fittings Local thermal transients not accounted for Size-on-sizehydlrofermed tees ‘optimized for pressure jot agsounted for in design with thicknesses Fortunately, piping systems sensitive «® non-conservative SIFs can be identified and typically require only small alterations in design, inspection at some point in the future, or precautions taken during startups. DEFINITION OF CYCLIC SERVICE ‘The 2016 version of B31.3 removed the definition of severe cyclic. service” from the Code and placed! the responsibil ition with the owner and the designer. (Ref, 2). Designers, owners and operators using B31.3 must now determine how (implement ASME published more able data (Ref. 1), and how to define cyclic ‘To minimize project impact designers should be able to review the line list and verify that most piping systems are not susceptible to non-conservative SIF related issues, ie, most piping systems do not require the use of B31J for safety related reasons. (Kef. 2) ‘The use of Table A and reasonably accurate cycle counting can be used to determine if more applicable SIFS are required. Most nonconservative SIFs are smaller than the additional margin on eyeles inherent in the B31 piping codes in low eycle regions. (Ref. 8) For existing facilites, owners should review operating piping systems and determine if they are running in highly Toaded (Si50-68q), eyelic service IF piping system cycles exceed the cycle thresholds listed in Table A some degree of screening and/or inspection should be conducted at the high siress locations for systems where unexpected leaks are hazardous or economically significant. RECOMMENDATIONS Designers and Owners should recognize that no change in SIFS or approach is required for most piping systems since most piping systems operate for relatively few cycles (ie. much less than those in Table A.) Implementing B31J for new designs may save analysis time, effort and reduce the number of supports and Toops because of the reduction of some SIFs and the incorporation of flexibilities forall branch connections. Because of way the B31.1 and B31.3 Codes are written, design ranges can be identified that typical nonconservative SIFS do not affect. This design range can be classified as non- {yclic, and most piping systems fall into the ne ic range. For this reason, most piping systems analyzed with non conservative SIFs will not experience fatigue failures prior 10 the end of life or suffer any significant safety factor reduction, (This is the reason that nonconservative STFS have been used seemingly without ineident for so long.) There are also piping systems where non-conservative SIFS ‘on their own, or via interaction with other damage mechanisms san produce fatigue failures (dhrough-wall cracks), or loss of the design safety factor by the end of the system life or sooner. ‘These piping systems are classified herein as “cyclic “severely cycli Piping systems in cyclic service (Table A) should be ‘evaluated or screened based on the potential for damage oF significant economic loss should an unexpected through wall crack develop. This interrogation should be part of the system Process Safety Management (PSM) program or part of the Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) evaluation, (Refs. 13, 14, 15) ‘The cycle threshold recommended for all B31.3 piping systems except for Elevated Temperature Fluid Service are «given in Tables A and B. These tables assume that designers use the allowable stress range provided by the Code, ie. the systems are highly loaded, Table A. - Non-Cyclie Service Cycle Threshold Stress Equation Used ie N 1 1 800 Tb L 1055 Ta 1.2] 2800 Ib 12. 600. ‘Table B. — Severe Cyclic Service Cyele Limits Sires Fu Used? N la “700000 1D. 500 Copyright © 2019 ASME a ne soot coco zeeMAECOETISOONEERSALOzanAMNsbopSUnsEO HuNVoRRIEN HN WOH PINON i When the number of significant load eyeles! for a piping system is less than the threshold number of eyeles (N) given in Table A, the piping system may be classified as non-eycic. ‘When the number of significant load cycles exceeds the number of eycles (N) given in Table B, the piping system is classified as severely cyclic. ‘The classification relationship with the number of design cycles and the system safety factor is shown in Figure 1 ‘Safety Factor Nonyete ‘yee ‘Severe ele Design Cycles Figure I~ Design Cycle Classification Impact on Salty Factor ‘Owners and designers must determine an accurate number of design eycles for use in the flexibility analysis so that high ‘consequence piping systems undergoing significant cycling are analyzed, inspected, or fabricated using an appropriate approach for cyclic systems. Some piping computer programs. sum equivalent cycles from multiple load cases and evaluate Table A compliance as part of their analysis. Designers and operators should recognize that when piping systems are cyclic, (eyeles greater than those in Table A), the safety factor varies over the life of the piping, dropping below ‘one if nonconservative SIFs are combined with weld, material, or fabrication anomalies. Figs. (1) and (8) show the B31 safety factor variation as a function of the number of cycles. Ref. (17) gives the development of the cycle thresholds in Tables A and B. ‘As seen in Figure 1, the nomeycle threshold is set at the umber of cycles where the separation between the B31 allowable stress and the mean failure is a minimum of 4 ‘When the cycle classification is non-cyclic, commonly used 31.1 and B31.3 approaches can be used snd more applicable data is not required for safety purposes since the safety factor for through-wall cracking is greater than 4. Greater concer for material quality and increased inspection is also generally not sequined, Once a system is determined to be cyclic or severely cyel the designer and the owner should evaluate the consequences of fan unexpected thru-wall crack. If the consequences are significant, more applicable data should be used in the stress analysis, fitings should be purchased from preferred vendors, fabrication requirements should be followed carefully and mean life inspection should be considered. IF the an unexpected through-wall erack for a eyelic piping system is considered highly consequential, then third party review of the design or installation may also be warranted, For cyclic or severely cyclic conditions the following guidelines should be considered: i) Require 100% ID and OD visual inspection of all (or most) welds where practical. (The ID of two girth welds at each welding tee for example, can always be inspected.) ii) Stresses due to pressure cyeling should be evaluated, ‘and when of sufficient magnitude included with other cyclic stresses inthe fatigue evaluation iii) Mote applicable data per B31J-2017 should be used. iv) Corroded wall thicknesses should be used inthe ‘expansion stress calculation (for stress only). ¥) Dynamic loadings per B31.3 301.4, 301.5, 301.7, 301.10, and 301.11, should be quantified. vi) The effect of the thermal rate of change and fluid ratification should be considered in the flexibility ‘analysis if present vii) The effect of occasional load stress ranges should be considered in the flexibility analysis, i. the seismic or wind load contribution to fatigue. vii) Additional inspection requirements for B16. welding tees should be established, including, but not limited to: min wall thickness verification, side-wall liquid penetrant examination, and design verification review, ix) Where operating displacement in the piping system exceeds about two inches, a laser scan of the piping system in the cold and operating conditions should be provided and verified against the computed deflections, from the flexibility analysis, x). For size-on-size B16.9 welding tees, out-of-plane STFS from B31.3 Appendix D, and B31J-2017 should be multiplied by a minimum of 1.5. For tees whose diameter is greater than NPS 10 the SIF multiplier may be higher, and is 4 function of the outside shape of the tee which is controlled by the button or die used to form the tee and the press capacity xi) More applicable data should be used for bends with trunnions, suppors, and vessel connections sli) Half-tife, or decade interval inspections. xii) 3rd party design or inspection verification. Copyright © 2019 ASME a ne soa acon szeeraECOETISOONEERSHLOLanAMNsbopseunsto uN VoRMIEUR HN OH PIN i ‘SUMMARY New SIFs were published by the ASME in 2017 that will improve the accuracy of pipe stress calculations. Some STFS will increase because they were t00 low in previous editions of the Code, most SIFs will stay about the same, and a number of SIFs will go down because they were recognizably too high in reviewe rtinne af the Coxe Annon-cyclic service category is introduced in this paper to help users reulize when the new SIFS may have a safety related impact on stress calculations. When piping systems are ‘identified as “non-cyclic” the more applicable SIF data is not considered necessary for safety related purposes, and does not need to be used. Most typical piping systems fall into the non- ceyelie category. Cyclic and severely eyelie systems are also identified based on threshold number of operating cycles and. recommendations are provided for a level of increased inspection and analysis for these systems. When unexpected through-wall cracks can cause dangerous, toxie, or economically significant events, additional safeguarding should be considered by the owner or designer. Fortunately, only a small number of piping systems should need this special attention, Responses to the questions posed in the introduction are listed below: ‘a) What steps should be taken if more applicable data shows that an existing piping system is overstressed? If the system is operating, then a fitness for service review should be performed. b) Have there been failures associated with current Appendix D usage that has warranted these chang ‘The authors know of no specific failures that may be attributable singularly to the use of non-conservative Appendix D SIFs and flexibilities. This is likely because most piping systems can be classified as non-cyclic. SIF changes are determined by comparisons with cyclic tests to failure however fand the changes implemented in B31J are established s0 that piping systems through the applicable B31 parameter ranges have uniform safety factors with respect to thru-wall cracking and collapse. 6) Should B31J (Ref. 1) STFS and flexi he implemented immediately? "The classification recommendations in this paper give the system characteristics where i is felt nat nore applicable duta should be used without hesitation, This recommendation will not apply to most piping. systems being analyzed or operating since most systems will be classified as non-cyclic, however, more applicable data can always be substituted for less applicable data. The use of more applicable data sill also generally result in more cost effeetive piping systems. 4) Do all older piping systems need to be reevaluated? ‘The classification recommendations in this paper can be used to sereen existing piping systems. It is believed that a very small umber of existing piping systems should he reevaluated, and that some potential additional inspection and repairs will be warranted, ©) Over 40% of explosions in plants occur due to leaks from piping systems, could_my piping system cause an ‘explosion if use the wrong SIF? Explosions are due often 10 leaks from piping systems containing light flammable gases that form vapor clouds and then reach ignition sourees. If your system contains a light flammable gas, or otherwise ‘dangerous or toxie medium then unexpected through wall Ieaks ofthe contents are conceming. Leaks are most ofien due 10 erosion and corrosion, improper material selection, or cracking ‘due to vibration, but with an increase in poor quality material, and overly-thinned fittings, highly loaded cyclic systems analyzed ina nonconservative way have significant probability of experiencing through-wall eracks at some point luring the lle of the piping system. For these few eyelic systems, inspections at half-life or earlier, and at high stress locations should be considered. In the United States there may be local, state and federal laws that document the requirements for handling hazardous material. In most cases, these regulations are system specific and ean be summarized by the following excerpt from CFR OSHA 1910.19), "The ‘employer shall determine and document that the {piping} is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operating in a safe manner.” Unique requirements for any particular system should be available from the plant safety engineer and found in the PSM or PHA documentation for that unit ‘The recommendations given here recognize that process piping systems exist where failure could result in significant loss of life and property. Design recommendations similar to those used in the nuclear industry, but marshaled 10 a more manageable level for use in the fossil power and process industries are recommended for the relatively small population ‘of high consequence piping systems that are experiencing decreasing safety margins as operation continues, Copyright © 2019 ASME 5a onsets aco ézeeraeCOETISOONEERSALOzansMNsDopseUnsto HuN VoRAORDUN HN WOH PINOD i FOOTNOTES ' refer to B31.3 Eq. Id. The number of significant eyeles can be calculated by the following equation: N Neianeant = 2 (Si/Sa)?% xn, is conservative to use the maximum calculated stress and allowable for a given Toad case as Sand Sq in the equation above, where N is the number of load eases. Ni is the actual ‘number of load cases possible and should not be overestinted, ‘S/Sq should in no case be greater than 1.0. 2 where company standards mandate that Eq. La is used with a ‘maximum fy of 1.0 and Se <0.5 Sa, then N = 30000. 5 the stress equation used in any analysis can be determined quickly by looking at the allowable stress printed in the output, ‘When the allowable expansion stress varies from node to node, then Eq. Ib is used. When the allowable expansion stress is the ssame for each node, then Eq. 1a is being used. REFERENCES: [1] - ASME B31J-2017, “Stress Intensification Factors (i- Factors), Flexibility Factors (k-Factors), and Their Determination for Metallic Piping Components”. [2] -ASME B31.3-2016, “Process Piping” [3] = E.C. Rodabaugh, “Accuracy of Stress Intensification Factors for Branch Connections”, Bulletin 329, December 1987, Welding Research Bulletin. [4] - ARC. Markt, “Piping-Flexiblity Analysis”, Transactions of the ASME, February, 1955, pp. 9, [5] -Ret {3}, ps, [6] - C-Hinnant, C-Becht IV, T-Paulin, W.S. Lock, C. Becht V, “Experimental Evaluation of the Markl Fatigue Methods and ASME Piping Stress Intensification Factors Part 2°, PVP2014- 28268, July-24,2014, Anaheim, CA., Proceedings of the ASME. 2014 Pressure Vessels and Piping Division, [7] - Marsh Report, “The 100 Largest Losses 1974-2015", Large property damage losses in the hydrocarbon industry, 24° edition, March 2016, Marsh & MeLennan Companies. [8] — PRGPVP.0N6, “Establishing NonCyclic, Cyotie, and Severely Cyclic Service Limits for B31 Piping”. [9] - TPaulin, “Report for ASME ST-LLC STIN-0148 Stress Intensification Factor, K-factor, and Sustained Stress Index. Development (R8)", ASME STIN-0148, Aug, 6, 2018. [10] - Wais, F., Rodubaugh, B.C., “Stress Intensification Factors and Flexibility Factors for Unreinforeed Branch Connections ‘TR 110996 Final Report, November 1998 [11] = Koves, Mokhtarian, Rodabaugh, Widera, “Large Diameter Ratio Shell Intersections", December 2004. Widera — WRC 497, GE.O. Widen and Z Wei “Parametric Finite Element Analysis of Large Shell Intersections, (External Loadings)” WRC 497 Part 3 GE.O. Widera and Z. Wei “ Large Diameter Ratio Shell Intersections", WRC 497 Parts 1.2 and 3 [12]- Hinnant.C., Paulin, ., “Experimental Evaluation of the Markl Fatigue Methods and ASME Piping Siress Intensification Factors” PVP2008-61871, July 27,2008. [13]-"Process Safety Management for Petroleum Refineries — Lessons Learned from the Petroleum Refinery Process Safety Management National Emphasis Program”, OSHA. 3918-08- 2017. [14] ~ “CPS, Guidelines for Risk Based Process: Safety’ Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Interscience - 2007, Chapter 3, Equipment Selection, pp.17-28, Management of Change, [15] - API RP-S71, “Damage Mechanisms Affecting Fixed Equipment in the Refining Industry” [16] 29CFR 1910.19 ~ Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals” LI7] = PRGPVP.006, “Equations Establishing Non-Cych Cyclic, and Severely Cyclic Service Limits for B31 Piping” i i z ; i : i i i 2 ease ue san ssa eam pnp wars fae rR 4D SzOraRRNSLLSUONE YEE ANNEX A SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURES & TABLES ‘xo oment of nog ongth win moment otc rltonsip given {in Tab 20 suet tat © across ha elment 1S equa io MEI, or INDIE per Tato? and Fg 2 Branen, Branch Flexibility Location Run Flexibility Location Figure2— Location for Be Flexibilities Provided in B31J. Branch k-factors usage is identical to ASME Section III Subsection NB, NB3600. Run Flexibilities were introduced by Wais and Rodabaugh in EPRT 110096 factor Figure 3— ‘Undulation in STF or Stress Factor as a funetion of /T. (This undulation added to SIF equations in B31 2017. E.Resiabaugh frst cautioned ubont potential VT effect on SIF in 1961.) Copyright © 2019 ASME oz maa 1 us t0 wanes oor an note NCD Ez OrMAEC EDLC EREAOzanEopseAunsEa sume VIDMIERIN HM WK PIN 16 i vT>1 B31.3 = ‘ pew 5 ma _ 5 Figue 4 Domonstates general lion of e201 Sis nd 83142017 I. Asus of exsing Ss inte vicinity of the test geometries, ic. d/D=1, and low D/T are the same as new SIFs. Outside of previous test ranges corrections are provided as needed. Between d/D of 0.5 and 1.0 there are corrections for these reduced branch connections. have heen corrected. Ref (9) SIF For d/D < 0.5, over conservatisms as reported by Rodabaugh in WRC 329 ¢ a appato = + 1 Figure 5— _Unreinforced and pad reinforced fabricated tee non-conservative SIFS in pre-2017 piping code. Light ted zones show nonconservative SIFs in diD ranges between 0.5 and 1.0. Copyright © 2019 ASME oz meg 1 uo tn wants ora in nete ecNCD Ez ORME NEDLBOESAOcanaEopsecUnaEo sume VSIOIEUN HM WK INC B31.3(2014) ig, Fi i B3tJign = I : « i i ; : : dID Ratio i Figure 6- Comparison of out-of-plane, branch B31.3 and B31J-2017 SIFs for 36” Standard Wall pipe for various 3 iD ratios, : i g 2 Schneider Effect . ¢ Wais (EPRI 110996) . ; < 5 . : Widera (WRC 497) o i v 3 3 5 zg er er ee ey ; i aD i ee ee | 2 fiem7= alpen vite Ft (coments round oeatsne tenons | i 8 ° Copyright © 2019 ASME 1000 Mean Curve: Sr= 1895 N°=X® (Hinnant Slope) q “ts Current B31 Limits 100 > (Mark! Slope) Eq. tb (S_=0) 10 Factor = 2 — Existing 831.3 Limits === Mean Cune Nominal Stress Range (M/Z) - ksi 1 ete ers tei 1E+2 16+3 1E+4 1E+5 1E+6 1E+7 1E+8 1E+9 Cycles to Failure Figure 8 — Girth Weld Fatigue Test Data and Code Related Safety Factors. Original trom Ref. (120). 2 cove onszteracovnLLOONEHEOSHLCLanaIssbuprenelunato mae oCORKPsUME NH ERNE Figurey- 616.9 Size-on-Size Welaing lees Used to Verify SIF Predictions in Excess of B31.3 Appendix D and B31J-2017 Table 1-1. (Left Photograph: 20°x20" on left and 4°x4" on right; Right Photograph: 20" Tee in Place for Twice Elastic Siope Test) i 3 i i : ' i { 3 0 Copyright © 2019 ASME Fatigue Strength Hig Load, yt Stam, met iF Low Guay Matra Pc Mantacureg or Poe Wein Non cyee system Load Load ete Sytem, Eran SF as ater, ‘Sood tartocures Hh Loa, yee sytem Ean iF ood Matera High Lod, Cte Site ‘Good Marwackred Components ‘Actus SI Good Wate Sood Were | ood Manfachred Compares Seasons oesige se Time Figure 10— Fatigue Strength vs. Time as a Function of Piping System End-of-Life i i z ; i : i i i ‘Table C ~ R16.9 Welding Tee Providers that can produce tees representative of commercial product forms tested for B31J-2017 and B31.3 Appendix D. # ‘Company Contact K.W.Doughty, PE. ken.doughty’@medermot.com Gary Robinson garyr(@dynamieproducts.net Alloy Piping Products LLC. 2.| Dynamic Products, Inc. reason uo san ssi ear Duara fae rR cso SzOraRRNSLLSUONE YE

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