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FE AT UR E D

by SOFREP Jul 16, 2020

Welcome back to the second part of Close Quarters Battle (CQB) series. In the
previous part, we talked about sight fixation and flashlights. Let’s continue to
our next two rules. But before, we would like to remind you that these “rules”
are more of a reminder of things that many forget or not aware of.

I will be honest. I was not sure if I should include this point in the list. It requires
a somewhat mature intellectual approach with experience glittered on top of it.
Dividing the threat’s attention, or in other words messing up his OODA loop, is
one of the most important principles. Especially when the threat is oriented and
you have no other means to distract him. However, before I am going to dig
into it, it is necessary to give an example in a bigger form.

When we used to practice raids in small unit capacities on fortified compounds,


we used to employ a very simple but effective technique. We used to refer to it
as “suppress and flank.”

While it consists of more than the name suggests, it would work like this:

1. Initially, a specified element opens fire from either one or several positions
with heavy/accurate/indirect weaponry in three different phases of fire.

2. After minutes of pounding the target, another element(s) begins to


deliberately flank and penetrate the objective from a specific direction(s).

3. By exploiting different angles of attack, the enemy will start to split his
strength concentration into smaller pieces which are easier to handle. Those
pieces are automatically reacting to what they see.

4. By splitting his
strength and having his
leadership OODA loop
constantly interrupted,
we force the enemy to
react quite slowly, or in
other words, we reduce
the threat’s strength and
ability to immediately
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unwritten rules of close-quarters combat
Taking this into the microcosm of CQB:
Author Disclaimer: I am aware that the majority of respected organizations will
not advocate going into a kneeling position when committing to an entry.
However, throughout my career, I have witnessed many who were, in fact,
instructed to kneel, for many rainbow and glitter kinds of shit reasons.

When things are moving fast and have the same configuration of Attackers
versus Defenders as depicted above, we used to employ the same principle but
in a slightly different way in order to increase our survivability odds. Dividing
the enemy’s attention works best in “known” type of entries.

One person is acting as “bait” as he moves fast into the known direction,
deliberately drawing attention by movement or sound from the threat. This
forces the oriented threat to shift his attention to the fast-moving picture, while
the point man follows in to engage the threat from cover. The threat will
basically be forced into reestablishing his subconscious OODA only to be
interrupted a moment later by the next team member who will gain a trajectory
on him.

I’ll give you another example that we use specifically in low to no-light
conditions. One person enters the room in X direction with a strong source of
light aimed at the target, while the other members entering in Y direction,
initially without lights, are concealed by contrast and darkness. Here the effect
is even more devastating for the threat since he will be essentially blind and
fixated on the source of light.
Some thoughts on the video above:

L Shaped Room.
Camera View: Threat
View

We teach the same


principle even to patrol
officers who are
approaching a person in
an open space, say a
parking lot, for the
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purpose of
to everyone. Don't be an idiot.
communication or
search. As soon as the
officers perceive danger or the officers are getting into the combative bubble,
they may begin to divide attention (see figure below). They will essentially be
breaking off laterally, turning one picture into two, thus forcing the observing
individual into recycling his decision making (OODA) and overloading the
amount of data he perceives.

What we teach normally in the next phase is that one teammate is talking,
drawing verbal and visual attention, while the other remains quiet, aware, and
exploiting the opponent’s flanks for better covering his partner, view, and
proper fields of fire. From observing, orienting, deciding, and eventually acting,
the threat is forced into two dimensions of consideration. More data to process,
less time to react. Mental physical cage.
 

In summary, dividing the threat’s attention, or similar concepts such as “running


the rabbit’’ is all about exploiting your opponent’s human limitations. Some
people will frown upon RTR, but it worked for us and for other people I know.
It’s all about human performance. Consider an assault with two elements on an
objective, one by air (helicopter) and one by land (vehicle). They strike the
target simultaneously. By the time the target decides which direction he wants
to fight in, the aggressor force is already breaching the door and clearing the
building.]

Note – This rule is in reference to clearing interior structures.

Back in the day when I served in the IDF, the first CQB course we took was
obviously a basic infantry level program. You know, corners, and box-shaped
rooms. In that course, it was a standard that once a person gets to his corner,
he immediately goes into a kneeling position to “avoid” the first bullets fired by
possible resistance. With the years and progress of training, this methodology
was quickly dismissed by my unit’s CQB instructors, but it was a reality that
made me really understand how stupid and potentially what a death sentence
kneeling can be in a CQB environment.
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General issues with kneeling

a) Injuries

Before we get into why it is important to highlight the difference between the
trigger and switch zones that a threat normally has.

Trigger zone — Trigger zones are often the chest and below. We call them
trigger zones since in most cases they trigger a certain chain of reactions
(bleeding, loss of mobility, trauma) rather than death. It might not
eliminate the threat right away, but will allow a “certain wished reality.”
Switch zone — You hit that area and its lights off. Neck and up. Shitty day
to the maximum.

Back to the issue: By kneeling an individual is not only losing mobility but often
replacing a “trigger” zone (aka his plate) with a “switch” zone (aka his head).
Why is it important to highlight this issue? Because the majority of tactical
institutions are still teaching, in their basic courses, kneeling and crowding
covers in the context of firefights that take place within 10 feet.
Can you see the issues?

b) Mobility

While in the majority of kill houses I’ve trained in the environment was a simple
empty box-shaped room with one to two doorways, the reality is very different.
Several interconnected compartments, doors, hallways, and other partitions
exist in any warehouse, apartment, or tunnel. They will require the team to be
responsive and take on the challenge as soon as possible. By kneeling down,
reaction time is decreased and one’s view becomes less general and more
fixated. Getting people to reinforce others by numbers is critical in a multi-room
clearing. Mobility is the key; accuracy is the lock.

c) The little things

Additional stuff I have recognized over time when I saw individuals kneeling by
default during room clearing:

1. Equipment is caught in the edges of tables, closets, etc.

2. Losing orientation with additional teammates who are moving around.

3. Becoming more fixated on visual covers.

4. When humans are afraid, or the need to self-preserve is initiated, the last
thing a human likes to do is to settle down and wait (freeze is a different phase).

With that being said, kneeling should be avoided in most cases unless you are
working a threat from the doorway or cover and concealment (HL for example).
There are several reasons, but the most important one is the simple fact that by
kneeling you simply replace your plate carrier with a head in the enemy’s sights.

Stay tuned to the third part of this series!

This article was written by Eli Feildboy, founder and CEO of Project Gecko and
former Israeli commando. It was originally published in 2019. 

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