1.

IN RE CUNANAN [94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]

Facts: 

Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of

1953.” In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to
the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75
percent.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions

for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their
examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground
for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their
grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or
not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.

Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

Held: RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar,
those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in
the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment
or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for
the license.

Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

2. PIMENTEL vs. LEB G.R. NO. 230642 & 242954. September 10, 2019
FACTS: 
Petitioners in this case assail the unconstitutionality of R.A. 7662 or the Legal Education
Reform Act of 1993 which creates the Legal Education Board. Petitioners particularly seek to
declare as unconstitutional the creation of LEB itself, LEB issuances and memorandums
establishing law practice internship as a requirement for taking the bar based on Sec. 7 (g) of
RA 7662, adopting a system of continuing legal education based on Sec. 2 (2) and Sec. 7 (h) of
RA 7662, and establishing and implementing the nationwide law school aptitude test known
as the Philippine Law School Admission Test or the PhilSAT pursuant to LEB’s power to
“prescribe the minimum standards for law admission” under Sec. 7 (e) of RA 7662. Petitioners
principally grounded the petitions on LEB’s alleged encroachment upon the rulemaking
power of the Court concerning the practice of law, violation of institutional academic freedom,
and violation of law school aspirant’s right to education under the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the regulation and supervision of legal education belong to the Court.

RULING: 

1. NO. Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically and consistently
exercised by the political departments. The historical development of statutes on education
unerringly reflects the consistent exercise by the political departments of the power to
supervise and regulate all levels and areas of education, including legal education. Legal
education is but a composite of the entire Philippine education system. It is perhaps unique
because it is a specialized area of study. This peculiarity, however, is no reason in itself to
demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the regulatory and supervisory powers of the
political branches. 

Two principal reasons militate against the proposition that the Court has the regulation and
supervision of legal education:

First, it assumes that the court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and regulate legal
education as a necessary consequence of its power to regulate admission to the practice of law.
This assumption, apart from being manifestly contrary to the history of legal education in the
Philippines, is likewise devoid of legal anchorage.

Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not, arrogate upon
itself a power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself violates the doctrine
of separation of powers. For the Court to void RA 7662 and thereafter, to form a body that
regulates legal education and place it under its supervision and control, as what petitioners
suggest, is to demonstrate a highly improper form of judicial activism. 

As it is held, the Court’s exclusive rule making power under the Constitution covers the
practice of law and not the study of law. The present rules embodied in the 1997 Rules of
Court do not support the argument that the Court directly and actually regulates legal
education, it merely provides academic competency requirements for those who would like to
take the Bar. Furthermore, it is the State in the exercise of its police power that has the
authority to regulate and supervise the education of its citizens and this includes legal
education.

3. Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991

Facts:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the

position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-
five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue:

Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Held:

In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work
experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The
respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of
the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
4. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012

The Facts and the Case

In May 1996, Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of the Ozamis City volleyball team, wrote
Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes of Ozamis City, requesting financial assistance for his team.
Mayor Fuentes approved the request and sent Abastillas’ letter to the City Treasurer for
processing. Mayor Fuentes also designated Mario R. Ferraren, a city council member, as
Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the city while Mayor Fuentes was away. Abastillas eventually got
the ₱10,000.00 assistance for his volleyball team.

Meanwhile, respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, then a Sangguniang Panlalawigan

member of Misamis Occidental, got a photocopy of Abastillas’ letter and, using it, filed on
June 24, 1996 a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao against
Ferraren for alleged illegal disbursement of ₱10,000.00 in public funds. Atty. Pactolin attached
to the complaint a copy of what he claimed was a falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed
that it was Ferraren, not Mayor Fuentes, who approved the disbursement.

Aggrieved, Ferraren filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25665 a complaint against
Atty. Pactolin for falsification of public document.1 On November 12, 2003 the Sandiganbayan
found Atty. Pactolin guilty of falsification under Article 172 and sentenced him to the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional as
minimum to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days of prision correccional as maximum, to suffer all
the accessory penalties of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of ₱5,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Atty. Pactolin appealed to this Court but on May 20, 2008 it affirmed his conviction.2 Since the
Court treated the matter as an administrative complaint against him as well under Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court, it referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
appropriate action.

Because complainant Ferraren neither appeared nor submitted any pleading during the
administrative proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, on October 9, 2010
the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XIX-2010-632, adopting and approving the
Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation that the case against Atty.
Pactolin be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The Issue Presented

The only issue presented in this case is whether or not Atty. Pactolin should be disbarred after
conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification.

The Court’s Ruling

In his pleadings before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Pactolin reiterated the
defenses he raised before the Sandiganbayan and this Court in the falsification case. He claims
that the Court glossed over the facts, that its decision and referral to the IBP was "factually
infirmed"3 and contained "factual exaggerations and patently erroneous observation," 4 and was
"too adventurous."5

To recapitulate, this Court upheld the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the copy of
Abastillas’ letter which Atty. Pactolin attached to his complaint was spurious. Given the clear
absence of a satisfactory explanation regarding his possession and use of the falsified
Abastillas’ letter, this Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not err in concluding that it was
Atty. Pactolin who falsified the letter. This Court relied on the settled rule that in the absence
of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the
forger and therefore guilty of falsification.6

This Court’s decision in said falsification case had long become final and executory. In In Re:
Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,7 the Court held that in disbarment cases, it is no longer called
upon to review the judgment of conviction which has become final. The review of the
conviction no longer rests upon this Court.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended on
the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly
immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the
lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8)
corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to do.

This Court has ruled that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice,
honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.8 Moral turpitude includes
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen,
or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.9

Having said that, what penalty should be imposed then on Atty. Pactolin?

As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution.1âwphi1 Being the most
severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in
clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and a member of the bar.10 Yet this Court has also consistently pronounced that
disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving
moral turpitude.11

Here, Atty. Pactolin’s disbarment is warranted. The Sandiganbayan has confirmed that
although his culpability for falsification has been indubitably established, he has not yet
served his sentence. His conduct only exacerbates his offense and shows that he falls short of
the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.12

This Court once again reminds all lawyers that they, of all classes and professions, are most
sacredly bound to uphold the law.13 The privilege to practice law is bestowed only upon
individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally.
As such, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their
clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.14

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin is hereby DISBARRED and his

name REMOVED from the Rolls of Attorney. Let a copy of this decision be attached to his
personal records and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA,

Presiding Judge of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of Antique, and AVELINO T.
JAVELLANA, respondents. G.R. No. 89591-96             January 24, 2000

RESOLUTION

PARDO, J.:

On September 8, 1999, we denied the People's motion seeking reconsideration of our August
13, 1990 decision in these cases. In said resolution, we held that respondent Judge Bonifacio
Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989
giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the
pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why
private respondent Javellana should not be detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial
court's order specifically provided for private respondent's detention at the residence of Atty.
del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but
was to be held as detention prisoner in said residence.

This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not
detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he
were a free man, including engaging in the practice of law. Despite our resolution of July 30,
1990 prohibiting private respondent to appear as counsel in Criminal Case No. 4262,1 the latter
accepted cases and continued practicing law.

On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F. Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court
a motion seeking clarification on the following questions: "(1) Does the resolution of this
Honorable Court dated July 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty. Javellana from appearing as counsel
refer only to Criminal Case No. 4262? (2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the
custodian of Atty. Javellana? and (3) Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never
really held and detained Atty. Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not Atty. Javellana
considered an escapee or a fugitive of justice for which warrant for his arrest should forthwith
be issued?"

In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.

After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed
hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, a motion seeking the revocation of the
trial court's custody order and the imprisonment of private respondent Javellana in the
provincial jail.1âwphi1.nêt

On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an urgent
motion seeking to clarify whether the June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or resolved
the motion for clarification filed by the State Prosecutor on April 7, 1997.

Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against
him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty.
Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation "to
hold and detain" him in Atty. del Rosario's residence in his official capacity as the clerk of
court of the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he
ceased to be the personal custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court
must be deemed the custodian under the same undertaking.

In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelana's life no longer exist. Thus,
the trial court's order dated August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must
be recalled, and he shall be detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.

Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana
is not allowed to practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention
prisoner. The trial court's order was clear that private respondent "is not to be allowed liberty
to roam around but is to be held as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to practice law
referred not only to Criminal Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as well, except in cases
where private respondent would appear in court to defend himself.

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed
under the custody of the law.1âwphi1 He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense.3 He must be detained in jail during
the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on
bail or on recognizance.4 Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive
detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business
or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary
consequence of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.

Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more
than ten (10) years, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose,
Antique, is ordered to continue with the trial of said criminal cases with all deliberate dispatch
and to avoid further delay.

WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355, including Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are
ordered detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique, effective immediately,
and shall not be allowed to go out of the jail for any reason or guise, except, upon prior written
permission of the trial court for a lawful purpose.

Let copies of this resolution be given to the Provincial Director, PNP Antique Provincial Police
Office, San Jose, Antique and to the Provincial Jail Warden, Provincial Jail of Antique, San
Jose, Antique.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

6. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. MISAEL M.

LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.
A.M. No. P-99-1287       January 26, 2001

KAPUNAN, J.:

In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice
Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza
Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled "People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga" for
Falsification of Public Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 40.1 While respondent's letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the
private complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator,
dated September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard to respondent's authority to
appear as counsel for the accused in the said criminal case.2 On September 7, 1998, the Office
of the Court Administrator referred the matter to respondent for comment.3

In his Comment,4 dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had appeared in
Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual
circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle the defense of his
cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while, on
the other hand, private complainant was a member of a powerful family who was out to get
even with his cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case did
not prejudice his office nor the interest of the public since he did not take advantage of his
position. In any case, his appearances in court were covered by leave applications approved
by the presiding judge.1âwphi1.nêt

On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a Resolution denying respondent's request for
authorization to appear as counsel and directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file
formal charges against him for appearing in court without the required authorization from the
Court.5 On January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed the instant administrative
complaint against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise
known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,"
which provides:

Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
 following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x      x      x

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:

x      x      x

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by

the Constitution or law, Provided, that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with their official functions;

In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on the

administrative complaint.

In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are "close blood cousins" who
belong to a "powerless family" from the impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte.
From childhood until he finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported and
guided him while he looked up to her as a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close
relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondent's help and advice when she was charged in
Criminal Case No. 84885 for falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres,
whose only purpose in filing the said criminal case was to "seek vengeance" on her cousin. He
explained that his cousin's discord with Ms. Andres started when the latter's husband, SPO4
Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their
illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth certificate of their
eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated
that since he is the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms. Ladaga's
plea to be her counsel since she not have enough funds to pay for the services of a lawyer.
Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7) years of untainted government service,
initially with the Commission on Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he had
performed his duties with honesty and integrity and that it was only in this particular case
that he had been administratively charged for extending a helping hand to a close relative by
giving a free legal assistance for "humanitarian purpose." He never took advantage of his
position as branch clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He
stressed that during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his
approved leave applications attached to his comment.

In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondent's comment and referred the
administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge
Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and recommendation.

In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings and
recommendation:
 There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in behalf of
his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for
"Falsification of Public Documents" before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied
that the appearance of said respondent in said case was without the previous
permission of the Court.

An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent
appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of
absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the
case he was handling. That the respondent appeared as pro bono counsel likewise cannot
be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared that the
respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and
respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his
compassion and high regard for her.

It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled a
case for a member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and
for the purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was
aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years
that he has been in government service, he has maintained his integrity and
independence.

RECOMMENDATION

In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel for
his cousin without first securing permission from the Court, and considering that this is
his first time to do it coupled with the fact that said appearance was not for a fee and
was with the knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully recommended
that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would
be dealt with more severely.6

We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.

Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private
practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private
practice of their profession. The said section reads:

SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. – No judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice
as a member of the bar or give professional advise to clients.

However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically the law
profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance;
rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding one's self to the public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,7 we explained the meaning of the term "private practice"
prohibited by the said section, to wit:

We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private
practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an
isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127,
p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the
public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E.
522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation
of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:

"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services."

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given
permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the
complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.8

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared
as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the "private
practice" of the law profession contemplated by law.

Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court appearances did not amount to a private
practice of law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the
Department, which is this Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules, thus:

Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,
or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers
and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission
to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed
by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or
employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in
the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors.9
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous occasions,
i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own
admission. It is true that he filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in
court. However, he failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The
presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department
contemplated by law.1âwphi1.nêt

7. Sophia Alawi v. Ashary M. Alauya A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997
Facts:

Ashary Alauya transacted with Sophia Alawi to avail of a contract for the purchase of one

housing unit from EB Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd., a real estate and housing company. Shortly

thereafter Alauya wrote to the company expressing his intent to render the contract void ab

initio.

Several correspondences ensued, all of which were signed by Alauya as ATTY. ASHARY M.

ALAUYA. Alauya is a member of the Sharia Bar and for that matter he is a counselor-at-law.

Alauya claims that he does not use the title of counselor-at-law for fear of being mistaken as a

local legislator, i.e. councilor. Hence, he affixed the title of attorney before his name.

Alawi filed a verified complaint against Alauya, alleging, among others, that Alawi usurped

the title of an attorney which is reserved only for the members of the Philippine Bar.

Issue:

Whether or not Alauya's membership in the Sharia Bar endows him the title of an attorney

Held:

No. Alauya is hereby reprimanded for usurping the title of an attorney reserved for those

who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and had successfully passed

the bar examinations, have been admitted ti the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain

members thereof in good standing.

Persons who passed the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Bar and may only
practice law before a Sharia Court, Alauya's disinclination to use the title of counselor-at-law

does not warrant his use of the title of an attorney.

8. Aguirre vs. Rana, 403 SCRA 342 (2003)

DOCTRINES: Practice of law´ means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the

application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession

Having held himself out as ³counsel´ knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.

It is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact
that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. 

THE CASE:
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance
than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the
morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations.

FACTS:
Respondent Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees
as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent
a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled
oath-taking. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys
pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on
the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave
misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel
for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers
(MBEC´) of Mandaon, Masbate and filed with the MBEC a pleading where
he represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George
Bunan,and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan.

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal

government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As
such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or
administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of

acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the latter engaging
respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to
prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyer’s oath
but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges
against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the
complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance´ to represent
him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a
lawyer but as a person who knows the law.´ Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001
pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains,
however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney´
in the pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he

submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He
submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001
signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is
politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the
losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment and refuted the claim
of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to
Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-
Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant
questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a
lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is motivated
mainly by political vendetta. On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC´) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

OBC’s Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in
the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively
participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the
MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes
that respondent’s misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the
Bar. The OBC also believes that respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny
his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be
denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent
allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government
employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise,
respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.

HELD: 

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that
respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the
lawyer’s oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of
Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed
as counsel for George Bunan.´ In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated
that he was the³(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
GEORGE T . BUNAN.´ Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had
authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him´ before the MBEC and similar
bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained´ respondent as her
counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L.
Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the
candidate of the said party.´ Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was
entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the
REFORMA LM-PPC.´ On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in
the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the
winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. Clearly, respondent
engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, the Court elucidated that: The practice of law is

not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation
of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where
the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts
and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that ³practice of law´ means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service
which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings
before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly
supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself ³counsel´
knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as ³counsel´
knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be
a member of the Philippine Bar.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited
to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations.
The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran,Jr. v Abad, a candidate

passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He
was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under
Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s
oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged
lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is
not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s
oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow
respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since
respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts
complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001
addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent stated that he was resigning ³effective upon your acceptance.´ Vice-Mayor Relox
accepted respondent's resignation effective 11 May 2001. Thus, the evidence does not support
the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies.
While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice
law.

9. In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edilion
A.M. No. 1928, 3 August 1978

Facts:
    The respondent is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Supreme Court the removal of the name of the respondent
from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the
provisions of the Rules of Court 139-A and the provisions of Paragraph 2, Section 24, Article
III of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of the IBP, payment of membership fee
and suspension for failure to pay the same.

    Edilion contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights
in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in
good standing to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues and that as a
consequence of this, compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions
of the Rules of Court and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

Issue:
    Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his membership fee
to the IBP.
Held:
    The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of a
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary.
All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar
including payment of reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court
only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional free to
associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.

    The Supreme Court concluded that the provisions of Rules of Court (Article 139-A) and of
the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither
unconstitutional nor illegal.

    The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent and his name stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.

10. Soriano v. Dizon A.C. No. 6792. January 25, 2006.

FACTS:

While driving on his way home, a taxi driver (herein complainant) overtook the car driven by
herein respondent. Incensed, respondent tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make
a turn. An altercation resulted therefrom that got to the point that the respondent fired and
shot complainant hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the respondent so the latter
pushed him out and sped off.

ISSUE:

WON respondent’s guilt warrants disbarment.

RULING:

Yes. Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.” It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an
unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.

11. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,

vs. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner. A.C. No. 244             March 29, 1963
BENGZON, C.J.:

After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was
admitted to the Bar.

About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The
matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be
investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from
the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this
Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal
education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following
particulars:

(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and

(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma
therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his
application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the
"required pre-legal education".

Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first
charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the
service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which
(according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life,
the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year
high school.

We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to
exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials.
However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious.
Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting
he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was
erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school
records.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence
to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously
of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano
University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he
began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in
Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our
Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That
previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required
pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis
on "previous").

Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to
his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter
admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and
is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such
examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed
courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential..

The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A.
Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.