CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS
U.S. v. JAIME FILART AND HILARIO SINGSON HELD:
G.R. No. L-10263 March 13, 1915
Moreland, J.
Doctrine:
A lottery is defined as a scheme for the distribution of prizes by
chance among persons who have paid, or agreed to pay, a
valuable consideration for the chance to obtain a prize. Its
elements are: (1) a consideration; (2) chance: (3) a prize, or some
advantage or inequality in amount or value which is in the nature
of prize.
FACTS: Filart and Singson took part in a lottery or raffle of an
automobile, which was the property of Filart.
The winner was determined in the following manner:
The numbers composing the 450, each written on a separate
piece of paper, were placed together in a box and thoroughly
mixed. A boy was selected who placed his hand in the box and
drew out a number. This he delivered to a person who unfolded
the paper and read the number in a loud voice while Filart, with a
list of the 450 numbers referred to, struck from the list the
number corresponding to that drawn from the box. This was
repeated until all of the numbers were drawn from the box and
stricken from the list. It was agreed that the last number drawn
from the box should be the winning number and that the owner
of that number should win the automobile.
Both defendants were charged for violating the following
provisions of the law:
Section 7 of Act No. 1757 provides, as follows:
The playing at and the conducting of any game of monte, jueteng,
or any form of lottery or policy . . . is hereby prohibited, and any
person taking any part therein . . . shall be punished as provided in
section 3 hereof. . . . .
This section also provides that:
It shall be no defense to any criminal action under this section
that the defendant acted as the agent of another or that he had
no interest in the result.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants conducted lottery
opposite way (and to make the record complete, we would add
Yes. The facts of record place this case within the definition
generally given of a lottery.
A lottery is said to be “a species of gaming, which may be defined
as a scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance among
persons who have paid, or agreed to pay, a valuable consideration
for the chance to obtain a prize.” It was held in the case
of Equitable Loan Co. vs. Waring, 117 Ga., 599, that three
elements enter into a lottery scheme: (1) A consideration; (2)
chance: (3) a prize, or some advantage or inequality in amount or
value which is in the nature of prize.
G.R. No. L-19982 December 29, 1922
"EL DEBATE," INC., petitioner,  authoritative one for this jurisdiction is that of the United States
vs.
JOSE TOPACIO, Director of Posts, respondent.
FACTS: The Director of Posts, following the advice of the Attorney-
General, refused to admit the issues of El Debate, containing the
advertisement, to the mails, for the reason that it fell within the
provisions of the Administrative Code concerning non-mailable
matter. Not satisfied with the ruling of the Director of Posts, the
publishers of El Debate have had recourse to these original
proceedings in mandamus to settle the controversy between the
newspaper and the Government.
The argument, while brilliant and informative to an unusually high
degree, has covered a somewhat wider range than is essential.
The issues will be more sharply defined and, correspondingly, our
burden will be lightened, if all extraneous matter is thrown
overboard.
The demurrer interposed by the Government serves to admit the
fact pleaded in the complaint. The applicable law is, likewise,
conceded, as is also the extent of power of the Director of Posts.
Section 1954 (a) of the Administrative Code includes, as
absolutely non-mailable matter, "Written or printed matter in any
form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or
conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning
any lottery, gift enterprise or similar scheme depending in whole
or in part upon lot or chance. . . ." As previously announced, the
courts will not interfere with the decision of the Director of Posts
as to what is, and what is not, mailable matter, unless clearly of
opinion that it was wrong.
In the next place, the fact that an Attorney-General of the
Philippines had held one way and another Attorney-General an
that an Attorney-General in 1912 also rendered an opinion on the
subject), with reference to carnival lotteries and newspaper
guessing schemes; the fact that three Attorneys-General of the
United States sustained the validity of guessing contests, only to
be overruled by an Attorney-General subsequently in office; the
fact that the older authorities in the United States refused to hold
such contests illegal, while a contrary view is now entertained;
and the fact that guessing contests are held not to be lotteries in
England, Canada, and other foreign countries, is relatively
unimportant. Passing by the historical phases, what we want to
know is the actual state of the law, and if the doctrines
announced in the authorities rest on a sound basis of reason.
In the next place, advancing one step further toward the issues,
while countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the
Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do with the power of
the United States Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery"
extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance,
such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at
fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential
elements of lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and
third, chance.
Reverting then to the admitted facts, to the admitted law, and to
the admitted judicial doctrines, the fundamental question is this:
Was the decision of the Director of Posts, refusing the privileges
of the mails to El Debate, clearly erroneous? And the subsidiary
question is this: Is the guessing contest of El Debate a "lottery, gift
enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon
lot or chance" within the meaning of the law?
Counsel for the petitioner is the first to admit that the element of
prize is present. We are, therefore, relieved from considering this
point. But he maintains that the element of chance "has been
reduced to a minimum and is practically nil, while the element of
consideration is totally absent." Taking up, therefore, these two
points in order, we finally arrive at our task.
What may be termed "the pure chance doctrine" is no longer
upheld by the weight of authority in the United States. The
element of chance is present even though it may be accompanied
by an element of calculation or even of certainly. Counsel,
therefore, practically admits himself out of court when he
concedes that any element of chance is present, for let it be
remembered that our law includes the phrase "depending in
whole or in part upon lot or chance It is difficult to select one of
the cases cited to elucidate the point under consideration,
because each and every one of them contains well considered
opinions. It was thus the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Public Clearing House vs. Coyne which marked the
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turning point toward a stricter application of the law. It was the
decision of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York in
People ex rel. Ellison vs. Lavin, which included the best
dissertation on the philosophical subject of what constitutes
chance. While it was the decision of the Federal Court in
Waite vs. Press Publishing Association which had a splendid
résumé of the situation, followed by all the encyclopaedias. We
choose the latter because the more recent and because the
briefest.
As indicated, in the case of Waite vs. Press Publishing Association,
the question before the court was whether a guessing contest
inaugurated by a publishing association prior to an election,
offering certain rewards or prizes to those persons who, prior to
such election, submitted to the association the nearest correct
estimates of the total number of votes cast for the office of
President of the United States, and at the time paid a certain sum
as the subscription to a named periodical, was a contest of chance
and a lottery, in violation of the laws of the United States and the
laws of the State of Michigan.  than a random and undeceive judgment. In the sense above
ISSUE: Whether a so-called guessing contest was valid or not.  receiving the paper every day for the number of months that he
HELD: "It is strictly and philosophically true in nature and reason
that there is no such thing as chance or accident it being evident
that these words do not signify anything really existing, anything
that is truly an agent or cause of any event; but they signify
merely men's ignorance of the real and immediate cause. But
though nothing occurs in the world as a result of chance, the
occurrence may be a matter of chance to the observer from his
ignorance of antecedent causes or of the laws of their operation."
The court refers at some length to the Coyne and reaches the
conclusion that the scheme before it falls far within the requisites
of a lottery as defined in that case, under a statute very similar to
the New York one. The two cases referred to, the Coyne case and
the Lavin case, are cited by Attorney-General Moody in his
opinion of Nov. 28, 1904 (25 Opinions of Attorneys-General, 286),
as authority for the reversal of the opinions of his predecessors
holding that "guessing contest" were not within the prohibition of
the federal statutes. The schemes presented to Attorney-General
Moody for his decision were dependent, the one upon estimates
of the total number of paid admissions to the World's Fair at St.
Louis, and the other upon estimates of the total vote cast for
President in 1904. The conclusions he reached were as follows:
"Conceding that the estimates in such a contest (the World's Fair
contest) will be to some extent affected by intelligent calculation,
the conclusion is, nevertheless, irresistible that it is largely a
matter of chance which competitor will submit the nearest correct
estimate. The estimates cannot be predicated upon natural and
fixed laws, since the total number of admissions may be affected
by many conditions over which the participants in this scheme
have no control and cannot possibly foresee."
And again:
"Neither of these contests is a "legitimate business enterprise." In
each thousands invest small sums in the hope and expectation
that luck will enable them to win large returns. A comparatively
small percentage of the participants will realize their
expectations, and thousands will get nothing. They are, in effect,
lotteries, under the guise of 'guessing contests,”
"It is true that one acquainted with the results of the elections of
the state in previous years and educated in politics would have
some advantages over one ignorant in those respects, yet it must
be apparent even to a casual observer that the result would
depend upon so many uncertain and unascertainable causes that
the estimate of the most learned would be after all nothing more
indicated there is an element of skill, possibly certainty, involved,
but it is clear that the controlling predominating element is mere
chance. It was a chance as to what the total vote would be; it was
equally a chance as to what the guesses of the other guessers
would be."
We think, for the reasons given by the courts in the cases from
which we have already quoted, the guessing contest before us
came within the terms of the Michigan law and the mischief at
which it was aimed. At the time the estimates on which this suit is
based were submitted, the vote was yet to be cast; indeed, on
June 6, 1904, when the Battrick estimate was sent in, one of the
leading candidates for President had not yet been nominated. The
number of persons who would be qualified to vote at the election,
and the number who would cast votes which would be counted,
were not only undetermined but impossible of ascertainment at
the time the estimates were submitted. A thousand causes might,
in one way or another, intervene to affect the total vote cast, so
that at the best an estimate, if at all near the total vote cast,
would be but a lucky guess. In so great a vote the necessary
margin of chance would be so large that no element of skill or
experience could operate to predict the result. While one skilled
in national politics and conversant with existing conditions might
make a closer estimate than one wholly ignorant, yet, after all, the
successful persons in such a contest would be but makers of lucky
guesses in which skill and judgment could play no effective part.
Conceding that the views of the American decisions are sound, —
and upon this point they are so full and clear that little remains to
be said; conceding that the estimates in the contest of El
Debate will, to some extent, and possibly to a great extent, be
effected by intelligent calculation, as has been ingeniously argued
by counsel for the petitioner, the conclusion is nevertheless
irresistible that the scheme depends in part upon chance. The
estimates cannot be predicated upon natural and fixed laws, since
the total number of votes that will be cast for the winning
candidates for carnival queen may be affected by many
conditions, over which the participants in this scheme have no
control and cannot possibly foresee. We think it is perfectly clear
that the dominating and controlling factor in the awarding of the
prizes is chance.
In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not
condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no
consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party
receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal, schemes in
which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or
indirectly for the chance to draw a prize. But what may appear on
its face to be a gratuitous distribution of property by chance has
often been held to be merely a device to evade the law.
Predicated on these legal assumptions, it is argued here with
much force that there is no consideration, for the reason that a
subscriber to El Debate receives the full value of his money by
subscribes. The position is tenable, as respects those persons who
would subscribe to the paper regardless of the inducement to win
a prize, for as to them there is no consideration. The position is
fallacious, as to other persons who subscribe merely to win a prize
(and it is to such persons that the scheme is directed), for as to
them it means the payment of a sum of money for the
consideration of participating in a lottery. Moreover, the
subscriber do not all receive the same amount, for there are a few
of them who will receive more than the others, and more, too,
than the value paid for their subscriptions, through the chance of
a drawing. The general rule, therefore, is that guessing
competitions or contests are lotteries within the statutes
prohibiting lotteries. Indeed, it is very difficult, if not impossible,
for the most ingenious and subtle mind to devise any scheme or
plan short of a gratuitous distribution of property, which will not
be held to be in violation of the Gambling Law, and repugnant to
the Postal law. It is for the courts to look beyond the fair exterior,
to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and the
pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent.
The purpose of El Debate in devising its advertising scheme was to
augment its circulation and thus to increase the number of
newspaper readers in the Philippines — which is commendable.
But the advertisement carries along with it a lottery scheme —
which is not commendable.
The evils to society arising from the encouragement of the
gambling spirit have been recognized here and elsewhere.
Experience has shown that the common forms of gambling are
comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the
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widespread pestilence of lotteries. The former are confined to a
few persons and places, but the latter infest the whole
community; they enter every dwelling; they reach every class;
they prey upon the hard-earned wages of the poor; they plunder
the ignorant and simple. Punitive and condemnatory laws must,
therefore, be interpreted and enforced by the courts in a way
calculated to secure the object sought Open the door of chance
but a little, for one scheme, however ingeniously and
meritoriously conceived, to pass through, and soon the whole
country will be flooded with lotteries.
Meeting, therefore, the issues in the case, we rule that the
Director of Posts acted advisedly in refusing the use of the mails
for the issue of El Debate which contained the announcement of
its guessing contest, and that said contests is a lottery, or gift
enterprise depending in part upon lot or chance, within the
meaning of the Postal Law.
The demurrer interposed by the Attorney-General is sustained,
and unless the petitioner shall, within five days, so amend the
complaint as to state a cause of action, the case shall be
dismissed, with costs. So ordered.
UY HA, petitioner-appellant,  of the general welfare clause of the city and that pinball machine
vs.
THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, ET AL., respondent. THE CITY OF
MANILA, intervenor-appellant.
FACTS: On December 24, 1957, the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila enacted Ordinance no. 3941, which was approved by the
mayor on January 3, 1958, providing, among others, that "no
license for the installation and/or operation of machines and
apparatus commonly known as 'Pinball' machines shall be granted
under any circumstances." Thereafter, the mayor ordered the
confiscation of all "pinball machines" which are being used in
violation of said ordinance within the city. Petitioner, who was
engaged in the business of operating "pinball machines" within
the city prior to the approval of said ordinance, applied for license
for the current year, but was refused, whereupon he filed the
present petition before the Court of First Instance of Manila
seeking to enjoin the enforcement of said ordinance on the
ground that said "pinball machines" are devised for amusement
and not for gambling and so said ordinance is invalid and
unconstitutional.
On February 20, 1958, respondents filed their answer stating that
the "pinball machines" operated by petitioner are specially
designed for gambling and as such their operation is prohibited by
law; that said ordinance is not discriminatory; that "pinball
machines" being designed for gambling, the operation of which
chiefly depending on chance, are a constant temptation to young
people in whom gambling may easily become deep-rooted; and
that "pinball machines" are deleterious to the moral, economic
and physical well-being of the people who indulge in them,
especially youngsters and schoolchildren, so that their operation
may be prohibited under Section 18 (kk) of Republic Act No. 409.
The City of Manila, which has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, was allowed to intervene, and in its complaint it alleged
that petitioner had been engaged in the business of operating
eight "pinball machines" in the City of Manila from the first
quarter of 1956 up to the present without first paying the annual
license fee of P300.00 for each machine in accordance with the
provisions of Section 774 of the Revised Ordinance, as amended
by Ordinance No. 3628, thereby becoming indebted to the
intervenor in the total sum of P4,620.00, including the surcharge
of 10% for non-payment. Petitioner answered this complaint
stating that he had already paid the corresponding fees for his
eight "pinball machines" for 1956 and the first half of 1957 and
that tender of payment for the second half of 1957 was refused
by the intervenor. He also claims that Ordinance No. 3628 is null
and void as it is not merely regulatory but a revenue measure
which is beyond the power of the City of Manila to enact.
After trial, the court rendered decision holding that "pinball
machines" are gambling devices and as such are proper subjects
joints cannot be considered places of amusements within the
purview of Republic Act 1224. However, it denied the claim of
intervenor for unpaid license fees on the ground that "it is
doubtful whether the increase of annual license fee from P50.00
to P300.00 can be justified under its police power, or under
Section 18(1) of its Charter, neither of which authorizes the
imposition of a tax measure."
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT, "pinball machines" gambling devices
the operation of which is prohibited by law; and (2) is Ordinance
No. 3941 of the City of Manila valid and constitutional?
HELD:
With regard to the first issue, we quote with approval the
following observation of the trial court:
Pinball machines generally consists of a playing surface,
containing obstacles and apertures, upon which balls or marbles,
obtained by inserting the required coin in the slot, are propelled
by various methods but uniformly with the object of dropping
such balls or marbles into particular apertures designated as
scoring or "pay-off" holes (39 CJS 66). Dets. Cezar Zaballa and
Numeriano Cortez upon order of the Chief of the Detective
Bureau conducted a three-day observation on the operation of
the one-ball pinball machine and found that the chance of
winning of a skilled player is 4.5% while that of a non-skilled
player is only 3.34% (Exhibit 6, pp. 1-4). They further observed
that the persons patronizing these joints are school children
carrying books and idle adults.
The foregoing observation made with respect to the non-flipper
or one-ball type which are invariably played for money is not
radically different from the conditions obtaining in the flipper or
5-ball type which where the object of ocular inspection. During
the ocular inspection, the Fiscal spent P0.60 without winning a
replay, while the presiding Judge spent P1.00 with only one
replay. In other words, for three games, P1.00 was lost. The result
depends mainly on chance or luck. The criterion is based not on
the skilled player but on the general public patronizing same. in
the flipper type, the prize is a chance at replay and the chances
are enhanced in proportion to the amount paid per game. Then
too, the replays one wins may be easily converted into cash by the
operator.
Pinball machines have generally been held gambling devices, it
has been held that "Under statute penalizing as a misdemeanour
operation of any game of chance played with any devise of
money, checks, credit or any representatives of value, a pin-ball
machine in the operation of which the certain amount of skill
could be developed, but which as played by patronizing public
was purely a game of chance, and which paid off in trade checks if
metal ball shot from spring or mechanical device fell into proper
hole designated by lighted number on back of machine which
changed each time machine was played, was a "gambling device"
and building in which it was used was properly enjoined as a
"nuisance". And in State ex rel. Green vs. One 5c Fifth Inning Base
Ball Machines, 3 So. 2nd 27, 28, it has been held that "A device
which was termed a "fifth winning baseball machine" and was
operated by placing nickel in slot, which released certain balls and
by ejecting balls on board by pulling a plunger and striking
againsts the balls, which would then strike projections or bumpers
on the board, a higher score resulting by striking a certain number
than by striking others, was a "game of chance" subject to
condemnation as a "gambling device" under codal provisions
relating to suppression of gambling devices." The proper test as to
whether a machine is a gambling device is whether it encourages
the gambling instinct (Dussault Case, Supra). Furthermore, "a
machine which return merchandise of the value of the coin played
therein and, in addition, a chance of receiving a varying amount of
checks which may be used to pay the machine for amusement
only is a gambling device the right to continue the operation of
the machine for amusement being a thing of value within statutes
directed against gaming. Under the foregoing authorities,
petitioner's non-flipper machines are clearly gambling devices;
while the flipper type should likewise be considered as gambling
devices due to their tendency to encourage the gambling instinct,
which lead to idleness, economic waste, dislike for work and
criminality especially among children of school age who are
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attracted by the lure and novelty of the machine. They are,
therefore proper subjects and object of the general welfare clause
of the City of Manila. It further results that pinball machines joints
cannot be considered "places of amusements" within the purview
of Republic Act 1224 as to affect the question at issue.
We fully agree with the trial court that "pinball machines" in the
different forms in which they are operated are gambling devices
in that the winning therein depends wholly upon chance or
hazard. They are inimical to the general welfare because they
tend to corrupt the people especially youngsters and
schoolchildren robbing them of their money and of their savings
earned by the sweat of their brow. Their operation should
therefore be suppressed not only because they are prohibited by
law but because they are injurious to public welfare. Being
gambling devices or contrivances the operation of which depends
upon chance, they are not only prohibited but are penalized by
Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code.
"Pinballl machines" being specially designed for gambling and as
such prohibited by law had been properly suppressed when the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
3941 providing therein that no license for their installation or
operation shall be granted under any circumstances. In this sense,
said ordinance cannot be held to be invalid or unconstitutional; on
the contrary, it properly comes under the general welfare clause
of the Charter of the City of Manila.
It is true that under Section 18(1) of Act 409, known as Revised
Charter of the City of Manila, the municipal board is given the
power to regulate and fix the amount of license fees for the
operation of certain devices, among them,slot machines, but this
provision should be understood as referring merely to those types
of slot machines that are not per se gambling devices, for what is
prohibited by law cannot be the subject of regulation. In this
sense, Ordinance No. 3941 is valid and proper, for it only seeks to
regulate, as it does, the installation and operation of any
mechanical contrivance not otherwise prohibited by law. But
"pinball machines" are not included in this proviso. They have
been properly suppressed.
A slot machine is not per se a gambling device, since it may be
used and played upon for innocent purposes, and courts cannot,
therefore, take judicial notice that every slot machine is a
gambling device because use to which it is put must determine its
character.
"Slot machine" is not per se a gambling device, but is only such
where it delivers some commodity in varying quantity, or where
player may receive, depending on chance, something of value or
token of some kind redeemable for something of value, or where
there is some other element that appeals to the gambling instinct
Since Ordinance No. 3628 seeks to regulate and license the
operation of "pinball machines" within the City of Manila upon
payment of an annual license of P300.00 for each "pinball
machines", the same is ultra vires, it being an exercise of power
not granted by law to the intervenor. As already stated, those
devices are prohibited by law and as such are not subject to
regulation. The attempt, therefore, on the part of the intervenor
to collect the sum of P4,620.00 as unpaid license fees under said
ordinance cannot be entertained.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
MANUEL UY, plaintiff-appellee,  business of selling sweepstakes and lottery tickets issued by the
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as Postmaster
General, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
Manuel Uy filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Civil Case No. 55678) against the Postmaster General,
praying for an injunction to restrain said Postmaster General and
his subordinates, agents or representatives from enforcing Fraud
Order No. 3, dated November 22, 1963, declaring Manuel Uy
Sweepstakes Agency as conducting a lottery or gift enterprise and
directing all postmasters and other employees of the Bureau of
Posts concerned to return to the sender any mail matter
addressed to Manuel Uy Sweepstakes Agency or to any of its
agents or representatives with the notation "Fraudulent" stamped
upon the cover of such mail matter, and prohibiting the issuance
or payment of any money order or telegraphic transfer to the said
agency or to any of its agents and representatives.
As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of preliminary injunction
was issued ex parte by the lower court. The Postmaster General
moved for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction,
but the motion was denied.
The Postmaster General filed an answer to the complaint, setting
up the defense that Manuel Uy was conducting a lottery or gift
enterprise that is prohibited by law; that as Postmaster General
he has the authority to issue the fraud order in question and he
did not abuse his discretion in doing so; and that Manuel Uy had
not exhausted all the administrative remedies before invoking
judicial intervention.
The lower court, on the basis of the stipulation of facts submitted
by the parties declared Fraud Order No. 3 contrary to law and
violative of the rights of the plaintiff and made permanent the
preliminary injunction previously issued.
The Postmaster General appealed to this Court.
The salient facts gathered from the stipulation of facts and culled
from the briefs of the parties are as follows:
Manuel Uy (appellee, for short) is a duly authorized agent of the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO for short), a
government entity created and empowered by law to hold
sweepstakes draws and lotteries for charitable and public
purposes. As such agent of the PCSO appellee is engaged in the
sale and distribution of sweepstakes and lottery tickets which the
PCSO prints and issues for each and every one of the not less than
twenty draws that said office annually holds. To carry out its
PCSO appellee, upon authority of the said office, employs sub-
agents throughout the Philippines, through which sub-agents not
less than 70% of appellee's total sales for each draw are made;
and, with the consent of the PCSO appellee agrees to give 50% of
the agent's prize to the sub-agent selling the prize-winning ticket.
The agent's prize is 10% of the prize won by the ticket sold.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellee's "Grand Christmas Bonus Award" plan
constitutes a lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme proscribed
by the Postal Law, aforequoted, as would authorize the appellant
to issue the fraud order in question.
HELD:
Before we resolve the question, however, we wish to advert to
the claim of the appellant that he had made his decision based
upon satisfactory evidence that the "Grand Christmas Bonus
Award" plan of appellee is a lottery or gift enterprise for the
distribution of gifts by chance, and his decision in this regard
cannot be reviewed by the court. 4 Thus, the appellant, in his
brief, 5 says:
It is respectfully submitted that corollary to the rule that courts
cannot interfere in the performance of ordinary duties of the
executive department is the equally compelling rule that decisions
of the defendant on questions of fact are final and conclusive and
generally cannot be reviewed by the courts. For it cannot be
denied that the Postmaster General is charged with quasi-judicial
functions and vested with discretion in determining what is
mailable matter and in withholding from the plaintiff the privilege
of using the mail, the money order system and the telegraphic
transfer service... As the disputed, Fraud Order No. 3 was issued
pursuant to the powers vested in the defendant by the Postal Law
and in accordance with satisfactory evidence presented to him, it
cannot be said that the defendant was palpably wrong or that his
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decision had no reasonable basis whatever. Neither can it be said
that he exceeded his authority nor that he abused his discretion.
That the conduct of the post office is a part of the administrative
department of the government is entirely true, but that does not
necessarily and always oust the courts of jurisdiction to grant
relief to a party aggrieved by any action by the head, or one of the
subordinate officials, of that Department, which is unauthorized
by the statute under which he assumes to act. The acts of all its
officers must be justified by some law, and in case an official
violates the law to the injury of an individual the courts generally
have jurisdiction to grant relief.
Considered in the light of the foregoing elucidations the
conclusion is irresistible that since in the instant case the element
of consideration is lacking, the plan or scheme in question is also
not a "gift enterprise" or a "similar scheme" proscribed by the
Postal Law.
Not being a lottery, gift enterprise or similar scheme, appellee's
"Grand Christmas Bonus Award" plan can be considered a scheme
for the gratuitous distribution of personal property by chance
which the Postal Law does not condemn. Thus, in labelling said
scheme as a lottery or gift enterprise when it is not, appellant not
only committed a palpable error of law but also exceeded his
statutory authority in issuing the fraud order in question. The
power of the appellant to issue a fraud order under the Postal
Law is dependent upon the existence of a lottery, gift enterprise
or similar scheme.
Accordingly, the lower court did not err in declaring the fraud
order in question contrary to law and in substituting its judgement
for that of the appellant. The lower court did not also err in
issuing the writ of injunction, the remedy adequate, speedy and
appropriate under the circumstances.lawphi1.nêt
... The Postmaster General's order being the result of a mistaken
view of the law, could not operate as a defense to his action on
the part of the defendant, though it might justify his obedience
thereto until some action of the court. In such a case as the one
before us there is no adequate remedy at law, the injunction to
prohibit the further withholding of the mail from complaint being
the only remedy at all adequate to the full relief to which the
complainants are entitled.... 27
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby, affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
August 23, 1906
G.R. No. 2785
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE CATAJAY, defendant-appellant.
G.E. Campbell, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The trial court found be accused guilty of the crime of public
scandal in violation of the provisions of article 441 of Penal Code.
It appears, however, that the acts complained of were committed
at night, in a private house, and at a time when no one was
present except the accused, the mistress of the house, and one
servant, and we are of opinion that these circumstances do not
constitute that degree of publicity which is an essential element
of the crime defined and penalized in article 441 of the Pnal Code.
(Decision of the supreme court of Spain, April 13, 1885.)
The correct construction of this article well stated by Viada in his
commentary on article 457 of the Penal Code of Spain, which
exactly corresponds with the article in question.
There can be no doubt that the accused committed the offense
defined and penalized in No. 2 of the article 571 of the Penal
Code, which corresponds with the above-mentioned number 2 of
article 586 of the Penal Code of Spain, and provides that a penalty
of from one of ten days' arrest and a fine of from 15 to 125
pesetas shall vbe imposed upon--
2. Those who, by exhibiting prints or engravings, or by means of
other acts, shall offend against good morals and custom without
committing a crime.
Since this is a lesser offense that the one charged in the
complaint, and is included therein, we find him guilt of a violation
of the provisions of the said article and, reversing the sentence of
the trial court, we impose upon the accused, Jose Catajay, the
penalty of the ten days' imprisonment (arresto), and the payment
of a fine of 125 pesetas, and the costs of the trial in both
instances. After the expiration of ten days from the date of final
judgment let the cause be remanded to the lower court for
proper procedure. So ordered.
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