G.R. No.
138334               August 25, 2003  Despite several demands, respondent company refused to reimburse the amount, contending that the same
ESTELA L. CRISOSTOMO, Petitioner,
vs.
The Court of Appeals and CARAVAN TRAVEL & TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondents.
FACTS
 In May 1991, petitioner Estela L. Crisostomo contracted the services of respondent Caravan Travel and Tours
International, Inc. to arrange and facilitate her booking, ticketing and accommodation in a tour dubbed "Jewels of
Europe".
 Petitioner was given a 5% discount on the amount, which included airfare, and the booking fee was also waived
because petitioner’s niece, Meriam Menor, was respondent company’s ticketing manager.
 Pursuant to said contract, Menor went to her aunt’s residence on June 12, 1991 – a Wednesday – to deliver
petitioner’s travel documents and plane tickets. Petitioner, in turn, gave Menor the full payment for the package
tour.
 Menor then told her to be at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) on Saturday, two hours before her
flight on board British Airways.
 Without checking her travel documents, petitioner went to NAIA on Saturday, to take the flight for the first leg
of her journey from Manila to Hongkong.
 To petitioner’s dismay, she discovered that the flight she was supposed to take had already departed the
previous day.
 She learned that her plane ticket was for the flight scheduled on June 14, 1991. She thus called up Menor to
complain.
 Subsequently, Menor prevailed upon petitioner to take another tour – the "British Pageant
 For this tour package, petitioner was asked anew to pay US$785.00 or P20,881.00 (at the then prevailing
exchange rate of P26.60). She gave respondent US$300 or P7,980.00 as partial payment and commenced the trip
in July 1991.
 Upon petitioner’s return from Europe, she demanded from respondent the reimbursement of P61,421.70,
representing the difference between the sum she paid for "Jewels of Europe" and the amount she owed
respondent for the "British Pageant" tour.
was non-refundable.
  Petitioner was thus constrained to file a complaint against respondent for breach of contract of carriage and
damages
 Petitioner alleged that
1. her failure to join "Jewels of Europe" was due to respondent’s fault since it did not clearly indicate the
departure date on the plane ticket.
2. Respondent was also negligent in informing her of the wrong flight schedule through its employee Menor.
3. She insisted that the "British Pageant" was merely a substitute for the "Jewels of Europe" tour, such that the
cost of the former should be properly set-off against the sum paid for the latter.
 respondent company, through its Operations Manager, Concepcion Chipeco, denied responsibility for
petitioner’s failure to join the first tour.
 Chipeco insisted that
1. petitioner was informed of the correct departure date, which was clearly and legibly printed on the plane
ticket.
2. The travel documents were given to petitioner two days ahead of the scheduled trip.
3. Petitioner had only herself to blame for missing the flight, as she did not bother to read or confirm her flight
schedule as printed on the ticket.
 Respondent explained that it can no longer reimburse the amount paid for "Jewels of Europe", considering that
the same had already been remitted to its principal in Singapore, Lotus Travel Ltd
 respondent maintained that the "British Pageant" was not a substitute for the package tour that petitioner
missed. This tour was independently procured by petitioner after realizing that she made a mistake in missing her
flight for "Jewels of Europe".
 Petitioner was allowed to make a partial payment of only US$300.00 for the second tour because her niece was
then an employee of the travel agency. Consequently, respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay the
balance of P12,901.00 for the "British Pageant" package tour
RTC
1. Ordering the defendant to return and/or refund to the plaintiff the amount of P53,989.43 with legal interest By definition, a contract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a certain person or association of persons
thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum starting January 16, 1992, the date when the complaint obligate themselves to transport persons, things, or news from one place to another for a fixed price.
was filed;
 
Such person or association of persons are regarded as carriers and are classified as private or special carriers
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of (P5,000.00) Pesos as and for reasonable attorney’s and common or public carriers.
fees;
 
A common carrier is defined under Article 1732 of the Civil Code as persons, corporations, firms or associations
3. Dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim, for lack of merit engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
4. With costs against the defendant.
It is obvious from the above definition that respondent is not an entity engaged in the business of transporting
 Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals either passengers or goods and is therefore, neither a private nor a common carrier.

CA Respondent did not undertake to transport petitioner from one place to another since its covenant with its
customers is simply to make travel arrangements in their behalf.
 REVERSED and SET ASIDE RTC DECISION
Respondent’s services as a travel agency include procuring tickets and facilitating travel permits or visas as well
as booking customers for tours.
 found both parties to be at fault.
 However, the appellate court held that petitioner is more negligent than respondent because as a
lawyer and well-traveled person, she should have known better than to simply rely on what was told to For reasons of public policy, a common carrier in a contract of carriage is bound by law to carry passengers as
her. far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons and with due
regard for all the circumstances. 11 As earlier stated, however, respondent is not a common carrier but a travel
agency.
 This being so, she is not entitled to any form of damages. Petitioner also forfeited her right to the "Jewels of
Europe" tour and must therefore pay respondent the balance of the price for the "British Pageant" tour.
G.R. No. L-47822 December 22, 1988
xxx
PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO CENDANA,
 Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration,  petitioner filed the instant petition under Rule 45 on the
following grounds: FACTS

Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial
court by ruling that the petitioner is not entitled to a refund of the cost of unavailed "Jewels of Europe" tour she
being equally, if not more, negligent than the private respondent, for in the contract of carriage the common
carrier is obliged to observe utmost care and extra-ordinary diligence which is higher in degree than the
ordinary diligence required of the passenger.
ISSUE
 Respondent Ernesto Cendana, a junk dealer, was engaged in buying up used bottles and scrap metal in
Pangasinan. Upon gathering sufficient quantities of such scrap material, respondent would bring such material
to Manila for resale.
 On the return trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicles with cargo which various merchants
wanted delivered to differing establishments in Pangasinan. For that service, respondent charged freight rates
which were commonly lower than regular commercial rates.

W/N CARAVAN TRAVEL & TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC. is a common carrier  etitioner Pedro de Guzman a merchant and authorized dealer of General Milk Company (Philippines), Inc. in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, contracted with respondent for the hauling of 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk from a
warehouse of General Milk in Makati, Rizal, to petitioner's establishment in Urdaneta
W/NHonorable Court erred in not granting to the petitioner the consequential damages due her as a result of
breach of contract of carriage
 Accordingly, respondent loaded in Makati the merchandise on to his trucks: 150 cartons were loaded on a truck
driven by respondent himself, while 600 cartons were placed on board the other truck which was driven by
RULING
Manuel Estrada, respondent's driver and employee.
 Only 150 boxes of Liberty filled milk were delivered to petitioner. The other 600 boxes never reached petitioner,
since the truck which carried these boxes was hijacked somewhere along the MacArthur Highway in Paniqui,
Tarlac, by armed men who took with them the truck, its driver, his helper and the cargo.’
 petitioner commenced action against private respondent in the CFI of Pangasinan, demanding payment of P
22,150.00, the claimed value of the lost merchandise, plus damages and attorney's fees.
1. Petitioner argued that private respondent, being a common carrier, and having failed to exercise the
extraordinary diligence required of him by the law, should be held liable for the value of the undelivered goods.
 In his Answer, private respondent denied that he was a common carrier and argued that he could not be held
responsible for the value of the lost goods, such loss having been due to force majeure.
RTC
the trial court rendered a Decision finding private respondent to be a common carrier and holding him liable for
the value of the undelivered goods (P 22,150.00) as well as for P 4,000.00 as damages and P 2,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
XXX
 On appeal before the Court of Appeals, respondent urged that the trial court had erred in considering him a
common carrier; in finding that he had habitually offered trucking services to the public; in not exempting him
from liability on the ground of force majeure; and in ordering him to pay damages and attorney's fees.
CA
The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the following terms:
Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying
or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the
public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or
goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom as "a sideline"). Article
1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on
a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither
does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the " general public," i.e., the general
community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the
general population. We think that Article 1733 deliberaom making such distinctions.
common carrier" under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with the notion of "public service,"
It appears to the Court that private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he
merely "back-hauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although such back-hauling was done
on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled manner, and even though private
respondent's principal  occupation was not the carriage of goods for others. There is no dispute that private
respondent charged his customers a fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight
rates is not relevant here.
A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisions
governing common carriers. That liability arises the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier, without
regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the requirements of the applicable regulatory statute
and implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or other franchise.

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that respondent had been engaged in
transporting return loads of freight "as a casual occupation — a sideline to his scrap iron business" and not as a
common carrier. Petitioner came to this Court by way of a Petition for Review assigning as errors the following
conclusions of the Court of Appeals:
1. that private respondent was not a common carrier;
We turn then to the liability of private respondent as a common carrier.
Common carriers, "by the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy"  2 are held to a very high degree
of care and diligence ("extraordinary diligence") in the carriage of goods as well as of passengers. The specific
import of extraordinary diligence in the care of goods transported by a common carrier is, according to Article
1733, "further expressed in Articles 1734,1735 and 1745, numbers 5, 6 and 7" of the Civil Code.

2. that the hijacking of respondent's truck was force majeure; and Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods which they carry, "unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
3. that respondent was not liable for the value of the undelivered cargo.
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity;
ISSUE (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character-of the goods or defects in the packing or-in the containers; and
whether or not private respondent Ernesto Cendana may, under the facts earlier set forth, be properly
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
characterized as a common carrier.

It is important to point out that the above list of causes of loss, destruction or deterioration which exempt the
RULING
common carrier for responsibility therefor, is a closed list.
As noted earlier, the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods is, under Article 1733, given
additional specification not only by Articles 1734 and 1735 but also by Article 1745, numbers 4, 5 and 6, Article
1745 provides in relevant part:
Under Article 1745 (6) above, a common carrier is held responsible — and will not be allowed to divest or to
diminish such responsibility — even for acts of strangers like thieves or robbers,  except where such thieves or
robbers in fact acted "with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force." We believe and so hold that the limits of
the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as
a result of a robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force."
In the instant case, armed men held up the second truck owned by private respondent which carried petitioner's
cargo. The record shows that an information for robbery in band was filed - The decision of the trial court shows
that the accused acted with grave, if not irresistible, threat, violence or force. 3 Three (3) of the five (5) hold-uppers
were armed with firearms. The robbers not only took away the truck and its cargo but also kidnapped the driver
and his helper, detaining them for several days and later releasing them in another province (in Zambales). The
hijacked truck was subsequently found by the police in Quezon City. The Court of First Instance convicted all the
accused of robbery, though not of robbery in band.  4
In these circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the
control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that even
common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and are not
held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied
with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence.
We, therefore, agree with the result reached by the Court of Appeals that private respondent Cendana is not
liable for the value of the undelivered merchandise which was lost because of an event entirely beyond private
respondent's control.
LTFRB
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
MAY 8 2015 - DOTC, the predecessor of DOTr, issued Department Order No. (DO) 2015-11, amending DO 97-1097,
which set the standard classifications for public transport conveyances to be used as basis for the issuance of a
Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) for public utility vehicles (PUVs).
In recognition of technological innovations which allowed for the proliferation of new ways of delivering and
offering public transportation, the DOTC, thru DO 2015-11, created two (2) new classifications, namely,
Transportation Network Companies (TNC) and Transportation Network Vehicle Service (TNVS).
TNC DEFINITION under DO 2015-11
an "organization whether a corporation, partnership, sole proprietor, or other form, that provides pre-arranged
transportation services for compensation using an online-enabled application or platform technology to connect
passengers with drivers using their personal vehicles."
Although DO 2015-11 made mention of TNVS, the term was not clearly defined until June 19, 2017, when the DOTr
issued DO 2017-11 which set the rules and procedures on the issuance of franchises for public transport routes
and services, including TNCs and TNVS.
TNVS DEFINITION under DO 2017-11
TNVS is defined as "a [PUV] accredited with a [TNC], which is granted authority or franchise by the LTFRB to run a
public transport service."
DO 2017-11 further provided in Item 2.2 thereof that "[m]otorcycles x x x are likewise not allowed as public
transport conveyance."
Consequently, the LTFRB issued various memorandum circulars to govern the issuance of the necessary CPC for a
TNVS and the accreditation of a TNC.
In its issuances, the LTFRB declared that a TNC is treated as a transport provider. Whose accountability
commences from the acceptance by its TNVS while online. On the other hand, the accountability of the TNVS, as a
common carrier, attaches from the time the TNVS is online and offers its services to the riding public.
FACTS OF THE CASE
 MAY 26, 2016 - , DBDOYC registered its business with the SEC and subsequently, in December
2016, launched "Angkas," an online and on-demand motorcycle-hailing mobile application
(Angkas or Angkas app) that pairs drivers of motorcycles with potential passengers without,
however, obtaining the mandatory certificate of TNC accreditation from the LTFRB. In this
regard, DBDOYC accredited Angkas drivers and allowed them to offer their transport services to
the public despite the absence of CPCs.
 Cognizant of the foregoing, the LTFRB issued a press release on January 27, 2017 informing the
riding public that DBDOYC, which is considered as a TNC, cannot legally operate. Despite such
warning, however, DBDOYC continued to operate and offer its services to the riding public sans
any effort to obtain a certificate of TNC accreditation.
 In response, DBDOYC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Application for TRO/Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against petitioners before the RTC alleging that:
(a) it is not a public transportation provider since Angkas app is a mere tool that connects the
passenger and the motorcycle driver;
(b) Angkas and its drivers are not engaged in the delivery of a public service;
(c) alternatively, should it be determined that it is performing a public service that requires the
issuance of a certificate of accreditation and/or CPC, then DO 2017-11 should be declared
 invalid because it violates Section 7 of Republic Act No. (RA) 4136 or the "Land and
Transportation Traffic Code," which does not prohibit motorcycles from being used as a PUV;
and
(d) neither the LTFRB nor the DOTr has jurisdiction to regulate motorcycles for hire.
RTC:
Issued TRO and WPI finding DBDOYC's business not subject to any regulation nor prohibited under existing law. It
added that since the use of DBDOYC's internet-based mobile application is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy, a clear and unmistakable right has been established in favor of DBDOYC
such that if petitioners prohibit the operation of Angkas, the same would cause irreparable injury to the company.
ISSUE:
W/N TNC & TNVS such as Angkas are Common Carriers which fall under the scope of the term “Public Service”.
RULING: RTC to conduct further proceedings
As stated in the Public Service Act, the term "public service" covers any person who owns, operates, manages, or
controls in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent,
occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes,  any common carrier. The Civil Code defines
"common earners" in the following terms:
Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business
of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation,
offering their services to the public. (Emphases supplied)
For its part, DBDOYC claims reprieve from the above-stated regulatory measures, claiming that it and its accredited
drivers are not common carriers or transportation providers. It argues that "[its] technology [only] allows a biker
willing to give a ride and a passenger willing to pay the set price to meet and contract with each other. Under this
set-up, an Angkas biker does not offer his/her service to an indefinite public." Since the application "merely pairs
an Angkas biker with a potential passenger under a fare scheme which [DBDOYC] fixes for both, [DBDOYC] may not
compel an Angkas driver to pick up a potential passenger even after the latter confirms a booking because as
between the biker and the passenger, there is but a purely private contractual arrangement."
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as "a
sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering
transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general
public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article [1732] deliberately refrained from making such
distinctions.
So understood, the concept of "common carrier" under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with the
notion of "public service," under the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least
partially supplements the law on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code. x x x.  (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
At any rate, even if it is assumed that Angkas-accredited bikers are not treated as common carriers and hence,
would not make DBDOYC fall under the "public service" definition, it does not necessarily mean that the business
of holding out private motorcycles for hire is a legitimate commercial venture. Section 7 of RA 4136 states that:
Section 7. Registration Classification. - Every motor vehicle shall be registered under one of the following
described classifications:
(a) private passenger automobiles; (b) private trucks; and (c) private motorcycles, scooters, or motor
wheel attachments. Motor vehicles registered under these classifications shall not be used for hire
under any circumstances and shall not be used to solicit, accept, or be used to transport passengers or
freight for pay.
That being said, the Court therefore concludes that no clear and unmistakable right exists in DBDOYC's favor;
hence, the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed injunctive writ. In the final analysis, the business
of holding one's self out as a transportation service provider, whether done through online platforms or not,
appears to be one which is imbued with public interest and thus, deserves appropriate regulations.
The Order dated August 20, 2018 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 (RTC)
directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in R-MND-18-01453-SC is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
RTC is hereby ORDERED to conduct further proceedings, and thereafter, resolve R-MND-18-01453-SC with utmost
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

Planters
 PPI purchased from Mitsubishi of Urea 46% fertilizer which the latter shipped in bulk aboard the
cargo vessel M/V "Sun Plum" owned by private respondent KKKK.
 a time charter-party on the vessel M/V "Sun Plum" pursuant to the Uniform General Charter 2
was entered into between Mitsubishi as shipper/charterer and KKKK as shipowner.
 Before loading the fertilizer aboard the vessel, 4 of her holds 4 were all presumably inspected by
the charterer’s representative and found fit to take a load of urea in bulk pursuant to par. 16 of
the charter-party.
 After the Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by stevedores hired by and under the supervision of
the shipper, the steel hatches were closed with heavy iron lids, covered with 3 layers of
tarpaulin, then tied with steel bonds. The hatches remained closed and tightly sealed throughout
the entire voyage.
 Upon arrival of the vessel at her port of call, the steel pontoon hatches were opened with the use
of the vessel’s boom. Petitioner unloaded the cargo from the holds into its steel-bodied dump
trucks which were parked alongside the berth, using metal scoops attached to the ship, pursuant
to the terms and conditions of the charter-party (which provided for an F.I.O.S. clause). The
hatches remained open throughout the duration of the discharge.
 Each time a dump truck was filled up, its load of Urea was covered with tarpaulin before it was
transported to the consignee’s warehouse located some 5Ometers from the wharf. Midway to
the warehouse, the trucks were made to pass through a weighing scale where they were
individually weighed for the purpose of ascertaining the net weight of the cargo.
 It took 11 days to unload the cargo. The survey report submitted by CSCI to the consignee (PPI)
revealed a shortage in the cargo and that a portion of the Urea fertilizer was contaminated with
dirt. The same results were contained in a Certificate of Shortage/Damaged Cargo prepared by
PPI which showed that the cargo delivered was indeed short and were rendered unfit for
commerce, having been polluted with sand, rust and dirt.
 Consequently, PPI sent a claim letter SSA, the resident agent of the carrier, KKKK, representing
the cost of the alleged shortage in the goods shipped and the diminution in value of that portion
said to have been contaminated with dirt.
 PPI filed an action for damages with the CFI of Manila. The defendant carrier argued that the
strict public policy governing common carriers does not apply to them because they have
become private carriers by reason of the provisions of the charter-party.
RTC: Sustained the claim of Plaintiff against the defendant carrier for the value of the goods lost or damaged.
CA: Reversed. private respondent KKKK was a private carrier and not a common carrier by reason of the time
charter-party. Accordingly, the Civil Code provisions on common carriers which set forth a presumption of
negligence do not find application in the case at bar.
ISSUE:
W/N a common carrier became a private carrier by reason of time charter party.
RULING:
A "charter-party" is defined as a contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part thereof, is let by the
owner to another person for a specified time or use;
a contract of affreightment by which the owner of a ship or other vessel lets the whole or a part of her to a
merchant or other person for the conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration of the payment of
freight;
Charter parties are of two types:
(a) contract of affreightment which involves the use of shipping space on vessels leased by the owner in
part or as a whole, to carry goods for others; and,
(b) charter by demise or bareboat charter, by the terms of which the whole vessel is let to the charterer
with a transfer to him of its entire command and possession and consequent control over its navigation,
including the master and the crew, who are his servants.
Contract of affreightment may either be time charter, wherein the vessel is leased to the charterer for a fixed
period of time, or voyage charter, wherein the ship is leased for a single voyage.
The distinction between a "common or public carrier" and a "private or special carrier" lies in the character of the
business, such that if the undertaking is a single transaction, not a part of the general business or occupation,
although involving the carriage of goods for a fee, the person or corporation offering such service is a private
carrier.
Common Carrier Remain CC
It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole or
portion of a vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in the case of a time-
charter or voyage-charter.
Common Carrier to Private Carrier
It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew, as in a bareboat or demise that a common carrier
becomes private, at least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned. Indubitably, a
shipowner in a time or voyage charter retains possession and control of the ship, although her holds may, for the
moment, be the property of the charterer.
Respondent carrier has sufficiently overcome, by clear and convincing proof, the prima facie presumption of
negligence. The presumption of negligence on the part of respondent carrier has been efficaciously overcome by
the showing of extraordinary zeal and assiduity exercised by the carrier in the care of the cargo.
Respondent carrier presented a witness who testified on the characteristics of the fertilizer shipped and the
expected risks of bulk shipping. The primary cause of these spillages is the clamped shell which does not seal very
tightly. Also, the wind tends to blow away some of the materials during the unloading process.
Clearly, respondent carrier has sufficiently proved the inherent character of the goods which makes it highly
vulnerable to deterioration; as well as the inadequacy of its packaging which further contributed to the loss. On
the other hand, no proof was adduced by the petitioner showing that the carrier was remiss in the exercise of due
diligence in order to minimize the loss or damage to the goods it carried.
SPS PERENAS
 The Pereñas were engaged in the business of transporting students from their respective
residences and back.
 In their business, the Pereñas used a van which had the capacity to transport 14 students at a
time. They employed Clemente Alfaro (Alfaro) as driver of the van.
 In June 1996, the Zarates contracted the Pereñas to transport Aaron to and from Don Bosco.
 Aaron took his place on the left side of the van near the rear door. Considering that the students
were due at Don Bosco by 7:15 a.m., and that they were already running late because of the
heavy vehicular traffic on the South Superhighway, Alfaro took the van to an alternate route.
 At the time, the narrow path was marked by piles of construction materials and parked
passenger jeepneys, and the railroad crossing in the narrow path had no railroad warning signs,
or watchmen, or other responsible persons manning the crossing. In fact, the bamboo barandilla
was up, leaving the railroad crossing open to traversing motorists.
 At about the time the van was to traverse the railroad crossing, PNR Commuter No. 302 (train),
operated by Alano, was in the vicinity of the Magallanes Interchange travelling northbound.
 As the train neared the railroad crossing, Alfaro drove the van eastward across the railroad
tracks, closely tailing a large passenger bus. His view of the oncoming train was blocked
because he overtook the passenger bus on its left side.
 The train blew its horn to warn motorists of its approach. When the train was about 50 meters
away from the passenger bus and the van, Alano applied the ordinary brakes of the train. He
applied the emergency brakes only when he saw that a collision was imminent.
 The passenger bus successfully crossed the railroad tracks, but the van driven by Alfaro did not.
The train hit the rear end of the van, and the impact threw nine of the 12 students in the rear,
including Aaron, out of the van. Aaron landed in the path of the train, which dragged his body
and severed his head, instantaneously killing him.
 Alano fled the scene on board the train, and did not wait for the police investigator to arrive.
 Devastated Zarates commenced this action for damages against Alfaro, the Pereñas, PNR and
Alano.
 In their defense, the Pereñas adduced evidence to show that they had exercised the diligence of
a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of Alfaro, by making sure that Alfaro
had been issued a driver’s license and had not been involved in any vehicular accident prior to
the collision; that their own son had taken the van daily; and that Teodoro Pereña had
sometimes accompanied Alfaro in the van’s trips transporting the students to school.
RTC
Perenas & PNR are severally and jointly liable. - cooperative gross negligence of the Pereñas and PNR had caused
the collision that led to the death of Aaron.
CA
Affrimed RTC's Decision
ISSUE:
W/N Perenas operated as a private carrier thus the diligence need to be exerciseby them is only due diligence of a
good father of family.
RULING:
No.
COMMON CARRIER PRIVATE CARRIER
DEFINITION
is a person, corporation, firm or is one who, without making the a common carrier because they held themselves out as a ready transportation indiscriminately to the students of a
association engaged in the activity a vocation, or without particular school living within or near where they operated the service and for a fee.
business of carrying orholding himself or itself out to
transporting passengers or goods the public as ready to act for all
or both, by land, water, or air, forwho may desire his or its
compensation, offering such services, undertakes, by special PLANTERS VS PERNAS
services to the public. agreement in a particular
instance only, to transport goods HOW COMMON CARRIER (VESSEL) BECAME A HOW COMMON CARRIER (VAN) WAS DETERMINED
or persons from one place to RPIVATE CARRIER OR REMAIN AS SUCH TO BE A COMMON CARRIER BY NATURE OF ITS
another either gratuitously or for BUSINESS.
hire.
GOVERNING LAWS
provisions on common carriers of The provisions on ordinary
the Civil Code, the Public Service contracts of the Civil Code
Act, and other special laws govern the contract of private
relating to transportation carriage.
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE
presumed to be at fault or to
have acted negligently in case of
the loss of the effects of
passengers, or the death or
injuries to passengers
DILIGENCE REQUIRED
A common carrier is required to The diligence required of a
observe extraordinary diligence private carrier is only ordinary,
that is, the diligence of a good
father of the family.

the true test for a common carrier is not the quantity or extent of the business actually transacted, or the number
and character of the conveyances used in the activity, but whether the

1. Undertaking is a part of the activity engaged in by the carrier that he has held out to the general
public as his business or occupation.
2. If the undertaking is a single transaction, not a part of the general business or occupation
engaged in, as advertised and held out to the general public, the individual or the entity
rendering such service is a private, not a common, carrier.
3. The question must be determined by the character of the business actually carried on by the
carrier, not by any secret intention or mental reservation it may entertain or assert when charged
with the duties and obligations that the law imposes.

Applying these considerations to the case before us, there is no question that the Pereñas as the operators of a
school bus service were: (a) engaged in transporting passengers generally as a business, not just as a casual
occupation; (b) undertaking to carry passengers over established roads by the method by which the business was
conducted; and (c) transporting students for a fee. Despite catering to a limited clientèle, the Pereñas operated as
 The hatches were sealed and could only be opened by representatives of Republic Flour Mills
Corporation.
 The vessel left Cagayan de Oro City and arrived at Manila. Republic Flour Mills Corporation was
advised of its arrival but it did not immediately commence the unloading operations.
 There were days when unloading had to be stopped due to variable weather conditions and
sometimes for no apparent reason at all. When the cargo was eventually unloaded there was a
shortage of 26.333 metric tons.
 The remaining merchandise was already moldy, rancid and deteriorating. The unloading
operations were completed (20) days after the arrival of the barge at the wharf of Republic Flour
Mills Corporation in Pasig City.
 Precision Analytical Services, Inc. was hired to examine the corn grains and determine the
cause of deterioration. A Certificate of Analysis was issued indicating that the corn grains had
18.56% moisture content and the wetting was due to contact with salt water. The mold growth
was only incipient and not sufficient to make the corn grains toxic and unfit for consumption. In
fact the mold growth could still be arrested by drying.
 Republic Flour Mills Corporation rejected the entire cargo and formally demanded from North
Front Shipping Services, Inc., payment for the damages suffered by it. The demands however
were unheeded. The insurance companies were perforce obliged to pay Republic Flour Mills
Corporation.
 By virtue of the payment made by the insurance companies they were subrogated to the rights
of Republic Flour Mills Corporation.

TABACALERA CONTENTION:

 Thusly, they lodged a complaint for damages against North Front Shipping Services, Inc.,
claiming that the loss was exclusively attributable to the fault and negligence of the carrier. The
Marine Cargo Adjusters hired by the insurance companies conducted a survey and found cracks
in the bodega of the barge and heavy concentration of molds on the tarpaulins and wooden
boards. They did not notice any seals in the hatches. The tarpaulins were not brand new as
there were patches on them, contrary to the claim of North Front Shipping Services, Inc., thus
making it possible for water to seep in. They also discovered that the bulkhead of the barge was
rusty.

NORTH FRONT CONTENTION:

 North Front Shipping Services, Inc., averred in refutation that it could not be made culpable for
G.R. No. 119197 May 16, 1997 the loss and deterioration of the cargo as it was never negligent. Captain Solomon Villanueva,
master of the vessel, reiterated that the barge was inspected prior to the actual loading and was
TABACALERA INSURANCE and NEW ZEALAND INSURANCE CO., found adequate and seaworthy. In addition, they were issued a permit to sail by the Coast
vs. Guard. The tarpaulins were doubled and brand new and the hatches were properly sealed. They
NORTH FRONT SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS,  did not encounter big waves hence it was not possible for water to seep in. He further averred
that the corn grains were farm wet and not properly dried when loaded.
 20,234 sacks of corn grains were shipped on board North Front 777, a vessel owned by North
Front Shipping Services, Inc. RTC RULING
 The cargo was consigned to Republic Flour Mills Corporation in Manila under Bill of Lading No.
001 and insured with the herein mentioned insurance companies. The court below dismissed the complaint and ruled that the contract entered into between North Front
 The vessel was inspected prior to actual loading by representatives of the shipper and was Shipping Services, Inc., and Republic Flour Mills Corporation was a charter-party agreement. As such,
found fit to carry the merchandise. The cargo was covered with tarpaulins and wooden boards. only ordinary diligence in the care of goods was required of North Front Shipping Services, Inc. The
inspection of the barge by the shipper and the representatives of the shipping company before actual
loading, coupled with the Permit to Sail issued by the Coast Guard, sufficed to meet the degree of
diligence required of the carrier.
CA RULING
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that as a common carrier required to observe a higher
degree of diligence North Front 777 satisfactorily complied with all the requirements hence was
issued a Permit to Sail after proper inspection. Consequently, the complaint was dismissed and the
motion for reconsideration rejected.
ISSUE
W/N North Front is a common carrier required to observe a higher degree of diligence.
RULING
YES. The charter-party agreement between North Front Shipping Services, Inc., and Republic Flour Mills
Corporation did not in any way convert the common carrier into a private carrier. We have already
resolved this issue with finality in Planters Products, Inc. v.  Court of Appeals -
It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the
charter of the whole or portion of a vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter
is limited to the ship only, as in the case of a time-charter or voyage-
charter (emphasis  supplied).
North Front Shipping Services, Inc., is a corporation engaged in the business of transporting cargo and
offers its services indiscriminately to the public. It is without doubt a common carrier. As such it is
required to observe extraordinary diligence in its vigilance over the goods it transports.  When goods
placed in its care are lost or damaged, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently. North Front Shipping Services, Inc., therefore has the burden of proving that it
observed extraordinary diligence in order to avoid responsibility for the lost cargo.
In Compania Maritima v. Court of Appeals  we ruled —
. . . Mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a common carrier, and of their
arrival at the place of destination in bad order, makes out prima facie case against the
common carrier, so that if no explanation is given as to how the loss, deterioration or
destruction of the goods occurred, the common carrier must be held responsible.
Otherwise stated, it is incumbent upon the common carrier to prove that the loss,
deterioration or destruction was due to accident or some other circumstances
inconsistent with its liability . . .
The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment
requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding
damage to, or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for safe carriage and delivery. It
requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and "to
use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristics of goods tendered
for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including such
methods as their nature requires" (emphasis supplied).
In fine, we find that the carrier failed to observe the required extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods placed in its care. The proofs presented by North Front Shipping Services, Inc., were
insufficient to rebut the  prima facie presumption of private respondent's negligence, more so if
we consider the evidence adduced by petitioners. It was shown during the trial that the vessel had
rusty bulkheads and the wooden boards and tarpaulins bore heavy concentration of molds. The tarpaulins
used were not new, contrary to the claim of North Front Shipping Services, Inc., as there were already
several patches on them, hence, making it highly probable for water to enter.
Laboratory analysis revealed that the corn grains were contaminated with salt water. North Front Shipping
Services, Inc., failed to rebut all these arguments. It did not even endeavor to establish that the loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods was due to the following: (a) flood, storm, earthquake, lightning,
or other natural disaster or calamity; (b) act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (c)
act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (d) the character of the goods or defects in the
packing or in the containers; (e) order or act of competent public authority. 6 This is a closed list. If the
cause of destruction, loss or deterioration is other than the enumerated circumstances, then the carrier is
rightly liable therefor.
However, we cannot attribute the destruction, loss or deterioration of the cargo solely to the carrier. We
find the consignee Republic Flour Mills Corporation guilty of contributory negligence. It was
seasonably notified of the arrival of the barge but did not immediately start the unloading operations. No
explanation was proffered by the consignee as to why there was a delay of six (6) days. Had the
unloading been commenced immediately the loss could have been completely avoided or at least
minimized. As testified to by the chemist who analyzed the corn samples, the mold growth was only at its
incipient stage and could still be arrested by drying. The corn grains were not yet toxic or unfit for
consumption. For its contributory negligence, Republic Flour Mills Corporation should share at least 40%
of the loss. 7
G.R. No. 143133           June 5, 2002 BELGIAN OVERSEAS CHARTERING AND SHIPPING N.V. and
JARDINE DAVIES TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC. vs. PHILIPPINE FIRST INSURANCE CO., INC.
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
 CMC Trading A.G. shipped on board the M/V 'Anangel Sky' at Hamburg, Germany 242
coils of various Prime Cold Rolled Steel sheets for transportation to Manila consigned
to the Philippine Steel Trading Corporation.
 M/V Anangel Sky arrived at the port of Manila and, within the subsequent days,
discharged the subject cargo.
 4 coils were found to be in bad order. Finding the 4 coils in their damaged state to be
unfit for the intended purpose, the consignee Philippine Steel Trading Corporation
declared the same as total loss. .
  "Despite receipt of a formal demand, defendants-appellees refused to submit to the
consignee's claim.
 Consequently, Philippine First Insurance paid the consignee and was subrogated to the
latter's rights and causes of action against Belgian.
 Subsequently, Respondent instituted this complaint for recovery of the amount paid by
them, to the consignee as insured.
Petitioner Contention.
1. Impugning the propriety of the suit against them, petitioner imputed that the damage and/or loss
was due to pre-shipment damage, to the inherent nature, vice or defect of the goods, or to perils,
danger and accidents of the sea, or to insufficiency of packing thereof, or to the act or omission
of the shipper of the goods or their representatives.
2. In addition thereto, petitioners argued that their liability, if there be any, should not exceed the
limitations of liability provided for in the bill of lading and other pertinent laws.
3. Finally, defendants-appellees averred that, in any event, they exercised due diligence and
foresight required by law to prevent any damage/loss to said shipment.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC dismissed the Complaint because respondent had failed to prove its claims with the quantum
of proof required by law.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In reversing the trial court, the CA ruled that petitioners were liable for the loss or the damage of the
goods shipped, because they had failed to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on
common carriers.
ISSUE
W/N petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of negligence of a common carrier
This Court's Ruling
YES.
Proof of Negligence
Petitioners contend that the presumption of fault imposed on common carriers should not be applied on
the basis of the lone testimony offered by private respondent. The contention is untenable.
Well-settled is the rule that common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence and vigilance with respect to the safety of the goods
and the passengers they transport. Thus, common carriers are required to render service with the
greatest skill and foresight and "to use all reason[a]ble means to ascertain the nature and characteristics
of the goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including such
methods as their nature requires." The extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time the goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of and received for transportation by the carrier until they are
delivered, actually or constructively, to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them.
Owing to this high degree of diligence required of them, common carriers, as a general rule, are
presumed to have been at fault or negligent if the goods they transported deteriorated or got lost or
destroyed. That is, unless they prove that they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the
goods. In order to avoid responsibility for any loss or damage, therefore, they have the burden of proving
that they observed such diligence.20
However, the presumption of fault or negligence will not arise  if the loss is due to any of the following
causes: (1) flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) an act of the
public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) an act or omission of the shipper or owner of the
goods; (4) the character of the goods or defects in the packing or the container; or (5) an order or act of
competent public authority. This is a closed list. If the cause of destruction, loss or deterioration is other
than the enumerated circumstances, then the carrier is liable therefor.
Corollary to the foregoing, mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a common carrier and of
their arrival in bad order at their destination constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence against
the carrier. If no adequate explanation is given as to how the deterioration, the loss or the destruction of
the goods happened, the transporter shall be held responsible.
That petitioners failed to rebut the prima facie presumption of negligence is revealed in the case
at bar by a review of the records and more so by the evidence adduced by respondent.
Further, petitioners failed to prove that they observed the extraordinary diligence and precaution which
the law requires a common carrier to know and to follow to avoid damage to or destruction of the goods
entrusted to it for safe carriage and delivery.
Package Limitation
Second, in Keng Hua Paper Products v. Court of Appeals, we held that a bill of lading was separate from
the Other Letter of Credit arrangements. We ruled thus:
"(T)he contract of carriage, as stipulated in the bill of lading in the present case, must be treated
independently of the contract of sale between the seller and the buyer, and the contract of
issuance of a letter of credit between the amount of goods described in the commercial invoice
in the contract of sale and the amount allowed in the letter of credit will not affect the validity and
enforceability of the contract of carriage as embodied in the bill of lading. As the bank cannot be
expected to look beyond the documents presented to it by the seller pursuant to the letter of
credit, neither can the carrier be expected to go beyond the representations of the shipper in the
bill of lading and to verify their accuracy vis-à-vis the commercial invoice and the letter of credit.
Thus, the discrepancy between the amount of goods indicated in the invoice and the amount in
the bill of lading cannot negate petitioner's obligation to private respondent arising from the
 contract of transportation."70
In the light of the foregoing, petitioners' liability should be computed based on US$500 per package and
not on the per metric ton price declared in the Letter of Credit. 71 In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,72 we explained the meaning of packages:
"When what would ordinarily be considered packages are shipped in a container supplied by the
carrier and the number of such units is disclosed in the shipping documents, each of those units
and not the container constitutes the 'package' referred to in the liability limitation provision of
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act."
Considering, therefore, the ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines and the fact that the Bill of Lading clearly
disclosed the contents of the containers, the number of units, as well as the nature of the steel sheets, the
four damaged coils should be considered as the shipping unit subject to the US$500 limitation.
G.R. No. 168151               September 4, 2009 REGIONAL CONTAINER LINES (RCL) OF SINGAPORE
and EDSA SHIPPING AGENCY, vs.THE NETHERLANDS INSURANCE CO. (PHILIPPINES), INC., 
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
 405 cartons of Epoxy Molding Compound were consigned to be shipped from Singapore to
Manila for Temic.
 U-Freight Singapore, a forwarding agent based in Singapore, contracted the services of Pacific
Eagle to transport the subject cargo. The cargo was packed, stored, and sealed by Pacific Eagle
in its Refrigerated Container.
 As the cargo was highly perishable, the inside of the container had to be kept at a temperature
of 0º Celsius.
 Pacific Eagle then loaded the refrigerated container on board the M/V Piya Bhum, a vessel
owned by RCL, with which Pacific Eagle had a slot charter agreement. RCL duly issued its own
Bill of Lading in favor of Pacific Eagle.
 To insure the cargo against loss and damage, Netherlands Insurance issued a Marine Open
Policy in favor of Temicand Marine Risk Note to cover all losses/damages to the shipment.
 The M/V Piya Bhum docked in Manila. After unloading the refrigerated container, it was plugged
to the power terminal of the pier to keep its temperature constant.
 Rocha, Vice-President for Operations of Marines Adjustment Corporation, accompanied by two
surveyors, conducted a protective survey of the cargo. They found that based on the
temperature chart, the temperature reading was constant from October 18, 1995 to October 25,
1995 at 0º Celsius.
 However, at midnight of October 25, 1995 – when the cargo had already been unloaded from
the ship – the temperature fluctuated with a reading of 33º Celsius. Rocha believed the
fluctuation was caused by the burnt condenser fan motor of the refrigerated container.
 Temic received the shipment. It found the cargo completely damaged. Temic filed a claim for
cargo loss against Netherlands Insurance, with supporting claims documents.
 The Netherlands Insurance paid Temic. Temic then executed a loss and subrogation receipt in
favor of Netherlands Insurance.
 Seven months from delivery of the cargo, Netherlands Insurance filed a complaint for
subrogation of insurance settlement with the RTC of Manila, against "the unknown owner of M/V
Piya Bhum" and TMS Ship Agencies (TMS).
 Netherlands Insurance amended the complaint to implead EDSA Shipping, RCL, Eagle Liner
Shipping Agencies, U-Freight Singapore, and U-Ocean (Phils.), Inc. (U-Ocean), as additional
defendants. A third amended complaint was later made, impleading Pacific Eagle in substitution
of Eagle Liner Shipping Agencies.
RTC
trial court handed down an Order dismissing Civil Case on demurrer to evidence. The trial court ruled
that while there was valid subrogation, the defendants could not be held liable for the loss or damage, as
their respective liabilities ended at the time of the discharge of the cargo from the ship at the Port
of Manila.
CA
RCL & EDSA – REVERSED
AGAINST OTHER DEFENDANTS - AFFIRMED
ISSUE
W/N the CA correctly held RCL and EDSA Shipping liable as common carriers under the theory of
presumption of negligence.
THE COURT’S RULING
The present case is governed by the following provisions of the Civil Code:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735,
and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set
forth in articles1755 and 1756.
ART. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods,
unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
3) Act of omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
5) Order or act of competent public authority.
ART. 1735. In all cases other that those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the preceding article, if the
goods are lost, destroyed, or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required by article
1733.
ART. 1736. The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the sane
are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right
to receive them, without prejudice to the provisions of articles 1738.
ART. 1738. The extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative even during the
time the goods are stored in a warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination, until the consignee has
been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or
otherwise dispose of them.
ART. 1742. Even if the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods should be caused by the character
of the goods, or the faulty nature of the packing or of the containers, the common carrier must exercise
due diligence to forestall or lessen the loss.
In Central Shipping Company, Inc. v. Insurance Company of North America, 6 we reiterated the rules for
the liability of a common carrier for lost or damaged cargo as follows:
(1) Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence over the goods they
transport, according to all the circumstances of each case;
(2) In the event of loss, destruction, or deterioration of the insured goods, common carriers are
responsible, unless they can prove that such loss, destruction, or deterioration was brought
about by, among others, "flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or
calamity"; and
(3) In all other cases not specified under Article 1734 of the Civil Code, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they observed extraordinary
diligence.7
In the present case, RCL and EDSA Shipping posit that the presumption of negligence provided in Article
1735 of the Civil Code should not apply. What applies in this case is Article 1734, particularly paragraphs
3 and 4 thereof, which exempts the carrier from liability for loss or damage to the cargo when it is caused
either by an act or omission of the shipper or by the character of the goods or defects in the packing or in
the containers. Thus, RCL and EDSA Shipping seek to lay the blame at the feet of other parties.
We do not find the arguments of RCL and EDSA Shipping meritorious.
A common carrier is presumed to have been negligent if it fails to prove that it exercised extraordinary
vigilance over the goods it transported.8 When the goods shipped are either lost or arrived in damaged
condition, a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, and there need
not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable.91avvphi1
To overcome the presumption of negligence, the common carrier must establish by adequate
proof that it exercised extraordinary diligence over the goods. It must do more than merely show
that some other party could be responsible for the damage.
In the present case, RCL and EDSA Shipping failed to prove that they did exercise that degree of
diligence required by law over the goods they transported. Indeed, there is sufficient evidence showing
that the fluctuation of the temperature in the refrigerated container van, as recorded in the temperature
chart, occurred after the cargo had been discharged from the vessel and was already under the custody
of the arrastre operator, ICTSI. This evidence, however, does not disprove that the condenser fan – which
caused the fluctuation of the temperature in the refrigerated container – was not damaged while the cargo
was being unloaded from the ship. It is settled in maritime law jurisprudence that cargoes while being
unloaded generally remain under the custody of the carrier; 11 RCL and EDSA Shipping failed to dispute
this.1avvphi1
RCL and EDSA Shipping could have offered evidence before the trial court to show that the damage to
the condenser fan did not occur: (1) while the cargo was in transit; (2) while they were in the act of
discharging it from the vessel; or (3) while they were delivering it actually or constructively to the
consignee. They could have presented proof to show that they exercised extraordinary care and diligence
in the handling of the goods, but they opted to file a demurrer to evidence. As the order granting their
demurrer was reversed on appeal, the CA correctly ruled that they are deemed to have waived their right
to present evidence,12 and the presumption of negligence must stand.
It is for this reason as well that we find RCL and EDSA Shipping’s claim that the loss or damage to the
cargo was caused by a defect in the packing or in the containers. To exculpate itself from liability for the
loss/damage to the cargo under any of the causes, the common carrier is burdened to prove any of the
causes in Article 1734 of the Civil Code claimed by it by a preponderance of evidence. If the carrier
succeeds, the burden of evidence is shifted to the shipper to prove that the carrier is negligent. 13 RCL and
EDSA Shipping, however, failed to satisfy this standard of evidence and in fact offered no evidence at all
on this point; a reversal of a dismissal based on a demurrer to evidence bars the defendant from
presenting evidence supporting its allegations.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Regional Container Lines of
Singapore and EDSA Shipping Agency. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 26, 2004 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 76690 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 153563             February 07, 2005
NATIONAL TRUCKING AND FORWARDING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, Respondent.
 DOH and the CARE. signed an agreement wherein CARE would acquire from the United States
government donations of non-fat dried milk and other food products. In turn, the Philippines
would transport and distribute the donated commodities to the intended beneficiaries in the
country.
 The government entered into a contract of carriage of goods with herein petitioner NTFC.
 Thus, the latter shipped 4,868 bags of non-fat dried milk through herein respondent LSC.
 The consignee named in the bills of lading issued by the respondent was Abdurahman Jama,
petitioner’s branch supervisor in Zamboanga City.
 On reaching the port of Zamboanga City, respondent’s agent unloaded the 4,868 bags of non-fat
dried milk and delivered the goods to petitioner’s warehouse.
 Before each delivery, delivery checkers of respondent’s agent requested Abdurahman to
surrender the original bills of lading, but the latter merely presented certified true copies thereof.
 Upon completion of each delivery, delivery checkers asked Abdurahman to sign the delivery
receipts. However, at times when Abdurahman had to attend to other business before a delivery
was completed, he instructed his subordinates to sign the delivery receipts for him.
 Notwithstanding the precautions taken, the petitioner allegedly did not receive the subject goods.
 Thus, petitioner NTFC filed a formal claim for non-delivery of the goods shipped through
respondent.
 In its letter, the respondent explained that the cargo had already been delivered to Abdurahman
Jama.
 The petitioner then decided to investigate the loss of the goods. But before the investigation was
over, Abdurahman Jama resigned as branch supervisor of petitioner.
 Noting but disbelieving respondent’s insistence that the goods were delivered, the government
through the DOH, CARE, and NTFC as plaintiffs filed an action for breach of contract of
carriage, against respondent as defendant, with the RTC of Manila.
RTC: DISMISSED
CA: AFFIRMED
ISSUE
W/N THE COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE AND APPLY THE LEGAL
STANDARD OF EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE IN THE SHIPMENT AND DELIVERY OF GOODS TO
THE RESPONDENT AS A COMMON CARRIER.
RULING
We rule for respondent.
Article 17338 of the Civil Code demands that a common carrier observe extraordinary diligence over the
goods transported by it. Extraordinary diligence is that extreme measure of care and caution which
persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their own property or
rights.9 This exacting standard imposed on common carriers in a contract of carriage of goods is intended
to tilt the scales in favor of the shipper who is at the mercy of the common carrier once the goods have
been lodged for shipment. Hence, in case of loss of goods in transit, the common carrier is presumed
under the law to have been at fault or negligent. 10 However, the presumption of fault or negligence, may
be overturned by competent evidence showing that the common carrier has observed extraordinary
diligence over the goods.
In the instant case, we agree with the court a quo that the respondent adequately proved that it
exercised extraordinary diligence. Although the original bills of lading remained with petitioner,
respondent’s agents demanded from Abdurahman the certified true copies of the bills of lading.
They also asked the latter and in his absence, his designated subordinates, to sign the cargo
delivery receipts.
This practice, which respondent’s agents testified to be their standard operating procedure, finds support
in Article 353 of the Code of Commerce:
ART. 353. . . .
After the contract has been complied with, the bill of lading which the carrier has issued shall be returned
to him, and by virtue of the exchange of this title with the thing transported, the respective obligations and
actions shall be considered cancelled, ….
In case the consignee, upon receiving the goods, cannot return the bill of lading subscribed by
the carrier, because of its loss or of any other cause, he must give the latter a receipt for the
goods delivered, this receipt producing the same effects as the return of the bill of lading.
(Emphasis supplied)
Conformably with the aforecited provision, the surrender of the original bill of lading is not a condition
precedent for a common carrier to be discharged of its contractual obligation. If surrender of the original
bill of lading is not possible, acknowledgment of the delivery by signing the delivery receipt
suffices. This is what respondent did.
We also note that some delivery receipts were signed by Abdurahman’s subordinates and not by
Abdurahman himself as consignee. Further, delivery checkers Rogelio and Ismael testified that
Abdurahman was always present at the initial phase of each delivery, although on the few occasions
when Abdurahman could not stay to witness the complete delivery of the shipment, he authorized his
subordinates to sign the delivery receipts for him. This, to our mind, is sufficient and substantial
compliance with the requirements.
We further note that, strangely, petitioner made no effort to disapprove Abdurahman’s resignation until PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
after the investigation and after he was cleared of any responsibility for the loss of the goods. With
Abdurahman outside of its reach, petitioner cannot now pass to respondent what could be Abdurahman’s
The Facts
negligence, if indeed he were responsible.
Battung boarded petitioner's bus in Delfin Albano, Isabela, bound for Manila.
On the second issue, petitioner submits there is no basis for the award of actual damages and attorney’s
fees. It maintains that its original complaint for sum of money with damages for breach of contract of
 Battung was seated at the first row behind the driver and slept during the ride.
carriage was not fraudulent, in bad faith, nor malicious. Neither was the institution of the action rash nor
precipitate. Petitioner avers the filing of the action was intended to protect the integrity and interest of the
government and its relationship and credibility with international relief agencies and donor states. When the bus reached the Philippine Carabao Center in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, the bus driver, Duplio, stopped the
bus and alighted to check the tires.
On the other hand, respondent maintains that petitioner’s suit was baseless and malicious because
instead of going after its absconding employee, petitioner wanted to recoup its losses from At this point, a man who was seated at the fourth row of the bus stood up, shot Battung at his head, and then left
respondent. The trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in granting actual damages and with a companion.
reasonable attorney’s fees to respondent.
The bus conductor, Daraoay, notified Duplio of the incident and thereafter, brought Romeo to the hospital, but
On this point, we agree with petitioner. the latter was pronounced dead on arrival.

The right to litigate should bear no premium. An adverse decision does not ipso facto justify an award of  Hence, respondents filed a complaint for damages based on a breach of contract of carriage against petitioner,
attorney’s fees to the winning party. 11 When, as in the instant case, petitioner was compelled to sue to Duplio, and Baraoay (petitioner, et al.) before the RTC.
protect the credibility of the government with international organizations, we are not inclined to grant
attorney’s fees. We find no ill motive on petitioner’s part, only an erroneous belief in the righteousness of Respondents Contention
its claim.
Respondents contended that as a common carrier, petitioner and its employees are bound to observe
Moreover, an award of attorney’s fees, in the concept of damages under Article 2208 of the Civil extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers; and in case of injuries and/or death on the part of a
Code,12 requires factual and legal justifications. While the law allows some degree of discretion on the part passenger, they are presumed to be at fault and, thus, responsible therefor. As such, petitioner,  et al. should be
of the courts in awarding attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, the discretion must be exercised with
held civilly liable for Battung's death.
great care approximating as closely as possible, the instances exemplified by the law. 13 We have
searched but found nothing in petitioner’s suit that justifies the award of attorney’s fees.
Petitioners Contention:
Respondent failed to show proof of actual pecuniary loss, hence, no actual damages are due in favor of
respondent.14 In their defense, petitioner, et al. maintained that they had exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law
from common carriers. In this relation, they claimed that a common carrier is not an absolute insurer of its
passengers and that Battung's death should be properly deemed a fortuitous event. Thus, they prayed for the
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court dismissal of the complaint, as well as the payment of their counterclaims for damages and attorney's fees.
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48349 dated January 16, 2002 and May 13, 2002 respectively, denying
petitioner’s claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages are AFFIRMED. The award of actual
damages and attorney’s fees to respondent pursuant to the latter’s counterclaim in the trial court is
DELETED.
The RTC Ruling
SO ORDERED.
The RTC ruled in respondents' favor
The RTC found that petitioner, et al. were unable to rebut the presumed liability of common carriers in case of
G.R. No. 208802, October 14, 2015
injuries/death to its passengers due to their failure to show that they implemented the proper security measures
to prevent passengers from carrying deadly weapons inside the bus which, in this case, resulted in the killing of
G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC., Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF ROMEO L. BATTUNG, JR., REPRESENTED BY ROMEO Battung. As such, petitioner, et al. were held civilly liable for the latter's death based on culpa contractual.
BATTUNG, SR., Respondents.

DECISION The CA Ruling

AFFIRMED
ISSUE
W/N Petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage for not exercising an extra-ordinary diligence as a
common carrier
RULING
NO.
The law exacts from common carriers (i.e., those persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering
their services to the public) the highest degree of diligence (i.e., extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the safety of
its passengers. Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code state:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
In this relation, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." This disputable presumption may also
be overcome by a showing that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event. 21
The foregoing provisions notwithstanding, it should be pointed out that the law does not make the common
carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers. In Mariano, Jr. v. Callejas,22 the Court explained that:
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their
passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an
insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation company makes it an insurer
of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal injuries sustained by its passenger rests upon its
negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of diligence that the law requires.  (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Pilapil v. CA,  the Court clarified that where the injury sustained by the passenger was in no way due (1) to any
defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting, or ( 2) to the negligent or willful acts of the
common carrier's employees with respect to the foregoing - such as when the injury arises wholly from causes
created by strangers which the carrier had no control of or prior knowledge to prevent — there would be no issue
regarding the common carrier's negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable care, as well as competent
employees in relation to its transport business; as such, the presumption of fault/negligence foisted under Article
1756 of the Civil Code should not apply:
First, as stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is only a disputable presumption.
[The presumption] gives in where contrary facts are established proving either that the carrier had exercised the
degree of diligence required by law or the injury suffered by the passenger was due to a fortuitous event . Where,
as in the instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way due to any defect in the means of
transport or in the method of transporting or to the negligent or wilful acts of [the common carrier'sl
employees, and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable [care] as well
as competent employees, with the injury arising wholly from causes created by strangers over which the carrier
had no control or even knowledge or could not have prevented, the presumption is rebutted and the carrier is
not and ought not to be held liable. To rule otherwise would make the common carrier the insurer of the absolute
safety of its passengers which is not the intention of the lawmakers. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this case, Battung's death was neither caused by any defect in the means of transport or in the method of
transporting, or to the negligent or willful acts of petitioner's employees, namely, that of Duplio and Daraoay, in
their capacities as driver and conductor, respectively. Instead, the case involves the death of Battung wholly
caused by the surreptitious act of a co-passenger who, after consummating such crime, hurriedly alighted from the
vehicle.25 Thus, there is no proper issue on petitioner's duty to observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring the
safety of the passengers transported by it, and the presumption of fault/negligence against petitioner under Article
1756 in relation to Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code should not apply.
In this particular case before Us, it must be considered that while it is true the passengers of appellant's bus should
not be made to suffer for something over which they had no control, as enunciated in the decision of this Court
cited by His Honor, fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty towards its passengers,
allowance must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the
passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him
anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own.  Not to be lightly
considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled.  He cannot be subjected to any
unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the
contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's
baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in
danger of being transgressed. Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested by the service manual invoked by the
trial judge, in compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had already
declared that the box contained mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have justified invasion of a
constitutionally protected domain. Police officers acting without judicial authority secured in the manner provided
by law are not beyond the pale of constitutional inhibitions designed to protect individual human rights and
liberties. Withal, what must be importantly considered here is not so much the infringement of the fundamental
sacred rights of the particular passenger herein involved, but the constant threat any contrary ruling would pose
on the right of privacy of all passengers of all common carriers, considering how easily the duty to inspect can be
made an excuse for mischief and abuse. Of course, when there are sufficient indications that the representations
of the passenger regarding the nature of his baggage may not be true, in the interest of the common safety of
all, the assistance of the police authorities may be solicited, not necessarily to force the passenger to open his
baggage, but to conduct the needed investigation consistent with the rules of propriety and, above all, the
constitutional rights of the passenger. It is in this sense that the mentioned service manual issued by appellant to
its conductors must be understood. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, records reveal that when the bus stopped at San Jose City to let four (4) men ride petitioner's bus (two
[2] of which turned out to be Battung's murderers), the bus driver, Duplio, saw them get on the bus and even took
note of what they were wearing. Moreover, Duplio made the bus conductor, Daraoay, approach these men and
have them pay the corresponding fare, which Daraoay did. During the foregoing, both Duplio and Daraoay
observed nothing which would rouse their suspicion that the men were armed or were to carry out an unlawful
activity. With no such indication, there was no need for them to conduct a more stringent search ( i.e., bodily
search) on the aforesaid men. By all accounts, therefore, it cannot be concluded that petitioner or any of its
employees failed to employ the diligence of a good father of a family in relation to its responsibility under Article
G.R. No. 148496      March 19, 2002
1763 of the Civil Code. As such, petitioner cannot altogether be held civilly liable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 31, 2013 and the Resolution dated VIRGINES CALVO doing business under the name and style TRANSORIENT CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES,
August 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97757 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. INC., petitioner,
Accordingly, the complaint for damages filed by respondents heirs of Romeo L. Battung, Jr. is DISMISSED for lack of vs.
merit. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. (formerly Allied Guarantee Ins. Co., Inc.) respondent.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary  Petitioner Virgines Calvo is the owner of Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc. (TCTSI), a sole
proprietorship customs broker.
 At the time material to this case, petitioner entered into a contract with San Miguel Corporation (SMC)
for the transfer of 114 reels of semi-chemical fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the
Port Area in Manila to SMC's warehouse at the Tabacalera Compound, Romualdez St., Ermita, Manila.
 The cargo was insured by respondent UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.
 the shipment in question, contained in 30 metal vans, arrived in Manila on board "M/V Hayakawa Maru"
and, after 24 hours, were unloaded from the vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator, Manila.
 Petitioner, pursuant to her contract with SMC, withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator and
delivered it to SMC's warehouse in Ermita, Manila.
 The goods were inspected by Marine Cargo Surveyors, who found that 15 reels of the semi-chemical
fluting paper were "wet/stained/torn" and 3 reels of kraft liner board were likewise torn. The damage
was placed at P93,112.00.
 SMC collected payment from respondent UCPB under its insurance contract for the aforementioned
amount.
 In turn, respondent, as subrogee of SMC, brought suit against petitioner in the RTC Branch 148, Makati
City.

RTC: rendered judgment finding petitioner liable to respondent for the damage to the shipment.

" . . . we opine that damages sustained by shipment is attributable to improper handling in transit presumably
whilst in the custody of the broker . . . ." Defendant, being a customs brother, warehouseman and at the same
time a common carrier is supposed [to] exercise [the] extraordinary diligence required by law, hence the
extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of and
received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered actually or constructively by the carrier to
the consignee or to the person who has the right to receive the same.

CA: AFFIRMED

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: petitioner denies liability for the damage to the cargo. She claims that the "spoilage
or wettage" took place while the goods were in the custody of either the carrying vessel "M/V Hayakawa Maru,"
which transported the cargo to Manila, or the arrastre operator, to whom the goods were unloaded and who
allegedly kept them in open air for nine days notwithstanding the fact that some of the containers were deformed,
cracked, or otherwise damaged, as noted in the Marine Survey Report
ISSUE: W/N PETITONER IS LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGE TO THE SHIPMENT
RULING: YES. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Survey Report of the Marine Cargo Surveyors indicates
that when the shipper transferred the cargo in question to the arrastre operator, these were covered by clean
Equipment Interchange Report (EIR) and, when petitioner's employees withdrew the cargo from the arrastre
operator, they did so without exception or protest either with regard to the condition of container vans or
their contents.
As found by the Court of Appeals:
From the [Survey Report], it [is] clear that the shipment was discharged from the vessel to the arrastre, Marina
Port Services Inc., in good order and condition as evidenced by clean Equipment Interchange Reports (EIRs). Had
there been any damage to the shipment, there would have been a report to that effect made by the arrastre
operator. The cargoes were withdrawn by the defendant-appellant from the arrastre still in good order and
condition as the same were received by the former without exception, that is, without any report of damage or
loss. Surely, if the container vans were deformed, cracked, distorted or dented, the defendant-appellant would
report it immediately to the consignee or make an exception on the delivery receipt or note the same in the
Warehouse Entry Slip (WES). None of these took place. To put it simply, the defendant-appellant received the
shipment in good order and condition and delivered the same to the consignee damaged. We can only conclude
that the damages to the cargo occurred while it was in the possession of the defendant-appellant. Whenever
the thing is lost (or damaged) in the possession of the debtor (or obligor), it shall be presumed that the loss (or
damage) was due to his fault, unless there is proof to the contrary. No proof was proffered to rebut this legal
presumption and the presumption of negligence attached to a common carrier in case of loss or damage to the
goods.
Nor is there basis to exempt petitioner from liability under Art. 1734(4), which provides --
Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same
is due to any of the following causes only:. . . .
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers.. . . .
For this provision to apply, the rule is that if the improper packing or, in this case, the defect/s in the container,
is/are known to the carrier or his employees or apparent upon ordinary observation, but he nevertheless accepts
the same without protest or exception notwithstanding such condition, he is not relieved of liability for damage
resulting therefrom. In this case, petitioner accepted the cargo without exception despite the apparent defects in
some of the container vans. Hence, for failure of petitioner to prove that she exercised extraordinary diligence in
the carriage of goods in this case or that she is exempt from liability, the presumption of negligence as provided
under Art. 1735
G.R. No. 147079             December 21, 2004
A.F. SANCHEZ BROKERAGE INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
 Wyeth-Pharma GMBH shipped on board an aircraft of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines at Dusseldorf,
Germany oral contraceptives consisting of 86,800 Blisters Femenal tablets, 14,000 Blisters Nordiol
tablets and 42,000 Blisters Trinordiol tablets for delivery to Manila in favor of the consignee, Wyeth-
Suaco Laboratories, Inc
 The Femenal tablets were placed in 124 cartons and the Nordiol tablets were placed in 20 cartons
which were packed together in one (1) LD3 aluminum container, while the Trinordial tablets were
packed in two pallets, each of which contained 30 cartons
 Wyeth-Suaco insured the shipment against all risks with FGU Insurance
 Upon arrival of the shipment at the (NAIA),  it was discharged "without exception"  and delivered to
the warehouse of the. (PSI) located also at the NAIA for safekeeping
 In order to secure the release of the cargoes from the PSI and the Bureau of Customs, Wyeth-Suaco
engaged the services of Sanchez Brokerage which had been its licensed broker since 1984. As its
customs broker, Sanchez Brokerage calculates and pays the customs duties, taxes and storage fees
for the cargo and thereafter delivers it to Wyeth-Suaco.
 Morales and Mendoza, representatives of Sanchez Brokerage, paid PSI storage fee, a receipt was
issued. On the receipt, another representative of Sanchez Brokerage, M. Sison,  acknowledged that
he received the cargoes consisting of three pieces in good condition.
 Wyeth-Suaco being a regular importer, the customs examiner did not inspect the cargoes which were
thereupon stripped from the aluminum containers and loaded inside two transport vehicles hired by
Sanchez Brokerage.
 Upon instructions of Wyeth-Suaco, the cargoes were delivered to Hizon Laboratories Inc. in Antipolo
City for quality control check. The delivery receipt, indicated that the delivery consisted of one
container with 144 cartons of Femenal and Nordiol and 1 pallet containing Trinordiol.
 Ronnie Likas, a representative of Wyeth-Suaco, acknowledged the delivery of the cargoes by affixing
his signature on the delivery receipt.
 Upon inspection, however, he, together with Ruben Alonzo of Elite Surveyors, discovered that 44
cartons containing Femenal and Nordiol tablets were in bad order. He thus placed a note above his
signature on the delivery receipt stating that 44 cartons of oral contraceptives were in bad order. The
remaining 160 cartons of oral contraceptives were accepted as complete and in good order.
 The Elite Surveyors later issued Certificate whereon it was indicated that prior to the
loading of the cargoes to the broker’s trucks at the NAIA, they were inspected and found to
be in "apparent good condition."  Also noted was that at the time of delivery to the
warehouse of Hizon Laboratories Inc., slight to heavy rains fell, which could account for the
wetting of the 44 cartons of Femenal and Nordiol tablets.
 Hizon Laboratories Inc. issued a Destruction Report 26 confirming that 38 x 700 blister
packs of Femenal tablets, 3 x 700 blister packs of Femenal tablets and 3 x 700 blister packs
of Nordiol tablets were heavily damaged with water and emitted foul smell.
 Wyeth-Suaco later demanded from Sanchez Brokerage the payment of P191,384.25 representing the
value of its loss arising from the damaged tablets.
As the Sanchez Brokerage refused to heed the demand, Wyeth-Suaco filed an insurance claim
against FGU Insurance which paid Wyeth-Suaco
Hence, the filing by FGU Insurance of a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City against the Sanchez Brokerage.
RTC: dismissed the complaint, holding that the Survey Report prepared by the Elite Surveyors is bereft
of any evidentiary support and a mere product of pure guesswork.
CA: REVERSED. Holding that the Sanchez Brokerage engaged not only in the business of customs
brokerage but also in the transportation and delivery of the cargo of its clients, hence, a common carrier
within the context of Article 1732 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is liable for the delivery of the damage goods.
RULING
In the case at bar, it was established that petitioner received the cargoes from the PSI warehouse in NAIA
in good order and condition; and that upon delivery by petitioner to Hizon Laboratories Inc., some of the
cargoes were found to be in bad order, as noted in the Delivery Receipt  issued by petitioner, and as
indicated in the Survey Report of Elite Surveyors and the Destruction Report of Hizon Laboratories, Inc.
In an attempt to free itself from responsibility for the damage to the goods, petitioner posits that they were
damaged due to the fault or negligence of the shipper for failing to properly pack them and to the inherent
characteristics of the goods53 ; and that it should not be faulted for following the instructions of Calicdan of
Wyeth-Suaco to proceed with the delivery despite information conveyed to the latter that some of the
cartons, on examination outside the PSI warehouse, were found to be wet.54
While paragraph No. 4 of Article 1734 55 of the Civil Code exempts a common carrier from liability if the
loss or damage is due to the character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers, the rule
is that if the improper packing is known to the carrier or his employees or is apparent upon ordinary
observation, but he nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception notwithstanding such
condition, he is not relieved of liability for the resulting damage.56
If the claim of petitioner that some of the cartons were already damaged upon delivery to it were
true, then it should naturally have received the cargo under protest or with reservations duly
noted on the receipt issued by PSI. But it made no such protest or reservation.
Petitioner goes on to posit that contrary to the report of Elite Surveyors, no rain fell that day. Instead, it
asserts that some of the cargoes were already wet on delivery by PSI outside the PSI warehouse but
such notwithstanding Calicdan directed Morales to proceed with the delivery to Hizon Laboratories, Inc.
Since petitioner received all the cargoes in good order and condition at the time they were turned over by
the PSI warehouseman, and upon their delivery to Hizon Laboratories, Inc. a portion thereof was found to
be in bad order, it was incumbent on petitioner to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in the
carriage of the goods. It did not, however. Hence, its presumed negligence under Article 1735 of the Civil
Code remains unrebutted.
G.R. No. L-48757 May 30, 1988
MAURO GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GELACIO E. TUMAMBING, respondents.
Gelacio Tumambing contracted the services of Mauro B. Ganzon to haul 305 tons of scrap iron from
Mariveles, Bataan, to the port of Manila on board the lighter LCT "Batman"
Pursuant to that agreement, Mauro B. Ganzon sent his lighter "Batman" to Mariveles where it docked in
three feet of water.
, Gelacio Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to defendant Filomeno Niza, captain of the lighter, for
loading which was actually begun on the same date by the crew of the lighter under the captain's
supervision.
When about half of the scrap iron was already loaded. Mayor Jose Advincula of Mariveles, Bataan,
arrived and demanded P5,000.00 from Gelacio Tumambing.
The latter resisted the shakedown and after a heated argument between them, Mayor Jose Advincula
drew his gun and fired at Gelacio Tumambing. The gunshot was not fatal but Tumambing had to be
1àw> 
taken to a hospital in Balanga, Bataan, for treatment
After sometime, the loading of the scrap iron was resumed. But , Acting Mayor Basilio Rub,
accompanied by three policemen, ordered captain Filomeno Niza and his crew to dump the scrap iron )
where the lighter was docked.
The rest was brought to the compound of NASSCO. Later on Acting Mayor Rub issued a receipt stating
that the Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron.
The private respondent instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila 1 an action against the
petitioner for damages based on culpa contractual.
CFI: IN FAVOR OF GANZON
CA: REVERSED. ORDER GANZON TO PAY TUMAMBING
ISSUE: W/N THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN CONDEMNING THE PETITIONER FOR THE ACTS OF HIS EMPLOYEES
IN DUMPING THE SCRAP INTO THE SEA DESPITE THAT IT WAS ORDERED BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL
WITHOUT HIS PARTICIPATION.
RULING:
The petitioner has failed to show that the loss of the scraps was due to any of the following causes enumerated in
Article 1734 of the Civil Code, namely:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
Petitioner maintains that he is exempt from any liability because the loss of the scraps was due mainly
to the intervention of the municipal officials of Mariveles which constitutes a caso fortuito as defined in
Article 1174 of the Civil Code.
We cannot sustain the theory of caso fortuito. In the courts below, the petitioner's defense was that the loss of the
scraps was due to an "order or act of competent public authority," and this contention was correctly passed upon
by the Court of Appeals which ruled that:
... In the second place, before the appellee Ganzon could be absolved from responsibility on
the ground that he was ordered by competent public authority to unload the scrap iron, it must
be shown that Acting Mayor Basilio Rub had the power to issue the disputed order, or that it
was lawful, or that it was issued under legal process of authority. The appellee failed to
establish this. Indeed, no authority or power of the acting mayor to issue such an order was
given in evidence. Neither has it been shown that the cargo of scrap iron belonged to the
Municipality of Mariveles. What we have in the record is the stipulation of the parties that the
cargo of scrap iron was accilmillated by the appellant through separate purchases here and
there from private individuals (Record on Appeal, pp. 38-39). The fact remains that the order
given by the acting mayor to dump the scrap iron into the sea was part of the pressure applied
by Mayor Jose Advincula to shakedown the appellant for P5,000.00. The order of the acting
mayor did not constitute valid authority for appellee Mauro Ganzon and his representatives to
carry out.
The petitioner was not duty bound to obey the illegal order to dump into the sea the scrap iron. Moreover,
there is absence of sufficient proof that the issuance of the same order was attended with such force or
intimidation as to completely overpower the will of the petitioner's employees. The mere difficulty in the
fullfilment of the obligation is not considered force majeure. We agree with the private respondent that the scraps
could have been properly unloaded at the shore or at the NASSCO compound, so that after the dispute with the
local officials concerned was settled, the scraps could then be delivered in accordance with the contract of
carriage.
[G.R. Nos. L-36481-2. October 23, 1982.]
AMPARO C. SERVANDO, CLARA UY BICO, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION
CO., Defendant-Appellant.
 Appellees Clara Uy Bico loaded 1,528 cavans of rice and Amparo Servando 44 cartons of
colored paper, toys and general merchandise on board the appellant's vessel, FS-176, for
carriage from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros Occidental.
 Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan, in the morning of November 18, 1963, the cargoes
were discharged, complete and in good order, unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs.
 At about 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day, said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown
origin, destroying appellees' cargoes. Before the fire, however, appellee Uy Bico was able to
take delivery of 907 cavans of rice.
 Appellees' claims for the value of said goods were rejected by the appellant.
RTC: defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiffs Amparo C. Servando and Clara Uy Bico
ISSUE: W/N the delivery to bureau of customs extinguishes the liability of the common carrier
RULING:
NO. BUT PETITIONER IS NOT LIABLE BECAUSE OF THE STIPULATION LIMITING THE LIABILITY OF THE COMMON
CARRIER and PURSUANT TO ART 1174 OF NCC
Article 1736 of the Civil Code imposes upon common carriers the duty to observe extraordinary diligence from the
moment the goods are unconditionally placed in their possession "until the same are delivered, actually or
constructively, by the carrier to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice
to the provisions of Article 1738."
RATIONALE:
The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is
not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736; and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or
constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees, the loss is chargeable against the Appellant.
LIMITING THE LIABILITY
It should be pointed out, however, that in the bills of lading issued for the cargoes in question, the parties agreed
to limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss or damage that may be caused to the shipment by inserting
therein the following stipulation:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed ‘owner’s risk’ unless such loss or
damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by force
majeure, dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters; war; public enemies; . . . fire . . ."
We sustain the validity of the above stipulation; there is nothing therein that is contrary to law, morals or public
policy.
Besides, the agreement contained in the above quoted Clause 14 is a mere iteration of the basic principle of law
written in Article 1174 of the Civil Code:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or
when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events
which should not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable."cralaw virtua1aw library
Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is
exempt from liability for non-performance.
G.R. No. L-28673 October 23, 1984 SAMAR MINING COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY, INC., defendants-appellants.
 The case arose from an importation made by , SAMAR MINING COMPANY, INC., of 1 crate
Optima welded wedge wire sieves through the M/S SCHWABENSTEIN a vessel owned by
NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD, (represented in the Philippines by its agent, C.F. SHARP & CO.,
INC.), which shipment is covered by Bill of Lading No. 18 duly issued to consignee SAMAR
MINING COMPANY, INC.
 Upon arrival of the aforesaid vessel at the port of Manila, the aforementioned importation was
unloaded and delivered in good order and condition to the bonded warehouse of AMCYL.   likeness, the goods in question in both cases were destined for Davao, but were discharged from ship in Manila, in
 The goods were however never delivered to, nor received by, the consignee at the port of
destination — Davao.
 When the letters of complaint sent to defendants failed to elicit the desired response, consignee
herein appellee, filed a formal claim for sum of money, against the former, but neither paid.
 Hence, the filing of the instant suit to enforce payment. Defendants-appellants brought in AMCYL
as third party defendant.
RTC: The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, ordering defendants to pay. However, the Court stated
that defendants may recoup whatever they may pay plaintiff by enforcing the judgment against third party
defendant AMCYL which had earlier been declared in default. Only the defendants appealed from said decision.
ISSUE: W/N DEFENDANT IS LIABLE FOR NON-DE;IVERY OF THE GOODS.
RULING: NO. The issue at hand demands a close scrutiny of Bill of Lading No. 18 and its various clauses and
stipulations which should be examined in the light of pertinent legal provisions and settled jurisprudence. This
undertaking is not only proper but necessary as well because of the nature of the bill of lading which operates both
as a receipt for the goods; and more importantly, as a contract to transport and deliver the same as stipulated
therein.  Being a contract, it is the law between the parties thereto  who are bound by its terms and
conditions  provided that these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy. 
Bill of Lading No. 18 sets forth in page 2 thereof 6 that one (1) crate of Optima welded wedge wire sieves was
received by the carrier NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD at the "port of loading" which is Bremen, Germany, while the
freight had been prepaid up to the port of destination or the "port of discharge of goods in this case, Davao, the
carrier undertook to transport the goods in its vessel, M/S SCHWABENSTEIN only up to the "port of discharge
from ship-Manila. Thereafter, the goods were to be transshipped by the carrier to the port of destination or
"port of discharge of goods The stipulation is plainly indicated on the face of the bill which contains the following
phrase printed below the space provided for the port of discharge from ship"
It is clear, then, that in discharging the goods from the ship at the port of Manila, and delivering the same into
the custody of AMCYL, the bonded warehouse, appellants were acting in full accord with the contractual
stipulations contained in Bill of Lading No. 18. The delivery of the goods to AMCYL was part of appellants' duty
to transship the goods from Manila to their port of destination-Davao.
The extent of appellant carrier's responsibility and/or liability in the transshipment of the goods in question are
spelled out and delineated under Section 1, paragraph 3 of Bill of Lading No. 18, to wit: 
The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any delay, loss or damage
occurring before the goods enter ship's tackle to be loaded or after the goods leave ship's
tackle to be discharged, transshipped or forwarded ... (Emphasis supplied)
The validity of stipulations in bills of lading exempting the carrier from liability for loss or damage to the goods
when the same are not in its actual custody has been upheld by Us in PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO., LTD. vs. UNITED
STATES LINES, 22 SCRA 674 (1968). Said case matches the present controversy not only as to the material facts but
more importantly, as to the stipulations contained in the bill of lading concerned. As if to underline their awesome
accordance with their respective bills of lading.
The liability of the common carrier for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods transported from a foreign
country to the Philippines is governed primarily by the New Civil Code.   In all matters not regulated by said Code,
the rights and obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws. A
careful perusal of the provisions of the New Civil Code on common carriers (Section 4, Title VIII, Book IV) directs
our attention to Article 1736 thereof, which reads: 
Article 1736. The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the
goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for
transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the
 consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the
provisions of article 1738.
Article 1738 referred to in the foregoing provision runs thus: 
Article 1738. The extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative even
during the time the goods are stored in a warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination,
until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable
opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them.
There is no doubt that Art. 1738 finds no applicability to the instant case. The said article contemplates a situation
where the goods had already reached their place of destination and are stored in the warehouse of the carrier.
The subject goods were still awaiting transshipment to their port of destination, and were stored in the warehouse
of a third party when last seen and/or heard of. However, Article 1736 is applicable to the instant suit. Under said
article, the carrier may be relieved of the responsibility for loss or damage to the goods upon actual or
constructive delivery of the same by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive
them. In sales, actual delivery has been defined as the ceding of corporeal possession by the seller, and the actual
apprehension of corporeal possession by the buyer or by some person authorized by him to receive the goods as
his representative for the purpose of custody or disposal. 17 By the same token, there is actual delivery in
contracts for the transport of goods when possession has been turned over to the consignee or to his duly
authorized agent and a reasonable time is given him to remove the goods.  The court a quo  found that there was
actual delivery to the consignee through its duly authorized agent, the carrier.
G.R. No. 94761 May 17, 1993
MAERSK LINE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND EFREN V. CASTILLO, doing business under the name and style of Ethegal
Laboratories, respondents.
 Petitioner Maersk Line is engaged in the transportation of goods by sea, doing business in the
Philippines through its general agent Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas.
 Private respondent Efren Castillo, on the other hand, is the proprietor of Ethegal Laboratories, a
firm engaged in the manutacture of pharmaceutical products.
 Private respondent ordered from Eli Lilly. Inc. of Puerto Rico through its (Eli Lilly, Inc.'s) agent in
the Philippines, Elanco Products, 600,000 empty gelatin capsules for the manufacture of his
pharmaceutical products. The capsules were placed in six (6) drums of 100,000 capsules each.
 Through a Memorandum of Shipment ), the shipper Eli Lilly, Inc. of Puerto Rico advised private
respondent as consignee that the 600,000 empty gelatin capsules in six (6) drums of 100,000
capsules each, were already shipped on board MV "Anders Maerskline" under Voyage No. 7703
for shipment to the Philippines via Oakland, California. In said Memorandum, shipper Eli Lilly,
Inc. specified the date of arrival to be April 3, 1977.
 For reasons unknown, said cargo of capsules were mishipped and diverted to Richmond,
Virginia, USA and then transported back Oakland, California. The goods finally arrived in the
Philippines on June 10, 1977 or after two (2) months from the date specified in the
memorandum. As a consequence, private respondent as consignee refused to take delivery of
the goods on account of its failure to arrive on time.
 Private respondent alleging gross negligence and undue delay in the delivery of the goods, filed
an action before the court a quo for rescission of contract with damages against petitioner and
Eli Lilly, Inc. as defendant
Petitioner’s Contention: Denying that it committed breach of contract, petitioner alleged in its that answer that the
subject shipment was transported in accordance with the provisions of the covering bill of lading and that its
liability under the law on transportation of good attaches only in case of loss, destruction or deterioration of the
goods as provided for in Article 1734 of Civil Code.
RTC: 1982 in favor of respondent Castillo. there was a breach in the performance of their obligation by the
defendant Maersk Line consisting of their negligence to ship the 6 drums of empty Gelatin Capsules which under
their own memorandum shipment would arrive in the Philippines on April 3, 1977 which under Art. 1170 of the
New Civil Code, they stood liable for damages.
CA: Affirmed
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Castillo is entitled to damages resulting from delay in the delivery of the
shipment in the absence in the bill of lading of a stipulation on the period of delivery.
RULING: We have carefully reviewed the decisions of respondent court and the trial court and both of them show
that, in finding petitioner liable for damages for the delay in the delivery of goods, reliance was made on the rule
that contracts of adhesion are void. Added to this, the lower court stated that the exemption against liability for
delay is against public policy and is thus, void. Besides, private respondent's action is anchored on Article 1170 of
the New Civil Code and not under the law on Admiralty.
It is not disputed that the aforequoted provision at the back of the bill of lading, in fine print, is a contract of
adhesion. Generally, contracts of adhesion are considered void since almost all the provisions of these types of
contracts are prepared and drafted only by one party, usually the carrier. The only participation left of the other
party in such a contract is the affixing of his signature thereto, hence the term "Adhesion" (BPI Credit Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 601 [1991]; Angeles v. Calasanz, 135 SCRA 323 [1985]).
In Saludo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals (207 SCRA 498 [1992]) this Court held:
The oft-repeated rule regarding a carrier's liability for delay is that in the absence of a special
contract, a carrier is not an insurer against delay in transportation of goods. When a common
carrier undertakes to convey goods, the law implies a contract that they shall be delivered at
destination within a reasonable time, in the absence, of any agreement as to the time of
delivery. But where a carrier has made an express contract to transport and deliver properly
within a specified time, it is bound to fulfill its contract and is liable for any delay, no matter
from what cause it may have arisen. This result logically follows from the well-settled rule that
where the law creates a duty or charge, and the default in himself, and has no remedy over,
then his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good
notwithstanding any accident or delay by inevitable necessity because he might have provided
against it by contract. Whether or not there has been such an undertaking on the part of the
 carrier is to be determined from the circumstances surrounding the case and by application of
the ordinary rules for the interpretation of contracts.
An examination of the subject bill of lading shows that the subject shipment was estimated to arrive in Manila on
April 3, 1977. While there was no special contract entered into by the parties indicating the date of arrival of the
subject shipment, petitioner nevertheless, was very well aware of the specific date when the goods were expected
to arrive as indicated in the bill of lading itself. In this regard, there arises no need to execute another contract for
the purpose as it would be a mere superfluity.
In the case before us, we find that a delay in the delivery of the goods spanning a period of two (2) months and
seven (7) days falls was beyond the realm of reasonableness. Described as gelatin capsules for use in
pharmaceutical products, subject shipment was delivered to, and left in, the possession and custody of petitioner-
carrier for transport to Manila via Oakland, California. But through petitioner's negligence was mishipped to
Richmond, Virginia. Petitioner's insitence that it cannot be held liable for the delay finds no merit.
RTC: ordered respondents to pay, jointly and severally.
having been surrendered. Subsequently, GPC failed to pay Pakistan Bank such that the latter,
still in possession of the original bills of lading, refused to pay petitioner through Solidbank.
 Petitioner sought collection of the value of the shipment from respondents before the RTC of
Manila, based on delivery of the shipment to GPC without presentation of the bills of lading and
bank guarantee.
 RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:
1. Respondents contended that the shipment was delivered to GPC without presentation of the
bills of lading and bank guarantee per request of petitioner himself because the shipment
consisted of perishable goods.
2. Respondents apprised the trial court that for the duration of their two-year business
relationship with petitioner concerning similar shipments to GPC deliveries were effected
without presentation of the bills of lading.

CA: Dismissed the complaint

ISSUE: W/N respondents are liable to petitioner for releasing the goods to GPC without the bills of lading
or bank guarantee.

RULING: NO. Wallem is not liable for the following reasons:

G.R. No. 125524           August 25, 1999
1. It delivered the goods to the person who has the right to receive them. This is in accordance with Art. 1736
BENITO MACAM doing business under the name and style BEN-MAC ENTERPRISES, petitioner, which states that: The extraordinary responsibility of the common carriers lasts from the time the goods are
vs. unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are
COURT OF APPEALS, CHINA OCEAN SHIPPING CO., and/or WALLEM PHILIPPINES SHIPPING,
delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive
INC., respondents.
them, without prejudice to the provisions of article 1738. GPC, even though designated as the notify party in the
BELLOSILLO, J.: bills of lading, was clearly named as buyer/importer in the export invoices.

2. The petitioner sent instructions through telex to deliver various shipments to the respective consignees without
 Petitioner Benito Macam shipped on board the vessel Nen Jiang, owned and operated by
need of presenting the bill of lading and bank guarantee per the respective shipper’s request since “for prepaid
respondent China Ocean Shipping Co., through local agent respondent Wallem Philippines
shipt ofrt charges already fully paid.” GPC is listed as one among the several consignees in the telex.
Shipping, Inc. boxes of watermelons and mangoes which were covered by bill of ladings and
exported through letters of credit issued by National Bank of Pakistan, Hongkong (Pakistan
Bank).
 The Bills of Lading contained the following pertinent provision: “One of the Bills of Lading must
be surrendered duly endorsed in exchange for the goods or delivery order.” The shipment was
bound for Hongkong with Pakistan Bank as consignee and Great Prospect Company of
Kowloon, Hongkong (GPC) as notify party.
 Copies of the bills of lading and commercial invoices were submitted to petitioner’s depository
bank, Consolidated Banking Corporation (Solidbank), which paid petitioner in advance the total
value of the shipment.
 Upon arrival in Hongkong and after receiving a telex instruction, the shipment was delivered by
respondent Wallem directly to GPC, not to Pakistan Bank, and without the required bill of lading
G.R. No. L-16086 May 29, 1964

M. RUIZ HIGHWAY TRANSIT, INC vs CA

 Spouses Guillermo Monserrat and Marta Consignado and their 4yr old daugther, victoria were
paying passengers in a bus of defendant transportation company driven by co-defendant Buena,
bound for Antipolo, Rizal.
 In Sta. Rosa, Laguna, while the bus was running, a rear tire exploded, blasting a hole in the very
place where Victoria was standing in front of her mother. As a result, the child fell through the
hole, and died that same morning from injuries sustained in the fall.
 Spouses Guillermo Monserrat and Marta Consignado filed a case to recover damages for the
death of their four-year old daughter Victoria.

RTC: Dismissed on the ground that the accident was not due to negligence of the carrier, but
was an act of God

CA: Reversed as the defendants failed to prove the extraordinary diligence required of
carriers

ISSUE:

w/n the bursting of the tire is a caso fortuito

RULING:

the appellate court found that the bus was overcrowded and overspeeding, and the floor
thereof was weak — persuasive indications of negligence; and reasoned out that the tire
exploded due to one or a combination of the following: "The tire was not strong and safe; the
air pressure was not properly checked; the load was heavy; the excessive speed of the bus
must have overstrained the tire; and the high velocity generated heat in the tire which could
have expanded the already compressed air therein."

G.R. No. L-22985 January 24, 1968

BATANGAS TRANSPORTATION COMPANY vs. CAGUIMBAL

  The deceased Pedro Caguimbal, Barrio Lieutenant of Barrio Calansayan, San Jose, Batangas, ISSUE: W/N BTCO, Biñan and Ilagan are jointly and severally liable for damages
was a paying passenger of BTCO bus, going south on its regular route from Calamba, Laguna
to Batangas, Batangas, driven by Perez, its regular driver. RULING:
 At about 5:30 o'clock on the early morning of April 25, 1954. The deceased's destination was his
residence at Calansayan, San Jose, Batangas. Article 1733 of the new Civil Code provides that "Common carriers, from the nature of their
 The bus of the Biñan Transportation Company driven by Ilagan, was coming from the opposite
direction (north-bound).
business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
 Along the national highway at Barrio Daraza, Tanauan, Batangas, on the date and hour above vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according
indicated, a horse-driven rig (calesa) managed by Makahiya, which was then ahead of the to all the circumstances of each case."
Biñan bus, was also coming from the opposite direction, meaning proceeding towards the north.
 As the BTCO bus was nearing a house, a passenger requested the conductor to stop as he was =PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE
going to alight, and when he heard the signal of the conductor, the driver Perez slowed down his
bus swerving it farther to the right in order to stop; In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of
 at this juncture, a calesa, then driven by Makahiya was at a distance of several meters facing the
BTCO bus coming from the opposite direction; that at the same time the Biñan bus was about
fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the
100 meters away likewise going northward and following the direction of the calesa; damages sought for by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the
 that upon seeing the Biñan bus the driver of the BTCO bus dimmed his light as established by express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe
Magno Ilaw, the very conductor of the Biñan bus at the time of the accident;
extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might
 that as the calesa and the BTCO bus were passing each other from the opposite directions, the
Biñan bus following the calesa swerved to its left in an attempt to pass between the BTCO bus be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier
and the calesa; (Article 1756, new Civil Code). This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be
 that without diminishing its speed of about 70 kilometers an hour, the Biñan bus passed through proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised
the space between the BTCO bus and the calesa hitting first the left side of the BTCO bus with
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the new Civil Code.
the left front corner of its body and then bumped and struck the calesa which was completely
wrecked;
 that the driver was seriously injured and the horse was killed; that the second and all other posts
The record shows that, in order to permit one of them to disembark, Perez drove his BTCO
supporting the top of the left side of the BTCO bus were completely smashed and half of the bus partly to the right shoulder of the road and partly on the asphalted portion thereof. Yet,
back wall to the left was ripped open. he could have and should have seen to it — had he exercised "extraordinary diligence" — that
 As a consequence of this occurrence, 2 passengers of BTCO died, namely, Pedro Caguimbal
his bus was completely outside the asphalted portion of the road, and fully within the
and Guillermo Tolentino, apart from others who were injured.
 The widow and children of Caguimbal instituted the present action, which was tried jointly with a shoulder thereof, the width of which being more than sufficient to accommodate the bus. He
similar action of the Tolentinos, to recover damages from the Batangas Transportation Company, could have and should have done this, because, when the aforementioned passenger
hereinafter referred to as BTCO. expressed his wish to alight from the bus, Ilagan had seen the aforementioned "calesa",
 BTCO, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against the Biñan and its driver, Marciano Ilagan.
driven by Makahiya, a few meters away, coming from the opposite direction, with the Biñan
 Subsequently, the Caguimbals amended their complaint, to include therein, as defendants, said
Biñan and Ilagan. bus about 100 meters behind the rig cruising at a good speed.

RTC: DISMISSED the case of BTCO w/out prejudice to the plaintiff's right to sue Biñan When Perez slowed down his BTCO bus to permit said passenger to disembark, he must have
known, therefore, that the Biñan bus would overtake the calesa at about the time when the
CA: REVERSED latter and BTCO bus would probably be on the same line, on opposite sides of the asphalted
portions of the road, and that the space between the BTCO bus and the "calesa" would not be
enough to allow the Biñan bus to go through. It is true that the driver of the Biñan bus should
have slowed down or stopped, and, hence, was reckless in not doing so; but, he had no
especial obligations toward the passengers of the BTCO unlike Perez whose duty was to
exercise "utmost" or "extraordinary" diligence for their safety. Perez was thus under
obligation to avoid a situation which would be hazardous for his passengers, and, make their
safety dependent upon the diligence of the Biñan driver. Such obligation becomes more
patent when we considered the fact — of which the Court may take judicial cognizance —
that our motor vehicle drivers, particularly those of public service utilities, have not
distinguished themselves for their concern over the safety, the comfort or the convenience of
others. Besides, as correctly stated in the syllabus to Brito Sy vs. Malate Taxicab & Garage,
Inc.,
G.R. No. 84458 November 6, 1989
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION vs CA
 Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by defendant, at the port at San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila, having purchased a ticket.
 Said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked, a
gangplank having been provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier.
 Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck which was on the
level with the pier.
 After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive
control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the MOA between the third party
defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation.
 The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane operator was placed
alongside the vessel and 1 hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started
operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel.
 While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said
vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went
back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place
where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the
vessel and the crane.
 He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later expired 3 days thereafter.
 Anacleto's wife filed a complaint for damages against Aboitiz or breach of contract of carriage.
Aboitiz Contention:
1. Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel was
completely under the control of respondent Pioneer as the exclusive stevedoring contractor
of Aboitiz, which handled the unloading of cargoes from the vessel of Aboitiz. It is also averred
that since the crane operator was not an employee of Aboitiz, the latter cannot be held liable
under the fellow-servant rule.
2. contends that since 1 hour had already elapsed from the time Anacleto Viana disembarked
from the vessel and that he was given more than ample opportunity to unload his cargoes
prior to the operation of the crane, his presence on the vessel was no longer reasonable e and
he consequently ceased to be a passenger.
RTC: Aboitiz is liable
CA: Affirmed
ISSUE:
W/N Anacleto ceased to be a passenger after lapsed of 1 hour and therefore the contract of
carriage was already expired
RULING:
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been
landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. Once
created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching
his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity
to leave the carrier's premises.
All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are
to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this
rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see
after his baggage and prepare for his departure.
The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person
transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the
carrier's premises to claim his baggage.
=WHAT IS THE REASONABLENESS OF TIME?
That reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the
case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place,
and so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of the time element per se without  By way of opposition to petitioner's affirmative defense, respondent Sotero Cailipan, Jr. testified
that be is the father of George, who at the time of the incident was a student, living with his
taking into account such other factors.
parents and totally dependent on them for their support; that the expenses for his hospitalization
were shouldered by his parents; and that they had not signed the "Release of Claims."
APPLICATION:
RTC: dismissed ruling that since the contract of carriage is between Baliwag and George L.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business as a shipper, the
Cailipan (of legal age) had the exclusive right to execute the Release of Claims despite the fact
passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than
that he is still a student and dependent on his parents for support
other common carriers such as a passenger bus(1hr RTime La Mallorca Case).
CA: setting aside the appealed Order and holding that the "Release of Claims" cannot operate
With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the number of passengers it can load, such vessels are
as a valid ground for the dismissal of the case because it does not have the conformity of all
capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both as compared to the capacity of a regular
the parties, particularly George's parents, who have a substantial interest in the case as they
commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need AT LEAST AN HOUR as is the usual
stand to be prejudiced by the judgment because they spent a sizeable amount for the medical
practice, to disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can
bills of their son;
easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time.

Anacleto Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred,
the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from ISSUE:
petitioner's vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers
safely to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage. W/N the contract signed by George during case pendency is valid discharging Baliwag from
any and all liability

G.R. No. 80447 January 31, 1989

BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC vs CA
 On 17 December 1984 George, of a legal age, a graduating student of Agricultural Engineering.
 George was a paying passenger on a Baliwag bus, and was allegedy thrown off said bus driven
in a careless and negligent manner by Cruz, the authorized bus driver.
 George suffered multiple serious physical injuries.
 Baliwag in its answer alleging that the cause of the injuries sustained by George was solely
attributable to his own voluntary act in that, without warning and provocation, he suddenly stood
up from his seat and headed for the door of the bus as if in a daze, opened it and jumped off
while said bus was in motion, in spite of the protestations by the driver and without the
knowledge of the conductor.
 Baliwag filed a Motion to Admit Amended Answer, which was granted by the Trial Court. The
Amended Answer incorporated the affirmative defense in the Motion to Dismiss to the effect that
George had been paid all his claims for damages arising from the incident subject matter of the
complaint when he executed the "Release of Claims"
RULING: YES.
We hold that since the suit is one for breach of contract of carriage, the Release of Claims
executed by him, as the injured party, discharging Fortune Insurance and Baliwag from any
and all liability is valid. He was then of legal age, a graduating student of Agricultural
Engineering, and had the capacity to do acts with legal effect (Article 37 in relation to Article
402, Civil Code). Thus, he could sue and be sued even without the assistance of his parents.
Significantly, the contract of carriage was actually between George, as the paying passenger,
and Baliwag, as the common carrier. As such carrier, Baliwag was bound to carry its
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, and is liable for injuries to
them through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees (Articles 1755 and 1759, Civil
Code). Thus, George had the right to be safely brought to his destination and Baliwag had the
correlative obligation to do so. Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto, as
against each other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties in interest, either as
plaintiff or as defendant, must be parties to said contract.
The Release of Claims had the effect of a compromise agreement since it was entered into for
the purpose of making a full and final compromise adjustment and settlement of the cause of
action involved. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced (Article 2028, Civil
Code). The Release of Claims executed by the injured party himself wrote finish to this
litigation.
G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991
DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO va CA
 As per finding of CA based on the testimonies of the witnesses the facts are:
 the subject bus was at full stop when the victim Pedrito Cudiamat attempted to board
defendants’ bus, the vehicle’s door was open instead of being closed.
 Cudiamat boarded the bus as it was precisely on this instance where a certain Miss Abenoja
alighted from the bus.
 It was at the instance when Pedrito Cudiamat was closing his umbrella at the platform of the bus
when the latter made a sudden jerk movement (as) the driver commenced to accelerate the bus.
 Thus, because the platform of the bus was at the time slippery and wet because of a drizzle,
Cudiamat fell from the platform of the bus and was run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle.
 The bus conductor declared that he saw an umbrella about a split second and he signalled the
driver, so the driver stopped and they went down and saw Pedrito Cudiamat asking for help
because he was lying down about 3 meters from the bus.
 However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter
bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other passengers and
cargo to their respective destinations before bringing said victim to the Lepanto Hospital where
he expired.
 private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death of Pedrito
Cudiamat
Petitioner's Contention:
1. alleged that they had observed and continued to observe the extraordinary diligence
required in the operation of the transportation company and the supervision of the
employees, even as they add that they are not absolute insurers of the safety of the public at
large.
2. Further, it was alleged that it was the victim’s own carelessness and negligence which gave
rise to the subject incident, hence they prayed for the dismissal of case.
3. That Pedro is not their passenger as they had no knowledge that the victim would ride on
the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention to board the same, does
not merit consideration.
RTC: Dismissed
CA: Set aside decision of RTC
ISSUE:
W/N Pedro is a passenger thus making Baliwag liable for breach of contract of carriage
RULING:
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered
a passenger and is entitled to all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual
relation. Hence, it has been held that the duty which the carrier of passengers owes to its
patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to those alighting therefrom.
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train,
streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to
afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered
by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances
while they are doing so.
Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver and the conductor failed to bring the
gravely injured victim immediately to the hospital for medical treatment is a patent and
incontrovertible proof of their negligence. It defies understanding and can even be
stigmatized as callous indifference.
G.R. No. 145804 February 6, 2003
LRTA vs NAVIDAD
 7:30 in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare).
 While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security
guard assigned to the area approached Navidad.
 A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight.
 No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two,
delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks.
 At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was
coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
 he widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a
complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband.
 LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and
Prudent.
 Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its security guards.
RTC:
1.Decide in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Prudent Security and Junelito
Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs
2. dismissed the complaint and compulsory counterclaim against defendants LRTA and
Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit.
CA: MODIFIED, exonerating Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin from any liability. Instead,
Rodolfo Roman and the LRTA are held liable
ISSUE:
W/N Rodolfo Roman and the LRTA can be held liable for the death of Nicanor Navidad
RULING:
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that
(a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and
(b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business
and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in
ensuring the safety of passengers.
The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its
passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through
the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account
of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission."
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of
carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and
entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a
contractual relation, and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA liable for the death
of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high
diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the
safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the
services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the
common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any
culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the
contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the
latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.
Contractual tie bet. LRT and Nicanor is NOT itself a juridical relation bet. Nicanor and Roman
LA MALLORCA vs CA
 At about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their 3 minor daughters boarded
the Pambusco Bus, owned and operated by the defendant, at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound
for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga.
 At the time, they were carrying with them four pieces of baggages containing their personal
belonging.
 The conductor of the bus, who happened to be a half-brother of plaintiff Mariano Beltran, issued
three tickets covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child, Milagros.
 No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at which fare is
charged in accordance with the appellant's rules and regulations.
 After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the passengers
bound therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off.
 With respect to the group of the plaintiffs, Mariano Beltran, then carrying some of their
baggages, was the first to get down the bus, followed by his wife and his children.
 Mariano led his companions to a shaded spot on the left pedestrians side of the road about four
or five meters away from the vehicle.
 Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his other bayong, which he had left
behind, but in so doing, his daughter Raquel followed him, unnoticed by her father.
 While said Mariano Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to
hand him his bayong which he left under one of its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor
was not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip,
notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given the driver the customary signal to start,
since said conductor was still attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran.
 Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten
meters from the point where the plaintiffs had gotten off.
 Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from the running
board without getting his bayong from the conductor.
 He landed on the side of the road almost in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and
children.
 At that precise time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate
on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life.
 The child was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she
rode earlier together with her parents.
 For the death of their said child, the plaintiffs commenced the suit to recover damages against
the defendant
RTC: liable for breach of contract of carriage
CA: guilty of quasi-delict and held the latter liable for damages, for the negligence of its driver,
in accordance with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. As well as increased the damages awarded
ISSUE:
W/N La Mallorca is guilty of quasi-delicts or breach of contract of carriage
RULING:
Breach of Contract of Carriage
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at
the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier
at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a
reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a
person who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a
passenger.So also, where a passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the
usual way to leave the company's premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the
report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without
intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and
necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of
the railroad and company and its agents.
APPLICATION:
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not
unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have
followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus
awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that
even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that
the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot
be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions
person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the
discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver,
although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to
run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was
still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and family. The
presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be
considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of
carriage.
G.R. No. 118664 August 7, 1998
JAPAN AIRLINES vs CA
 June 13, 1991 - private respondent Jose Miranda boarded JAL flight No. JL 001 in San
Francisco, California bound for Manila.
 Likewise, on the same day private respondents Aganas and Francisco left Los Angeles,
California for Manila via JAL flight No. JL 061.
 As an incentive for travelling on the said airline, both flights were to make an overnight stopover
at Narita, Japan, at the airlines' expense, thereafter proceeding to Manila the following day.
 June 14, 1991 - private respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko Narita for the night.
 The next day, private respondents, on the final leg of their journey, went to the airport to take
their flight to Manila.
 However, due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, unrelenting ashfall blanketed NAIA rendering it
inaccessible to airline traffic. Hence, private respondents' trip to Manila was cancelled
indefinitely.
 To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound
passengers on flight No. 741 due to depart on June 16, 1991 and also paid for the hotel
expenses for their unexpected overnight stay.
 On June 16, 1991, much to the dismay of the private respondents, their long anticipated flight to
Manila was again cancelled due to NAIA's indefinite closure.
 At this point, JAL informed the private respondents that it would no longer defray their hotel and
accommodation expense during their stay in Narita.
 Since NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22, 1991, private respondents were
forced to pay for their accommodations and meal expenses from their personal funds from June
16 to June 21, 1991.
 Their unexpected stay in Narita ended on June 22, 1991 when they arrived in Manila on board
JL flight No. 741.
 private respondents, on July 25, 1991, commenced an action for damages against JAL before
the RTC QC
RTC: JAL is liable for damages
CA: affirmed with modifications
ISSUE:
w/n JAL, as a common carrier has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal expenses of
its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination, even if the delay were
caused by "force majeure."
RULING:
We are not unmindful of the fact that in a plethora of cases we have consistently ruled that a
contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind, and degree from any other
contractual relation. It is safe to conclude that it is a relationship imbued with public interest.
Failure on the part of the common carrier to live up to the exacting standards of care and
diligence renders it liable for any damages that may be sustained by its passengers. However,
this is not to say that common carriers are absolutely responsible for all injuries or damages
even if the same were caused by a fortuitous event. To rule otherwise would render the
defense of "force majeure," as an exception from any liability, illusory and ineffective.
Accordingly, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of
"force majeure," the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-
performance. Corollarily, when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to
the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and
meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred, cannot be charged to JAL. Yet it is
undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected
overnight stay on June 15, 1991
Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the
mode of travel. In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are
some of the perils involved in air travel, the consequences of which the passenger must
assume or expect. After all, common carriers are not the insurer of all risks
We are not oblivious to the fact that the cancellation of JAL flights to Manila from June 15 to
June 21, 1991 caused considerable disruption in passenger booking and reservation. In fact, it
would be unreasonable to expect, considering NAIA's closure, that JAL flight operations would
be normal on the days affected. Nevertheless, this does not excuse JAL from its obligation to
make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on its first available flight
to Manila. After all, it had a contract to transport private respondents from the United States
to Manila as their final destination.
Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its
passengers when it declassified private respondents from "transit passengers" to "new
passengers" as a result of which private respondents were obliged to make the necessary
arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila. Private respondents were placed on
the waiting list from June 20 to June 24. To assure themselves of a seat on an available flight,
they were compelled to stay in the airport the whole day of June 22, 1991 and it was only at
8:00 p.m. of the aforesaid date that they were advised that they could be accommodated in
said flight which flew at about 9:00 a.m. the next day.
G.R. No. L-82619 September 15, 1993
PAL vs CA
 According to private respondent, Zapatos, on 2 August 1976, he was among the 21 passengers
of PAL Flight 477 that took off from Cebu bound for Ozamiz City.
 The routing of this flight was Cebu-Ozamiz-Cotabato.
 While on flight and just about 15 minutes before landing at Ozamiz City, the pilot received a radio
message that the airport was closed due to heavy rains and inclement weather and that he
should proceed to Cotabato City instead.
 Upon arrival at Cotabato City, the PAL Station Agent informed the passengers of their options to
return to Cebu on flight 560 of the same day and thence to Ozamiz City on 4 August 1975, or
take the next flight to Cebu the following day, or remain at Cotabato and take the next available
flight to Ozamiz City on 5 August 1975.
 The Station Agent likewise informed them that Flight 560 bound for Manila would make a stop-
over at Cebu to bring some of the diverted passengers; that there were only 6 seats available as
there were already confirmed passengers for Manila; and, that the basis for priority would be the
check-in sequence at Cebu.
 Private respondent tried to stop the departure of Flight 560 as his personal belongings, including
a package containing a camera which a certain Miwa from Japan asked him to deliver to Mrs. Fe
Obid of Gingoog City, were still on board. His plea fell on deaf ears. PAL then issued to private
respondent a free ticket to Iligan city, which the latter received under protest.
 Private respondent was left at the airport and could not even hitch a ride in the Ford Fiera loaded
with PAL personnel.
 PAL neither provided private respondent with transportation from the airport to the city proper nor
food and accommodation for his stay in Cotabato City.
 The following day, private respondent purchased a PAL ticket to Iligan City.
 He informed PAL personnel that he would not use the free ticket because he was filing a case
against PAL.
 In Iligan City, private respondent hired a car from the airport to Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte,
reaching Ozamiz City by crossing the bay in a launch.
 His personal effects including the camera, which were valued at P2,000.00 were no longer
recovered.
 On 25 November 1976, private respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of contract
of carriage against PAL
RTC: PAL is liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage
CA: Affirmed
ISSUE:
W/N PAL IS LIABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE for failure to attend to the needs
of the diverted passengers
RULING:
The contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Being imbued with public interest, the law
requires common carriers to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.
In Air France v. Carrascoso, we held that —
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the
public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation
attended with a public duty . . . . ( emphasis supplied).
The position taken by PAL in this case clearly illustrates its failure to grasp the exacting
standard required by law. Undisputably, PAL's diversion of its flight due to inclement weather
was a fortuitous event. Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PAL's contract with
its passengers. Being in the business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the country,
PAL is deemed equipped to deal with situations as in the case at bar. What we said in one
case once again must be stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger continues until
the latter has been landed at the port of destination and has left the carrier's premises.
Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the
comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final
destination. On this score, PAL grossly failed considering the then ongoing battle between
government forces and Muslim rebels in Cotabato City and the fact that the private
respondent was a stranger to the place.
G.R. No. L-55300 March 15, 1990
FRANKLIN G. GACAL and CORAZON M. GACAL, the latter assisted by her husband, FRANKLIN
G. GACAL, petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., and THE HONORABLE PEDRO SAMSON
C. ANIMAS, in his capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SOUTH
COTABATO, BRANCH I, respondents.
 Plaintiffs were then passengers boarding defendant's BAC 1-11 at Davao Airport for a flight to
Manila, not knowing that on the same flight are 6 members of the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF), were their co-passengers,(3) armed with grenades, two (2) with .45 caliber pistols, and
one with a .22 caliber pistol.
 (10) minutes after take off at about 2:30 in the afternoon, the hijackers brandishing their
respective firearms announced the hijacking of the aircraft and directed its pilot to fly to Libya.
 With the pilot explaining to them especially to its leader, Commander Zapata, of the inherent fuel
limitations of the plane and that they are not rated for international flights, the hijackers directed
the pilot to fly to Sabah.
 With the same explanation, they relented and directed the aircraft to land at Zamboanga Airport,
Zamboanga City for refueling. The aircraft landed at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 21,
1976 at Zamboanga Airport.
 When the plane began to taxi at the runway, it was met by two armored cars of the military with
machine guns pointed at the plane, and it stopped there.
 The rebels thru its commander demanded that a DC-aircraft take them to Libya with the
President of the defendant company as hostage and that they be given $375,000 and 6
armalites, otherwise they will blow up the plane if their demands will not be met by the
government and PAL.
 Meanwhile, the passengers were not served any food nor water and it was only on May 23, a
Sunday, at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon that they were served 1/4 slice of a sandwich and
1/10 cup of PAL water.
 After that, relatives of the hijackers were allowed to board the plane but immediately after they
alighted therefrom, an armored car bumped the stairs. That commenced the battle between the
military and the hijackers which led ultimately to the liberation of the surviving crew and the
passengers, with the final score of 10 passengers and 3 hijackers dead on the spot and 3
hijackers captured.
 Hence, the action of damages instituted by the plaintiffs against PAL
RTC: dismissed the complaints finding that all the damages sustained in the premises were
attributed to force majeure.
ISSUE:
W/N hijacking or air piracy during martial law and under the circumstances obtaining herein,
is a caso fortuito or force majeure which would exempt an aircraft from payment of damages
to its passengers whose lives were put in jeopardy and whose personal belongings were lost
during the incident.
RULING:
=Req. Diligence
Under the Civil Code, common carriers are required to exercise extraordinary diligence in
their vigilance over the goods and for the safety of passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case (Article 1733). They are presumed at fault or
to have acted negligently whenever a passenger dies or is injured or for the loss, destruction
or deterioration of goods in cases other than those enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil
Code.
=breach of contract
The source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage, and by entering into
said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide. There is breach of this obligation if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence
according to all the circumstances of the case in exercise of the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person
=Force Majeure
Thus, as ruled by this Court, no person shall be responsible for those "events which could not
be foreseen or which though foreseen were inevitable. (Article 1174, Civil Code). The term is
synonymous with caso fortuito which is of the same sense as "force majeure"
In order to constitute a caso fortuito or force majeure that would exempt a person from
liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, it is necessary that the following elements must
concur:
(a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will (the will
of the debtor or the obligor);
(b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable;
(c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner; and
(d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the
creditor
Caso fortuito or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or
avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is,
therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is
commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty
to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.
Applying the above guidelines to the case at bar, the failure to transport petitioners safely
from Davao to Manila was due to the skyjacking incident staged by 6 passengers of the same
plane, all members of the MNLF, without any connection with private respondent, hence,
independent of the will of either the PAL or of its passengers.
=NOT LIABLE=
Rationale: Under normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the skyjacking incident
which could have been avoided had there been a more thorough frisking of passengers and
inspection of baggages as authorized by R.A. No. 6235. But the incident in question occurred
during Martial Law where there was a military take-over of airport security including the
frisking of passengers and the inspection of their luggage preparatory to boarding domestic
and international flights. In fact military take-over was specifically announced on October 20,
1973 by General Jose L. Rancudo, Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force in a letter
to Brig. Gen. Jesus Singson, then Director of the Civil Aeronautics Administration (Rollo, pp.
71-72) later confirmed shortly before the hijacking incident of May 21, 1976 by Letter of
Instruction No. 399 issued on April 28, 1976 (Rollo, p. 72).
Otherwise stated, these events rendered it impossible for PAL to perform its obligations in a
nominal manner and obviously it cannot be faulted with negligence in the performance of
duty taken over by the Armed Forces of the Philippines to the exclusion of the former.
Finally, there is no dispute that the fourth element has also been satisfied. Consequently the
existence of force majeure has been established exempting respondent PAL from the
payment of damages to its passengers who suffered death or injuries in their persons and for  Some of the passengers were able to pull Atty. Caorong out of the burning bus and rush him to
the Mercy Community Hospital in Iligan City, but he died while undergoing operation
loss of their baggages.
 The private respondents brought this suit for breach of contract of carriage

RTC: Dismissed - for lack of merit

G.R. No. 119756 March 18, 1999
CA: REVERSED = Appellee's argument that there is no law requiring it to provide guards on its
FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC. vs CA 11,13,15 buses and that the safety of citizens is the duty of the government, is not well taken.

Given the circumstances obtaining in the case at bench that: (a) two Maranaos died because
of a vehicular collision involving one of appellee's vehicles; (b) appellee received a written
 On November 18, 1989, a bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan, report from a member of the Regional Security Unit, Constabulary Security Group, that the
Lanao del Norte, resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney, including two
Maranaos.
tribal/ethnic group of the two deceased were planning to burn five buses of appellee out of
 Petitioner received a written report from a member of the Regional Security Unit, Constabulary revenge; and (c) appelle did nothing — absolutely nothing — for the safety of its passengers
Security Group, that the tribal/ethnic group of the two deceased were planning to burn five buses travelling in the area of influence of the victims, appellee has failed to exercise the degree of
of appellee out of revenge
dilegence required of common carriers. Hence, appellee must be adjudge liable.
 Bravo, pperations manager of petitioner, in its main office in Cagayan de Oro City.
 Bravo assured that the necessary precautions to insure the safety of lives and property would be
ISSUE:
taken.
 on November 22, 1989, At about 6:45 P.M. 3 armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers,
W/N Fortune is liable for damages
seized a bus of petitioner at Linamon, Lanao del Norte while on its way to Iligan City. Among the
passengers of the bus was Atty. Caorong.
 The leader of the Maranaos, identified as one Bashier Mananggolo, ordered the driver,
RULING: YES.
Godofredo Cabatuan, to stop the bus on the side of the highway.
 Mananggolo then shot Cabatuan on the arm, which caused him to slump on the steering wheel. 1. BREACH OF CONTRACT
 The one of the companions of Mananggolo started pouring gasoline inside the bus, as the other
held the passenger at bay with a handgun. Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered
 Mananggolo then ordered the passenger to get off the bus. by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of other passengers, if the employees of the
 The passengers, including Atty. Caorong, stepped out of the bus and went behind the bushes in common carrier could have prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good
a field some distance from the highway.
father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner's
 However, Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the overhead rack.
 at that time, one of the armed men was pouring gasoline on the head of the driver. employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible.
 Cabatuan, who had meantime regained consciousness, heard Atty. Caorong pleading with the
armed men to spare the driver as he was innocent of any wrong doing and was only trying to Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were
make a living. planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of
 The armed men were, however, adamant as they repeated the warning that they were going to petitioner's operation manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be
burn the bus along with its driver.
taken, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers.
 During this exchange between Atty. Caorong and the assailants, Cabatuan climbed out of the left
window of the bus and crawled to the canal on the opposite side of the highway. He heard shots
from inside the bus. Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the
 Larry de la Cruz, one of the passengers, saw that Atty. Caorong was hit. Then the bus was set malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple
on fire. precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and
inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors,
before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger's
constitutional rights. As this Court amended in Gacal v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., a common
carrier can be held liable for failing to prevent a hijacking by frisking passengers and
inspecting their baggages.
From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner's employees failed to prevent the attack on
one of petitioner's buses because they did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family. Hence, petitioner should be held liable for the death of Atty. Caorong.
2. NOT A CASE OF FORCE MAJEURE
Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as an occurence which could not be
foreseen, is inevitable. In Yobido v. Court of Appeals, we held that to considered as force
majeure, it is necessary that (1) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the human will; (2) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable;
(3) the occurence must be render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a
normal manner; and
(4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor.
The absence of any of the requisites mentioned above would prevent the obligor from being
excused from liability.
In the case at bar there is an absence of 2nd requisite as there was a report regarding to
possible revenge of tribal/etchnic group of maranaos
3. DECEASED IS NOT GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
The petitioner contends that Atty. Caorong was guilty of contributory negligence in returning
to the bus to retrieve something. But Atty. Caorong did not act recklessly. It should be pointed
out that the intended targets of the violence were petitioners and its employees, not its
passengers. The assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as a
result of the collision between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos
were riding. Mananggolo, the leader of the group which had hijacked the bus, ordered the
passengers to get off the bus as they intended to burn it and its driver. The armed men
actually allowed Atty. Caorong to retrieve something from the bus. What apparently angered
them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. He was playing the
role of the good Samaritan. Certainly, this act cannot considered an act of negligence, let
alone recklessness.
PILAPIL VS CA
The record discloses the following facts:
 Petitioner-plaintiff Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, boarded respondent-defendant's bus at San
Nicolas, Iriga City on 16 September 1971 at about 6:00 P.M.
 While said bus was in due course negotiating the distance between Iriga City and Naga City,
upon reaching the vicinity of the cemetery of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, on the
way to Naga City, an unidentified man, a bystander along said national highway, hurled a stone
at the left side of the bus, which hit petitioner above his left eye.
 Private respondent's personnel lost no time in bringing the petitioner to the provincial hospital in
Naga City where he was confined and treated.
 Considering that the sight of his left eye was impaired, petitioner was taken to Dr. Malabanan of
Iriga City where he was treated for another week. Since there was no improvement in his left
eye's vision, petitioner went to V. Luna Hospital, Quezon City where he was treated by Dr.
Capulong. Despite the treatment accorded to him by Dr. Capulong, petitioner lost partially his left
eye's vision and sustained a permanent scar above the left eye.
 Thereupon, petitioner instituted before the CFI of Camarines Sur, Branch I an action for recovery
of damages sustained as a result of the stone-throwing incident.
CFI: ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
CA: REVERSED
ISSUE: W/N Defendant can be held liable for damages caused by the stone-throwing incident
RULING: NO
In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the business of
transporting passengers and goods, a common carrier does not give its consent to become an
insurer of any and all risks to passengers and goods. It merely undertakes to perform certain
duties to the public as the law imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach thereof.
Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are required to observe extraordinary
diligence for the safety of the passenger transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case. The requirement of extraordinary diligence imposed upon
common carriers is restated in Article 1755: "A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances." Further, in case of death
of or injuries to passengers, the law presumes said common carriers to be at fault or to have
acted negligently.
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does
not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance and precaution
in the carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such as human care and foresight
can provide. what constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard to all the
circumstances.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the part of
the common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time
being, from introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because the
presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same
is rebuttable by proof that the common carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as
required by law in the performance of its contractual obligation, or that the injury suffered by
the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event.
In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the Code Commission and Congress to
curb the recklessness of drivers and operators of common carriers in the conduct of their
business.
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation
company makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal
injuries sustained by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree
of diligence that the law requires
Although the suggested precaution could have prevented the injury complained of, the rule of
ordinary care and prudence is not so exacting as to require one charged with its exercise to
take doubtful or unreasonable precautions to guard against unlawful acts of strangers. The
carrier is not charged with the duty of providing or maintaining vehicles as to absolutely
prevent any and all injuries to passengers. Where the carrier uses cars of the most approved
type, in general use by others engaged in the same occupation, and exercises a high degree of
care in maintaining them in suitable condition, the carrier cannot be charged with negligence
in this respect.
SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED vs FERNANDEZ
 Respondent Andion Fernandez is an acclaimed soprano here in the Philippines and abroad. At
the time of the incident, she was availing an educational grant from the Federal Republic of
Germany, pursuing a Master’s Degree in Music majoring in Voice.
 She was invited to sing before the King and Queen of Malaysia on February 3 and 4, 1991.
 For this singing engagement, an airline passage ticket was purchased from petitioner Singapore
Airlines.
 The petitioner issued the respondent a Singapore Airlines ticket, , leaving Frankfurt, Germany on
January 27, 1991 bound for Singapore with onward connections from Singapore to Manila.
SCHEDULE: Leaving Germ= 1:45 pm Jan 27
Singapore Arrival = 8:50 am Jan 28
Singapore departure= 11am Jan 28
Manila Arrival = 2:20pm Jan 28
 On January 27, 1991, Flight No. SQ 27 left Frankfurt but arrived in Singapore two hours late or
at about 11:00 in the morning of January 28, 1991.
 By then, the aircraft bound for Manila had left as scheduled, leaving the respondent and about
25 other passengers stranded in the Changi Airport in Singapore.
 Upon disembarkation at Singapore, the respondent approached the transit counter who referred
her to the nightstop counter and told the lady employee thereat that it was important for her to
reach Manila on that day, January 28, 1991.
 he lady employee told her that there were no more flights to Manila for that day and that
respondent had no choice but to stay in Singapore.
 Upon respondent’s persistence, she was told that she can actually fly to Hong Kong going to
Manila but since her ticket was non-transferable, she would have to pay for the ticket.
 The respondent could not accept the offer because she had no money to pay for it.
 Her pleas for the respondent to make arrangements to transport her to Manila were unheeded.
  The respondent then requested the lady employee to use their phone to make a call to Manila.
Over the employees’ reluctance, the respondent telephoned her mother to inform the latter that
she missed the connecting flight. The respondent was able to contact a family friend who picked
her up from the airport for her overnight stay in Singapore.
 The next day, after being brought back to the airport, the respondent proceeded to petitioner’s
counter which says: "Immediate Attention To Passengers with Immediate Booking."
 The respondent approached petitioner’s male employee at the counter to make arrangements
for immediate booking only to be told: "Can’t you see I am doing something."
 She explained her predicament but the male employee uncaringly retorted: "It’s your problem,
not ours."
 The respondent never made it to Manila and was forced to take a direct flight from Singapore to
Malaysia on January 29, 1991, through the efforts of her mother and travel agency in Manila.
Her mother also had to travel to Malaysia bringing with her respondent’s wardrobe and personal
things needed for the performance that caused them to incur an expense of about P50,000.
 As a result of this incident, the respondent’s performance before the Royal Family of Malaysia
was below par. Because of the rude and unkind treatment she received from the petitioner’s
personnel in Singapore, the respondent was engulfed with fear, anxiety, humiliation and
embarrassment causing her to suffer mental fatigue and skin rashes. She was thereby
compelled to seek immediate medical attention upon her return to Manila for "acute urticaria."
RTC: ordering Singapore to pay for damages
CA: Affirmed
Petitioner's Contention:
contending that it exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law under the given
circumstances. The delay of Flight No. SQ 27 from Frankfurt to Singapore on January 28, 1991
for more than two hours was due to a fortuitous event and beyond petitioner’s control.
Inclement weather prevented the petitioner’s plane coming from Copenhagen, Denmark to
arrive in Frankfurt on time on January 27, 1991.
ISSUE:
W/N Singapore cannot be held liable because the delay on the flight is due to caso fortuito
RULING: NO. Singapore is liable.
When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a particular flight on a certain
date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger then has every right to expect that he be
transported on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a
suit for a breach of contract of carriage.
The contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Imbued with public interest, the law requires
common carriers to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the
circumstances. In an action for breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not
have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that is necessary to
prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the respondent carried a confirmed ticket for the two-
legged trip from Frankfurt to Manila: 1) Frankfurt-Singapore; and 2) Singapore-Manila. In her
contract of carriage with the petitioner, the respondent certainly expected that she would fly
to Manila on Flight No. SQ 72 on January 28, 1991. Since the petitioner did not transport the
respondent as covenanted by it on said terms, the petitioner clearly breached its contract of
carriage with the respondent. The respondent had every right to sue the petitioner for this
breach. The defense that the delay was due to fortuitous events and beyond petitioner’s
control is unavailing. In PAL vs. CA we held that:
.... Undisputably, PAL’s diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous event.
Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PAL’s contract with its passengers. Being in
the business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL is deemed to be
equipped to deal with situations as in the case at bar. What we said in one case once again
must be stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the latter has been
landed at the port of destination and has left the carrier’s premises. Hence, PAL necessarily
would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort, convenience
and safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination...
...
"...If the cause of non-fulfillment of the contract is due to a fortuitous event, it has to be the
sole and only cause (Art. 1755 C.C., Art. 1733 C.C.). Since part of the failure to comply with the
obligation of common carrier to deliver its passengers safely to their destination lay in the
defendant’s failure to provide comfort and convenience to its stranded passengers using
extraordinary diligence, the cause of non-fulfillment is not solely and exclusively due to
fortuitous event, but due to something which defendant airline could have prevented,
defendant becomes liable to plaintiff."
The petitioner’s diligence in communicating to its passengers the consequences of the delay
in their flights was wanting.
G.R. No. 85691 July 31, 1990
BACHELOR EXPRESS, INCORPORATED, and CRESENCIO RIVERA vs CA
 The evidence shows that the bus came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro City
passing Butuan City; that while at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the bus picked up a passenger;
that about 15 minutes later, a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which
caused commotion and panic among the passengers;
 That when the bus stopped, passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were found lying
down the road, the former already dead as a result of head injuries and the latter also suffering
from severe injuries which caused her death later.
 The passenger assailant alighted from the bus and ran toward the bushes but was killed by the
police.
 Thereafter, the heirs of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut, private respondents herein filed a
complaint for "sum of money" against Bachelor Express, Inc. its alleged owner Samson Yasay
and the driver Rivera.
Petitioners Contentions:
1. hey alleged that ... the driver was able to transport his passengers safely to their respective
places of destination except Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut who jumped off the bus
without the knowledge and consent, much less, the fault of the driver and conductor and the
defendants in this case;
2. the defendant corporation had exercised due diligence in the choice of its employees to
avoid as much as possible accidents;
3. the incident on August 1, 1980 was not a traffic accident or vehicular accident; it was an
incident or event very much beyond the control of the defendants; defendants were not
parties to the incident complained of as it was an act of a third party who is not in any way
connected with the defendants and of which the latter have no control and supervision
RTC: Dismissed
CA: REVERSED
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioners should not be held liable because the incident is of force majeure
RULING:
ART. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each
case.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard
for all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
There is no question that Bachelor Express, Inc. is a common carrier. Hence, from the nature
of its business and for reasons of public policy Bachelor Express, Inc. is bound to carry its
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
In the case at bar, Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were passengers of a bus belonging
to petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. and, while passengers of the bus, suffered injuries which
caused their death. Consequently, pursuant to Article 1756 of the Civil Code, petitioner
Bachelor Express, Inc. is presumed to have acted negligently unless it can prove that it had
observed extraordinary diligence in accordance with Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil
Code.
FORCE MAJEURE=
Article 1174 of the present Civil Code states:
Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulations, or
when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were
inevitable.
The above-mentioned provision was substantially copied from Article 1105 of the old Civil
Code which states"
No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen, were
inevitable, with the exception of the cases in which the law expressly provides otherwise and
those in which the obligation itself imposes liability.
In discussing and analyzing the term caso fortuito the Enciclopedia Juridica Española says: 'In
a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso fortuito presents the
following essential characteristics:
(1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to
comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will.
(2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can
be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.
(3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner. And
(4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor.
(5) Enciclopedia Juridica Española, 309) As will be seen, these authorities agree that some
extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the obligor or of his employees, is an
essential element of a caso fortuito. ...
application:
The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered
off a commotion and panic among the passengers such that the passengers started running to
the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and
Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another
passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure.
However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force
majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier
must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident.
There is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that the solitary door of the bus was
locked as to prevent the passengers from passing through. Leonila Cullano, testifying for the
defense, clearly stated that the conductor opened the door when the passengers were
shouting that the bus stop while they were in a state of panic. Sergia Beter categorically
stated that she actually saw her son fall from the bus as the door was forced open by the
force of the onrushing passengers.
Pedro Collango, on the other hand, testified that he shut the door after the last passenger had
boarded the bus. But he had quite conveniently neglected to say that when the passengers
had panicked, he himself panicked and had gone to open the door.
G.R. No. L-8034 November 18, 1955
CORNELIA A. DE GILLACO, ET AL. vs MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
 That at about 7:30 a.m., on the morning of April 1, 1946, Lieut. Tomas Gillaco, husband of the
plaintiff, was a passenger in the early morning train of the Manila Railroad Company from
Calamba, Laguna to Manila;
 That when the train reached the Paco Railroad station, Emilio Devesa, a train guard of the
Manila Railroad Company assigned in the Manila-San Fernando, La Union Line, happened to be
in said station waiting for the same train which would take him to Tutuban Station, where he was
going to report for duty;
 That Emilio Devesa had a long standing personal grudge against Tomas Gillaco, same dating
back during the Japanese occupation;
  That because of this personal grudge, Devesa shot Gillaco with the carbine furnished to him by
the Manila Railroad Company for his use as such train guard, upon seeing him inside the train
coach;
 That Tomas Gillaco died as a result of the would which he sustained from the shot fired by
Devesa.
 It is also undisputed that Devesa was convicted with homicide by final judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
 Respondent Contention: Not liable as the crime was not committed in the actual performance of
Devesa's ordinary duties and service
RTC: Liable for damages on the ground that a contract of transportation implies protection of
the passengers against acts of personal violence by the agents or employees of the carrier.
ISSUE:
W/N Manila Rail Road can be held liable for damages
RULING: MRR is not liable
There can be no quarrel with the principle that a passenger is entitled to protection from
personal violence by the carrier or its agents or employees, since the contract of
transportation obligates the carrier to transport a passenger safely to his destination. But
under the law of the case, this responsibility extends only to those that the carrier could
foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of car and diligence required of it.
Discussing the basis of a carrier's liability under the old Civil Code of 1889 this Court said in
Lasam vs. Smith It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of the defendant's legal liability is
the contract of carriage; that by entering into that contract he bound himself to carry the
plaintiff safely and securely to their destination; and that having failed to do so he is liable in
damages unless he shows that the failure to fulfill his obligation was due to causes mentioned
in article 1105 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
"No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen,
were inevitable, with the exception of the cases in which the law expressly provides otherwise
and those in which the obligation itself imposes such liability."
The act of guard Devesa in shooting passenger Gillaco (because of a personal grudge nurtured
against the latter since the Japanese occupation) was entirely unforeseeable by the Manila
Railroad Co. The latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet, nor
could it reasonably foresee every personal rancor that might exist between each one of its
many employees and any one of the thousands of eventual passengers riding in its trains. The
shooting in question was therefore "caso fortuito" within the definition of article 105 of the
old Civil Code, being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the given circumstances; and
pursuant to established doctrine, the resulting breach of appellant's contract of safe carriage
with the late Tomas Gillaco was excused thereby.
Another very important consideration that must be borne in mind is that, when the crime
took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in connection with the transportation
of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. The stipulation of facts is clear that when Devesa
shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San Fernando (La Union)
trains, and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to Tutuban, the starting point of
the train that he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty was to start at 9:00 a.m., two
hours after the commission of the crime. Devesa was therefore under no obligation to
safeguard the passenger of the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was riding; and the
killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. The position of Devesa at the time was that of
another would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting transportation, and not that of an
employee assigned to discharge any of the duties that the Railroad had assumed by its
contract with the deceased. As a result, Devesa's assault cannot be deemed in law a breach of
Gillaco's contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier.
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD vs. CA
 On 19 October 1975, respondent Tomas L. Alcantara was a first class passenger of petitioner
Cathay on its Flight No. CX-900 from Manila to Hongkong and onward from Hongkong to
Jakarta on Flight No. CX-711.
 The purpose of his trip was to attend the following day, 20 October 1975, a conference with the
Director General of Trade of Indonesia, Alcantara being the Executive Vice-President and
General Manager of Iligan Cement Corporation, Chairman of the Export Committee of the
Philippine Cement Corporation, and representative of the Cement Industry Authority and the
Philippine Cement Corporation.
 He checked in his luggage which contained not only his clothing and articles for personal use but
also papers and documents he needed for the conference.
 Upon his arrival in Jakarta, respondent discovered that his luggage was missing. When he
inquired about his luggage from CATHAY's representative in Jakarta, private respondent was
told that his luggage was left behind in Hongkong.
  For this, respondent Alcantara was offered $20.00 as "inconvenience money" to buy his
immediate personal needs until the luggage could be delivered to him.
 His luggage finally reached Jakarta more than twenty four (24) hours after his arrival. However, it
was not delivered to him at his hotel but was required by petitioner to be picked up by an official
of the Philippine Embassy.
 On 1 March 1976, respondent filed his complaint against petitioner with the CFI of Lanao del
Norte praying for temperate, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees.
RTC: Ordering to pay plaintiff for damages
CA: affirmed
ISSUE:
W/N Cathay shoul be held liable for damages
The aforequoted testimony shows that the language and conduct of petitioner's
representative towards respondent Alcantara was discourteous or arbitrary to justify the
grant of moral damages. The CATHAY representative was not only indifferent and impatient;
he was also rude and insulting. He simply advised Alcantara to buy anything he wanted.
When petitioner airline misplaced respondent's luggage and failed to deliver it to its
passenger at the appointed place and time, some special species of injury must have been
caused to him. For sure, the latter underwent profound distress and anxiety, and the fear of
losing the opportunity to fulfill the purpose of his trip. In fact, for want of appropriate
clothings for the occasion brought about by the delay of the arrival of his luggage, to his
embarrassment and consternation respondent Alcantara had to seek postponement of his
pre-arranged conference with the Director General of Trade of the host country.

RULING:

Petitioner breached its contract of carriage with private respondent when it failed to deliver
his luggage at the designated place and time, it being the obligation of a common carrier to
carry its passengers and their luggage safely to their destination, which includes the duty not
to delay their transportation, and the evidence shows that petitioner acted fraudulently or in
bad faith.

In the case at bar, both the trial court and the appellate court found that CATHAY was grossly
negligent and reckless when it failed to deliver the luggage of petitioner at the appointed
place and time. We agree. CATHAY alleges that as a result of mechanical trouble, all pieces of
luggage on board the first aircraft bound for Jakarta were unloaded and transferred to the
second aircraft which departed an hour and a half later. Yet, as the Court of Appeals noted,
petitioner was not even aware that it left behind private respondent's luggage until its
G.R. No. 175172 September 29, 2009
attention was called by the Hongkong Customs authorities. More, bad faith or otherwise
improper conduct may be attributed to the employees of petitioner. While the mere failure of CRESENCIA ACHEVARA vs RAMOS
CATHAY to deliver respondent's luggage at the agreed place and time did not ipso facto
amount to willful misconduct since the luggage was eventually delivered to private Jeep = valdez
respondent, albeit belatedly, We are persuaded that the employees of CATHAY acted in bad
vehicle= ramos
faith. We refer to the deposition of Romulo Palma, Commercial Attache of the Philippine
Embassy at Jakarta, who was with respondent Alcantara when the latter sought assistance  In their Complaint, respondents alleged that in the morning of April 22, 1995, Benigno Valdez
was driving a passenger jeep heading north on the national highway in Barangay Tablac,
from the employees of CATHAY.
Candon, Ilocos Sur in a reckless, careless, and negligent manner.
  He tried to overtake a motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite lane
and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos.
 The injuries sustained by Arnulfo Ramos caused his death, notwithstanding prompt medical
assistance.
 Respondents alleged that Crescencia Achevara failed to exercise due diligence in the selection
and supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of the passenger jeep.
 Respondents sought to recover actual damages as well as moral and exemplary damages, lost
earnings, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
Petitioners denied respondents’ allegation that Benigno Valdez overtook a motorcycle and
bumped the vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. They alleged that on April 22, 1995, Benigno
Valdez was driving southward at a moderate speed when he saw an owner-type jeep coming
from the south and heading north, running in a zigzag manner, and encroaching on the west
lane of the road. To avoid a collision, Valdez drove the passenger jeep towards the shoulder
of the road, west of his lane, but the owner-type jeep continued to move toward the western
lane and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Petitioners alleged that it was Arnulfo
Ramos who was careless and negligent in driving a motor vehicle, which he very well knew
had a mechanical defect. Hence, respondents had no cause of action against petitioners.
RTC: in favor of Ramoses=The trial court found that the testimony of respondents’ witness,
Alfredo Gamera, was controverted by the testimony of PO3 Baltazar de Peralta and the
finding of police investigator SPO2 Marvin Valdez. Gamera testified that the vehicular
accident occurred because the passenger jeep tried to overtake the motorcycle driven by PO3
Baltazar de Peralta and encroached on the lane of the owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo
Ramos.
CA: AFFIRMED
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners are liable to respondents for damages incurred as a result of the vehicular
accident.
RULING: NO.
Doctrine of last clear chance
petitioners contend that Arnulfo Ramos’ own negligence in knowingly driving a mechanically
defective vehicle was the immediate and proximate cause of his death, and that the doctrine
of last clear chance does not apply to this case.
IS WITHOUT MERIT
The Court notes that respondents’ version of the vehicular accident was rebutted by
petitioners.
Fundamental Test of Negligence (application to last clear chance)
Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have
acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that
certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite
class of risks.[G.R.]
Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner as it
travelled on the opposite side of the highway, Benigno Valdez was made aware of the danger
ahead if he met the owner-type jeep on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution by
immediately veering to the rightmost portion of the road or by stopping the passenger jeep at
the right shoulder of the road and letting the owner-type jeep pass before proceeding
southward; hence, the collision occurred. The Court of Appeals correctly held that Benigno
Valdez was guilty of inexcusable negligence by neglecting to take such precaution, which a
reasonable and prudent man would ordinarily have done under the circumstances and which
proximately caused injury to another.
Application:
Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner as it
travelled on the opposite side of the highway, Benigno Valdez was made aware of the danger
ahead if he met the owner-type jeep on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution by
immediately veering to the rightmost portion of the road or by stopping the passenger jeep at
the right shoulder of the road and letting the owner-type jeep pass before proceeding
southward; hence, the collision occurred. The Court of Appeals correctly held that Benigno
Valdez was guilty of inexcusable negligence by neglecting to take such precaution, which a
reasonable and prudent man would ordinarily have done under the circumstances and which
proximately caused injury to another.
Guilty of Contributory Negligence
On the other hand, the Court also finds Arnulfo Ramos guilty of gross negligence for
knowingly driving a defective jeep on the highway. An ordinarily prudent man would know
that he would be putting himself and other vehicles he would encounter on the road at risk
for driving a mechanically defective vehicle. Under the circumstances, a prudent man would
have had the owner-type jeep repaired or would have stopped using it until it was repaired.
Ramos was, therefore, grossly negligent in continuing to drive on the highway the
mechanically defective jeep, which later encroached on the opposite lane and bumped the
passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez. Gross negligence is the absence of care or diligence
as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property. It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.
Last clear chance applicability:
G.R.: The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of
prior or antecedent negligence, but the defendant − who had the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so − is made liable for all the consequences of the accident,
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.
passenger jeep driven by Valdez was unable to avoid the collision. Hence, the doctrine of last
clear chance does not apply to this case.
In this case, both Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez failed to exercise reasonable care and
caution that an ordinarily prudent man would have taken to prevent the vehicular accident.
Since the gross negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of Benigno
Valdez were the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover
damages pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:
When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

XPN: However, the doctrine does not apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand
after the peril is or should have been discovered.

The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case, because even if it can be said
that it was Benigno Valdez who had the last chance to avoid the mishap when the owner-type
jeep encroached on the western lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez no longer had the
opportunity to avoid the collision. The Answer of petitioners stated that when the owner-type
jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, Benigno Valdez maneuvered his vehicle G.R. No. 208802, October 14, 2015
towards the western shoulder of the road to avoid a collision, but the owner-type jeep driven
by Ramos continued to move to the western lane and bumped the left side of the passenger G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC., Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF ROMEO L. BATTUNG, JR.,
jeep. Thus, petitioners assert in their Petition that considering that the time the owner-type REPRESENTED BY ROMEO BATTUNG, SR., Respondents.
jeep encroached on the lane of Valdez to the time of impact was only a matter of seconds, he
DECISION
no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision. Although the records are bereft of
evidence showing the exact distance between the two vehicles when the owner-type jeep PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, it must have been near enough, because the
The Facts
 Battung boarded petitioner's bus in Delfin Albano, Isabela, bound for Manila.
 Battung was seated at the first row behind the driver and slept during the ride.
 When the bus reached the Philippine Carabao Center in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, the bus driver,
Duplio, stopped the bus and alighted to check the tires.
 At this point, a man who was seated at the fourth row of the bus stood up, shot Battung at his
head, and then left with a companion.
 The bus conductor, Daraoay, notified Duplio of the incident and thereafter, brought Romeo to the
hospital, but the latter was pronounced dead on arrival.
 Hence, respondents filed a complaint for damages based on a breach of contract of carriage
against petitioner, Duplio, and Baraoay (petitioner, et al.) before the RTC.
Respondents Contention
Respondents contended that as a common carrier, petitioner and its employees are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers; and in case of injuries
and/or death on the part of a passenger, they are presumed to b e at fault and, thus,
responsible therefor. As such, petitioner, et al. should be held civilly liable for Battung's death.
Petitioners Contention:
In their defense, petitioner, et al. maintained that they had exercised the extraordinary
diligence required by law from common carriers. In this relation, they claimed that a common
carrier is not an absolute insurer of its passengers and that Battung's death should be
properly deemed a fortuitous event. Thus, they prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, as
well as the payment of their counterclaims for damages and attorney's fees.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC ruled in respondents' favor
The RTC found that petitioner, et al. were unable to rebut the presumed liability of common
carriers in case of injuries/death to its passengers due to their failure to show that they
implemented the proper security measures to prevent passengers from carrying deadly
weapons inside the bus which, in this case, resulted in the killing of Battung. As such,
petitioner, et al. were held civilly liable for the latter's death based on culpa contractual.
The CA Ruling
AFFIRMED
ISSUE
W/N Petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage for not exercising an extra-
ordinary diligence as a common carrier
RULING
NO.
The law exacts from common carriers (i.e., those persons, corporations, firms, or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land,
water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public) the highest degree of
diligence (i.e., extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the safety of its passengers. Articles 1733
and 1755 of the Civil Code state:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each
case.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard
for all the circumstances.
In this relation, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733
and 1755." This disputable presumption may also be overcome by a showing that the accident
was caused by a fortuitous event. 21
The foregoing provisions notwithstanding, it should be pointed out that the law does not
make the common carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers. In Mariano, Jr.
v. Callejas,22 the Court explained that:
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does
not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation
company makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal
injuries sustained by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the
degree of diligence that the law requires. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Pilapil v. CA,  the Court clarified that where the injury sustained by the passenger was in no
way due (1) to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting, or (2) to
the negligent or willful acts of the common carrier's employees with respect to the foregoing
- such as when the injury arises wholly from causes created by strangers which the carrier had
no control of or prior knowledge to prevent — there would be no issue regarding the common
carrier's negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable care, as well as competent
employees in relation to its transport business; as such, the presumption of fault/negligence
foisted under Article 1756 of the Civil Code should not apply:
First, as stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is only a
disputable presumption.[The presumption] gives in where contrary facts are established
proving either that the carrier had exercised the degree of diligence required by law or the
injury suffered by the passenger was due to a fortuitous event . Where, as in the instant case,
the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way due to any defect in the means of
transport or in the method of transporting or to the negligent or wilful acts of [the common
carrier'sl employees, and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its duty to provide
safe and suitable [care] as well as competent employees, with the injury arising wholly from
causes created by strangers over which the carrier had no control or even knowledge or
could not have prevented, the presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not and ought not
to be held liable. To rule otherwise would make the common carrier the insurer of the
absolute safety of its passengers which is not the intention of the lawmakers. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In this case, Battung's death was neither caused by any defect in the means of transport or in
the method of transporting, or to the negligent or willful acts of petitioner's employees,
namely, that of Duplio and Daraoay, in their capacities as driver and conductor, respectively.
Instead, the case involves the death of Battung wholly caused by the surreptitious act of a co-
passenger who, after consummating such crime, hurriedly alighted from the vehicle. 25 Thus,
there is no proper issue on petitioner's duty to observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring the
safety of the passengers transported by it, and the presumption of fault/negligence against
petitioner under Article 1756 in relation to Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code should not
apply.
In this particular case before Us, it must be considered that while it is true the passengers of
appellant's bus should not be made to suffer for something over which they had no control,
as enunciated in the decision of this Court cited by His Honor, fairness demands that in
measuring a common carrier's duty towards its passengers, allowance must be given to the
reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard
to their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him
anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not
to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled.  He
cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his
baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words,
inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when such is not
outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of
being transgressed. Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested by the service manual
invoked by the trial judge, in compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection,
after the passenger had already declared that the box contained mere clothes and other
miscellaneous, could not have justified invasion of a constitutionally protected domain. Police
officers acting without judicial authority secured in the manner provided by law are not
beyond the pale of constitutional inhibitions designed to protect individual human rights and
liberties. Withal, what must be importantly considered here is not so much the infringement
of the fundamental sacred rights of the particular passenger herein involved, but the constant
threat any contrary ruling would pose on the right of privacy of all passengers of all common
carriers, considering how easily the duty to inspect can be made an excuse for mischief and
abuse. Of course, when there are sufficient indications that the representations of the
passenger regarding the nature of his baggage may not be true, in the interest of the
common safety of all, the assistance of the police authorities may be solicited, not
necessarily to force the passenger to open his baggage, but to conduct the needed
investigation consistent with the rules of propriety and, above all, the constitutional rights
of the passenger. It is in this sense that the mentioned service manual issued by appellant to
its conductors must be understood. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, records reveal that when the bus stopped at San Jose City to let four (4) men ride
petitioner's bus (two [2] of which turned out to be Battung's murderers), the bus driver,
Duplio, saw them get on the bus and even took note of what they were wearing. Moreover,
Duplio made the bus conductor, Daraoay, approach these men and have them pay the
corresponding fare, which Daraoay did. During the foregoing, both Duplio and Daraoay
observed nothing which would rouse their suspicion that the men were armed or were to
carry out an unlawful activity. With no such indication, there was no need for them to
conduct a more stringent search (i.e., bodily search) on the aforesaid men. By all accounts,
therefore, it cannot be concluded that petitioner or any of its employees failed to employ the
diligence of a good father of a family in relation to its responsibility under Article 1763 of the
Civil Code. As such, petitioner cannot altogether be held civilly liable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 31, 2013 and the
Resolution dated August 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97757 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for damages filed by
respondents heirs of Romeo L. Battung, Jr. is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.c
GREENSTAR EXPRESS, INC. vs UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION AND NISSIN UNIVERSAL
ROBINA CORPORATION
Petitioner Greenstar Express, Inc. (Grepistar) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of public transportation, while petitioner Fruto L. Sayson, Jr. (Sayson) is one of its bus
drivers
Respondents Universal Robina Corporation (URC) and Nissin Universal Robina Corporation
(NURC) are domestic corporations engaged in the food business. NURC is a subsidiary of URC.
FACTS:
 At about 6:50 a.m. on February 25, 2003(PEOPLE POWER), which was then a declared
national holiday,petitioner's bus, which was then being driven toward the direction of Manila by
Sayson, collided head-on with the URC van, which was then being driven Quezon province-
bound by NURC's Operations Manager, Bicomong. Bicomong died on the spot, while the
colliding vehicles sustained considerable damage.
 On September 23, 2003, petitioners filed a Complaint against NURC to recover damages
sustained during the collision, premised on negligence.
 As per testimonies and evidences: it was found out that the cause of accident was because of
Bicomong's negligence
RTC: Plaintiff has no cause of action and cannot recover from the defendants even assuming
that the direct and proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the defendant's
employee Renato Bicomong.
Pursuant to Article 2184 of the New Civil Code, the owner of a motor vehicle is solidarily liable
with his driver if at the time of the mishap, the owner was in the vehicle and by the use of due
diligence could have presented (sic) the misfortune; if the owner is not in the motor vehicle,
the provision of Article 2180 is applicable. The defendants being juridical persons, the first
paragraph of Article 2184 is obviously not applicable.
Under Article 2180, "employers shall be liable tor the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry. "In other words, for the employer to be liable for the
damages caused by his employee, the latter must have caused the damage in the course of
doing his assigned tasks or in the-performance of his duties
In this case, it is beyond cavil that the deceased Renante Bicong [sic] was not in the
performance of his duty on that fateful day of February 25, 2003. In the first place that day
was a holiday; there was no work and it was not shown that he was working.
CA: Affirmed
ISSUE:
W/N RESPONDENTS ARE NOT LIABLE TO PETITIONERS FOR THE DAMAGES THEY SUSTAINED
CONSIDERING THAT THE ACCIDENT WAS ATTRIBUTED TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF RENANTE
BICOMONG.
RULING: YES.
In Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar, the Court made the following
relevant pronouncement:
The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules.
1. First, Article 2180's specification that '[e]mployers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees ... acting within the scope of their assigned tasks [.]'
2. Second, the operation of the registered-owner rule that registered owners are
liable for death or injuries caused by the operation of their Vehicles.
These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the employer is also the
registered owner of a vehicle.
Article 2180 requires proof of two things:
1. first, an employment relationship between the driver and the owner; and
2. second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks.
On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff to prove that
the defendant-employer is the registered owner of the vehicle.
The registered-owner rule was articulated as early as 1957 in Erezo, et al. v. Jepte, where this
court explained that the registration of motor vehicles, as required by Section 5(a) of Republic
Act No. 41365 the and Transportation and Traffic Code, was necessary 'not to make said
registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles is transferred, ... but to permit
the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway[.]' Its 'main aim ... is to identify
the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the
vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual,
the registered owner.'
As acknowledged in Filcar Case, there is no categorical statutory pronouncement in the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code stipulating the liability of a registered owner. The source of a
registered owner's liability is not a distinct statutory provision, but remains to be Articles 2176
and 2180 of the Civil Code:
Thus, it is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner that harmonizes it with
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Rules must be construed in a manner that will
harmonize them with other rules so as to form a uniform and consistent system of
jurisprudence. In light of this, the words used in Del Carmen are particularly notable. There,
this court stated that Article 2180 'should defer to' the registered-owner rule. It never stated
that Article 2180 should be totally abandoned.
Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the registered-owner rule
and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the registered
owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there
arises a disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been proven. As
a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that no liability under
Article 2180 has arisen.
This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle in relation to the
actual driver is concerned, recognizes that between the owner and the victim, it is the former
that should carry the costs of moving forward with the evidence. The victim is, in many cases,
a hapless pedestrian or motorist with hardly any means to uncover the employment
relationship of the owner and the driver, or any act that the owner may have done in relation
to that employment.
Applying the above pronouncement in the Caravan Travel and Tours case, it must be said that
when by evidence the ownership of the van and Bicomong's employment were proved, the
presumption of negligence on respondents' part attached, as the registered owner of the van.
and as Bicomong's employer. Hie burden of proof then shifted to respondents to show that
no liability under Article 2180 arose. This may be done by proof of any of the following:
1. That they had no employment relationship with Bicomong; or
2. That Bicomong acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or
3. That they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Bicomong.
[1] Holiday no work
[2] that the URC van was not assigned to Bicompng (itwas toyota corolla that he left in cavite
plant)
[3] That they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Bicomong.
The law exacts from common carriers (i.e., those persons, corporations, firms, or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land,
water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public) the highest degree of
diligence (i.e., extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the safety of its passengers. Articles 1733
and 1755 of the Civil Code state:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary, diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
 Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care arid foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.

In this relation, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that '[i]n case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733
and 1755. xxx

The doctrine of last clear chance

x x x The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the
incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed
to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is
that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by
the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence, x x x

Thus, Sayson took no defensive maneuver whatsoever in spite of the fact that he saw
Bicomong drive his van in a precarious manner, as far as 250 meters away - or at a point in
time and space where Sayson had all the opportunity to prepare and avert a possible collision.
The collision was certainly foreseen and avoidable but Sayson took no measures to avoid it.