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Alfred Schutz
First published Tue Oct 29, 2002; substantive revision Tue Feb 27, 2018
Alfred Schutz (b. 1899, d. 1959), more than any other phenomenologist, attempted to
relate the thought of Edmund Husserl to the social world and the social sciences.
His Phenomenology of the Social World supplied philosophical foundations for Max
Weber’s sociology and for economics, with which he was familiar through contacts with
colleagues of the Austrian school. When Schutz fled Hitler’s Anschluss of Austria and
immigrated to the United States in 1939, he developed his thought further in relationship
to the social sciences, American pragmatism, logical empiricism, and to various other
fields of endeavor such as music and literature. His work has been influential on new
movements in sociological thought such as ethnomethodology and conversation analysis.
3. Extensions
3.1 The Bergson Writings
Schutz’s manuscripts on Bergson, produced from 1925 to 1927 and finally published in
English in 1982, illuminate his subsequent works, with which they share the general
purpose of “the grounding of the social sciences in the Thou experience.” (Schutz 1982,
34) In reaction to positivistic approaches of the Schlick Circle (in which Felix Kaufmann
participated) that reduced experience to what the method of natural scientific observation
found tolerable, Schutz sought to give an account of the life-form of pre-scientific
experience preceding conceptual-categorical comprehension, the “highest and most
powerful life-form” (Schutz 1982, 53). Of course, by moving in this direction, he
encountered the problem, faced by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Wilfrid Sellars, John
McDowell, Robert Brandom, and others, namely, how it is possible to access the pre-
conceptual without conceptualizing it. Hence, he acknowledged that his work is “in
conflict with its material” since it “is forced to resort to conceptual formulations” (Schutz
1982, 70). This problem parallels the problem of reaching the life-form of the present
unfolding of experience (duration) since one can only speak of it by arresting its flow,
distinguishing its moments, and thus remembering what has lapsed—but then one is in
the new life-form of memory. Although this gap between present duration and memory
prompted his turn to Husserlian phenomenology, the problematic itself highlighted for
him the pervasiveness and hiddenness of interpretive activity as one moves between
interpretive frameworks—a principal theme of all his later work. He took notice of this
theme when he frequently pointed out how one’s reconstitution of a past experience in
memory varied according to the interests of the present from which one remembered the
past. Indeed a favorite example from Bergson’s work involved an actor reflecting upon a
prior process of choosing and interpreting it as if it had been a choice between two clearly
defined possibilities, whereas in fact the process often oscillated between several options,
retaining, reproducing, comparing, and modifying them in succession. In general, Schutz
concurred with Bergson on such notions such as attention to life, planes of consciousness,
the body as the intersection of outer and inner temporality, music as the model of
duration, and multiple types of ordering, but rejected his bio-evolutionary theory,
vitalism, and the idea of a supra-personal elán.
3.4 Applications
In 1945, Schutz published an essay, “On Multiple Realities,” that extended the theory
of The Phenomenology of the Social World and anticipated later essays applying that
theory. While he reiterated earlier views about levels of activity, Bergsonian tensions of
consciousness, and the structure of the social world, his work took a decidedly pragmatic
twist, emphasizing “working” (Wirken) as involving bodily movements as opposed to the
covert performances of mere thinking. In manuscripts in the 1930s and after The
Phenomenology of the Social World, Schutz had already turned in this pragmatic
direction. In “On Multiple Realities,” he enlarged upon the “world of working” by
demonstrating how reflection dissolves the self unified in lived action into partial, role-
taking selves and by expanding Mead’s idea of the “manipulatory sphere” to include
worlds within “potential reach,” either restorable (from the past) or attainable (in the
future). This “world of working” constitutes the paramount reality, organized in its
interests in the face of the fundamental anxiety that derives, as it did for Heidegger, from
the inescapability of one’s own death. Following Husserl’s views on how consciousness
can modify its stances toward reality and de-ontologizing James’s sub-universes of
reality, Schutz developed the notion of various finite provinces of meaning. One enters
any of these provinces, such as those of phantasms, dreams, the theater, religious
experience, or theoretical contemplation, by undergoing different types of epoché,
analogous to the phenomenological protoype, as when one slips into a daydream, falls
asleep, watches theater curtains open, commences a ritual, or assumes the scientist’s role.
Each province contains its distinctive logical, temporal, corporal, and social dimensions,
and movement between the provinces only becomes paradoxical (e.g., asking how
phenomenologists are able to communicate their private findings publicly) if one
conceives the provinces as ontological static realms to which one transmigrates as a soul
to another world. Rather the provinces are permeable, and one adopts the attitudes of
scientist or religious believer within the world of working as if it were seen through by
another viewpoint, all the while that its communicative activities subtend these other
provinces. There is something paradoxical, though, about describing one’s dreams or
theorizing about religious experience since to give an account one must absent oneself
from the province for which one accounts, and Kierkegaard’s notion of indirect
communication and various postmodern critiques of theory address themselves to just
such paradoxes.
The essay on multiple realities underpins Schutz’s theory of signs and symbols in
“Symbol, Reality, and Society,” published almost ten years later. Synthesizing the notion
of potential reach from the earlier essay with Husserl’s concept of appresensation, namely
that one element of a pair refers to another not directly given in experience, Schutz
describes how agents overcome whatever transcends them. Hence they leave marks to
bring within reach what they leave behind (e.g., breaking a twig to remind oneself to turn
when one returns) or follow indications, that is, regular connections not of their making
(e.g. smoke indicating a not yet visible fire), to bring within their knowledge what lies
beyond it. Signs, however, appresent in an intersubjective setting the meanings of one
person to another, but an insuperable transcendence still remains insofar as the each one’s
stream of consciousness and therefore meanings are never identical with another’s.
Finally, through symbols, developed within groups, something given within everyday
reality appresents a reality belonging to a entirely different province of meaning, an
ultimate transcendence (e.g., the stone where Jacob dreamed of a ladder to heaven
memorializes God, accessible within the religious province of meaning).
Schutz dealt with this theme of language in other contexts, comparing Husserl’s
distinction between prepredicative (prepropositional) and predicative levels with Kurt
Goldstein’s separation, based on studies of brain lesions, of a concrete attitude relying on
automatic speech associations from an abstract attitude forming propositions and utilizing
rational language. Husserl’s prepredicative/predicative differentiation plays a key role in
Schutz’s essay “Type and Eidos in Husserl’s Late Philosophy,” in which he shows a
gradual development from empirical types passively constituted within the prepredicative
sphere to presumptive universals spontaneously formed in the predicative sphere. At the
predicative level, scientific reflection further transforms nonessential types (e.g., that
whales are fish) into essential ones (whales are mammals), and philosophy seeks eidetic
universals. At the end of this essay, Schutz speculates whether the Husserlian method of
freely varying examples to determine the essential features that survive through such
variations is not constrained by both ontological structure (e.g., sounds are not colors) and
the socially shaped, natural-attitude experience of types. In his essay “Tiresias, or our
Knowledge of Future Events,” produced contemporaneously with the type essay, Schutz
explains how knowledge based on natural attitude types functions in contrast to the
mythical Tiresias’ knowledge of the future, which is private and detached from his
present or past experience. These types, based on past experiences or socially transmitted,
aim at future occurrences not in their uniqueness but with an emptiness that future events
will fill in, such that only in retrospect, after an event occurs, is one able to determine
how much that event was expected or unexpected. Finally, there are future events lying
beyond one’s influence that one expects only to conform with past experience and there
are indeterminate projects that provide direction—not too tightly, though—as one gives
shape to what is within one’s power.
Schutz, himself a trained pianist and widely read musicologist, integrated his
phenomenology with his understanding of music. Music, differing from language in being
non-representative, lends itself to phenomenological analysis in the meaning it carries
beyond its mere physical nature as sound waves and in its character as an ideal object that
must be constituted through its unfolding stages, i.e., polythetically. Further music is
bound to inner temporality, and its themes, even though their note sequences are the
same, vary according to context, require reflection for their recognition, and emerge
through an interplay between musical elements and the listener’s attention and interest.
Schutz found music instructive in regard to social relationships insofar as, prior to any
communication, parties to musical performances establish a non-linguistic, non-
conceptual “mutual tuning in relationship.” This “tuning-in,” this sharing of another’s
flux of experience in inner time already described in his Phenomenology, is very clearly
exhibited whenever a listener to a musical performance participates in quasi-simultaneity
in the composer’s stream of consciousness or when co-performers orient themselves to
each other, the composer, and the audience. Hence, Schutz disagreed with Maurice
Halbwachs who posited musical notation as the basis of social relationships between
performers, when in fact it is merely a technical device accidental to their relationship. In
another essay, Schutz depicted Mozart as a social scientist, presenting a succession of
situations that different characters interpret, and Schutz showed how orchestral
representations of characters and their moods in melody made possible a simultaneity of
fluxes of inner time that the non-operatic, nonmusical dramatist could only unfold
successively. Without self-consciously philosophizing, Mozart conveyed in music and
better than most philosophers in their own medium, how human beings meet each other
as a “We.”
Fred Kersten discovers in Schutz’s musical writings important philosophical insights. For
instance, music and inner time unfold polythetically and cannot be grasped
monothetically; that is, one must live through the unfolding of a symphony or inner
experience, and any conceptual summary of their contents inevitably fails to do justice to
their meaning. However, since all conceptualization consists in a monothetical grasping
of polythetic stages, Schutz is actually realizing that certain dimensions of consciousness
elude conceptualization and thus demarcating the limits of rationalization, just as he had
pointed out how certain provinces of meaning (e.g. dreams) evade theoretic
comprehension or duration eludes memory. According to Kersten, Schutz has seen clearly
that the passive associations of listening (e.g. recognizing the appearance of symphonic
theme) differ from those of sight (e.g., apprehending an object like a house) and that
listening does not identify numerically distinct items but produces an illusion of
identification. Schutz’s conclusion that sameness in music involves not numerical unity
but recurrent likeness challenges the fundamental Husserlian thesis that the synthesis of
passive identification is universal, at the basis of the constitution of the world.
Schutz was also a master of literature, a careful student of the works of Goethe, and
author of an article that analyzed Miguel de Cervantes’s Don Quixote through the prism
of the theory of multiple realities. Cervantes repeatedly brings Quixote’s “world of
chivalry”—an order of reality with its arguments for its own reality, its stock of
knowledge, modes of social reinforcement, and views about space, time, and causality—
into conflict with the worlds of drama, common sense, and science. Although Quixote is
capable of constructing a defense of his own chivalrous world from within that world, the
fact that this phantasied world contains an enclave of dreams (at the cave of Montesinos)
ends up undermining it by raising the possibility that it itself is but a dream. Quixote’s
withdrawal of the accent of reality from his private province of meaning reveals for
Schutz the importance of the paramount reality of everyday life and the value of Sancho
Panza who “remains deeply rooted in the heritage of common sense.” (Schutz 1964, 158)
Schutz also brought his phenomenology to bear on political issues such as citizenship or
racial equality. His essay “The Well-Informed Citizen,” dealing not only with citizenship
but also the sociology of knowledge under the rubric of the social distribution of
knowledge, constructs ideal types of the expert, the man on the street, and the well-
informed citizen (to whom it falls to determine which experts are competent). Schutz
delineates various zones of interests, or relevances, extending from those within reach to
those absolutely irrelevant, comments on the constant changeability of relevance
configurations, and differentiates between relevances intrinsic to a theme, which one
chooses, and those imposed. Paradoxically, as modernity’s rationalization processes
heighten anonymity, modern technology also brings everyone within reach, as the nuclear
arms race demonstrates, and Schutz suggests as a solution that citizens become broadly
informed rather than succumb to the narrow dogmatism of the man on the street or the
short-sighted specialization of experts. In becoming well-informed, one depends on
knowledge socially derived through the consultation of eyewitnesses, insiders, analysts,
and commentators, depending on their access to facts and governing relevances, much as
Alvin Goldman’s social epistemology involves appraising the veritistic value of assorted
agents’ claims and practices. Schutz, usually the value-free describer of social reality, in
his conclusion endorses a normative notion of democracy in which it is a duty and a
privilege, frequently not available in non-democratic societies, for well-informed citizens
to express and defend opinions that often conflict with the uninformed opinions of the
man in the street.
Schutz composed “Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World” at the time
of the legal decision of Brown v. Board of Education that ended racially segregated
education in the United States. With typical dispassion, Schutz explains how the meaning
of the term “equality” depends on the domain of relevances to which it pertains (e.g.,
economic equality, equality of civil rights, etc.) and on the in-group or out-group utilizing
it—and here he conceives interpretation in terms of groups rather than individuals. He
spends most of the essay contrasting subjective and objective interpretations of group
membership, equality, and equality of opportunity, construing “subjective” and
“objective” in terms of in-group and out-group interpretations. As regards group
membership, he illustrates that the mere categorization of another as a member of a group
need not be discriminatory, but depends upon an appropriate evaluation of the category
from the viewpoint of the categorized individual. In-groups and out-groups differ in
whether they understand equality merely as “formal,” i.e., as nondiscrimination, or “real,”
calling for special rights and services. Similarly groups think of equality of opportunity
from an out-group perspective as “the career open to all” without appreciating how in-
group members might subjectively experience insuperable obstacles in trying to avail
themselves of opportunities supposedly objectively equal. In this essay, Schutz is
concerned not to present a final definition of equality, but to highlight the differences
between in-group and out-group understandings that serve as the preconditions of any
discussion about it.
Some recently published texts that Schutz authored during an ethics institute in 1956
make possible an even richer awareness of his views on politics. In these documents, he
recognizes the complex, unforeseen consequences resulting from social change, urges
active engagement with others as crucial for developing social and civil judgment, and
examines the barriers to sound civil judgment created by government, political parties,
pressure organizations, mass media, and educational, familial, religious, and professional
institutions. At one point, he even criticizes views that limit democracy to mere
majoritarian rule insofar as they neglect the importance of the single individual’s ability
“to make his personal opinion be heard and appreciated,” preferably in smaller publics,
such as families, schools, local communities (cited in L. Embree 1999, 271). One could
take Schutz’s thoughts here to converge with political theories favoring what is today
known as deliberative democracy. Moroever, his normative judgment against
implementations of democracy that increase the anonymity of citizens suggests that a
parallel normative, even ethical, dimension informs his many theoretic endeavors to
retrieve from anonymity the neglected subjective viewpoint of actors, whether strangers,
homecomers, victims of discrimination, or the “forgotten man” of social sciences.
3.5 Phenomenology
Schutz’s philosophical targeting of the social world had its repercussions upon
phenomenology, particularly in his critique near the end of his career of Husserl’s
account (also referred to as a “transcendental constitution”) of how the other person
comes to appearance in consciousness. In “The Problem of Transcendental
Intersubjectivity in Husserl,” Schutz first objected when Husserl in his Fifth Cartesian
Mediation prepared the ground for the other’s appearance in consciousness by the
methodology of screening off everything that referred to other minds. Husserl had begun
the Cartesian Meditations by reflectively abstaining from believing in the existence of
what appeared in experience in order to refrain from any dogmatic suppositions, but since
this first epoché, or phenomenological reduction, still left meanings with intersubjective
references, the screening off methodology, or second epoché, became necessary. For
Husserl, one’s actual or potential experiences of correlates that were not properly of the
ego still would belong to one’s sphere of ownness, but one had to seek to exclude any
reference those correlates, as products of the sense-determining of other subjectivities,
might have to those other subjectivities. For Schutz, however, insofar as those
experiences of what was not properly of the ego, supposedly confined within the sphere
of ownness, had their origin in the intersubjective world of everyday life that higher level
phenomenological reflection presupposed, it seemed difficult to see how one could
exclude from such correlates any reference to the sense-determinining of other
subjectivities. It was as though Husserl was striving for a theoretical detachment that the
ontological origins of theory would not allow. In addition, for Schutz the very
consciousness of another inevitably instituted a relationship with her. Husserl’s argument
in the Fifth Meditation continued by affirming that a non-ratiocinative “pairing” occurred
through which one transferred the sense “another living body” to another. One could then
verify that the other’s living body was like one’s own if it continued manifesting behavior
congruent with what one would expect of a living body. Schutz challenged this sense-
transfer, however, since one experienced the other’s body from the outside, unlike one’s
own, which was given interiorily (but might the similarities suffice for the transfer?), and
he suggested that verification through what was “congruent” behavior drew on social-
world presuppositions of how bodies ought to behave. Finally, he questioned whether the
philosopher, refraining from belief in the existence of the world or others and entering
into a certain reflective solitude, could ever experience the transcendental community of
which Husserl spoke, since she only constituted the world for herself and not for all other
transcendental egos. Intersubjectivity, Schutz concluded, was a matter of everyday life to
be simply described and not to be constituted within the transcendental sphere of a self-
reflective consciousness giving an account of how the other comes to appearance. Just as
Schutz had argued that the social world dictated the methods for its own social scientific
investigation, so here it seemed to prescribe to phenomenology the approach appropriate
to its description.
In the last thirteen years of his life, Schutz was preparing a comprehensive
phenomenology of the natural attitude, and one manuscript, edited by Richard Zaner, was
posthumously published as Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, and another, co-
authored by Thomas Luckmann, appeared as The Structures of the Life World. The
former book distinguishes different sets of interests, or relevances: topical (which focus
attention on themes), interpretive (which confer meanings on experiences or objects), and
motivational. Such relevances often involve a subject, with more or less systematic
interests, or relevances, interacting with the world, and from this interaction between
subject and world, it becomes evident what is “of relevance” to an actor. These
relevances, interdependent on each other and conjoined with one’s system of types or
categories, constitute a stock of knowledge, which Schutz examines in terms of its
genesis and structure. He further explores the meaning of one’s biographical situation,
including types and relevances, one’s body, and the ontological constraints of space and
time that, for instance, prevent one from being at certain places at certain times or compel
one to wait (for salt to dissolve in water).
The Structures of the Life-World represents a most complex and thorough restatement of
many of the themes Schutz addressed throughout his life. After a more general account of
the life-world and its relation to the sciences, the book takes up its various stratifications,
such as provinces of meaning, temporal and spatial zones of reach, and social structure.
Schutz and Luckmann then comment on the components of one’s stock of knowledge,
including learned and non-learned elements, relevances and types, and trace the build-up
of such a stock. The authors study the social conditioning of one’s subjective stock of
knowledge and inquire about the social stock of knowledge of a group and different
possible combinations of knowledge distribution (generalized and specialized). They
consider how subjective knowledge becomes embodied in a social stock of knowledge
and how the latter influences the former. In addition, the authors pursue such issues as the
structures of consciousness and action, the choosing of projects, rational action, and
forms of social action, whether such action be unilateral or reciprocal, immediate or
mediate. A final section analyzes the boundaries of experience, different degrees of
transcendencies (from simply bringing an object within reach to the experience of death),
and the mechanisms for crossing boundaries (e.g. symbols).
In the years after Schutz’s death in 1959, his works have been posthumously published
and his thought expanded in several directions. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann
wrote The Social Construction of Reality, which focused on how subjective human
processes construct objective structures that human subjectivity in turn interprets and
reacts to and which was among the most widely read books of social science in the
twentieth century. Ilja Srubar emphasized the importance of the pragmatic dimensions of
Schutz’s corpus, just as Hans-Georg Soeffner, along with Jochen Dreher, has developed
its symbolic aspects. On Schutzian grounds, Lester Embree produced a theory of science
in the model of a Wissenschaftslehre, and George Psathas extended Schutz’s thought in
the direction of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. Recently, sociologists
Hubert Knoblauch and Carlos Belvedere have shown the relevance of Schutz’s
framework to communication theory and questions of social ontology, respectively. The
Austrian Economic School has continued to make use of Schutz’s works, as Daniela
Griselda López has shown. López and Dreher have further argued that Schutzian theory
can adequately account for the exercise of institutional power through the interplay
between objective structures and subjective meaning-interpretation and the idea of
relevances that are imposed upon agents. Michael Staudigl and George Berguno have
edited a collection of essays on the connection between the Schutzian approach and
various hermeneutic traditions. And Staudigl and Michael Barber have highlighted the
connections between Schutz’s philosophy of multiple realities and religion and humor.
Furthermore, collections of essays have addressed the value of Schutz’s paradigm for
music, literature, and the arts. The work of Alfred Schutz opens a wide field that is
fruitful for addressing multiple themes and underpinning and supporting multiple
disciplines.
Bibliography
Works by Schutz
1932, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt:
Eine Einleitung in die verstehenden Soziologie,
Vienna: Springer (also in 1960) and Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, 1974; English translation: The
Phenomenology of the Social World, G. Walsh
and F. Lehnert (trans.), Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1967.
1962, Collected Papers I: The Problem of
Social Reality, Maurice Natanson (ed.), The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
1964, Collected Papers II: Studies in Social
Theory, Arvid Brodersen (ed.), The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff.
1966, Collected Papers III: Studies in
Phenomenological Philosophy, I. Schutz (ed.),
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
1970, On Phenomenology and Social
Relations: Selected Writings, H. Wagner (ed.),
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1971, Reflections on the Problem of Relevance,
R.M. Zaner (ed.), New Haven: Yale University
Press.
1972, “Choice and the Social Sciences,” in
Lester Embree (ed.), Life-World and
Consciousness, Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 565–596.
1973, (with T. Luckmann), The Structures of
the Life-World, R.M. Zaner and T. Engelhardt
(trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, and London: Heinemann; German
edition: Strukturen der Lebenswelt, vol. 1,
Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1975; vol. 2: The
Structures of the Life-World, R.M. Zaner and
David J. Parent (trans.), Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1983; German
edition: Strukturen der Lebenswelt, vol. 2,
Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984.
1976, “Fragments on the Phenomenology of
Music” in In Search of Musical Method, F.J.
Smith (ed.), London, New York, and Paris:
Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 23–71.
1978, (with T. Parsons), The Theory of Social
Action: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz
and Talcott Parsons, R. Grathoff (ed.),
Bloomington and London: Indiana University
Press; German edition: Zur Theorie sozialen
Handelns: Briefwechsel/Alfred Schutz, Talcott
Parsons, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977.
1982, Life Forms and Meaning Structure, H.
Wagner (trans., ed.), London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul; German edition: Theorie der
Lebensformen, I. Srubar (ed.), Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, 1981.
1989, (with A. Gurwitsch), Philosophers in
Exile: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz
and Aron Gurwitsch, 1939–1959, R. Grathoff
(ed.), J.C. Evans (trans.), Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
1996, Collected Papers IV, H. Wagner and G.
Psathas (eds.), in collaboration with F. Kersten,
Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
1997, “Positivistic Philosophy and the Actual
Approach of Interpretative Social Science: An
Ineditum of Alfred Schutz from Spring 1953,”
L. Embree (ed.), Husserl Studies, 14: 123–149.
1999, “Some Considerations concerning
Thinking in Terms of Barriers,” “Memorandum
(to Doctor Harold Lasswell),” “Report on the
Discussions of Barrier to Equality of
Opportunity for the Development of Power of
Social and Civil Judgment,” “Letter of Alfred
Schutz to Clarence H. Faust, The Fund for the
Advancement of Education,” all in L. Embree,
“The Ethical Political Side of Schutz: His
Contributions at the 1956 Institute on Ethics
concerned with Barriers to Equality of
Opportunity,” in Schutzian Social Science, L.
Embree (ed.), Dordrecht, Boston, London:
Kluwer Academic Publishing, 235–318.
2003, Theorie der Lebenswelt 1: Die
pragmatische Schichtung der Lebenswelt, M.
Endress and I. Srubar (eds.), vol. 5,1: Alfred
Schütz Werkausgabe, R. Grathoff, H-G.
Soeffner, and I. Srubar (eds.), Redaction, M.
Endress, Konstanz: UVK Vergesellschaft,
mbH.
2003, Theorie der Lebenswelt 2: Die
kommunikative Ordnung der Lebenswelt, H.
Knoblauch, R. Kurt, and H-G. Soeffner (eds.),
vol. 5,2: Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe, R.
Grathoff, H-G. Soeffner, and I. Srubar (eds.);
Redaction, M. Endress, Konstanz: UVK
Vergesellschaft, mbH.
2004, (with Eric Voegelin), Eine Freundschaft,
die ein Leben ausgehalten hat: Briefwechsel
1938–1959, G. Wagner and G. Weiss (eds.),
Konstanz: UVK Vergesellschaft, mbH.
Translated as A Friendship that Lasted a
Lifetime: The Correspondence Between Alfred
Schutz and Eric Voegelin, 2011, G. Wagner
and G. Weiss (eds.), trans. W. Petropulos,
Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
2004, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt:
Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie,
M. Endress and J. Renn (eds.), vol 2: Alfred
Schütz Werkausgabe, R. Grathoff, H-G.
Soeffner, and I. Srubar; Redaction, M. Endress
(eds.), Konstanz: UVK Vergesellschaft, mbH.
2004, Relevanz und Handeln 1: Zur
Phänomenologie des Alltagswissens, E. List
(ed.), vol. 6,1: Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe, R.
Grathoff, H-G. Soeffner, and I. Srubar (eds.);
Redaction, M. Endress, Konstanz: UVK
Vergesellschaft, mbH.
2005, Philosophisch-phänomenologische
Schriften 2: Studien zu Scheler, James, und
Sartre, H. Kellner und J. Renn (eds.), vol.
3,2: Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe, R. Grathoff,
H-G. Soeffner, and I. Srubar (eds.); Redaction,
M. Endress, Konstanz: UVK Vergesellschaft,
mbH.
2006, Sinn und Zeit: Frühe Wiener Arbeiten
und Entwürfe, M. Michailow (ed.), vol.
1: Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe, R. Grathoff, H-
G. Soeffner, and I. Srubar (eds.); Redaction, M.
Endress/G. Sebald, Konstanz: UVK
Vergesellschaft, mbH.
2009, Philosophisch-phänomenologische
Schriften 1: Zur Kritik der Phänomenologie
Edmund Husserls, G. Sebald (ed.) in
collaboration with R. Grathoff and T. Michael;
Redaction, G. Sebald, Konstanz: UVK
Vergesellschaft, mbH.
2009, “Private Family Journal of First Trip to
the United States of America,” Evelyn S. Lang
(trans.), Schutzian Research, 1: 245–271.
2009, “Understanding, Self-reflection, and
Equality: Alfred Schutz’s Participation in the
1955 Conference on Science, Philosophy, and
Religion,” ed. Michael Barber, Schutzian
Research, 1: 273–291.
2009, Philosophisch-phänomenologische
Schriften 1: Zur Kritik der Phänomenologie
Edmund Husserls, Gerd Sebald (ed.) based on
preliminary work by Richard Grathoff and
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George Herbert | phenomenology | Sartre, Jean-Paul | Scheler, Max | Weber, Max
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