Case simplify

Saludaga v. sandiganbayan

The afore-stated ruling is consistent with the well-entrenched principle of

statutory construction that "The word or is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word."16

Civil service commission v. Dela cruz

decree (P.D. 807, as amended) says, "approves" or "disapproves" an

appointment made by the proper authorities. . . . To be sure, it has no
authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that
the private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted
an encroachment on the discretion vested solely (in the appointing
authority). [p. 333]

Pelizloy realty corp. v. The Prov. Benguet

The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the
particular and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating
the class and the general words as including all that is embraced in said
class, although not specifically named by the particular words. This is
justified on the ground that if the lawmaking body intended the general
terms to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would have not made an
enumeration of particular subjects but would have used only general terms.
Thus, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots do not belong to the same
category or class as theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia. It follows that they
cannot be considered as among the ‘other places of amusement’ contemplated by Section 140 of
the LGC and which may properly be subject to amusement taxes

Go Tan v. Spouses Tan + husband

the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for
liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law
according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of
victims of violence against women and children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios

est exclusio alterius" finds no application here. It must be remembered
that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not
of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as
a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest
and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the
legislature.25

ABS CBN v. World Interactive Network

cases" enumerated therein. Under the legal maxim in statutory

construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the explicit mention of
one thing in a statute means the elimination of others not specifically
mentioned. As RA 876 did not expressly provide for errors of fact and/or
law and grave abuse of discretion (proper grounds for a petition for review
under Rule 43 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, respectively) as
grounds for maintaining a petition to vacate an arbitral award in the RTC, it
necessarily follows that a party may not avail of the latter remedy on the
grounds of errors of fact and/or law or grave abuse of discretion to overturn
an arbitral award.

Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council

Under the maxim of Noscitur a Sociis, where the particular word or phrase
is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings ,its
correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.

The particular words or phrases should not be studied as detach and

isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its part and in order to produce a
harmonious whole

A statute must be construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its

provision whenever possible.

According to the rule of casus omissus "a case omitted is to be held as

intentionally omitted."34 "The principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty
that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its power of
interpretation supply the omission even though the omission may have
resulted from inadvertence or because the case in question was not
foreseen or contemplated."36 "The Court cannot supply what it thinks the
legislature would have supplied had its attention been called to the
omission, as that would be judicial legislation." 37

NAPOCOR V. Prov. Of Isabela

It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of

one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in
the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Not being a
local water district, a cooperative registered under R.A. No. 6938, or a non-
stock and non-profit hospital or educational institution, petitioner clearly
does not belong to the exception. It is therefore incumbent upon the
petitioner to point to some provisions of the LGC that expressly grant it
exemption from local taxes.
The legislative purpose to withdraw tax privileges enjoyed under existing law or charter is clearly
manifested by the language used in Sections 137 and 193 categorically withdrawing such exemption
subject only to the exceptions enumerated. Since it would be not only tedious and impractical to
attempt to enumerate all the existing statutes providing for an express, albeit general, withdrawal of
such exemptions or privileges. No more unequivocal language could have been used. 27

Yu v. Samson Tatad

First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court
is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a
criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that [t]he period for
appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any
court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.  . Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we
(this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction.[17]

Coca-cola bottlers v. Gomez

principles of statutory construction giving particular attention, not so much to

the focus of the IP Code generally, but to the terms of Section 168 in
particular. Under the principle of "noscitur a sociis," when a particular word
or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings,
its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated.15

Amorez v. HRET

There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondent’s ratiocination

that after the third congressional term from the ratification of the
Constitution, which expired in 1998, Section 9 of RA No. 7941 would apply
only to sectoral parties registered exclusively as representing the youth
sector. This distinction is nowhere found in the law. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we
must not distinguish.13

Binalay v. Lelina

According to the foregoing definition of the words "ordinary" and "extra-

ordinary," the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry
season is the ordinary one, and the highest depth they attain during the
extra-ordinary one (sic); inasmuch as the former is the one which is regular,
common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year,
while the latter is uncommon, transcends the general rule, order and
measure, and goes beyond that which is the ordinary depth. If according to
the definition given by Article 74 of the Law of Waters quoted above, the
natural bed or basin of the lakes is the ground covered by their waters
when at their highest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of Laguna de
Bay is the ground covered by its waters when at their highest depth during
the dry season, that is up to the northeastern boundary of the two parcels
of land in question.

Chua v. Civil service commission

A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant,

like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid reason why the
latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former
are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its
benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are
uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be
argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not
have made a specific enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to
restrict its meaning and confine its terms and benefits to those expressly
mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro omisso habendus est — A person,
object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. 15 Yet adherence to these legal maxims can result in
incongruities and in a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al.,  16 comes to mind where,

workers belonging to a work pool, hired and re-hired continuously from one
project to another were considered non-project-regular and permanent
employees.

Page 2
 Gonzales III v. Office of the Pres.

A construction that would render a provision inoperative should be

avoided,instead,apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled
whenever possible as parts of acoordinated and harmonious whole.

In interpreting a statute,care should be taken that every part thereof be given

effect,on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not a
hodge-podge of conflicting provisions.

Apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as

parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole

Roma Drugs v. RTC

Where a statute of a latter date, such as RA No. 9502, clearly reveals an intention
on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject that intention
must be given effect; irreconcilable inconsistency between two laws embracing
the same subject may exist when the later law nullifies the reason or purpose of
the earlier act, so that the latter loses all meaning and function.

: where a statute of a latter date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject that intention must be given
effect.

Tomawis v. Balindong

, they should be construed in parimateria, taking into account

the lawmaker’s intent that they be harmonized together. Another principle to
be applied is the generalia specialibus non derogant, a general law does not
nullify a special law. It must be born in mind that the reason of creation of the special
law, particularly the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, is to acknowledge the need for
the Muslims to have a law specific to their own customs and denying the SDC that
jurisdiction will defeat the purpose of the said Code. However, the said code does not
invalidate the generally rules laid upon by the Judiciary Reorganization Act, it merely
provides for the jurisdiction of Sharia Courts over cases where an especially devised
law exclusive to the Muslims is needed, like the case at bar

Heirs of Reyes v. Garilao

HELD:
Yes. Respondents also contend that both laws are complementary to each other such that while
RA No. 6657 does not provide for the mechanism for the exercise of the right of retention of
landowners under PD No. 27, LOI No. 474, as implemented by DAR Administrative Order No. 4,
series of 1991, supplies that mechanism. 42 Lastly, respondents argue that as between a general
law (R.A. No. 6657) and a special law (LOI No. 474), there is no dispute that the latter shall
prevail.

The position of respondents is well-taken. It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that

a subsequent general law does not repeal a prior special law on the same subject matter unless
it clearly appears that the legislature has intended by the latter general act to modify or repeal
the earlier special law.44 Generalia specialibus non derogant (a general law does not nullify a
specific or special law).45 This is so even if the provisions of the general law are sufficiently
comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act. 46 Moreover, the special act and
the general law must stand together, one as the law of the particular subject and the other as
the law of general application.47

Maria Virginia V. Remo,

Petitioner, vs.
The Honorable Secretary of Foreign Affairs

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, 

vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), 

Bagatsing v. Ramirez

 ISSUE:
What law shall govern the publication of tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, the
Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code.
HELD:
The fact that one is a special law and the other a general law creates the presumption that the
special law is to be considered an exception to the general. The Revised Charter of Manila speaks
of “ordinance” in general whereas the Local Tax Code relates to “ordinances levying or imposing
taxes, fees or other charges” in particular. In regard therefore, the Local Tax Code controls.

HUBERT TAN CO and ARLENE TAN CO

Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an
expressed national policy, thus:

On the presumption that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind the
previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, it is held that in the absence of
any express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision was enacted in accord
with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes, and they all should be
construed together. Provisions in an act which are omitted in another act relating to
the same subject matter will be applied in a proceeding under the other act, when not
inconsistent with its purpose. Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are to
be compared with the new provisions; and if possible by reasonable construction, both
are to be construed that effect is given to every provision of each. Statutes
in pari materia, although in apparent conflict, are so far as reasonably possible
construed to be in harmony with each other. [8]

LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the naturalization of qualified
aliens residing in the Philippines. While they provide for different procedures, CA No.
473 governs naturalization by judicial decree while LOI No. 270 governs naturalization
by presidential decree; both statutes have the same purpose and objective: to enable
aliens permanently residing in the Philippines, who, having demonstrated and
developed love for and loyalty to the Philippines, as well as affinity to the culture,
tradition and ideals of the Filipino people, and contributed to the economic, social and
cultural development of our country, to be integrated into the national fabric by being
granted Filipino citizenship. Under the LOI, the procedure for the acquisition of
citizenship by naturalization is more expeditious, less cumbersome and less
expensive. The sooner qualified aliens are naturalized, the faster they are able to
integrate themselves into the national fabric, and are thus able to contribute to the
cultural, social and political well- being of the country and its people.
Clearly, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are, as the petitioners correctly posit, statutes
in pari materia. Absent any express repeal of Section 15 of CA No. 473 in LOI No. 270,
the said provision should be read into the latter law as an integral part thereof, not being
inconsistent with its purpose. Thus, Section 15 of CA No. 473,  which extends the grant
[9]

of Philippine citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized thereunder, should be

 similarly applied to the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the
petitioners in this case

LAZARO C. GAYO, petitioner, vs. VIOLETA G.

VERCELES, respondent.

So that, the absence of that conditional clause in Section 40(f) of the Local
Government Code may be supplied by Section 68(e) of the Omnibus Election Code as
both provisions relate to the same subject matter and purpose; hence, in pari
materia. And, when statutes are in pari materia, they are to be construed together;
each legislative intent is to be interpreted with reference to other acts relating to the
same matter or subject. (Black, Construction and Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., p.
331)[35]

Finally, the respondent avers that in the event of her disqualification from holding
office, the petitioner cannot assume the mayoralty post because he did not obtain a
plurality of votes for the position.
The rule is well settled. The ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. As we
held in Reyes v. Commission on Elections

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS