Evidence Outline San Pedro With Cases

ˈe-və-dəns EXCLUSIVE NOTES
EVIDENCE OUTLINE
Atty. Abraham Rey Acosta
SY 2018-2019, second Semester
COMPILED BY:
Aljun T. Sarmiento
SPECIAL Weekday class 2018 1|Page

PART ONE
I. RULE 128
A. General Provisions
Cases:
(1) Knapp v. State, 79 N.E. 1076 (1907)
(2) State v. Ball, 339 S.W. 2nd 783 (1960)
B. Rules of Exclusion
a) §2-3, Constitution Art. III
b) §12, Constitution Art. III
c) §17, Constitution Art. III
d) §201, Tax Reform Act of 1997
e) R.A. 4200, Anti-Wiretapping Law
f) R.A. 1405, Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits
g) R.A. 6426, FCD Act of the Philippines
Cases:
(1) Mamba v. Garcia, 359 SCRA 426 (2001)
BAR Q: An illegal possession of firearms case was filed against a certain Renato Bulatao. On
the date set for preliminary investigation, the complaining officer demanded a sum of money
from Bulatao in consideration of the withdrawal of the criminal case against him.
During an entrapment operation, 2 police officers were arrested when the marked money was
found in their possession, inside the chambers of respondent Judge Garcia where the supposed
negotiations took place.
The investigating judge handling the administrative case against Judge Garcia, referred to the
taped conversation between the 2 policemen and Bulatao. After investigation, the judge found
Judge Garcia guilty of improper conduct. Is the reliance of the investigating judge on the taped
conversation valid?
ANSWER: NO.
The Investigating Judge's reliance on the tape-recorded conversation between Bulatao and the
two police officers is erroneous. The recording of private conversations without the consent of
the parties contravenes the provisions of Rep. Act. No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-
Wire Tapping Law, and renders the same inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding. The law
covers even those recorded by persons privy to the private communications, as in this
case. Thus, the contents of the tape recorder cannot be relied upon to determine the culpability
of respondent judge.
(2) Marquez v. Desierto, 359 SCRA 772 (2001)

BAR Question: In October 2000 allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against E before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee. Same year, E was impeached by the Hor and impeachment proceedings were
begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against
Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic
to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against E. As a result, the
impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and
Senate President P resigned after casting his vote against E.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for E and joined the crowd at
EDSA Shrine. E called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this
election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that E
“constructively resigned his post”. At noon, A took her oath of office in the presence of the
crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. E and his family later left Malacañang Palace. E after his
fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his
term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming E to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office. Dis E resign as President?
Answer:
Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were
present when President E left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing
material relevant issues—President E is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President E could not be doubted as confirmed by his
leaving Malacañang Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was
going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President
(without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same
service of the country;

5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before,
during and after January 20, 2001.
(3) Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, 509 SCRA 190 (2006)
II. What need not be proved (Rule 129)

A. Judicial Notice (§1-3, Rule 129)
Cases:
(1) Manufacturers Hanover Trust v. Guerrero, 397 SCRA 709 (2003)
BarQ:
X filed a complaint for damages against Y with the Regional Trial Court. Guerrero sought
payment of damages allegedly for illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his
checking account with the Bank. Y alleged in its answer, that by stipulation of Xs account is
governed by New York law and this law does not permit any of claims except actual damages. Y
filed a motion for summary judgement seeking the dismissal of the case. The RTC denied the
motion. Is the RTC Correct?
ANSWER:
Yes.
There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where material
allegations of the pleadings are in dispute. The resolution of whether a foreign law allows only
the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far as the trial court is concerned since
foreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts. Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial
notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. Certainly, the conflicting
allegations as to whether NY law or Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims present a clear
dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits.
(2) Pigao v. Rabanillo, 488 SCRA 546 (2006)
(3) BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. CTA, 330 SCRA 507 (2000)
(4) Land Bank v. Yatco Agriculture Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551, 15 January 2015
(5) Land Bank of the Philippines v. Banal, 434 SCRA 543 (2004)
(6) Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375, 13 December 2011

Bar Question: The PCGG filed a petition to declare the accounts in various Swiss banks as ill-
gotten wealth of the deceased and former President Wang and his family and that it be forfeited
in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

Before it was set for pre-trial, B. Wang, son of President A. Wang, answered that the Wang
Family agreed to negotiate with the Philippine government in the hope of finally putting an end
to the problems besetting their family regarding the Swiss accounts. Further, the Wang Family
contended that the funds were lawfully acquired by the former president and that it be placed in
custodia legis. Subsequently, they disclaim the ownership thereof.
Can the answers of the Wang Family be considered judicial admission?
Suggested Answer: Yes.

Judicial admission may be made (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties, (b) in the course of the
trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of judicial
proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case. Further, admissions of a party in his testimony are
receivable against him. If a party, as a witness, deliberately concedes a fact, such concession has
the force of a judicial admission.
Here, the Wang Family’s willingness to agree to an amicable settlement with the Republic only
affirmed their ownership of the Swiss deposits for the simple reason that no person would
acquiesce to any concession over such huge dollar deposits if he did not in fact own them.
Moreover, they moved that the accounts be placed in custodia legis. These were doubtlessly an
acknowledgment of ownership on their part.
B. Judicial Admissions
a) §4, Rule 129
b) § 8, Rule 10
c) §1-4, Rule 26
d) Arts. 12 and 2035, Civil Code
e) Arts. 48 and 60, Family Code
f) §2, Rule 118
Cases:
(1) Herrera-Felix v. Court of Appeals, 436 SCRA 87 (2004)
BAR Q: ABC, Inc. filed a complaint for sum of money against the Spouses X and Y with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment. It was alleged that, XY Spouses purchased from the
respondent tubs of assorted fish and still had an outstanding obligation. The trial court granted
the respondent's prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment and a copy of the writ of
preliminary attachment, summons and complaint were served on them, through the sister of Y,
Z. Thereafter, XY Spouses, through Atty. C, filed a motion praying for an extension of time to
file their answer to the complaint but failed to file their answer to the complaint. So, petitioner
was adjudged liable for its unpaid obligation to respondent on the ground of default. Petitioner
contends that the judgment of the lower court is void because of the defective service of
summons since the writ was not served personally but was served to her (another) sister. Is the
contention of her sister tenable?
Suggested answer. NO, The contentions of the petitioner have no merit.
In this case, the petitioner appeared before the court, through counsel, and filed a motion for
extension of time to file her answer to the complaint which the trial court granted. She even
admitted in the said motion that she was served with a copy of the complaint as well as the
summons. The admissions made in a motion are judicial admissions which are binding
on the party who made them. Such party is precluded from denying the same unless
there is proof of palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
(2) Heirs of Pedro Clemeña v. Heirs of Irene Bien, 501 SCRA 405 (2006)
(3) Luciano Tan v. Rodil Enterprises, 511 SCRA 162 (2006)
(4) Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 596 (1997)

BAR Q: AMANCOR failed to pay a loan which was later assumed by petitioner. AMANCOR
failed to repay petitioner. Petitioner now sues AMANCOR and Michell Lhullier. Lower court
ruled Lhullier is not personally liable. Petitioner appealed.
Petitioner claims that LHUILLIER made a judicial admission of his personal liability in his
Answer wherein he stated that:
"3.11. In all the subject dealings, it was between plaintiff and Lhuillier personally
without the official participation of Amancor, Inc.
xxx xxx xxx
3.14 . Since the board of Amancor, Inc. did not formally ratify nor acceded (sic)
to the personal agreement between plaintiff and Lhuillier through no fault of the
latter, the corporation is not bound and the actionable documents are, at most,
unenforceable insofar as the subject claim of plaintiff is concerned."
Petitioner contended that an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him
contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed
by the party or not. Whether such admission is conclusive and cannot be objected upon?
Suggested ANSWER: NO.
As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule that a
judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof
admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact
made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he
made such an admission.
Contrary to petitioner's allegations, LHUILLIER had categorically denied personal liability for
AMANCOR's corporate debts.
We hold that such admission is not conclusive upon him. Applicable by analogy is our
ruling in the case of Gardner vs. Court of Appeals which allowed a party's testimony in open court
to override admissions he made in his answer. Thus:
“ xxx
As a general rule, facts alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that
party and are binding upon it, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer
is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not
evidence.
xxx ”
(5) People v. Lacson, 413 SCRA 20 (2003)
(6) Dimaguila v. Monteiro, 314 SCRA 565 (2014)

Bar Question: Sps. A filed a case for partition against B et al. According to A they bought the land from the
heirs of C which is a co-owner of the said property. During the proceeding in the lower court B admitted that
indeed there was an partition and that C is one of the heirs. However, in their answer to the amended complaint B
denied the division of the property into northern and southern halves. Can B deny their earlier admission?
Suggested Answer: No. Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission
made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and
may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The
petitioners argue that such admission was the palpable mistake of their former counsel in his
rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not provided to them. This contention is
unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota of evidence. Bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.
III. RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY (RULE 130)

A. Object Evidence
Cases:
(1) Sison v. People, 250 SCRA 58 (1995) [cf. § 1, Rule 11 of Rules of Electronic Evidence]
Question: A group of Marcos loyalist held a rally. Some of these supporters began inciting the
others and encouraging them to attack all those who are wearing yellow shirts. Stephen Salcedo
was wearing a yellow shirt at that time, initially he removed his shirt to avoid the angry mob's
attention towards him but to no avail the crowd chased him and caught up with him. They
mauled mercilessly until he collapsed. He was sent to the hospital but died upon arrival. The
incident of the mauling was caught on camera and even become the headline photo the next
day. Can these photographs be admitted as evidence?

Answer: Yes. When Photos are presented in evidence, they must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were
produced. Value lies in it being a correct representation or reproduction of the original.
Admissibility determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. These
pictures were all present in this case. Futher, as ruled by the SC the use of the photographs by
the appellants is an admission of the exactness and accuracy of the said picture.
(2) People v. Rullepa, 398 SCRA 567 (2003)

Bar Question: XXX, a houseboy, was charged with Rape before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City for allegedly having carnal knowledge with “AAA”, three (3) years of
age, a minor and against her will and without her consent.
“AAA” described her abuse under the hands of XXX in a plain and matter-of-fact manner in
her testimony. The victim and her mother testified that she was only three years old at the time
of the rape. However, the prosecution did not offer the victim‘s certificate of live birth or
similar authentic documents in evidence. The RTC found XXX guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of rape and accordingly sentenced him to death. The case was placed for automatic review of
the Supreme Court. The victim’s age being relevant to the crime of rape since it may constitute
an element of the offense, is a person’s appearance, admissible as object evidence?
Suggested Answer:
A person‘s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being
addressed to the senses of the court. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in
rape cases, the Court in People v. Pruna laid down the guideline.
Under the guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient
to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a) and (b) above. In such cases, the
disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can easily
determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance
corroborates the relative‘s testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person‘s appearance, as object
evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and,
following United States v. Agadas, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be
proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the
victim‘s age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second
element of statutory rape is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, reasonable
doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped
seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much
weight and the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that “AAA” was below seven years old at
the time of the commission of the offense, XXX cannot be sentenced to suffer the death
penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.
B. Documentary Evidence
Case:
(1) Yap v. Inopiquez, Jr., 403 SCRA 141 (2003)

BAR Q: X filed an administrative case against judge O for grave abuse of authority and acts
unbecoming a judge.
In his sworn affidavit, complainant Officer X arrested BB for violation of B.P Blg. 22. Pending
in the MTC, Respondent Judge O issued an Order of Release in favor of accused BB on the
basis of cash bond and subsequently posted property bond. Complainant claimed that
respondent Judge O issued the Orders of Release although there was yet no cash bond or
proper bond for actually the cash bond was posted on march 8, while the property bond on
march 10 based on the documents presented . Clearly, respondent judge ordered the release of
the accused BB prematurely. Respondent Judge O contends through oral evidence that such
cash bond and property bond was posted on march 6 and the Order of Release was issued
properly. Is the contention of respondent Judge O tenable?
Suggested answer: No.

It is a basic rule of evidence that between a documentary and oral evidence, the former carries
more weight.
The cash bond was posted on march 8 Monday, not on march march 6, 1999 as shown by o.r
no. 9215725. The property bond, in substitution of the cash bond, was filed, not on march 6,
but on march 10 wednedsay, as shown by the jurat. Both orders of release were issued on
march 6 Saturday. Therefore, there is no doubt that respondent judge ordered the release of the
accused despite the fact that there was yet no bail filed and approved for his provisional liberty.
1. Best Evidence Rule ( §3-8, Rule 130)
a) E-Commerce Act, §10
b) Rules on Electronic Evidence Rules 2(h), 3, and 4
Cases:
(1) Consolidated Bank v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., 465 SCRA 117 (2006)
(2) Lee v. People, 440 SCRA 662 (2004)

BAR Q: X Inc. sold and delivered, on different occasions, pieces of empty white bags to Y
Corp. In payment of said purchases, Y issued 2 BPI Checks. Z, president of X refused to
comply in turning over the money to AA Law Firm, a trustee of X.
Z is now sued for estafa. Z submitted a counter-affidavit stating therein the fact of sale and
receipt of the payment made by Y. Prosecution was not able to produce the originals of the
checks, because according to its witness, the Manager for Corporate Affairs of Y Corp, the
checks have been lost during a flood where it was stored. Prosecution offered as secondary
evidence photocopies, microfilms of the Invoices and checks. Z objects contending that best
evidence rule applies.
Is Z correct in contending that only the originals may be admitted as evidence?
ANS.: NO.
Rule 130, Section 3 provides:
Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole;
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office.
In the case at bar, the court ordered Y by subpoena to produce the originals of the invoices and
checks. Y’s manager testified that all its records including the invoices and checks subject of the
case was lost during a flood. Further, petitioner’s counter-affidavit itself had proved the due
execution and authenticity of said checks and invoices. Thus, the court held with the admissions
of petitioner in his counter-affidavit, the prosecution even no longer needed to adduce evidence
aliunde to prove existence, due execution and authenticity of the checks and invoices.
(3) Citibank, N.A. Mastercard v. Teodoro, 411 SCRA 577 (2003)
(4) Vda. De Corpus v. Brabangco (C.A.), 59 O.G. 8262 (1963)

BAR Q: Defendant X is the owner of a certain parcel of land. Plaintiffs, (heirs of Y) alleges that
the land was sold by X to Y. Plaintiffs alleged that Y was and is in possession of said land up to
his death until X with the aid and protection of policemen entered the premises and got
bamboos and corn. X. Plaintiffs filed a case against the defendants with reference to the deed of
sale from which the plaintiffs’ case draw its cause of action, but was said to be lost during the
war. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and upheld the sale. The defendants appealed
claiming that the sale never took place since the document of sale could not be produced. Does
SPECIAL Weekday class 2018 10 | P a g e
the Plaintiffs have sufficiently proven the existence, due execution and subsequent loss of the
Deed of sale?
Suggested answer. Yes.
It’s not necessary, in order to admit evidence of the contents of lost instrument, that the
witnesses should be able to testify with verbal accuracy to its contents; it is sufficient if they are
able to state it in substance. It’s enough if intelligent witnesses have read the paper and state
substantially its contents and import with reasonable accuracy.
In this case, the existence of the deed, however, was convincingly proven not only by the
testimony of Y’ widow, and by the environmental facts disclosed by the evidence, but also by
the disinterested testimony of Z, a municipal counselor who served as one of the witnesses in
the execution of the sale.
(5) Vila Rey Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer, 25 SCRA 845 (1968)

BAR QUESTION: Jose Villarama, the operator of the Villa Rey Transit bus company
pursuant to certificates of public convenience (CPC) granted to him by the Public Service
Commission, sold two of the CPCs to the Pangasinan Transportation Company (Pantranco),
with the condition that Villarama shall not, for 10 years, apply for any TPU service identical or
competing with the buyer. Three months later, the Villa Rey Transit Inc. (VRTI) was formed,
with Villarama’s wife and relatives as stockholders and incorporators. VRTI bought 5 CPCs
from Valentin Fernando, two of which was levied pursuant to a writ of execution in favor of
Eusebio Ferrer, a creditor of Fernando. The CPCs were sold at auction, of which Ferrer was the
highest bidder. Ferrer then sold the CPCs to Pantranco. VRTI filed a complaint for annulment
of the sheriff’s sale in favor of Ferrer and the subsequent sale of the CPCs to Pantranco. As
evidence, Pantranco presented photostatic copies of ledger entries and vouchers, the
admissibility of which was assailed by Villarama on the ground that the best evidence were the
originals themselves. Were the photostatic copies of the ledger entries and vouchers of VRTI
sufficient to prove Pantranco’s allegations, and thereby are admissible as evidence?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. The photostatic copies of the ledger entries and vouchers showing that Villarama had co-
mingled his personal funds and transactions with those made in the name of VRTI are very
illuminating evidence. The requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the
original is in the custody of the adverse party are: a) the adverse party’s possession of the
original; b) reasonable notice to the adverse party to produce the same; c) satisfactory proof of
its existence; and d) the failure or refusal of the adverse party to produce the original in court.
However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence to show that
the original is in the actual possession of the adversary. Neither is it required that the party
entitled to the custody of the instrument, upon notice to produce it, admit having it in his
possession.

(6) Compania Maritima v. Allied Free Workers Union, 77 SCRA 24 (1977)
BAR Q: C & A entered into a contract whereby A would perform arrastre and stevedoring
work for the consignees. The consignees paid A for the arrastre work but not the stevedoring.
C also refused to pay, citing the contract stipulation that the consignees were the ones who shall
pay for the work, leading them to terminate the contract. A filed charges of unfair labor
practice. C later entered into the same contract with a different association, where A picketed
them to prevent their work. C filed a case for recovery of damages on account of A’s
interference. The court ruled in C’s favour and awarded C with P450,000 for actual damages,
basing the amount on the auditors’ reports provided by C as evidence. Additionally, C added
their auditor’s oral testimony as evidence to show the alleged cost incurred. C argues that the
auditor’s reports are admissible as evidence because of (Sec 2e, Rule 130) the rule that “when
the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined by
the court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is the
general result of the whole”, the original writings need not be produced. Are C’s evidence
admissible?
Answer: No.
To invoke Section 2(e), Rule 130, because the voluminous character of the records must first be
clearly established. Thus, the general rule shall be applied, which states that “an audit made by,
or the testimony of, a private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original
records, books of accounts, reports or the like.”
In this case, C failed to show that there was difficulty or impossibility attending the production
of the records in court and their examination. Hence, since the audit was made by a private
auditor, such report was inadmissible as evidence.
(7) Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 272 (2004)
(8) Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, G.R. No. 171701, 8 February 2012

Bar Q: PCGG, filed a Complaint before the Sandiganbayan for Reversion, Reconveyance,
Restitution, Accounting and Damages against (X); and (Y), (Z), (B), (T),(G) and (F), in the
alleged illegal activities and undertakings of M in relation to the ill-gotten wealth allegation.
PCGG presented and formally offered its evidence, a photocopies of the documents, against
respondents. However, the latter objected on the ground that the documents were
unauthenticated and mere photocopies. The Sandiganbayan admitted all documentary exhibits
formally offered by the prosecution; however, their evidentiary value was left to the
determination of the Court.
The respondents filed their respective demurrers to evidence which was granted the by the
Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan ruled that all presented evidence are hearsay, for being merely photocopies
and that the originals were not presented in court, nor were they authenticated by the persons
who executed them. Furthermore, the court pointed out that petitioner failed to provide any
valid reason why it did not present the originals in court.
Is the court correct?
Suggested Answer: Yes. It is petitioner’s burden to prove the allegations in its Complaint. For
relief to be granted, the operative act on how and in what manner the M siblings participated in
and/or benefitted from the acts of the M couple must be clearly shown through a
preponderance of evidence. Should petitioner fail to discharge this burden, the Court is
constrained and is left with no choice but to uphold the Demurrer to Evidence filed by
respondents.
First, petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the documents
themselves. It is imperative, therefore, to submit the original documents that could prove
petitioner’s allegations.
Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court,
otherwise known as the best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must be the
original document itself
2. Parole Evidence Rule (§9, Rule 130)

a) Express trusts on immovables (Art. 1443, Civil Code)
b) Statute of Frauds (Arts. 1403 and 1405, Civil Code)
Cases:
(1) Financial Building Corporation v. Rudlin, G.R. No. 164186, 4 October 2010
(2) Palanca v. Fred Wilson & Co., 37 Phil. 506 (1918)

BAR Q: Song Fo & Co (Song Fo) purchased a distilling apparatus from Wilson & Co (Wilson).
The terms of the contract (in Spanish) disclosed the following essential constituents: (1) A
machine Guillaume, type "C" (Agricola) as described on page 30 of the Catalogue Egrot, edition
of 1907; (2) a machine of a capacity of 6,000 liters for every 24 hours of work, and (3) a
machine producing alcohol of a grade 96-97 Gay Lussac.
Song Fo sued Wilson for damages for breach of contract since the machine could not produce
the amount of alcohol stipulated in the contract. According to Song Fo, the agreement was
supposedly for the production 6,000 liters, but the machine produced only 480 liters. The
defense of Wilson is that the agreement was for the TREATMENT of 6,000 liters and not the
PRODUCTION of 6,000 liters.Was there breach of contract?
ANSWER: NO.
Section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing that a written agreement shall be
presumed to contain all the terms, nevertheless "does not exclude other evidence of the
circumstances under which the agreement was made, or to which it relates, or to explain an
intrinsic ambiguity."

There is intrinsic ambiguity in the contract which needs explanation. The SC in this case
resolved the issue from 2 directions: 1.by taking up the meaning of the words themselves. 2.by
evidence of the circumstances under which the agreement was made.
In connection with the distilling of liquor, the word "capacity" may have different meanings
unless restricted in terminology. In Chicago Distilling Co. vs. Stone ([1891] 140 U. S., 647), the
qualifying phrases "working capacity" and "producing capacity' are specifically" mentioned. In
English and Spanish dictionaries, both definitions denote that which anything can receive or
contain.
There was no breach of contract. The agreement was merely for the TREATMENT
(not production) of 6,000 liters.
(3) Maulini v. Serrano, 28 Phil. 640 (1914)

BAR Q: A parol evidence was presented to court claiming that Serrano was a broker in Manila.
His work includes delivering the money personally to the borrower, took the note in his own
name and immediately transferred it by indorsement to the lender. As a special request, Maulini
asked Serrano to write his name in the instrument because did not wish that his name will
appear in the books of the borrowing company as lender. The note was then transferred to the
lender. Serrano was not paid so he sought for the enforcement of the indorser’s liability. Is
parol evidence showing that the indorsement was without consideration and Serrano acted as
an agent for the indorsee admissible?
ANSWER: YES. The evidence was presented to deny that there ever existed any agreement
whatever; to wipe out all apparent relations between the parties, and not to vary, alter or
contradict the terms of a relation admittedly existing. The purpose of the parol evidence was to
deny the reality of any indorsement; that a relation of any kind whatever was created or existed
between him and the indorsee by reason of the writing on the back of the instrument; that no
consideration ever passed to sustain an indorsement of any kind whatsoever
(4) Woodhouse v. Halili 93 Phil. 526 (1953)

Question: W entered into a written agreement with H. But prior to entering into this
agreement, W had informed the Mission Dry Corporation of Los Angeles, California, that he
had interested a prominent financier (defendant herein) in the business, and requested, in order
that he may close the deal with him, that the right to bottle and distribute be granted him for a
limited time under the condition that it will finally be transferred to the corporation. Pursuant
to this request, W was given “a thirty days’ option on exclusive bottling and distribution rights
for the Philippines”.
When the bottling plant was already in operation, W demanded for the execution of the
contract of partnership. H on the other hand claims that the H’s consent to the agreement, was
secured by the representation of W that he was the owner, or was about to become owner of an
exclusive bottling franchise, which representation was false. Did W represent to H that he had
an exclusive franchise?

Answer: Yes. Parol evidence rule expressly allows the evidence to be introduced when the
validity of an instrument is put in issue by the pleadings. As in this case, W’s representation can
be easily gleaned from his own letters and his own testimony. Certainly, his acts or statements
prior to the agreement are essential and relevant to the determination of said issue.
(5) Land Settlement Development Corp. v. Garcia Plantation Co., Inc., 7 SCRA 750 (1963)
BAR Q: Z Co. filed a case of specific performance of contract against X Co., Inc. for the
recovery of the sum of P5,955.30, representing the unpaid balance of the purchase price of two
tractors. X Co. admitted that a subsequent agreement contained in a letter sent by F, Manager,
Board of Liquidators of the Z Co, giving the defendant an extension up to May 31, 1957, within
which to pay the account.
The plaintiff contended that it did not express the true intent and agreement of the parties,
thereby placing the fact in issue, in the pleadings. At the trial, when the plaintiff presented Atty.
L, Legal Officer of the Board of Liquidators, to testify on the true agreement and the intention
of the parties at the time the letter was drafted and prepared, the defendants objected. The
lower court ruled out said testimony and prevented the introduction of evidence under the
parol evidence rule (Sec. 22, Rule 123). Is the lower court erred in excluding parol evidence,
tending to prove the true intention and agreement of the parties and the existence of a
condition precedent?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes.
When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an event, which,
for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be established by parol evidence.
In the case at bar, the court should not have improvidently and hastily excluded said parol
evidence, knowing that the subject- matter treated therein, was one of the exceptions to the
parol evidence rule. The condition precedent is manifested by the second paragraph of the
letter Exhibit L, quoted hereunder:
xxx Please be advised that the Board has granted you an extension up to May 31, 1957, within
which to pay your account.
This matter has been the subject of agreement between your husband and this office.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.) FILOMENO C. KINTANAR"
(6) Robles v. Lizarraga Hermanos 50 Phil. 387 (1927)

BAR: R leased a parcel of land from the administrator of his parent’s property with the
stipulation that any permanent improvements necessary to the cultivation and exploitation of
the hacienda should be made at the expense of R without right to indemnity at the end of the
term. R made various improvements and additions to the plant. The firm of LH was well aware
of the nature and extent of these improvements. When R’s mother died, LH made a proposal to
buy the heirs’ portion of the property in consideration that the plaintiff should shorten the term
of his lease to the extent stated, LH agreed to pay him the value of all betterments that he had
made on the land and furthermore to purchase from him all that belonged to him personally on
the land. R agreed to the proposal. On the ensuing instrument made, no reference was made to
the surrender of the plaintiff’s rights as lessee, except in fixing the date when the lease should
end; nor is anything said concerning the improvements which the plaintiff had placed. May R
contest the validity of a written contract with oral evidence?
ANSWER: Yes.
Jurisprudence dictates that, in case of a written contract of lease, the lessee may prove an
independent verbal agreement on the part of the landlord to put the leased premises in a safe
condition; and a vendor of realty may show by parol evidence that crops growing on the land
were reserved, though no such reservation was made in the deed of conveyance.
In this case, the deed of conveyance purports to transfer to the defendant only such interests in
certain properties as had come to the conveyors by inheritance. Nothing is said concerning the
rights in the hacienda which the plaintiff had acquired by lease or concerning the things that he
had placed thereon by way of improvement or had acquired by purchase. Thus, the verbal
contract which R has established is therefore clearly independent of the main contract of
conveyance, and evidence of such verbal contract is admissible under the doctrine above stated.
(7) Philippine National Railways v. CIR of Albay, Br. I, 83 SCRA 569 (1978)
(8) Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 421 SCRA 328 (2004)
BAR QUESTION: Sometime in 1977, A (Elias Q. Tan), then President of Lapulapu
Foundation, Inc., obtained four loans from XYZ (Allied Banking Corporation) covered by four
promissory notes in the amounts of P100,000 each. As of 23 January 1979, the entire obligation
amounted to P493,566.61 and despite demands made on them by the XYZ Bank, A and the
foundation failed to pay the same. XYZ Bank was constrained to file with the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 15, a complaint seeking payment by A and the foundation, jointly
and solidarily, of the sum of P493,566.61 representing their loan obligation, exclusive of
interests, penalty charges, attorney’s fees and costs.
In its answer to the complaint, the Foundation denied incurring indebtedness from XYZ Bank
alleging that the loans were obtained by A in his personal capacity, for his own use and benefit
and on the strength of the personal information he furnished the Bank. The Foundation
maintained that it never authorized A to co-sign in his capacity as its President any promissory
note and that XYZ Bank fully knew that the loans contracted were made in A’s personal
capacity and for his own use and that the Foundation never benefited, directly or indirectly,
therefrom.
For his part, A admitted that he contracted the loans from XYZ Bank in his personal capacity.
The parties, however, agreed that the loans were to be paid from the proceeds of A’s shares of
common stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corporation, a real estate firm. The loans were
covered by promissory notes which were automatically renewable (“rolled-over”) every year at
an amount including unpaid interests, until such time as A was able to pay the same from the
proceeds of his aforesaid shares.
The RTC ruled requiring A and the Foundation to pay jointly and solidarily to XYZ Bank the
amount of P493,566.61 as principal obligation for the four promissory notes including all other
charges included in the same, with interest at 14% per annum, computed from 24 January 1979,
until the same are fully paid, plus 2% service charges and 1% monthly penalty charges.
The CA affirmed with modification the judgment of the court a quo by deleting the award of
attorney’s fees. Whether or not the Court erred in applying the Parol Evidence Rule and the
Doctrine of Piercing the Veil of Corporate entity as basis for adjudging joint and solidary
liability on the part of petitioners?
SUGGGESTED ANSWER: No.

As a corollary, the parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject petitioner A’s
claim regarding the purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent XYZ
Bank on the payment of the obligation.
Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that: [w]hen the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms agreed upon
and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than
the contents of the written agreement.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. While parol evidence is admissible to
explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing,
unless there has been fraud or mistake. No such allegation had been made by the petitioners in
this case.
(9) Baluyot v. Poblete, 514 SCRA 370 (2007)
Bar Question: B signed a promissory note to loan from Sps. P which shall mature in one
month. To secure the payment, B conveyed to Sps. P a house and lot by way of a real estate
mortgage contract. B failed to pay her indebtedness upon maturity of the loan. Subsequently,
Sps. P extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage which was sold to Sps. P evidenced by
a certificate of sale and a certificate of title issued in their names. B failed to redeem the
property however he remained possession of the property and refused to vacate the same.
Sps. P filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession which was granted. However, B
filed an action for annulment of mortgage, extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of the property, as
well as cancellation of the title issued, arguing that his competent witness Atty. E’s testimony
that the maturity of the loan is one year, is acceptable proof of the existence of collateral
agreements which were entered into by him who executed the Promissory Note and the Real
Estate Mortgage prior, contemporaneous and subsequent to the execution of these documents.
He also argues that the issue of the real date of the maturity of the loan can be settled only by a
formal letter of demand indicating the sum due and the specific date of payment which is the
duty of the private respondents to give; that absent said letter of demand, the loan may not be
considered to have matured; that, as a consequence, the property given as a collateral may not
be foreclosed and the subsequent consolidation of title over the subject property should be
annulled. Is B correct?
Suggested Answer: No.

Jurisprudence provides that evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is
generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. While
parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the
purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are
not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.
In the instant case, B makes much of the testimony of Atty. E that the maturity of the loan
which petitioner incurred is one year. However, aside from the testimony of Atty. E, no other
evidence was presented to prove that the real date of maturity of the loan is one year. In fact
there was not even any allegation in the Complaint filed by E with the trial court to the effect
that there has been fraud or mistake as to the date of the loans maturity as contained in the
Promissory Note.
(10) Heirs of Ureta v. Heirs of Ureta, G.R. No. 165748, 14 September 2011
BAR Q: A was financially well- off and owned several properties. He (A) has fourteen children,
including the petitioners and B, the father of respondents. A sold his several parcels of land to his
four children, without consideration. When A died, C acted as the administrator. The tenants
who rented the portion of the land never turned over the produced of the land to B, but to A,
subsequently to C. When B died, neither him or his heirs took possession of the subject lands.
A’s heirs executed an Extrajudicial Partition to the lands that were covered by the four Deeds of
Sale. D, the eldest son of B signed the Extrajudicial Partition. The other sibling of D averred that
the Extrajudicial Partition was void because it was signed by D, without their written authority.
Whether D lack capacity to give his co- heirs consent to the Extrajudicial Partition.
Answer: No. Art. 1390 if the Civil Code is not applicable, because it contemplates the
incapacity of a party to give consent. This case, does not involve D’s incapacity to give consent,
but rather his lack of authority. D’s failure to obtain authority from his co- heirs to sign the
Extrajudicial Partition renders the contract unenforceable against his (D’s) co- heirs. The Heirs
of B must be in a state of confusion in arguing that the Heirs of A may not question the Deed
of Sale for not being parties or successors-in-interest therein on the basis that the parol
evidence rule may not be properly invoked in a proceeding or litigation where at least one of the
parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and
does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the
relation established thereby. If their argument was to be accepted, then the Heirs of B would
themselves be precluded from invoking the parol evidence rule to exclude the evidence of the
Heirs of A.
(11) Lechugas v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 335 (1986)
(12) Inciong v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 578 (1996)

BAR Q:X alleged he was persuaded by Y, who was a partner of the branch manager of a bank,
to act as “co-maker” for a loan with the same bank to buy an equipment for a business venture.
X acceded but with the understanding that he would only be a co-maker for the loan of 5,000.
So, X affixed his signature on the 5 copies of blank promissory note which were brought to him
by Y, but in one copy, he indicated that he be bound only for 5,000. Upon default on the
payment, the bank proceeded against X who was solidarily liable to the bank for the amount of
50,000; and in the action filed by the bank, the court decided in its favor. X claimed there was
fraud, and asserted that since the promissory note "is not a public deed," parol evidence may
"overcome" the contents of the promissory note. Does the parol evidence rule 1 specify that the
written agreement be in a public document?
ANSWER: No.
What the law requires is that agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on "long
experience that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in
fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their
contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show that
the parties intended a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them."
Thus, for the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form,
or be signed by both parties. As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar
nature are not subject to be varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.
3. Interpretation of Documents (§§10-19, Rule 130)
C. Testimonial Evidence
1. Qualifications of Witnesses (§20, Rule 130)
a) Art. 821, Civil Code
b) §17, Rule 119, Rules of Court
Case:
(1) Recto v. Republic, 440 SCRA 79 (2004)

Bar Question: Spouses A and E filed a petition for registration of a land which he bought
from B and C, who are the heirs of the deceased D. As evidence they presented the testimonies
of B and C, that they, and prior to them their father, had been cultivating and possessing Lot
806 in the concept of owners. The Solicitor General opposed their testimonies on the ground
that they were only were 13 years of age when they became aware of their family’s possession
of Lot 806 in 1930 and 1935, respectively. Are their testimonies admissible?
Suggested Answer: Yes. The requirements of a child’s competence as a witness are: (a)
capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication. There
is no showing that as a children, they did not possess the foregoing qualifications. It is not
necessary that a witness’ knowledge of the fact to which he testifies was obtained in adulthood.
At 13, they were undoubtedly capable and competent to perceive their father’s possession of
Lot 806 in the concept of owner.
2. Mental Incapacity or Immaturity (§21, Rule 130)

a) §6 of Child Witness Rule
Cases:
(1) People v. Deauna, 386 SCRA 136 (2002)

BAR Q: X was charged with 2 counts of rape, with her daughter Y as the victim. The trial court
convicted X. During the pendency of the appeal, Y submitted numerous letters and
manifestations, including an affidavit of desistance, stating that her father had not raped her,
and that she had been insane when she testified in court.
An expert witness testified that Y was diagnosed with psychosis a few weeks before she testified
on her affidavit of desistance. However, the records reveal that it was not yet present at the time
of the rape incidents or immediately thereafter. Is the subsequent insanity of Y a sufficient
ground to discredit her first testimonies?
Answer: No.
Unsoundness of mind does not per se render a witness incompetent. The general rule is that
lunatics or persons affected with insanity are admissible as witnesses, if they have sufficient
understanding to apprehend the obligation of an oath and are capable of giving correct
accounts of the matters that they have seen or heard with respect to the questions at issue.
In this case, Y was competent to testify as witness for the prosecution. The longstanding rule is
that when a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape has been committed. Moreover, it is not impossible that he or his family may have
been taken advantage of her lack of mental fortitude to persuade her to write those letters.
Lastly, mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate her original
testimony.
(2) People v. Macapal, Jr., 463 SCRA 387 (2005)

Bar Q: An information for rape was filed against X for raping Y, 23-year old illiterate who
appears to be mentally retarded. A psychiatrist opined that while the mental capacity of Y is
comparable to that of a child between 9 to 12 years old, she could testify in court but under
closed door and leading questions should be avoided as retarded people may be suggestible and
wish to please others. X argued that Y, a mental retardate, is incompetent to establish his
identity for, so he contends, it is not easy to ascertain the identity of a rapist when the victim is
deprived of reason. Can a mental retardate be allowed to testify in court?
Suggested ANSWER:
Yes.
Jurisprudence provides that mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally
retarded may be a credible witness. The acceptance of his or her testimony depends on the
quality of his or her perceptions and the manner he or she can make them known to the court.
As long as a witness’ testimony is straightforward, candid and unflawed by inconsistencies or
contradictions in its material points, and his or her demeanor is consistent with one who has
been victimized to thus bolster credibility with the verity born out of human nature and
experience, credibility can be accorded to him or her.
(3) People v. Santos, 501 SCRA 325 (2006)

Bar Q: R was charged with the crime of rape against V, a 5-year old child. During trial, V, as a
child witness, testified in court where she pointed R to be the perpetrator. On the basis of such
testimony, R was convicted. On appeal, one of the arguments of R is that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it acted as the prosecutor and the judge at the same
time for initiating and propounding the questions, as if supplying the desired answer from V. Is
the argument of R tenable?
Suggested Answer: No. Under the Rules on Examination of a Child Witness, child witnesses
may testify in a narrative form and leading questions may be allowed by the trial court in all
stages of the examination if the same will further the interest of justice.
In the case at bar, the offended party, V, is a 5-year old minor when she was sexually assaulted;
and as a child of such tender years not yet exposed to the ways of the world, she could not have
fully understand the enormity of the bestial act committed on her person. Therefore, the judge
did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it took a leading part by asking clarifying
questions.
3. Marital Disqualification (§22, Rule 130)
Cases:
(1) Lezama v. Rodriguez, 23 SCRA 1166 (1968)
Bar Question: Company A was placed under receivership and B was appointed as receiver.
Upon finding that there was still a loan that the company owes, a case was filed but the
summons was served with spouses C and D, the former the President and the latter the
Secretary. On the day of the hearing, the wife D, was asked to testify as to the existence of the
loan. Company A objected on the ground that the wife or the husband cannot testify against
each other. Whether the objection is correct?
The rule provides that a spouse cannot testify against one another.
In this case, the basis in requiring that the wife testify was to prove the existence of the loan,
not to testify against her husband. Thus, the wife may be required to testify.
(2) Alvarez v. Ramirez, 473 SCRA 72 (2005)
BAR Q: X, the sister of Y, is the complaining witness in a criminal case for arson against Z,
who is the husband of Y. Y was called to the witness stand by Atty.W to provide testimony
against Z to prove the crime of arson. Z, through counsel, files a motion to disqualify Y
pursuant to the rule on marital disqualification. X filed an opposition. Trial court issued an
order disqualifying Y and deleting her testimony from the records. Is the trial court correct?
Answer.: NO.
Jurisprudence provides when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation,
it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in
a criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against the other the offense of arson
attributed to petitioner Z, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife Y.
4. Dead Man’s Statute (§23, Rule 130)
Cases:
(1) Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 (1927)
QUESTION: A and B contracted marriage on July 5, 1894. A died on July 8, 1925, leaving B.
The niece of the deceased, C, was named administratrix. Shortly before his death, A had
presented claims in a cadastral case asking for titles to certain properties in the name of his
conjugal partnership, and that corresponding decrees for these lots were issued not long after
his death. In the cadastral case, the widow began action on April 28, 1926, presenting a motion
for revision of certain decrees within the one-year period prescribed. Issue was joined by the
administratrix of the estate. The Court of First Instance ordered new decrees and certificates of
title be issued to the widow. A motion for a new trial was denied. On July 19, 1926, the
administratrix of the estate began action against the widow for recovery of specified property
and for damages. The issue was practically the same as in the cadastral case. CFI absolved the
widow. The motion for a new trial was denied by His Honor, the trial judge. The administratrix
appealed. Was the widow competent to testify?
ANSWER Yes, the widow was competent to testify because the actions were not brought
‘against’ the administrator of the estate, neither were they brought upon claims ‘against’ the
estate. The administrator in the first case should have even enforced the demand ‘by’ the estate
as what conjugal partnership in law dictates.

All the property of the spouses is presumed partnership property in the absence of proof that it
belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. But even proceeding on this assumption, the
widow has proved in a decisive and conclusive manner exclusive ownership of the property.
(2) Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf, 84 Phil. 330 (1949)

BAR Q: X, the President of Atlantic Company held 1000 shares of stock of the same company.
545 shares were not yet fully paid by X, thus, an agreement was executed between X and
Atlantic Company that on the instance that the former will die, the latter, may either reacquire
the said stock and credit the equivalent amount to the estate of X or issue the same in favor of
the estate.
X died intestate. A special proceeding to settle the estate of X was instituted before CFI Manila.
Atlantic Company filed a claim against the estate of X for the following: P 63, 000 (overdrafts)
supported only by testimonial evidence since books were destroyed and P 868.67 (charges)
supported by documents. Moreover, the company also offered to reacquire the unpaid 545
shares of stock and return to the estate of X an amount worth P 64, 500. The administrator of
the estate denied the claims made by the company as evidenced in the inventory of the
properties, assets and debts between X and his divorced wife. B and C, officers of the company
also testified as to the status of the personal account of the deceased with the company but
were not allowed by the lower court upon opposition of the administrator.
(1) Are the pieces of evidence adduced have been established by satisfactory evidence?
(2) Whether or not the officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against
the executor or administrator of the deceased person are disqualified to testify on
matter of fact occurring before the death of the decedent?
Suggested Answer
(1) The oral testimony of the witnesses for the claimant based entirely on their memory as
to the status of Fitzsimmons' account. Realizing the frailty and unreability of human
memory, especially with regard to figures, we find no sufficient basis upon which to
reverse the trial court's finding that this claim had not been satisfactorily proven. This is
with regard to the P 63,000 peso claim; item 868.67 was sufficiently established and
supported by documents the fact of the claim. Therefore, the claim for P 63,000 was
disapproved; however, the P 868.67 was chargeable against the estate of X.
(2) Inasmuch as section 26(c) of Rule 123 disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties,
we are constrained to hold that the officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are
not disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to an
action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter
of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.
(3) Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho, 96 Phil. 622 (1955)

Bar Question:Mr. Go Checo is a Chinaman who died in China leaving intestate properties in
the Philippines. He was married twice: first, with Mrs. Ong So (deceased) with five children,
Paulino, Tua and Pan, Chi and Away, then with Mrs. Yu (deceased) with two minor children,
Cheng and Siu. The project of partition was signed my Mr. Joaquin as guardian ad litem. Upon
the termination of the intestate proceedings, Paulino instituted guardianship proceedings for his
minor brothers and sisters, and he was appointed guardia. Unfortunately, Paulino died and so
his eldest son, Chi-Chi, instituted intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate.
However, Chi and Away filed for the annulment of the partition made during the settlement of
the estate of their deceased father and testified that Paulino by fraudulent means and conspiracy
with Mr. Joaquin obtained the properties and made it appear that their deceased father had not
left any properties. With this, Chi-Chi cannot proceed with the settlement of his father’s estate
since it will prejudice them considering the properties are their common properties.
The trial court favored Chi and Away thereby annulled the project of partition. It allowed the
testimony of Chi and Away over the objection that they were incompetent to testify thereto
under the provisions of Section 26 (c) of Rule 123 of the Rules of court, holding that as the
action is brought against the heirs in their personal capacity, and the claim is not directed
against the estate Paulino but against the latter personally. The action is based on an alleged
fraud committed by the deceased. Does the Deadman’s Statute operate to bar plaintiff from
testifying on the fraud that the deceased committed?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO. Based on jurisprudence, in order that the rule may apply, the action must be one which is
a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person and that the action is against the
executor, administrator, or representative of such deceased person. The purpose of the law is to
guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on
the part of the surviving party. However, as an exception to the rule is where the decedent had
been guilty of fraud. The rule has been adopted to promote justice and not to shield fraud. But
before the testimonies of witnesses were allowed to be introduced, the fraud perpetrated by the
deceased had been established beyond all doubt, not by mere preponderance of the evidence
alone.
In application, the suit made is directed to the heirs as not in their representative capacities but
merely personal pertaining to successional rights.
Hence, the rule on Deadman’s statute is not applicable.
(4) Asturias v. Court of Appeals, 9 SCRA 131 (1963)

BAR Q: M obtained a loan from A secured by a mortgage over a piece of land. Since he had
failed to pay the full amount, M executed a written document of sale with the right of
repurchase within seven years. Though not expressed in the contract, the parties agreed that M
shall stay in possession of the land, but A shall be permitted to benefit from the coconut tree in
said land. Before A died, M offered to redeem the property but A requested him to postpone to
a later date. The same offer was repeated to A’s heirs (B) but which was asked to postpone
again. A year after A’s death, his heirs decided to partition the land among themselves as they
discovered the contract between A and M was a contract of sale. When they tried to enter and
fence the subject land, M filed an action for forcible entry and prevented them from entering.
Since B refused to have the property redeemed, M filed the case. B claims that M’s testimony is
inadmissible under the rules of survivorship disqualification (Sec. 26(c), Rule 123, Rules of
Court // now Sec 23, Rule 130). Is M’s testimony admissible?
ANSWER: Yes.
For testimony to be inadmissible under the survivorship disqualification rule, the other party
must have made a timely objection against the introduction of such evidence. Additionally, if
one of the parties who claimed such rule was made to testify on such prohibited matters
covered the by the exclusion rule, the same party would have deemed to have waived the
benefit and protection of the same.
Thus the claim of B that the action of M has already prescribed, and that they in turn had
acquired title to the land in question by acquisitive prescription, is without merit.
(5) Guerrero v. St. Claire’s Realty & Co., 124 SCRA 553 (1983)
BAR Q:The disputed lot was formerly owned by A, father of the P. A entrusted the land to his
sister, C , who was to enjoy the owner’s share in the produce of the land. After the death of A
in 1943, C continued as trustee of the deceased.
P alleged that the land was surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the name of A as early
as 1957. Then, at about 1971, the P discovered that the land was titled in the name of their
cousin, M, on the basis of a “Deed of Sale of Land” dated 1948 purportedly executed by C.
M subsequently sold this lot in favor of the defendants G, also a cousin of P. The defendants G
later sold the disputed lot to a SCR, a partnership constituted by them.
According to the complaint, the Deed of Sale in favor of M was fraudulently obtained and that
the subsequent deeds of sale were likewise fraudulent and ineffective since the defendants
allegedly knew that the property belonged to A.
During trial, L, a daughter of C, was presented as witnesses for the petitioners. She testified that
the money used for the illness of her mother was obtained from M by mortgaging the land as
security for the loans obtained. This was objected to by the counsel of the defendants based on
Sec. 20 (a), Rule 130(now, Sec.23, Rule 130). Initially, the trial court allowed the witness to
continue, but upon a written motion to disqualify on the same basis, the trial court declared L
disqualified from testifying in the case.
Despite this, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of G, even ordering P to pay damages
in the amount of more than P2M. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Was the witnesses L correctly disqualified from testifying in the case and her testimony
excluded on the basis of the “dead man’s rule”? Was the exclusion of P’s evidence and their
preclusion from presenting further proof, correctly sustained by the CA?
ANSWER:

L is not a party in the present case, and neither is she an assignor of the parties nor persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted. She was a mere witnesses by whose testimony that P aimed
to establish that it was not C who owned the disputed land at the time of the alleged sale to M,
and that C merely mortgaged the property to M.
The present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased M. G is not the
executor or administrator or representative of such deceased. G is being sued as claimants of
ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate
of M. Thus, the dead man’s rule is clearly inapplicable.
Aside from the disqualified witnesses, other witnesses testified and it was error to hold that the
testimonial evidence should have been formally offered, or that without such offer, such
evidence was waived. The offer of testimonial evidence is affected by calling the witness to the
stand and letting him testify before the court upon appropriate questions.
The trial court rendered its decision solely on the basis of defendants’ evidence and without
regard to the proofs that petitioner has presented. Therefore, exclusion of petitioners’ evidence
and their preclusion from presenting further proof was incorrect.
(6) Razon v. IAC, 207 SCRA 234 (1992)

Bar Q. XXX Co. was organized by X. X distributed their shares to Y, to whom he transferred,
300 shares of stock. It was agreed between the two that Y was only given the option to buy the
said shares, but X would be the owner of stock certificate was issued by the XXX Co. In the
name of Y, covering the 300 shares of stock. The said transfer was also recorded in the
corporate books of the corporation. The said certificate, however, was held by X, who delivered
it to the Philippine Bank of Commerce. Y thereafter died, and his administrator filed an action
to recover the certificate of shares of stock from X, representing Y shareholdings in the
corporation. The RTC declared X as the owner but the CA reversed it and ruled that Y was the
owner of the said shares.
X maintains that his aforesaid oral testimony as regards the true nature of his agreement with
the late Y on the 3 shares of stock of corporation. is sufficient to prove his ownership over the
said 300 shares of stock. X’s testimony admissible?
ANSWER: Yes. Dead man’s statute (DMS) may not be invoked when the case was not filed
against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.
The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Y to recover shares of stock in
XXX Co. allegedly owned by the late Y. It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the
petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the
administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. Furthermore, the
records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of the X as regards
the true nature of his transaction with the late elder Y. The X’s testimony was subject to cross-
examination by the private respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony

is within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the Y is deemed to
have waived the rule.
(7) Sunga-Chan v. Chua, 363 SCRA 249 (2001)

BAR Q: On June 22, 1992, A (respondent) filed a complaint against X (Chan) ( petitioner) and
Y daughter and wife, of the deceased J (hereafter Jacinto), for “Winding Up of Partnership
Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary
Attachment” with the Regional Trial Court.
A alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the distribution of
Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience, A and J
allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS
APPLIANCE CENTER, under the name of J as a sole proprietorship. A allegedly delivered
his initial capital contribution of P100,000.00 to J while the latter in turn produced P100,000.00
as his counterpart contribution, with the intention that the profits would be equally divided
between them.
Upon J’s death, his surviving wife, petitioner X and Y, took over the operations, control,
custody, disposition and management of Shellite without A’s consent.
Despite A’s repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up
and restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply. X and Y
allegedly continued the operations of Shellite, converting to Their own use and advantage its
properties.
Allegedly, X disbursed out of the partnership funds the amount of P200,000.00 and partially
paid the same to A. Despite such commitment, X and Y allegedly failed to comply with their
duty to account, and continued to benefit from the assets and income of Shellite to the damage
and prejudice of respondent.
The trial court in its decision which is affirmed also by CA, DIRECTING X and Y to render an
accounting of the properties, assets, income and profits of the Shellite Gas Appliance Center
since the time of death of J. Can there be an application of dead man statute principle in this
case to render inadmissible A’s testimony and that of his witness.
ANSWER: No
The “Dead Man’s Statute” provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded
from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled
to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction.[9] But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of
testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
“1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a
case is prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person or a person of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.”[10]
Two reasons not to the apply the “Dead Man’s Statute” to this case:
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim[11] against respondent in their answer
before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves
effectively removed this case from the ambit of the “Dead Man’s Statute”.[12] Well
entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of
the estate that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to
occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim.
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the “Dead Man’s Statute” for the simple
reason that she is not “a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted”. Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish
the existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto
A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property or real rights
are contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall be necessary.[6] Hence, based
on the intention of the parties, as gathered from the facts and ascertained from their language
and conduct, a verbal contract of partnership may arise
In the case at bar, non-compliance with this directory provision of the law will not invalidate
the partnership considering that the totality of the evidence proves that respondent and Jacinto
indeed forged the partnership in question.
(8) Zeigler v. Moore, 75 Nev. 91 335 P2d S. 425 (1959)

BAR Q: Z sued C for damages allegedly suffered in an automobile collision with C`s vehicle.
There were no witnesses other than the parties. Before the trial could commence, C died so the
administrator of his estate M substituted the case. According to Nevada law, no person may
testify when the other party to the transaction is dead if the testimony would seek to prove facts
that transpired before the death of such party. Relying on the statute, the trial judge did not
admit the Sheriff`s testimony as to the conversation he had with C after the accident when C
came to his office to fill out an accident report. Z was also precluded from testifying that she
did not drive in a reckless manner, the extent of her medical cost and the road conditions at the
time of the accident. Is the Sheriff`s testimony within the scope o f the Dead Man`s statute?
ANSWER: No. Under the Nevada law, the Dead Man`s statute does not apply to the
testimony of disinterested third parties. The object of the statute is to prevent one interested
party from giving testimony when the other party's lips are sealed by death.

In the case at bar, the rule would not also preclude plaintiff's description of her own actions and
the road conditions prior to the point when within limitations of time or space the decedent
could have contradicted her testimony of his own knowledge.
5. Privileged Communication (§24, Rule 130)

a) Marital Communications Cases:
Cases:
(1) United States v. Antipolo, 37 Phil. 726 (1916)

BAR Q: A was charged with murder of F. RTC convicted him with homicide. A appealed
claiming that the trial court allowed S, the widow of F, to testify as witness on behalf of the
defense on the alleged dying declarations. Counsel of the defendant insisted that the witness
was competent but the trial court denied the same. Is the denial proper?
Answer: NO. Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows: Except with the
consent of both, or except in cases of crime committed by one against the other, neither
husband nor wife shall be a competent witness for or against the other in a criminal action or
proceeding to which one or both shall be parties.
This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is based. The
purpose of section 58 is to protect accused persons against statements made in the confidence
engendered by the marital relation, and to relieve the husband or wife to whom such
confidential communications might have been made from the obligation of revealing them to
the prejudice of the other spouse. Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of
injuries he has suffered makes a statement regarding the manner in which he received those
injuries, the communication so made is in no sense confidential. On the contrary, such a
communication is made for the express purpose that it may be communicated after the death of
the declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause of his death.
The declarations of a deceased person while in anticipation of certain impending death,

concerning the circumstances leading up to the death, are admissible in a prosecution of the
person charged with killing the declarant. Such dying declarations are admissible in favor of the
defendant as well as against him.
(2) People v. Carlos, 47 Phil 626 (1925)

Question: Dr. S performed a surgical operation upon the C's wife for appendicitis and certain
other ailments. After her release therefrom she was required to go several times to the clinic of
Doctor S for the purpose of dressing the wounds caused by the operation. C received a letter
from Doctor S asking for the immediate settlement of the account for the professional services
rendered his wife.

In the afternoon of May 26th C again went to the office of the Dr. S and found him there
alone. According to the evidence of the prosecution, C then attacked Dr. S with a fan-knife and
stabbed him thrice and as a consequence of the three wounds he died within a few minutes. C
admits that he killed the deceased but maintains that he did so in self-defense.
The trial court found that the crime was committed with premeditation and therefore
constituted murder. This finding can only be sustained by taking into consideration Exhibit L, a
letter written to C by his wife and seized by the police in searching his effects on the day of his
arrest. It is dated May 25, 1924, two days before the commission of the crime and shows that
the wife feared that C contemplated resorting to physical violence in dealing with the doctor.
Was the letter considered as a privileged communication and therefore not admissible in
evidence?
Answer: Yes. Under the law, a letter written by a wife to her husband is incompetent as
evidence in a criminal case against the latter where there is no indication of assent on his part
to the statements contained in the letter. The letter may, however, be admissible to impeach
the testimony of the wife if she goes upon the witness-stand in the trial of the case.
In this case, C is guilty of simple homicide only, without aggravating or extenuating

circumstances. The letter was written by the wife of the defendant and if she had testified at
the trial the letter might have been admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put
on the witness-stand and the letter was therefore not offered for the purpose. If the
defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the statements contained
in the letter it might also have been admissible, but such is not the case here; the fact that he
had the letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The
letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in evidence violates the
constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the witnesses for
the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine them.
(3) Zuleta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, 20 February 1996

BAR Q: X is the wife of private respondent Y. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic
of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband’s clinic and took certain possessions and documents belonging to Dr. Y. It was to be
used as evidence for the suit X filed against her husband. Y filed an action before the RTC of
Manila which rendered a decision declaring him as “the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff’s Complaint or those further described in the
Motion to Return and Suppress.” The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made
final and X and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from “using or
submitting/admitting as evidence” the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition. Petitioner
contends that a previous ruling of a different nature involving the same documents were
admissible as evidence. Are the documents and papers unwillingly seized by petitioner be
admissible as evidence?
ANSWER: No. The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence[to

be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved
by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,as prescribed by law.” Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any
proceeding.
(4) People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694 (1947)

BAR Q: F, charged with robbery, was held as a detention prisoner in the Municipal Jail in
Mindoro. He requested from the Chief of Police to go home and see his wife to talk about the
procurement of a bail for his provisional release. His request was granted and was allowed to go
home with P as his detailed guard. While at his house, F allegedly stabbed his wife, himself and
their one year and a half old son with scissors which caused the death of the latter.
In an affidavit signed and sworned by F, he virtually confessed the killing. A year after his
confession, he contested the affidavit stating that such was made through intimidation and
violence and that his wife killed their son, but such was not sufficiently proven. The court
found that the statements in the affidavit of F were corroborated by the testimony of his wife
on rebuttal. Is the testimony of F’s wife admissible as evidence against him?
Suggested Answer: Yes. Jurisprudence provides as a general rule, that neither a husband nor
wife shall in any case be a witness against the other except in a civil action against each other
and in criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other because of the
following reasons: First, identity of interests; second, the consequent danger of perjury; third,
the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private
life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because
its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and, fourth, because, where a
want of domestic tranquillity exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile
testimony of the other.
In this case, F not only limited himself to denying that he was the killer, but went further and
added that was really a new matter consisting in the imputation of the crime upon his wife. By
his said act, F himself exercising the very right which he would deny his wife upon the ground
of their marital relations — must be taken to have waived all objection to the latter's testimony
upon rebuttal, even considering that such objection would have been available at the outset.
(5) Lacurom v. Jacoba, 484 SCRA 206 (2006)

FACTS: An administrative case was filed by Judge L against AB and C of ABC Law Firm who
is the counsel in a civil case. ABC Law Firm filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Request
for Inhibition in which the following words were used in its Prefatory Statement and Grounds
for Reconsideration:
abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to
the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process.
Judge L ordered AB, who signed the motion, to explain why she should not be held in
contempt for the very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating contents of such motion. As a
defense, AB denied that she actually prepared the said motion and recounted that Atty. C made
her sign such in trusting blind faith on her husband of 35 years with whom she entrusted her
whole life and future. Judge L issued another order this time directing C to explain why he
should not be held in comtempt. On his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, Atty. C
invoked the marital privilege in evidence against AB’s statement implicating him.
ISSUE: Can the statement of AB be inadmissible for being under the marriage privilege rule of
the rules on evidence?
RULING: No.
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to
object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent.
In the case at bar, waiver applies to C when he impliedly admitted the authorship of the motion
at issue. In its Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, it did not contain a denial of of his
wife’s account.
Counsels are suspended.
b) Attorney-Client Privilege
Cases:
(1) Barton v. Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co., 46 Phil. 938 (1924)
BAR QUESTION
James Barton (A) is a US citizen residing in Manila while Leyte Asphalt (B) is a Philippine
company which has its principal office in Cebu. A sought to recover the sum of $318,563.30 in
damages from B due to breach of contract along with a judicial pronouncement that he was
entitled to an extension of the terms of the sales agencies specified in the contract.
In San Francisco, B entered into an agreement with Ludvigsen & McCurdy (XYZ). XYZ was
instituted as a subagent and given the sole selling rights for the bituminous limestone products

of Leyte Asphalt for 1 year. Thereafter, XYZ advised A of an order of 6,000 tons of
bituminous limestone which A accepted.
Anderson informed A that Leyte Asphalt was behind construction so it could not handle big
contracts as of the moment. The two met in Manila, Anderson said that, owing to lack of
capital, adequate facilities had not been provided by the company for filling large orders and
suggested that A had better hold up in the matter of taking orders.
Despite Anderson’s response, A wrote a notification to B for the company to be prepared to

ship five thousand tons of bituminous limestone to San Francisco. He also made additional
orders for Smith in Australia. B acknowledged the orders for Australia and San Francisco but
stated that no orders would be entertained without a cash deposit.
The CFI absolved B from four of the six causes of action. The CFI allowed A to recover
$202,500 from the first cause of action and $405,000 from the fourth cause of action. Among
the evidence presented was a carbon copy of a letter written by Baron to Atty. Ingersoll, his
lawyer.
When the letter was offered in evidence by the attorney for the defendant, the counsel for the
plaintiff announced that he had no objection to the introduction of this carbon copy in
evidence if counsel for the defendant would explain where this copy was secured. The attorney
for the defendant informed the court that he received the letter from the former attorneys of
the defendant without explanation of the manner in which the document had come into their
possession. Baron’s lawyer then made an announcement that unless the defendant’s counsel
explained how the letter came to the defense’s possession, he proposed to object the letter’s
admission on the ground that it was a confidential communication between client and lawyer.
The trial judge excluded the letter. Whether or not the letter should be excluded?
SUGGESTED ANSWER NO
When papers are offered in evidence a court will take no notice of how they were obtained,
whether legally or illegally, properly or improperly; nor will it form a collateral issue to try that
question.
Even supposing that the letter was within the privilege which protects communications between
attorney and client, this privilege was lost when the letter came to the hands of the adverse
party and it makes no difference how the defense acquired possession.
The law protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in the
confidence of the legal relation, but when such a document, containing admissions of the client,
comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence.

According to Wigmore: “Since the means of preserving secrecy of communication are entirely
in the client's hands, and since the privilege is a derogation from the general testimonial duty
and should be strictly construed, it would be improper to extend its prohibition to third persons
who obtain knowledge of the communications. One who overhears the communication,
whether with or without the client's knowledge, is not within the protection of the privilege.
The same rule ought to apply to one who surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a
document in original or copy.”
Judgment reversed
(2) Orient Insurance v. Revilla, 54 Phil. 919 (1930)

Question:
ABC Company filed an action against XYZ Company to recover insurance policy which has a
stipulation that in case of loss of the said policy, all benefits be forfeited, the claim be rejected
and action or suit be commenced within three months after such rejection. XYZ argued that
the suit was instituted more than three months after the rejection of the claim. ABC contended
that a week after the notification of denial of claim, he reported certain conversations to their
attorneys who, through a letter, urged him to file this case, however they relied upon the request
of XYZ to defer judicial action as there is a possibility of an extrajudicial compromise.
XYZ then required ABC to produce the said letter, however the latter offered as evidence only
a part of the letter which is relevant to the urging of the complaint and argued that other than
that cannot be presented as they are privileged in nature between attorneys and their clients.
XYZ requested that the entire document should be exhibited, in conformity with the rule that
when part of a document is offered in evidence, it waives the privilege and the entire document
must be presented. May the request of XYZ be granted?
Answer: Yes. Jurisprudence provides that the introduction in evidence of part of a paper
writing by one party waives privilege as to other parts of the same writing.
Here, ABC already offered a part of the letter as evidence, this constitutes a waiver. XYZ is
entitled to use other parts of the same writing so far as relevant to the issues in the case. Hence,
its request may be granted.
(3) Upjohn Company v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383 (1981)

BAR Q: The General Counsel for petitioner pharmaceutical manufacturing corporation was
informed that one of its foreign subsidiaries had made questionable payments to foreign
government officials. An internal investigation of such payments was initiated. As part of this
investigation, petitioner's counsel sent a questionnaire to all foreign managers seeking detailed
information concerning such payments. Based on a report voluntarily submitted by petitioner
disclosing the questionable payments, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began an investigation
to determine the tax consequences of such payments and issued a summons demanding
production of the questionnaires and the memoranda and notes of the interviews. Petitioner

refused to produce the documents on the grounds that they were protected from disclosure by
the attorney-client. Are the questionnaires covered by attorney- client privilege?
Suggested Answer: The communications by petitioner's employees to counsel are covered by the
attorney-client privilege insofar as the responses to the questionnaires and any notes reflecting
responses to interview questions are concerned. The notes and memoranda sought by the
Government constitute work product based on oral statements. If they reveal communications,
they are protected by the attorney-client privilege. To the extent they do not reveal
communications they reveal attorneys' mental processes in evaluating the communications.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, make clear, such work product cannot be disclosed simply on a
showing of substantial need or inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship.
(4) People v. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997)
Bar Q: A perjury case was filed against Y and was dismissed on the ground of prescription.
Another case was filed against Y in violation of violation of RA 3019, Y, as defense, contends
that he has already been charged under the same set of facts and the same evidence. In support
hereof, Y presented court records but were found to be falsified. In all these cases, Y was
represented by respondent Atty. X. Hence, another case was filed for falsification of judicial
records against X and Y. It was then that respondent X offered to testify as a state witness
against his client Y, claiming that the latter contrived and induced him to have the graft case
dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by having him and co-respondent prepare and
falsify the subject documents. But the Sandiganbayan denied the motion on the ground of
attorney-client privilege. Is Sandiganbayan correct?
Suggested Answer: No. The privilege applies only if the information was relayed by the client
to the lawyer respecting a past crime. The reckoning point is when the communication was
given, not when the lawyer was made to testify. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in
these cases as the facts thereof and the actuations of both respondents therein constitute an
exception to the rule.
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such
unlawful communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are
nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel from
revealing the genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of
the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties in the rules
of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.
(5) Mercado v. Vitriolo, 459 SCRA 1 (2005)

BAR Q: X filed a disbarment case against Atty. Y for maliciously instituting a case for
falsification of public document against her based on confidential information gained from their
attorney-client relationship. Atty. Y filed a criminal action against X for falsification of public
document for false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children.
X alleged that said criminal complaint disclosed confidential information relating to the
dismissal of the annulment case filed by X’s husband. Atty. Y maintained that the 2 certificates
of live birth are public documents in no way connected with the confidence taken during his
engagement as counsel. Did Atty. Y violated the rule on attorney-client privilege
communication in the falsification of public document by X
ANSWER: No.
The Sec. 24 (b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “an attorney cannot, without
the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or
his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can
an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client
and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such
capacity”. (This is not mentioned in the case)
On the rule on attorney-client privilege, the factors essential to establish the existence of the
privilege: (1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client
relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication; (2)
The client made the communication in confidence; and (3) The legal advice must be sought
from the attorney in his professional capacity.
Here, X failed to attend and testify in the hearings at the IBP as to the specific confidential
information allegedly divulged by Atty. Y without her consent. The mere relation of attorney
and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The burden of proving that the
privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege.
(6) Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 124 (1996)

Bar Question: PCGG failed a case against A, B and firm C for the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth. D, a lawyer from firm C was excluded on the condition that he will disclose the identity
of the principals. Other lawyers from firm C requested PCGG to grant them the same
treatment. But the lawyers from firm C will not disclose the identity of their clients. Is this
covered by the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege?
Suggested Answer:
Yes. As a general rule a client's identity is should not be shrouded in mystery but there are
exceptions which include the following:
1. Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name
would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
2. Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
3. The content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant
to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance.
The present case falls under the first and third exceptions.
c) Physician - Patient Privilege
—See also Rule 28—

Cases:
(1) Lim v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 273 (1992)
Bar question: H filed an annulment case against W alleging that W is suffering from a mental
illness called schizophrenia “before, during and after the marriage and until the present.”
During trial, H’s counsel requested Dr. A’s testimony as expert witness.
W’s counsel objected on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is
privileged since the latter had examined the W in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her
to be suffering from schizophrenia. Can Dr. A testify?
Suggested ANSWER: Yes.
In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must concur:
1.The privilege is claimed in a civil case;

2.The person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics;
3.Such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional
capacity;
4.The information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
5.The information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the
patient.
In this case, Dr. A was presented and qualified as an expert witness. Her expert opinion
excluded whatever information or knowledge she had about W which was acquired by reason
of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert witness, her testimony
cannot then be excluded.
Thus, Dr. A can testify.
(2) Krohn v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 146 (1994)

Bar Question: H filed an annulment case against W on the ground of psychological incapacity.
During trial, a confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence. The
witness testifying on the report is H and not the physician who prepared the report. The subject
of the evaluation report, W, invoking the rule on privileged communication between physician
and patient, seeks to enjoin H from disclosing the contents of the report. Is W correct?

Suggested ANSWER: No.
One of the requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked is: x x x (b) the
person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics x x x.
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized
to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient’s husband who wishes to
testify on a document executed by medical practitioners.
d) Priest/Minister - Penitent Privilege
e) State Secrets
(1) Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board, 142 SCRA 523 (1986)

Bar Q: The Monetary Board (MB) closed down BF Bank (BF). BF petitioned for the
production of documents and tapes supposedly necessary for the preparation of BF’s case, but
MB did not want to give BF copies of these documents. Among BF’s allegations was that the
Central Bank governor had some shady dealings and decisions, that’s why they say the MB is
trying to suppress the production of these documents. MB on the other hand invoked Secs. 13
and 15 of the Central Bank Act that holds liable members of the MB who discloses information
of a confidential nature about the discussion or resolutions of the MB. They also invoked Rule
130, Sec. 24 (e): A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as
to communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public
interest would suffer by disclosure. Also, MB claimed that the "public interest" requirement for
non-disclosure is evident from the fact that the statutes punish any disclosure of such
deliberations. Can the MB hide behind the privileged communication rule?
Suggested Answer: No. Under Rule 130, Sec. 24(e), the privilege communication rule is
intended not for the protection of public officers but for the protection of public interest.
Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this invoked rule will not be
applicable. In the case at bar, MB was not able to establish that public interest would suffer by
the disclosure of the papers and documents sought by BF. Neither will it trigger any bank run
nor compromise state secrets. Therefore, MB cannot hide behind the privileged communication
rule.
**See §16, R.A. 7653 (New Central Bank Act)
(2) Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006)

Bar Question: The Senate Committee sent a letter to the Executive Department Heads and
AFP heads to appear before the Senate. Later on, EO 464 was enacted and it provides that the
various Executive Dept. Heads and AFP personnels cannot appear before any hearing without
consent of the President. A, now invoke EO 464, stating that he cannot appear in the Senate by
virtue of EO 464. Was A covered by executive privilege?

EO 464 provides that an AFP personnel or Executive Dept. Head may not appear in the Senate
provided that there is a reason for the non-appearance.
In this case, mere invocation of EO 464 does not suffice, there must be a legitimate reason not
the heed the call of the Senate.
f) Parental and Filial Privilege (§25, Rule 130) (a) Art. 215, Civil Code
Case:
(1) People v. Invencion, 398 SCRA 592 (2003)
BAR Q: X was charged with rape before the RTC of Tarlac for allegedly raping his 16-year-old
daughter Y. Prosecution presented several witnesses among whom is Z, half-brother of Y and
son of X. Z testified that, before the end of the school year in 1996, while he was sleeping in
one room with his father X, sister Y, and two other younger brothers, he was awakened by Y’s
loud cries. Looking towards her, he saw his father on top of Y, doing a pumping motion. After
about two minutes, his father put on his short pants. X attacks the competency and credibility
of Z as a witness. He argues that Z, as his son, should have been disqualified as a witness
against him. Is Z disqualified from testifying against his father?
Ans.: NO.
Jurisprudence provides that in Section 25, Rule 130 the rule on filial privilege, this rule is not
strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to
testify against an ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or
waived like other privileges.
In this case, Z was not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial
privilege when he voluntarily testified against X. Z declared that he was testifying as a witness
against his father of his own accord and only to tell the truth.
g) Newsman’s Privilege (See R.A. No. 53, as amended by R.A. 1477)
Case:
(1) In the Matter of Farber, 394 A.2d 330 (1978)
QUESTION Q: A was a reporter for the New York Times. A’s investigation into the criminal
activity of B contributed to B’s prosecution and subsequent trial for murder. The court in the
murder trial ordered A to produce materials compiled in his investigation into B. A declined to
produce his investigative materials and was charged with contempt of court. A was found guilty
of contempt, sentenced to jail, and appealed. Did the court err in finding A guilty of contempt?
ANSWER: No, the court did not err because the state constitutional guarantee of a criminal
defendant's right to confront witnesses prevailed over the state statute granting privilege to
newspersons regarding their sources of confidential information. There is no present authority
in this Court either that newsmen are constitutionally privileged to withhold duly subpoenaed
documents material to the prosecution or defense of a criminal case or that a defendant seeking

the subpoena must show extraordinary circumstances before enforcement against newsmen will
be had.
h) Trade Secrets
Case:
(1) Air Phil Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc. (13 December 2007)
Bar Question: Air Phil (petitioner) filed a petition to compel Pennswell (respondent) to
disclose the chemical components and ingredients of products (lubricants) bought by the
former from the latter. The problem rooted when Air Ph. discovered (allegedly) that some of
the lubricants it brought from Pennswell were identical in composition and constitution (anti-
friction lubricants) - although they have different names. Because of the alleged discovery, Air
Ph. refused payment of the said products. Pennswell thereafter filed a complaint for collection
of money. Now, Air Ph. is asking the court to compel the respondent to provide the chemical
components and ingredients for comparison, to determine whether fraud was committed by the
respondent. Is Air Ph. correct to compel Pennswell to disclose the chemical components
of the lubricants it bought from the latter?
Suggested Answer: No, the chemical compounds sought after are considered as confidential.
Trade secrets may not be the subject of compulsory disclosure. By reason of [their]
confidential and privileged character, ingredients or chemical components of the products
ordered by this Court to be disclosed constitute trade secrets lest [herein respondent] would
eventually be exposed to unwarranted business competition with others who may imitate and
market the same kinds of products in violation of [respondents] proprietary rights. Being
privileged, the detailed list of ingredients or chemical components may not be the subject of
mode of discovery under Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which expressly makes
privileged information an exception from its coverage.
To determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit:
(1) The extent to which the information is known outside of the employer's business;
(2) The extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in
the business;
(3) The extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the
information;
(4) The value of the information to the employer and to competitors;
(5) The amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the
information; and
(6) The extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an
independent source.
In this case, the chemical formulation of respondent’s products is not known to the
general public and is unique only to it. The ingredients are not within the knowledge of the

public. Therefore, the respondent cannot be compelled to disclose the chemical components
because of the protection afforded by the law in favor of trade secrets.
PART TWO
I. Admissions and Confessions
A. Admissions Against Interest
a) §§26 and 32, Rule 130
b) §13, Rule 132
Cases:
(1) People v. Paragsa, 84 SCRA 105 (1978)
Bar Question:
Benben was charged with rape of Mirasol who is a little over twelve and a half (12½) years old.
In the Information, it was alleged that at that time, she was alone in the house then Benben was
armed with a hunting knife, entered the house, closed the door, forced her to lie in bed and did
the sexual intercourse. This was interrupted when Benben heard Mrs. Lita, the aunt of Mirasol,
calling from outside the gate of the house, asking Mirasol to open the gate. Mirasol did not
answer because she was then in the act of putting on her panties.
Accordingly, during trial, Mrs. Lita testified that she saw Mirasol’s act of putting on her panties.
Mirasol did not reveal immediately to her parents that she was raped. It took three (3) days after
the incident she revealed to her parents. On the other hand, Benben admits having sexual
intercourse with Mirasol, but he stoutly denied that he did so by employing force or
intimidation. He claims he and Mirasol were sweethearts; that on the day of the incident, it was
Mirasol who invited him to the latter's house where they had sexual intercourse and it was
consensual. These statements were substantially corroborated by two witnesses. However,
Mirasol did not bother to rebut the testimony of Benben and his witnesses to the effect that the
accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that they had had two previous sexual
communications. Whether guilt beyond reasonable doubt was established to warrant the
conviction of the accused?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO. A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak,
unsatisfactory and inconclusive to justify a conviction. The rule allowing silence of a person to
be taken as an implied admission of the truth of statements uttered in his presence is applicable
in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can be taken as an admission of what is said,
it must appear: (1) that he heard and understood the statement; (2) that he was at liberty to
interpose a denial; (3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in
which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; (4) that the facts were within
his knowledge; and (5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence
would be material to the issue.

In application, all the requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. The
silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely
construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion.
Therefore, the accused shall be acquitted.
(2) Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain, 434 SCRA 491 (2004)

Bar Q: A was hired as labourer at R Factory, owned by L. He tended his resignation in 1991
with a separation letter and also executed a duly notarized affidavit of separation from
employment which he tended to the SSS. In 1995, A verbally demanded payment of his
retirement benefits, claiming that actual retirement was done in the same year. L refused to pay,
thus A filed a complaint with the NLRC. The NLRC decided in favour of A, giving weight to
A’s sworn statement that he actually retired in 1995, and that the documents were so he could
receive the benefits from SSS. The NLRC also took into account his daughter’s sworn
statement corroborating the same. R Factory appealed the decision to the CA, who affirmed the
NLRC decision, before reaching the Supreme Court, contending that the appellate court did
not give weight to the separation letter and affidavit of separation made by A, choosing instead
to give credence to A’s self-serving statement and the daughter’s corroboration. Is R Factory
correct?
Answer: Yes.
An admission against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the
facts in dispute, since it’s based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against
himself unless such declaration was true. The disserving quality of the admission is judged as of
the time it is used or offered in evidence and not when such admission is made. While it may be
refuted, if the admission is a notarial document, it may only be refuted by evidence that is clear,
convincing, and more than merely preponderant.
In this case, since A had indeed voluntarily executed the separation letter and affidavit of
separation from employment, A must have presented clear, convincing evidence against the
same, and not just a subsequent notarial document refuting it. Since he failed to do so, the two
documents must be given more weight.
(3) Estate of Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No. 168661, October 26, 2007
BAR Q:
OSG filed a case for reversion against X and Y, alleging that the and registered in the name of
Y which was later on sold to X, was still a portion of Manila Bay as evidenced by Namria
Hydrographic Map as surveyed by Engineer H. The allegations were based on the statement of
M, who contacted their legal department, and V, who issued the report stating that the land in
issue is part of Manila Bay. X and Y filed a motion to dismiss which was granted by the RTC.
On appeal, Republic alleged that the trial court erred in its decision that they have evidence to
that such parcel of land acquired by X used to be foreshore and is part of Manila Bay. CA
granted the petition and ordered the case to be remanded to the lower court for a full blown
trial.
Meanwhile, the parties were allowed to present evidence. New officials of Bureau of lands made
2 ocular inspections; surveyed the land and later came up with a report that the land purchased
by X is solid and is not part of Manila Bay.
Do the findings of the new officials of the bureau of lands eliminate the probability of the
evidence issued by the retired officers?
RULING:
Yes.
Section 13 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times, statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the
circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether
he made such statements and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing,
they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.
In the case at bar, the statements given by the previous and present officers of the Bureau of
lands are contradictory, however, the Republic was not able to present M and V as their witness
since both already retired. Assuming arguendo that M and V were available to testify, the
projections made on the cadastral map will not prevail to the results of the two ocular
inspections made by the new officers of the Bureau of Lands.
B. Compromises
a) §1(f), Rule 116
b) §§1-2, Rule 118
c) §27, Rule 130
Cases:
(1) Varadero v. Insular Lumber, 46 Phil. 176 )1924)
Bar Question: X had a lighter which was to be repaired by Y, pursuant to no express
agreement, but with the implicit understanding that the price would be as low as, or lower than,
could be, secured from any other company. When repairs were completed and Y gave X the
bill, the latter refused to pay because it was of the opinion that the price was grossly exorbitant.
X offered a compromise, but they disagreed. Hence, they went to court. In the RTC, course of
the abortive negotiations therein, the X expressed a willingness to pay Y. Ultimately, they never
settled on an agreed figure. The RTC adopted X’s proposal. Is the offer of compromise
excluded?

The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission of liability. It is
not admissible in evidence against the offeror. To determine the admissibility or non-
admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the case and the intent of the
party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but
offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of
settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits the
existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the
admission is admissible to prove such indebtedness.
In this case the Court applied the exception to the general rule there was neither an expressed
nor implied denial of liability, but during the course of the abortive negotiations therein, the
defendant expressed a willingness to pay the plaintiff. Finding that there was no denial of
liability, and considering that the only question discussed was the amount to be paid, the Court
did not apply the rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations.
(2) People v. Lambid, 412 SCRA 417 (2003)

Bar Question: X was criminally charged for rape. Upon his arraignment, X pleaded not guilty.
A review of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during X’s direct and cross examinations
shows that he never disowned the acts imputed against him. X merely claimed that he was
drunk and he asked for forgiveness from the victim, if he had really raped her. Is X’s plea for
forgiveness considered an admission of guilt?
ANSWER: Yes. Jurisprudence provides that a plea for forgiveness may be considered as
analogous to an attempt to compromise and an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
Thus, by asking for forgiveness, X has admitted his guilt
(3) People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (1995)

Bar Question: Godoy was accused of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal
detention. The private complainant Mia allegedly said that her teacher Godoy by means of
force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and by means of deceit, have carnal knowledge
with her and kidnapped or detained her. Godoy`s main defense was the sweetheart theory and
the same was corroborated by the testimonies of the defense witnesses. Godoy`s mother,
absence his knowledge and presence, offered a compromise. Is the compromise admissible in
evidence against the accused?
Suggested Answer: No. In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as
evidence against the party making it. However, it has been held that where the accused was not
present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of compromise
would not save the day for the prosecution. In another case, this Court ruled that no implied
admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the
accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and the effort to settle the case was in
accordance with the established tribal customs.
C. Res Inter Alios Acta (§§28 and 34, Rule 130)

Case:
(1) People v. Gaudia, 423 SCRA 520 (2004)

Bar QUESTION: G was accused of raping R, a minor. A, R’s mother was presented the
primary witness. A found R in the mango trees, naked and with fresh and dried blood on her
body. One neighbor saw G pass by their house and took R. G interposed an alibi claiming that
he was with T to register at the Comelec and gathered tuba. He also claimed that the child he
was carrying was D and not A. RTC found G guilty. Did the RTC erred in convicting G?
Suggested Answer:
NO. G was convicted with simple rape. Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court, conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided three requisites concur: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. The ruling case law is that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient
to support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
In this case, the circumstances are listed by the SC. The circumstances prove the culpability of
G with moral certainty. The circumstances have been indubitably proven, both by the
testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, and by the inability of the
appellant to discredit their veracity.
D. Exceptions to the Res Inter Alias Acta Rule
a) Admissions by a co-partner or agent i. §29, Rule 130 ii. §23, Rule 138
Case:
(1) Acenas v. Sison, 8 SCRA 711 (1963)

Question: Mrs. S executed a promissory note, promising to pay Mrs. A. Mrs. S was able to
pay up to several months only. Upon her failure to pay the balance of the note, she was sued
and Mr. S, was joined as a defendant. When this case was called for hearing, counsel for
Spouses S moved for the postponement of the hearing in view of the absence of his clients
and that he needs time within which to confer with them for the purpose of amicably settling
this case.
When the court indicated to Spouses S' counsel that there seems to be no defense on the part
of Spouses S in this case, and that it would be for the best interest of the latter if the case is
terminated by way of judgment on the pleadings or confession of judgment, counsel for Spouses
S offered no objection and asked that confession of judgment by Spouses S may be entered in this
case provided that the corresponding writ of execution thereof should not be issued until June
30, 1960, to which counsel for Spouses A agreed. Was the laywer authorized to confess
judgment for Mr. S?

Answer: No.
Section 21 of Rule 127 expressly requires that attorneys have special authority not only to
receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash but also to
compromise their client's litigation.
In this case, it was error for the trial court to accept the confession made by counsel without
ascertaining his authority to do so, at least with respect to Mr. S. With respect to Mrs. S,
however, the judgment will be maintained, there being no claim in this appeal that the
confession of judgment made in her behalf was unauthorized. In fact, her liability is admitted
here.
(PS. You can add this:
In addition, the records do not show that Atty. X had authority to confess judgment. On the
contrary, the decision of March 7, 1960 states that Atty. X "moved for the postponement of
the hearing hereof in view of the absence of his clients and that he needs time within which to
confer with them for the purpose of amicably settling this case." This indicates that Atty. X
lacked authority to confess judgment, otherwise, there would have been no need for him to
confer with his clients. This circumstance should have put the trial court on an inquiry as to
counsel's authority.)
b) Admission by conspirators (§30, Rule 130)

Cases:
(1) People v. Cabrera, 57 SCRA 715 (1974)
BAR Q: X and Y are convicted of Robbery-Hold-up with Homicide. X did not appeal. Only Y
appealed. In the morning of January 18, 1972, defendant X was arrested by the police. On
January 20, 1972 she executed an extra-judicial confession. In the said extra-judicial confession
she pointed to appellant Y as the mastermind of the robbery. She merely hired the jeep upon
instruction of appellant but the robbery and the killing of the deceased were done by appellant
and his two unidentified companions.
The only evidence that would support the judgment of conviction of appellant Y was the extra-
judicial confession of his co-accused X. Is the rule on admission by conspirator can be availed
of?
Admission by conspirator.— The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
In the case at bar, there is no question that X's inculpatory statements were made by her during
the investigation conducted by the Valenzuela police on January 20, 1972, two days after the
date of the incident in question. For this reason alone, that is, that said statement was not made
during the existence of the alleged conspiracy between her and appellant, but after said
supposed conspiracy had already ceased and when she was already in the hands of the
authorities, Section 27 of Rule 130 cannot be availed of.
(2) Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 406 SCRA 311 (2003)

Bar Q: A team from the Commission on Audit was organized to verify the alleged issuances of
fake Letters of Advice of Allotments (LAAs) and Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceilings
(SACDCs) during the period of 1976-1978 in various Highway Engineering Districts (HEDs)
of Region VII. Then President Marcos also created a Special Cabinet Committee to investigate
the fund anomalies. The Audit team found out that fake LAAs and SACDCs were issued in the
year 1977 leading to irregular disbursements of public funds for the payment of “ghost”
projects. The investigations resulted in the filing of 397 criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan
charging officials and employees of the Cebu 2nd HED (including A) as well as private
contractors with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. During the trial, accused
M (Region VII Accountant) who signed all the fake LAAs and SACDCs, and co-accused
contractors/ suppliers G and E who delivered the materials and “prosecuted” the ghost
projects, changed their previous pleas of “not guilty” to “guilty” to the crimes charged against
them.
According to A, et al., the admission or confession of a party may be presented as evidence only
against himself pursuant to Sec. 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and under Sec. 26 of the
same Rule; that, therefore, admission of the pleas of guilty of M, G and E against petitioners
violated the hearsay and res inter alios acta rules. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan violated
the rule of res inter alios acta when the Court made reference to the pleas of guilty of M, G and
E.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
In this case, G, M and E were charged together with A, et al., for having acted in conspiracy
with one another to commit the offenses. The pleas of guilty of some of the accused are
admissions of the truth of the accusations that they committed acts of falsifications done during
the existence of the conspiracy. Even if the confession, i.e., the pleas of guilty, were not made
during the existence of the conspiracy (Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 30). However, it is
submitted that said pleas are nonetheless admissible against A, et al., as co-conspirators because
the pleas were made in open court. In other words, they are judicial confessions. The rule
embodied in Sec. 30 that the declaration of a conspirator made after the termination of the
conspiracy is inadmissible against his co-conspirator applies only to an extra-judicial confession,
and not to a plea of guilty, which is a judicial confession.
Thus, in this very specific instance, the rule res inter alios acta does not apply because the
confessions embodied in the pleas of guilty are judicial confessions, not extra-judicial ones.
(3) Preagido, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, 476 SCRA 143 (2005)

Facts: A case of Estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents were filed
against petitioners AB in relation to certain projects involving the restoration of various roads
and bridges in Tagbilaran City. In the information filed, it averred that ABC as public officials
who by reason of the duties of their office, are accountable officers, and conspiring and
conniving among themselves, as well as with their private party co-accused, after having
falsified or caused to have falsified Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAA) which are all public
documents. Sandiganbayan convicted ABC on the basis of conspiracy.
In its Petition for review on Certiorari, petitioners averred, among others, that assuming that
there were admissions from the other co-accused, the alleged conspiracy must first be proven
by evidence other than the declaration of a co-conspirator citing Section 27 of Rule 130, Rules
of Court.
ISSUE: Is the contention of the petitioners correct?
RULING: No.
Section 27, Rule 130 provides that “Admission by conspirator- The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against
the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.”
Such provision applies only to extrajudicial acts or declarations but not to testimony given on
the witness stand at the trial where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant.
Petition denied.
c) Admission by privies (§31, Rule 130)

Cases:
(1) City of Manila v. Del Rosario, 5 Phil. 227 (1905)

BAR QUESTION: The City of Manila sought to recover possession of two lots located in the
Tondo district. It appears from the case that A acquired the land from B and then sold it to
his brother C, the defendant in this case. However, the City of Manila wanted to recover
possession of the lots and presented as one of its witnesses, D, who testified that the land in
question was formerly included in the Gran Divisoria, and that all the land included in it
belonged to the city. This particular testimony is at variance with the testimonies of two other
witnesses E and F who testified that the land belonged to the Central Government (not the
city). D’s testimony was based on what he had learned from the oldest residents of that section
of the city and was introduced by the City of Manila apparently for the purpose of proving that
the city was generally considered the owner of the land drawing from this fact the presumption

of actual ownership. Was the testimony of D admissible as proof of common reputation,
making it an exception against hearsay?
SUGGESTED ANSWER No. D's testimony was merely hearsay. It consisted of what he
had learned from some of the oldest residents in that section of the city. His testimony was
introduced by the plaintiff apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was generally
considered the owner of the land, drawing from this fact the presumption of actual ownership
under the Code of Civil Procedure. Such testimony, however, does not constitute the "common reputation"
referred to in the section mentioned. "common reputation," as used in that section, is equivalent
to universal reputation. The testimony of this witness is not sufficient to establish the
presumption referred to.
(2) Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 406 SCRA 190 (2003)

Bar Question: The PCGG filed a petition to declare the accounts in various Swiss banks as ill-
gotten wealth of the deceased and former President Wang and his family and that it be forfeited
in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.
Before it was set for pre-trial, B. Wang, son of President A. Wang, answered that the Wang
Family agreed to negotiate with the Philippine government in the hope of finally putting an end
to the problems besetting their family regarding the Swiss accounts. Further, the Wang Family
contended that the funds were lawfully acquired by the former president and that it be placed in
custodia legis. Subsequently, they disclaim the ownership thereof. Can the answers of the Wang
Family be considered judicial admission?
Answer: Yes.
Judicial admission may be made (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties, (b) in the course of the
trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of judicial
proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case. Further, admissions of a party in his testimony are
receivable against him. If a party, as a witness, deliberately concedes a fact, such concession has
the force of a judicial admission.
Here, the Wang Family’s willingness to agree to an amicable settlement with the Republic only
affirmed their ownership of the Swiss deposits for the simple reason that no person would
acquiesce to any concession over such huge dollar deposits if he did not in fact own them.
Moreover, they moved that the accounts be placed in custodia legis. These were doubtlessly an
acknowledgment of ownership on their part.
E. Confessions
a) §33, Rule 130
b) §3, Rule 133
c) §§12 and 17, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

Cases:
(1) People v. Compil, 244 SCRA 135 (1995)

BAR Q: A was convicted of robbery with homicide. Several days after, A was caught in
Quezon Province, where A was trembling. After gaining composure, A admitted his guilt, he
was brought to the police station, and further investigated, he still confessed about his
participation to the crime. Is A’s extrajudicial confession, be rendered inadmissible?
Suggested Answer: Yes. A was immediately subjected to interrogation upon his arrest, and the
same goes upon his transfer. The police officers elicited incriminating questions and confessed
to the commission of the crime, where he was not assisted by counsel. Even the arrival of a
lawyer the following day, it will not cure the defect.
(2) People v. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182 (1996)
Bar Question: X and Y (British) together with the 9 tourists (Malaysian) arrived at NAIA from
Hong Kong. Upon inspection, 30 boxes of Alpen Cereals containing white crystalline substance
were allegedly recovered from the baggages of the eleven (11) accused. A Customs Collector
ordered them to sign on the masking tape placed on the boxes allegedly recovered from them.
At CAMP Crame, a NARCOM Officer immediately informed the 11 accused that they were
under arrest and were asked to identify their signatures on the boxes and after having identified
them, they were again made to sign on the plastic bags containing white crystalline substance
inside the boxes bearing their signatures. They were charged with violation of Section 15, Art.
III, R.A. 6425 as amended and charged with unlawfully transporting into the country
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, respectively. In their appeal brief, X and Y alleges
that the court the lower court erred in not excluding the inadmissible evidence obtained in
violation of appellants Miranda rights. Are the signatures of the accused on the boxes, as well as
on the plastic bags containing "shabu"? admissible in evidence?
Suggested Answer: NO, the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags
containing shabu, are inadmissible in evidence.
The law provides that any evidence wrongfully obtained from the accused in violation of their
constitutional rights is inadmissible against them. The fact that all accused are foreign nationals
does not preclude application of the "exclusionary rule" because the constitutional guarantees
embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
By affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags, accused in
effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession of shabu is punished by
law. These signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession
which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights (Section 12 [1][3], Article III, 1987 Constitution).
(3) People v. Base, 329 SCRA 158 (2000)

BAR Q: Y, a detention prisoner was charged with Murder with Direct Assault when he shot
the Brgy. Captain X in the head. According to the prosecution, the statement of Y shows that
he admitted that he was with the assassins surveilling the residence of X for murder. Y claimed
he was tortured by the assassins to help in the murder plot. Y also claimed that he was not read
the written statement by the prosecution, that he neither knew nor saw the lawyer who signed
it, and that he was forced to sign a confession.
Is the Sworn Statement admissible in evidence when it was executed in violation of his right to
counsel of his own choice?
Answer:
Yes.
For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must be: 1.] voluntary; 2.] made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3.] express; and 4.] in writing.
When, as in this case, “[a]n extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the
Constitution, it constitutes evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no
person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted
by truth and conscience. The defense has the burden of proving that it was extracted by means
of force, duress, promise or reward.”
Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a]n extrajudicial confession made by
an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence
of corpus delicti.”
In this case the prosecution presented other evidence to prove the two elements of corpus
delicti, to wit: a.] a certain result has been proven, i.e. a man has died; and 2.] some person is
criminally responsible. Direct proof is not essential, for conspiracy may be inferred from the
acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent to the incident.
(4) People v. Ulit, 423 SCRA 374 (2004)
Bar Question: A was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the charged of rape by the
RTC. His counsel argued that the admission by A of raping B to the barangay chairman is not
admissible as he was not assisted by counsel and was forced to sign the said admission. Is it
admissible?
Suggested Answer: Yes. The statement made to barangay chairman is admissible in evidence
because the defendant was not under arrest or under custodial investigation when he gave his
statement. The Barangay Chairman is not a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying
Art. III of the Constitution.
(5) People v. Tomaquin, 435 SCRA 23 (2004)

Bar question: X was charged with murder. In the police station, X told SPO2 M that he was
willing to confess and asked for Atty. P (their barangay captain) to assist him. Atty. P then
called SPO2 M and told him that X was ready to give his extrajudicial confession. Is the
confession admissible in evidence?
Suggested ANSWER: No. The words “competent and independent counsel” in the
constitutional provision stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful
conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him
by a diligent and capable lawyer.
In the given case, considering that Atty. P’s role as a barangay captain, was a peacekeeping
officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing competent
legal assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, Atty. P
could not be considered as an independent counsel of X, when the latter executed his
extrajudicial confession.
Therefore, it is inadmissible.
(6) People v. Rapeza, 520 SCRA 596 (2007)
BAR Q: X was charged with murder. X was then held in the police station overnight before he
was taken to the house of Atty. R. It was alleged that an interpreter was provided because X
was not well versed in Tagalog being a native of Samar. As he is illiterate, he affixed only his
thumbmark on the statement above his printed name. The interpreter, and Atty. R, as the
assisting counsel, also signed the statement. Atty. R signed again as the notary public who
notarized the statement. The interpreter was not presented as a witness during trial. Is the
confession admissible in evidence?
An extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must conform to the following requisites: 1) the

confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant’s choice; 3) the confession
must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing.
In the case at bar, X was illiterate and not well-versed in Tagalog but there was no evidence that
there was in fact an interpreter because none was presented during trial. Further, although Atty.
R signed the confession as X’s counsel and he himself notarized the statement, there is no
evidence on how he assisted X starting from the time he was taken to the police station.
Thus, the confession is inadmissible.
II. Conduct as Evidence

A. Similar Acts/Unaccepted Offer
a) §§34-35, Rule 130
b) Art. 1256, Civil Code
Cases:
(1) U.S. v. Pineda, 37 Phil. 457 (1918)
Bar Question: P is a registered pharmacist who owns a drug store. S, having some sick horses,
presented a copy of a prescription obtained from Dr. X at P’s drug store. The prescription was
prepared by P and returned to S the medicine. Under the belief that he purchased a medicine, P
gave such to his horses which died shortly afterwards. It was found out by Chemists that the
medicines given by P are poisons. Thereafter, said chemists went to the drug store of P and
bought same medicine which when analyzed was also a poison. S then filed a suit against P.
During trial, P argued that the testimony of the chemists as to their purchase of medicine at his
drugstore which substance proved on analysis to be poison is not admissible under the doctrine
of res inter alois acta (the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is inadmissible). Is
the argument of P tenable?
Suggested Answer: No. There are instances where the doctrine of res inter alois acta does not
apply, to wit: (a) that the effort is not to convict the accused of a second offense; and (b) that
there is no attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue prejudicing the defendant’s
case. Here, the doctrine of res inter alois acta will not apply because the purpose of the
testimonies of the chemists is to ascertain P’s knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence is
intensified. Therefore, P’s argument is untenable.
(2) People v. Asinas, 53 Phil. 59 (1929)

Bar Question: A, was allegedly killed by his children, B, C, and D. Upon trial, the accomplice,
E, testified against the latter children. The trial court, in convicting the 3 accused, considered
the testimony of the accomplice E. May the accomplice’s testimony be admitted?
It is elementary law that a defendant in a criminal action cannot be convicted on the evidence of
the accomplice only, and that to sustain such a conviction, there must be other evidence
corroborating with the accomplice, which tends to show the guilt of the defendant.
In this case, the 3 accused cannot be convicted on the basis of the testimony of the accomplice
E.
(3) People v. Irang, 64 Phil. 285 (1937)

BARQ: One evening, seven individuals armed with guns and bolos, went to the house of Sps.
X and Y. X was killed, Y was struck by the butt of a gun to her face, and from her was stolen by
the assailants, money and jewelry. Y was able to identify accused (A), when he was brought to
her house for identification, which she identified him having pockmarks, and a scar on his left
eyelid. That same evening, the house of Z was also assaulted by malefactors. Z also noticed that
one of them had pockmarks, a scar on the left eyelid and was dressed in a maong-colored suit.
After A was arrested, he executed an affidavit stating the events of the robbery in the presence
of the constabulary. However, he later disputed the affidavit stating he merely affixed his
thumbmark upon said document for fear of the soldiers upon whom the affidavit was executed.
He further claimed that in the afternoon of the day of the commission of the crime, he was in
his rice field washing a fishing basket. Should A’s alibi be given credence?
Ans.: NO.
Jurisprudence provides, while evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a
prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to
identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at
the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a
circumstance connected with the crime.
In this case, defense of alibi is contradicted by the above-stated testimony of Z and by the
accused-appellant's own admission under oath. Y’s testimony corroborated by Z’s testimony
proved accused’s identity and guilt of the crime of robbery with homicide.

(4) Nicolas v. Enriquez, 97 Phil. 286 (1955)
Bar QUESTION: A and B were accused of concubinage by C, A’s wife. The court ruled out
testimony of three prosecution witnesses tending to show that a boy a son was begot and was
born in Cavite on September 17, 1949 by both of the defendants. The said testimony was
objected to as immaterial, but the objection was sustained on the ground that inquiry into the
paternity of a natural child is forbidden except in actions for forcible acknowledgment. Is the
evidence immaterial?
Suggested ANSWER: Yes, the evidence is immaterial because it appears from the order
containing the questioned ruling that the boy was born five years before complainant's marriage
to one of the defendants. This means that the previous sexual relations sought to be proved
were far removed in point of time from the illicit act now complained of, and having, moreover,
taken place when there was as yet no legal impediment to the same, they furnish no rational
basis for the inference that they would be continued after complainant's marriage to one of the
defendants had created such impediment and made continuance of sexual relations between the
defendants a crime.
(5) Boston Bank v. Manalo, 482 SCRA 108 (2006)
Bar Question: (Xie) Estate sold parcels of subdivision lots to Overseas Bank (OBM). Xie, as
agent of OBM continued the sale of the lots. Xie sold certain lots to Manalo Jr., however, the
manner of payment was not clearly agreed upon by Xie (vendor/agent) and Manalo Jr. (buyer)
despite the fact that the down payment and the purchase price was known. Xie demanded for
the payment of the remaining amount of the down payment but Manalo Jr. rejected the demand
for want of the prepared deed of conditional sale to be signed. OBM thereafter continued the
operation of the sale of the lots. The property was then acquired by Commercial Bank of
Manila (CBM). CBM demanded Manalo Jr. to stop any construction and improvement in the
questioned lot. CBM, which later on changed its name to Boston Bank filed an unlawful
detainer case against Manalo Jr. Was there a valid agreement between the parties for the manner
of payment of the disputed lot/property?
Suggested Answer: No. For a perfected contract of sale or contract to sell to exist in law, there
must be an agreement of the parties, not only on the price of the property sold, but also on the
manner the price is to be paid by the vendee.
There is no showing on the records that the schedule of payment was agreed upon by the
parties. Jurisprudence is that if a material element of a contemplated contract is left for future
negotiations, the same is too indefinite to be enforceable. It has to be noted that a conditional
sale was supposed to be executed by the seller in favor of the buyer but it was never perfected.
Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one
time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at
another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity,
plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.
Here, even if there is a business pattern or habit of payment between Xie and the other buyers,
such terms cannot be adopted since the respondents failed to allege and prove in the lower
court.

III. Hearsay Rule
A. Testimonial Knowledge (§§36-47, Rule 130)
Cases:
(1) Richmond v. Anchuelo 4 Phil. 596 (1905)

Bar Question:
Mr. B is a blind man who went to Mr. D, a doctor, to treat his eyes. Mr. D tried his best but still
without success. Mr. D is now claiming payment for the services rendered. He claimed that he
was to receive 200 pesos in any event, and if he effected a cure he was to receive 500 pesos
more. On the other hand, Mr. B argued that if a cure was effected, Mr. D was to receive 200
pesos, but if no cure was effected he was to receive nothing.
At the trial, Mr. B presented a witness, Jose Pastor, to prove his claim. The judge excluded this
evidence. Is the court correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER;
YES. According to the provisions of section 276 of the Code of Civil Procedure (old rule), the
statement made by the witness is hearsay and such is inadmissible. The witness did not offer to
testify to anything which the plaintiff had said, but offered to testify to what the defendant said
that the plaintiff had said. The witness did not know that the plaintiff had made these
statements; he only knew that the defendant said that the plaintiff had made them.
Therefore, the court is correct.
(2) Lea Mer Industries, Inc. v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., 471 SCRA 698 (2005)
Bar Q: XX entered into a contract with LL for the shipment of silica sand from Palawan to
Manila. During the voyage, the vessel sank, resulting in a loss of cargo. MM, as insurer, paid XX
the value of the lost cargo, subsequently demanding reimbursement from LL. LL refused to
pay, thus MM filed a complaint. LL claims that the cause of the loss of the vessel was due to a
fortuitous event, hence LL didn’t need to reimburse the amount. MM claims that the vessel was
not seaworthy when it sailed for Manila, hence the loss of cargo was due to LL’s fault. MM
relied on the report of J, the cargo surveyor, whose report showed that the barge was not
seaworthy. LL claims that J’s report is not admissible in evidence, since he did not testify during
the trial. The report was only presented by S, who testified that the report was used in preparing
the Final Adjustment Report conducted by their company. Thus, the report amounts to hearsay
and is not admissible. Is J’s report admissible as evidence?
That witnesses must be examined and presented during the trial, and that their testimonies must
be confined to personal knowledge is required by the rules on evidence, as stated under Section
36. An exception to this rule, however, is on “independently relevant statements”, wherein a
report made by a
person is admissible if it is intended to prove the tenor, not the truth, of the statements.
Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement given in the report, the fact that it has
been made is relevant. Here, the hearsay rule does not apply.
In this case, the survey report was admitted only as part of the testimonies of MM, since its
referral was in relation to the preparation of S’s adjustment report. Evidently, it was the
existence of the Survey Report that was testified to. Thus, the evidence is admissible.
(3) Estrada v. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108 (2001)

Bar Question:
In October 2000 allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other
forms of corruption were made against E before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Same
year, E was impeached by the Hor and impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate
during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and
were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President,
succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against E. As a result, the impeachment trial was
thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President P
resigned after casting his vote against E.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for E and joined the crowd at
EDSA Shrine. E called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this
election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that E
“constructively resigned his post”. At noon, A took her oath of office in the presence of the
crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. E and his family later left Malacañang Palace. E after his
fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his
term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming E to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office. Dis E resign as President?
Suggested Answer:
Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were
present when President E left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing
material relevant issues—President E is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President E could not be doubted as confirmed by his
leaving Malacañang Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and
that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as
President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the
same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit
of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before,
during and after January 20, 2001.
B. Specific Exceptions
1. Dying Declaration (§37, Rule 130)
Cases:
(1) People v. Camiling, 424 SCRA 698 (2004)
Bar Question: X,Y, Z robbed Masterline Grocery store, armed with firearms and hand
grenade and took and carried away cash and pieces of Chinese gold necklace worth, and after
which X,Y, Z on their way out to escape with their loot, shot and hit a responding Policeman,
PO3 XX mortally wounding him on his face, however in the emergency room of a District
Hospital, PO3 XX moaned I might die. I might die. in the presence of SPO1 YY and SPO4
ZZ. Hence, PO3 XX statements were taken down by SPO1 YY who assisted PO3 XX in
affixing his thumbmark with his own blood wherein he identified X shot him. Is the declaration
of SP03 XX admissible in evidence of the cause and the surrounding circumstances of such
death?
Suggested Answer: Yes. Under Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, the declaration of
a dying person with the consciousness of impending death may be received in any case wherein
his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and the surrounding circumstances
of such death. There are four requisites which must concur in order that a dying declaration
may be admissible: (1) it must concern the crime and surrounding circumstances of the
declarants death; (2) at the time it was made, the declarant was under the consciousness of an
impending death; (3) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (4) the declaration is offered
in any criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the declarant was the victim.
(1) The first requisite is present in the ante-mortem statements of deceased PO3 XX . (2) The
declarant, at the time he gave the dying declaration, was conscious of his impending death. PO3
Pastor knew at the time he was being questioned that his chances of recovery were nil. In fact,
he uttered the words, I might die. I might die. to signify his perception that death was
forthcoming. (3) PO3 Pastor, at the time he uttered the dying declaration, was competent as a
witness. (4) The dying declaration of PO3 Pastor was offered as evidence in a criminal case for
robbery with homicide in which the declarant was the victim. Indubitably, PO3 Pastors dying
declaration is complete in the sense that it was a full expression of all that he wanted to say with
regard to the circumstances of his death . An ante-mortem statement is evidence of the
highest order. It is doctrinal that, when a person is at the point of death, every motive of
falsehood is silenced.

(2) Pp. v. Salafranca, G.R. No. 173476, 22 February 2012
(3) People v. Sabio, 102 SCRA 218 (1981)

Bar Question: Papu was charged of the crime of robbery with homicide. Catalino, the victim,
died three days later but the circumstance of his death narrated by the victim himself was
recorded by the responding policeman. Defense argued that there is no evidence showing that
when the declaration was uttered the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending
death. Is there dying declaration?
Suggested Answer: Yes. That death did not ensue till three days after the declaration was
made will not alter its probative force since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires
immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death,
in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration admissible.
(4) People v. Laquinon, 153 SCRA 91 (1985)

Bar QUESTION: Samama, the barrio captain heard gunshot and went to the crime scene. He
saw a man who identified himself as Pablo. Pablo took an ante mortem statement that he was
shot by Laquinon. The Vice mayor also went to the scene and asked Pablo who shot him to
which the latter pointed Laquinon. Pablo died later that day. Laquinon denied the allegations.
He claimed that it was Cabardo who shot Pablo. Laquinon argued that the dying statement of
Pablo is inadmissible in evidence because it was not executed under a consciousness of an
impending death and that the deceased was not a competent witness. Is the contention tenable?
Suggested ANSWER: YES. The dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not
admissible as an antemortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he
would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremis,
"at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct," which is the sole basis for
admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule." It may be admitted,
however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately after the incident
and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the
accused.
(5) People v. De Joya, 203 SCRA 343 (1991)

Bar Question: In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, when A reached home from school, he
saw his grandmother, E, lying down prostrate and drenched with her own blood. He
immediately threw his bag and ran towards her. He then held her hands and asked her: "Apo,
Apo, what happened?" E held his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui". After saying these
words, she let go of A's hand and passed away.
DJ thereafter was charged before the RTC with the crime of robbery with homicide. At
arraignment, DJ pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision convicting DJ
of the crime charged relying heavily on the circumstances surrounding the death of the victim
as testified to by the witnesses and proven during the trial, also the most convincing is the dying
statement of the deceased. When Alvin was asked during his testimony who is this Paki, he
identified the accused. The accused during his testimony never denied that he is called Paki.
Is the dying statement of the deceased admissible?
It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be
complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted
the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a
full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact.
The doctrine of completeness has also been expressed in the following terms in Prof.
Wigmore's classic work: "The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar. The
statement as offered must not be merely a part of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be
complete as far it goes. But it is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death is related,
provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished or intended to include in it.
Thus, if an interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts short a statement which thus remains clearly less
than that which the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the
intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if the
dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told only a
portion of what he might have been able to tell."
The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded
little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other circumstance)
from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by the
statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore
entitled to the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying
declarations are received.
In this case, it is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was
incomplete. In other words, the deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a
complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial court simply assumed that by uttering
the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person who had thrust some sharp
instrument through and through her neck just below her ears. But E herself did not say so and we
cannot speculate what the rest of her communication might have been had death not
interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the
appellant as the doer of the bloody deed.
(6) Marturillas v. People, 487 SCRA 273 (2006)

BAR Q: On 04 November 1998, after BB had served his wife Cecilia and Artemio Pantinople
with lunch, Artemio returned to his store which was five (5) meters away from BB house. At
about 7:30 in the evening, BB was eating lunch in his house when he heard a gunshot. XX had
been shot on the chest. He shouted at BB “Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan.” BB saw a
man running away from the direction of XX’s store, but he wasn’t able to see his face. XX’s
wife, YY, came running from her house to her husband’s side upon seeing him sprawled on the
ground and bloodied. She shouted several times, “Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay ang akong
bana.”To his defense, he claimed that he was asleep in his home which was 250 meters away
from XX’s store.
During the trial of the case, YY positively identified ZZ as her husband’s assailant. This
positive identification is corroborated by BB’ testimony and expert witness Dr.CC , a medico-
legal officer for Davao City, that the gunshot wound in the body had been caused by a bullet
that is of the same size as that fired from an M-14 Rifle. However, the same expert witness
testified that ZZ’s hands do not contain gunpowder nitrates.
ISSUE:
1. Is the prosecution’s evidence credible?
2. Is it enough to convict Marturillas of homicide?
Suggested Answers
1. Yes.
As to Credibility of the Prosecution Evidence
Positive Identification
Judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that people in rural communities
generally know each other both by face and name, and can be expected to know each
other’s distinct and particular features and characteristics.
In the case at bar, undoubtedly, YY is familiar with ZZ, who is her neighbor, and a
long-time barangay captain of Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City when the
incident took place.
Inconsistency Between Affidavit and Testimony
The alleged inconsistency is inconsequential to the ascertainment of the presence of petitioner
at the crime scene. Ruled the CA:
"x x x. They referred only to that point wherein YY x x x ascertained the identity of ZZ as the
victim. They did not relate to EYY’s identification of [petitioner] as the person running away
from the crime scene immediately after she heard a gunshot."
Statements Uttered Contemporaneous with the Crime
As between the positive and categorical declarations of the prosecution witnesses and the mere
opinion of the medical doctor, the former must necessarily prevail.
In the case at bar, several hours had elapsed prior to the examination. Thus, Dr. CC could not
have determined XX’s physical condition a few seconds after the man was shot.
Dying Declaration
Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, provides:
"The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of impending death,
may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of
the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death."
To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding
the declarant’s death; 2) be made under the consciousness of an impending death; 3) be made
freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of improper influence; 4) be offered in a
criminal case, in which the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5) have been

made by a declarant competent to testify as a witness, had that person been called upon to
testify
The dying declaration of the victim was complete, as it was "a full expression of all that
he intended to say as conveying his meaning. It [was] complete and [was] not merely
fragmentary." Testified to by his wife and neighbor, his dying declaration was not only
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, but was also a weighty and
telling piece of evidence.
2. Declaration Again Interest (§38, Rule 130)

Cases:
(1) Parel v. Prudencio, 487 SCRA 405 (2006)
(2) Viacrucis v. Court of Appeals, 44 SCRA 176 (1972)
(3) Fuentes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 430 (1996)

BAR QUESTION: At four o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina (A)
together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, (B,C,D) was at a benefit
dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Petitioner (E) called Malaspina (A) and
placed his right arm on the shoulder of the latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a long hair but
now you have a short hair." Suddenly petitioner (E) stabbed Malaspina (A) in the abdomen
with a hunting knife. Malaspina (A) fell to the ground and his companions rushed to his side.
Petitioner fled. Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen he muttered
that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr.,(E) stabbed him.
Petitioner (E) claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie"
who knifed Malaspina; that when the victim was killed he was conversing with him; that he was
compelled to run away when he heard that somebody with a bolo and spear would "kill all
those from San Isidro" because "Jonie," the killer, was from that place; that since he was also
from San Isidro he sought refuge in his brother's house where he met "Jonie;" that "Jonie"
admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina (A) because after a boxing match before the
latter untied his gloves and punched him; that as there were many persons milling around the
house "Jonie" jumped out and escaped through the window; that he was arrested at eight
o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 while he was in a store in the barangay.
The Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, found petitioner (E) guilty of murder
qualified by treachery and imposed on him an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Julieto Malaspina (A)
the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay P8,300.00 as actual damages plus costs. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court; hence, this petition for review. Whether or not
the appellate court erred when it held that petitioner was positively and categorically identified

as the killer of Malaspina, in affirming the judgment of conviction and in holding petitioner
liable for damages to the heirs of the victim?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: This discrepancy is inconsequential. What is material is that

Malaspina was stabbed to death and that three (3) prosecution witnesses positively identified
petitioner as the knife wielder. It must be stressed that these witnesses had known petitioner for
quite some time and never had any personal misunderstanding nor altercation with the latter as
to create any suspicion that they were impelled by ill motives to falsely implicate him.
One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made
against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration made
by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact
asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest
and against third persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on
necessity and trustworthiness.
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a)
the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable
by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify
existed.
In the instant case, we find that the declaration particularly against penal interest attributed to
Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. We are not
unaware of People v. Toledo, 12 a 1928 case, where Justice Malcolm writing for the Court
endeavored to reexamine the declaration of third parties made contrary to their penal interest.
In that case, the protagonists Holgado and Morales engaged in a bolo duel. Morales was killed
almost instantly. Holgado who was seriously wounded gave a sworn statement (Exh. 1) before
the municipal president declaring that when he and Morales fought there was nobody else
present. One (1) month later Holgado died from his wounds. While the Court was agreed that
Toledo, who reportedly intervened in the fight and dealt the mortal blow, should be exonerated
on reasonable doubt, the members did not reach an accord on the admissibility of Exh. 1. One
group would totally disregard Exh. 1 since there was ample testimonial evidence to support an
acquittal. The second group considered Exh. 1 as part of the res gestae as it was made on the
same morning when the fight occurred. A third group, to which Justice Malcolm belonged,
opined that the court below erred in not admitting Exh. 1 as the statement of a fact against
penal interest.
3. Pedigree (§39, Rule 130)
Cases:
(1) Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742 (1967)
BAR Question: The Superintendent advised X of the latter’s separation from the service as a
public school principal on the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65
as shown in the pre-war records which was destroyed by fire.
X filed a suit protesting his forced retirement contending that he has not yet reached 65, that his
brother, now deceased, in a prior Cadastral Case, declared X’s age in a verified pleading, and
that his family, relatives and neighbors have signified his true birth date wherein it all indicated
that he has not yet reached the age of 65 at the time he was forced to retire.
If you were the judge, will you receive the declaration of X’s brother in a prior case as evidence?
Answer:
Yes.
Section 39, Rule 130 provides that the act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Here, the declaration of X’s brother contained in a verified pleading in a cadastral case way back
in 1924, about X’s age, cannot be ignored. It is a clear indication that he has not yet reached the
compulsory retirement age at the time he was separated from work. Made ante litem motam by a
deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the
intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
(2) Tison v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582 (1997)
4. Family Tradition (§40, Rule 130)
Cases:
(1) People v. Alegado, 201 SCRA 37 (1991)
Bar Question: X (minor) was playing at the Freedom when Y, market watchman, took her to
the second floor of the public market. Y ordered X to lie down, and forced her to take off her
pedal pushers and, but failed to penetrate fully. X bled a little but never told anybody. This
incident happened again, but this time, X was seen by the patrolwoman and immediately
reported to the police. Y was convicted of statutory rape. Y contends that the offended party's
actual age at the time of the alleged incidents of rape was not established with certainty. Is the
contention of Y correct?
Suggested Answer: NO! The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party
herself and her maternal grandfather, as to the fact that the victim was born on September 5,
1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall
under the exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence.
In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 to prove the victim's age is beyond
question. The said provision contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely: (1) that there
is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the members of a family; (2) that there
putation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed previous to thec
ontroversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding the
pedigree of the person must be a member of the family of said person.
(2) Ferrer v. De Ynchausti, 38 Phil. 905 (1918)
BAR Q: Heirs of X claimed that X, their mother, was born to Y and Z. After Z died, Y
contracted a second marriage. The heirs from the second marriage presented a day-book kept
by their half-brother from the first marriage of Y, which contained an entry that on such date, a
three-year old girl name X, of unknown parents was merely delivered to Y.
This was objected by the heirs of X declaring that their mother, had the right to succeed to the
inheritance left by Y. They alleged that it has not been proven that the entries in said book were
made at the same time that those events occurred; that the heir-witness who identified it did not
see his half-brother in the act of making the said entries, and that even if it were so, still the
writing contained in the book, being a mere memorandum of an interested party, cannot be
admitted at the trial.
Is the day-book admissible in evidence?
Answer:
YES.
Based on provisions of section 298, No. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that
evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and inscriptions in public places as evidence of
common reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other family books or charts; engravings on
rings, family portraits and the like, as evidence of pedigree.
The law does not require that the entries in the said booklet be made at the same time as the
occurrence of those events; hence, the written memorandum in the same is not subject to the
defect attributed to it. The heir-witness from the second marriage declared affirmatively that the
memorandum under consideration has been written in the handwriting of his half-brother,
whose handwriting he was familiar with, and the testimony of this witness contains some
reference to a member of the family, now dead, and concerning the family genealogy of the
same.
5. Common Reputation (§41, Rule130)
Case:
(1) City of Manila v. Del Rosario, 5 Phil. 227 (1905)

Bar Question: The City of Manila filed an action to recover possession of a lot. One of the
evidence presented was the oral testimony of A, who testified that that the land in question was
formerly included in the Gran Divisoria, and that all the land included in it belonged to the city.
Is his testimony admissible?

Suggested Answer: No. A's testimony was merely hearsay. It consisted of what he had learned
from some of the oldest residents in that section of the city. It was introduced by the City of
Manila apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was generally considered the owner
of the land, drawing from this fact the presumption of actual ownership. Such testimony,
however, does not constitute the “common reputation” referred to. Common reputation is
equivalent to universal reputation.
6. Res Gestae (§42, Rule 130)
Cases:
(1) People v. Latayada, 423 SCRA 237 (2004)
BAR QUESTION: On October 29, 1195, A arrived at the house of B and the former told the
latter that he was stabbed by Z. B brought A to the hospital, subsequently A told B that Z asked
to brought to Claveria, Misamis Oriental. On their way, Z told A to stop because he wanted to
answer the call of nature. After Z relieved himself, instead of boarding at the back of the
motorcycle, he stabbed A and escaped on board the motorcycle.
When a passenger jeepney passed by, A was loaded and brought to Claveria Hospital. When
they passed by a police station, the conduct of the jeepney reported the stabbing incident. At
the Claeveria Hospital, A’s wound was treated and sutured. However, due to inadequate
medical facilities the Doctor thereat advised the wife of A to bring him to Cagayan De Oro
Hospital. On the same day, A died.
Prior to the death of A, the wife of A was able to converse with him. Again, A pointed to Z as
his assailant and further narrated the circumstances surrounding his stabbing. Moreover, SPO1
Busalla arrived at the hospital prior to the death of A and immediately preceded to take the
antemortem statement. A could not write because of his injuries. Hence, he placed his thumb
mark using his own blood in lieu of his signature on the said statement that Z was the one who
stabbed him.
RTC found that Z is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping with homicide. Held as part
of the res gestae were A’s statement uttered before his death. Is the statement uttered by A is
admissible in evidence
Suggested Answer:
Yes
The utterance separately made by the victim to each of the witnesses were correctly appreciated
as part of res gestae, since they had been immediately after a startling occurrence and had
complied the following requirements: (1) The statement were spontaneous; (2) They were made
immediately before, during and after the startling occurrence; and (3) They are related to the
circumstance thereof.
Here, the statement uttered by A to his wife, B and SPO1 Bussala that Z was the one who
stabbed him was appreciated as part of res gestae rule.
Hence, the statement uttered by A is admissible in evidence.

(2) People v. Lungayan, 162 SCRA 100 (1988)
Bar Question: The crime of rape allegedly transpired when X invited Y at 10:00 P.M. to step
out of her house allegedly to join him to observe the persons drinking wine in the market stall
identified as Linda's canteen in violation of the barangay ordinance prohibiting the same after
10:00 o'clock in the evening. Y went home at about 12:00 o'clock that evening with her clothes
all muddy. She had some bruises on her body and back also. When Y reached home she was
confronted by her daughter as to what happened. Y told her that she was abused by X but she
was not prepared to reveal everything and promised to tell all the details to her daughter the
following day.
The trial court considered the revelation of the complainant to her daughter of what happened
to her when she returned home as part of the res gestae, thus the conviction.
If the revelation to her daughter of what happened when she returned home part of the res
gestae, therefore admissible?
Suggested Answer: NO. In order to be categorized as part of the res gestae, the statement
must not only be spontaneous. It must also be made at a time when there was no opportunity
for the witness to concoct or develop her own story.
In this case, as the Court had observed, the complainant did not immediately go home after the
sexual encounter. She took a walk. She spent sometime thinking of what to do. Her clothes
were muddy. She had some bruises on her body and back because she was lying down on the
ground during the sexual intercourse and their passionate interlude. She had enough time to
make a decision on what will be the nature of her story. Her revelation cannot thus be
categorized as part of the res gestae.
Petition granted. Judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside. Accused acquitted.
(3) DBP Pool of Accredited Companies v. Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. 480 SCRA 314 (2006)
Bar Question: RMN, a radio station, was razed by fire. It sought recovery against DBP under
insurance policies. However, the claims were denied on the ground that the cause of loss was an
excepted risk excluded in the policy. DBP maintained that the evidence showed that the fire
was caused by members of CPP/NPA; and consequently denied the claims. RMN then filed a
case against DBP. During trial, DBP presented as evidence the testimonies of bystanders who
allegedly were present when the fire started; and that these can be admitted as part of res gestae.
Is the argument of DBP tenable?
Suggested Answer: No. The rule in res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, applies
when the declarant himself did not testify and provided that the testimony of the witness who
heard the declarant complies with the following requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae,
be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to
contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances. In the case at bar, while the statements of
the bystanders were made during a startling occurrence, however these utterances were made
spontaneously by the bystanders and before they had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood.
Therefore, these statements are not admissible as evidence.
7. Entries in the Course of Business (§43, Rule 130)

Cases:
(1) Sadagnot v. Reinier Pacific International Shipping, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 152636, 8 August 2007
Bar Question: A was hired as a third officer in a vessel owned by Company B. On voyage, the
ship captain ordered A to do something, but A disobeyed on the ground that it was not part of
his work as a third officer. Later on, A was repatriated back to PH. As a result, he filed a case
for illegal dismissal. One of the basis in the decision of the Labor Arbiter was the logbook entry
required by law to be filled up by the captain. On such logbook, the disobedience of A was
provided. May the logbook entry be admissible as evidence?
Suggested answer: Yes.
The ships logbook is the official record of a ships voyage which its captain is obligated by law
to keep. The entries made in the ships logbook by a person performing a duty required by law
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the logbook.
In this case, the logbook is admissible as evidence.
(2) Canque v. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 579 (1999)

BAR Q: X, a contractor, entered into a contract with Y Corp. in connection with the
construction of several government projects. When Y billed X for the materials supplied and
the services rendered, X refused to pay claiming that Y failed to submit the delivery receipts and
acceptance thereof by the government. On trial, Y presented its Book of Collectible Accounts
and the testimony of its bookkeeper, A. The facts stated in the bill, which is the delivery of the
materials, was supervised by the company engineer of Y. X contents that the delivery receipts,
as stipulated in the contract, is a condition precedent for her payment of the amount claimed by
Y, and as such the Book of Collectible Accounts cannot take the place of the delivery receipts,
that such entries are hearsay, thus inadmissible in evidence. Y argues that the entries in question
constitute entries in the course of business sufficient to prove deliveries. Decide whether the
entries in the Book of Collectible Accounts constitute competent evidence.
Suggested Answer: NO.

The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the
following conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to
testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty,
whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

In the case at hand, the first and third requisite is lacking. A, the bookkeeper was able to testify
in court, hence there was no necessity nor justification for the presentation of the entries as the
person who made them was available to testify in court. Moreover, A, had no personal
knowledge of the facts, since the deliveries of the materials were supervised by the company
engineer, who was therefore, the person who had personal knowledge of the facts stated in the
entries.
(3) Land Bank v. Oñate, G.R. No. 192371, 15 January 2014

Bar QUESTION: In 1980, E Corporation obtained loans amounting to about P26 million
from Bank B. E defaulted in its payment but in 1981, E submitted a Payment Plan with the
hope of restructuring its loan. The plan was rejected and Land Bank sued E. It impleaded A, the
majority stockholder of E who is serving as the Chairman and treasurer of ECO. The trial court
ruled in favor of Bank B but A was absolved from liabilities because Bank B failed to prove that
the "miscredited" funds came from the proceeds of the pre-terminated loans of its corporate
borrowers. Should A be personally held liable based on the entries of the passbook alone?
Suggested ANSWER: No, because Bank B neither identified the persons who made the
entries in the passbooks nor established that they are already dead or unable to testify as
required by Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. While the deposit entries in the bank’s
passbook enjoy a certain degree of presumption of regularity, the same do not indicate or
explain the source of the funds being deposited or withdrawn from an individual account."
They are mere prima facie proof of what are stated therein – the dates of the transactions, the
amounts deposited or withdrawn, and the outstanding balances. They do not establish that the
total amount of ₱4,086,888.89 deposited in A’s Trust Account No. 01-125 in November 1980
came from the proceeds of the pre-terminated loans of Bank B’s corporate borrowers.
8. Official Records
a) §44, Rule 130
b) §§23-25, Rule 132
(1) Unites States v. Que Ping, 40 Phil. 17 (1919)

Bar question: Que was convicted of Homicide with finality. For the judgment to be read in
open court, the sureties were required to present the accused before the court, but the sureties
failed to follow the order of the court, thus, the court ordered for the forfeiture of the bail
money of the sureties. The sureties appealed the forfeiture of the bail money, presented a
certification issued by the municipal secretary, stating that Que had died of gastritis but the
court held that the sureties failed to satisfactorily prove the death of the accused. Did the court
err in not admitting the proof of death presented by the sureties?
Suggested Answer:
No. These two exhibits being in the nature of entries in public records, made in the
performance of their duty by public officers of the Philippine Islands, are prima facie

evidence of the facts therein stated. Such documents, however, are not conclusive evidence.
Their probative value may either be substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence.
In this case, the municipal secretary who certified the death of Que did not personally saw the
corpse or body of the deceased. In addition the porter of the cemetery, by direct opposition,
swore that no burial took place on the date of the alleged burial of the accused. The municipal
doctor who diagnosed the accused of gastritis 4 months before his death had not seen the body
of the deceased. Thus, the prima facie evidence presented was hereby nullified by competent
evidence.
(2) People v. San Gabriel, 253 SCRA 84 (1996)

Bar Question: A fistfight fistfight ensued between Jaime Tonog, Ricardo San Gabriel and
Ramon Doe. The fight was eventually broken up when onlookers pacified the protagonists.
This time, Ramon and Ricardo brought bladed weapons and eventually killed Tonog. Then,
Ricardo San Gabriel was charged with murder. Several versions of how the crime were offered
both the accused and the witnesses. According to the accused, it was a certain Mando who
killed Tonog and not him. The lower court convicted the accused of the crime. It ruled that his
failure to present any witness pointing to Mando as the perpetrator of the crime and the fact
that Mando was never alleged during trial makes his defense insufficient. His mere reliance of
the Advance Information Sheet prepared by the police officer after interviewing a witness is
erroneous. This information sheet did not mention him at all and named only Ramon Doe as
the principal suspect. According to the court, this unfortunately, cannot defeat the positive and
candid testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Decide the case.
Suggested Answer: The trial court is correct.
It is an established rule that entries in official records, as in the case of a police blotter, are
only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. They are not conclusive. But to be
admissible in evidence three (3) requisites must concur: (a) The entry was made by a police
officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the public
officer in the performance of his duties or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and, (c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge
of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
In application, the Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an exception to the hearsay
rule, hence, inadmissible. The police officer who prepared the document had no sufficient and
personal knowledge of the stabbing incident. Any information possessed by him was acquired
from the witnesses.
(3) Escobar v. Luna, 519 SCRA 1 (2007)
Bar Q: E bought two parcels of land in Tagaytay City and were issued TCT nos. TCT Nos. (T-
21294) T-13361 and (T-21295) T-13362. Eleven years later, L filed a complaint with the RTC
seeking to nullify the TCTs issued to E, claiming that he had been in actual, public, adverse,
continuous, and notorious physical possession of the parcel of land. He claims that, per
certification of Atty. V, the Acting Register of Deeds, OCT no. 5483, which the TCTs of E
were derived from, did not exist. /The trial court held that the titles issued to the Escobars had
acquired incontrovertibility and indefeasibility by mandate of Act No. 496. L filed an appeal
with the CA, who reversed the dismissal. The SC remanded the case to the trial court,/ which
held that L failed to prove their case for cancellation of TCT Nos. (T-21294) T-13361 and (T-
21295) T-13362 since the documentary evidence they submitted, not being supported by
testimonial evidence, were hearsay. May the certification of the Acting Register of Deeds be
admitted as evidence without their testimony?
Suggested Answer: Yes. An exception to the hearsay rule is that those issued by government
offices, certified by authorized personnel who were clothed with authority and duty to issue
such certification, may be admitted as evidence. Even without the testimony of such person, the
evidence is sufficient and admissible as evidence, as per Section 28, Rule 132.
In this case, Atty V was authorized to issue a certification as to the nonexistence of OCT no.
5483. Being authorized and as a government official, the certification she issued is sufficient
evidence to prove that the title of E are spurious.
9. Commercial Lists (§45, Rule 130)
Case:
(1) PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 (1998)
BAR Question: This is a civil case for damages arising from a sea collision incident when
plaintiff's tanker hit respondent's fishing boat, causing the boat to sink.
The lower court and CA ruled in favor of respondent on the basis of documentary exhibits
presented, mainly the price quotations. These price quotations were issued personally to Del
Rosario who requested for them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost at the
collision of the two vessels. However, these were not published in any list, register, periodical or
other compilation nor containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the
work of the occupation. Are price quotations considered commercial list, thus can be admissible
in evidence?
Price quotations are not within the purview of commercial lists as these are not standard
handbooks or periodicals, containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the
work of the occupation. These are simply letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario. The
price quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should
have been proffered along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not
have testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings even though he was the seasoned
owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who issued the price quotations.
A document is a commercial list if:
(1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation;
(2) such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published
compilation; (3) said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that
occupation, and

(4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
10. Learned Treatises (§46, Rule 130)
Case:
(1) Estrada v. Noble, 49 O.G. 139 (1952)
Bar Question: X sold to his son Y a lot with a right to repurchase. The same lot was conveyed
by absolute sale to E. In computing the amount to be paid by E to Y in redeeming the property,
the RTC used the Ballantine Scale of Values. Y objected to its use. On appeal the CA ruled that
it is an official document whose publication constituted a leading event of general interest and
whose provisions are widely known and played an important part in contemporary political
history of the country, of which the courts of justice could take judicial cognizance of. Is the
CA correct?
Suggested Answer: Yes. Learned treatise are admissible in evidence if (a) the court takes
judicial notice thereof, or (b) the same are testified to by a witness expert in the subject.
The Ballantine Scale of Values, w/c was embodied in a bill the President sent to Congress for
enactment in 1945, has been repeatedly applied by Philippine courts in numerous cases. It is,
therefore, an official document whose publication constituted a leading event of general interest
and whose provisions are widely known and have played an important part in the contemporary
political history of the country, of which courts could take judicial cognizance.
In this case the CA took judicial notice of the Ballantine Scale of Values.
11. Prior Testimony
a) §47, Rule 130
b) §4, Rule 23
Cases:
(1) Manliclic, et al. v. Calaunan, 512 SCRA 642 (2007)
BAR Q: At around 6:00 to 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent C, together
with M, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. Philippine
Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. North Luzon Expressway
Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided.
The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter
to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall... on a ditch with water resulting to further
extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging
petitioner X with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries
Subsequently... respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners X and PRBLI before
the RTC of Dagupan City The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following: The parties agreed on
the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as the venue and the identities of the vehicles
involved; The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed; The date and place of
the vehicular collision; The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff C and the existence of the
medical certificate; That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being ahead
of the bus; That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although there was
a ditch on the right side where the jeep fell into. counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts
of stenographic notes of the testimonies of respondent C, M and F in the criminal case be received
in evidence in the civil case in... as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil
case. Whether the right to object can be waived.
Ruling: Yes. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged
inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived,
since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of
respondent C, M and F in the criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial
court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of C... and M were admitted by both petitioners. It
cannot argue that the TSNs of the... testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the
criminal case should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of
the witness for the accused be admitted in its favor.
It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial... of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to
object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs did not comply with Section
47.
(2) Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375, 13 December 2011

Bar Question: The Supreme Court, voting 7-7, dismissed for lack of merit the government’s
petition that sought to overturn a Sandiganbayan resolution denying the admission of the
deposition of Maurice V. Bane as part of its evidence in its ill-gotten wealth case (Civil Case No.
0009) against former President Ferdinand Marcos and his wife Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and
several others in connection with the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and
Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc. Is Bane`s testimony at a former
proceeding admissible in evidence?
SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a
witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against
the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
A plain reading of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court readily rejects the petitioner`s position that the
Bane deposition can be admitted into evidence without observing the requirements of Section
47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4,
Rule 23 of the Rules of Court does not only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to
(d); it also requires, as a condition for admissibility, compliance with the rules on evidence.
Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court makes an implied reference to Section 47,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before the deposition may be used in evidence. By reading Rule
23 in isolation, the petitioner failed to recognize that the principle conceding admissibility to a
deposition under Rule 23 should be consistent with the rules on evidence under Section 47,
Rule 130.
In determining the admissibility of the Bane deposition, therefore, reliance cannot be given on
one provision to the exclusion of the other; both provisions must be considered. This is
particularly true in this case where the evidence in the prior proceeding does not simply refer to
a witness testimony in open court but to a deposition taken under another and farther
jurisdiction.
IV. Opinion Rule
1. §§48-50, Rule 130
2. §22, Rule 132
3. Rule on DNA Evidence
Cases:
(1) People v. Duranan, 349 SCRA 180 (2001)
Bar QUESTION: N, 25 years old, was considered to be retarded. Duranan rented in the same
apartment with N. N claimed that Duranan raped her twice and molest her. Virginia, N’s
mother saw her daughter leave the bathroom, quickly followed by accused-appellant. N told her
mother about the previous incidents. Duranan denied the allegations and claimed that the crime
could not have been committed in a room where 5 other people were sleeping. RTC ruled in
favor of the prosecution. Duranan claimed that he cannot be convicted of rape since the
victim's mental age was not proven. Is the contention valid?
Suggested ANSWER: NO. Rule 130, Section 50 of the Rules of Evidence, provides that the
opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be received in evidence regarding: (a)
the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge; (b) a handwriting with which
he has sufficient familiarity; and (c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted. What complainant's mother meant that N was “quiet intelligent” was although she
thought like a child, nevertheless could tell others what happened to her. SC also held that the
medico-legal report categorically states that the purpose of the medical examination is limited to
determining whether the complainant had been sexually abused. 33 In other words, the purpose
of the examination was to determine her physical, not her mental, state. In this case, although
complainant is a retardate, she was nevertheless able to tell the court what accused-appellant
had done to her and to answer the questions of both the prosecutor and the defense counsel.
(2) Ilao-Quianay v. Mapile, 474 SCRA 246 (2005)

Bar Question: Subject of the case was a parcel of land in Sta. Cruz, Manila owned by the
deceased, I. In a judicial settlement of I’s estate, the heirs found an adverse claim annotated at
the back claimed by J. Respondent Atty. M filed a motion to exclude the said property from
the inventory claiming that it did not form part of I’s estate, the land having been disposed of
during the latter’s lifetime in favor of J.
Acting upon Atty. M’s motion the heirs of I filed a case for quieting of title and damages
before the RTC of Manila. Atty. M then filed a case for Specific Performance and Declaration
of Nullity of Contract, averring that I sold the property to J through a Deed of Sale;
subsequently J sold the property to him.
The RTC rendered decision upholding the validity of the notarized Deed of Sale primarily due
to the conflicting testimonies of the two handwriting experts presented by both parties.
Petitioners were ordered to surrender the owner’s duplicate copy of the title. The CA affirmed
the trial court’s decision.
Does the testimony of an expert witness have more evidentiary weight over the discretion of
the court with due regard on evidentiary matters presented?
Courts are not bound by expert testimonies. They may place whatever weight they choose upon
such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of
expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the
ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process
of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side
for whom he testifies, and any other matters which serve to illuminate his statements. The
opinion of an expert should be considered by the court in view of all the facts and
circumstances of the case. The problem of the evaluation of expert testimony is left to the
discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse
of that discretion.
The validity of the deed of sale should, therefore, be recognized, the only opposition thereto
being the alleged forgery of I's signature which was not satisfactorily demonstrated. There is no
doubt that the deed of sale was duly acknowledged before a notary public. As a notarized
document, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
In this connection, we have to say that petitioners' objection to the admission in evidence of the
testimony of the notary public who supposedly notarized the deed of sale taken in another case
in which petitioners were not parties is persuasive. Such testimony does not qualify as an
exception to the hearsay rule under Sec. 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
(3) People v. Umanito, G.R. No. 172607, 26 October 2007

Bar Question: Around 9PM, AAA was accosted by a young male. He waited for her by the
creek, and he pointed as knife at her abdomen. He dragged her into the Home Economics
Building of Daramuangan Elementary School. He undressed her while still holding the knife.
He set her down on a bench, put down the knife, and had sex with her. He dressed up and
threatened to kill her if she reported the incident. Six months later, AAA ’ s mother noticed the
prominence on her stomach, and it was then that she divulged to her mother the alleged rape.
Her mother brought her to the police station. (X’ s alibi: He was at home all day. Re: AAA, he
admitted that he courted her but she spurned him. He conjectured that she had a crush on him
since she frequently visited him.) RTC found X guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape. CA affirmed the judgement. X seeks acquittal on reasonable doubt, with the belated filing
of the case and AAA ’ s questionable credibility as grounds. He also said that AAA filed the
complaint only upon her mother ’s insistence; this supports his claim that AAA had sex with
another (a married man). Also, he claimed that there were several inconsistencies in her
assertions. WON X is the father (through DNA testing) is material to the fair and correct
adjudication of his appeal.
Suggested Answer:
Under Sec. 4 of AM No. 06-11-5-SC, the courts are authorized, after due hearing and
notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. DNA print / identification technology is now
recognized as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to absolve one
erroneously accused, where biological evidence is available.
In the case at bar, the fact that AAA bore a child because of the purported rape may provide
the definitive key to X ’ s absolution, since it can now be determined with reasonable certainty
WON he is the father of her child. AAA and her child are directed to submit themselves to
DNA testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence (AM No. 06-11-5-SC) which
took effect on 15 Oct 2007 (a few days before promulgation of this case).
(4) People v. Yatar, 428 SCRA 505 (2004)
Bar Q: Y was accused of committing rape with homicide against victim K. DNA testing of the
sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was of identical semen. Yatar questions the
giving of much weight to the evidence presented by the prosecution notwithstanding their
doubtfulness. Whether or not DNA Evidence is considered relevant in the case.
In the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on
scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under
Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial,
including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel
procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence. Furthermore, in assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: 1) how the samples were
collected, 2) how they were handled, 3) the possibility of contamination of the samples, 4) the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, 5) whether the proper standards and procedures
were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the
tests.
Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing
and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable
since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular
biology.
(5) People v. Webb, G.R. No. 176389, 14 December 2010
V. Character as Evidence
1. §51, Rule 130
2. §14, Rule 132
3. §6, R.A. 8505
(1) People v. Babiera, 52 Phil. 97 (1928)

BAR QUESTION: Justo Babiera (A) filed a complaint against Basilio Copreros (B) in the
justice of the peace court of Oton for the recovery of the possession of said two parcels of land.
The complaint having been dismissed on April 19, 1927 on the ground that it did not allege
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. On several occasions, Justo Babiera (A)
confronted Fermin Bruces (C), the person plowing the lands for Haro (D), threathening Bruces
(C) and Haro (D). On August 21, 1927, Severino Haro (D), as usual, went to visit his land in the
barrio of Bita. On arriving there Fermin Bruces (C), his copartner on shares, told him that the
day before he had found Clemente Babiera's (E) cow grazing on that land. It happened at that
moment Clemente Babiera (E) and Dominga Bores (F) were passing by. Severino Haro (D)
then informed Clemente Babiera (E) of what his cow had done on the former's land and told
him to take better care of his cow in future and not to let it run loose.
In the evening, Haro (D) and his companions were making their way back to town using a
torch, as it was already dark. Haro (D) was walking ahead, Suddenly, Babiera (E) sprang from
the cogon grass and struck Haro (D) with a bolo. On turning his head to see who had attacked
him Severino Haro (D) received another bolo blow in the forehead near the right eyebrow. In
trying to defend himself with his hand he was wounded between the index finger and the
thumb. He then tried to grasp his assailant but did not succeed and he fell to the ground. Then
Justo Babiera (A) appeared and placing himself upon Severino Haro's (D) stomach, held the
latter's hands. Later, Dominga Bores (E) appeared on the scene and held both knees of the
wounded man.
On August 22, 1927, Severino Haro (D) made a sworn statement before the deputy fiscal,
Edmundo S. Piccio (Exhibit I), relating the occurrence and mentioning the persons who were
present. This sworn statement was ratified by him before the same deputy fiscal on the 27th of
the said month and year when he had given up all hope of recovery. Whether there is sufficient
evidence to hold the appellants guilty?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: YES. It has been contended by the defense that the defendant-
appellant, Clemente Babiera (E), only acted in defense of his life and property, having been
obliged to resort to arms on seeing his life endangered, contending that the provocation
consisted in that after Severino Haro (D) had agreed to an indemnity of P2 for the damage
caused, the latter wanted to take Clemente Babiera's (E) cow to the town, and that the attack
consisted in that Margarito Mediavilla gave him a bolo blow on the little finger of the right
hand, and that Severino Haro (D) threatened him with his revolver and fired several shots at
him. Examined in the light of the ordinary conduct of men, Severino Haro's (D) alleged
attitude, in having tried to take Clemente Babiera's (E) cow after having agreed to accept P2 for
the damages, and having ordered that the animal be returned to its owner, is highly illogical, and
not a scintilla of evidence has been presented to explain this change of determination, as
unexpected as it is unreasonable. With respect to the allegation that Margarito Mediavilla and
Severino Haro (D) began the attack, inasmuch as it has not been proved that they were the
instigators, it cannot be conceived that they committed said unlawful aggression, for he who has
no reason to provoke, has no reason to attack unlawfully. The defense also attempted to prove
that Severino Haro was of a quarrelsome disposition, provoking, irascible, and fond of starting
quarrels in the municipality of Oton, but the trial judge would not permit it. While it is true that
when the defense of the accused is that he acted in self-defense, he may prove the deceased to
have been of a quarrelsome, provoking and irascible disposition, the proof must be of his
general reputation in the community and not of isolated and specific acts (Underhill Criminal
Evidence, par. 325, p.570), such as the accused Clemente Babiera tried to prove, and hence the
lower court did not err in not admitting such proof. But even if it had been proved by
competent evidence that the deceased was of such a disposition, nevertheless, it would not have
been sufficient to overthrow the conclusive proof that it was the said accused who
treacherously attacked the deceased.
(2) People v. Soliman, 101 Phil. 767 (1957)

BAR Question: A and B were charged with the crime of murder of C.
In their reply, A and B contended that C had a violent, quarrelsome or provocative character,
that prior to the incident, C boxed A for not lending the latter’s pushcart and as a result he
suffered physical injuries, that C beat up A with an iron pipe, that C boxed A, forced him to
give money and that when A and C were fighting, B came and separated them.
May the bad character of the C be considered as proof for a necessity of a prompt defensive
action?
Suggested Answer:
No.
Jurisprudence provides that while good or bad character may be availed of as an aid to
determine the probability or improbability of the commission of an offense, such is not
necessary in crime of murder where the killing is committed through treachery premeditation.
The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show "that it has

produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable
conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary."
Here, A and B were charged with the crime of murder, hence the rule does not apply in this
case.
(3) People v. Cheng 279 SCRA 129 (1997)
(4) Civil Service Commission v. Belagan, 440 SCRA 578 (2004)
Bar Question: X, directress of Mother and Child Learning Center, (upon applying for a
permit to operate a pre-school and during the inspection of the pre-school, Dr. Z placed his
arms around her shoulders and kissed her cheeks.) and Y, Public School Teacher, (on four
separate occasions, respondent touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins,
embraced her from behind and pulled her close to him, his organ pressing the lower part of her
back), filed 2 separate cases for sexual indignities and harassment and various
malfeasances against Dr. Z, Superintendent of DECS. Dr. Z attacked the X’s credibility
to become a witness having 22 criminal cases and 23 Brgy complaints in 70’s and 80’s.
Is X credible witness?
Suggested Answer: Yes. Evidence of one’s character or reputation must be confined to a time
not too remote from the time in question. In other words, what is to be determined is the
character or reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a
period remote from the commencement of the suit. Character evidence must be limited to the
traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.
PART THREE
I. Burden of Proof and Presumptions Rule 131
A. Burden of Proof (§1, Rule 131)
Cases:
(1) People v. Pajenado, 31 SCRA 812 (1970)

BAR Q: Accused were found guilty of the crime of murder qualified by the aggravating
circumstance of having been committed by a band.
The accused Z admitted responsibility for the injuries sustained by the deceased and denied that
his other co-accused had any hand in beating up the deceased. In justification, he claims that he
acted in the lawful performance of a duty as a barrio policeman in removing the bolo from the
deceased who was angry and drunk.
The accused Y admitted that he focused his flashlight on the deceased when Z was beating the
victim, but denied having participated in the said beating of the deceased. All the other accused
did not testify in court.
Did the accused successfully proven their innocence?
Answer:
No.
Where the accused admitted that he was the author of death of the deceased, it is incumbent
upon him, in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by
him on the strength of his own evidence without relying on the weakness of that of the
prosecution, for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved
after the accused himself had admitted the killing.
Conspiracy may be inferred from the accused's conduct. Thus, where five accused emerged
between the houses along which the deceased was passing by, all of them armed with pieces of
wood, one of them with a flashlight which he focused on the eyes of deceased, while the others
were all beating the deceased, and all of them fled after deceased fell down due to the blows
inflicted upon him, it is evident that they had community of design.
(2) People v. Macalaba, 395 SCRA 461 (2003)

Bar Question: A was convicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts despite the
insuficiency of evidence as the prosecution did not present any certification from the
concerned government agency, to the effect that he was not authorized to possess shabu. Is the
conviction valid?
Suggested Answer: Yes. As a general rule if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative

allegation, or that a negative averment is an essential element of a crime, the prosecution has
the burden of proving the charge. But as an exception where the negative of an issue does not
permit of direct proof, or where the facts are more immediately within the knowledge of the
accused, the onus probandi rests upon him.
(3) People v. Florendo, 413 SCRA 132 (2003)

Bar Question: W and H were having an argument. After W was heard to have told H to go to
sleep, the latter all of a sudden and without any provocation hacked W with a bolo in the head
and other parts of her body.
H ran to the house of the barangay captain after hacking his wife. He was found there holding a
bloodied bolo, his hands and feet dripping with blood. The barangay captain advised appellant
to yield his bolo but the latter did not respond. This prompted the barangay captain to grab his
hand and take away his bolo.
At the pre-trial conference, H admitted killing his wife but put up the defense of insanity to
claim exemption from criminal liability.
H’s testified that he claimed he did not recall the hacking incident but recalled seeing his
children days before the incident; that he was brought by the authorities to jail; he thumb
marked a form given in jail; and came to know of his wife’s death when his father told him
while he was in jail and that he did not know the Brgy. Capt when he was asked about his wife’s
affair. A’s Should be acquitted based on insanity
Suggested Anwer: No. The Court rejects the plea of insanity. Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1,
of The Revised Penal Code exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in

committing the act, i.e., appellant is deprived of reason; he acts without the least discernment
because of complete absence of the power to discern; or, there is a total deprivation of freedom
of the will. The onus probandi “Burden of Proving”rests upon him who invokes insanity
as an exempting circumstance, and he must prove it by clear and convincing evidence
Here, the alleged insanity of H was not substantiated by sufficient evidence. He was not
completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he mortally hacked his
wife.
The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably negate a complete absence of intelligence
on his part when he committed the felony: (a) He was apparently well until about three (3) to
four (4) months prior to his admission in the hospital when he was noted to have blank stares,
claiming that he was in deep thought because he suspected his wife of having an extramarital
affair, and at times would confront his wife about the matter but the latter would deny it; (b)
That due to his jealousy he claimed that he only wanted to frighten his wife with his bolo in
order to confront her but hacked her instead many times to death
(c) He denied having hallucinations at that time or being possessed by an evil spirit;
(d) Immediately after the incident he went to the barangay captain, never thought of running
away, and apparently felt guilty about what happened;
As such, A perusal of H’s testimony would show that he was aware of his emotions,
bearing and temperament.
Thus, F’s contention is wrong.
(4) Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. TransAsia Shipping Lines, Inc., 491 SCRA 411 (2006)
Bar Question: Plaintiff XXX is the owner of the vessel M/V Asia Korea. In consideration of
payment of premiums, defendant YYY insured M/V Asia Korea for loss/damage of the hull
and machinery arising from perils, inter alia, of fire and explosion for the sum of P40 Million.
XXX filed its notice of claim for damage sustained by the vessel. XXX executed a document
denominated "Loan and Trust receipt”. Defendant YYY denied plaintiff's claim. XXX filed a
Complaint for Sum of Money against YYY with the RTC.. According to the trial court, XXX
failed to prove compliance of the terms of the warranty, the violation thereof entitled YYY, the
insured party, to rescind the contract.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
thus XXX failed to prove compliance of the terms of the warranty?
Suggested Answer: NO. At the outset, it must be emphasized that the party, which alleges a
fact as a matter of defense, has the burden of proving it. PRUDENTIAL, as the party, which
asserted the claim that TRANS-ASIA breached the warranty in the policy, has the burden of
evidence to establish the same. Hence, on the part of PRUDENTIAL lies the initiative to show
proof in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving.
Clearly, if no evidence on the alleged breach of TRANS-ASIA of the subject warranty is shown,
a fortiori, TRANS-ASIA would be successful in claiming on the policy. It follows that
PRUDENTIAL bears the burden of evidence to establish the fact of breach.
In our rule on evidence, TRANS-ASIA, as the plaintiff below, necessarily has the burden of
proof to show proof of loss, and the coverage thereof, in the subject insurance policy.
However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his
favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima
facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. TRANS-ASIA was able to
establish proof of loss and the coverage of the loss, i.e., Fire on Board. Thereafter, the burden
of evidence shifted to PRUDENTIAL to counter TRANS-ASIA's case, and to prove its special
and affirmative defense that TRANS-ASIA was in violation of the particular condition on
CLASSED AND CLASS MAINTAINED.
The SC sustained the findings of the Court of Appeals that PRUDENTIAL was not successful
in discharging the burden of evidence that TRANS-ASIA breached the subject policy condition
on CLASSED AND CLASS MAINTAINED.
Petition denied.
B. Presumptions (§§2-4, Rule 131)
(1) Mabunga v. People, 429 SCRA 518 (2004)

Bar Question: M was accused of the crime of robbery for the alleged taking of a typewriter.
During trial, the prosecution presented as evidence the testimony of X, the witness, which
stated that M was bringing a box which bore the marking “HOPE”, boarded a pedicab; that
having heard that M was the prime suspect of the police for the robbery, X followed M who
rode a pedicab going to the pier; that later on, X told some police officers to watch a box of
HOPE brand placed under a bench inside the terminal; that when the box was turned over by
the terminal officers to the police officers, it contained the lost typewriter. Through such
testimony, the trial court found M guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery relying on the
disputable presumption that “a person in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him.” Is the ruling of the trial
court correct?
Suggested Answer: No. Before an inference of guilt arising from possession of recently stolen
goods can be made, one of the basic facts need to be proven by the prosecution is that the
stolen property was found in possession of the defendant. Further, for purposes of conclusively
proving possession, the possession must be exclusive. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that M was caught in exclusive possession of the recently
stolen goods for the reason that the HOPE box was not concealed and anyone entering and
leaving the terminal had access to it, being placed just below one of the benches, therefore, it
cannot be assumed that the HOPE box opened by the police officers containing the typewriter
is not the same box carried by M.
(2) Ong v. Sandiganbayan, 470 SCRA 7 (2005)

Bar Question: BIR Commissioner A was charged with violation of RA 1379 for allegedly
amassing properties worth disproportionately more than his lawful income. The Office of the
Ombudsman ordered A to provide for the pertinent documents that would prove his claim that
the money he acquired was through a loan that he had in the past. A, instead of obeying the
order, questioned such order on the ground that it violates his right to be presumed innocent.
Was A correct?
The presumption of innocence clause of the Constitution refers to criminal prosecutions and
not to forfeiture proceedings which are civil actions in rem.
In this case, the case filed against A was civil in nature, as such, he cannot invoke the right to be
presumed innocent.
(3) Pilipinas Bank v. Glee Chemical Laboratories, Inc., 490 SCRA 663 (2006)
Bar Q: Y contracted a loan with X bank secured by a REM. Y contends that X never delivered
the loan proceeds and instead applied the amount to a debt by a certain person Z. Y
represented by its President A, contends that the name typewritten in the blank space on the
deed of REM, and the third-party liability were not yet appearing on said document when he
affixed his signature thereto. X bank contends that there is a stipulation pour autri in said
documents. Furthermore, that because the document is notarized and had been registered with
the Register of Deeds, then there should no longer be doubt as to its due execution. Is X bank
correct?
Section 3 par. (m) of Rule 131 provides, the following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(m) That official duty has been regularly preformed;
Jurisprudence provides that, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is
not conclusive. As provided under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, such
presumption is rebuttable.
In this case, the testimony of petitioner’s own witness destroyed this presumption by admitting
that when the document was notarized, A did not appear before the notary public. Hence, the
notary public did not witness A affixing his signature on the document.
(4) Surtida v. Rural Bank of Malinao (Albay), Inc., 511 SCRA 507 (2006)
(5) Ermitano v. Paglas, G.R. No. 174436, 23 January 2013
II. Presentation of Evidence

A. Examination of Witnesses
1. §§1-2, Rule 132
2. Rule on the Conduct of Pre-Trial (AM No. 03-1-09-SC)
3. Judicial Affidavit Rule
B. Rights of a Witness

1. §3, Rule 132
Cases:
(1) Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294 (1985)
Bar Question: With the assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando
Galman, the Agrava Board was created under PD 1886 in order to response a popular public
clamor. The Agrava Board is an ad hoc Fact Finding Board that conducted public hearings
wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other
evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the Board.
Among the witnesses who appeared, testified and produced evidence before the Board were
respondents, namely: General Fabian C. Ver, Major General Prospero Olivas, Sgt. Pablo
Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt. Prospero Bona
and AIC Aniceto Acupido.
In the course of the trial in the Sandiganbayan, the individual testimonies before the Agrava
Board were offered as evidence. The respondents opposed to the admissibility contending that
its admission will be in derogation of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and
violative of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. Hence, it must be rejected as evidence for the
prosecution. On the other hand, TANODBAYAN opposed contending that the immunity
relied upon by the respondents in support of their motions to exclude their respective
testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against self-
incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board. Whether the failure to invoke such right
along with the immunity provided by the law before the Agrava Board makes the individual
testimonies admissible in evidence?
Suggested Answer: NO. Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which
grants "use immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known as "transactional immunity."
The distinction between the two is as follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness'
compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of
the witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from
prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates."
In this case, PD 1886 belongs to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity
from use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by
reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the
witness immuned from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self-
incrimination. He still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self-
incrimination.
However, the right to self-incrimination applies to all types of proceedings. It is not the
character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has
consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which
punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. This is the essence of
due process. The violation of this right renders the evidence inadmissible. The exclusionary rule
applies not only to confessions but also to admissions, whether made by a witness in any

proceeding or by an accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense.
In this case, the strong testimonial compulsion imposed by Section 5 of P.D. 1886 viewed in
the light of the sanctions provided in Section 4, infringes upon the witness' right against self-
incrimination. As a rule, such infringement of the constitutional right renders inoperative the
testimonial compulsion, meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to answer UNLESS a co-
extensive protection in the form of IMMUNITY is offered. Hence, despite such use immunity
provided, the respondents must be informed of their constitutional rights before the Agrava
Board as the dictate of fair play.
(2) Herrera v. Alba, 460 SCRA 197 (2005)

Bar Q: Then 13-year-old A (represented by his mother) filed before the trial court, a petition
for compulsory recognition, support, and damages from H. H denied that he is A’s biological
father. A filed a motion to direct the taking of a DNA paternity test. H opposed, claiming that
the test would violate his right against self-incrimination and thus unconstitutional. Would a
DNA paternity test violate H’s rights?
Obtaining samples of DNA will not violate the right against self-incrimination. This privilege
applies only to evidence that is communicative in essence. It is just a prohibition on the use of a
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from a defendant, not an exclusion of
evidence taken from his body when it may be material since the gist of the privilege is the
restriction on “testimonial compulsion”.
Thus, since a DNA test is not testimonial compulsion, a DNA paternity test will not violate H’s
rights against self-incrimination.
On DNA test as evidence

(not necessary since the case is under ‘rights of witnesses’ pero
wa ta kibaw aning sir so i-apil na lang nako)
Is a DNA paternity test admissible as evidence?
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among
other
things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the
analyst
who conducted the tests. Thus, if the value of the Probability of Paternity is less than 99.9%,
the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of
the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity.
(3) Rosete v. Lim, 490 SCRA 125 (2006)
Bar Question: Respondents J and L filed before Branch 77 of the RTC of Quezon City a
Complaint for Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages against R,et al. It asked, among
other things, that the Deed of Sale executed by R, et al covering certain parcels of lands in favor
of E Realty and the titles thereof under the name of the latter be annulled; and that the R, et al
be ordered to execute the necessary documents to restore ownership and title of said lands to
respondents, and that the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel the titles of said land under
the name of E Realty and to transfer the same in the names of respondents.
Respondents filed a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination giving notice that on
June 18 and 20, 1997 at 9:00 a.m., they will cause the deposition of petitioners R, et al.
Petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion and Objection to Take Deposition Upon Oral
Examination. They argued that the deposition may not be taken without leave of court as no
answer has yet been served and the issues have not yet been joined since their Answer was filed
ex abudanti cautela, pending resolution of the Petition for Certiorari challenging the orders that
denied their Motions to Dismiss and for Reconsideration, respectively. Moreover, they contend
that since there are two criminal cases pending before the City Prosecutors of Mandaluyong
City and Pasig City involving the same set of facts as in the present case wherein respondent J is
the private complainant and petitioners are the respondents, to permit the taking of the
deposition would be violative of their right against self-incrimination because by means of the
oral deposition, respondents would seek to establish the allegations of fact in the complaint
which are also the allegations of fact in the complaint-affidavits in the said criminal cases. Was
the order of the court granting the taking of Deposition of Petitioners unconstitutional?
Suggested Answer: The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives
evidence, whether voluntary or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or
administrative proceeding. The right is not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. It
secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular
incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some
crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in
character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give
a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it,
appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular

question is addressed to which may incriminate himself for some offense that he may refuse to
answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
In the present controversy, the case is civil it being a suit for Annulment, Specific Performance
with Damages. In order for petitioners to exercise the right to refuse to take the witness stand
and to give their depositions, the case must partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding. The
case on hand certainly cannot be categorized as such. The fact that there are two criminal cases
pending which are allegedly based on the same set of facts as that of the civil case will not give
them the right to refuse to take the witness stand and to give their depositions. They are not
facing criminal charges in the civil case. Like an ordinary witness, they can invoke the right
against self-incrimination only when the incriminating question is actually asked of them. Only
if and when incriminating questions are thrown their way can they refuse to answer on the
ground of their right against self-incrimination.
C. Order of Examination
1. §4-10, Rule 132
2. §1(d), Rule 115

Case:
(1) Capitol Subdivision v. Province of Negros Occidental, 99 Phil. 633 (1956)
D. Impeachment of Witnesses
1. §11-15, Rule 132
2. §4, Rule 23
Cases:
(1) Office of the Court Administrator v. Morante, 428 SCRA 1 (2004)
(2) Civil Service Commission v. Belagan, 440 SCRA 578 (2004)

Bar Question: Dr. Belagan, the Superintendent of DECS, faces 2 separate complaints for
sexual harassment and various malfeasances. Magdalena applied for a permit to operate a pre-
school. During the inspection of the pre-school, Belagan placed his arms around her shoulders
and kissed her cheeks. When she followed up her application, Belagan replied, “Magdate muna
tayo.” Magdalena was previously charged with 22 offenses before the MTC Baguio and 23
complaints before barangay captains. WON Magdalena is a credible witness.
Suggested Answer:
1. YES. Rules on character evidence provision pertain only to criminal cases, not to
administrative offenses. Even if it is applicable to admin cases, only character evidence that

would establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged may be proved.
Character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of
offense charged. In this case, no evidence is bearing on Magdalena’s chastity. What were
presented were charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical
injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Regarding Magdalena’s credibility as a witness,
the charges and complaints against her happened way back in the70s and 80s while the act
complained of happened in 1994, thus, the said charges are no longer reliable proofs of
Magdalena’s character or reputation. Evidence of one’s character or reputation must be
confined to a time not too remote from the time in question. In other words, what is to be
determined is the character or reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto,
but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit.
The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to
show that a witness has been arrested or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a
criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility.
This view has usually been based upon one or more of the following grounds or theories: (a)
that a mere unproven charge against the witness does not logically tend to affect his credibility,
(b) that innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that one accused of a
crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally established, and (d) that a witness may
not be impeached or discredited by evidence of particular acts of misconduct.
(3) Philippine Trust Co. v. Antigua Botica Ramirez, 56 Phil. 562 (1932)
BAR QUESTION: Phil. Trust Co. seeks to collect balance from Antigua in the 2 promissory
notes executed by the latter. RTC dismissed the complaints and ordered the cancellation of the
mortgage of Manuela Reyes' land, discharging the receiver and ordering him to turn over the
properties of the defendant Antigua Botica Ramirez to Phil. Trust Co. Phil. Trust Co appealed
and claim that the trial court erred in permitting the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide
testify, over the objection and exception of counsel for the plaintiff, that he signed the
promissory notes as a mere surety, and for no consideration. It also claimed that the trial court
erred in permitting the defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, Daniel Boquer and J. J. Dunbar
and the witness Rosario Boquer testify, over the objection and exception of counsel for the
plaintiff. Is the contention tenable?
Suggested ANSWER: NO.. Defendant testified that he was told by his codefendant that the
plaintiff gave his codefendant several extensions for the payment of the promissory notes. This
defendant was the only witness for the defendants who testified on the alleged extensions given
by plaintiff, and his testimony consisted only of hearsay evidence and general statements against
the direct and positive evidence and general statements against the direct and positive evidence
introduced by plaintiff that no extension was ever given for the payment of the promissory
notes. But what convinces the court that plaintiff did not extend the time for the payment of
the promissory notes in question, is the fact that the testimony of the said defendant was not
corroborated by either his codefendant, who imparted to him the information, or by his other
codefendant.
E. Reference to Writing
1. §16-18, Rule 132
Case:
(1) Canque v. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 579 (1999)

Question: C is a contractor doing business under the name and style RDC Construction. She
entered into 2 contracts with S Construction (private respondent) as sub-contractor for her
projects with the government. On May 28, 1986, S Construction sent a bill, representing the
balance of C for materials delivered and services rendered by S Construction under the two
contracts. However, C refused to pay, claiming that private respondent failed to submit the
delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of the items delivered and the
acceptance by the government.
Hence, S Construction brought a suit in the RTC to recover from C. During the trial, S
Construction presented A, its bookkeeper to testify on the entries of their Book of Collectible
Accounts (Exh. K). RTC rendered a decision in favor of S Construction. C however, argues
that the entries in S Construction's Book of Collectible Accounts cannot take the place of the
delivery receipts and that such entries are mere hearsay and, thus, inadmissible.
Are the entries in the Book of Collectible Accounts constitute competent evidence to show
such delivery?
Answer: No.
Be that as it may, considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not itself constitute evidence. As
explained in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals: Under the above provision (Rule 132, §10), the
memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness does not constitute evidence, and may
not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has just the same to testify on
the basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness has testified independently of
or after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in dispute, such
memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may
not be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more
credible just because he supports his open-court declaration with written statements of the
same facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless the proper
predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down.
What is more, even where this requirement has been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule
itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is not very difficult
to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when the witness stands to
gain materially or otherwise from the admission of such evidence. . . . As the entries in question
(Exh. K) were not made based on personal knowledge, they could only corroborate A’s
testimony that she made the entries as she received the bills.
III. Authentication and Proof of Documents

A. Public Documents
1. §§19, 23-30, Rule 132

2. Art. 408, Civil Code
3. §201, R.A. 8424
Cases:
(1) Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988)
Bar Question: Pacific Asia is an overseas employment agency that provided Rances work
abroad. X was engaged by Gulf-East Ship Management a Radio Operator but due to
insubordination he was dismissed our months later. According to Rances he sued Gulf-East in
Dubai and the Gulf-East compromised with him that instead of paying him $9k+ they’ll just
pay him $5.5k plus his fare going home to the Philippines plus if in case Rances’ wife does not
agree with the amount of the allowance being sent to her via Pacific Asia, Rances is entitled to
have $1.5k more from pacific Asia.
Back in the Philippines, X was sued by Pacific Asia for acts unbecoming of a marine officer
(due in part to his insubordination to Pacific Asia’s client). X filed a counterclaim for the $1.5k
as his wife did not agree with the monthly allowance sent by Pacific Asia to her. POEA ruled in
favor of Pacific Asia but did not rule on Rances’ counterclaim. Rances then filed a separate case
for his $1.5k claim. Rances produced the original copy of the Dubai court decision awarding
him the compromised amount of $5.5k. The said court decision was in Arabic but it came with
an English translation. It also came with a certification from a certain Mohd Bin Saleh who was
purportedly an Honorary Consul for the Philippines. This time he won.
Pacific Asia appealed but its appeal was one day late after the reglementary period. POEA
denied the appeal. NLRC likewise denied the appeal. WON the transmittal letter, signed by
Mohd Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines' complies with the requirements of either the
attestation under Section 26 or the authentication envisaged by Section 25.

Under the law, it requires that documents written in a non-official language shall not be
admitted as evidence unless accompanied by a translation into English or Spanish or Flilipino.
Pursuant to the Rules of Court (Sect 25, 26 Rule 132), original copy of foreign court’s decision
must be properly authenticated.
In the case at bar, X failed to submit any attestation issued by the proper Dubai official having
legal custody of the original of the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented by said
respondent is a faithful copy of the original decision, which attestation must furthermore be
authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal
letter, signed by Mohd Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines' does not comply with the
requirements of either the attestation under Section 26 nor the authentication envisaged by
Section 25.

(2) People v. Lazaro, 317 SCRA 435 (1999)
Bar question: Information’s for Homicide and for illegal possession of fire arms and
ammunition under Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 was filed against L for the fatal shooting of R. In the
illegal possession case, the subject firearm and six empty shells recovered from L was
submitted in evidence as well as the certification issued by the Chief of the Firearms and
Explosives Office (FEO), the official repository of all records regarding firearms in the
Philippines. It stated that L is not a licensed or registered firearm holder of any kind or caliber.
However, the official who issued the certificate did not testify. The certificate was admitted,
over the objection of the defense, on the ground that the same is an official record. No
eyewitness was presented to prove the killing with the use of unlicensed firearm. Appellant was
convicted of both crimes. Whether or not the certification issued by the FEO is admissible for
being hearsay.
On several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a
certification from, the PNP Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a
licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
possession of illegal firearms. Moreover, the rule on hearsay evidence admits of several
exceptions. One such exception is that provided for under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of
Court which states that entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specifically
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Relative to this provision,
Rule 132, Section 28 of the same Rules allows the admission of the said document.
In this case the Certification issued by the Commanding Officer of the PNP-Firearm and
Explosives Office, which is the repository of all records regarding firearms in the Philippines, is
competent and admissible evidence to prove that L is not a licensed holder or possessor of a
firearm of any kind or caliber. Indeed, the certificate of a custodian that he has diligently
searched for a document or an entry of a specified tenor and has been unable to find it ought to
be as satisfactory an evidence of its non-existence in his office as his testimony on the stand to
this effect would be.
(3) Delfin v. Billones, 485 SCRA 38 (2006)
(4) Sevilla v. Cardenas, 497 SCRA 428 (2006)

BAR QUESTION: In a Complaint filed by Jaime O. Sevilla (A) before the RTC, he claimed
that on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by
Carmelita N. Cardenas (B) and the latter’s father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas (C) of the
Armed forces of the Philippines, he (A) and Carmelita (B) went to the City Hall of Manila and
they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the
Gospel. On the said date, the father (C) of Carmelita caused him (A) and Carmelita (B) to sign a
marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime (A), he never
applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita (B) and never did they
obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was
presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita (B) refuted these allegations of Jaime (A), and claims that she (B) and
Jaime (A) were married civilly on 19 May 1969, and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May
1969 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with
the local civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from
invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.
Perlita Mercader (G) of the local civil registry of San Juan testified that they “failed to locate
the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered,” for the reason that “the
employee handling is already retired.“ With said testimony We cannot therefore just
presume that the marriage license specified in the parties’ marriage contract was not issued for
in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of
the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was issued but
rather, because it “failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered.”
Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it
would have contained an entry on marriage license no. 2720792. Whether or not there was a
marriage license issued?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify
that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a
particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of
public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage
licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and
such other relevant data.
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the
document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register
despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record
as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or
entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the
logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired.
Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on
record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony

could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the
material contents therein, had been exerted.
B. Private Documents (§§20-22, 32-33, Rule 132)
Cases:
(1) Bartolome v. IAC (now Court of Appeals), 183 SCRA 102 (1990)
BAR QUESTION: A and B owned a lot in Laoag. Before they left for Isabela and died there,
they entrusted the said lot to his cousin C, whose lot bounds A and B’s property on the south.
When the latter died, the Director of Lands instituted cadastral proceedings over the said lands.
Y, daughter-in-law of C, filed an answer claiming ownership over the said lands alleging that she
acquired those through inheritance from B. X, grandchild of A and B, also filed an answer
claiming ownership by inheritance from her grandparents.
After 34 years, the RTC notified C and X for the continuation of the hearing. Months later, Y
amended her answer alleging that she’s the absolute owner of the said lots, that she’s been in
possession for over 50 years, that she and her husband purchased the said lots. Further, she
presented 3 deeds of sale where the last one was allegedly executed by B which is also the same
land being claimed by X.
RTC held that the deed of sale executed by B no probative value as the same is incomplete and
unsigned. Y appealed to CA which reversed the decision of RTC contending that the deeds of
sale presented by Y are ancient documents.
Is the CA correct?
Due execution and authenticity of a private writing under Sec. 21, Rule 132 must be proved
either by anyone who saw the writing executed, by evidence of the genuineness of the
handwriting of the maker, or by a subscribing witness
Here, the signature of the wife of A on the missing fourth page of the deed of sale would have
helped authenticate the document if it is proven to be genuine. But as there can be no such
proof arising from the signature of the wife of A in the deed of sale, the same must be
excluded.
(2) Malayan Insurance Ca, Inc. v. Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation, 380 SCRA 374 (2002)
BAR Q: Philippine Nails and Wires Corp. insured against all risks its shipment of steel billets
with. The shipment delivered was short by 377.168 metric tons. Respondent claimed insurance
for the shortage but petitioner refused to pay. The respondent then filed a complaint against
petitioner. Petitioner moved to dismiss the said complaint but it was denied. An amended
complaint was filed. Respondent moved to declare petitioner in default. The trial court granted
the motion and allowed the presentation of evidence ex parte. Should respondent authenticate
the documentary evidence it submitted at the trial court?
Suggested Answer: Yes. Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public or private.
Private documents are those that do not fall under any of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court. Section 20 of the same law, provides that before any private
document is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by
anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker. Here, respondent's documentary exhibits are private
documents. They are not among those enumerated in Section 19, thus, their due execution and
authenticity need to be proved before they can be admitted in evidence. With the exception
concerning the summary of the weight of the steel billets imported, respondent presented no
supporting evidence concerning their authenticity. Consequently, they cannot be utilized to
prove less of the insured cargo and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets.
(3) Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relation of the United Presbyterian Church in
the USA, 383 SCRA 326 (2002)
Bar Q: The lot was donated by the Commission to the United Church, as evidenced by a TCT
and a Deed of Donation. Jimenez claims that their parents never sold the lot to the
Commission and United Church and that the purported signatures of their parents have been
found to be forgeries by government handwriting experts. Is handwriting expert’s opinion
binding?
Suggested Answer: NO. It is also hornbook doctrine that the opinions of handwriting
experts, even those from the NBI and the PC, are not binding upon courts. This principle holds
true especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which
can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those
of the currently existing ones.
A judge must therefore conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to
arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity
Moreover, Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court,
by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
(4) Cequena v. Boante, 330 SCRA 216 (2000)

Bar Question: Prior to 1954, the land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name
of X who died in 1930. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of X of the
contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of his brother, Y. Heirs of X
is the present occupant of the land while the heirs of Y instituted an action for recovery of the
property. The trial court ordered the heirs of X to surrender possession. The court of appeals
reversed it because the genuiness and due execution of the affidavit allegedly signed by the heirs
of X had not been sufficiently established. Is the affidavit of the heirs of Y admissible as
evidence of ownership of the property?
Before a private document offered as authentic can be received in evidence, its due execution
and authenticity must be proved first. And not all authorized documents are exempted from the
rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public document just
because it contains a notarial juriat.
The affidavit does not state how the ownership of the subject land was transferred from X to Y;
and it is doubtful because one of the alleged signatories of the heirs of Y testified that she was
illiterate and could not have signed the document. In the absence of actual public and adverse
possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.
(5) Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 482 SCRA 164 (2006)
Bar Question: A executed an SPA in favor of B to sell his land. B obtained a loan from a bank
and used the money to buy the land. B was not able to pay the debt to the bank, so he sold the
land to C Company. A opposed the sale made by B to Company C, as the marital consent
obtained by B is spurios. Does the marital consent enjoy the presumption of regularity?
Suggested Answer: No. The presumption of regularity does not hold true with respect to the
notarized Marital Consent which is a private writing. It is subject to the requirement of proof
under R132.20 which states the Marital Consent was merely a jurat, and thus a private
document whose execution and authenticity required proof under R132.
C. Alteration in Documents (§31, Rule 132)

Cases:
(1) Cabotaje v. Padunan, 436 SCRA 423 (2004)

BAR Question:X was the owner of two parcels of land, Lot 1 and and Lot 2 wer covered by
(TCT) No. T-1657. X died intestate on November 23, 1965 and was survived by her
grandchildren A and B
A and B in dire need of money. They borrowed P1,000 from the Spouses C and D. They signed
a private document prepared by E, which stated inter alia that the payment of the said amount
was secured by a mortgage over Lot 1 and that the property was redeemable within one year,
extendible for another year, until the full amount of the loan was paid. The owner’s duplicate
copy of TCT was then delivered to the mortgagees by the mortgagors. The Spouses C and D
took possession of the property, although under the document, the mortgagors had the right to
remain in possession thereof.
On the same date, A and B affixed their signatures over a deed entitled “Confirmatory Deed of
Sale,” in which they undertook to sell Lot 2 to the Spouses C and D for the price of P2,000.00.
The document was notarized by the Judge
The Judge retained two copies of the deed for his notarial file. However, the deed was not filed
with the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya. Subsequently, it was made to appear in the
original copy of the said deed that both Lots 1 and 2, consisting of 6,382 square meters and
9,951 square meters, respectively, were sold to the Spouses C and D. As such, the alterations are
underscored. The original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale wherein it appears that the A
and B also sold Lot 1 of their property to Spouses C and D is null and void.
Suggested Answer:
Yes

Under Sec. 31 Rule 132 of Rules of Court that the party producing a document as genuine
which has been altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to
the question in dispute, must account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was
made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected
by it, or was otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration did not change the
meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall not be
admissible in evidence.
Here, there is no doubt that the alterations in the assailed deed of sale are substantial and
material. The Court reviewed the evidence on record and convinced that Spouse C and D,
either by themselves or at their behest and without the knowledge of the petitioners, caused the
alterations in the assailed copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale by making it appear therein
that the petitioners sold Lot 1 as well as Lot 2.
Thus, Confirmatory Deed of Sale is invalid.
(2) Cirelos v. Hernandez, 490 SCRA 635 (2006)
D. Rule on Electronic Evidence

Cases:
(1) Aznar v. Citibank, N.A. 519 SCRA 287 (2007)
Bar Question: A, businessman, treat his family for an Asian Tour using Citibank credit card.
When they were in Kuala Lumpur, they decided to purchase things to which the credit card was
dishonored for over the limit. He also tried to use the same in an agency to buy plane tickets
but was as well dishonored. They returned to the Philippines and filed a complaint for damages
against Citibank. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was no
proper authentication as to the print out of the computer generated document presented as
evidence before the court. Is the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint?
Suggested Answer: Yes. Whenever any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker. Here, A, who testified on the authenticity of the on-line
authorization foreign account activity report, a computer print-out handout handed to A by the
agency, did not actually see the document executed or written, neither was he able to provide
evidence on the genuineness of the signature of the handwriting of the person who handed to
him said computer print-out. Therefore, the trial court is correct in dismissing A’s complaint.
(2) Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, 469 SCRA 439 (2005)

Bar Question: A was charged and held liable for offenses on inefficiency and incompetence of
official duty; conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and directly and
indirectly having financial and material interest in an official transaction considering his undue
interest in the service of the order of release and actual release of B. One of the basis for A’s
liability was a text message that he sent to B’s Atty, which A, admitted to be his. Was the text
message not admissible by virtue of the right to privacy?

Text messages have been classified as “ephemeral electronic communication” under Section
1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and “shall be proven by the testimony of a
person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof.
In this case, any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as
A himself already admitted that he was the sender.
(3) MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corp., G.R. No. 170633, 17 October 2007
Bar Question: M wanted to purchase several metric tons of stainless steel from S. The parties
conduct business by way of telephone calls, or facsimile. S sent a confirmation letter to M, by
which X, its President, assented. S proceeded to forward to M pro forma invoices containing
the terms and conditions. M through X conformed. Later, S informed M that it is ready to
deliver, and requires M to open an irrevocable letter of credit(L/C). M failed to open the L/C,
So S instituted an action for damages for breach of contract, offering as evidence the
photocopies of the fax transmittal, specifically the invoices. M objects contending that the
photocopies are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of the law. May a
facsimile transmission be considered as electronic evidence?
Suggested Answer NO.
Under jurisprudence, the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile
transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of
an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
Further, a facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy
preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on
its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the
party and his counsel.
Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document,"
and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a
photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, the
Pro Forma Invoices which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not
electronic evidence.
(4) Torres v. Pagcor, G.R. No. 193531, 6 December 2011

Bar QUESTION: A was a slot-machine machine operator supervisor before P
Corporation. Within the period November 2006 to March 2007, there was a complaint filed
before the office of the HR department of the respondent for the involvement of A in the
alleged padding of the credit meter reading of the slot machines. The investigation conducted
affirmatively proved that A was involved with the said crime. The administrative tribunal
adjudge for the dismissal of A. A filed a motion for reconsideration for the
said judgment through facsimile transmission. The Administrative tribunal denied such motion,
affirmed by the CSC and further affirmed by the appellate court. Is the filing of pleadings
through fax machines admissible as evidence?

Suggested ANSWER: No, it is not admissible. A facsimile or fax transmission is not a genuine
and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original.
Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is
genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be
a sham pleading. A facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not
the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as
electronic evidence.
IV. Offer and Objection (§§34-40. Rule 132)
Cases:
(1) Parel v. Prudencio, 487 SCRA 405 (2006)
Bar Q: S alleged that he is the sole owner of a two storey residential house in Baguio City. That
he allowed D’s parents to occupy the 2nd floor while the construction was ongoing to supervise
the construction and to safeguard the materials; that S allowed them to transfer and temporarily
reside the 2nd floor with their children. S wrote a notice to D’s father (deceased) to vacate the
premises. Without S’s knowledge, D and his family unlawfully entered and took possession of
the ground floor and refuses to vacate the house despite repeated demands leading S to file a
complaint for recovery of possession and damages against D.
D alleged co-ownership but failed to formally offer in evidence any documentary evidence to
refute the evidence presented by S (Tax declaration and Affidavit executed by D’s father
declaring that he is not the owner of the building in question and that it is owned by S).
Whether or not the affidavit offered by S is sufficient evidence to support his complaint for
recovery of possession of the subject house as the exclusive owner thereof.
Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 38. Declaration Against Interest. — The declaration made by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in
the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration
unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors-in-interest and against third persons.
In this case, D’s father had adequate knowledge with respect to the subject covered by his
statement declaring that while he is the occupant of the residential building, he is not the owner
of the same as it is owned by S. It is safe to presume that he would not have made such
declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well as to his
children's interests as his heirs. A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords
the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.
(2) Ramos v. Dizon, 489 SCRA 17 (2006)

Bar Question: The subject matter of said action was the purported contract of sale between
Mr. R and Mr. D involving an apartment building and a portion of Mr. R’s land. Mr. D alleged
that Mr. R is the owner of an undivided one-half portion of a parcel of land and executed a SPA
authorizing Mr. E to sell the land in his favor under the Deed of Sale Under Pacto de Retro. On
the other hand, Mr. R alleged that the SPA was executed for the purpose of enabling Mr. E to
secure a loan by using his lot as collateral and the sale is not denominated as pacto de retro but
an equitable mortgage. The Pre-Trial Order enumerated the parties respective exhibits, to wit:
for Mr. D includes the TCT, SPA and Deed of Sale under Pacto de Retro not admitted; while,
Mr. R includes the promissory note, Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, SPA and letter of
revocation of the SPA. During trial, several witnesses were presented. The lower court favored
Mr. R. However, prior to the submission of Mr. R’s formal offer of evidence, rendered a
Decision dated January 24 holding that the contract was actually one of equitable mortgage and
not a pacto de retro sale. It was only on January 31 when Mr. R filed his Formal Offer of Exhibits.
Mr. D opposed contending that the court shall not consider evidence which has not been
formally offered as provided by the Rules. Whether the absence of a formal offer of evidence
during trial render it inadmissible?
Suggested Answer: NO. Based on jurisprudence, there is a distinction between identification

of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. The first is done in the course of
the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit. The second is done
only when the party rests its case and not before. The mere fact that a particular document is
identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean it will be or has been offered as part of the
evidence of the party. The party may decide to formally offer it if it believes this will advance its
cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, the trial court is,
under Rule 132, Section 35 (sic) not authorized to consider it. From the foregoing provision, it
is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the
mere fact that a particular document to identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that
is has already been offered as part of the evidence of a party.
However, the foregoing rule is not absolute since the court may allow evidence not formally
offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are
present, viz: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must
have been incorporated in the records of the case.
In this case, the abovementioned requirements have been satisfied. The exhibits in question
were presented and marked during the pre-trial of the case thus, they have been incorporated
into the records.
(3) Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan v. Comorposa, 408 SCRA 692 (2003)
Bar Q: In 1965, C was terminated from his job, causing him a problem in relocating his house.
Out of pity, S allowed C to occupy their land, hence his nipa hut was transferred to the same. C
later left for USA, but his heirs (CC) remained in the land. In 1998, the heirs of S (SS) gave a
formal demand for CC to vacate the premise but CC refused. Thus SS filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer against CC. CC claimed that they have acquired just and valid ownership and
possession of the premises by ordinary and extraordinary prescription. They also presented the
certification of the Regional Director of the DENR who upheld their claim over the land, that
when the cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet allocated
to any person. SS claims the certification is not admissible, as it was raised on the first time on

appeal. CC claims that the certification was already marked as evidence during pre-trial in the
MTC, but was not formally offered as evidence because CC had not been able to file their
position paper. Is the evidence still admissible in this case despite not being formally offered?
Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would allow the admission of evidence that
has not been formally offered during the trial. However, this rule is applicable only to ordinary
trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown
trial is held.
Since the case is one for unlawful detainer, it shall be covered by the rule on summary
procedure. Thus, there is no need for the evidence to be formally offered during the trial and
the certification of the DENR may be given weight.
(4) Cabugao v. People, 435 SCRA 624 (2004)

BAR QUESTION: Petitioner C was found guilty of selling illegal drugs. C, on appeal
contends that there was no buy-bust operation and the police officers who apprehended him
were of questionable characters and were in fact dismissed from service. He presented
documents the following documents: (a) the authenticated copy of the Order of Police Chief
Superintendent Velasco showing that SPO2 D was found guilty of grave misconduct for acts of
lasciviousness and ordered dismissed from service; and (b) the certified true copy of the
Resolution showing that SPO1 L was convicted of grave misconduct when he was found
positive of metabolite (marijuana) and demoted from the rank of SPO1 to PO3. The petitioner
claims that SPO2 D and SPO1 L had reason to frame him up for he repeatedly refused to
become their police asset for the arrest of certain neighbors believed to be drug pushers. He
alleged that because of his refusal, other police officers were able to arrest the suspects ahead of
SPO2 Domingo and SPO1 L. As result, other police officers were promoted instead of SPO2
Domingo and SPO1 L. His testimony was corroborated by his father, R.
The respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends that they are
hearsay evidence because they are not certified and were only identified by the petitioners
father, R. It also argues that the demotion of SPO1 L and the dismissal from service of SPO2 D
have no bearing on the culpability of the petitioner. Did the trial court fail to give credence to
the inconsistent and incredible statements of the prosecution witnesses?
Suggested Answer: YES.
The contention of the respondent that the subject documents are uncertified is erroneous.
Under the Rules of Court, when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the
public officer in custody thereof. The Rules does not require that the certification should be in a
particular form.
At any rate, these documentary pieces of evidence cannot be cavalierly dismissed as irrelevant.
They have a material bearing on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, SPO2 D and SPO1
L. SPO2 D has been dismissed from the service as of the time of the incident, he was no longer
a policeman and yet misrepresented himself as one. On the other hand, SPO1 L has been found
guilty of drug use. Their credibility as truth tellers leaves much to be desired.
Furthermore, the participation of SPO2 D in the alleged buy-bust operation when he was no
longer a member of the police force speaks ill of the regularity of the operation. It is unusual for
SPO2 D to be given the role of poseur buyer when he was at the time a dismissed policeman.
As a dismissed policeman, he is not entitled to the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty. Yet this presumption was used as a crutch to convict the petitioner.
Thus, the appeal should be granted and petitioner C granted an acquittal.
(5) Yu v. Court of Appeals, 476 SCRA 443 (2005)

Bar Question: X filed against, Y, her husband, an action for legal separation and dissolution of
conjugal partnership on the grounds of marital infidelity and physical abuse. Before the RTC.
During the trial X, moved for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to certain
officers of XYZ co. to compel production of the insurance policy and application of a person
suspected to be petitioner’s illegitimate child. The court denied the motion. On appeal the CA
ruled that private respondent was merely seeking the production of the insurance application
and contract, and was not yet offering the same as part of her evidence. Thus, it declared that
Y’s objection to the admission of the documents was premature, and the trial court’s
pronouncement that the documents are inadmissible, precipitate. Is the CA correct?
Suggested Answer: Yes. Sec.40. Tender of excluded evidence. —If documents or things
offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or
made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record
the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed
testimony.
It is thus apparent that before tender of excluded evidence is made, the evidence must have
been formally offered before the court. And before formal offer of evidence is made, the
evidence must have been identified and presented before the court.
In the present case X made a "Tender of Excluded Evidence," such is not the tender contemplated
by the above-quoted rule, for obviously, the insurance policy and application were not formally
offered much less presented before the trial court. At most, said "Tender of Excluded Evidence"
was a manifestation of an undisputed fact that the subject documents were declared
inadmissible by the trial court even before these were presented during trial.
(6) Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, 473 SCRA 279 (2005)

(7) Tan v. People, 500 SCRA 172 (2006)
MTC charged Tan for violation of BP 22. In his appeal, Tan argued that no evidentiary weight
should be given to the demand letter because, although included in the formal offer of evidence
by the prosecution, it was not presented during trial for proper identification, hence, it should
not have been admitted into evidence even if the defense failed to object to the formal offer
thereof.
Issue: Whether the rule on objection to the admissibility of evidence applies
Ruling:
No.
For documentary evidence to be considered by the court, it must have been presented during
trial and formally offered.
It is quite true that this Court has ruled that objection to the admissibility of evidence, if not
made at the time such evidence is offered, shall be deemed waived. However, in all cases where
said rule had been applied, the assailed testimonial or object evidence had been duly presented
during the course of the trial.
In the present case, a judicious examination of the entire record shows that, indeed, the demand
letter was never presented during the course of the trial. Such circumstance, to say the least, is
tainted with irregularity because, as previously mentioned, such document was never presented
or identified in any of the hearings.
Therefore, it would be unreasonable to apply to the present case the general rule that objection
to the admissibility of evidence, if not made at the time such evidence is offered, shall be
deemed waived.
(8) Catacutan v. People, G.R. No. 175991, 31 August 2011

Bar QUESTION: Georgito is an Instructor while Magdalena is an Education Program
Specialist. They were appointed as Vocational Instruction Supervisor III. However, they were
not able to assume office because Jose strongly opposed their appointments and that he would
not implement them despite written orders from CHED. RTC held that Jose violated RA 3019.
Jose claimed that there are procedural lapses or infirmities attending the preparation of the
appointment papers. He argues that the Decision rendered by the trial court is flawed and is
grossly violative of his right to be heard and to present evidence. He contends that he was not
able to controvert the findings of the trial court since he was not able to present the Court of
Appeals’ Decision. Is the contention tenable?
Suggested ANSWER: No. There is also no denial of due process when the trial court did not
allow petitioner to introduce as evidence the CA Decision. It is well within the court's discretion
to reject the presentation of evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to

the proceeding on hand. This is specially true when the evidence sought to be presented in a
criminal proceeding as in this case, concerns an administrative matter. Even assuming that the
trial court erroneously rejected the introduction as evidence of the CA Decision, petitioner is
not left without legal recourse. Petitioner could have availed of the remedy provided in Section
40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
If the petitioner is keen on having the RTC admit the CA's Decision for whatever it may be
worth, he could have included the same in his offer of exhibits. If an exhibit sought to be
presented in evidence is rejected, the party producing it should ask the court's permission to
have the exhibit attached to the record. CA Decision does not form part of the records of the
case, thus it has no probative weight. Any evidence that a party desires to submit for the
consideration of the court must be formally offered by him otherwise it is excluded and rejected
and cannot even be taken cognizance of on appeal. The rules of procedure and jurisprudence
do not sanction the grant of evidentiary value to evidence which was not formally offered.
V. Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

A. Civil Cases (§1, Rule 133)
Cases:
(1) Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., 454 SCRA 653 (2005)
(2) Spouses Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150284, 22 November 2010
Bar Question: A, for herself and in behalf of her children, filed an action for damages against
spouses X and Y on account of the killing of her husband. It was alleged that he is said to be a
very jealous husband, discovered that his wife was having an illicit affair. On the early morning
of June 6, 1986, B and BB were caught red-handed having a rendezvous in a parking lot by Y
who was just waiting in ambush together with some companions. There, BB was mauled and
shot to death. Because of this incident, they started disposing their properties and eventually left
for the United States of America with their children. Thereafter, a criminal case for murder was
filed against them before the RTC of Makati, but it was archived because they had already left
the country. On March 2, 1987, the A filed a civil case for damages against the X and Y arising
from the murder case.
CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC, finding the petitioners, spouses X and Y, jointly and
severally, liable for damages to the private respondents. They argue that the CA rendered a
decision based on hearsay, incompetent, and inadmissible evidence. They claim that the A failed
to prove their case even by circumstantial evidence. Moreover, they opine that the rule on
indigent party was violated when the A were allowed to litigate as pauper litigants. Whether or
not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Villareals are entitled to an award of
damages for the death of Jose Villareal.

Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides how preponderance of evidence
is determined:
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. - In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where
the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstance of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability of their testimony, their interest or want
of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon
the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is
not necessarily with the greater number.
Applying said principle in the case at bench, the factual circumstances established by the A
through their testimonial and documentary evidences are sufficient and convincing enough to
prove that they are entitled to an award of damages for the death of BB compared to the bare
allegations to the contrary of the petitioners. These circumstances, which were earlier
enumerated, have successfully swayed this Court to believe that indeed they are liable for the
death of the victim to the exclusion of others except their henchmen.
Furthermore, the Court notes that in the course of their appeal with the CA, the factual
conclusions of the RTC were never assailed by the Sevillas. Instead of questioning the facts that
would garner them a favorable judgment, what they filed were an "urgent motion to resolve one
issue that will make all other issues moot"and a "motion for reconsideration on the sole issue of
the extent of the award of unliquidated damages." Consequently, with the filing of these
motions, the factual findings of the lower court were deemed admitted.
(3) Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Wan Choi, 515 SCRA 502 (2007)
BAR QUESTION: EWC was charged for violation of BP Blg. 22 for issuing a PNB postdated
check in the amount of P1, 875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. Upon the arraignment, E pleaded “not guilty” to the offense charged. In his
defense, he said that he merely borrowed P1, 500,000 with the remainder representing the
interest, and that he made a partial payment of P1, 590,000. HPP however counters that the
payments made by EWC pertained to other transactions. EWC filed a demurrer to the evidence
after the prosecution rested its case. The Makati Metropolitan Trial Court granted the Demurrer
and dismissed the case.
HHP appealed the civil aspect of the case to the Regional Trial Court of Makati, contending
that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include the civil aspect. RTC held that while
the evidence presented was insufficient to prove respondent‘s criminal liability, it did not
altogether extinguish his civil liability. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC
set aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC for further proceedings,
so that the defendant may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case. Whether or not the
remand of the case to the MeTC is proper.

Jurisprudence provides that if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also
declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
In this case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. EWC did not assail the
RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand. Indicatively,
EWC stands by his defense that he merely borrowed P1,500,000 with the remainder
representing the interest, and that he already made a partial payment of P1,590,000.
Park counters, however, that the payments made by EWC pertained to other transactions.
Given these conflicting claims which are factual, a remand of the case would afford the fullest
opportunity for the parties to ventilate, and for the trial court to resolve the same.
B. Criminal Cases:
Cases:
(1) Ungsod v. People, 478 SCRA 282 (2005)
(2) Marturillas v. People, 487 SCRA 273 (2006)

BAR QUESTION: On 04 November 1998, after Lito Santos (A) had served his wife Cecilia
(B) and Artemio Pantinople (C) with lunch, Artemio (C) returned to his store which was five (5)
meters away from Santos’ (A) house. At about 7:30 in the evening, Santos (A) was eating lunch
in his house when he heard a gunshot. Artemio (C) had been shot on the chest. He shouted at
Santos “Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan.” (Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain.) Lito
(A) saw a man running away from the direction of Artemio’s (C) store, but he wasn’t able to see
his face. Artemio’s wife, Ernita (D), came running from her house to her husband’s side upon
seeing him sprawled on the ground and bloodied. She had left her infant lying on the kitchen
floor in surprise. Ernita (D) shouted several times, “Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay ang akong
bana.” (Captain, why did you shoot my husband?)
Barangay Captain Celestino Marturillas (F) was invited by a couple of police officers to the
police station upon informing that he was the principal suspect in the slaying of Artemio
Pantinople (C). He also took with him his government-issued M-14 Rifle and one magazine of
live M-14 ammunition, and turned over the same to the Bunawan PNP. To his defense, he
claimed that he was asleep in his home which was 250 meters away from Artemio’s (C) store.
Further, he is said to have just risen from bed when two Barangay Kagawads wanted to see him
because of the shooting incident. He even tried to approach Artemio’s (C) family, but he could
not do so because they had turned belligerent at his presence.
During the trial of the case, Ernita (D) positively identified Marturillas (F) as her husband’s
assailant. This positive identification is corroborated by Santos’ (A’s) testimony and expert
witness Dr. Danilo Ledesma, a medico-legal officer for Davao City, that the gunshot wound in
Artemio’s (C’s) body had been caused by a bullet that is of the same size as that fired from an

M-14 Rifle. However, the same expert witness testified that Marturillas’ (F’s) hands do not
contain gunpowder nitrates. Whether the prosecution’s evidence is credible and enough to
convict Marturillas of homicide?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Basic is the rule that this Court accords great weight and a high
degree of respect to factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, as in
the present case. Here, the RTC was unequivocally upheld by the CA, which was clothed with
the power to review whether the trial court’s conclusions were in accord with the facts and the
relevant laws. Indeed, the findings of the trial court are not to be disturbed on appeal, unless it
has overlooked or misinterpreted some facts or circumstances of weight and substance.
Although there are recognized exceptions to the conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the
trial and the appellate courts, petitioner has not convinced this Court of the existence of any.
Settled is the rule that on questions of the credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their
testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the highest degree of respect. It was the trial
court that had the opportunity to observe the manner in which the witnesses had testified; as
well as their furtive glances, calmness, sighs, and scant or full realization of their oaths. It had
the better opportunity to observe them firsthand; and to note their demeanor, conduct and
attitude under grueling examination.
This Court has consistently held that—given the proper conditions—the illumination produced
by a kerosene lamp, a flashlight, a wick lamp, moonlight, or starlight is considered sufficient to
allow the identification of persons. In this case, the full moon and the light coming from two
fluorescent lamps of a nearby store were sufficient to illumine the place where petitioner was;
and to enable the eyewitness to identify him as the person who was present at the crime scene.
Settled is the rule that when conditions of visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not
appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be
accepted.
Some pieces of the above-mentioned evidence are circumstantial does not diminish the fact that
they are of a nature that would lead the mind intuitively, or by a conscious process of reasoning,
toward the conviction of petitioner. Circumstantial, vis-à-vis direct, evidence is not necessarily
weaker. Moreover, the circumstantial evidence described above satisfies the requirements of the
Rules of Court, which we quote: “SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.—
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”
Moreover, the statement of the victim is considered by the Court as both a dying declaration
and res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as part of res gestae. Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants
of the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its
commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false
statement. All the requisites of res gestae are present in this case:
1.) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;

2.) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
3.) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
Both the statements of the victim and Ernita can be considered res gestae
(3) People v. Del Mundo, 510 SCRA 554 (2006)

Bar Question: The policemen were instructed to apprehend X for the alleged possession of
the illegal drugs, and that when they were to approach him, who was with an identified person,
X drove away with his vehicle but was still caught. When they searched him and his vehicle,
they found marijuana. Hence X was arrested and charged with violation of Dangerous Drugs
Act.
X argued that the said marijuana found cannot be admissible as evidence against him as the
search and consequent seizure of the same were illegal since there was neither a warrant of
arrest nor a search warrant issued, his arrest was illegal because it was prompted in part by his
being included in the order of battle drawn up by the police to arrest suspected drug dealers in
the area, that the said marijuana was that of the passenger he was with before the police chased
them. Is X correct?
Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides the Disputable presumptions that a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker
and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possess, or exercises acts
of ownership over, are owned by him, is satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted
and overcome by other evidence
In the instant case, the evidence on record established beyond any doubt that was in possession
of the marijuana. It was found inside the vehicle he owned and was driving at the time he was
apprehended. In fact, he sought to evade arrest by driving his vehicle away from the scene with
the package on board. His possession thereof gives rise to the disputable presumption under
the said rule, that he is the owner of the package and its contents. His bare, unpersuasive and
uncorroborated disavowal that the package belonged to his unidentified passenger is a mere
denial which by itself is insufficient to overcome this presumption.
(4) People v. Villanueva, 506 SCRA 280 (2006)
BAR Q: PO1 B was informed that appellant was selling shabu. PO1 B immediately composed a
team to entrap appellant wherein PO1 B acted as the poseur buyer. After the entrapment they
confiscated the substance. Appellant denied the accusation and testified that was at home when
suddenly the Policemen knocked and looked for a certain person named C . When he identified
himself as C, he was handcuffed and brought to the headquarters without explanation and it
was only later on that he discovered that he was being charged for selling shabu. The trial court
finds appeallant guilty for drug pushing. Appellant insist that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty alone could not sustain conviction, and that self serving and
uncorroborated testimony of PO1 B could not prevail over his constitutionally granted
presumption of innocence. Is C correct on his conterntions?
Suggested Answer: The prosecution bears the duty to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only
the commission.but likewise to establish, with the same, the quantum of proof, the identity of
the person or persons responsible therefore. This burden of proof does not shift to the defense
but remains in the prosecution throughout the trial. However when prosecution has succeeded
in discharging the burden of proof by presenting the evidence sufficient to convince the court
of the truth of the allegation in the information or has established a prima facie case against the
accused, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon him to adduce
evidence in order to meet and nullify if not to overthrow, that prima facie case. In this case, the
Prosecution submitted three strong positive and substantial evidence, where PO1 B identifies
Villanueva as the person who sold to him a plastic sachet containing the crystalline substance.
Appellant handed the drug, it was duly proven before the RTC.
(5) People v. Padua, 516 SCRA 590 (2007)
BAR QUESTION: A, B and C were charged with rape with homicide of a 10-year-old minor
X. X’s younger brothers Y and Z testified that they saw the three carry their older sister away
while they were walking home and that her mouth was covered to keep her from crying out.
They were able to positively identify the three suspects because the place where X was taken
from was illuminated by billboard lights. X was found dead 2 days later. An examination of the
body found that X was raped. The three interposed an alibi that they were in Alabang when the
incident took place. The lower court found the three guilty, and sentenced them to death. Later
on it was found that A was a minor at the time of the crime, and his sentence was reduced to
reclusion perpetua. Is the guilt of the three accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt?
Suggested Answer: YES. Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules of evidence
allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Thus,
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided the circumstances proven
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
In this case, all the circumstantial evidence that were presented have been duly proven and
established. The prosecution was able to establish the appellants’ culpability through the
established facts which constitute an unbroken chain of events leading to the conclusion of guilt
on the part of the appellants.
C. Administrative Cases (§5, Rule 133)

Cases:
(1) Ramos Vda. De Brigino v. Ramos, 481 SCRA 546 (2006)

Bar Question: X filed a case for annulment of agricultural leasehold contract against her
brother and sister-in-law, Y and Z. Y and Z claimed to have registered the land with the DAR
as evidenced by the “Kasunduan ng Pamumuwisan.” On the other hand, X claimed to be the
registered owner of the land. X denied tenancy relationship between them as there was no
consent on her part of the harvest since her signature was forged, and that the harvests were
treated as gifts from Y and Z. DARAB found that there was implied tenancy based on
substantial evidence on receipts given by X’s husband and daughter to Y and Z. Is DARAB
correct that Y and Z are bona fide tenants of the subject landholding?
Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not
only respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Such findings deserve full
respect and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified or reversed.
The DARAB and the appellate court found that apart from the “Kasunduan ng
Pamumuwisan,” the element of “sharing” is present, as shown by the receipts for the period of
1991-1992. It substantially establishes the fact of “implied tenancy” or that the tillage of the
land was with the personal knowledge of X, who is thereby estopped from claiming otherwise.
(2) Nacu v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 187752, 23 November 2010
(3) Reyes v. Mangno, 450 SCRA 27 (2005)
Bar Question: An administrative case filed by A against Judge B for graft and corruption, fraud
and deception, relative to Criminal Case No. 200-97 entitled “People of the Philippines v.
Spouses Felix and Yolanda Reyes. The complainant averred that she was one of the accused in
the said case. Upon receipt of the criminal complaint and after the filing of an ex-parte motion
for the conduct of preliminary investigation, Judge B issued a warrant of arrest and a writ of
preliminary attachment. No preliminary investigation was, however, conducted. This prompted
A to post a cash bond, to file an exparte motion for the lifting of the preliminary attachment
and to request the court to conduct a preliminary investigation.
The respondent Judge merely directed the private prosecutor to oppose or comment on the
motion, instead of setting the case for preliminary investigation as required under Rule 112 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure. A also alleged that the respondent Judge convinced her and
her husband not to pursue the issue of the absence of preliminary investigation and the lack of
jurisdiction of the court, on the assurance that he would dismiss the case after their
arraignment; double jeopardy would then set in, to their advantage. Does the administrative
case against Judge B prosper?
Suggested Answer: No
Jurisprudence provides that as a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even
though such acts are erroneous. He cannot be subjected to liability such as civil, criminal or
administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good

faith. In such a case, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint
against the judge but to elevate the error to the higher court for review and correction. The
Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, not
every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable,
unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good
faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses
in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. 19
Here, the Judge cannot be held administratively liable. However, the Court finds that the Judge
is liable for gross ignorance of the law in not requiring the presence of the accused during the
promulgation of the decision in Criminal Case No. 200-97, as admitted by him in his Comment
on the complaint.
There are two instances when judgment may be promulgated even without the personal
presence of the accused: (1) when the judgment is for a light offense, in which case, the counsel
for the accused or a representative may stand for him; and (2) in cases where despite due notice
to the accused or his bondsman or warden and counsel, the accused failed to appear at the
promulgation of the decision. The evident purpose of this latter exception is to afford the
offended party the opportunity to enforce the award of civil indemnity which could not
otherwise be effected if the decision cannot be pronounced on account of the absence of the
accused.
Hence, Criminal Case No. 200-97 does not fall under any of the exceptions, since the accused
therein were charged and convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code, which is a less grave felony, the imposable penalty being arresto mayor.
D. Credibility of Witnesses
Cases:
(1) People v. Domingcil, 419 SCRA 291 (2003)
(2) People v. Alcantara, 427 SCRA 673 (2004)

Bar Question: A was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. During trial, the
prosecution presented L, a 50-year old woman who happens to be at her fruit stand at a
distance of an arm’s length to the alleged crime, to testify as an eyewitness. L stated that she saw
A trying to take the bag of the victim who resisted. Then, A stabbed the victim on the thigh and
chest, and thereafter fled. On the strength of such testimony, the trial court rendered judgment
against A. A appealed arguing that the trial court’s reliance upon the testimony of L failed to
identify the person who stabbed the victim and merely described him as being 20 to 25 years
old; and that L came to name three persons as the perpetrators in the two affidavits she
executed when initially, she identified no one during her interview with the police. Will the
appeal of A prosper?
Suggested Answer: No. Where the prosecution’s eyewitness was familiar with both victim
and accused, and where the locus criminis afforded good visibility, and where no improper motive
can be attributed to the witness for testifying against the accused, then her version of the story
deserves much weight. In the case at bar, it must be noted that L was questioned by the police

just few hours after she witnessed the killing of the victim who is her fellow vendor. Such a
shocking experience can verily create confusion especially in the mind of a fifty-year old
woman. Also, during trial L was able to point out A as the perpetrator of the crime. Lastly,
there is no evidence on record that would show any reason why an elderly fruit vendor would
perjure herself and scheme to convict an innocent person. Therefore, the appeal will not
prosper.
E. Termination of Presentation of Evidence (§6, Rule 133)

Case:
(1) People v. Subida, 493 SCRA 125 (2006)

Bar Question: A was charged with illegal possession of ammunition and two counts of
frustrated homicide. Upon hearing, the judge was sick, so it was reset. The next hearing, the
counsel of A, was sick, so the hearing was also reset. The subsequent hearings, the prosecution’s
witnesses were absent so the hearing was reset again. Finally, when the trial was commenced,
the counsel of accused A, was nowhere to be found. The judge issued an order that A waived
his right to adduce additional evidence. In all of the proceedings, A was present. Was A’s right
to adduce additional evidence violated?
Suggested answer: Yes.
There was no showing in the records that respondent ever waived his right to present witnesses
to corroborate his testimony. The absence of his counsel was unknown to him.
In this case, since A was present in all of the proceedings, having not expressly waived his right
to adduce additional evidence, his right was violated when the trial court judge ordered that the
case was submitted for decision.
F. Evidence on Motion (§7, Rule 133)

Cases:
(1) Bravo, Jr. v. Soria, 134 SCRA 466 (1985)
Bar Question: Petitioner X was charged with murder. While detained, he filed a motion for
bail on grounds of (i) evidence against him is not strong, and (ii) minority. Despite having on
record a certified copy of petitioner’s birth certificate proving his minority, respondent Judge
dismissed the motion for bail. Did the judge commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
motion?
Suggested Answer: YES.
The Rules of Court provides, Evidence on motion. — When a motion is based on facts not
appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the
respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony or depositions.
In the case at bar, evidence of petitioner’s minority was already a part of the record of the case.
This was error because evidence of petitioner's minority was already a part of the record of the
case. It was properly filed in support of a motion. It would be a needless formality to offer it in
evidence.
(2) People v. Monteiro, 192 SCRA 548 (1990)
Bar QUESTION: A is the operator and owner of "A's Footwear," an establishment engaged
in the manufacture of footwear. A did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to
register and/or report to the Social Security System, E as member thereof who was employed in
said firm or establishment from January 1964 to May 1974 in violation of the Social Security
Laws; and despite demands failed to register aforesaid employee to the damage and prejudice of
the offended party. A filed a motion to quash because of prescription and he cites in support of
his view, E’s statements 4 at the preliminary investigation of the case which provides that:
“SEC. 2. Prescription shall commence to run on the day of the commission of the violation of the law and if the
same be not known at that time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.” Is the statement of E admissible as evidence?
Suggested ANSWER: No, it is not admissible. The statements of E were not admissible
evidence because they had not been formally offered; hence, no proof of discovery had been
presented by the appellant.
Furthermore, appellee's argument that the appeal should be dismissed because the appellant had
failed to show that it was only in 1974 that the offense was discovered is untenable. That was
not his responsibility. On the contrary, the burden of proving that the crime had prescribed fell
on the appellee because it was he who was invoking that affirmative defense.
Good, better, best.

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ˈe-və-dəns EXCLUSIVE NOTES

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(2) State v. Ball, 339 S.W. 2nd 783 (1960)

b) §12, Constitution Art. III

c) §17, Constitution Art. III

d) §201, Tax Reform Act of 1997

e) R.A. 4200, Anti-Wiretapping Law

f) R.A. 1405, Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits

g) R.A. 6426, FCD Act of the Philippines

(2) Marquez v. Desierto, 359 SCRA 772 (2001)

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(3) Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, 509 SCRA 190 (2006)

II. What need not be proved (Rule 129)

(2) Pigao v. Rabanillo, 488 SCRA 546 (2006)

(6) Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375, 13 December 2011

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Suggested Answer: Yes.

a) §4, Rule 129

d) Arts. 12 and 2035, Civil Code

e) Arts. 48 and 60, Family Code

f) §2, Rule 118

Suggested answer. NO, The contentions of the petitioner have no merit.

(3) Luciano Tan v. Rodil Enterprises, 511 SCRA 162 (2006)

(4) Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 596 (1997)

Suggested ANSWER: NO.

(5) People v. Lacson, 413 SCRA 20 (2003)

(6) Dimaguila v. Monteiro, 314 SCRA 565 (2014)

III. RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY (RULE 130)

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(2) People v. Rullepa, 398 SCRA 567 (2003)

(1) Yap v. Inopiquez, Jr., 403 SCRA 141 (2003)

Suggested answer: No.

1. Best Evidence Rule ( §3-8, Rule 130)

a) E-Commerce Act, §10

b) Rules on Electronic Evidence Rules 2(h), 3, and 4

(2) Lee v. People, 440 SCRA 662 (2004)

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(3) Citibank, N.A. Mastercard v. Teodoro, 411 SCRA 577 (2003)

(4) Vda. De Corpus v. Brabangco (C.A.), 59 O.G. 8262 (1963)

Suggested answer. Yes.

(5) Vila Rey Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer, 25 SCRA 845 (1968)

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(7) Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 272 (2004)

(8) Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, G.R. No. 171701, 8 February 2012

2. Parole Evidence Rule (§9, Rule 130)

b) Statute of Frauds (Arts. 1403 and 1405, Civil Code)

(2) Palanca v. Fred Wilson & Co., 37 Phil. 506 (1918)

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(3) Maulini v. Serrano, 28 Phil. 640 (1914)

(4) Woodhouse v. Halili 93 Phil. 526 (1953)

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SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes.

(6) Robles v. Lizarraga Hermanos 50 Phil. 387 (1927)

SUGGGESTED ANSWER: No.

(9) Baluyot v. Poblete, 514 SCRA 370 (2007)

Suggested Answer: No.

(11) Lechugas v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 335 (1986)

(12) Inciong v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 578 (1996)

3. Interpretation of Documents (§§10-19, Rule 130)

a) Art. 821, Civil Code

b) §17, Rule 119, Rules of Court

(1) Recto v. Republic, 440 SCRA 79 (2004)

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2. Mental Incapacity or Immaturity (§21, Rule 130)