DAIS vs.

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAPIZ

51 Phil 896 (January 21, 1928)

FACTS:

In the course of the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Serapion
Dais, civil case No. 988 of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, Manuel Arnaldo was appointed
administrator of the estate. For the payment of some of the debts of the deceased, said
administrator was authorized to sell certain parcels of land of said estate; whereupon he sold lots
Nos. 1132 and 1136 in the form prescribed by the law which sale was approved by the court on
February 15, 1926.

The herein petitioners or some of them objected to such approval and filed a motion for
reconsideration on March 6, 1926, which was denied on March 10,1926. They appealed accordingly
on April 6, 1927, and the same was denied on August 1, 1927, on the ground that it was not
presented within the time prescribed by section 783 of the Code of Civil Procedure, because more
than twenty days had elapsed since the orders appealed from had been entered.

On May 20, 1926, Manuel Arnaldo filed an answer in the cadastral proceeding No. 18 (G. L. R. O.
Record No. 714), in the name of Serapion Dais's heirs, claiming title to lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136
of said proceeding. Jose Morente also filed an answer claiming title to lots Nos. 1132 and 1136.
Jose Altavas also filed an answer claiming title to lot No. 626.

The respondent court ordered the answers presented by said administrator in the name of Serapion
Dais's heirs with respect to lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136 stricken out. Dissatisfied with this order
striking out their answer, the heirs of Serapion Dais presented a motion for reconsideration,
objecting to the motions to strike out their answer and praying that the order of July 25, 1927,
granting said motions, be annulled.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the petitioners the right to intervene in a cadastral proceeding for the purpose
of objecting to the striking out of an answer filed by the judicial administrator of the intestacy
of the petitioners' predecessor in interest, claiming several parcels of land as the property of
said estate, when the aforementioned administrator consents to its being stricken out?

2. Whether or not the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering that the answers
filed by the legal administrator in the name of the heirs be stricken out over the record

HELD:

1. Yes, the heirs have a right to intervene in a cause involving certain property of the
decedent's hareditas jacens whenever they believe the legal administrator's acts are
prejudicial to their interests. Act No. 496, known as the Land Registration Act, contains
no special rule as to the procedure to be followed in contesting the sufficiency of answers
in cadastral registration proceedings, or in determining whether their dismissal will lie.

2. Yes, the court exceed its jurisdiction; because it is not enough that a court have
jurisdiction over the subject matter in litigation and the parties, but it is necessary that it
have authority in and over each and every one of the essential particulars of the case. In
dismissing the answer presented by the judicial administrator, Manuel Arnaldo in the
name of the heirs of the deceased Serapion Dais, over their objection, and in finally
deciding the case on the merits awarding the controverted lots to their adversaries,
 without hearing said heirs, the court not only exceeded its jurisdiction, but also deprived
them of their constitutional right to be heard before being deprived of their property
rights, and its proceedings were in this sense, void and of no effect.

The court awarded the lot No. 626 to the spouses Jose Altavas and Socorro Laserna (on behalf of
the heirs of the deceased Serapion Dais) and the lots Nos. 1132 and 1136 to the spouses Jose
Morente and Patria Altavas (buyers of the lots sold by Manuel Arnaldo and Antonio Habana).

DURAN VS OLIVIA

3 SCRA 154 (SEPTEMBER 29, 1961)

FACTS:

On December 3, 1952, Jose O. Duran and Teresa Diaz Vda. de Duran filed an application for the
registration in their names of sixteen lots in the he Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur.  On
April 20, 1954, the case was heard initially and on May 5, 1954, the oppositors filed their opposition
to the application. On August 27, 1958, the oppositors filed a motion to dismiss the application on
the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to decree registration of the lots respectively claimed by
them, because said lots are already registered and certificates of title have been issued thereon in
their names.

The applicants filed their objection to said motion, alleging that the reasons for the motion to dismiss
do not appear in the application but are mere assertions of the parties and that the trial court has
jurisdiction to consider the application even though the lots subject matter thereof are already
covered by certificates of title. They also argued in that a certificate of title based upon a mere
homestead, sales or free patent covering private land is null and void; that it is the decree of
registration, not the certificate of title which confers the character of incontestability of title; that they
have been deprived of their property without hearing; and that the cases cited in the order of the
lower court do not apply to the case at bar. Consequently, they claim that the lower court possesses
jurisdiction to try and decide the instant land registration proceedings even with respect to the lots
already covered by certificates of title.

The lower court resolved the motion to dismiss and rendered successively the two orders of
dismissal of the land registration case for lack of jurisdiction of the lower court, so applicants Duran
filed an appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the application for land registration upon the mere
assertion of the oppositors that these are covered by certificates of title based merely upon public
land patents granted to them.

HELD:

No. Considering Section 122 of Act No. 496, the a homestead patent once registered under the
Land Registration Act cannot be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding and that any title
issued thereon is null and void. The same may be said of a sales patent. Once a certificate of title is
issued under the Land Registration Act in lieu of a sales patent, the land is considered registered
under the Torrens system and the title of the patentee becomes indefeasible.

As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the Land Registration Act becomes
indefeasible, it follows that the Court of First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain
proceedings for the registration of the same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title of the
respondents.

The orders appealed from are affirmed, with costs against appellants.

MERCED vs. COURT OF APPEALS

5 SCRA 240 (1962)

FACTS:

Ezequiel Santos (and his wife) claimed ownership of Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre by virtue of
an adjudication of the cadastral court dated December 26, 1923, in favor of his father, sought
recovery of ownership and possession thereof from the named defendant, and of the landlord's
share in the harvests for the agricultural years 1950-1956.

Mamerta de la Merced, a legitimate daughter of Juan de la Merced, was allowed intervene in

asserting their ownership over said property as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 3462
issued to their predecessor Juan de la Merced on October 10, 1931 and their continuous possession
of the land for more than 30 years.

The court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs after making a finding that Lot No. 395 was part of the
Original Certificate of Title No. 425 issued on May 30, 1916 in the name of the spouses Inocencio de
los Santos and Victorina Macapagal, parents of plaintiff Ezequiel Santo which was cancelled and
then declared as a public land by the cadastral court. As a consequence of which, Juan de la
Merced obtained Original Certificate of Title by filing a homestead application.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the order of the cadastral court adjudicating the lot in favor of Santos constitute
registration under the law even though the corresponding certificate of title has not been issued

HELD:

Yes, a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the
certificate of title over Lot No. 395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said
property had already become final, and there being no imputation of irregularity in the said cadastral
proceedings, title of ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested as of the date of the issuance of
such judicial decree. The land, for all intents and purposes, had become, from that time, registered
property which could not be acquired by adverse possession .
REPUBLIC VS VERA
129 SCRA 210 (1983)

FACTS:

Luisito Martinez filed with the lower court an application for registration of title under Act 496 of one
(1) parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan.

On July 24, 1972, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the lower court an opposition to the
application stating that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to
the Republic, not subject to private appropriation.

In the hearing in the lower court, applicant Luisito Martinez testified that he is the owner of the land
applied for, having inherited the same from his parents as confirmed by witnesses Antonio Reyes
and Silvestre Garcia.

On March 21, 1972, applicant-respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for registration
under Act No. 496 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan. She testified that she had possessed the
land "openly, adversely, notoriously and in the concept of owner since February 2, 1970 when the
said land was sold to her by Elisa Llamas who allegedly possessed this land" in the same manner
since 1935; that the applicant had paid for the taxes of the land for the years 1970-1972.

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, argued that Lot 626, Mariveles
Cadastre was declared public land by the decision of the Cadastral Court dated October 11, 1937
and such being the case, the lands in question can no longer be subject to registration by voluntary
proceedings, for they have already been subjected to compulsory registration proceedings under the
Cadastral Act. The parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not applicant-respondents can assert their rights over the subject land
2. Whether or not casual cultivation of the land constitutes possession under claim of
ownership

HELD:

1. No, The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public lands, and its
decision had already become final and conclusive. Applicant-respondents are now barred by
prior judgment to assert their rights over the subject land, under the doctrine of res judicata.
A cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world. Under this doctrine, parties
are precluded from re-litigating the same issues already determined by final judgment.

2. No, A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute
possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and
notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. The possession of public
land however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon
the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate
against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the
State. Applicants, therefore, have failed to submit convincing proof actual, peaceful and
adverse possession in the concept of owners of the entire area in question during the period
required by law.