4 Against Objectivity

“The sensibility theory of morals is a subjectivist theory. To some, this is a sufficient reason for
rejection. Morality is objective, they insist. It is an objective fact that killing innocent people is
wrong. Subjectivism loses sight of this. It makes morality too dependent on us.” (p. 138)

“Subjectivists can respond to this objection in one of two ways. One strategy is to deny that
objectivity and subjectivity are incompatible. Another is to deny that morality is objective.”
(Ibid.)

“Objectivity and subjectivity are compatible, but morality is not objective. That’s what I intend
to argue.” (Ibid.)

“Some of these objectivist theories are compatible with subjectivism, and others are not. All of
them, I contend, have insurmountable flaws.” (Ibid.)

“I will conclude by pointing out that a flight from objectivism need not be a flight from realism.
There are moral facts; they are just purely subjective facts.” (Ibid.)

4.1 Species of Objectivity

“A form of conduct is truly wrong for someone if that person has a sentiment of disapprobation
toward it. I said that this captures an intuition that morality has something to do with how things
really are in the world, without forfeiting the intuition that moral judgments derive from us.” (p.
138)

“According to the first definition, objectivity is tied to impartiality. An objective fact is one that
is ascertained by an objective judgment, and an objective judgment is one that a person would
make if she had all the evidence, no biases, and a good capacity for reasoning.” (p. 139)

“Impartiality is clearly compatible with subjectivity. Subjectivity can be defined in terms of

mind-dependence, and an impartial judgment can be a judgment about something that depends
on the mind.” (Ibid.)

“Some impartial truths are not subjective. The term ‘‘impartiality’’ is sometimes used to
designate judgments that are free from subjective responses. Or, more specifically, it is used to
designate judgments that are dispassionate.” (Ibid.)

“Impartiality is an epistemic construct. Leiter contrasts epistemic objectivity with a non-

epistemic variety, which he calls metaphysical objectivity. He characterizes metaphysical
objectivity in terms of mind-independence. The notion of mind-independence is itself
ambiguous, however. On the one hand, mind-independence might mean existing independently
of any mental states.” (Ibid.)
“A strongly representation-independent property is one that can be instantiated even if no one
was ever disposed to represent that property. Transcendentally objective properties are strongly
representation-independent, but strong representation-independence is a weaker notion.” (p. 140)

“Subjectively impartial facts are based on subjective responses; rationally impartial facts are
based on rules of reason; transcendental facts are based on how things are in the mind-external
world; psychological facts are based on human psychology; and intentional products are based
on human intentions and intentional acts.” (p. 141)

“Transcendental facts cannot be psychological facts, subjectively impartial facts, or intentionally

produced facts. And something can be an objective fact of any one of these species, without
being an objective fact in any of the other species.” (Ibid.)

“The authority that moral rules have over us has something to do with human freedom and the
structure of the will. If we did not act from laws, then we would not need to universalize in
seeking reasons, and if we didn’t universalize, reason would not lead us to pursue the good and
avoid the bad.” (Ibid.)

4.2 Are Moral Truths Objective?

4.2.1 Impartiality: Ideal Observes

“Moral truths are not dictated by knee-jerk responses. If our judgments change after considering
a situation in greater depth, we say that our earlier judgments were false. This gives the
impression that moral judgments are objective.” (p. 142)

“It is quite possible that two people who have access to all the facts and no personal investments
might form different moral assessments of the same situation. Our emotional reactions are
influenced by biography, personality, core values, and other non-cognitive individual
differences. Such variability is obvious when we shift from matters of value to matters of taste.”
(Ibid.)

“As a sentimentalist, the defender of ideal observer theory must concede that values are not
logically entailed by factual knowledge, so idealized information access underdetermines the
ideal observer’s evaluative judgments. If other factors bear on those judgments, and those factors
are variable, ideal observers will not reach consensus. Ideal observers are impartial, hence
objective in one sense, but divergent” (Ibid.)

“Indeed, the idea of an unbiased evaluator may be incoherent. To evaluate is to express one’s
biases. Biases are personal preferences. The best one can do is try to liberate one’s personal
preferences from idiosyncratic features of one’s biography.” (p. 143)

“The ideal observer theory might reply that such practical limitations are irrelevant. Ideal
observation conditions are ideal, and they can only be approached asymptotically. What matters
is principle, not practice. But there may be principled worries here too.” (Ibid.)
“Moral responses require moral emotions, and moral emotions may emerge through
enculturation. A person liberated from culture might be angered by certain things and saddened
by others, but there is no guarantee that she would have full-fledged moral sentiments, since
these, I have suggested, are acquired through a regimen of punishment, love withdrawal, and
induction during moral development.” (Ibid.)

“In sum, I suspect that ideal observer theories, when taken to demand total impartibility, are not
accurate descriptions of our goals in moral reasoning. Complete impartiality is not our ideal, and
partial impartiality is not fully objective. If I am right, we seek good observation conditions
because we want to discern what conforms best to our biases, not because we want freedom from
bias.” (p. 144)

4.2.2 Transcendentalism: Natural Kinds

“Morality governs the lives of intelligent creatures. It has no place in a universe without minds.
The idea that moral rules can exist mind-independently sounds very implausible.” (p. 144)

“On this view morality has important connections to the mind: it is intended for creatures with a
faculty for understanding, it is intended to regulate human affairs, and it is imposed by a being
with supreme intelligence. But, in a more restricted sense, a divine command morality is
transcendental.” (Ibid)

“So, divine commands transcend human minds in this sense. If we restrict transcendentalism in
this way (morals are not generally supervenient on human psychology), then transcendentalist
theories of morality begin to look possible.” (p.145)

“On the divine command theory, the claim that God is good just means that God acts in
accordance with his own wishes. That is faint praise. Morality must have another source. It turns
out that the Euthyphro insight is widely, though implicitly, recognized by people with strong
religious faith.” (Ibid.)

“The major fault with divine command theories isn’t the theological premises upon which they
are based. The problem is that most people do not really believe that morality depends on divine
command, even if they are religious, and even if they would assent to such a claim. Divine
command theory is not a good analysis of ordinary moral concepts.” (Ibid.)

“A world without highly intelligent beings has no place for morality.” (p. 147)

“We do not assume that moral rules can exist in a world without intelligent creatures. That
assumption is at best non-compulsory and at worst incoherent. If our moral concepts were
committed to a strong form of mind-independence, we should embrace the assumption without
hesitation.” (Ibid.)

“My final observation is that arguments against transcendentalism would still be possible if
moral concepts did aim to pick out mind-independent properties. A concept can aim to pick out
such properties and fail.” (p. 149)
“Moral concepts do not aim to pick out mind-independent properties, as Mackie claims, and,
even if they did, they would not be vacuous.”(p. 151)

4.2.3 Psychological Facts 1: Virtue Theory

“Virtue ethics is generally supposed to be grounded in human nature. The traits are supposed to
capture something about how we are, or rather, how we are ideally. Humans flourish most, when
they express their humanity most fully and fruitfully, when they posses virtuous character traits.
Strictly speaking, one can be a virtue ethicist without invoking such character traits (Thomson,
1997; Harman, 2001).” (p.152)

“Virtue ethicists define traits as broad, enduring, and efficacious: they influence behavior in a
consistent way over a wide range of situations. Evidence from social psychology raises doubts
about whether such traits exist. In reality, behavior is strongly influenced by circumstances.
Minor features of a situation can sway behavior, and people who claim to have different
character traits will be equally swayed. If traits don’t exist, then a moral theory that asks us to
cultivate traits is asking for the impossible.” (p.153)

“These findings contradict strong forms of situationism, but they can be reconciled with
situationist results. It is evident that situational factors can override the behavior dispositions of
character. An adequate theory of behavior would allow for interactions between situation and
traits, and it would specify the conditions under which each factor is most likely to dominate.”
(p. 156)

“Traits tend to influence behavior in tasks where context is familiar, instructions are not given,
considerable choice is available, duration is long, and responses are broadly defined.” (Ibid.)

“I conclude that character traits may be in good standing and may encompass traits that are of
interest to virtue ethicists.” (Ibid.)

“The standard response in virtue theory is that good traits are more natural then bad traits. It is
part of the human design, part of our natural teleology to have certain traits and not others.
Someone who lacks virtue is not fulfilling the proper function of human beings.” (p. 157)

“Some of the variation in basic traits seems to have a genetic basis (Jang et al. 1996), and all
traits within the normal range are compatible with productive lives and reproductive success.
There may even be benefit to our species in individual differences. A variety of traits may allow
people to play different roles (suppose everyone wanted to be the alpha male or the alpha
female).” (p. 158)

“The difference between a virtuous trait and a trait that lacks moral significance is determined by
our sentiments.” (Ibid.)

“It is sentiments that make these traits good, not nature, though nature may exert some influence
on our sentiments. If I am right, then virtue theory is not a path to moral objectivism. The virtues
attain high station because of the reactions they arouse in us.” (Ibid.)
4.2.4 Psychological Facts 2: Consequentialism

“Utilitarianism is, thus, a psychologically based theory of morality, but not a response-dependent
theory. If utilitarianism is correct, things have moral merit (they are good or right) objectively, in
one sense of that term. Likewise for other forms of consequentialism; things can be good or right
without being represented as such.” (p. 159)
“Consequentialism is not a good account of what we mean by our moral terms, and therefore it
adds no support to the claim that moral values have an objective foundation. At best,
consequentialists might argue that morality should have an objective foundation.” (p.160)

4.2.5 Intentional Products: Conventionalism

“The kind of contractualism I want to consider here focuses on the social policies that we have
actually created, not those that we would create. The idea is that we have an obligation to follow
the law, because the law is a special kind of social product. It came about through procedures
that make it authoritative, even if we become lazy, jaded, critical, or criminal.” (p. 161)

“I think conventionalism has a kernel of truth, but only if we jettison the objectivism. The
problem with conventionalism is that it incorrectly assumes that moral rules depend solely on
prior events and not current practices. I think that moral rules become binding only relative to
current response dispositions.” (p. 162)

“I conclude that conventionalism only stands a chance as a subjectivist theory.” (p. 163)

4.3 Constructive Realism

4.3.1 Realism without Objectivity

“An action may be imprudent if it fails to maximize utility. An act might be eschatologically
risky if it goes against divine command. An action may be unhealthy if it goes against human
nature. An action may be irrational if it goes against the dictates of universal reason. An action
may be unpopular if it goes against consensus. For an action to be morally wrong, something else
is required. An action can be wrong in one of these other senses, and not be immoral.” (p.164)

“I have also argued that the relevant reactions cannot be idealized to a position free from bias,
and they must remain immanent for moral truths to persist.” (Ibid.)

“I conclude that moral objectivism is mistaken.” (Ibid.)

“A plausible answer is we can quantify objectually over all and only things that are causally
efficacious—things that we need to postulate in order fully to explain all the events that take
place in the world.” (p. 165)

“Moral facts impact our behavior, and they impact our behavior in virtue of being moral facts.”
(p. 166)
“I would point out that emotion-inducing properties are playing a different explanatory role from
that played by the emotions themselves. There are situations in which one has an emotion
without the emotion-inducing property.” (Ibid.)

“I conclude that moral properties are perfectly real in this sense. They are part of the causal
fabric of the world. We can use them to explain behavior, and we can quantify over them in our
explanations.” (p.167)

“In summary, I think we should give up on moral objectivism. Moral properties are not objective
in any interesting sense. If being real entails being objective, then moral realism is false. We
should be antirealists. But realism can be understood in other ways. Moral statements can be
true; there are moral facts; moral properties are causally efficacious; and, therefore, we can
quantify over them. For these reasons, it makes perfectly good sense to call the kind of
subjectivism that I favor a form of moral realism.” (Ibid.)

“Moral facts are like money. They are social facts that obtain in virtue of our current dispositions
and practices. They are as real as monetary values and even more important, perhaps, in guiding
our lives.” (Ibid.)

4.3.2 Constructive Sentimentalism

“Morals are not objective features of the world in the way that, say, lions and tigers and bears
might be. They come from us.” (p. 168)

“The idea of construction resolves the conflict between the ideas of perception and projection.
Things that we construct or build come from us, but, once there, they are real entities that we can
perceive.” (Ibid.)