SHAW ON (ETHICAL) RELATIVISM

A companion to the article (by RB)

Essentially, Bauer’s notes

I. Background

Reminder: philosophical reflection tends to concern the abstract and general (compare with the natural
sciences, which concern the concrete); typically, the philosopher steps back from what we do and what
we think and asks general and fundamental (and thus abstract) questions. Meta-ethics illustrates this, for
it involves reflection on the nature of ethics and the meaning of central (fundamental) ethical terms.

SOME VOCABULARY:

objective adj.
1. Of or having to do with a material object.
2. Having actual existence or reality.

Subjective adj.
1.a. Proceeding from or taking place within a person's mind such as to be unaffected by the external
world. b. Particular to a given person; personal: subjective experience.
…
3. Existing only in the mind; illusory.

ethnocentrism n.
Belief in the superiority of one's own ethnic group.

intuition n.
1.a. The act or faculty of knowing or sensing without the use of rational processes; immediate
cognition. b. Knowledge gained by the use of this faculty; a perceptive insight.

(Definitions from American Heritage Dictionary)

For case to think about: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Female genital_mutilation

1. “META-ETHICS”
2. Def.: “meta-ethics involves philosophical reflection on the nature of ethics—in particular, reflection
on the meaning and status of ethical terms and discourse, and on the nature and possibility of
justifying ethical principles.” “What matters is whether there is some procedure or reasoning by
which ultimate ethical standards can be justified to rational and clear-headed people.” (Shaw) “the
study of the meaning of moral language and the possibility of ethical knowledge.” (Martin) “Meta-
ethics is the philosophical study of the nature of moral judgment. So, instead of being concerned with
questions of what actually is right or wrong (or good or bad), it is concerned with the meaning or
significance of calling something right or wrong (or good or bad)…Meta-ethics includes both the
meaning of moral terms and also such questions as whether moral judgements are objective or
subjective.” (Oxford Companion to Philosophy)
3. Moral philosophy (i.e., philosophical reflection concerning morality or ethics) is often viewed as
comprising both “normative” ethics and meta-ethics. Normative ethics seeks to identify the standards
of right and wrong. A standard is a norm; hence the term. (Utilitarianism’s “greatest happiness
principle” is an instance of normative ethics.)
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 4. THREE MAJOR META-ETHICAL POSITIONS
5. Naturalism.
6. Defined: Those who think that the ethical words like “good” and “right” may be defined in terms of
natural properties (the ordinary properties of the physical world) are ethical naturalists. For example,
some ethical naturalists [viz., utilitarians] think that “the right act” means “the act that produces the
most happiness.” Ethical supernaturalism is the view that ethical properties really are properties that
have to do with the supernatural or divine: for example the view that calling an action good is the
same as saying that it conforms to the will of God. (Martin) (It seems to make sense to lump
supernaturalism together with naturalism. In each case, ethical properties are (allegedly) real
properties. If God exists, then his will is as real as any fact in “the world.”)
7. Intuitionism.
8. Defined: Ethical intuitionism is the position that ethical truths are intuited. Moore, for example, held
that there is a special sort of facility for intuiting ethical truths. [Note: ] Nowadays, ethical theorists
mostly doubt this, but many rely on what they call “ethical intuitions” (i.e., ethical reactions not
based on theory or reasoning) as data to confirm ethical theories. (Martin)
9. Emotivism.
10. Defined: “A position in meta-ethics that holds that ethical utterances are to be understood not as
statements of fact that are either true or false, but rather as expressions of approval or disapproval,
and invitations to the listener to have the same reactions and to act accordingly. Expressions of
approval don’t state facts: when I express my liking of ice cream by saying “Yum!” what I’m saying
is neither true nor false. Neither is what I say when I urge you to try some. (“Prescriptivism” is a
form of emotivism that emphasizes this ordering or requesting or inviting function in its analysis.)
Thus emotivists emphasize the “emotive meaning” of ethical utterances, denying that they have
cognitive meaning. Emotivists can nevertheless be “descriptivists” in that they can agree that
evaluative utterances have some “descriptive content”: when I say this is a good apple, I express my
approval, but also describe it as having certain characteristics on which my approval rests: that it is,
for example, not worm-infested.” (Robert Martin)

11. The “open question” argument

12. Defined: “An argument against Ethical Naturalism due to G.E. Moore. Ethical naturalists suppose
that an ethical term is synonymous with some natural terms, for example, that “the right action” is
synonymous with “the action that produces the greatest happiness.” But Moore argued against this
synonymy (and any synonymy with a natural predicate) by claiming that even though it’s clear that
some actions had this (or any) natural property, it could still be an open question (not a question
thereby settled) whether that action was the right action. (Martin) (Because you already know what
the word “bachelor” means, the assertion “bachelors are unmarried” strikes you as trivially true. It is,
for you, a “closed” question (a settled matter) whether bachelors are married. In general, one might
say, the mark of a correct definition of X is that it will strike us as trivially true—it will strike us as
stating the obvious. –And yet, when we consider any philosopher’s attempt to identify the meaning of
“right” or “good,” their definition does not strike us as trivially true. That is, it appears to be an “open
question” whether “good” is X. But then X cannot be the definition of “good.”)

13. Relativism/absolutism.
14. Defined: “Relativists argue that when certain views vary among … cultures (“cultural relativism”)
there is no universal truth: there is, instead, only “true for us; false for them.” This contrasts with
absolutism (sometimes called “objectivism”): the position that there is an objectively right view. The
most common relativist views concern morality (“ethical relativism”), but some philosopher have
been relativists about a number of other matters, including the nature of reality itself.” (Martin)

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 15. A “critical thinking” point: beware of committing the “appeal to consequences” (or “wishful
thinking”) fallacy.
16. Def.: Obviously, that we want X to be true is not evidence in favor of X, and that we want Y not to be
true is not evidence against Y. To suppose that such wantings constitute evidence is to commit the
“appeal to consequence” or “wishful thinking” fallacy.
17. Example: If, as some have argued, humans lack a free will, it would follow that our entire legal
system is illegitimate; no one would ever be responsible for anything that they do. Thus (one might
argue, fallaciously) we must reject the idea that humans lack a free will. (The speaker is probably
correct in his assessment of the dire implications of the alleged fact that humans lack a free will, but
those unfortunate implications are not evidence that our wills are free. The speaker may reasonably
hope that we have free will—or he may dread the possibility that we lack free will—but that hope or
dread does not constitute evidence. It has no bearing on whether in fact we have a free will.
18. One should take care not to commit this fallacy with regard to the issue of relativism and absolutism.
One might opine that the truth of NER would be disastrous, for its truth would preclude our ability to
condemn the brutal practices of some foreign cultures (e.g., objectionable forms of corporal
punishment). It would be a fallacy to reason that, since the truth of NER would have dire
consequences, it follows that NER is false. (Sometimes, the truth is dire or unwelcome. Consider the
mounting evidence for global warming. Despite its unwelcomeness, it is, nevertheless, likely the
truth.)

19. ETHICAL RELATIVISM

20. Distinguishing between three senses of ethical “relativism”
21. DESCRIPTIVE Ethical Relativism (DER).
22. Def.: There exists variation (from culture to culture) with regard to ethics or fundamental ethical
principles. (This is thesis that an anthropologist might hold. That is, it is an alleged matter of
descriptive fact.)
23. NORMATIVE Ethical Relativism (NER).
24. (Shaw’s simple form of NER) Def.:
 “what is right is what the culture says is right.”
 Implication: “There is no absolute ethical standard.”
 Also: “the ethical relativist feels that there can be no nonethnocentric standard by which to judge
actions.” [I.e., all judgments of the conduct of those of other cultures based on our culture’s ethical
standards commit the error of “ethnocentrism.” Such judgments commit the error of regarding our
ethical standards as the absolute standard. There are no absolute standards; there are only the
standards of one’s culture, i.e., relative standards.]
 “Morality is just like fashion in clothes, beauty in persons, and legality in action….” [I.e., there is no
absolute “right” or “correct.” There is only “right” or “correct” relative to one’s culture.]
25. Note: NR is a normative theory of both rightness and value. Like Divine Command, hedonism.
26. SUBJECTIVISM
27. Def.: morality is relative, not to the culture, but to the individual.
28. META-ETHICAL RELATIVISM (MER)
29. Def. “there is no satisfactory method for choosing among ethical codes, that conflicting ethical
opinions can be equally valid.” “As a meta-ethical theory, relativism does not provide a criterion for
distinguishing right and wrong; rather, it states that in the case of conflicting basic ethical judgments
there is no objectively valid, rational way of justifying one against the other. Two such opinions will
be equally sound.” (Not thus committed to NR.) “it makes a statement about the possibility of
justifying rival ethical standards; it rules out objective certification of moral principles.” (Alleged
evidence: diversity, i.e., DER.)

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 30. The relativist’s “tolerance” paradox. Some who espouse normative ethical relativism draw the
conclusion that each of us is obliged to be tolerant of the norms of other cultures. But such thinking
is confused: “It has sometimes been thought that moral relativism gives a special support to toleration
as a moral attitude to codes which diverge from one’s own. Paradoxically, however, if that were
accepted as a universal (and universally morally approvable) attitude, it would contradict the
relativism which disallows any universally authoritative principles!” (The Oxford Companion to
Philosophy) The upshot: if one is a NERelativst, one has no business insisting on tolerance of “other
cultures” and their objectionable norms, for such insistence contradicts NER.

II. Shaw’s discussion or ethical relativism

31. NOT SO FAST: “we are not required to be ethical relativists in order to explain why moral
obligations may differ according to the social context.” That is, the fact of ethical diversity (among
cultures) is consistent with absolutism. (1) For one thing, the diversity may be superficial. (Shaw’s
example of a culture in which children are not required to tell the truth. If, in that culture, adults don’t
expect the truth but rather expect amusement from children, then their practices are consistent with a
rule against deception.) (Consider the culture in which children kill their parents before they become
feeble; they do so to prevent their parents’ experiencing an eternity of feebleness. What looks like
cruelty is actually an act of kindness.) (2) For another: disagreement does not imply that there is no
objective truth. If it did, then disagreement about the shape of the earth would imply that there is no
objective truth about that. That people disagree about the truth of X does not in itself imply that there
is no objective truth about the matter.

NER collapses under the weight of its many absurdities.

32. THE NO-CONDEMNATION IMPLICATION. An implication of NER: we cannot condemn the

actions or practices of “other” cultures. E.g., we cannot condemn the appalling practice of female
“circumcision,” which is common to some cultures. (Or: the slavery of our own past.) “To condemn
slave owners as immoral, says the relativist, is to attempt to extend the standards of our society
illegitimately to another culture.” (14)

[Is Shaw committing the fallacy of “wishful thinking”? (appealing to consequences) Or is he using an
informal version of “reductio ad absurdum”? Something else?]

33. [Bauer’s note:] Consider our tendency to wield the notion of “human rights.” On the very notion of a
“human rights violation.” If NER is correct, one cannot justify cross-cultural accusations of “human
rights” violations.

34. NER VS. CONVENTIONAL THOUGHT. Shaw notes that the “no-condemnation” idea is “not the
way we usually think.” When we condemn the slavery of another culture or of our own past, we do
not feel that we are committing some sort of error. We are particularly confident that our criticism is
just or rational.

35. Further, we do not feel it is an error to condemn our own practices in the here and now (e.g.,
condemnation of the death penalty or of abortion). But, if NER is correct, such condemnations are
nonsensical and erroneous.

[What are we to make of Shaw’s appeal to “what we normally think” or “how we normally feel”?]

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 36. Shaw: “[According to NER] People can be censured for not living up to their society’s moral code,
but that is all; the moral code itself cannot be criticized. Whatever a society takes to be morally right
really is right for it.” Hence: “Reformers who campaign against the ‘injustices’ of their society are
only encouraging people to be immoral.” Odd.

37. Odd implications of NER. E.g., if NER is correct, then rightness is determined by the majority. But
how do we define “majority”? If the figure (the percentage constituting “majority”) is high (say, 75
percent), then (according to NER) some actions are wrong despite being accepted by the majority
(e.g., 74%). Very odd. Further, without a sufficient majority either way, the action would be neither
right nor wrong. Odd again.

38. But if the figure is set low (say 51%), then “there will be frequent moral flip-flops.” Last year, 51%
felt that abortion was wrong; this year, only 49% feel that way. Hence, abortion flipped from wrong
to permissible, and it may soon flip back. Odd. “Surely…something is wrong with majority rule in
matters of morality.”

39. Another problem: what counts as “a society”? “In a large and heterogeneous nation like the U.S., are
right and wrong determined by the whole country; or do smaller societies like Harlem, San Francisco,
rural Iowa, or the Chicano community in Los Angeles set their own moral standards?…what about
such “societies” as outlaw bikers, the drug culture, or the underworld? And what, then, does the
relativist say about conflicts between these group moralities or between them and the morality of the
overall society?…an individual may be in several overlapping “societies” at the same time.” (15)

40. Further, NER “promotes conformity and supports the moral status quo…[the individual] should fall
in step. The unheeded reformer, far from being a prophet, is a scoundrel.”

41. SHAW: “These are the questions the relativist must answer if he is to make his theory coherent.”

42. “By contending that the moralities of different societies are all equally valid, the relativist holds that
there can be [no] nonethnocentric grounds for preferring one moral code to another, that one cannot
speak of moral progress. Moralities may change, but they do not get better or worse. [Shaw refers to a
possible practice of torturing children; we cannot condemn it is immoral; hence,]…ethical relativism
must be false as a theory of normative ethics.” <END of section>

43. On page 16, Shaw raises an important question: why would anyone care what the majority thinks? If
being right is simply acting in accordance with what the majority think is right, then why should one
care about acting rightly? One who supposes that there is no moral standard beyond the standard of
majority opinion within one’s culture might give up on morality altogether.

44. Shaw seems to say: still, we are struck by the apparent fact of moral cultural diversity. Perhaps we
are not attracted to NER. Still, we wonder how one moral code can be justified over another. Why
should I take my own moral code (provided by my culture) more seriously than any other moral
code? We suppose that morality is more than a matter of taste. We suppose that it is somehow
required by reason.

45. META-ETHICAL RELATIVISM (MER). Such reflections have led some to adopt yet another form
of ethical relativism, which may be called “meta-ethical relativism.” It is the view that “there is no
satisfactory method for choosing among ethical codes, that conflicting ethical opinions can be equally
valid.” “[This theory states that] in the case of conflicting basic ethical judgments there is no
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 objectively valid, rational way of justifying one against the other. “Two such opinions will be equally
sound.” “[MER] rules out objective certification of moral principles.”

46. Observe that MER is a meta-ethical theory, not a normative theory. It does not offer a criterion of
“rightness” (as does NER). It is not “about” what is right. Rather, it is about justification of moral
codes or principles. It asserts that there exists nothing to justify favoring one code over another. (This
is a much more abstract and general point.)

47. Recall the earlier point that moral cultural diversity might be “superficial.” On page 18, Shaw
presents the case sometimes given against DER. “On closer inspection, it is not so obvious that the
values and principles of these societies vary in fundamental ways.”

…many ethical disagreements are due to different factual beliefs…and not to conflicting values. Some
primitive tribes, for example, are reported by anthropologists to authorize the killing of one’s parents
before they get too old. Such practice strikes us in Western cultures as monstrously wicked. Yet these
people are not evil; they believe, rather, that one spends the afterlife in the physical state in which one
dies. One does one’s parents a great service by not letting them grow old and feeble before they die. If
we shared this belief, we would probably do the same…Ethical disagreements are fundamental only if
they remain after there is full agreement about the factual characteristics of whatever is being evaluated.
(18)

In the end, Shaw seems to fall on the side of embracing DER: “there do seem to be areas of moral
variance—for example, concerning the treatment of animals—which do not result from differing factual
beliefs or conceptual schemas.” Probably, fundamental ethical disagreeme3nt (between cultures) exists.
So the question remains: is MER correct?

48. Shaw next makes a familiar philosophical point: “In ethical matters as in factual matters, a
divergence of opinion does not mean that there is no one, right answer, that all opinions are equally
sound. The existence of disagreement fails to undermine the claim that there is an objective truth to
the matter.” (If we discovered that there are many cultures in which it is believed that the earth is flat,
that would not be a reason to suppose that the question of the shape of the earth is “relative.” No, the
question is objective. These other cultures are mistaken. If we were take a member of such a culture
into a spaceship affording a view of the earth as we rise above it, at some point he would say, “I
abandon my former view concerning the earth.”)
49. He adds: “agreement on fundamental ethical principles—if it existed—would not ipso facto justify
them nor refute meta-ethical relativism. After all, this concurrence might be a happy accident….”

THE CENTRAL QUESTION:

50. The real issue, he says, is whether our fundamental moral principles are justified. That question
remains, whether or not DER is true.
51. According to Shaw, the question of “agreement” is not crucial. “What matters is whether there is
some procedure or reasoning by which ultimate ethical standards can be justified to rational and
clear-headed people.” (19) Obviously, Shaw intends to meet this challenge—to offer (in outline) a
justification of a particular ethical standard.

HISTORICAL APPROACHES:
52. Shaw next describes “three main positions…on this crucial issue of justifying ethical standards.”
They are (1) naturalism, (2) intuitionism, and (3) emotivism. (See discussion of these in section I
above.)
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 53. Naturalism. Cutting to the chase: the proposed analyses (of ethical terms) offered by naturalistic
theories are problematic, for “it seems that these moral words do not have a uniform, descriptive
meaning for all people in our culture, let alone all cultures.” We could assign definite meanings to our
moral words, but that would only raise the question of how best to define those words. The question
of ultimate justification does not go away.
54. Intuitionism. Cutting to the chase: given the failure (revealed in part by the “open question”
argument—see above) of naturalists to offer a successful “natural” definition of “right” or “good,”
intuitionists have insisted that such words must refer to simple non-natural and “distinctively moral
properties”—a “peculiar moral characteristic” that we apprehend through “intuition” (i.e., just
“seeing”). Though this view has some plausibility (after all, many of our moral judgments seem to be
“intuitions”—we often “see” that something is right or wrong, and we do not or cannot offer
elaboration as to why we thus view the matter), talk of a mysterious simple and nonnatural property
is pretty strange. Also, “intuitions conflict.” If so, how can they be the basis of moral knowledge?
The fact of the matter is that different people (especially cross culturally) have different moral
“intuitions.”
55. Shaw says we can account for the “intuitive” quality of some of our moral judgments without
appealing to the mysterious properties and faculties—the speculative baggage—of the inuitionist. As
members of culture X, we are trained or socialized to react in certain ways to certain things. Thus,
after a while, when we (e.g.) observe the mistreatment of a little old lady, we naturally react with
simple aversion, for that is how we have been trained to react. But, obviously, reactions are a relative
matter; that is, different cultures train their members somewhat differently, creating diverse aversions
(and the like) to different things (e.g., to homosexuality, to meat-eating, etc.). That people of some
culture have an immediate (intuitive) aversion to, say, meat-eating does not suggest that they have a
special faculty by which they intuit a non-natural property of “wrongness.” It reflects only their
particular socialization.
56. Emotivism. (See earlier discussion.) According to this view, ethical judgments are not really
judgments, for they are expressions of “pro” or “con” attitudes/feelings and our desire to have others
share our attitudes. (“’Hooray” for what you are doing!” “’Boo’ on that thing you did!”) Accordingly,
any “moral reasoning” will concern getting clear about the relevant facts. Beyond that, there is
nothing to argue about—one simply feels as one does, and that is that. (There are no moral reasons or
considerations; there are only points about what the facts are.) Though emotivism does capture our
emotional investment in moral issues (in a way that the other views do not) and it captures our desire
to persuade others of our moral perspective [see Prescriptivism], emotivism fails to capture our sense
of morality as something involving beliefs and judgments and reasons: “If we say ‘Tom was wrong to
break his date with Betty in order to see Jane’ or ‘Tom would have been wrong to stand her up,’ we
seem—at least sometimes—to be assserting an opinion, not expressing an emotion…At least some
moral judgments seem to be just that—judgments that something is or is not the case—rather than an
exclamation.” “Reason-giving is essential to the nature of morality….” (23) [At this point, my notes
become sketchy, owing to a lack of time. Fortunately, what is, in my judgment, most important in
Shaw’s article is what I have already covered. The last part of Shaw’s essay concerns his approach to
objectivity in ethics.]
57. Shaw explores the role of reason-giving and argumentation (he says it is essential to morality) of
morality. He notes that even those who operate with unsavory prejudices (e.g., racists) attempt to
dress up their view with “reasons,” though those reasons are fraudulent. They do so because it is
understood by all that a moral perspective is a perspective based on reasons, judgments, things about
which we can argue. We all implicitly understand that having a moral position involves more than
simply seeing things our own way. It is a matter of giving reasons that make sense to everyone.

THE RULE-GOVERNED NATURE OF MORAL REASONING

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 58. Shaw notes that we do seem to discriminate between reasons that can morally justify and reasons that
cannot. If Jones explains his view that incest is immoral by saying that “it’s just gross,” we would be
inclined to dismiss his point as utterly without substance. (Compare with his arguing that “it is
unnatural.” Prima facie, that might be a point worth considering. We’d next ask: what does this mean,
and why should it matter?) “Within moral discourse there are certain standard moves and relevant
considerations—acknowledged by the vast majority of those who engage in it….”
59. OBJECTIVITY; CRITERIA. Further, “the relevant standards are fairly clear and can be applied with
a reasonable claim to objectivity. Within the complex institution of morality it is not the case that it is
all subjective, that all judgments are equal. There are criteria, an they can be interpreted and applied
with a substantial degree of objectivity…And mistakes can be made…Within our society we do not
see eye to eye on everything, but our considered and reflective moral judgments do enjoy extensive
agreement. Moral life is, to a large extent, a common life…There are agreed-upon standards in our
moral practice, and within limits most moral determinations can be said to be correct or incorrect,
justified or unjustified.” (24-5) “The emotivist overlooks all this in reducing moral judgments to
attitudes and feelings. He disregards the extent to which morality is a rule-governed activity, the
extent to which moral judgments can claim to be objective. Within the framework of a particular
moral system—and, more specifically, internal to the practice of morality as we know it—judgments
about right and wrong can, at least within limits, be said correctly to be true or false. They can be
either more or less justified, and they can be rationally defended or liable to objective criticism.”
[Compare with games like baseball. There are rules to playing, to winning, etc. It would be absurd for
a batter to stop the action and insist on a “4th strike” or for a losing team to insist on a tenth inning.
Baseball is rule-governed. So is speaking a language. So is writing an essay. So is moral life. That the
rules are “relative to one’s culture” in no way threatens the objectivity of judgments concerning the
game. The fact that the people of East Timor do not play baseball in no way threatens the objectivity
of the remark, down at Anaheim Stadium, that the Angels, which have failed to score even one run,
while the Yankees have scored ten, has lost.]
60. But our central question is: “what about the moral system itself—can its rules be justified? Can the
practice as a whole be defended? Shaw offers a kind of sketch of an answer to this challenge.
61. There is a traditional view: “Morality is simply there…waiting to be apprehended by us; rightness
and wrongness, duties and obligations, are built into the very fabric of the universe. This view holds
there are values or some objective “oughtness” that is presumed to exist apart from human minds,
attitudes, or societies. Moral principles are as independent of us and as autonomously true as the
theorems of mathematics or the laws of nature. [The Divine Command Theory and Aristotlelian
appeals to “functions” illustrate this “traditional” approach.] Contemporary philosophers, however,
have generally abandoned this conception of morality. Instead of seeing ethical conduct as
objectively prescribed, independent of society and history, and values as simply part of the furniture
of the world, they locate normative entities within human thinking and practice. Moral values,
standards, principles, and ideals are not things to be discovered. Whether explicitly or implicitly, they
are laid down, posited, or adopted.” (25) [Abandoning the old style of “objectivity” as concerning
external entities.]

THE CHALLENGE
SHAW’S ANSWER
62. Shaw presents his view: “morality is essentially a cooperative, social enterprise in which we all
participate…This way of looking at morality accomodates the insights made by each of the three
main meta-ethical positions sketched in the preceding section… [See central paragraph of page 26 for
S’s elaboration.] Since a moral code cannot be proved by showing that it accords with
transcendentally certified values or principles, the question of how the particular rules of a moral
code can be justified, or whether one moral system can be rationally preferred to another, remains.
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 The relativist [the meta-ethical relativist], it will be recalled, argues that there are no grounds for
recommending one set of principles over another. This is the challenge that needs to be met.”
63. Shaw outlines the “concept-of-morality” strategy, which, it seems, he finds wanting. He returns to his
conception of morality as a social enterprise, etc.: “”Given that a moral code is supposed to regulate
social conduct, that it is a human institution with a necessary role to play—a human creation open to
modification—certain criteria for evaluating moral systems spring to mind. It would be self-
defeating for a society to endorse a moral code that was not conducive to what we might call human
flourishing, that failed to further—in some broad sense—human ends, purposes, desires, and needs.
[Compare with the approach of Bentham.] To adopt a moral code which thwarted the very things it is,
as a morality, supposed to promote would be irrational. A given morality, like a given legal code, can
fulfill its functions in a better or worse fashion, can satisfy or fail to satisfy our aims in having
moral…ties in the first place. Not all moral codes will perform equally well, and because of this we
can evaluate rival normative systems and alternative ethical principles with a reasonable claim to
objectivity.” (28)
64. Shaw briefly discusses how one might go about defending one moral code over others. He considers
some objections to his approach and offers some possible answers. In the end, he says: “By viewing
morality in the way I have proposed and by searching for moral principles that, given the object of
morality and the nature of our present moral system, can be defended as coherent, reasonable,
psychologically attractive, and socially feasible, we can go a long way toward answering the relativist
and showing the legitimacy of our ethical standards. How far we can go toward objectively justifying
one particular moral system over all its rivals remains to be seen, but it should be clear that we need
not worry further about the claims of the relativist.