Peacekeeping in Africa

Peacekeeping in Africa
The Evolving roles of the African Union
and Regional Mechanisms
Edited by
de Carvalho, Thomas Jaye, Kasumba, Wafula Okumu (Eds.)

Benjamin de Carvalho | Thomas Jaye | Yvonne Kasumba | Wafula Okumu
www.trainingforpeace.org
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC)
Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Training for Peace in Africa (TfP) is an international capacity building
programme aiming at improved and self-sustaining African civilian
and police capacity for peace support operations, and with a view to
strengthening the African security architecture.
The programme’s focus is on training, policy advice and research,

with a major part of activities being carried out by African partners.
Norwegian Institute
of International
Aﬀairs
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Publisher: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
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[start tittel]
Peacekeeping in Africa:
The Evolving Roles of the
African Union and
Regional Mechanisms
Edited by
Benjamin de Carvalho, Thomas Jaye,
Yvonne Kasumba, Wafula Okumu
Start
Contents
Foreword ............................................................................................................ 5
Abbreviations ................................................................................................... 7
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 11
Wafula Okumu and Thomas Jaye
African Solutions for African Conflicts:

Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding in Africa .................... 21
Vasu Gounden, Venashri Pillay & Karanja Mbugua
The Evolution of Peace Operations in Africa:

Trajectories and Trends ............................................................................... 33
Cedric de Coning
Understanding the relationship between the UN, EU & AU

in African Peacekeeping .............................................................................. 45
Kwesi Aning
Regional Mechanisms and African Peacekeeping:

ECOWAS, IGAD & SADC ............................................................................... 57
Funmi Olonisakin
African Union Peacekeeping Cases:

Lessons for the African Standby Force ................................................ 65
Andrews Atta-Asamoah
[start forord]
Foreword
This publication is the result of the collaboration between the different

partners of the Training for Peace in Africa (TfP) programme. TfP has
over the past fifteen years, worked to address these challenges through sys-
tematic training, research and policy development. Today, TfP is an
Africa-wide training and research programme for capacity building in
peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding missions. The programme was
established by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Dis-
putes (ACCORD), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the Norwe-
gian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in conjunction with the
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1995, and has been fully funded
by the Ministry throughout the period.
The TfP programme has since expanded its initial cooperation to include
East and West Africa as well, with the Kofi Annan International Peace-
keeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) also becoming a partner to the pro-
gramme in 2004. The TfP programme’s research and evaluation findings
have emphasised the need for complex, robust, and multi-functional
peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations and a closer linkage between
sub-regional, African and international actors. This is especially challeng-
ing in view of the fact that the African contribution to these operations has
as yet been largely military.
TfP also has as one of its objectives to contribute to the overall African
peace security architecture, and in particular that of the African Union.
The TfP partners contribute to this process through research on the chang-
ing and complex security situation in Africa, as well as policy advice.
Within this framework, the TfP programme seeks to assist the United
Nations and the African Union to fulfil their peacekeeping mandates on
the African continent. Furthermore, the programme aims to:
6 Foreword
• provide training in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, espe-

cially in the civilian and police spheres.
• enhance institutional capacity for training and policymaking in peace-
keeping operations in Africa.
• assist in the establishment of a resource pool of trained personnel that
can be deployed at short notice.
• encourage and assist in the development of a common peacekeeping
doctrine within the region.
• undertake research on trends and techniques in peacekeeping and con-
flict resolution in order to address ongoing policy processes.
Since its inception, the primary focus of TfP has been to train civilian and
police personnel. These training courses, as well as related activities such
as policy seminars and workshops, have focused on conflict prevention,
conflict resolution and conflict management, notably peacekeeping.
While the first five years of the programme concentrated on multifunc-
tional training, during the second phase of the programme, TfP increased
its focus on the civilian and police dimensions of peacekeeping. The civil-
ian and police dimensions of peacekeeping and peacebuilding have also
become more central in efforts to rebuild and develop social structures in
war-torn societies. Target groups for the programme therefore include:
• AU and African regional organisations, as well as structures of the Afri-

can Standby Force (ASF)
• the police and other professionals in the rule of law sector
• civil servants in ministries of defence, foreign affairs, the interior and
justice
• politicians, in particular members of parliamentary foreign affairs and
defence/security committees
• non-governmental organisations, in particular those operating in peace
operations and peacekeeping operations
• peacekeeping personnel, especially civilian and police personnel serving
in the United Nations and African Union missions
[start vedl]
Abbreviations
ACCORD African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of

Disputes
AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan
AMIB African Union Mission in Burundi
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
APF African Peace Facility
APPMs Burundi Armed Political Parties and Movements
APSA African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF African Standby Force
AU African Union
AUPSC African Union Peace and Security Council
AUPSOD African Union Peace Support Operations Division
AUPST African Union Peacekeeping Support Team
CFC Ceasefire Commission
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CNDD-FDD Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie
– Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EASBRICOM Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination
Mechanism
EASBRIG Eastern African Standby Brigade
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
8 Abbreviations
ECPF Economic Community of West African States

Conflict Prevention Framework
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
ECOMIL Economic Community of West African States Mission
in Liberia
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States
Ceasefire Monitoring Group
EPLF Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front
EPRDF Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ESF Economic Community of West African States
Standby Force
EU European Union
EUFOR Chad/CAR European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic
FARDC The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
FRODEBU Hutu Front pour la Democratie au Burundi
FRUD Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy
HCFA Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
ICU Islamic Courts Union
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IGAD The Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM The Intergovernmental Authority on Development
Mission in Somalia
ISS Institute for Security Studies
JEM Justice and Equality Movement
KAIPTC Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training
Centre
MINURCAT United Nations Mission in the Central African
Republic and Chad
MONUC United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic
of Congo
Abbreviations 9
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission

in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NARC Northern African Regional Capability
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organizations
NUPI Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
OAU Organization of African Unity
ONUB United Nations Operation in Burundi
PLANELM Eastern African Standby Brigade Planning Element
REC Regional Economic Community
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADCBRIG Southern African Development Community Brigade
SLA Sudan Liberation Army
SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
TCC Troop Contributing Countries
TGoB Transitional Government of Burundi
UN United Nations
UN RC/HC United Nations Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian
Coordinator
UNAMID African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in
Darfur
UNAMIR United Nations Mission in Rwanda
UNHQ United Nations Headquarters
UNITAF Unified Task Force
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNOSOM the UN Operations in Somalia
UNPROFOR UN Protection Force in Bosnia
UNPBSO United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office
UNSC United Nations Security Council
[start innledn]
Introduction
Wafula Okumu and Thomas Jaye
Peacekeeping in Africa is no longer the sole prerogative and responsibility

of the United Nations (UN). This has been clear ever since 1990, when
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) first inter-
vened in Liberia, and 2003, when the African Union (AU) embarked on
an ambitious plan to establish its own peacekeeping force. Today’s opera-
tions in Africa involve local actors and local ownership and partnerships to
an unprecedented extent. These radical changes have put the AU at the
centre of managing and resolving African conflicts. This has in turn gene-
rated keen interest in how the AU has set about building its peacekeeping
capacities and handling existing missions.
The nature of peace operations in Africa has changed dramatically over the
past decade in the sense that such operations now involve a range of actors,
ranging from the UN, the AU, and the European Union (EU) to regional
organizations like ECOWAS, as well as a plethora of states and non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs). Many operations are partnerships that
involve multilevel coordination among and between the actors involved.
While participation in these operations has increased, the scope and aims
of these operations have also widened. The AU places a very high premium
on coordinating and integrating peacekeeping efforts as an intrinsic part of
its peace and security architecture. In current AU peacekeeping operations,
actors are involved simultaneously in different operations, and in very dif-
ferent tasks within the same operation. In Darfur, for instance, the AU and
the UN are operating a hybrid peacekeeping mission (UNAMID) while
also facilitating reconciliation efforts.
The AU peace and security architecture is evolving in an environment with

dramatic challenges, if Africa is to live up to its motto of solving its own
12 Introduction
problems. The AU, alongside sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS,

the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Inter-
governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), is severely restrained
by limited resources and trained manpower. In the meantime, the interna-
tional community seems comfortable with the AU mantra of ‘African solu-
tions to African problems.
Evolution of the AU Peacekeeping Role

One of the motives for the formation of the AU in July 2002 was the real-
ization ‘that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impedi-
ment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need
to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implemen-
tation of our development and integration agenda.’1 The founders of the
AU adopted the objective of ‘promot(ing) peace, security, and stability on
the continent.’2 This objective was to be guided by principles such as
‘peaceful resolution of conflicts’3 and the ‘right to live in peace and secu-
rity.’4 The supreme organ of the AU, the Assembly, adopted the Constitu-
tive Act that gave it the powers of ‘managing conflicts’ and ‘restoring
peace,’5 then delegated them to the Executive Council and did not estab-
lish a specialized organ for peace and security. However, using Article 5(2)
this anomaly was addressed when the assembly adopted the ‘Protocol
Establishing the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.’
This protocol, ratified in December 2003, established the AU Peace and

Security Council (AUPSC) as the AU’s ‘standing decision-making organ
for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.’6 Besides
anticipating and preventing conflicts, as well as reconstructing societies
emerging from violent conflicts, the AUPSC has the mandate of managing
1. See preamble to the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CAAU), available from http://
www.africa-union.org/root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm [30.06.10].
2. Constitutive Act of the African Union [hereinafter CAAU], Art. 3(f).
3. CAAU, Art. 4(e).
4. CAAU, Art. 4(i).
5. CAAU, Art. 9(g).
6. AU. ‘Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union’, Art. 2(1). [hereinafter The PSC Protocol]Available from http://www.africa-union.org/
root/au/organs/psc/Protocol_peace%20and%20security.pdf [30.06.10].
Introduction 13
and resolving conflicts through ‘peace support operations.’7 The AUPSC,

in conjunction with Commission Chairperson, is empowered to ‘authorize
the mounting and deployment of peace support missions’ and to ‘lay down
general guidelines for the conduct of such missions, including the mandate
thereof, and undertake periodic reviews of these guidelines.’8
The AUPSC is to perform its responsibilities of deploying peace support

missions through the African Standby Force (ASF), made up of ‘standby
multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in
their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate
notice.’9 The protocol also specifies the ASF’s composition, mandate,
chain of command, training, and role of AU member states in providing
troops and all forms of assistance and support. In order for the ASF to
undertake peace support missions, the AU has also established a Peace
Fund ‘to provide the necessary financial resources,’10 and a Military Staff
Committee ‘to advise and assist’ on ‘all questions relating to military and
security’ matters.11
Since its launch in 2004, the AUPSC has been called upon to undertake
peacekeeping missions to the Darfur region of western Sudan and Somalia.
It is worthy noting that the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was not its first
mission. The AU was barely one year old when it was called upon in 2003
to deploy a peacekeeping force to Burundi (AMIB); and this operation has
been rightly be regarded as its most successful to date.
AU Solution to African Problems

The AU peacekeeping role in Africa is anchored in a peace and security
architecture that includes regional mechanisms, the United Nations and
other stakeholders such as the European Union and NATO. While assign-
ing itself the ‘primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and sta-
bility in Africa,’12 the AU also acknowledges the UN Security Council’s
7. The PSC Protocol, Art. 6(d).

8. The PSC Protocol, Arts. 7(c) and 7(d).
9. The PSC Protocol, Art. 13.
11. The PSC Protocol, Art. 13(8).
12. The PSC Protocol, Art. 16(1).
14 Introduction
‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and

security,’ and the importance of working cooperatively and closely with it
and regional mechanisms.13 The working relationship in peace support
operations, particularly with regional mechanisms, is to be guided by the
principles of comparative advantage, partnership, cooperation, comple-
mentarity and subsidiarity.
It is clear that while the AU recognizes the role of the UN Security Council
in promoting international peace and security, it is also informed by his-
tory that can show the sad realities of Somalia in 1992 and Rwanda in
1994, when the international community, haphazardly and meekly, inter-
vened to stem the sufferings of civilians whose own states failed to protect
them. This in essence is the driving force behind the transformation of the
principle of ‘non-interference’ into that of ‘non-indifference’ and the
motto of ‘African solutions to African problems.’ The application of this
motto is captured in the chapter by Gounden, Pillay and Mbugua, who
argue that Africans should design their peace and security agendas, and
also own the processes for creating these agendas as well as their implemen-
tation. They point out that it is through an understanding, explanation
and development of an African identity that African solutions to conflicts
can emerge. However, the authors go on to note that in the search for Afri-
can solutions, Africans should also learn from experiences and lessons from
other continents. They consider this point as vital because of global inter-
dependence and the need to strengthen African interventions and solu-
tions by collaborating with others outside the continent.
AU Partners in Peacekeeping
The AU also recognizes that the primacy of the UN Security Council in
international peace and security matters is not exclusive and does not pre-
empt regional or sub-regional organizations from maintaining peace and
security in their respective regions. The AU operates with the clear under-
standing that regional organizations have a comparative advantage by vir-
tue of being closer to situations where peace or security is threatened. It is
also clear to the AU that the UN has the resources and experience that it

Introduction 15
needs to fulfil ‘its mandate in the promotion and maintenance of peace,

security and stability in Africa.’14
In order for the AU to be able to meet its mandate of undertaking peace-

keeping missions in Africa it must not only fully establish its peace and
security architecture but also forge close working relationships with other
partners (particularly the UN and regional mechanisms), finance its oper-
ations, and learn lessons from past peacekeeping operations.
Kwesi Aning, in his chapter, argues that there is a deepening relationship

between the UN, EU and AU in the bid to provide collective responses to
Africa’s security challenges including those involving collaborative multi-
dimensional peace support operations. Accordingly, these organizations
can work in partnership to contribute significantly to such operations.
They have their unique comparative advantages, internal structures, capa-
bilities, experiences and roles in peace support operations. Nevertheless,
the AU suffers from financial and human resource constraints. The main
concern is that, because of such weaknesses, relationships with interna-
tional organizations such as the UN and the EU may easily swing from
partnership to paternalism.
The partnership of the AU and UN peacekeeping in Africa is further chal-

lenged by the ambiguity of the nature of regional arrangements in main-
taining peace and security, as called for in Chapter VIII of the UN Char-
ter. According to Aning, Article 53(1) provides for the supremacy of the
Security Council in peace and security issues, but recent developments in
the continent seem to indicate a gradual move away from exclusive reliance
on UN-command peace operations to hybrid ones in which these institu-
tions work together in various ways. Whether this constitutes a paradigm
shift remains debatable – but the reality is that the evolving partnership in
peacekeeping, while desirable, will have to face enormous challenges as
regards the political and strategic calculations of the institutions involved.
One way of approaching such challenges involves drawing on past experi-

ences. Cedric de Coning, while acknowledging the emerging pattern of
14. The PSC Protocol, Art.17(1).

16 Introduction
cooperation between the AU and other partners, particularly the UN, in

peacekeeping operations, points out that it is one characterized by a
sequencing of activities. Using past experiences to illustrate his point, de
Coning points out that the AU or a regional economic community (REC)
can deploy a stabilization operation followed by UN interventions within
90 to 120 days. This was the case in 2003, when AMIB in Burundi was
replaced by ONUB, and ECOMIL in Liberia was replaced by UNMIL.
According to de Coning, this arrangement is a realistic one, given that
efforts to set up an African peace and security architecture are still under-
way, and because, above all, the AU seems to lack the institutional capacity
to develop policy, plan and manage peace operations. Additionally, the AU
lacks the finances to operationalize the architecture. That means that the
single most important element to consider in relation to the future of peace
operations in the continent is how to finance them. Currently, such oper-
ations are financed from outside – and that represents major challenge.
Role of Regional Mechanisms

As key building blocks in the AU peace and security architecture, regional
mechanisms are expected to ‘closely harmonize and coordinate’ their
peacekeeping activities with the AU’s. The central role of regional mecha-
nisms in AU peacekeeping operations is underlined by the fact that some
of the five ASF regional brigades are being established under the auspices
of regional economic communities like ECOWAS, SADC and the Eco-
nomic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).
Using ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC as case studies, Funmi Olonisakin

argues that the effectiveness of African peacekeeping and peace support
operations can be only as effective as regional mechanisms allow them to
be. Further, she notes that the dynamic nature of Africa’s strategic environ-
ment and by implication its regional security environment requires that
planning processes for peacekeeping and peace support operations reflect
this reality.
RECs such as ECOWAS and SADC, Olonisakin points out, have been
coherent in terms of the development of institutional frameworks for
peacekeeping and peace operations, and this can have a positive impact on
Introduction 17
the preparation for continental peacekeeping. However, attention should

also be paid to the complications of undertaking regional peace initiatives
by some of these RECs. IGAD seems to be the least coherent, for several
reasons. In IGAD, there are countries that are dealing with conflicts either
within or between them, and this has the potential to create conflicts of
interest when it comes to dealing with regional security issues. Another
problem concerns the establishment of the Eastern African Standby Bri-
gade Coordination Mechanis (EASBRICOM), which is supported by the
wider international community and therefore seems to derive its legiti-
macy from its benefactors. That leads to a critical question: can such a
body be considered, within African circles, as a legitimate actor in African
security issues and an example of African ownership? Moreover, its man-
date extends beyond military issues to political ones, including early warn-
ing, dialogue and mediation. All of these have been the original focus of
IGAD, and involve the potential for overlap of duties and creation of ten-
sions within the institution. Unless properly addressed, this could compli-
cate the evolving African capacity for conflict management.
Although a REC such as ECOWAS, has more extensive experience in con-

flict management than the AU and has fairly advanced peace and security
institutions, other organizations, such as the ECCAS, have experienced
major challenges in conceptualizing and establishing peace and security
frameworks and institutions. Due to duplications and multiple member-
ships it has also been difficult to identify specific RECs to spearhead peace-
keeping operations or to establish regional ASF brigades. One example is
the case of Eastern Africa, where countries have concurrent memberships
in IGAD, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA), and the EAC. In order for regional mechanisms to play effec-
tive roles in the AU peace and security architecture they must deal with the
myriad of issues highlighted above, in addition to building adequate
capacities and locating sustainable sources of funding within their regions.
Lesson from AU Past Experiences

Another major challenge observed in the AU’s evolving peacekeeping
operations has been the disinclination to draw on its rich experiences.
When the AU was pressured to respond to the Darfur crisis in 2004, it
18 Introduction
experienced a great many difficulties in planning and deploying the mon-

itors and their protectors. Observers of the nascent organization wondered
why it was not drawing on its experiences in Burundi. AMIB should have
provided useful lessons in mission planning, deployment and sustainabil-
ity. Other lessons involved the experience of working with the UN to pre-
pare its takeover and facilitating a ceasefire agreement to enable this trans-
fer to take place. The same observers later asked, when the AU Mission to
Somalia (AMISOM) was undertaken under almost the same disorderly
circumstances as AMIS, why lessons seem not to have been learned from
previous missions. Indeed, it appeared as if the AU were ‘re-inventing the
wheel’ whenever faced with a new situation that needs deployment of a
peacekeeping force.
Drawing lessons from past and present AU peacekeeping operations is

essential both for future missions and for the construction of the ASF.
Andrew Atta-Asamoah examines AU-led peacekeeping operations in
Burundi, Sudan and Somalia, pointing out not only the challenges to
expect but also key lessons for the ASF. The challenges faced by these
missions range from the lack of capacity and political will, to perennial
financial and logistical constraints on effective peacekeeping operations.
These challenges, as noted out also by Aning, have made the AU heavily
dependent on the international community to undertake its peacekeep-
ing operations.
Achieving the political will needed to declare a situation as a crisis requir-

ing intervention is only the beginning of the arduous path to planning,
deploying and sustaining an AU peacekeeping mission. In addition to the
problem of only a| few member states pledging their troops, AU missions
have witnessed jostling for ‘lead-nation’ status that has interfered with
timely deployment and command of the force. This ‘lead-nation syn-
drome’, as Atta-Asamoah terms it, has exhibited itself in a various ways. In
some cases, a single state may dominate, sustain and obscure the multina-
tional character of the operation, as was the case with South Africa in
Burundi. In his view, such a situation has implications for the legitimacy
of the operation, because local people may question the motives of the
dominant country. In another instance, two nations might jostle for the
Introduction 19
status of lead nation, as during the initial deployment of AMIS in 2004

when both Rwanda and Nigeria sought the distinction.
After a critical review of the three AU-led missions, Atta-Asamoah calls for
proper planning at the strategic, tactical and operational levels. He pro-
poses that a pre-deployment fact-finding and reconnaissance mission
should be undertaken and its findings used to guide the decisions and
planning of missions. Such findings should also inform the crafting of
mandates that reflect the realities in the mission area. To a large degree, the
success of ASF will depend on its drawing lessons from previous AU peace-
keeping experiences in Burundi, Sudan and Somalia.
From Peacekeeping to Peace-building

Another major challenge facing the AU in its peacekeeping operations is
to engage in what the Brahimi Report termed ‘sound peace building’ or
‘post-conflict reconstruction’ of societies emerging from violent conflicts.
De Coning makes the point that while the AU–UN Darfur hybrid mission
is a stabilization one, UN missions like MONUC, UNMIL and UNMIS
are in effect peace-building operations: their mandates include political,
security, development, rule of law and human rights dimensions aimed at
addressing the challenges of immediate post-conflict societies and the
underlying causes of the conflicts. Thus, the UN can be differentiated
from other bodies like the AU because of its capability to undertake a sys-
tem-wide peace-building operation. Only the EU can match the UN in
this aspect. This is a critical point to note as failure to build peace and
reconstruct societies could lead to resurgence of the conflict.
About the Book

This book highlights how the AU’s peacekeeping mechanisms, along those
of regional organizations, have evolved, and the challenges and opportuni-
ties that lay ahead. It represents the output of a partnership involving four
institutions, and presents contributions by some of the most accomplished
researchers on African peacekeeping operations. Except for Funmi Olo-
nisakin, all the editors and authors are affiliated with the partner institu-
tions – ACCORD, ISS, KAIPTC and NUPI. By bringing together these
accomplished authors to provide their insights into the evolving AU and
20 Introduction
regional mechanisms in peacekeeping we hope to capture some key issues

such as the rationale for establishment of an African peacekeeping mecha-
nism, how the AU is setting it up, and the challenges involved. The book
is organized into seven chapters, including this introduction and a conclu-
sion. We hope that the readers will find its content useful, as reference for
both policy and academic research.
[start kap]
African Solutions for African Conflicts:

Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding
in Africa 1
Vasu Gounden, Venashri Pillay & Karanja Mbugua
The time is ripe for Africa to usher in peace and prosperity by identifying
and implementing African solutions to African problems.2 ‘African solu-
tions to African conflicts’ means that Africans should not only design their
agendas for peace and security: they should also own the processes for cre-
ating such agendas and their implementation. Further, only through anal-
ysis and evaluation, understanding and development of an ‘African iden-
tity’ can African solutions to African conflicts emerge. But this does not
mean that Africans are blind to experiences and lessons from other conti-
nents. On the contrary, ‘interdependence’ is an African principle that
emphasizes relationships and connection. It suggests that even when we
look to ourselves for solutions and make progress in resolving conflicts, our
collaboration with others outside the continent can strengthen our inter-
ventions and solutions.
Historically, conflict resolution interventions in Africa have occurred

largely from the outside, on the assumption of Western applied principles.
In recent years, however, several African conflict transformation attempts
1. This article was first published in its full version as a book chapter in: Mohamoud, Abdullah A.
(Ed.) (2007). Shaping a New Africa, KIT Publishers: Amsterdam.
2. ‘African solutions to African problems’ is not a new idea. Ghana’s founding president, Kwame
Nkrumah, had proposed the formation of an African High Command, in the early 1960s. Nkru-
mah, Kwame (1963). “We Must Unite Now or Perish”. Speech at the OAU’s founding confer-
ence, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 24 May. Though Nkrumah was primarily concerned with the inher-
ited colonial borders that arbitrarily divided African communities, his conception envisaged an
African force for policing and resolving conflicts on the continent, Mburu, Nene. ‘Africa Crisis
Response Initiative: Its Workability as a Framework for Conflict Prevention & Resolution,’ Online
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 5(1), 2003:77-79. www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/5_1. [30.06.10].
22 Vasu Gounden, Venashri Pillay & Karanja Mbugua
and successes have become visible, and they deserve documentation and
analysis. Nowhere are these successes more evident than in the Great Lakes
Region and the Horn of Africa, two conflict hotspots. In the following, we
highlight the regional and country-specific conflict overviews, African
interventions to resolve the conflicts, and conclude by noting some valu-
able lessons for conflict transformation and peacebuilding in Africa.
1. Great Lakes Region

The complex, overlapping and protracted nature of conflicts in the Great
Lakes Region has rendered this region in Africa one of the most volatile
and explosive on the continent. For the first time, today there is positive,
albeit fragile, development and progress in the Great Lakes region.
a. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Following Belgian colonization, the Republic of Congo gained indepen-
dence in 1960, but the country has continued to be characterized by polit-
ical, social and economic instability. Colonel Joseph Mobutu seized power
in a 1965 coup, changing the name of the country to Zaire.3 Mobutu’s era
of dictatorship, which spanned 32 years, undermined the formation and
entrenchment of state institutions, setting the tone for corruption and
continued fighting between government forces and growing anti-govern-
ment rebel factions. Ethnic strife and civil war, coupled by a massive influx
of refugees in 1994 from conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi, led in 1997 to
the toppling of the Mobutu regime by a rebellion led by Laurent Desire
Kabila, who renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC). Laurent Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 and his son
Joseph Kabila was named head of state. Unchecked tribal, rebel, and mili-
tia fighting has continued unabated in the north-eastern region of the
DRC, still involving the neighbouring states.
The main conflict issues in the DRC can be summarized as follows: a leg-
acy of dictatorship which has divided the government from the people and
spurred rebel groups; divided control of strategic parts of the country
between government and rebel groups; involvement of various countries
3. Mobutu also brought the country into the Cold War when he allowed the U.S. to use Zaire as
an entry point for operations into Soviet-backed Angola.
African Solutions for African Conflicts: Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding in Africa 23
and parties, rendering the conflict both intrastate and interstate; the insta-
bility of the region at large; crime, corruption and poor governance which
have resulted in a non-trusting population; control of natural resources,
especially minerals, diamonds and gold, which are also at the centre of the
conflict; the intractable nature of the conflict which has perpetuated a cul-
ture and ethos of violence as the ‘norm’; mass population movements fuel-
ling old conflicts and igniting new ones; continually shifting alliances
among the various parties and militias, as well as the continuous emergence
of new parties adding to the pervasive distrust and divisions; and instabil-
ity, ethnic tensions and rampant violence in the north-eastern regions.
History, both past and recent, shows various attempts at conflict resolu-
tion in the DRC by African neighbours and actors. The late 1990s marked
a clear period of peace process initiation as the build-up to the Lusaka
Accords. Mediation efforts by South Africa, Zambia, Libya, Tanzania and
Mozambique sought to bring together the various conflict groups operat-
ing in the DRC with the government. The signing of the Lusaka Accords,
in 1999, by the DRC, Zimbabwe, Angola, Uganda, Namibia, Rwanda,
and Congolese armed rebel groups, was an initiative facilitated by the AU,
the SADC and the UN. The 1999 ceasefire agreement provided for the
disarming of militias, deployment of UN peacekeeping forces, and the
inter-Congolese dialogue.4
b. Rwanda
Rwanda’s distant and recent history is characterized by recurrent and
extreme cycles of violence. During German colonial rule and Belgian trust-
eeship, the Tutsi community was perceived as racially superior to the
Hutus and Twa communities5. Where the two groups lived side by side
and intermarried, the Tutsis became the privileged and powerful minority
group. In 1994, the plane crash which killed Hutu President, Juvenal
Habyarimana, was seen as an assassination attempt and triggered a coordi-
nated attempt by Hutus to eliminate Tutsis. The subsequent genocide left
4. Apuli, Kasaija. ‘The Politics of Conflict Resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The
Inter-Congolese Dialogue Process.’ African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 4(1), 2004.
5. The Hutu’s comprise approximately 84% of the population, the Tutsi’s make up approximately
15% of the population and the Twa are the smallest population group at about 1%.
some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus dead. The primarily Tutsi
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a Tutsi dominant party, gained control
of the country in July 1994, and over 2 million Hutus fled to neighbouring
states. In August 2003, Paul Kagame of the RPF won a landslide victory
in the first presidential elections since the 1994 genocide.
The main conflict issues in Rwanda can be summarized as follows: manip-

ulation of politicized identities, psychological and emotional barriers man-
ifest in distrust and fear of ‘the demonized other’, the need for self-deter-
mination and basic freedoms, the involvement of various countries and
parties that has made the conflict both intrastate and interstate; and the
instability of the region at large.
c. Burundi
The conflict history of Burundi is very similar to that of Rwanda. It has
been characterized by genocide, ethnic cleansings, other significant viola-
tions of human rights, the generation of refugees, mass internal displace-
ment of people, and coups and assassinations of leaders.
Burundi’s history has been marked by violent clashes between the Hutu
majority militia groups and the Tutsi government forces. The historic
Arusha peace agreement was signed in 2000 in Tanzania, and a power-
sharing government was put in place, finally leading to elections in July
2005 and a new beginning for the country.
As in Rwanda, main conflict issues in Burundi include the manipulation

of politicized identities, psychological and emotional barriers which man-
ifest in distrust and fear of ‘the demonized other’, the need for self-deter-
mination and basic freedoms, the instability of the region at large; a culture
and ethos of violence as the ‘norm’; and mass movements of people. In
addition, Burundi’s culture of distrust in leadership and stable government
is based on a legacy of multiple coups and assassinations. Moreover, the
country is one of the poorest in Africa, with very little economic resources
to meet people’s basic needs or sustain significant change.
Key African leaders played a significant role in mediating the Burundi con-
flict and ensuring the successful completion of the peace process. In
November 1999, Nelson Mandela of South Africa was appointed the new
mediator after Julius Nyerere of Tanzania.6 Under Mandela, the faltering
Arusha peace process was revived and after two and a half years of negoti-
ations, a peace agreement was signed on 28 August 2000.
The Burundi case also clearly illustrates the significant role that civil soci-
ety can play in conflict transformation. The African Centre for the Con-
structive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) has been involved in the
Burundi peace process since 1995.7 Following the Arusha Agreement,
ACCORD developed and implemented a coherent programme to
enhance the capacity of various stakeholders in Burundi to the new polit-
ical dispensation. ACCORD’s activities in Burundi include capacity
building through conflict resolution training, facilitating interactions
among key stakeholders, informing policy formulation through research
and analysis, monitoring peacebuilding progress, assessing conflict vulner-
abilities, developing peacebuilding programmes that acknowledge the cen-
trality of Burundians, and the transfer of skills and knowledge through
interactions and exchange programmes.
2. Horn of Africa Region

During the past fifteen years, the Horn of Africa has undergone sudden
and startling upheavals. The recent history of the region has been marred
by protracted civil wars and territorial disputes. This saw the region pro-
duce the largest percentage of the world's refugees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs).8
6. Following Mandela, Jacob Zuma, then South Africa’s Deputy President, took over the role of
mediator in 2002 and played a significant role in facilitating dialogue and promoting the transi-
tional process in Burundi.
7. ACCORD’s head office is based in Durban, South Africa, but there are satellite offices in
Burundi, with the main office in the capital city, Bujumbura.
8. The north-south war in Sudan resulted in the death of at least 2 000 000 people and by 2002 the
country had 4 638 582 refugees and IDPs, the highest number in the world, WHO. ‘Post-con-
flict Strategic Framework for World Health Organisation (WHO) in Sudan,’ EHA, 2002.
a. Djibouti
The conflict issues can be summarized as domination and exploitation,
exclusion from political power and economic marginalization of the
minority Afar group by the majority Issa group.
In 1994, as a result of political and economic pressure from political and

civil society groups, as well as French and US interests in the country, Pres-
ident Hassan Gouled Aptidon accepted a peaceful resolution to the civil
war. A mediated peace process resulted in a peace agreement that was
signed in December 1994 between the government of Djibouti and the
leaders of the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD).
On 12 May 2001, President Ismail Omar Guelleh presided over the sign-
ing of another peace accord that officially ended the decade-long civil war.
That peace accord successfully completed the peace process begun on 7
February 2000 in Paris. Ahmed Dini Ahmed represented the FRUD.
b. Somalia
Somalia’s government and state institutions collapsed in January 1991.
With the country carved into 16 fiefdoms controlled by faction leaders
(warlords), the Transitional Federal Government elected on 14 October
2004 in Nairobi, Kenya, has not been able to establish a foothold. The
breakaway north-west region declared unilateral independence in 1991
and renamed itself the Republic of Somaliland, but is not recognized inter-
nationally.9 All attempts to construct a central state have come to nought.
Conflict issues in Somalia centre on the struggle for state control, politici-
zation of identity, state structure (whether centralism, federalism or con-
federalism) and power-sharing arrangements.
In 2000, after a succession of dialogues, Djibouti hosted a major reconcil-

iation conference which created the Transitional National Government in
August with a three-year mandate. In early 2002, the IGAD organized a
reconciliation effort in Nairobi, known as the Somalia National Reconcil-
iation Conference, which concluded in October 2004. In August 2004,
the Somali Transitional Federal Assembly was established by the IGAD
9. Somalia, with a population of 8.6 million, is culturally, linguistically and religiously homoge-
neous; it is 96% Somali and 100% Muslim in composition.
process. In February 2005, the AU authorized IGAD to send a peace mis-

sion to Somalia to support the transitional government in stabilizing the
country. In March, the AU adopted a plan to deploy 10,000 peacekeepers
to Somalia beginning on 30 April 2005. However, the IGAD Charter had
no provisions for this. After a year of factional fighting, Somali leaders
signed the Aden Declaration on 5 January 2006, which served to encour-
age reconciliation between the various groups in the transitional govern-
ment. To allow the deployment of a peacekeeping force, the AU in January
2006 requested the UN to exempt Somalia from the arms embargo.
Though IGAD member countries have expressed willingness to send a
peacekeeping force to Somalia, this did not occur as the UN rejected the
request to lift the arms embargo in 2005.
c. Ethiopia–Eritrea
In Ethiopia, the last emperor, Haile Selassie I, was overthrown in 1974 by
the military, which, after a brief period of factional fighting, declared Ethi-
opia a one-party state in 1977 under the leadership of Colonel Mengistu
Haile Mariam. The Mengistu government fell in 1991 to a group of guer-
rilla movements under the banner of Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF). EPRDF is still in power, but has been bat-
tling an insurgency in the south.
Eritrea10 federated with Ethiopia in 1952. Ethiopia terminated the federa-

tion in 1962, making Eritrea one of its provinces. The ensuing protracted
guerrilla war, led by the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF), ended
when the EPLF assumed control of Eritrea in May 1991 after the fall of
Mengistu Haile Mariam’s government in Addis Ababa. The EPLF estab-
lished a provisional government which governed Eritrea until April 1993,
when Eritreans voted for independence in a UN-monitored referendum.
Conflict issues between Ethiopia and Eritrea revolve around the common
boundary, where Ethiopia claims territory within its Tigray administra-
tive zone. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) – now the AU –
played a key role in resolving the border conflict between Ethiopia and
10. Eritrea has a population of 4.7 million from less than 10 ethnic groups and a mix of Christian
(50%), mostly Orthodox, Muslim (48%) and indigenous beliefs (2%).
Eritrea. At the OAU summit in Algiers in July 1999, the two parties
accepted the Modalities for the Implementation of the OAU Framework
Agreement.
d. Sudan
The most publicized conflict in Sudan11 is in the western region of Darfur.
Save for a ten-year period (1972–1983), the North–South conflict went
on from when Sudan attained independence in 1956, until January 2005,
when SPLM and the Government of Sudan signed a comprehensive peace
agreement. Conflict issues in the Sudan centre on the fundamentals of
statehood, citizenship and the judicial system; security and power sharing
arrangements; sharing of national resources; and the devolution of power
from the centre to the periphery.
In Darfur, Chad facilitated negotiations in April 2004 under the auspices

of the AU, which resulted in the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. The
Agreement came into effect on 11 April 2004, and the AU formed a
Ceasefire Commission to monitor observance of the ceasefire. Ceasefire
violations led to another round of talks brokered by the AU in December
2004, held in Abuja, Nigeria. But large-scale violations of the ceasefire
continued.
In the North–South Sudan war, towards the late 1990s, the IGAD-facili-
tated peace process gained momentum, producing several breakthroughs.
Together these are known as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),
which was signed on 9 January 2005 in Nairobi.
3. Lessons for Conflict Resolution in Africa

The conflicts and interventions in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn
of Africa provide crucial lessons for conflict resolution in Africa. These les-
sons can be divided into two broad categories: first, the styles and the
11. Sudan straddles a fault line between Africa and the Middle East geographically, culturally, politi-
cally and socially. With an area of 2 505 819 square km, the size of Western Europe, Sudan is the
largest country in Africa, and one of the most geographically and culturally diverse. Its population
of 40.2 million people is derived from Black Africans (52%), Arab (39%), Beja (6%) and others
(2%), which are split further into more than 200 different ethnic and sub-ethnic groups. Of the
total population, 70% are Sunni Muslim, 25% practice indigenous beliefs and 5% are Christian.
nature of interventions; second, the mechanisms employed in these inter-

ventions.
a. Styles and Nature of Conflict Resolution Interventions

Lesson One: Importance of People-based Resolution
In Africa, the analysis and resolution of conflicts cannot be based on ‘inter-
ests’ alone. Such approaches to conflict resolution (often based on Western
legal models) focus on the concrete and incompatible interests over which
parties compete. By contrast, African resolution centres on people, identi-
ties, and the meanings and feelings they ascribe to situations and context.
Conflict issues are best dealt with through a process of collaborative work
on common issues and approaches that encourage joint activities and face-
to-face interaction. Identifying areas where parties can come together and
work jointly to produce tangible results fairly quickly allows each side to
re-humanize the other, by working together. As people learn to interact
and to trust each other, more difficult sources of tension can then be dealt
with. This approach has proven effective in Djibouti and in Sudan.
Lesson Two: Relevance of Culturally Rooted Resolution
Again, modelling interventions on Western-based strategies will not account
for the unique conditions and nuances of African conflicts – such as the use
of elder statesmen and former presidents as mediators, or by also providing
a militant rebel group with space and voice in the negotiation process.
Moreover, Africa has strong oral traditions and deep-rooted cultures. His-
tory shows that indigenous conflict management and resolution mecha-
nisms have used local actors and traditional community-based judicial and
legal decision-making mechanisms to manage and resolve conflicts within
or between communities. These mechanisms favoured dialogue and ‘hash-
ing out problems’ at the community level, often with a chief or king pre-
siding. Even though the specific mechanisms have long been discarded or
are barely used today, the strong capacity for dialogue is evident in the
many instances of official and unofficial mediations and facilitations that
do occur.
Lesson Three: Multilevel Efforts are Necessary

Another crucial lesson is that conflict resolution interventions in Africa
must be multilevel and holistic. This means that intervening at the top
leadership level, as with mediations between African presidents in Burundi,
must be supported at the middle and grassroots levels as well.
Lesson Four: Inclusiveness is Vital
The conflict cases presented here share the common characteristic of com-
plexity due to the involvement of numerous internal and external parties.
The DRC conflict, with its multitude of players and continually evolving
smaller ‘side’-conflicts, almost defies comprehension and analysis. In
Africa, conflict issues and parties overlap greatly. If conflict transformation
is to be effective and sustainable, it must also be all-inclusive.
b. Conflict Resolution Intervention Mechanisms

Lesson One: African Organizations
A significant resource for conflict transformation entry and implementa-
tion are the various African organizations, which have been transformed in
response to fast-changing global dynamics. These include the AU,
NEPAD, and various regional organizations. At present, the AU is the
major continental organization entrusted with maintaining peace and
security in Africa. A key principle in the AU’s Constitutive Act, enshrined
in Article 4 (e), is the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa by African
states themselves. This is supported by another principle: the need to artic-
ulate Africa’s own vision for development and cooperation after years of
marginalization. The main implementation instrument of the AUPSC.
The AU and NEPAD have also developed Africa’s post-conflict reconstruc-

tion policy. While the AU has primary responsibility for peace and security
on the continent, NEPAD supports post-conflict reconstruction and devel-
opment and the mobilization of resources for the AU Peace Fund.12
Lesson Two: Intrastate and Regional Efforts
African organizations are ideally situated on the continent to provide
insider expertise and knowledge in analysing conflict, identifying key
12. Wiseman, Nkhulu. ‘The New Partnership for Africa’s Development: The Journey so Far.’
Midrand, South Africa. NEPAD Secretariat, 2005.
stakeholders for interventions, and developing relevant and realistic inter-

vention plans. An understanding of the conflicts in the regions under con-
sideration reveals that the specific countries within these regions cannot be
regarded as closed, independent entities. On the contrary: the porous bor-
ders and overlapping, multilevel nature of the conflicts indicate that
although intrastate conflict resolution plans may be implemented (for
example, democratic government in Burundi), such interventions and
changes will prove futile unless consideration is also given to resolution
plans for the region as a whole.
The other aspect of this principle is that conflict resolution in Africa has a
better chance of success when there is synergy between the many models
and plans for intervention.
This principle not only ensures broad based support but also ownership of
peacemaking and peacebuilding processes by the people. Empowerment
through direct involvement and ownership of conflict transformation pro-
cesses restores people’s sense of worth and allows for recognition of this
important value.
Lesson Three: Civil-Society Role
A growing strength and resource in Africa is its strong civil society. As
shown by ACCORD and its contribution to the Burundi transformation
process, civil society organizations have a significant role to play, and
should be involved at strategic entry-points and as partners in any conflict
resolution efforts. They can represent the needs and concerns of the peo-
ple, while also serving a monitoring function with regard to actions at the
government level.
4. Conclusion
Practical expressions of the concept of ‘African solutions to African Prob-
lems’ have involved interventions by African states and other actors in con-
flict resolution across various regions of Africa. Two regions where inter-
ventions have registered notable success are the Great lakes Region and the
Horn of Africa. In turn, these interventions have brought to the fore crucial
principles and lessons. One might well argue that these lessons are not nec-
essarily uniquely African. Indeed, experiences from other parts of the world,
particularly the South and the East, are likely to produce similar lessons in
conflict resolutions, especially general lessons that have been nuanced by
culture and tradition. On the other hand, there is no denying that interven-
tions by Africans in African conflicts – particularly as described in the Great
Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa – are uniquely African.
To deny Africa’s unique conflict resolution mechanisms and paint societ-

ies in general with one brush is to commit the error of over-generalization,
to the exclusion of important and unique lessons for intervention. These
lessons are Africa’s contribution to the world in general, and conflict trans-
formation practice in particular, as the continent is poised to claim its
rightful place in the 21st century.
[start kap]
The Evolution of Peace Operations in Africa:

Trajectories and Trends
Cedric de Coning
While Western foreign policy, security and media attention has focused on
Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans over the past decade, Africa has emerged
as the major arena for UN peace operations.1 Of the 16 peace operations
currently managed by the UN Department of Peacekeeping operations, 8
are in Africa.2 This figure includes six of the UN’s seven largest on-going
peace operations and explains why 75% of the approximately 124,000
military, police and civilian UN peacekeepers currently deployed can be
found in Africa. The emphasis on Africa is also reflected in the UN peace-
keeping budget. Of the approximate $8 billion budgeted for 2009/2010,
some 77% is set aside for operations in Africa.
Peace operations are also a dominant theme for the African Union. Over
the past decade, the AU has undertaken three major peace operations of its
own – in Burundi, Sudan and Somalia – involving approximately 14,000
1. This paper will use the term peace operations in its generic form, i.e. to refer to the whole spec-
trum of operations (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) authorized by the United Nations to monitor ceasefire
agreements and/or to support the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements, including
those aspects of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction that fall within the domain of the
UN’s new integrated missions concept. The UN distinguishes between peacekeeping operations
led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and special political missions
directed by Department of Political Affairs and supported by DPKO and Department of Field
Support, such as UNAMA in Afghanistan and BINUB in Burundi.
2. All the United Nations peacekeeping related statistics in this paper, unless otherwise indicated,
is based on the Rev.7, March 2010, DPKO Fact Sheet, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/
factsheet.pdf, last accessed on 13 October 2010.
34 Cedric de Coning
peacekeepers at a total cost of some $1.3 billion.3 Africa is, of course, also
a significant troop contributor to UN peace operations throughout the
world, with 34 African countries contributing approximately 28% of the
UN’s uniformed peacekeepers.
True, the UN missions of the mid- to late-1990s were small and weak. But
the scale of today’s UN peace operations represents a significant shift in the
political will of the international community to invest in peace operations in
Africa, and to use the UN as the vehicle of choice for these types of operations.
On the other hand, the increase in funding for UN peace operations should
not be seen as a concerted effort by the international community, and espe-
cially the West, to improve UN peace operations in the wake of the failures
of the 1990s – although such an effort was indeed made within the UN.
The political willingness to invest approximately $8 billion in UN peace
operations was generated in, and will be sustained by, the post-9/11 belief
that failed states can provide ideal training, staging and breeding grounds
for international terrorists.4 More recently, this assumption has begun to be
challenged, as little evidence has emerged to link the identity of terrorists,
or their training and staging grounds, with failed states in Africa.
However, this assumption remains very influential in Western security

policy circles, and can be seen as the main reason why these countries are
willing to invest, at least financially, in UN and African peace operations.
The result is a kind of informal peacekeeping apartheid, where most Euro-
pean and US peace and stability operations are deployed in NATO or EU
operations in Europe and the Middle East,5 whereas most UN peace oper-
3. For AMIS statistics see ACCORD’s Conflict Trends magazine Issue 4/2005, http://
www.accord.org.za/ct/2005-4/ct4_2005_pgs52_53.pdf [20.05.06]. For AMIB see Aboagye, Festus.
‘The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learned from the First African Union Peacekeeping Oper-
ation’, Conflict Trends, 2, 2004, http://www.accord.org.za/ct/2004-2/CT2_2004%20PG9-15.pdf
[20.05.06].
4. See Traub, James. ‘Making Sense of the Mission,’ New York Times Magazine, 11 April 2004; Ches-
terman, Simon. ‘Bush, the United Nations and Nation-building’, Survival, 46(1), 2004:105; and
Jones, Bruce. Evolving Models of Peacekeeping: Policy Implications and Responses, United Nations
Peacekeeping Best Practice Unit, New York, 2004.
5. de Coning, Cedric. ‘An African Perspective on United Nations Reform’ (Un Point De Vue Africain),
Revue Agir, 22, 2005:126-132.
The Evolution of Peace Operations in Africa: Trajectories and Trends 35
ations troops are based on recruitment from the developing world and are
deployed in Africa.
Whilst this division of roles reflects the macro-pattern, it masks an interest-

ing sub-trend that has emerged over the last few years. Almost a decade after
Somalia and Rwanda resulted in the West withholding its peacekeepers
from the UN and Africa, we now see a new willingness to consider deploy-
ing European peacekeepers to Africa in EU and UN peace operations.
In 2003, the EU deployed operation Artemis in Bunia, in the north-east

of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Artemis was a very short,
focused and robust intervention that augmented the UN peace operation
(MONUC) deployed at the time. It enabled the UN to seek a more robust
mandate for its own operation, and to deploy a new brigade to take over
from Artemis. The success of this mission encouraged the EU to follow up
with further operations.6 From June 2004, the EU deployed approxi-
mately 100 military and 50 police advisors in support of the African Union
Mission in Sudan (AMIS); over the same period, it provided strategic air-
lift to over 2000 AMIS personnel.7 In the context of the 2006 elections,
the EU deployed military and police missions in the DRC in support of
MONUC.8 In 2008, the EU deployed its first fully fledged, stand-alone
peace operation in Africa – European Force (EUFOR) CHAD/CAR –
alongside the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
(MINURCAT). The EU is still very cautiously testing the ground in
Africa. The almost 3,000-strong EU mission in Chad/CAR was strictly
mandated for a one-year period only, ending on 15 March 2009.
6. A report on the lessons learned from Operation Artemis is available at: http://pbpu.unlb.org/
PBPU/view/viewdocument.aspx?id=2&docid=572 [21.05.06].
7. For EU Council support to AMIS, see http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/
EVOD-6PTJP8?OpenDocument of 15 May 2006 [21.05.06]. For a critical review of the AU/
EU partnership in Darfur, see the International Crisis Group’s Africa Report N°99 of 25 Octo-
ber 2005, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3766 [21.05.06]. Total num-
bers from EU Delegation to Washington D.C. Fact Sheet, December 2007, http://www.eurun-
ion.org/newsweb/HotTopics/DarfurEUFactsheetDec2007.doc [10.02.08].
8. For more information on the mandate, structure and budget of the EUFOR R.D. Congo, see the
Joint Action approved by the Council of the European Union on 27 April 2006, http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_116/l_11620060429en00980101.pdf [21.05.06].
36 Cedric de Coning
These EU deployments in Africa, and the EU and NATO support to the

AU missions in Darfur and Somalia, have stimulated debate around
Europe’s and NATO’s future defence and security policies towards Africa.
Several| European countries have indicated a willingness to re-engage with
UN peace operations. As a result of the new UN mission in Lebanon, in
the wake of the Israeli–Hezbollah war, and the re-hatting of some Euro-
pean countries from EUFOR Chad/CAR to MINURCAT, two European
countries – France and Italy – now rank among the top 20 UN Troop
Contributing Countries.
The return of some European TCCs to Africa via UN and EU peace oper-
ations has been motivated by two factors. The first relates to the perceived
capability of the UN to be a credible security actor. Most Europeans fol-
lowed the US lead and turned to NATO when they lost faith in the UN
after the experience of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia
and the UN failures in Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s. However,
whilst NATO performed well in its own backyard, it has been unable to
do the same in Afghanistan, and this has reminded many of the European
countries of the critical role of international legitimacy in the success of
such operations. The UN has in the meantime demonstrated that it is still
the most widely legitimate and credible international vehicle for peace
operations; moreover, it has successfully completed complex UN peace
operations in Sierra Leone and Burundi, and is performing well in Liberia
(UNMIL) and south Sudan (UNMIS). The second reason, somewhat
related to the first, is more strategic, in that European countries have come
to realize that their close association with the Bush regime’s war in Iraq and
its ‘war on terror’ approach towards Palestine, Afghanistan, Iran and Paki-
stan has severely damaged their reputation as independent international
actors. European countries are thus keen, both as individual states and as
the EU, to re-establish themselves as independent agents pursuing their
own national and regional interests, as well as serving global needs – for
instance, by again contributing to UN peace operations. Norway is a good
example of this trend of re-engaging with UN peacekeeping missions.
Norway contributed a hospital to MINURCAT and seems willing to con-
tribute a unit to a post-referendum successor mission to UNMIS.
Troop contributions, however, reflect only one form of support UN mem-

ber states can show towards peace operations. The financing of UN and
African peace operations reveal another facet of support. Through the
assessed contribution system, the USA is responsible for 27% of the UN
peace operations budget, while Europe’s combined contribution represents
approximately 43%. Together, the USA, Japan and Europe are responsible
for approximately 88% of the UN peace operations budget. The USA and
Europe are also the major financial contributors to African peace operations.
The USA and the EU financed approximately 80% of the cost of AMIS and
contributes approximately the same level of support to the ongoing AMI-
SOM. From a UN and African perspective, the USA and Europe thus have
a major political and financial, influence on, and stake in, the future of peace
operations in Africa. They can be expected to have a continued interest in
supporting the development of a balanced capacity to manage conflicts in
Africa that can ensure robustness at all levels – international, regional and
sub-regional – in the international conflict management system.
United Nations Peace Operations

Most contemporary UN peace operations, such as MONUSCO, UNMIL
and UNMIS, are in effect peacebuilding operations: their mandates com-
bine political, security, development, rule of law and human rights dimen-
sions in the post-conflict phase aimed at addressing both the immediate
consequences and root causes of a conflict. The UN–AU hybrid mission
in Darfur is an exception, as it is a stabilization mission deployed in the
wake of a failed peace agreement, with the primary aim of protecting civil-
ians and providing security for the ongoing humanitarian effort, whilst
political efforts are underway to seek a peaceful settlement to the conflict.
The UN’s capability to undertake system-wide peacebuilding operations is

what sets it apart from NATO and the AU. The EU is the only other mul-
tilateral body with the potential to muster a system-wide response, but it
has been unable, to date, to combine its own political, security and devel-
opmental capacities into one mission. Instead, it has – for instance in the
DRC – deployed several military, police, election monitoring, develop-
ment and humanitarian missions alongside each other, without attempt-
ing to bring them all under an overall ‘One EU’ umbrella. The EU is also
38 Cedric de Coning
the only multilateral body with the potential to integrate the trade dimen-
sion into its system-wide approach.
Combining such a diverse range of functions under one institutional

framework has proven a daunting task for the UN.9 To manage these
interdependencies in the field, the UN has developed the ‘Integrated Mis-
sions’ model, essentially aimed at enhancing coherence between the UN
Country Team, which is humanitarian and developmental in focus, and
the UN peace operation, with its focus on peace and security.
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan released a Note on Integrated

Missions that describes the concept as follows: ‘An integrated mission is
based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the pri-
orities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken
at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process,
the UN system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries
emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent
and mutually supportive manner.’10 The current UN missions in Cote
d’Ivoire, the DRC, Haiti, Liberia and (South) Sudan all have Integrated
Mission management structures.
Current UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has re-affirmed the Integrated

Approach as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations
where the UN has a Country Team and a multidimensional peacekeeping
operation, or a political or peacebuilding office, regardless of whether these
missions are structurally integrated or not.11 The 2008 Secretary-General’s
decision on the Integrated Approach differs from the Integrated Missions
concept in that it does not require structural integration, although it pro-
vides for it where appropriate. Instead, the Integrated Approach refers to a
9. Uvin, P. ‘The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Para-

digms’, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 1(1), 2002:5.
10. United Nations. Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, Issued by the Secretary-General on 9
December 2005, paragraph 4. See also the Revised Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, dated
17 January 2006, and released under a Note from the Secretary-General on 9 February 2006, para-
graph 4.
11. Decision Number 2008/24 – Integration, Decisions of the Secretary-General, 25 June 2008 Pol-
icy Committee, United Nations, New York.
strategic partnership between the UN peacekeeping operation and the UN

Country Team that ensures that all components of the UN system operate
in a coherent and mutually supportive manner, and in close collaboration
with other partners. As with any new innovation, this model has not been
without its detractors, and it has highlighted various technical, administra-
tive, organizational and budgetary challenges that need to be overcome
before all aspects of the model can be fully implemented.
The AU in particular has started to adopt some of the Integrated Missions

terminology in its missions, and for the African Standby Force concept. 12
Here it is important to distinguish between the scope for integration that
exists within the UN system, and that of the African Union. Although, it
is possible, under certain circumstances, to integrate the UN Resident
Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) function in UN peace
operations to establish an UN ‘Integrated Mission’, it is inconceivable that
the UN RC/HC function can be integrated with AU, EU, NATO, or any
other non-UN peace operation, because the humanitarian and develop-
ment coordination mandate has been entrusted to the UN system. 13 This
does not mean it is impossible for the UN development and humanitarian
coordination system to work with AU, EU or NATO peace operations –
because such collaboration did take place in Darfur, Chad and Afghani-
stan – but it is inconceivable that they can be ‘integrated’ with the same
technical meaning that this concept implies in the UN system context.
Instead, ‘integration’ in the AU context is used in a generic sense to refer
to multidimensional coordination and cooperation.
Another trend is the new more robust approach to the use of force that has
become a defining characteristic of complex UN peace operations. Con-
temporary UN peace operations in Africa are still grounded in, and char-
acterized by, the core UN peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality
and the minimum use of force – but the practical interpretation and appli-
cation of these principles have undergone significant development.
12. de Coning, C. & Kasumba, Y. (eds.). The Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force, Dur-
ban: African Union & ACCORD, 2010.
13. General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 14 April 1992.
40 Cedric de Coning
‘Consent’ still implies that the parties to the conflict must invite the UN
presence and agree on its role, but it is now recognized that strategic consent
at the level of the leadership of the parties to the conflict does not necessarily
translate into operational and tactical consent at all levels in the field.
‘Impartiality’ still implies that UN peace operations will not take sides in
the conflict among the parties to the conflict, but the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) now distinguishes between impartial-
ity and neutrality; in most contemporary missions with a civilian protec-
tion mandate, UN peace operations will not remain neutral if civilians are
in imminent threat of danger.
‘Minimum use of force’ still implies that a UN peace operation is to use

the minimum amount of force necessary to protect itself and others cov-
ered by its mandate, but it is now understood that such operations should
have the capacity and mandate to prevent or counter serious threats,
including threats to those it is mandated to protect.
One innovation to emerge out of the nexus between peacebuilding and

robust peace operations in the context of MONUC was collaborative offen-
sive operations. MONUC was operating alongside, and in support of, the
integrated brigades of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (the FARDC), in offensive operations aimed at protecting civilians
and forcefully disarming armed groups. This trend, where the UN assists
with the establishment of new security services, and then supports them in
the peace consolidation phase to deal with spoilers or other remaining secu-
rity threats, is likely to continue, as it is motivated by two constant realities.
The UN is rarely, if ever, likely to have the resources to control the security
situation on its own; even if it did, it would be undesirable for it to do so
beyond the stabilization phase, as the logic of local ownership and occupa-
tion fatigue dictate that the responsibility for security should be handed
over to local agents as soon as this can be reasonably achieved.
Another pertinent example of the trend towards greater synergy and cohe-
sion across the traditional security/ development divide is the way in which
the protection of civilians is emerging as a common theme for both the
humanitarian and peace operations community. Since 1999, seven UN
peace operations – Burundi, Haiti, Cote d’Ivoire, the DRC, Sierra Leone,
Liberia and Sudan – have been mandated to protect civilians under immi-
nent threat of violence.14 The Protection of Civilians will be one of the dom-
inant themes of UN peace operations in the short to medium term, and is
increasingly also influence doctrinal thinking in the AU, EU and NATO.
African Peace Operations

Over the past half-decade, the AU, and RECs like the ECOWAS, IGAD
and SADC, have significantly increased their capacity to undertake and
manage peace operations. The AU, in particular, has played a leading role
with its first three peace operations – AMIB in Burundi, AMIS in Darfur
and AMISOM in Somalia.15
One of the most significant developments in the African context is the

informal division of roles that has emerged around the sequencing of peace
operations. The pattern that is taking shape is that the AU, or one of the
RECs, first deploys a stabilization operation, followed by a UN peacebuild-
ing operation within approximately 90 to 120 days. This pattern was estab-
lished in Burundi, where the AU deployed AMIB in 2003 followed by a
UN operation (ONUB) in 2004; it was repeated in Liberia, where ECO-
WAS deployed ECOMIL in 2003, followed by a UN operation (UNMIL)
later on the same year. This sequencing of operations appears to work well
because it utilizes the respective strengths of the UN, AU and RECs. The
UN is averse to deploying peace operations in situations where a compre-
hensive peace agreement is not yet in place, and when it does receive the
green light to deploy, it needs approximately 90 days to muster the political
process necessary to plan, organize and deploy a complex peace operation.
African regional organizations, on the other hand, seem more willing to

undertake stabilization operations – especially when they have been
14. See Holt, V. K. ‘The Military and Civilian Protection: Developing Roles and Capacities’ in Vic-
toria Wheeler and Adele Harmar, Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in Military-
Humanitarian Relations, HPG Report 21, March 2006.
15. The African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) had approximately 8,000 personnel and its budget for 1
July 2005 to 30 June 2006 was approximately US$ 466 million. The African Mission in Burundi
(AMIB) had approximately 3335 personnel and its budget for 2004 was approximately US$ 134
million.
42 Cedric de Coning
involved in brokering a ceasefire, and feel obliged to build on that momen-

tum. Although the AU and some of the RECs are capable of deploying mil-
itary forces that can achieve limited stabilization mandates, they generally
lack the staying power and multidimensional capability of the UN neces-
sary to transition from a security-focused stabilization mission to a complex
peacebuilding mission. These African missions are also dependent on
financial support from the West, and the countries providing this support
are generally eager to transfer these mandates to the UN so that the UN’s
assessed contribution system can kick in and take over the financial burden.
Africa now has a more comprehensive peace and security architecture in

place than at any other time since the OAU was founded in 1963. Many
of the new structures, however, still need to become fully operational. 16 A
major shortcoming of today’s AU is the lack of institutional capacity, espe-
cially human resources, to adequately develop policy, plan and manage
peace operations.17 The AU has significantly less staff, dedicated to the
planning and management of peace operations, than its UN and EU coun-
terparts, even when taking the number and scope of mission managed into
account. Donors interested in investing in African peace operations capac-
ity need to understand that investments in training and equipping peace-
keepers are unlikely to prove sustainable unless matched by a correspond-
ing investment in developing an appropriate headquarter capacity.
The single most important factor for the future of peace operations in
Africa is how they are financed. The AU experience has shown that even
relatively small un-armed military observer missions may prove too costly
to be financed solely from its own budget or from the African Peace Fund.
Instead the AU, and the OAU before it, has to rely on voluntary contribu-
tions to finance its peace missions.18 The only exceptions thus far have
been the role Nigeria played in financing the ECOMOG missions in
16. Bakwesegha, C.J. ‘The need to strengthen regional organizations: A rejoinder’, Security Dialogue,
24(4) 1993:377–81.
17. Berman, E. & Sams. K. Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities, Geneva:
UNIDIR, 2000.
18. See African Union. Policy Framework for the Establishment of an African Stand-by Force and the
Military Staff Committee (Part I1 – Annexes), 12–14 May 2003, Addis Ababa, Exp/ASF-MSC/
2(1), http://www.iss.org.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/aurep.htm, [25.05.06].
Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, and the role played by South Africa
in supporting the AMIB mission in Burundi. Otherwise, the AU remains
dependent on voluntary contributions to finance its peace operations. This
is problematic, because such dependency on external resources denies the
AU the freedom to take independent decisions on strategic, operational
and even tactical aspects of the peace operations it may wish to under-
take.19 The availability of funding determines the number of troops, the
nature of their equipment and support, the duration of the mission and
various other aspects of the mission. For instance, the AU has increased the
approved strength of AMISOM to 20,000 in July 2010, but as the AU is
unlikely to obtain sufficient funding for a mission of that size, it will prob-
ably have to make do with a mission that is less than half the size that they
assess that they need to achieve their stated objectives. As a result of
depending on voluntary contributions, AU peace operations are likely to
have to make do with considerably less resources than the UN, EU or
NATO would be willing to accept for similar missions. Finding the appro-
priate balance between African and partner interests will thus probably be
the dominant feature of the relations between these partners over the short
to medium term.
Conclusion
The scale of contemporary UN peace operations – 16 peace operations
across 5 continents with a total deployment of approximately 124,000
civilian, police and military peacekeepers at a cost of approximately $8 bil-
lion a year – represents a significant shift in the political will of the inter-
national community to invest in UN peace operations.
Although a macro-pattern has developed whereby most European and US

peace and stability operations are deployed in NATO or EU operations in
Europe and the Middle East, whilst most UN peace operations troops rely
on recruitment from the developing world and deployed in Africa, there is
19. de Coning, C. ‘The Role of the OAU in Conflict Management in Africa, Conflict Management,
Peacekeeping and Peace-Building’, in Lessons for Africa from a Seminar Past, ISS Monograph
Series, 10, April 1997, Midrand, http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/No10/DeConing.html
[25.05.06].
44 Cedric de Coning
now a new willingness in Europe to consider deploying some of its peace-

keepers to Africa in EU or UN peace operations.
The USA and Europe have major political and financial influence on, and
stakes in, the future of peace operations in Africa. They are likely to have
a continued interest in supporting the development of a balanced capacity
to manage conflicts in Africa that can ensure robustness at all levels – inter-
national, regional and sub-regional – in the international conflict manage-
ment system.
Over the past half-decade, the AU and RECs like ECOWAS, IGAD and
SADC have significantly increased their capacity to undertake and manage
peace operations. The AU in particular has played a leading role by deploy-
ing its first three peace operations – AMIB in Burundi, AMIS in Darfur
and AMISOM in Somalia. One of the most significant developments in
the African context is the informal division of roles that has emerged
around the sequencing of peace operations. The pattern now taking shape
is that the AU, or one of the RECs, first deploys a stabilization operation,
which is then followed by a UN peace consolidation operation, once a
comprehensive peace process is in place.
The single most important factor for the future of peace operations in
Africa is how they are financed: that determines the size, scope and dura-
tion of the missions, and thus has a direct bearing on their impact. To
finance its peace operations, the AU has to rely on voluntary contribu-
tions, the bulk of which have come from the USA and Europe to date. This
is problematic because the AU cannot take decisions on its own on many
strategic, operational and even tactical aspects of the operations it under-
takes, as the size, scope, duration and various other aspects will be deter-
mined by the resources available, and these are neither predictable nor
known long in advance. Finding an appropriate balance between African
and partner interests seems set to be the dominant feature of relations
between the AU and its financing partners over the short to medium term.
[start kap]
Understanding the relationship between

the UN, EU & AU in African Peacekeeping
Kwesi Aning
There is a deepening relationship between the African Union, the Euro-

pean Union and the United Nations in their efforts to respond collectively
to Africa’s security challenges – those posed by collaborative multidimen-
sional peace support operations in particular. The need to unravel and
understand the multiple facets and dynamics of such relationships between
the AU, EU and the UN was captured in a UNSC Presidential Statement
of 28 March 2007.1 Here, the UNSC re-affirmed its primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with
the UN Charter. However, it also recognized the critical role of regional
organizations like the EU and AU in the prevention, management and res-
olution of conflicts. A process was initiated that sought to identify and
clarify the available options, processes and procedures through which the
UN could improve its support and arrangements for cooperation and
coordination, particularly with the AU, under Chapter VIII arrange-
ments.2 Such clarification sought to deepen their relationship in areas of
common interest, particularly in peacekeeping, by focusing on promoting
and broadening the dialogue and cooperation between the UNSC and the
AUPSC. But while the AU’s collaboration on peacekeeping with the UN
has been useful, it is through the EU – with its provision of consistent
1. UN Security Council S/PRST/2007/7

2. There is a long history to UN-regional organizations relationships. Some of the most important
documentation to this end is:. UNSC Resolution 1625 (14 September 2005) on the effectiveness
of the UNSC’s role in conflict prevention. This resolution called for the strengthening of coop-
eration and communication between the UN and sub-regional organizations in accordance with
Chapter VIII; also UNSC Resolution 1631 (17 October 2005), which was the first resolution
adopted by the UNSC on regional organizations. A good source for an overview of UNSC Res-
olutions, Presidential Statements, Letters, Secretary-General’s Reports, General Assembly Reso-
lutions, UNSC Debates can be found at www.securitycouncilreport.org
46 Kwesi Aning
funding options through the African Peace Facility (APF) – that the AU
managed to sustain its peacekeeping engagement in Darfur through the
operations of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). AMIS became the new
AU’s flagship operation because it was the most comprehensive peacekeep-
ing operation undertaken by this young organization, and much depended
on its success if the AU were to gain internal gravitas and the wider recog-
nition that it could operate in the big league of international institutions. 3
In this chapter, I discuss some of the challenges of coordination between

the UN, EU and AU in multinational and multifunctional peace support
operations in Africa. It is clear that these institutions are distinct, separate
bodies, with individual comparative advantages, internal structures, capa-
bilities, experiences and roles. However, because the AU suffers from
financial and human resource constraints, the relationship among these
institutions has been characterized as ‘vacillat[ing] between paternalism
and partnership,’4 although there is also recognition that the international
community is ‘witnessing the emergence of a UN–AU partnership partic-
ularly in peace operations.’5 While that argument is correct, I will posit
that the critical point is to identify where the gaps are, and to improve this
relationship characterized as either ‘emerging,’ or ‘unique.’ It is essential to
understand the challenges that such tripartite or multilateral engagements
entail and to propose schemes for improved partnerships in multilateral
peace support operations. Some of the factors affecting such inter-organi-
zational coordination of peace operations will be analysed here. Finally, I
offer some recommendations that emphasize areas in need of attention for
enhancing future UN–EU–AU coordination.
Situating AU, EU and UN relations

The role and placement of regional organizations like the AU and EU were
critical during the negotiation stages of the UN. The outcome was Chapter
VIII, which acknowledges both the scope for contribution but subordinate
3. See for example, Bah, Sarjoh. ‘Dilemmas of Regional Peacemaker: the dynamics of AU’s response
to Darfur.’ Centre on International Cooperation, New York University, 2010
4. Murithi, Tim. ‘Between paternalism and hybrid operations: the emerging UN and African rela-
tionship in peace operations.’ Friederich Ebert Stiftung, Briefing Paper no. 2 on Dialogue on
Globalisation, 2010:1.
5. Ibid.
Understanding the relationship between the UN, EU & AU in African Peacekeeping 47
capacity of regional organizations to the settlement of disputes. Despite

this recognition, there is some ambiguity about the exact nature of regional
arrangements. While Article 52(1) states that nothing in the Charter pre-
cludes ‘the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with
such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity as are appropriate for regional action,’ Article 53(1) ensures the
supremacy of the Council in peace and security matters. It states:
The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional

arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its author-
ity. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of
the Security Council.
To that end, Article 54 ensures that the Security Council is kept fully
informed of activities undertaken by regional organizations for the main-
tenance of international peace and security. While the Charter offers the
legal basis for interaction between the UN and regional organizations, the
Council’s practice has not been consistent when recognizing or authoriz-
ing the actions of an organization to lead peace operations.
As a result, from the 1990s the UN began to pay more attention to regional
organizations. In January 1992, the Security Council met at the level of
heads of state and asked the Secretary-General to recommend ways of
strengthening the UN for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-
keeping. An Agenda for Peace, issued in June 1992, was the UN’s response
where the role of regional organizations in preventive diplomacy, early
warning systems for crisis prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace
building were highlighted. It marked the birth of the concept of a ‘regional-
global security partnership.’ In Larger Freedom (2005) recognized this
emerging relationship and argued for the ‘establishment of an interlocking
system of peacekeeping capacities’ that would allow the UN to work with
the AU and EU in predictable and reliable partnerships.6
6. For further work on this, see ‘Report of the African Union – United Nations panel on modalities
for support to African Union peacekeeping operations,’ S/2008/813, 31 December 2008 and
‘Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between the United Nations and regional
organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and
security’: S/2008/186 7 April 2008.
48 Kwesi Aning
Interpretation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter

In this chapter, I discuss the emerging partnership and challenges between
the UN, EU and AU in peace operations. This relationship is predomi-
nantly founded on a mutual bond characterized by resource dependency,
legitimacy and sharing of emerging common values. Whereas the UN, EU
and AU have different internal structures, levels of experience and
resources for peacekeeping operations, and therefore different comparative
advantages for peace operations in Africa, there is a political willingness to
deepen this relationship, although these ‘unequal’ traits impact on inter-
organizational coordination. Recognition of such differential strengths has
resulted in this partnership being described as ‘an asymmetric[al] relation-
ship’, and a caution to the AU not to descend into a ‘relationship of hybrid
paternalism.’7
Irrespective of these concerns, the UN still remains flexible, employs com-

paratively efficient mechanisms for large-scale resource management, and
acts with the full legitimacy of the international community. However,
political realities and decision-making procedures sometimes do work
against timely deployment and sustained engagement in areas of fragile or
failed peace. Procedures for accommodating the emerging peacekeeping
partnerships, and a modus operandi for interacting with regional organiza-
tions, are being formalized and continuously refined.8
The EU has at its disposal a range of tools for conflict prevention and crisis
management, and it is currently engaged in several missions Africa. In
addition, the EU provides funding to support conflict prevention, crisis
management and capacity building, through mechanisms such as the APF.
However, the EU has difficulties in coordinating its member states and
institutions when it comes to foreign and security policy. This creates
problems in relations with third countries and international organizations.
Other regional organizations, like the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), can serve as key partners to the UN in main-
7. See Murithi, Tim. ‘The African Union’s evolving role in peace operations: the AU Mission in
Burundi, Sudan and Somalia’, African Security Review, 17(1), 2007:72ff.
8. See Joint Communique agreed by the UNSC and AUPSC, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 16 June
2007.
taining international peace and security. This is the reason why when the
AU undertakes peace and security interventions: it perceives its actions as
a contribution to the UN and the general international community and
therefore expects to be supported.9 However, the UNSC response to deci-
sions made by other regional organizations in terms of peacekeeping has
been ad hoc. As a result, there is a need to discuss what exactly the term
partnership means as this gives rise to several questions about the nature of
such relationships. For example, to what extent can the UN support deci-
sions taken by the AU outside the remit of the UNSC? What does delega-
tion of authority mean?
With the increase in the interfaces and synergies between the UN and
regional organizations, the AU in particular, there appears to be recogni-
tion that the roles played by both the AU and EU as components of mul-
tilateralism are desirable, feasible and necessary. Such collaboration con-
tributes to deepening the possibility of establishing global-regional
mechanisms for maintaining international peace and security. This is
based on the recognition of the need for greater involvement by both the
AU and EU in conflict prevention and management in their respective
regions, and in cooperation with the UN. These multiple facets of engage-
ment underpin the vision of a ‘mutually-reinforcing regional-global mech-
anism’ for peace and security.10 This mechanism can be effective if there is
a combination of flexibility with impartiality, and pragmatism with con-
sistency. Such an approach will reduce the endemic uncertainties and
occasional tensions between the UN, as responsible for international peace
and security, and the AU, which plays a supporting role.
However, much as there is a recognition of the potential and reality for

greater AU and EU involvement in conflict prevention and management
in Africa, in cooperation with the UN, the real challenge is to replace the
improvised, politically-selective, resource-skewed approach to regionalism
with a more planned, consistent yet flexible, and resource-balanced style of
9. See African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.145 (VIII). In this resolution by African Heads of State
and Government, they stated inter alia ‘…we will also bear in mind that in taking initiatives for
the promotion of peace and security in Africa in terms of chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the
AU is also acting on behalf of the international community.’
10. A/61/204 – S/2006/590.
50 Kwesi Aning
regional and global governance on the part of the UNSC.11 Recent trends
have seen a move away from exclusive reliance on UN-commanded peace
operations in favour of ‘hybrid’ operations in which the UN and the AU
cooperate over the same mission. But there are gaps in determining
whether this development represents a paradigm shift.
Coordination and consultation mechanisms

Improved partnerships between the UN and AU assume, by extension,
that there will be coordination and consultation mechanisms between the
UNSC and AUPSC. Such mechanisms have been established; indeed,
since 2004 several meetings have been held between the AUPSC and
UNSC. Here the AUPSC serves as a fulcrum of a new arrangement that
can provide a clear and structured paradigm on security and how to con-
struct a security architecture for the African continent.12 The objectives of
the AUPSC include the promotion of peace, security and stability in
Africa, the anticipation and prevention of conflicts and the promotion of
peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. Furthermore, it has been
established as a standing decision-making organ intended to function as a
collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and
efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.
Following its establishment in March 2004, the UNSC adopted two Pres-
idential Statements13 recognizing the importance of strengthening cooper-
ation with the AU in order to help build its capacity to deal with security
challenges. This cooperation has been emphasized in a UNSC resolution 14
expressing support for the establishment of a ten-year capacity-building
programme for the AU.
11. See AU-UN. ‘Report of the African Union-United Nations panel on modalities for support to
African Union peacekeeping operations.’ A/63/666-S/2008/813, 2008 [hereinafter the Prodi
Report].
12. Aning, Kwesi. ‘The African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture: defining an emerging
response mechanism’, paper presented at Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden. September 2008
13. S/PRST/2004/27 and S/PRST/2004/44
14. UNSC Resolution 1625, 2005
UN, EU & AU cooperation in peacekeeping

Both the EU and AU have become significant contributors to interna-
tional endeavours to support states in transition from armed violence to
sustainable peace. Both organizations have shown remarkable growth in
their commitment to peacekeeping, especially in Africa and Europe. The
EU and AU are distinguished by their intimate local knowledge, expertise
in specific issue-areas, as well as their material and personnel resources. In
this sense, the AU has been active in Burundi, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and the Sudan, with sub-
stantial EU support for AMIS.
Today the nature and characteristics of UN and AU cooperation in peace-

keeping are among the most contentious issues – at least, with reference to
the case of the AU. While the AU has started and assiduously continued
with the groundwork and processes for establishing a system of Standby
Forces, this process recognizes the importance of the UN framework, both
in legal terms and in terms of the standards necessary in operations and in
training. The basic assumption is that the ASF will undertake peacekeep-
ing activities which will, in due course, be handed over to the UN. Accord-
ingly, AU and regional operations should be designed with a view to even-
tually handing over mandates and responsibilities to the UN.15
Some crucial issues that need to be addressed are early planning and the
emerging challenges of the start-up phase of an operation. Other important
areas relate to initial deployment and pre-mandate requirements of the AU.
Responding to these identified challenges will enable the AU to intervene
before funds are made available by the international community, whether
through assessed contributions mandated by member states or bilateral
donors. Since the nature of crises in Africa often necessitates a quick
response, a critical question arises: how can the AU obtain the funding
needed for deploying African troops immediately at the onset of a crisis?
With the increasing and deepening relationship between the UN and AU

has come a determined and rolling endeavour by several partner institu-
15. See the Prodi Report.

52 Kwesi Aning
tions – the EU in particular – to support Africans with a range of financing

options and capacity-building schemes designed to develop and enhance
the quality and quantity of African peace operation capabilities or African
contributions as part of UN operations. Parts of these support packages
have been primarily intended to support African capacities for launching,
leading and sustaining peacekeeping interventions under the auspices of
the AU and/or one or more of its sub-regional organizations.
While the AU has shown a remarkable political will to keep the peace, there
is also no doubt that peacekeeping has grown exponentially in the midst of
competing political and budgetary requirements. As a consequence, the
UN is not always able to find the funding mechanisms with the appropriate
flexibility, sustainability and predictability to enable the rapid deployment
of AU troops. To resolve this challenge, the UN, EU and AU must strive
to reinforce a collective approach to funding peacekeeping operations.16
Discussions pertaining to UN financing of peacekeeping operations under-
taken by the AU have gained momentum recently, especially in the context
of support to African peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Darfur and
Somalia. Although the AU has demonstrated the political will to tackle cur-
rent and emerging conflicts, timely responses have often been hampered by
the lack of critical logistical and financial resources.
Part of the broader discourse around the AU’s political will to engage in
peace support operations is that when it engages in such operations –
either with UN support (as in Darfur) or without (as in Somalia) – it does
so in order to stabilize a potentially dangerous situation and create favour-
able conditions for an international peacekeeping operation, on the basis
of the principles of complementarily, subsidiarity and collective solidarity.
That makes it critical to examine the institutional arrangements for sus-
taining the capacities of the AU to respond effectively to new and emerg-
ing international realities and global challenges that have contributed to
exposing the weaknesses of ad hoc arrangements.
16. See UNSC Resolution 1809, 2008:4 which welcomed the Secretary General’s proposal to set up
within three months ‘an African Union-United Nations panel (…) to consider in-depth the
modalities of how to support such peacekeeping operations, in particular start-up funding,
equipment and logistics.’
Building capacity for AU peace support operations

Since the mid-1990s, capacity building has become a buzzword of choice
by external agencies seeking to support their partners. Whilst understand-
ing of this term differs, capacity building should go beyond what it is cur-
rently perceived as being – i.e. the basic provision of training – to include
a combination of factors and activities focused on improving an organiza-
tion’s performance in relation to its mission, working environment and
practical resources. Capacity building becomes necessary when an organi-
zation lacks or falls short of the various resources (human, financial and
logistical) needed to effectively implement its mandate. The primary goals
of such processes are to increase organizational effectiveness and nurture
ownership of its activities.
In recognition of this capacity gap within the AU’s peacekeeping ability,

the 2005 World Summit called for the ‘forging of predictable partnerships
and arrangements between the United Nations and regional organizations’
and ‘a strong African Union’. The Summit expressed its ‘support for the
development and implementation of a ten-year plan for capacity-building
with the African Union’. Furthermore the Security Council called on
‘states and international organizations to contribute to strengthening the
capacity of …African regional and sub-regional organizations in conflict
prevention and crisis management, and in post-conflict stabilization.17 It
was within this context that the EU established the APF. In the case of the
AU, the aspect of its peace and security architecture that has received the
most interest from partners in terms of concerted capacity-building assis-
tance and support has been the African Standby Force (ASF) which is the
tool envisioned to undertake African peace support operations. There is,
however, recognition that while external initiatives have helped to improve
African peace support capacities, the level of external assistance has been
lower than expected, and has not always focused on key African concerns.
In particular, the AU has not always been fully involved in determining the
nature and scope of such initiatives.
17. UNSC Resolution 1631, 2005.

54 Kwesi Aning
The UN’s modalities for supporting the AU’s peacekeeping capacity build-
ing are guided by recommendations in a report of the Secretary-General18
which resulted in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) beginning, in 2006, a processes to ‘implement a comprehensive
program of support for African peacekeeping capacities’ and ‘further
develop the guiding principles for strengthening cooperation with regional
arrangements. The DPKO’s objective is to support the AU in the establish-
ment of an African Peace and Security Architecture through the establish-
ment of the ASF as envisaged in the African Union’s paper “Vision 2010”’.
In this connection, the DPKO emphasizes the importance of reflecting the

requirements of multidimensional peacekeeping and integrated planning,
and of ensuring that the long-term approach is taken into account in the
AU’s planning for peacekeeping.
In order to accelerate the UN’s commitment to support African peace-
keeping capacity building, the DPKO through the African Union Peace-
keeping Support Team (AUPST), provides expertise and transfer of tech-
nical know-how to the AU Peace Support Operations Division
(AUPSOD). This co-location of UN staff in the operational structures of
the AU is an innovative and completely new approach established through
mutual consent. The AUPST, which became operational in January 2007,
focuses on three priority areas: mission planning, mission management, and
logistic and resource management, within the overall context of an inte-
grated, inclusive and long-term capacity-building engagement.
The EU’s contribution for the enhancement of AU peacekeeping capacity

and its long-term capacity building is an ongoing one. There is no doubt that
there will be a need for continued collaborative work by UN DPKO, EU and
the AU’s PSOD to develop longer-term training implementation plans to
support the operational development of the ASF in a progressive manner.
18. See ‘Enhancement of African Peacekeeping Capacity’ of 30 November 2004 (A/59/591) and the
subsequent World Summit Outcomes Document of 2005 which set the context for the United
Nations 10 year capacity building programme for the AU.
Conclusion
While the peacekeeping partnership between the AU and the UN and EU
is desirable, several challenges remain as regards the political and strategic
calculations of all institutions involved and the operational difficulties of
emplacing troops in theatre. On the other hand, thanks to the willingness
of these institutions to respond to certain glaring cases of atrocities and to
prevent their recurrence, there is a general belief that such collaborative
processes are set to continue.
These developments are encouraging, but the opportunities and challenges

identified in this chapter remain critical points for ensuring more func-
tional and effective cooperation and coordination with regional arrange-
ments. Such collaboration must be premised on a clear division of labour
which recognizes the relative advantages of each organization. To this end,
more work needs to be done on how the UN can better support arrange-
ments for further cooperation and coordination with the African Union
on Chapter VIII arrangements to contribute to addressing common secu-
rity challenges and deepening and broadening dialogue and cooperation
between the UN Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of
the African Union.
[start kap]
Regional Mechanisms and African Peacekeeping:

ECOWAS, IGAD & SADC
Funmi Olonisakin
This chapter makes two inter-related arguments. First, African peacekeep-

ing and peace support operations will be only as effective as regional mech-
anisms allow them to be. Second, Africa’s strategic environment – and by
implication, its regional security environment – is a dynamic one. Plan-
ning for African peacekeeping and peace support operations must be suf-
ficiently adaptable to this reality if they are to remain relevant. In this
regard, the real challenge that confronts peace support planning is that of
the capacity to respond to ‘moving targets’.
In its bid to respond to crisis and undertake effective conflict management

on the continent, the African Union has sought to operationalize various
aspects of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). A promi-
nent part of the APSA is the African Standby-Force (ASF), which will
comprise five regional brigades when it becomes operational in 2010:
• Central – Economic Community of Central African States Standby

Brigade (ECCAS Standby Brigade)
• East – Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG),
• North – Northern African Regional Capability (NARC)
• South – Southern African Development Community Brigade (SAD-
CBRIG)
• West – ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF).
The AUPSC is the sole decision-making authority for mandating and ter-
minating AU peace support operations. By implication therefore, ASF
peace operations will be under the political control of the AU. The various
RECs and related mechanisms thus constitute important building blocks
58 Funmi Olonisakin
for realizing such AU-authorized peace operations. There is collective rec-

ognition that the success of the ASF and related peace operations depends
in large part on the relationship between the AU and RECs – of which
ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC are integral parts.
The extent to which the AU–REC relationship, and by extension the ASF
operationalization, will be successful will depend largely on realities on the
ground in the various sub-regions. This chapter reflects on these realities
as they relate to the sub-regions in which ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC
operate and in turn relate to the wider continental security agenda. It
argues that the reality on the ground in these sub-regions makes it difficult
to achieve the goals of the APSA, not least the peacekeeping and peace sup-
port agenda sought for the ASF. A look at organizational coherence and
progress with the development of regional brigades as well as the overall
security situations in these regions can offer some insights into the poten-
tial for effective peacekeeping and peace support operations in Africa.
Gearing up for ASF Operationalization in ECOWAS,

IGAD and SADC
The relationship between RECs and the AU is governed by a common
understanding, most visibly manifested in the process of establishing the
ASF. The June 2008 Memorandum of Understanding between the AU
and the RECs highlighted cooperation in several important areas includ-
ing, fundamentally, to contribute to the full operationalization and effec-
tive functioning of the APSA.1 The MoU further reflects the common
understanding that the RECs are to serve as a crucial building block for
operationalization of the APSA. The establishment of the ASF represents
an important test of this understanding.
Some regional mechanisms have made considerable progress towards the

objective of establishing the five regional brigades by 2010. In all, four
regions – West Africa, Southern Africa, the Horn of Africa and Central
Africa – have made reasonable advances towards the creation of standby
1. AU, Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the area of peace and security between
the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of
the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa, June 2008.
Regional Mechanisms and African Peacekeeping: ECOWAS, IGAD & SADC 59
brigades, albeit to varying degrees. Not surprisingly, the West African sub-
region, in which the Economic Community of West African States has had
considerable peacekeeping experience and institutionalized its ECO-
MOG2 force as part of its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Man-
agement, is ahead of other regions in the move towards ASF establishment.
Its timeframe for ECOWAS Standby Force development is ahead of the
target set at the all-African level. The ESF will comprise over 5,000 troops
within pre-determined units, ready to deploy within 90 days. The ESF
Task Force of approximately 2,700 troops is already in place.
Also the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has made

progress, having launched its emergency Brigade in September 2007 and
subsequently undertaken activities toward operationalizing the force. At
the launch, the force consisted of 564 soldiers from 11 SADC countries. 3
This became the second standby peacekeeping force on the continent after
ECOMOG. The force will operate under the SADC Organ on Politics,
Defence and Security, with the planning elements in the SADC headquar-
ters in Gaborone as its only permanent structure, receiving guidance from
SADC Chiefs of Defence. A Memorandum of Understanding was con-
cluded by the states contributing to this force to ensure a sound legal basis
for collaboration and joint operations.
Like ECOWAS and SADC, the Intergovernmental Authority on Devel-

opment (IGAD) is one of the eight RECs recognized by the AU, particu-
larly in working toward the operationalization of APSA. In 2004, EAS-
BRIG was established under the aegis of the IGAD. But in 2007, the task
of coordinating EASBRIG in preparation for the ASF was transferred from
IGAD to a new independent secretariat, the EASBRIG Coordination
Mechanism (EASBRICOM), operating from Nairobi. Apart from the fact
that IGAD itself had been plagued by conflict within and between mem-
ber states for some time, the decision to separate EASBRIG coordination
2. The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) initially deployed in Liberia in 1990
and subsequently in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau.
3. These included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swazi-
land, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
60 Funmi Olonisakin
into a new secretariat was informed in part by the fact that several states
were members of EASBRIG, but not of IGAD.
EASBRIG, with participation from 13 member states, has nonetheless pro-

ceeded to establish an organizational vision and a strategic development
plan, which was adopted in December 2007 with support from the inter-
national community. The EASBRIG Planning Element (PLANELM) and
Brigade Headquarters are already in place. Its Command Post Exercise held
in November 2008 in Nairobi, a precursor to the field training exercise
planned for December 2009, is a good indicator of progress toward achiev-
ing its ASF targets. However, the separation of EASBRIG from IGAD pre-
sents several challenges, as further discussed below.
Problems of Organizational Coherence Might

Stall Progress
Despite this tangible progress in the preparation for the ASF within the
ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC regions, these relative successes are qualified
by issues of organizational development. As evident in the case of IGAD,
these are likely to complicate ASF-related peace operations. In the three
sub-regions under discussion here, the initial approach of developing each
standby brigade under the umbrella of the REC concerned seemed logical,
for several reasons. First, the existing political and decision-making struc-
tures and processes of these institutions, to varying degrees, allowed for the
systematic inclusion of standby arrangements. The authorization and
coordination of regional planning brigades could be readily accommo-
dated within these structures. In the case of ECOWAS, this was seamless
since ECOMOG had already been institutionalized as a standby force
arrangement for the sub-region. Similarly, SADC’s Organ on Politics,
Defence and Security could readily accommodate such an arrangement.
Secondly, the existing headquarters structures of these organizations could

provide support for the planning of the regional standby brigades. It was
therefore logical that the planning elements of the standby brigades should be
coordinated within the various headquarters. Moreover, these RECs also had
a framework that made it relatively easy to systematize linkages with the AU.
However, of the three RECs, IGAD has appeared the least coherent in
terms of the development of its institutional frameworks, and that might
affect the preparation for continental peacekeeping. Achieving the type of
coherence seen in ECOWAS and SADC has been difficult in an IGAD
region in which several states are dealing with conflict within or between
each other, which in turn creates potential conflicts of interest as regards
addressing overall regional security issues. Furthermore, IGAD is the only
one of the three organizations that has had non-members participate in the
standby brigade arrangement. These factors complicated the development
of EASBRIG and eventually led to the establishment of a separate secretar-
iat, EASBRICOM.
Despite the obvious progress realized in the preparation for the ASF, this
separation of EASBRIG from IGAD gives rise to several questions. One
relates to political backing for troop deployment for peace operations.
Although this is already backed by an MoU in SADC and part of a Protocol
in ECOWAS, a separate arrangement might be required in EASBRICOM,
which is more of a coordinating agency rather than a political authority. An
agreement between the participating states and the AU might offer the way
forward in terms of providing troops for AU operations.
A second and related factor is that support for the EASBRICOM has come
largely from the wider international community, and much of its legiti-
macy derives from this. The question then arises as to the extent to which
African leaders consider EASBRICOM a legitimate actor in the larger
security discourse on the continent. Third, this situation is compounded
by the possible expansion of the mandate of EASBRIG beyond its initial
military focus, to political activities such as early warning, dialogue and
mediation capacity – traditional focal areas of IGAD. This potential over-
lap in mandate and duplication of roles is an emerging source of tension
between EASBRICOM and IGAD, which if not carefully addressed might
complicate efforts to produce an African capacity for conflict manage-
ment. It remains to be seen how all of these factors will play out at the con-
tinental level.
62 Funmi Olonisakin
Is the Regional Security Picture Consistent with

Peace Support Planning?
Apart from issues of organizational coherence discussed above, which
might affect the process of developing a continental peacekeeping and
peace support capacity, it is important to take into account the evolving
security situation on the continent. The AU must address itself to the real-
ities of the overall security environment in Africa as it continues to plan for
peace support functions under the ASF. Two trends are worthy of note in
this regard. First, the large-scale armed conflicts of the last two decades
have gradually mutated and have been largely contained within national
spaces. This is due, in no small measure, to the peacemaking and peace-
keeping efforts of African regional organizations and the United Nations.
There are now fewer active wars in Africa that have the potential to inflict
dire consequences on the region. In fact, what we have as a result is not
peace and stability in much of the African continent, but a situation of ‘no
war, no peace’ – in which neither security nor development is attainable.
Second and related to this, the real challenge in these spaces is low-intensity
conflicts. These are not so significant in their regional impact as to pose a
threat to international peace and security. Neither are they so benign as to
allow normal development to continue. Examples of such low-intensity
conflicts are found in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, northern Ghana, northern
Mali, northern Niger, Casamance in Senegal and northern Uganda, among
others. This is a reflection of the widespread structural instability in Africa,
which predates many of the civil wars that exploded in the last two decades.
Among these structural factors we may note the following:
• weak democratic structures, culture and practice

• states and ruling elite far removed from the people, and in effect,
• systemic gaps in administration of justice and provision of security for
citizens
• two parallel systems co-existing within the same national space:
– state-led security, justice and economic systems that respond largely
to the needs of the ruling elite and their networks; and
– informal, unofficial systems that legitimately cater to the needs of
the masses of ordinary people
• demographic shift – Africa’s rising youth tide – which can have nega-
tive impacts on security and development in the absence of good cen-
tral planning
• the impact of global changes.
The current security situation on the continent is far from that of the early
1990s, when armed conflict had flared across several regions, and peace
planners focused on peace operations to contain the spread of these con-
flicts. The recent reduction in large-scale armed conflict has, for the first
time, created the space to address the structural roots of armed conflict
while responding to ongoing situations of armed conflict and the challenge
of low-intensity conflicts. The ECOWAS region, for example, has begun
to change its approach, through its articulation of a Conflict Prevention
Framework (ECPF) and subsequent implementation plan. Planning for
continental capacity for peacekeeping and conflict management cannot
discountenance this emerging reality.
What does this all Mean for APSA and the Continued
move toward Capacity Development for PSOs in Africa?
The African security environment is dynamic. It will continue to undergo
mutations, albeit with (sub)regional variations, for the foreseeable future
or until the continent achieves a tangible measure of structural stability.
Conflict management frameworks, including planning for peace opera-
tions, must retain the flexibility to respond to ‘moving targets’. The cur-
rent security environment can offer some lessons for AU and regional
mechanisms in planning for future peace operations in Africa.
One lesson concerns the type of peace operations for which the AU and
regional mechanisms should prepare. The ASF invariably responds to a par-
ticular type of strategic environment – one that assumes continued situa-
tions of large-scale armed conflict. Failure to prepare the ASF for the low-
intensity conflict scenario will reduce its relevance in the medium to long
term. While some of today’s situations of armed conflict will remain a chal-
lenge in the foreseeable future, emerging trends indicate that the incidence
of large-scale armed conflict will gradually be on the decline in Africa, while
situations of low intensity conflict are likely to remain a challenge.
64 Funmi Olonisakin
An operational APSA which relies on regional mechanisms will therefore

need to develop effective early response systems and effective support for
mediation efforts through, for example, preventive deployment. Planning
for the ASF envisages several components, including the military, police
and civilian dimensions. But much of the preparatory work has focused on
the military dimension. While institutions in West and Southern Africa 4
in particular have begun to address training for civilian components, this
has been within the context of classical peace support operations and not
in anticipation of a different type of engagement in less familiar settings
where low-intensity conflicts thrive.
Preparation for peace operations in any context – whether of low- or high-

intensity conflicts – cannot be divorced from politics. The AU will depend
almost entirely on cohesive regional organizations and mechanisms if it is
to be able to plan and execute continental peace operations under its polit-
ical authority. Politically divided RECs without a coherent approach to
peace, security and development will invariably weaken the plan for such
African missions. The AU will ultimately gain and retain political author-
ity over regional brigades that evolve from viable regional arrangements.
Perhaps one lesson that can still be taken on board as the AU continues to
work with regional mechanisms to operationalize APSA is that, as cur-
rently structured, implementation necessarily targets state-centred institu-
tions and processes, with less attention to the structures and processes that
govern the daily lives of ordinary Africans who are far removed from offi-
cialdom. Interventions which focus only on official actors and processes
often fail to percolate down to the people. There is nonetheless an oppor-
tunity to address the structural instability at the roots of armed conflict.
But much depends on the will of African leaders and, in particular, the
approach of the AU and RECs. These would do well to respond appropri-
ately to the needs of the current security environment on the African con-
tinent.
4. Through, for example, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)
and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD).
[start kap]
African Union Peacekeeping Cases:

Lessons for the African Standby Force
Andrews Atta-Asamoah
‘No more, never again. Africa cannot sit and watch tragedies devel-
oping on the continent and say this is the UN’s responsibility or
somebody else’s responsibility,’ Ambassador Said Djinnit, AU
Commissioner for Peace and Security.1
The statement above and others, such as ‘African solutions to African

problems’, reflect a view that has become widespread among African lead-
ers over the past two decades and especially after the genocide in Rwanda
and the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the Afri-
can Union. In efforts to realize this slogan, the AU is increasingly taking
centre-stage in efforts towards the maintenance of peace and security on
the continent.
The surge in Africa’s willingness to take responsibility for its security needs
is evident in three major ways. First is the explicit adoption of a more inter-
ventionist stance in Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, which pro-
vides for the right of the Union to intervene in a member state in circum-
stances of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Second, the
AU has since its establishment played key roles in the search for peace in
troubled regions of the continent. Third, there are the efforts made thus
far in operationalizing the idea of an African peace and security architec-
ture (APSA) to consist of a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warn-
ing Mechanism, a Peace Fund and an African Standby Force (ASF).
1. Quoted in IRIN, ‘African Union stresses importance of conflict resolution and peacekeeping’,
June 28, 2004. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/06/mil-040628-
irin01.htm> (accessed 05 June 2008).
66 Andrews Atta-Asamoah
As part of APSA, the ASF is aimed at enabling the PSC intervene in mem-
ber states in respect of grave circumstances or towards the restoration of
peace and security pursuant to Article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act.
It is to be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian
and military components in their countries of origins and ready for rapid
deployment. To operationalize this goal, the final concept adopted by the
Heads of State of the Union provided for five standby arrangements in
each of Africa’s five regions – north, south, central, east and west – as the
building blocs of the ASF. The ASF is to have a Planning Element
(PLANELM) and logistic depot at the continental level or at the AU Com-
mission. Each of the regional arrangements is to have a permanent brigade
headquarters, logistic depot, permanent PLANELM, standby brigade and
training facilities.
When fully operational, the ASF is to be deployed under six scenarios:
Scenario 1: AU/Regional military advice to a political mission. Deploy-

ment is required within 30 days from AU mandate resolu-
tion.
Scenario 2: AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mis-
sion. Deployment is required within 30 days from AU man-
date resolution.
Scenario 3: Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission. Deployment
required within 30 days from AU mandate resolution.
Scenario 4: AU/Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preven-
tive deployment missions (and peace building). Deployment
required within 30 days from AU mandate resolution.
Scenario 5: AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peace-
keeping missions, including those involving low-level spoil-
ers. Deployment required within 90 days from AU mandate
resolution, with the military component able to deploy
within 30 days.
Scenario 6: AU intervention, e.g. in genocide situations where the inter-
national community does not act promptly. Deployment
required within 14 days from AU mandate resolution, with
robust military force.
African Union Peacekeeping Cases: Lessons for the African Standby Force 67
In each of the above scenarios, the main functions of a deployment as pro-

vided by Article 13 of the Peace and Security Council Protocol of the AU
include:
• observation and monitoring missions;

• other types of peace support missions;
• intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances or at
the request of a member state in order to restore peace and security, in
accordance with Art. 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act;
• peace building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobiliza-
tion;
• preventative deployment in order to prevent (i) a dispute or conflict
from escalating; (ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to
neighbouring areas or states; and (iii) the resurgence of violence after
parties to a conflict have reached an agreement;
• humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population
in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters;
• any other functions as may be mandated by the PSC or Assembly.
Since the adoption of the concept, the ASF has become a major preoccu-
pation of the AU and the various Regional Economic Communities of
Africa.
Whilst the idea is undoubtedly laudable, it is important for the operation-

alization of the concept to be informed by the store of lessons learned in
the various AU-led peace support operations on the continent. Drawing
on the lessons from the past is important for avoiding the many mistakes
of earlier operations, as well as for helping to institute an enduring ASF
that can be not only robust, but also appropriately adapted to current secu-
rity realities on the continent.
Against this backdrop, this chapter attempts a crystallization of the major

lessons learned from AU-led peacekeeping operations in Burundi, Sudan
and Somalia for the ASF. It argues that, even though the ASF must grapple
with certain practical challenges in the short to medium term, its long-term
sustainability and achievement of goals will depend largely on the extent to
which the AU’s past experiences in Burundi, Somalia and Sudan inform
the operationalization process. These lessons revolve around the effective
planning of missions, realistic crafting of mission mandates, development
of an independent capacity to deploy and sustain a mission, and avoiding
the ‘lead-nation syndrome’. Section one of this chapter provides a brief
background to the deployment of AU forces into Burundi, Sudan and
Somalia. This is followed by a discussion of the major successes and chal-
lenges of the operations, and draws lessons for the ASF in conclusion.
Backgrounds to AU Deployments in Burundi, Sudan

and Somalia
AMIB – The AU Mission in Burundi
The outbreak of violence preceding the deployment of AU forces seeking
to promote peace and stability in Burundi is traceable to the assassination
of President Francois Melchior Ndadaye of the Hutu Front pour la
Democratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) by Tutsi-dominated forces in
1993.2,3 The ensuing ethno-political violence claimed more than 300,000
lives and displaced many more.
Efforts to broker peace led by the late Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and sub-
sequently by former South African President Mandela eventually culmi-
nated in the signing of the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation
for Burundi in 2000. Seventeen Burundian political parties, the govern-
ment and the National Assembly signed the Agreement.4 Later, two more
agreements between the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB)
and the Burundi Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs); and
between the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces
pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) and the TGoB were
signed in October and December 2002 respectively. Even though the two
2. Aboagye, Festus. ‘The African Mission in Burundi: lessons learned from the first African Union
peacekeeping Operation,’ Conflict Trends, 2, 2004:1
http://www.accord.org.za/ct/2004-2/CT2_2004%20PG9-15.pdf (Accessed 05 June 2008)
3. Powell, K. ‘The African Union’s emerging peace and security regime: opportunities and chal-
lenges for delivering on the responsibility to protect,’ ISS Monograph, 119, May 2005:34–35.
4. ACCORD. ‘South Africa’s peacekeeping role in Burundi: challenges and opportunities for future
peace missions,’ ACCORD Occasional Papers Series, 2, 2007:29.
agreements signed in 2002 were to provide an opportunity for factions

that did not participate in the previous agreement to join the peace pro-
cess, not all factions joined. One faction of the FNL, the Rwasa faction,
did not participate.
In each of the three agreements, provisions for verification differed.

Whereas the Arusha Agreement provided for the government of Burundi
to request an international peacekeeping force from the UN, the Agree-
ment between the TGoB and the APPMs (October 2002) vested the role
of verification and control in either a UN or AU mission. Unlike the two,
however, the December 2002 Agreement between the TGoB and the
CNDD-FDD placed the role of verification with an African mission.
From naming the UN in the first agreement, the role of verification and
control gradually shifted to an African mission in the third agreement.
Coupled with the unwillingness of the UN to deploy peacekeeping troops
in the absence of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement in Burundi, it
became imperative for the AU to lead efforts towards the restoration of
peace and security in that country. In April 2003, therefore, the Union
deployed AMIB to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agree-
ments; to support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)
efforts; and to strive towards ensuring favourable conditions for the estab-
lishment of a UN peacekeeping mission, among others. 5
With a force strengthen of 3,335 troops, AMIB drew troop contributions

principally from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique. South Africa
was the lead nation and therefore contributed the bulk of troops.
AMIS – The AU Mission in Sudan

Factors underlying the conflict in Sudan are inherently embedded in the
history of the country. Notwithstanding, the current spate of unrest is
traceable to April 2003, when government bases in El Fashir came under
attack from Darfur-based movements, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)
5. Communiqué of the 91st Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution at Ambassadorial Level; http://www.africa-union.org/
News_Events/Communiqu%E9s/Communique_E9_20_Eng_2apr03.pdf [23.0409].
and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The attack resulted in the
destruction of government air force planes.6 Government forces and the
'Janjaweed’(an Arab militia alleged to be supported by the government of
Sudan), subsequently launched a counter-insurgency against villages and
ethnic groups perceived to be sympathetic to the rebels. This resulted in
the death of about 200,000 Darfurians and the displacement of some two
million others.7
Mediation efforts under the auspices of President Idriss Deby of Chad and
the Chairperson of the AU Commission culminated in the signing of a
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) and a Protocol on the Estab-
lishment of Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur in April 2004. Parties to
the HCFA accepted an offer by the AU to lead the mobilization of inter-
national support and to monitor the ceasefire.8
The Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and the first deployment of military

observers arrived in El-Fasher on 9 June 2004. Known as AMIS I, the mis-
sion was mandated to monitor the HCFA and report violations to the CFC.
The mission was permitted to use force only for self-defence and was not to
intervene between parties on the ground.9 Notwithstanding regular patrols
by military observers, the situation in Darfur continued to deteriorate, basi-
cally because the number of observers deployed was inadequate to imple-
ment the mandate effectively. In response to the worsening security situa-
tion, the AU Commission proposed an enhanced mission headed by a
Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC) with
a force strength of 3,320 troops consisting of military, police and civilians.10
Endorsement of the proposal transformed AMIS I into what became

known as AMIS II, deployed from October 2004 for a period of one year
6. HRW. ‘Imperatives for immediate change: The AU mission in Sudan.’ Human Rights Watch,
18(1A), 2006: 12.
7. UN, Darfur – UNAMID – Background, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/
background.html [12.05.09].
8. HRW, op. cit., 12.
9. AMIS, Background and chronology, http://www.amis-sudan.org/history.html [18.04.09].
10. AU. Report of the chairperson (PSC/PR/2(XVII)), 20 October 2004, paragraph 67.
www.africa-union.org/News_Events/Communiqués/Report%20-%20Darfur%2020%20oct%
202004.pdf [10.05.09].
with an extension of the same mandate, but more extensive reach in the
field. As part of its mandate, AMIS II was to protect civilians encountered
under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources
and capability.
However, the security situation in Darfur continued to deteriorate. The

growing insecurity in Darfur despite the deployment of AMIS II led to
international recognition of two important issues. First, that AMIS was
neither sufficiently mandated nor adequately resourced to control the vio-
lence on the ground and bring peace to Darfur. Secondly, that for a real-
istic restoration of peace and security in Darfur, progress would have to be
made in the political process, the peacekeeping mission, and the process of
grassroots social reconciliation, since the three issues are intertwined and
reinforce each other.
To AMIS, a Joint AU/UN Technical Assessment process led by Ambassa-

dor Said Djinnit, former AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, and
Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, former UN Under Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Operations recommended in June 2006 that the political
process be re-energized and also that the ceasefire be strengthened under a
joint AU and UN leadership. The proposal eventually led to the deploy-
ment of UNAMID, an unprecedented joint AU/UN peacekeeping opera-
tion in Darfur. UNAMID was formally established by the UN Security
Council in July 2007 through the adoption of resolution 1769, and for-
mally took over from AMIS in December 2007.
AMISOM – The AU Mission in Somalia

Since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somalia has not had
an effective central government. Inter-clan rivalry, competition, and crim-
inality have worsened the security situation in the country. There have
been several fruitless international attempts to restore peace and security,
including the UN Operations in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), the US-led,
UN-sanctioned Unified Task Force (UNITAF), and UNOSOM II (May
1993–March 1995).
The AU’s involvement in Somalia dates back to October 2004, when a

two-year peace process led by Kenya, under the auspices of the Intergov-
ernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), led to the formation of

Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) for Somalia.11
Battling severe opposition from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and
other armed groups in Somalia, Abdullahi Yusuf requested the deploy-
ment of a multinational peacekeeping force by the AU to prevent a further
worsening of the security and humanitarian situation. Based upon his
request, a proposal for the deployment of an AU mission to protect the
TFIs and the civilian population emerged from the AU Commission. The
proposal was eventually accepted by the PSC in 2005. Even though IGAD
had earlier planned to deploy an IGAD Mission in Somalia (IGASOM),
the idea never materialized because of difficulties as to capacity, composi-
tion of the force and the eventual non-acceptance by factions in Somalia.
The AU finally authorized the deployment of AMISOM in January 2007

and mandated it to support dialogue and reconciliation, provide protec-
tion to TFIs and their key infrastructure to enable them to function, assist
in the re-establishment and training of Somali security forces, and facilitate
humanitarian operations, including the resettlement of Internally Dis-
placed Persons (IDP), amongst others. To date, AMISOM remains one of
the most challenged missions on the continent, plagued by slow troop gen-
eration, lack of logistics, financial constraints and the non-existence of a
peace for the AMISON forces to keep.
Major Challenges and Lessons from the Deployments

AU peacekeeping efforts suffer what can be referred to as a ‘consistency
shortfall’ in terms of capacity and political will. Firstly, the institutional
and legal reforms for peacekeeping purposes have not been consistent with
the capacity to launch and sustain successful peace support operations.
Consequently African-led peacekeeping efforts have recorded capacity
shortfalls, particularly in terms of logistics and finance. When African
countries have deployed peacekeeping missions, they have always looked
11. AU. AMISOM Background and political developments. 2008, http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/

AUC/Departments/PSC/AMISOM/AMISOM_ Background.htm [23.03.09].
to the international community for logistical and financial support to sus-

tain operations. Where international support has not been forthcoming,
missions have shown crucial deficiencies in transportation, logistics, and
equipment for operations.
The second strand of inconsistency is that the political will of members of

African organizations has not been consistent with the collectively pro-
claimed resolve to tackle insecurity on the continent. Political will is what
African states need to sustain troop contributions and to collectively sus-
tain peacekeeping operations. This is the one of the things that can make
African efforts ultimately gain the description as ‘African-led’. As yet, Afri-
can countries have remained sluggish in contributing troops to AU-led
peacekeeping operations.
Despite what seem like a continental collective resolve to act together, the
differences in political will have always resulted in a ‘lead-nation syn-
drome’ – a situation in which a single state leads and sustains a specific
peace support operation. In Burundi, for example, the brunt of generating
most of the required troops and sustaining them in the field was borne
almost entirely by South Africa. The effect on peace processes is that the
dominant role of that country obscures the multinational character of the
operations. This can have dire implications for local acceptance of peace-
keepers and the effectiveness of their operations in the long run. On the
other hand, this situation also highlights the importance of committed and
resourced regional leadership, and the role that ‘regional hegemons’ can
play in the quest for peace and security on the African continent.
From the AU’s peacekeeping experiences, several instructive lessons can be

deduced for the ASF. These include the following:
Planning of Missions
The complex and multidimensional nature of peace support operations
are such that no realistic progress can be made without proper planning
at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. As a result, the concept of
integrated mission planning has gained enormous international atten-
tion in the planning of peace support operations. A results-driven oper-
ation should be based on a properly developed comprehensive integrated

plan, with achievable objectives, clear benchmarks, and explicit modali-
ties for division of labour between the various components. In order for
the ASF to avoid the mistakes of the AU’s past missions regarding plan-
ning, it is important for the ASF to base all deployments on proper inte-
grated planning at the strategic, operational and tactical levels prior to
deployment. To do this effectively, it may be necessary for the ASF to
consider:
• Instituting a systematic method for undertaking pre-deployment fact-

finding and reconnaissance missions that will guide the decisions and
planning for deployment;
• For an integrated mission, the ASF should endeavour to make planning
processes all-inclusive by bringing together all the key components of
the mission, relevant non-AU entities (including the UN and human-
itarian agencies), and stakeholders at both the headquarters and field
levels;
• It will be important for the AU to develop an extensive capacity for
mission planning within the AUPSOD;
• Finance, logistics and troop generation should be critical themes in
planning processes. Prioritization here can help prevent them from
later becoming stumbling blocks in the achievement of the mission
goals and objectives.
Crafting of Mission Mandates

One of the most critical shortcomings a mission can face is being given an
ambiguous mandate without adequate resources to carry it out. According
to the UN peacekeeping operations principles and guidelines (Capstone
Doctrine), therefore, the existence of a clear mandate with resources to
match is one of the conditions for a successful peace support operation. 12
Such a lesson has been learned from bitter international experience, like
that of the UN Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), where the nature of the
mission mandate and the rules of engagement coupled with a lack of
12. UN. UN peacekeeping operations: principles and guidelines, DPKO, New York, 2008:51.
resources became an impediment to the protection of civilians. The ASF

can prevent similar challenges by ensuring that, when mission mandates
are crafted, the realities in the mission areas are considered, and also by
ensuring that the decision makers are well informed about such realities
prior to crafting of the mandate.
Keeping Peace or Finding Peace to Keep?

The deployment of AU troops in Somalia gives rise to some important
questions. Is there in fact a peace to keep in the country? Or is the AU try-
ing to find a peace to keep? It is important for the emerging peace and
security architecture of the AU, of which the ASF is part, to realize that in
the quest for peace in Africa, political processes, peacekeeping missions,
and the process of grassroots social reconciliation are intertwined and rein-
force each other. The deployment of troops should therefore not be made
to supplant an effective political process. Deployment without an endur-
ing political process involving all actors of the conflict not only erodes con-
sent for the mission, it also endangers the forces.
Donor-dependency Syndrome
The AU has shown over-dependence on donor and foreign assistance for
its peacekeeping operations in two major ways. First, in all the cases that
the organization has launched a peace support operation, it has always
gone with an idea that the mission will ultimately be ‘blue-hatted’ or sub-
sumed by the UN. Whilst such an idea demonstrates the AU’s respect for
the international division of labour as enshrined in Chapter VIII of the
UN Charter and the fact that issues of international peace and security are
the principal responsibility of the UN Security Council, the AU will have
to be able to develop an independent capacity to launch and sustain a mis-
sion without looking to the UN to take over, if it intends to realize the
dream of finding African solutions to African problems.
The Lead-nation Syndrome

Even though AMIB was officially an AU mission, many observers have
questioned whether the mission was truly an AU operation given the dom-
inance of South Africa throughout. Whereas such a lead-nation role has
the merit of easing the financial and logistical burden on the AU, it may
also introduce several important inter-state challenges.13 First is that the

mission, instead of being a neutral turf for the search for peace, can easily
become an arena for geo-political competition between rival states. Sec-
ondly, it can become the platform for some states to entrench their hege-
monic stands in a given region or the continent, a situation that may
dampen the political willingness of other Troop Contributing Countries
(TCC) to provide troops for the mission.
Conclusions
As an emerging standby arrangement on the continent, the ASF will have
to grapple with several important practical challenges in the short to
medium term, particularly as regards its ability to put together systems
capable of tackling the wide range of economic, development, human
rights, political and security issues in the mission area. However, as we
have indicated here, if the operationalizing process is guided by the lessons
learned from the deployment of troops in Burundi, Sudan and Somalia, a
great deal of the problems already encountered can be avoided, thereby
enhancing the long-term sustainability of the ASF concept and the AU’s
vision of finding African solutions to African problems.
13. Svensson, E. The African Mission in Burundi: lesson learned from the African Union’s first peace
operation, Swedish Defense Research Agency, Stockholm, 2009:17, www.foi.se/upload/projects/
Africa/FOI2561_AMIB.pdf [02.02.09].
Publisher: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Copyright © Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2010
ISBN: 978-82-7002-294-6
Any views expressed in this publication are those of the authors. They should not
be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.
The text may not be printed in part or in full without the permission of the authors.
Visiting address: C.J. Hambros plass 2d

Address: P.O. Box 8159 Dep.
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The Evolving roles of the African Union
and Regional Mechanisms
Edited by
de Carvalho, Thomas Jaye, Kasumba, Wafula Okumu (Eds.)

Benjamin de Carvalho | Thomas Jaye | Yvonne Kasumba | Wafula Okumu
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC)
Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Training for Peace in Africa (TfP) is an international capacity building
programme aiming at improved and self-sustaining African civilian
and police capacity for peace support operations, and with a view to
strengthening the African security architecture.
The programme’s focus is on training, policy advice and research,

with a major part of activities being carried out by African partners.
Norwegian Institute
of International
Aﬀairs

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Peacekeeping in Africa

de Carvalho, Thomas Jaye, Kasumba, Wafula Okumu (Eds.)

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

The programme’s focus is on training, policy advice and research,

100862 GRMAT Peacekeeping in Africa 100101 Cover.indd 1 29.10.10 13.17

Visiting address: C.J. Hambros plass 2d

100862 GRMAT Peacekeeping in Africa 100101 Cover.indd 2 29.10.10 13.18

African Solutions for African Conflicts:

The Evolution of Peace Operations in Africa:

Understanding the relationship between the UN, EU & AU

Regional Mechanisms and African Peacekeeping:

African Union Peacekeeping Cases:

This publication is the result of the collaboration between the different

• provide training in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, espe-

• AU and African regional organisations, as well as structures of the Afri-

ACCORD African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of

ECPF Economic Community of West African States

MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission

Peacekeeping in Africa is no longer the sole prerogative and responsibility

The AU peace and security architecture is evolving in an environment with

problems. The AU, alongside sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS,

Evolution of the AU Peacekeeping Role

This protocol, ratified in December 2003, established the AU Peace and

and resolving conflicts through ‘peace support operations.’7 The AUPSC,

The AUPSC is to perform its responsibilities of deploying peace support

AU Solution to African Problems

7. The PSC Protocol, Art. 6(d).

‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and

13. The PSC Protocol, Art. 17.

needs to fulfil ‘its mandate in the promotion and maintenance of peace,

In order for the AU to be able to meet its mandate of undertaking peace-

Kwesi Aning, in his chapter, argues that there is a deepening relationship

The partnership of the AU and UN peacekeeping in Africa is further chal-

One way of approaching such challenges involves drawing on past experi-

14. The PSC Protocol, Art.17(1).

cooperation between the AU and other partners, particularly the UN, in

Role of Regional Mechanisms

Using ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC as case studies, Funmi Olonisakin

the preparation for continental peacekeeping. However, attention should

Although a REC such as ECOWAS, has more extensive experience in con-

Lesson from AU Past Experiences

experienced a great many difficulties in planning and deploying the mon-

Drawing lessons from past and present AU peacekeeping operations is

Achieving the political will needed to declare a situation as a crisis requir-

status of lead nation, as during the initial deployment of AMIS in 2004

From Peacekeeping to Peace-building

About the Book

regional mechanisms in peacekeeping we hope to capture some key issues

African Solutions for African Conflicts:

Historically, conflict resolution interventions in Africa have occurred

22 Vasu Gounden, Venashri Pillay & Karanja Mbugua

1. Great Lakes Region

a. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

24 Vasu Gounden, Venashri Pillay & Karanja Mbugua

The main conflict issues in Rwanda can be summarized as follows: manip-

As in Rwanda, main conflict issues in Burundi include the manipulation

2. Horn of Africa Region

26 Vasu Gounden, Venashri Pillay & Karanja Mbugua

In 1994, as a result of political and economic pressure from political and

In 2000, after a succession of dialogues, Djibouti hosted a major reconcil-

process. In February 2005, the AU authorized IGAD to send a peace mis-

Eritrea10 federated with Ethiopia in 1952. Ethiopia terminated the federa-

28 Vasu Gounden, Venashri Pillay & Karanja Mbugua

In Darfur, Chad facilitated negotiations in April 2004 under the auspices