Enrile Vs Sandigbayan

7/10/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 767 Copy
G.R. No. 213847. August 18, 2015.*

.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION),
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Criminal

Procedure; Presumption of Innocence; In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.—In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved. The presumption of
innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due
process, and is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail,
and further binds the court to wait until
after trial to impose any punishment on
the accused.
Same; Same; Bail; The purpose of bail is
to guarantee the appearance of the accused
at the trial, or whenever so required by the
trial court.—It is worthy to note that bail is
not granted to prevent the accused from
committing additional crimes. The purpose
of bail is to guarantee the appearance of
the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the trial court. The amount of
bail should be high enough to assure the
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016bdc69742f3da5cdb6003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/126
presence of the accused when so required,

but it should be no higher than is
reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the
accused’s interest in his provisional liberty
before or during the trial, and the society’s
interest in assuring the accused’s presence
at trial.
Same; Same; Same; The general rule is
that any person, before being convicted of
any criminal offense, shall be bailable,
unless he is charged with a capital offense,
or with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
and the evidence of his guilt is strong.—A
capital offense in the context of the rule
refers to an offense that, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and
the application for admission to bail, may
be punished with death. The general rule
is, therefore, that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged
_______________
* EN BANC.

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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
with a capital offense, or with an offense

punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed
under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the
officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee
of his provisional liberty under the Bill of
Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he
is charged with a capital offense, or with an
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt
is strong. Once it has been established that the
evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall
be recognized.
Same; Same; Same; All criminal cases
within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Municipal Trial Court (MTC),
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) are
bailable as matter of right because these courts
have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment.—All criminal cases within
the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are
bailable as matter of right because these courts
have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of
right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
or even prior to conviction for an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life

imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not
strong.
Same; Same; Same; The granting of bail is
discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years,
provided none of the circumstances enumerated
under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present.—The granting of bail is discretionary:
(1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years,
provided none of the circumstances enumerated
under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, as follows: (a) That he is a recidivist,
quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has
previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or vio-

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284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
lated the conditions of his bail without

valid justification; (c) That he committed the
offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances
of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk
that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
Same; Same; Same; For purposes of
admission to bail, the determination of whether
or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal
cases involving capital offenses, or offenses
imprisonment lies within the discretion of the
trial court.—For purposes of admission to bail,
the determination of whether or not evidence of
guilt is strong in criminal cases involving
capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies
within the discretion of the trial court. But, as
the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v.
Elma, 241 SCRA 84 (1995), “such discretion
may be exercised only after the hearing called
to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused
for the purpose of whether or not he should be
granted provisional liberty.” It is axiomatic,
therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its
grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the
trial court unless there has been a hearing with
notice to the Prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; In resolving bail
applications of the accused who is charged with
a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
trial judge is expected to comply with the
guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, 279

SCRA 1 (1997).—In resolving bail applications
of the accused who is charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is
expected to comply with the guidelines outlined
in Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 (1997), to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right
or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require
him to submit his recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended); 2.
Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7
and 8, supra) 3. Decide whether the guilt of the
accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution; 4. If the guilt of the
accused is not

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VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 285

strong, discharge the accused upon the

approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra)
Otherwise petition should be denied.
Same; Same; Same; This national

commitment to uphold the fundamental human
rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person has authorized the grant of bail not
only to those charged in criminal proceedings
but also to extraditees upon a clear and
convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will
not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances.—
This national commitment to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person has
authorized the grant of bail not only to those
charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a
flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances. In our view, his
social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that
the risk of his flight or escape from this
jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal
disposition from the onset of his indictment for
plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated
his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier
time many years ago when he had been charged
with rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar
personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as
a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both

his public and his private lives, his long years of
public service, and history’s judgment of him
being at stake, he should be granted bail. The
currently fragile state of Enrile’s health
presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail, but which the
Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
Same; Same; Same; Bail for the provisional
liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the
merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to
his health or to endanger his life.—Bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of
the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly
shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail
despite

286

ANNOTATED
imperiling his health and life would not

serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.

LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure;
Bail; View that bail is not a matter of right in
cases where the crime charged is plunder and
the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.—
This Petition for Certiorari should not be
granted. The action of the Sandiganbayan in
denying the Motion to Fix Bail was proper. Bail
is not a matter of right in cases where the crime
charged is plunder and the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua. Neither was there grave
abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan when
it failed to release accused on bail for medical or
humanitarian reasons. His release for medical
and humanitarian reasons was not the basis for
his prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail filed before
the Sandiganbayan. Neither did he base his
prayer for the grant of bail in this Petition on
his medical condition.
Same; Same; Same; View that the grant of
bail, therefore, by the majority is a special
accommodation for petitioner. It is based on a
ground never raised before the Sandiganbayan
or in the pleadings filed before the Supreme
Court (SC).—The grant of bail, therefore, by the
majority is a special accommodation for
petitioner. It is based on a ground never raised
before the Sandiganbayan or in the pleadings
filed before this court. The Sandiganbayan
should not be faulted for not shedding their
neutrality and impartiality. It is not the duty of
an impartial court to find what it deems a
better argument for the accused at the expense

of the prosecution and the people they
represent.
Same; Same; Same; View that bail for
humanitarian considerations is neither
presently provided in our Rules of Court nor
found in any statute or provision of the
Constitution.—The majority’s opinion — other
than the invocation of a general human rights
principle — does not provide clear legal basis
for the grant of bail on humanitarian grounds.
Bail for humanitarian considerations is neither
presently provided in our Rules of Court nor
found in any statute or provision of the
Constitution. This case leaves this court open to
a justifiable criticism of granting a privilege ad
hoc: only for one person — petitioner in this
case.

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Same; Same; Same; View that the

mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the
amount of bail when it is a matter of right. On
the other hand, mandatory bail hearings are
held when an accused is charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not only to fix the amount of bail
but fundamentally to determine whether the
evidence of guilt is strong.—The mandatory bail

hearing is only to determine the amount of bail
when it is a matter of right. On the other hand,
mandatory bail hearings are held when an
accused is charged with a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
only to fix the amount of bail but fundamentally
to determine whether the evidence of guilt is
strong.
Same; Same; Same; View that petitioner did
not ask that bail be granted because of his
medical condition or for humanitarian reasons;
Yet, it now becomes the very basis for petitioner’s
grant of bail.—The Sandiganbayan did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when it failed
to release petitioner on bail for medical or
humanitarian reasons. Petitioner did not ask
that bail be granted because of his medical
condition or for humanitarian reasons. Neither
petitioner nor the prosecution as respondent
developed their arguments on this point at the
Sandiganbayan or in this court to establish the
legal and factual basis for this special kind of
bail in this case. Yet, it now becomes the very
basis for petitioner’s grant of bail.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure;
Judgments; Dissenting Opinions; The Internal
Rules of the Supreme Court (SC) allows one (1)
week for the submission of a dissenting opinion.
—The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court
allows one week for the submission of a
dissenting opinion. Thus, in Rule 13, Section 7
of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC: SEC. 7. Dissenting,
separate or concurring opinion.—A Member
who disagrees with the majority opinion, its
conclusions, and the disposition of the case may

submit to the Chief Justice or Division
Chairperson a dissenting opinion, setting forth
the reason or reasons for such dissent. A
Member who agrees with the result of the case,
but based on different reason or reasons may
submit a separate opinion; a concurrence “in the
result” should state the reason for the qualified
concurrence. A Member who agrees with the
main opinion, but opts to express other reasons
for concurrence may submit a concurring
opinion. The dissenting, separate, or concurring
opinion must be submitted within one week from
the date the writer of the majority opinion
presents the decision for the signature of the
Members. (Em-

288

ANNOTATED
phasis supplied) But this member

endeavored to complete his draft incorporating
the ideas and suggestions of other dissenting
justices within two days from the circulation of
the majority opinion.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure;
Bail; View that nowhere in the rules of
procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on
judicial notice of a doctor’s certification.—In
essence, the majority now insists on granting

bail merely on the basis of the certification in a
Manifestation and Compliance dated August
14, 2014 by Dr. Jose C. Gonzales (Dr. Gonzales)
stating that petitioner is suffering from
numerous debilitating conditions. This
certification was submitted as an annex to a
Manifestation before this court regarding the
remoteness of the possibility of flight of the
accused not for the purposes of asking for bail
due to such ailments. Nowhere in the rules of
procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on
judicial notice of a doctor’s certification. In
doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on
evidence by doing away with cross-examination
and authentication of Dr. Gonzales’ findings on
petitioner’s health in a hearing whose main
purpose is to determine whether no kind of
alternative detention is possible.
Same; Same; Same; View that assuming
that the medical ailments of petitioner are
relevant issues for bail, the prosecution is now
deprived of a fair opportunity to present any
evidence that may rebut the findings of Dr.
Gonzales or any other medical documents
presented by petitioner in this Court. Due
process requires that we remand this matter for
a bail hearing to verify Dr. Gonzales’ findings
and to ensure that that is still the condition that
prevails at present.—Petitioner’s medical
ailments are not matters that are of public
knowledge or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration. His illness is not a matter of
general notoriety. Assuming that the medical
ailments of petitioner are relevant issues for
bail, the prosecution is now deprived of a fair

opportunity to present any evidence that may
rebut the findings of Dr. Gonzales or any other
medical documents presented by petitioner in
this Court. Due process requires that we
remand this matter for a bail hearing to verify
Dr. Gonzales’ findings and to ensure that that is
still the condition that prevails at present. That
we make factual determinations ourselves to
grant provisional liberty to one who is obviously
politically privileged without the benefit of the
presentation of evidence by both the prosecution
and the accused, without the prosecution being
granted the op-

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portunity to cross-examine the evidence,

and without consideration of any rebutting
evidence that may have been presented should
a hearing be held, casts serious doubt on our
neutrality and objectivity.
Same; Same; Same; View that the majority
has not set specific bases for finding that the
medical condition of petitioner entitles him to
treatment different from all those who are now
under detention and undergoing trial for
plunder.—It is unclear whether this privilege
would apply to all those who have similar
conditions and are also undergoing trial for

plunder. It is unclear whether petitioner’s
incarceration aggravates his medical conditions
or if his medical conditions are simply
conditions which come with advanced age. The
majority has not set specific bases for finding
that the medical condition of petitioner entitles
him to treatment different from all those who
are now under detention and undergoing trial
for plunder. There is no showing as to how
grave his conditions are in relation to the
facilities that are made available to him. There
is also no showing as to whether any of his
medical ailments is actually aggravating in
spite of the best care available. If his health is
deteriorating, there is no showing that it is his
detention that is the most significant factor or
cause for such deterioration. Usually, when
there is a medical emergency that would make
detention in the hospital necessary, courts do
not grant bail. They merely modify the
conditions for the accused’s detention. There is
now no clarity as to when special bail based on
medical conditions and modified arrest should
be imposed.
Same; Same; Same; View that bail is not a
matter of right merely for medical reasons.—
Bail is not a matter of right merely for medical
reasons. In People v. Fitzgerald, 505 SCRA 573
(2006): Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or
aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care
outside the prison facility. A mere claim of
illness is not a ground for bail. It may be that
the trend now is for courts to permit bail for
prisoners who are seriously sick. There may
also be an existing proposition for the “selective

decarceration of older prisoners” based on
findings that recidivism rates decrease as age
increases.
Same; Same; Same; View that before the ink
used to write and print the majority opinion and
this dissent has dried, friends, family, and
colleagues of petitioner already strongly predict
that he would report immediately for work. This
strongly indicates that the major-

290

ANNOTATED
ity’s inference as to the existence of very

serious debilitating illnesses may have been too
speculative or premature.—Before the ink used
to write and print the majority opinion and this
dissent has dried, friends, family, and
colleagues of petitioner already strongly predict
that he would report immediately for work. This
strongly indicates that the majority’s inference
as to the existence of very serious debilitating
illnesses may have been too speculative or
premature. Significantly, there is no guidance
to the Sandiganbayan as to whether bail then
can be cancelled motu propio or upon motion.
There is no guidance as to whether that motion
to cancel bail should be filed before the

Sandiganbayan or before this court.
Same; Same; Same; View that the crime
charged in petitioner’s case is one where the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The
Constitution and our rules require that bail can
only be granted after granting the prosecution
the opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt is
strong. The special grant of bail, due to medical
conditions, is unique, extraordinary, and
exceptional.—The crime charged in petitioner’s
case is one where the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua. The Constitution and our
rules require that bail can only be granted after
granting the prosecution the opportunity to
prove that evidence of guilt is strong. The
special grant of bail, due to medical conditions,
is unique, extraordinary, and exceptional. To
allow petitioner to go about his other duties
would be to blatantly flaunt a violation of the
provisions of the Constitution and our rules. In
other words, there is no rule on whether the
grant of provisional liberty on the basis of
humanitarian considerations extends even after
the medical emergency has passed. Again, a
case of a decision especially tailored for
petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; View that the more
prudent course of action would have been for the
Sandiganbayan, not the Supreme Court (SC), to
exercise its discretion in setting the amount of
bail.—There is no evidentiary basis for the
determination of P1,000,000.00 as the amount
for bail. The original proposal of the member in
charge was P100,000.00. This was increased to
P500,000.00 in its revised proposal circulated

on August 14, 2015. Then, upon the request of
one member who voted with the majority, it was
then increased to P1,000,000.00. The rules
guide courts on what to consider when setting
the amount of bail. The majority opinion is
sparse on the evidence it considers for setting
this particular amount. Again, the

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more prudent course of action would have

been for the Sandiganbayan, not this court, to
exercise its discretion in setting the amount of
bail.
Same; Same; Same; Universal Declaration
of Human Rights; View that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, relied upon in the
majority opinion, is a general declaration to
uphold the value and dignity of every person. It
does not prohibit the arrest of any accused based
on lawful causes nor does it prohibit the
detention of any person accused of crimes.—
There are no specific and binding international
law provisions that compel this court to release
petitioner given his medical condition. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, relied
upon in the majority opinion, is a general
declaration to uphold the value and dignity of
every person. It does not prohibit the arrest of

any accused based on lawful causes nor does it
prohibit the detention of any person accused of
crimes. It only implies that any arrest or
detention must be carried out in a dignified and
humane manner.
Same; Same; Same; View that even the
Supreme Court (SC) in Government of Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region v. Hon.
Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470 (2007), was wary to
grant bail without evidence presented that the
accused was not a flight risk.—In any case, even
this court in Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr., 521
SCRA 470 (2007), was wary to grant bail
without evidence presented that the accused
was not a flight risk. For this reason, it
remanded the case to the trial court instead of
applying the provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and categorically
stating that based on these principles alone, the
accused was entitled to bail. It is true that the
Constitution is replete with provisions on both
the respect for human dignity and the
protection of human rights. These rights are
applicable to those who, during the dark days of
Martial Law, were illegally detained, tortured,
and even involuntarily disappeared. There is, of
course, no reason for these rights and the
invocation of human dignity not to be applicable
to Senators of our Republic.
Same; Same; Same; View that suspending
the applicability of clear legal provisions upon
the invocation of human rights compels this
court to do a more conscious and rigorous
analysis of how these provisions violate specific

binding human rights norms.—The mere

292
invocation of the broadest concept of human

rights is not shibboleth. It should not be cause
for us to be nonchalant about the existence of
other constitutional and statutory provisions
and the norms in our Rules of Court. The mere
invocation of human rights does not mean that
the Rule of Law is suspended. It is not a
shortcut to arrive at the conclusion or result
that we want. Rather, human rights are best
entrenched with the Rule of Law. Suspending
the applicability of clear legal provisions upon
the invocation of human rights compels this
court to do a more conscious and rigorous
analysis of how these provisions violate specific
binding human rights norms.
Same; Same; Same; View that those that
read a decision which does not fully respond to
the legal issues outlined in this dissent may be
tempted to conclude that the decision is the
result of obvious political accommodation rather
than a judicious consideration of the facts and
the law.—Those that read a decision which does
not fully respond to the legal issues outlined in
this dissent may be tempted to conclude that
the decision is the result of obvious political
accommodation rather than a judicious
consideration of the facts and the law. This case
may benefit one powerful public official at the
cost of weakening our legal institutions. If it is
pro hac vice, then it amounts to selective

justice. If it is meant to apply in a blanket
manner for all other detainees, then it will
weaken the administration of justice because
the judicial standards are not clear.
Same; Same; Same; View that the grant of
provisional liberty to petitioner without any
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong violates the clear and unambiguous text
of the Constitution.—The grant of provisional
liberty to petitioner without any determination
of whether the evidence of guilt is strong
violates the clear and unambiguous text of the
Constitution. It may be that, as citizens, we
have our own opinions on or predilections for
how the balance of fundamental rights,
liberties, and obligations should be. It may be
that, as citizens, such opinions are founded on
our wealth of knowledge and experience.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme

Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the
Court.

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Estelito P. Mendoza, Susan A.

Mendoza, Lorenzo G. Timbol, Ma.
Donnabel T. Tan, Marie Krizel P.
Malabanan, Eleazar B. Reyes, Joseph B.

Sagandoy, Jr., Edwardson L. Ong, Erwin
G. Matib and Kay Angela R. Peñaflorida
for Juan Ponce Enrile.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:

The decision whether to detain or
release an accused before and during trial
is ultimately an incident of the judicial
power to hear and determine his criminal
case. The strength of the Prosecution’s
case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s
propensity for flight or for causing harm to
the public, is subsidiary to the primary
objective of bail, which is to ensure that
the accused appears at trial.1

The Case

Before the Court is the petition for
certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile to assail and annul the resolutions
dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143
issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238,
where he has been charged with plunder
along with several others. Enrile insists
that the resolutions, which respectively
denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his
Motion For Reconsideration, were issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
_______________
1 See Lindermayer, Ariana, What the Right Hand

Gives: Prohibitive Interpretations of the State
Constitutional Right to Bail, Fordham Law Review,
Vol. 78, Issue 1, pp. 307-309 (2009).
2 Rollo, pp. 79-88; penned by Associate Justice
Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang and concurred in by
Associate Justices Samuel R. Martires and Alex L.
Quiroz.
3 Id., at pp. 89-102.

294

ANNOTATED
Antecedents

On June 5, 2014, the Office of the
Ombudsman charged Enrile and several
others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan
on the basis of their purported involvement
in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4
On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014,
Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus
Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6
praying, among others, that he be allowed
to post bail should probable cause be found
against him. The motions were heard by
the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution

filed its Consolidated Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan
issued its resolution denying Enrile’s
motion, particularly on the matter of bail,
on the ground of its prematurity
considering that Enrile had not yet then
voluntarily surrendered or been placed
under the custody of the law.8 Accordingly,
the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of
Enrile.9
On the same day that the warrant for
his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to Director Benjamin
Magalong of the Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, and was later on
confined at the Philippine National Police
(PNP) General Hospital following his
medical examination.10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for
Detention at the PNP General Hospital,11
and his Motion to Fix Bail,12 both dated
July 7, 2014, which were heard by the
Sandiganbayan on
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 107-108.

5 Id., at pp. 103-157.
6 Id., at pp. 163-192.
7 Id., at pp. 193-221.
8 Id., at pp. 222-241.
9 Id., at p. 241.
10 Id., at pp. 242-243.
11 Id., at pp. 244-247.
12 Id., at pp. 249-256.

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July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions,

Enrile argued that he should be allowed to
post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had
not yet established that the evidence of his
guilt was strong; (b) although he was
charged with plunder, the penalty as to
him would only be reclusion temporal, not
reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a
flight risk, and his age and physical
condition must further be seriously
considered.
issued its first assailed resolution denying
Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail, disposing
thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall

have presented its evidence and the Court shall
have made a determination that the evidence of
guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he
demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only
then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the
amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been
made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has
not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no

bail hearing can even commence. It is thus
exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask
the Court to fix his bail.
x x x x
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court
should grant him bail because while he is
charged with plunder, “the maximum penalty
that may be possibly imposed on him is
reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua.” He
anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No.
7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he
is over seventy (70) years old and that he
voluntarily surrendered. “Accordingly, it may be
said that the crime charged against Enrile is not
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus
bailable.”
The argument has no merit.
x x x x
_______________
13 Id., at p. 13.

296

ANNOTATED
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of

mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into
consideration. These circumstances will only be

appreciated in the imposition of the proper
penalty after trial should the accused be found
guilty of the offense charged. x x x
x x x x
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court
should already fix his bail because he is not a
flight risk and his physical condition must also
be seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical
condition and his being a flight risk are among
the factors that are considered in fixing a
reasonable amount of bail. However, as
explained above, it is premature for the Court
to fix the amount of bail without an anterior
showing that the evidence of guilt against
accused Enrile is not strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail
dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.14

On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan
issued its second assailed resolution to
deny Enrile’s motion for reconsideration
filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014
resolution.15
Enrile raises the following grounds in
support of his petition for certiorari,
namely:
A. Before judgment of
the
Sandiganbayan,
Enrile is bailable as
a matter of right.
Enrile may be
deemed to fall
within the
exception only
upon concurrence
of two (2)
circumstances: (i)
where the offense
is punishable by
reclusion perpetua,
and (ii) when
evidence of guilt is
strong.
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 84-88.

15 Id., at pp. 89-102.

297
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 297

x x x x
B. The prosecution failed to show
clearly and conclusively that
Enrile, if ever he would be
convicted, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile
is entitled to bail as a matter of

right.
x x x x
C. The prosecution failed to show
clearly and conclusively that
evidence of Enrile’s guilt (if ever)
is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled
to bail as a matter of right.
x x x x
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable
as he is not a flight risk.16

Enrile claims that before judgment of
conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as
matter of right; that it is the duty and
burden of the Prosecution to show clearly
and conclusively that Enrile comes under
the exception and cannot be excluded from
enjoying the right to bail; that the
Prosecution has failed to establish that
Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua
considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances — his age and his voluntary
surrender; that the Prosecution has not
come forward with proof showing that his
guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and
that he should not be considered a flight
risk taking into account that he is already
over the age of 90, his medical condition,
and his social standing.
In its Comment,17 the Ombudsman
contends that Enrile’s right to bail is
discretionary as he is charged with a
capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is
mandatory that a bail hearing be

conducted to determine whether there is
strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of
it; and that entitlement to
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 16-19.

17 Id., at pp. 526-542.

298

ANNOTATED
bail considers the imposable penalty,

regardless of the attendant circumstances.

Ruling of the Court

The petition for certiorari is meritorious.

1.
Bail protects the right of the
accused
to due process and to be presumed
innocent

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.18 The presumption of
innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due

process, and is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail,19
and further binds the court to wait until
after trial to impose any punishment on
the accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not
granted to prevent the accused from
committing additional crimes.21 The
purpose of bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the trial court.
The amount of bail should be high enough
to assure the presence of the accused when
so required, but it should be no higher
than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a rec-
_______________
18 Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987

Constitution.
19 Government of the United States of America v.
Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002, 389
SCRA 623, where the Court said that the
constitutional right to bail flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused
who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt; see also
Baradaran, Shima, Restoring the Presumption of
Innocence, Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 72, p. 728
(2011).
20 Baradaran, id., at p. 736.
21 Id., at p. 731.
22 Yap, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529,

June 6, 2001, 358 SCRA 564, 572.

299
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 299

onciling mechanism to accommodate both

the accused’s interest in his provisional
liberty before or during the trial, and the
society’s interest in assuring the accused’s
presence at trial.23

2.
Bail may be granted as a matter
of right or of discretion

The right to bail is expressly afforded by
Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with

offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.

This constitutional provision is repeated

in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of
Court, as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense

imprisonment, not bailable.—No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt
is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.

A capital offense in the context of the
rule refers to an offense that, under the
law existing at the time of its commission
and the application for admission to bail,
may be punished with death.25
_______________
23 Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122,

March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 619, 628.
24 As amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, December
1, 2000.
25 Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

300

ANNOTATED
The general rule is, therefore, that any

person, before being convicted of any
criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless
he is charged with a capital offense, or
with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from
the moment he is placed under arrest, or is
detained or restrained by the officers of the
law, he can claim the guarantee of his
provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights,
and he retains his right to bail unless he is
charged with a capital offense, or with an
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, and the evidence of
his guilt is strong.26 Once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is
strong, no right to bail shall be
recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the
competence of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit
Trial Court are bailable as matter of right
because these courts have no jurisdiction to
try capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of
right prior to conviction by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, or even prior to
conviction for an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not
strong.28
_______________
26 Government of the United States of America v.

Purganan, supra note 19 at p. 693.
27 Id.
28 Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—All
persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a
matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on
recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a)
before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b)
before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment.

301
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 301

On the other hand, the granting of bail

is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the
RTC of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29
or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years,
provided none of the circumstances
enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section
5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-

recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from
legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without
valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while
under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case
indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may
commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal.

3.
Admission to bail in offenses
punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or
reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial
discretion

For purposes of admission to bail, the
determination of whether or not evidence
of guilt is strong in criminal cases
involving capital offenses, or offenses
imprisonment lies within the discretion of
the trial court. But, as the Court has held
in Concerned Citizens v. Elma,30 “such
discretion may be exercised only after the
hearing called to ascertain the degree of
guilt of the accused for the purpose of

whether or not he should be granted provi-
_______________
29 Section 5, paragraph 1, Rule 114 of the Rules of

Court.
30 A.M. No. RTJ-94-1183, February 6, 1995, 241
SCRA 84, 88.

302

ANNOTATED
sional liberty.” It is axiomatic, therefore,

that bail cannot be allowed when its grant
is a matter of discretion on the part of the
trial court unless there has been a hearing
with notice to the Prosecution.31 The
indispensability of the hearing with notice
has been aptly explained in Aguirre v.
Belmonte, viz.:32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the

Lim case, this Court already ruled in People v.
Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory
before bail can be granted to an accused who is
charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court

acted irregularly in granting
bail in a murder case

without any hearing on the
motion asking for it, without
bothering to ask the
prosecution for its
conformity or comment, as it
turned out later, over its
strong objections. The court
granted bail on the sole
basis of the complaint and
the affidavits of three
policemen, not one of whom
apparently witnessed the
killing. Whatever the court
possessed at the time it
issued the questioned ruling
was intended only for prima
facie determining whether
or not there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-
founded belief that the crime
was committed and
pinpointing the persons who
probably committed it.
Whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong for each
individual accused still has
to be established unless the
prosecution submits the
issue on whatever it has
already presented. To
appreciate the strength or
weakness of the evidence of
guilt, the prosecution must
be consulted or heard. It is
equally entitled as the
accused to due process.
x x x x
_______________
31 Gacal v. Infante, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845

(formerly A.M. No. I.P.I. No. 03-1831-RTJ), October 5,
2011, 658 SCRA 535, 536.
32 A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October 27, 1994, 237
SCRA 778, 789-790.

303
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 303

Certain guidelines in the

fixing of a bailbond call for
the presentation of evidence
and reasonable opportunity
for the prosecution to refute
it. Among them are the
nature and circumstances of
the crime, character and
reputation of the accused,
the weight of the evidence
against him, the probability
of the accused appearing at
the trial, whether or not the
accused is a fugitive from
justice, and whether or not
the accused is under bond in
other cases. (Section 6, Rule
114, Rules of Court) It is
highly doubtful if the trial
court can appreciate these
guidelines in an ex parte
determination where the
Fiscal is neither present nor
heard.

The hearing, which may be either
summary or otherwise, in the discretion of
the court, should primarily determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. For this
purpose, a summary hearing means —
x x x such brief and speedy method of

receiving and considering the evidence of guilt
as is practicable and consistent with the
purpose of hearing which is merely to
determine the weight of evidence for purposes
of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit
to try the merits or to enter into any nice
inquiry as to the weight that ought to be
allowed to the evidence for or against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of
the trial or on what further evidence may be
therein offered or admitted. The course of
inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court
which may confine itself to receiving such
evidence as has reference to substantial
matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in
the examination and cross examination.33
In resolving bail applications of the

accused who is charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion
_______________
33 Cortes v. Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387,

September 10, 1997, 279 SCRA 1, 11.


304

ANNOTATED
perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial

judge is expected to comply with the
guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to
wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a
matter of right or of discretion,
notify the prosecutor of the hearing
of the application for bail or
require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion,
conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling
the court to exercise its sound
discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the
accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not
strong, discharge the accused upon
the approval of the bailbond.

(Section 19, supra) Otherwise
petition should be denied.

4.
Enrile’s poor health justifies
his admission to bail

We first note that Enrile has averred in
his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two
mitigating circumstances that should be
appreciated in his favor, namely: that he
was already over 70 years at the time of
the alleged commission of the offense, and
that he voluntarily surrendered.35
Enrile’s averment has been mainly
uncontested by the Prosecution, whose
Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has
only argued that —
_______________
34 Id., at p. 18.
35 Rollo, pp. 252-253.

305
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 305

8. As regards the assertion that the

maximum possible penalty that
might be imposed upon Enrile is

only reclusion temporal due to the
presence of two mitigating
circumstances, suffice it to state
that the presence or absence of
mitigating circumstances is also
not consideration that the
Constitution deemed worthy. The
relevant clause in Section 13 is
“charged with an offense
punishable by.” It is, therefore,
the maximum penalty provided
by the offense that has bearing
and not the possibility of
mitigating circumstances being
appreciated in the accused’s
favor.36

Yet, we do not determine now the
question of whether or not Enrile’s
averment on the presence of the two
mitigating circumstances could entitle him
to bail despite the crime alleged against
him being punishable with reclusion
perpetua,37 simply because the
determination, being primarily factual in
context, is ideally to be made by the trial
court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s
petition for certiorari, the Court is guided
by the earlier mentioned principal purpose
of bail, which is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the court. The
Court is further mindful of the Philippines’
responsibility in the international
community arising from the national

commitment under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to:
_______________
36 Id., at p. 260.
37 Worthy to mention at this juncture is that the
Court En Banc, in People v. Genosa (G.R. No. 135981,
January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 537), a criminal
prosecution for parricide in which the penalty is
reclusion perpetua to death under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code, appreciated the concurrence of
two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance as a privileged mitigating circumstance,
and consequently lowered the penalty imposed on the
accused to reclusion temporal in its medium period.

306

ANNOTATED
x x x uphold the fundamental human

rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person. This commitment
is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: “The State
values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human
rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has
the responsibility of protecting and

promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that
those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before
a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention
and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to
make available to every person under
detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to
liberty. These remedies include the
right to be admitted to bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every
person has authorized the grant of bail not
only to those charged in criminal
proceedings but also to extraditees upon a
clear and convincing showing: (1) that the
detainee will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community; and (2) that
there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political
standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his
being charged in court indicate that the
risk of his flight or escape from this
jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal
disposition from the onset of his indictment
for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal
processes of this country. We also do not

ignore that at an ear-
_______________
38 Government of Hong Kong Special

Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., G.R. No. 153675,
April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA 470, 482 (bold underscoring
supplied for emphasis).
39 Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila,
Br. 17, G.R. No. 157977, February 27, 2006, 483
SCRA 290, 298.

307
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 307

lier time many years ago when he had

been charged with rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder, he already
evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was
granted bail during the pendency of his
trial because he was not seen as a flight
risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his
public and his private lives, his long years
of public service, and history’s judgment of
him being at stake, he should be granted
bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s
health presents another compelling
justification for his admission to bail, but

which the Sandiganbayan did not
recognize.
In his testimony in the
Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales,
the Director of the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a
geriatric patient who was found during the
medical examinations conducted at the
UP-PGH to be suffering from the following
conditions:

(1) Chronic Hypertension with
fluctuating blood pressure levels
on multiple drug therapy; (Annexes
1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic
cardiovascular disease composed
of the following:
a. Previous history of
cerebrovascular disease with
carotid and vertebral artery
disease; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery
calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index
suggestive of arterial
calcifications. (Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia
(irregular heart beat) documented
by Holter monitoring; (Annexes
1.7.1, 1.7.2)
_______________
40 Rollo, pp. 559, 571-576.

41 Id., at pp. 339-340 (TSN of July 14, 2014).

308

ANNOTATED
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrome

(ACOS) and postnasal drip
syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration,
neovascular s/p laser of the Retina,
s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections;
(Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior
chamber intraocular lens.
(Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on
medications;
b. High cholesterol
levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding
(etiology uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with
documented enlarged prostate on
recent ultrasound).42

Dr. Gonzales attested that the following
medical conditions, singly or collectively,
could pose significant risks to the life of
Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled
hypertension, because it could lead to
brain or heart complications, including
recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia,
because it could lead to fatal or nonfatal
cardiovascular events, especially under
stressful conditions; (3) coronary
calcifications associated with coronary
artery disease, because they could indicate
a future risk for heart attack under
stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations
of ACOS, because they could be triggered
by certain circumstances (like excessive
heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure)
which could cause a deterioration in
patients with asthma or COPD.43
_______________
42 Id., at pp. 373-374 (bold underscoring supplied

for emphasis).
43 Id., at pp. 334-335, 374-375.

309
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 309

Based on foregoing, there is no question

at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill
health required special medical attention.
His confinement at the PNP General
Hospital, albeit at his own instance,44 was
not even recommended by the officer-in-
charge (OIC) and the internist doctor of
that medical facility because of the
limitations in the medical support at that
hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
x x x x
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued
confinement of Senator Enrile at the Philippine National
Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the
continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the PNP
Hospital?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot
give him the best.
x x x x
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused,
Senator Enrile, are you happy or have any fear in your
heart of the present condition of the accused vis-à-vis
the facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.

310

ANNOTATED
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency
situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can
handle it but probably if the condition of the patient
worsen, we have no facilities to do those things, Your
Honor.45
x x x x

Bail for the provisional liberty of the
accused, regardless of the crime charged,
should be allowed independently of the
merits of the charge, provided his
continued incarceration is clearly shown to
be injurious to his health or to endanger
his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling his health and life would not
incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing
reasons is not unprecedented. The Court
has already held in Dela Rama v. The
People’s Court:46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first

petition for certiorari, held the following:
x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is

forbidden by law in the particular case, the
illness of the prisoner, independently of
the merits of the case, is a circumstance,
and the humanity of the law makes it a
consideration which should, regardless of
the charge and the stage of the proceeding,
influence the court to exercise its
discretion to admit the prisoner to bail;
x x x47
_______________
45 Id., at pp. 485-488 (TSN of September 4, 2014).

46 77 Phil. 461 (October 2, 1946), in which the
pending criminal case against the petitioner was for
treason.
47 Id., at p. 462.

311
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 311

x x x x
Considering the report of the Medical
Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect
that the petitioner “is actually suffering from
minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary
tuberculosis, and chronic, granular
pharyngitis,” and that in said institute they

“have seen similar cases, later progressing into
advance stages when the treatment and
medicine are no longer of any avail”; taking into
consideration that the petitioner’s previous
petition for bail was denied by the People’s
Court on the ground that the petitioner was
suffering from quiescent and not active
tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the
People’s Court in sending the petitioner to the
Quezon Institute for clinical examination and
diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs,
was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is
suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to
act accordingly in deciding his petition for bail;
and considering further that the said People’s
Court has adopted and applied the well-
established doctrine cited in our above quoted
resolution, in several cases, among them, the
cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and
Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the
said defendants were released on bail on the
ground that they were ill and their continued
confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be
injurious to their health or endanger their life;
it is evident and we consequently hold that the
People’s Court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to release the petitioner
on bail.48

It is relevant to observe that granting
provisional liberty to Enrile will then
enable him to have his medical condition
be properly addressed and better attended
to by competent physicians in the hospitals
of his choice. This will not only aid in his

adequate preparation of his defense but,
more importantly, will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in
order to wait for the trial to finish before a
meaningful consideration of the appli-
_______________
48 Id., at pp. 465-466.

312

ANNOTATED
cation for bail can be had is to defeat the

objective of bail, which is to entitle the
accused to provisional liberty pending the
trial. There may be circumstances decisive
of the issue of bail — whose existence is
either admitted by the Prosecution, or is
properly the subject of judicial notice —
that the courts can already consider in
resolving the application for bail without
awaiting the trial to finish.49 The Court
thus balances the scales of justice by
protecting the interest of the People
through ensuring his personal appearance
at the trial, and at the same time realizing
for him the guarantees of due process as

well as to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the
objective of bail to ensure the appearance
of the accused during the trial; and
unwarrantedly disregarded the clear
showing of the fragile health and advanced
age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in denying
Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of
discretion, as the ground for the issuance
of the writ of certiorari, connotes whimsical
and capricious exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to excess, or lack of
jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law as where the
_______________
49 Bravo, Jr. v. Borja, No. L-65228, February 18,

1985, 134 SCRA 466, where the Court observed:
To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be
actually imposed would require a consideration not
only of the evidence of the commission of the crime
but also evidence of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. There would then be a need for a
complete trial, after which the judge would be just
about ready to render a decision in the case. As
perceptively observed by the Solicitor General, such
procedure would defeat the purpose of bail, which is
to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending

trial.
50 Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division),
G.R. No. 129406, March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA 119, 127;
Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc., No. L-40867,
July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 489, 494.

313
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 313

power is exercised in an arbitrary and

despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.51
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS
the petition for certiorari; ISSUES the writ
of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING
ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case
No. SB-14-CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and
August 8, 2014; ORDERS the
PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner
Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-
CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of
P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and
DIRECTS the immediate release of
petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody
unless he is being detained for some other
lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,

Brion, Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Sereno, CJ., I join the Dissent of J.
Leonen.
Carpio, J., I join the Dissent of J.
Leonen.
Peralta, J., For humanitarian reasons.
Del Castillo, J., I concur in the result
based on humanitarian grounds.
Villarama, Jr., J., On Official Leave.
Reyes, J., On Sick Leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., I join the Dissent
of J. Leonen.
Leonen, J., I dissent. See Separate
Opinion.
Jardeleza, J., No part. Prior OSG
action.

314

ANNOTATED
DISSENTING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:
All persons, except those charged with

offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided

by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required. — Const., Art. III, Sec. 13
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the
rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to
beg in the streets, and to steal bread. — The Red
Lily, Chapter 7 (1894) by Anatole France,
French novelist (1844-1924)

I dissent.
This Petition for Certiorari should not
be granted. The action of the
Sandiganbayan in denying the Motion to
Fix Bail was proper. Bail is not a matter of
right in cases where the crime charged is
plunder and the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua.
Neither was there grave abuse of
discretion by the Sandiganbayan when it
failed to release accused on bail for medical
or humanitarian reasons. His release for
medical and humanitarian reasons was not
the basis for his prayer in his Motion to Fix
Bail1 filed before the Sandiganbayan.
Neither did he base his prayer for the
grant of bail in this Petition on his medical
condition.
The grant of bail, therefore, by the
majority is a special accommodation for
petitioner. It is based on a ground never
raised before the Sandiganbayan or in the
pleadings filed before this court. The
Sandiganbayan should not be faulted for
_______________
1 Petition for Certiorari, Annex I.

315
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 315

not shedding their neutrality and

impartiality. It is not the duty of an
impartial court to find what it deems a
better argument for the accused at the
expense of the prosecution and the people
they represent.
The allegation that petitioner suffers
from medical conditions that require very
special treatment is a question of fact. We
cannot take judicial notice of the truth
contained in a certification coming from
one doctor. This doctor has to be presented
as an expert witness who will be subjected
to both direct and cross-examination so
that he can properly manifest to the court
the physical basis for his inferences as well
as the nature of the medical condition of
petitioner. Rebutting evidence that may be
presented by the prosecution should also
be considered. All this would be proper
before the Sandiganbayan. Again, none of
this was considered by the Sandiganbayan
because petitioner insisted that he was
entitled to bail as a matter of right on

grounds other than his medical condition.
Furthermore, the majority’s opinion —
other than the invocation of a general
human rights principle — does not provide
clear legal basis for the grant of bail on
humanitarian grounds. Bail for
humanitarian considerations is neither
presently provided in our Rules of Court
nor found in any statute or provision of the
Constitution.
This case leaves this court open to a
justifiable criticism of granting a privilege
ad hoc: only for one person — petitioner in
this case.
Worse, it puts pressure on all trial
courts and the Sandiganbayan that will
predictably be deluged with motions to fix
bail on the basis of humanitarian
considerations. The lower courts will have
to decide, without guidance, whether bail
should be granted because of advanced
age, hypertension, pneumonia, or dreaded
diseases. They will have to decide whether
this is applicable only to Senators and
former Presidents charged with plunder
and not to those accused of drug
trafficking, multiple incestuous rape,
serious illegal detention,

315
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 315
and other crimes punishable by reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment. They will
have to decide whether this is applicable
only to those who are in special detention
facilities and not to the aging or sick
detainees in overcrowded detention
facilities all over this country.
Our trial courts and the Sandiganbayan
will decide on the basis of personal
discretion causing petitions for certiorari to
be filed before this court. This will usher in
an era of truly selective justice not based
on clear legal provisions, but one that is
unpredictable, partial, and solely grounded
on the presence or absence of human
compassion on the day that justices of this
court deliberate and vote.
Not only is this contrary to the Rule of
Law, it also undermines the legitimacy and
the stability of our entire judicial system.

I

On June 5, 2014, Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile (Enrile) was charged with the crime
of plunder punishable under Republic Act
No. 7080.2 Section 2 of this law provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder,

Penalties.—Any public officer who, by himself or
in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt

or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d)
hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of
at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)
shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death[.] (Emphasis supplied)

On June 10, 2014, Enrile filed an
Omnibus Motion before the
Sandiganbayan, praying that he be
allowed to post bail if
_______________
2 An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of

Plunder, as Amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993).

317
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 317

the Sandiganbayan should find probable

cause against him.3 On July 3, 2014, the
Sandiganbayan denied the Omnibus
Motion on the ground of prematurity since
no warrant of arrest had been issued at
that time. In the same Resolution, the
Sandiganbayan ordered Enrile’s arrest.4
On the same day the warrant of arrest
was issued and served, Enrile proceeded to
the Criminal Investigation and Detection

Group of the Philippine National Police in
Camp Crame, Quezon City.5
On July 7, 2014, Enrile filed a Motion to
Fix Bail, arguing that his alleged age and
voluntary surrender were mitigating and
extenuating circumstances that would
lower the imposable penalty to reclusion
temporal.6 He also argued that his alleged
age and physical condition indicated that
he was not a flight risk.7 His prayer states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that

the Honorable Court allow Enrile to post bail,
and forthwith set the amount of bail pending
determination that (a) evidence of guilt is
strong; (b) uncontroverted mitigating
circumstances of at least 70 years old and
voluntary surrender will not lower the
imposable penalty to reclusion temporal; and (c)
Enrile is a flight risk [sic].8

The Office of the Ombudsman filed its
Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail9 dated
July 9, 2014. Enrile filed a Reply10 dated
July 11, 2014.
_______________
3 Ponencia, p. 294.

4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Petition for Certiorari, Annex I, pp. 4-5.
7 Id., at p. 5.
8 Id., at pp. 6-7.
9 Petition for Certiorari, Annex J.

10 Petition for Certiorari, Annex K.

318

ANNOTATED
Pending the resolution of his Motion to

Fix Bail, Enrile filed a Motion for
Detention at the PNP General Hospital11
dated July 4, 2014, arguing that “his
advanced age and frail medical condition”12
merit hospital arrest in the Philippine
National Police General Hospital under
such conditions that may be prescribed by
the Sandiganbayan.13 He also prayed that
in the event of a medical emergency that
cannot be addressed by the Philippine
National Police General Hospital, he may
be allowed to access an outside medical
facility.14 His prayer states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that

the Honorable Court temporarily place him
under hospital confinement at the PNP General
Hospital at Camp Crame, Quezon City, with
continuing authority given to the hospital head
or administrator to exercise his professional
medical judgment or discretion to allow Enrile’s
immediate access of, or temporary visit to,
another medical facility outside of Camp
Crame, in case of emergency or necessity,

secured with appropriate guards, but after
completion of the appropriate medical
treatment or procedure, he be returned
forthwith to the PNP General Hospital.15

After the prosecution’s submission of its
Opposition to the Motion for Detention at
the PNP General Hospital, the
Sandiganbayan held a hearing on July 9,
2014 to resolve this Motion.
issued an Order allowing Enrile to remain
at the Philippine National Police General
Hospital for medical examination until
further orders of the court.16
_______________
11 Petition for Certiorari, Annex L.

12 Id., at p. 2.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id., at p. 3.
16 Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.

319
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 319

This Order regarding his detention at

the Philippine National Police General
Hospital is not the subject of this
Petition for Certiorari. Enrile did not
ask that this Order be declared invalid
or null and void.
issued the Resolution17 denying Enrile’s
Motion to Fix Bail for being premature,18
stating that:
[I]t is only after the prosecution shall have

presented its evidence and the Court shall have
made a determination that the evidence of guilt
is not strong against accused Enrile can he
demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only
then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the
amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been
made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has
not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no
bail hearing can even commence. It is thus
exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask
the Court to fix his bail.19

Enrile filed a Motion for
20
Reconsideration, reiterating that there
were mitigating and extenuating
circumstances that would modify the
imposable penalty and that his frail health
proved that he was not a flight risk.21 The
Sandiganbayan, however, denied the
Motion on August 8, 2014.22 Hence, this
Petition for Certiorari was filed.

II

The Sandiganbayan did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when it denied
the Motion to Fix Bail for prematurity. It
_______________
17 Petition for Certiorari, Annex A.

18 Id., at pp. 6 and 10.
19 Id., at p. 6.
20 Petition for Certiorari, Annex L.
21 Id., at pp. 3-5.
22 Petition for Certiorari, Annex B, p. 14.

320

ANNOTATED
was following entrenched and canonical

procedures for bail based upon the
Constitution and the Rules of Court.
A trial court — in this case, the
Sandiganbayan — acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused through his
or her arrest.23 The consequent detention
is to ensure that the accused will appear
when required by the Rules and by order of
the court trying the offense.24 The
provisions on bail provide a balance
between the accused’s right to be presumed

innocent on one hand and the due process
rights of the state to be able to effect the
accused’s prosecution on the other hand.
That balance is not exclusively judicially
determined. The Constitution frames
judicial discretion.
Thus, Article III, Section 13 states:
ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
....
SECTION 13. All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required.

The doctrine on bail is so canonical that
it is clearly provided in our Rules of Court.
The grant of bail is ordinarily understood
as two different concepts: (1) bail as a
matter of right and (2) bail as a matter of
discretion. Thus, Sections 4 and 5 of Rule
114 provide:
_______________
23 See Gimenez v. Nazareno, 243 Phil. 274, 278;

160 SCRA 1, 4 (1988) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].
24 See Rev. Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 114, Sec. 3.

321
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 321

SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—

All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail
as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or
released on recognizance as prescribed by law
or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment.
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary.—Upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to
bail is discretionary. The application for bail
may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided
it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the
nature of the offense from non-bailable to
bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Then in Section 7 of Rule 114:
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense

imprisonment, not bailable.—No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt
is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution. (Emphasis supplied)

The mandatory bail hearing is only to
determine the amount of bail when it is a
matter of right. On the other hand,
mandatory bail hearings are held when an
accused is charged with a crime punishable
not only to fix the amount of bail but
fundamentally to determine whether the
evidence of guilt is strong.

322

ANNOTATED
The mandatory character of a bail

hearing was first addressed in the 1945
case of Herras Teehankee v. Rovira25 where
this court ordered the People’s Court to
conduct a bail hearing despite the accused
being charged with a capital offense.26 This
court reasoned that “the hearing is for the
purpose of enabling the People’s Court to

exercise its sound discretion as to whether
or not under the Constitution and laws in
force[,] petitioner is entitled to provisional
release under bail.”27
A year later, this court clarified its
orders to the People’s Court and gave the
following instructions:
(1) In capital cases like the present, when

the prosecutor does not oppose the petition for
release on bail, the court should, as a general
rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion,
grant the release after the approval of the bail
which it should fix for the purpose;
(2) But if the court has reasons to believe
that the special prosecutor’s attitude is not
justified, it may ask him questions to ascertain
the strength of the state’s evidence or to judge
the adequacy of the amount of bail;
(3) When, however, the special prosecutor
refuses to answer any particular question on
the ground that the answer may involve a
disclosure imperiling the success of the
prosecution or jeopardizing the public interest,
the court may not compel him to do so, if and
when he exhibits a statement to that effect of
the Solicitor General, who, as head of the Office
of Special Prosecutors, is vested with the
direction and control of the prosecution, and
may not, even at the trial, be ordered by the
court to present evidence which he does not
want to introduce — provided, of course, that
such refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the
defendant or detainee.28
_______________
25 75 Phil. 634 (1945) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].

26 Id., at p. 644.
27 Id.
28 Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76
Phil. 756, 774 (1946) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].

323
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 323

The ruling in Herras Teehankee was

applied in Ocampo v. Bernabe:29
We have held in Herras Teehankee v.

Director of Prisons, that all persons shall before
conviction be bailable except when the charge is
a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is
strong. The general rule, therefore, is that all
persons, whether charged or not yet charged,
are, before their conviction, entitled to
provisional release on bail, the only exception
being where the charge is a capital offense and
the evidence of guilt is found to be strong. At the
hearing of the application for bail, the burden of
showing that the case falls within the exception
is on the prosecution, according to Rule 110,
Section 7. The determination of whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong is, as stated in
the Herras Teehankee case, a matter of judicial
discretion. This discretion, by the very nature of
things, may rightly be exercised only after the

evidence is submitted to the court at the
hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
weight of evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or
produced before the court, it is obvious that a
proper exercise of judicial discretion requires
that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the
court, the petitioner having the right of cross-
examination and to introduce his own evidence
in rebuttal. Mere affidavits or recital of their
contents are not sufficient since they are mere
hearsay evidence, unless the petitioner fails to
object thereto.30 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

Herras Teehankee was also applied in
Feliciano v. Pasicolan, etc., et al.31 and
Siazon v. Hon. Presiding Judge of the
Circuit Criminal Court, etc., et al.32
_______________
29 77 Phil. 55 (1946) [Per CJ. Moran, En Banc].

30 Id., at p. 58.
31 112 Phil. 781, 782-783; 2 SCRA 888, 889 (1961)
[Per J. Natividad, En Banc].
32 149 Phil. 241, 247; 42 SCRA 184, 186 (1971)
[Per J. Makalintal, En Banc].

324

ANNOTATED
We have disciplined numerous judges

who violated this court’s instructions on
the application of the constitutional
provisions regarding bail.
Basco v. Judge Rapatalo33 outlines
these administrative cases promulgated
from 1981 to 1996.34 Unfortunately, there
were still administrative complaints filed
against judges for failing to hold a hearing
for bail even after the promulgation of
Basco.
In Cortes v. Judge Catral,35 this court
ordered Judge Catral to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 for granting bail to the ac-
_______________
33 336 Phil. 214; 269 SCRA 220 (1997) [Per J.

Romero, Second Division].
34 Id., at pp. 221-227; pp. 227-233, citing People v.
Sola, 191 Phil. 21; 103 SCRA 393 (1981) [Per CJ.
Fernando, En Banc], People v. San Diego, 135 Phil.
514; 26 SCRA 522 (1968) [Per J. Capistrano, En
Banc], People v. Dacudao, 252 Phil. 507; 170 SCRA
489 (1989) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division],
People v. Calo, Jr., 264 Phil. 1007; 186 SCRA 620
(1990) [Per J. Bidin, En Banc], Libarios v. Dabalos,
A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, July 11, 1991, 199 SCRA 48
[Per J. Padilla, En Banc], People v. Nano, G.R. No.
94639, January 13, 1992, 205 SCRA 155 [Per J. Bidin,
Third Division], Pico v. Combong, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-
91-764, November 6, 1992, 215 SCRA 421 [Per

Curiam, En Banc], De Guia v. Maglalang, A.M. No.
RTJ-89-306, March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 153 [Per
Curiam, En Banc], Borinaga v. Tamin, A.M. No. RTJ-
93-936, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 206, 216 [Per
J. Regalado, En Banc], Aurillo, Jr. v. Francisco, A.M.
No. RTJ-93-1097, August 12, 1994, 235 SCRA 283
[Per J. Padilla, En Banc], Estoya v. Abraham-
Singson, A.M. No. RTJ-91-758, September 26, 1994,
237 SCRA 1 [Per Curiam, En Banc], Aguirre v.
Belmonte, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October 27, 1994,
237 SCRA 778 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc],
Lardizabal v. Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ-94-897, December
5, 1994, 238 SCRA 640 [Per J. Padilla, En Banc],
Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr., 310 Phil. 176; 240 SCRA 154
(1995) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division], Santos v.
Ofilada, 315 Phil. 11; 245 SCRA 56 (1995) [Per J.
Regalado, En Banc], Sule v. Biteng, 313 Phil. 398; 243
SCRA 524 (1995) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc], and
Buzon, Jr. v. Velasco, 323 Phil. 724; 253 SCRA 601
(1996) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
35 344 Phil. 415; 279 SCRA 1 (1997) [Per J.
Romero, En Banc].

325
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 325

cused charged with capital offenses.36 This

court could only lament on the deluge of
these administrative cases, stating:
It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming,

that the Court should be besieged with a
number of administrative cases filed against
erring judges involving bail. After all, there is
no dearth of jurisprudence on the basic
principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the
Court itself, through its Philippine Judicial
Academy, has been including lectures on the
subject in the regular seminars conducted for
judges. Be that as it may, we reiterate the
following duties of the trial judge in case an
application for bail is filed:
“1. In all cases, whether

bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of
the application for bail or
require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a
matter of discretion, conduct
a hearing of the application
for bail regardless of
whether or not the
prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused
is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion;
(Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the
guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the
accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon

the approval of the bailbond
(Section 19, supra)
Otherwise petition should be
denied.”
With such succinct but clear rules now

incorporated in the Rules of Court, trial judges
are enjoined to study them well and be guided
accordingly. Admittedly, judges cannot be held
to account for an erroneous decision ren-
_______________
36 Id., at pp. 430-431; p. 12.

326

ANNOTATED
dered in good faith, but this defense is much too

frequently cited even if not applicable. A
number of cases on bail having already been
decided, this Court justifiably expects judges to
discharge their duties assiduously. For a judge
is called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules; it is imperative that he be
conversant with basic legal principles. Faith in
the administration of justice can only be
engendered if litigants are convinced that the
members of the Bench cannot justly be charged

with a deficiency in their grasp of legal
principles.37

The guidelines in Cortes fell on deaf
ears as administrative cases continued to
be filed against judges who failed to hold
hearings in applications for bail.
In Docena-Caspe v. Judge Bugtas,38 the
accused was charged with murder.39 Judge
Bugtas initially denied the accused’s
petition for bail but granted his motion for
reconsideration and set his bail without a
hearing.40 As a result, Judge Bugtas was
ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.0041 for
being “grossly ignorant of the rules and
procedures in granting or denying bail[.]”42
In Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Flores,43 the
erring judge was ordered to pay a fine of
P10,000.00 for granting bail to the accused
charged with rape without a hearing.44
_______________
37 Id., citing Basco v. Rapatalo, 336 Phil. 214, 237;

269 SCRA 220, 243-244 (1997) [Per J. Romero,
Second Division].
38 448 Phil. 45; 400 SCRA 37 (2003) [Per J.
Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
39 Id., at p. 48; p. 41.
40 Id., at pp. 49-50; p. 46.
41 Id., at pp. 56-57; p. 48.
42 Id., at p. 56; p. 47.
43 389 Phil. 372; 334 SCRA 1 (2000) [Per J.
Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
44 Id., at pp. 375 and 388; p. 13.

327
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 327

In Chief State Prosecutor Zuño v. Judge

Cabebe,45 Judge Cabebe was fined
P20,000.00 for granting bail, without the
requisite hearing, to the accused charged
with possession of illegal drugs.46
A bail hearing is mandatory even if the
accused has not filed an application for bail
or the prosecutor already recommends an
amount for bail.
In Atty. Gacal v. Judge Infante:47
Even where there is no petition for bail in a

case like Criminal Case No. 1138-03, a hearing
should still be held. This hearing is separate
and distinct from the initial hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause, in
which the trial judge ascertains whether or not
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty of the
crime. The Prosecution must be given a chance
to show the strength of its evidence; otherwise,
a violation of due process occurs.
....
Being the trial judge, Judge Infante had to
be aware of the precedents laid down by the
Supreme Court regarding the bail hearing being

mandatory and indispensable. He ought to have
remembered, then, that it was only through
such hearing that he could be put in a position
to determine whether the evidence for the
Prosecution was weak or strong. Hence, his
dispensing with the hearing manifested a gross
ignorance of the law and the rules.48
_______________
45 486 Phil. 605; 444 SCRA 382 (2004) [Per J.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].
46 Id., at pp. 611 and 618; p. 385.
47 674 Phil. 324; 658 SCRA 535 (2011) [Per J.
Bersamin, First Division].
48 Id., at pp. 340-341; p. 550, citing Directo v.
Bautista, 400 Phil. 1, 5; 346 SCRA 223, 228-229
(2000) [Per J. Melo, Third Division] and Marzan-
Gelacio v. Flores, supra note 43 at p. 381; p. 19.

328

ANNOTATED
In the present charge of plunder,

petitioner now insists that this court
justify that bail be granted without any
hearing before the Sandiganbayan on
whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
During the hearing on petitioner’s Motion

to Fix Bail, the prosecution argued that
any grant of bail should be based only on
their failure to establish the strength of
the evidence against him.49 The
prosecution had no opportunity to present
rebuttal evidence based on the prematurity
of the Motion.
Building on consistent precedent, the
Sandiganbayan correctly denied
petitioner’s Motion to Fix Bail for being
premature. The denial is neither
“capricious, whimsical, arbitrary [nor]
despotic”50 as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion. It was in accord with the clear
provisions of the Constitution,
jurisprudence, and long-standing rules of
procedure.
Thus, this could not have been the basis
for declaring that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion when it
denied petitioner’s Motion to Fix Bail.

III

The Sandiganbayan did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when it failed to
release petitioner on bail for medical or
_______________
49 Petition for Certiorari, Annex A, p. 2.

50 People v. Sandiganbayan, 490 Phil. 105, 116;
467 SCRA 137, 165 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario,
Second Division], citing People v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610, 616
[Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division], Rodson

Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141857,
June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 469, 480 [Per J. Callejo, Sr.,
Second Division], Matugas v. Commission on
Elections, 465 Phil. 299, 313; 420 SCRA 365, 378
(2004) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], Tomas Claudio
Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 467 Phil.
541, 553; 423 SCRA 122, 133 (2004) [Per J. Callejo,
Sr., Second Division], and Condo Suite Club Travel,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 380
Phil. 660, 667; 323 SCRA 679, 686 (2000) [Per J.
Quisumbing, Second Division].

329
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 329

humanitarian reasons. Petitioner did not

ask that bail be granted because of his
medical condition or for humanitarian
reasons. Neither petitioner nor the
prosecution as respondent developed their
arguments on this point at the
Sandiganbayan or in this court to
establish the legal and factual basis for
this special kind of bail in this case.
Yet, it now becomes the very basis for
petitioner’s grant of bail.
In his Petition before this court,
petitioner argued that:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan,

Enrile is bailable as a matter of right.
Enrile may be deemed to fall within the
exception only upon concurrence of two
(2) circumstances: (i) where the offense
is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and
(ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.
It is the duty and burden of the

prosecution to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile falls within
the exception and exclusion from the
right; and not the burden of Enrile to
show entitlement to his right.
The prosecution failed to establish that
Enrile’s case falls within the exception;
hence, denial of his right to bail by the
Sandiganbayan was in grave abuse of
discretion.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly

and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he
would be convicted, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is
entitled to bail as a matter of right.
The Sandiganbayan ignored the fact

that the penalty prescribed by the
Anti-Plunder Law itself for the crime
of plunder is not only reclusion
perpetua but also the penalty next
lower in degree (or reclusion temporal)
by “consider(ing) the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating
circumstances, as provided by the
Revised Penal Code.”

330

ANNOTATED
Further proceedings to receive

evidence of mitigating circumstances is
a needless formality.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly

and conclusively that evidence of
Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is strong; hence,
Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
Notwithstanding that the prosecution

did not assert, hence failed to raise in
issue, in its Opposition to Enrile’s
motion for bail, that evidence of guilt is
strong, in the light of the prosecution’s
continuing muteness to the defense’s
repeated challenge for the prosecution
to produce any “single piece of paper
showing that Enrile received even a
single peso of kickback,” the
Sandiganbayan nonetheless insisted
that Enrile must first initiate, and
formally apply for, the formal
proceedings (“bail hearing”) before the
prosecution may be called upon to
discharge its duty of proving evidence

of guilt is strong.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as

he is not a flight risk.
The exception to, or exclusion from, the

right (“shall be bailable”) does not
become a prohibition (“shall not be
bailable”). Indeed, the exception to a
mandatory right (“shall”) is a
permissive right (“may”).
A liberal interpretation is consistent
with the rights to presumptive
innocence and non-deprivation of
liberty without due process, and the
theory behind the exception to right-to-
bail.
Hence, if the theory is clearly shown
not to exist as to Enrile (i.e., Enrile is
demonstrated not being a flight risk),
then bail may be granted to him.

331
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 331

Enrile is definitely not a flight risk,

being of old age, frail physical and
medical condition, and having
voluntarily surrendered.
Circumstances of official and social

standing shows that Enrile is not a
flight risk.
Other circumstances negating Enrile’s
disposition to become a fugitive from
justice are also present.
The following illustrative cases decided
by the Supreme Court show that at
this stage of the proceeding, Enrile is
entitled to bail a matter of right.51
The prayer in his Petition reads:

WHEREFORE, petitioner Enrile

respectfully prays that the Honorable
Court:
a. ACT En Banc on the Petition for
Certiorari;
b. EXPEDITE the certiorari
proceedings;
c. SET the Petition for Certiorari for
oral arguments; and
d. after due proceedings, ANNUL,
REVERSE, and SET ASIDE the
Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dated
July 14, 2014, and the Resolution
dated August 8, 2014, and
forthwith GRANT BAIL in favor of
Enrile.
Petitioner Enrile prays for such other
and further relief as may be just and
equitable.52

IV

This case entailed long, arduous, and
spirited discussion among the justices of
this court in and out of formal
deliberations. As provided by our rules and
tradition, the discussion
_______________
51 Petition for Certiorari, pp. 9-12.

52 Id., at p. 64.

332

ANNOTATED
was triggered by the submission of the

member in charge of a draft early this
year. The draft mainly adopted the legal
arguments of the Petition which was
centered on this court taking judicial notice
of evidence to establish two generic
mitigating circumstances that would lower
the penalty to be imposed even before trial
or a hearing for the determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong
happened before the Sandiganbayan.
Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe
and this member submitted their
reflections on this issue. Refutations and
arguments were vigorously exchanged in

writing.
Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe
and this member adopted the common
position that there was no grave abuse of
discretion and, therefore, the Petition
should be dismissed. At most, the Motion
to Fix Bail could be treated by the
Sandiganbayan as a petition or application
for bail as in all cases where the statutorily
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua,
death, or life imprisonment. Associate
Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this
member differed only in the treatment of
mitigating circumstances and the
interpretation of Bravo, Jr., etc. v. Hon.
Borja, et al.53
When this case was called again for
deliberation during the En Banc session on
August 11, 2015, the member-in-charge
(now the ponente) proposed the idea of
dropping all discussion on the legal points
pertaining to whether bail was a matter of
right and focusing the grant of bail on
“humanitarian” grounds. The member-in-
charge committed to circulate a draft for
the consideration of all justices. This
member expressed that he was open to
listen to all arguments.
The revised draft that centered on
granting bail on the basis of the medical
condition of petitioner was circulated on
August 14, 2015. After considered
reflection, this member responded with a
letter addressed to all the justices, which
stated:
_______________
53 219 Phil. 432; 134 SCRA 466 (1985) [Per J.

Plana, First Division].

333
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 333

In my view, there are several new issues

occasioned by the revisions in the proposed
ponencia that need to be threshed out
thoroughly so that the Sandiganbayan can be
guided if and when an accused charged with
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua
should be released on bail “for humanitarian
reasons.”
Among these are as follows:
First: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it applied the text of the
Constitution, the rules of court, and the present
canonical interpretations of these legal texts?
Second: Are we taking judicial notice of the
truth of the contents of the certification of a
certain Dr. Gonzalez? Or are we suspending our
rules on evidence, that is, doing away with
cross-examination and not appreciating
rebutting evidence that may be or have been
presented by the prosecution?
Third: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave
abuse of discretion in appreciating the facts
relating to the medical condition of the accused?

Or are we substituting our judgment for theirs?
Fourth: What happens to the standing order
of the Sandiganbayan which authorizes the
accused to be brought to any hospital
immediately if he exhibits symptoms which
cannot be treated by the PNP hospital subject
only to reportorial requirements to the court?
Are we also declaring that the Sandiganbayan’s
decisions in relation to their supervision of the
detention of the accused were tainted with
grave abuse of discretion?
Fifth: What, if any, is the legal basis for
humanitarian releases on bail? Or if we are able
to hurdle the factual issues and find that there
is actually a medical necessity, should his
detention rather be modified? Do we have clear
judicial precedents for hospital or house arrests
for everyone?
Sixth: Without conceding, if the accused is
released on bail so that his medical condition
can be attended to,

334

ANNOTATED
should he be returned to detention when

he becomes well? If he reports for work,
does this not nullify the very basis of the

ponencia?
Seventh: What is the basis for
P500,000.00 as bail? We have established
rules on what to consider when setting the
amount of bail. In relation to the accused
and his circumstances, what is our basis
for setting this amount? What evidence
have we considered? Should this Court
rather than the Sandiganbayan exercise
this discretion?
Eighth: What are our specific bases for
saying that the medical condition of the
accused entitles him to treatment different
from all those who are now under
detention and undergoing trial for
plunder? Is it simply his advanced age?
What qualifies for advanced age? Is it the
medical conditions that come with
advanced age? Would this apply to all
those who have similar conditions and are
also undergoing trial for plunder? Is he
suffering from a unique debilitating
disease which cannot be accommodated by
the best care provided by our detention
facilities or hospital or house arrest? Are
there sufficient evidence and rules to
support our conclusion?
Ninth: Are there more specific and
binding international law provisions, other
than the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which specifically compel the
release of an accused in his condition? Or
are we now reading the general tenor of
the declaration of human rights to apply
specifically to the condition of this accused?
What entitles the accused in this case to a

liberal application of very general
statements on human rights?54
The points in my letter were raised
during the deliberations of August 18,
2015. The member-in-charge, however, did
not agree to wait for a more extensive
written reflection on the points raised.
Insisting on a vote, he thus declared
that he was abandoning the August 14,
2015 circulated draft centering on
release on bail on humanitarian \
_______________
54 J. Leonen, Letter to Colleagues dated August

18, 2015.

335
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 335

grounds for his earlier version

premised on the idea that bail was a
matter of right based on judicial
notice and the judicial declaration of
the existence of two mitigating
circumstances.
This was the version voted upon at
about 11:00 a.m. of August 18, 2015. The
only amendment to the majority opinion
accepted by the member-in-charge was the

increase of the proposed amount of bail to
P1,000,000.00.
The vote was 8 to 4 with Associate
Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, who was the
member-in-charge, emerging as the
ponente. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio, Associate Justice Estela Perlas-
Bernabe, and this member dissented.
During the oral arguments on the Torre
de Manila case or at about 3:00 p.m., the
ponente passed around a final copy of
the majority opinion which was not the
version voted upon during the
morning’s deliberation. Rather, the copy
offered for signature was substantially the
August 14, 2015 circulated version
granting bail on humanitarian grounds.
The current ponencia now does away
with petitioner’s entire argument, stating
that:
Yet, we do not now determine the
question of whether or not Enrile’s
averment on the presence of the two
mitigating circumstances could entitle him
to bail despite the crime alleged against
him being punishable with reclusion
perpetua, simply because the
determination, being primarily factual in
context, is ideally to be made by the trial
court.55 (Citation omitted)
Ordinarily, the drafts of the dissents
would have been available to all members
of the court at the time that the case was
voted upon. But because the final version

for signing was
_______________
55 Ponencia, p. 305.

336

ANNOTATED
not the version voted upon, this member

had to substantially revise his dissent.
Since the issue of mitigating circumstances
and bail as a matter of right was no longer
the basis of the ponencia, Associate Justice
Estela Perlas-Bernabe decided to
graciously offer her points for the drafting
of a single Dissenting Opinion and to
abandon her filing of a Separate Opinion
and joining this member.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court allows one week for the submission
of a dissenting opinion. Thus, in Rule 13,
Section 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC:
SEC. 7. Dissenting, separate or concurring

opinion.—A Member who disagrees with the
majority opinion, its conclusions, and the
disposition of the case may submit to the Chief
Justice or Division Chairperson a dissenting
opinion, setting forth the reason or reasons for

such dissent. A Member who agrees with the
result of the case, but based on different reason
or reasons may submit a separate opinion; a
concurrence “in the result” should state the
reason for the qualified concurrence. A Member
who agrees with the main opinion, but opts to
express other reasons for concurrence may
submit a concurring opinion. The dissenting,
separate, or concurring opinion must be
submitted within one week from the date the
writer of the majority opinion presents the
decision for the signature of the Members.
(Emphasis supplied)

But this member endeavored to
complete his draft incorporating the ideas
and suggestions of other dissenting justices
within two days from the circulation of the
majority opinion.
In the meantime, media, through
various means, got wind of the vote and
started to speculate on the contents of the
majority opinion. This may have created
expectations on the part of petitioner’s
friends, family, and counsel. The Presiding
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, while
admitting that the Decision had as yet not
been promulgated and served, made
announcements as to their readiness to
receive the cash bond and process the
release of the accused even if August 19,
2015

337
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 337

happened to be a holiday in Quezon City,

which was the seat of their court.
This is the context of the apparent delay
in the announcements regarding the vote
and the date of promulgation of this
judgment.

V

Despite brushing aside all of petitioner’s
arguments, the majority, instead of
denying the Petition for Certiorari, grants
it on some other ground that was not even
argued nor prayed for by petitioner.
In essence, the majority now insists on
granting bail merely on the basis of the
certification in a Manifestation and
Compliance dated August 14, 2014 by Dr.
Jose C. Gonzales (Dr. Gonzales) stating
that petitioner is suffering from numerous
debilitating conditions.56 This certification
was submitted as an annex to a
Manifestation57 before this court regarding
the remoteness of the possibility of flight of
the accused not for the purposes of asking
for bail due to such ailments.
Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we
allow the grant of bail based on judicial
notice of a doctor’s certification. In doing
so, we effectively suspend our rules on
evidence by doing away with cross-

examination and authentication of Dr.
Gonzales’ findings on petitioner’s health in
a hearing whose main purpose is to
determine whether no kind of alternative
detention is possible.
_______________
56 The enumeration of diseases on pages 307-308

of the ponencia is based on the certification of Dr.
Gonzales. There was a hearing but for the purpose of
determining whether hospital arrest can continue.
The hearing was not for the purpose of determining
whether bail should be granted on the basis of his
medical condition.
57 Rollo, p. 373.

338

ANNOTATED
Under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the

Revised Rules on Evidence:
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when

discretionary.—A court may take judicial notice
of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration, or
ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.

In State Prosecutors v. Muro:58
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice

have three material requisites: (1) the matter
must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled
and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must
be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it
can be said that judicial notice is limited to
facts evidenced by public records and facts of
general notoriety.59
Petitioner’s medical ailments are not

matters that are of public knowledge or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration.
His illness is not a matter of general
notoriety.
Assuming that the medical ailments of
petitioner are relevant issues for bail, the
prosecution is now deprived of a fair
opportunity to present any evidence that
may rebut the findings of Dr. Gonzales or
any other medical documents presented by
petitioner in this Court. Due process
requires that we remand this matter for a
bail hearing to verify Dr. Gonzales’
findings and to ensure that that is still the
condition that prevails at present.
_______________
58 A.M. No. RTJ-92-876, September 19, 1994, 236

SCRA 505 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
59 Id., at pp. 521-522, citing 20 Am. Jur.,
Evidence, Sec. 17, 48, King v. Gallun, 109 U.S. 99, 27
L. ed. 870, and 31 C.J.S., Evidence, Secs. 6-7, 823.

339
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 339

That we make factual determinations

ourselves to grant provisional liberty to
one who is obviously politically privileged
without the benefit of the presentation of
evidence by both the prosecution and the
accused, without the prosecution being
granted the opportunity to cross-examine
the evidence, and without consideration of
any rebutting evidence that may have been
presented should a hearing be held, casts
serious doubt on our neutrality and
objectivity.
The better part of prudence is that we
follow strictly our well-entrenched, long-
standing, and canonical procedures for
bail. Doctrinally, the matter to determine
is whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
This is to be examined when a hearing is
granted as a mandatory manner after a
petition for bail is filed by the accused. The
medical condition of the accused, if any,

should be pleaded and heard.

VI

Assuming without conceding that
petitioner suffers from illnesses that
require immediate medical attention, this
court has not established clear guidelines
for such releases. The closest that the
majority opinion reaches for a standard is:
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused,

regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the
charge, provided his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail
despite imperiling his health and life would not
incarceration during trial.60 (Emphasis in the
original)

To see the logical fallacy of the
argument we break it down to its premises:
_______________

340

ANNOTATED
Premise: There are those whose

continued incarceration is clearly shown to
be injurious to their health OR whose lives
are endangered due to incarceration.
Premise: Petitioner is suffering from
some ailments.
Therefore: Petitioner should be released.
There are various ways to see the
fallacy of the argument.
It is true that it is the duty of courts to
ensure that detention prisoners are
humanely treated. Under A.M. No. 07-3-
02-SC,61 judges of lower courts are
mandated to conduct monthly jail
visitations in order to “[e]nsure the
promotion and protection of the dignity
and well-being”62 of detention prisoners.
Detention prisoners may also be released
to a medical facility on humanitarian
grounds “if their continuous confinement
during the pendency of their case would be
injurious to their health or endanger their
life.”63
In many instances, alternative
detention — whether temporary or
permanent — is granted upon a clear
showing before the trial court or the
Sandiganbayan that the physical condition
of the accused, as proven through evidence
presented in open court, is absolutely
requiring medical attention that could not
be accommodated within the current
custodial arrangements. Care should,

however, be taken that such alternative
custodial arrangements do not take place
more than the time necessary to address
the medical condition of the accused.
Likewise, the Sandiganbayan should
ensure that alternative custodial
arrangements are not borne by the state
and, therefore, should be sensitive to the
possibility that these alternatives are not
seen as a privilege given to the wealthy or
powerful detainees.
_______________
61 Re: Guidelines on the Jail Visitation and

Inspection. New guidelines are stated in OCA
Circular No. 107-2013.
62 A.M. No. 07-3-02-SC (2008), Sec. 1(3)
63 De la Rama v. People’s Court, 77 Phil. 461, 465
(1946) [Per J. Feria, En Banc].

341
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 341

On July 9, 201464 and July 15, 2014,65

the Sandiganbayan already issued
Resolutions allowing accused to remain at
the Philippine National Police General
Hospital and continue medical
examinations until further orders from the

court, subject to reportorial requirements
and at accused’s personal expense. In
particular, the Resolution dated July 9,
2014 states:
Pending receipt of [Dr. Jose C. Gonzales’s

report], the Court will hold in abeyance action
on accused Enrile’s motion for detention at the
PNP General Hospital. However, he is allowed
to remain thereat until further orders from this
Court. The Director or Administrator of PNP
General Hospital is GRANTED AUTHORITY
to allow accused Enrile to access another
medical facility outside Camp Crame only (1) in
case of emergency or necessity, and (2) the
medical procedure required to be administered
on accused Enrile is not available at, or cannot
be provided for by the physicians of, the PNP
General Hospital, ALL AT THE PERSONAL
EXPENSE OF ACCUSED ENRILE. After
completion of the medical treatment or
procedure outside Camp Crame, accused Enrile
shall be returned forthwith to the PNP General
Hospital. The said director or
administrator is DIRECTED to submit a
report to the Court on such visit/s of
accused Enrile to another medical facility
on the day following the said visit/s.66
(Emphasis in the original)

The Resolution dated July 15, 2014
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Dr.

Jose C. Gonzales, and/or any his duly
authorized representative/s from the Philippine

General Hospital, is DIRECTED to continue
with the medical examination of accused Juan
Ponce Enrile and to submit a report and
recommendation
_______________
64 Petition for Certiorari, Annex O.

65 Petition for Certiorari, Annex P.
66 Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.

342

ANNOTATED
to the Court within thirty (30) days from receipt

hereof. The necessary medical examination/s
and/or procedure/s as determined the said
doctor/s shall be undertaken at PGH or any
government hospital, which the medical team
may deem to have the appropriate, suitable
and/or modern equipment or medical apparatus
and competent personnel to undertake the
procedure/s, ALL AT THE PERSONAL
EXPENSE OF ACCUSED JUAN PONCE
ENRILE. Pending the completion of the
aforesaid medical examination/s and/or
procedure/s and submission of the required
report and recommendation, accused Juan
Ponce Enrile is allowed to remain at the

Philippine National Police General Hospital
subject to conditions earlier imposed by the
Court in its Resolution dated July 9, 2014.
SO ORDERED.67

These are standing orders of the
Sandiganbayan that authorize accused to
be brought to any hospital immediately if
he exhibits symptoms that cannot be
treated at the Philippine National Police
General Hospital subject only to
reportorial requirements to the court. In
granting bail to petitioner, we are, in
effect, declaring that the Sandiganbayan’s
decisions in relation to its supervision of
the accused’s detention were tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.
However, these orders were not the
subject of this Petition for Certiorari.
To the Sandiganbayan, based upon the
facts as presented to it, accused does not
seem to be suffering from a unique
debilitating disease whose treatment
cannot be provided for by our detention
facilities and temporary hospital arrest in
accordance with their order. How the
majority arrived at a conclusion
different from the Sandiganbayan has
not been thoroughly explained. Neither
did this issue become the subject of
intense discussion by the parties
through their pleadings.
_______________
67 Petition for Certiorari, Annex P, pp. 2-3.

343
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 343

It is unclear whether this privilege

would apply to all those who have similar
conditions and are also undergoing trial for
plunder. It is unclear whether petitioner’s
incarceration aggravates his medical
conditions or if his medical conditions are
simply conditions which come with
advanced age.
The majority has not set specific bases
for finding that the medical condition of
petitioner entitles him to treatment
different from all those who are now under
detention and undergoing trial for plunder.
There is no showing as to how grave his
conditions are in relation to the facilities
that are made available to him. There is
also no showing as to whether any of his
medical ailments is actually aggravating in
spite of the best care available. If his
health is deteriorating, there is no showing
that it is his detention that is the most
significant factor or cause for such
deterioration.
Usually, when there is a medical
emergency that would make detention in
the hospital necessary, courts do not grant

bail. They merely modify the conditions for
the accused’s detention. There is now no
clarity as to when special bail based on
medical conditions and modified arrest
should be imposed.
Finally, there is no guidance as to
whether this special bail based on medical
condition is applicable only to those of
advanced age and whether that advanced
age is beyond 90 or 91 years old. There is
no guidance as to whether this is
applicable only to cases involving plunder.
There is no guidance in the majority’s
opinion as to whether this is only
applicable to the medical conditions or
stature or titles of petitioner.
The majority has perilously set an
unstated if not ambiguous standard for the
special grant of bail on the ground of
medical conditions.
Bail is not a matter of right merely for
medical reasons. In People v. Fitzgerald:68
_______________
68 536 Phil. 413; 505 SCRA 573 (2006) [Per J.

Austria-Martinez, First Division].

344

ANNOTATED
Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged

detainee or prisoner needing medical care
outside the prison facility. A mere claim of
illness is not a ground for bail. It may be that
the trend now is for courts to permit bail for
prisoners who are seriously sick. There may
also be an existing proposition for the “selective
decarceration of older prisoners” based on
findings that recidivism rates decrease as age
increases.69

VII

Neither is there clarity in the majority
opinion as to the conditions for this special
kind of bail. Thus, the majority asserts:
It is relevant to observe that granting

provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable
him to have his medical condition be properly
addressed and better attended to by competent
physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This
will not only aid in his adequate preparation of
his defense but, more importantly, will
guarantee his appearance in court for the
trial.70

Before the ink used to write and print
the majority opinion and this dissent has
dried, friends, family, and colleagues of
petitioner already strongly predict that he
would report immediately for work. This

strongly indicates that the majority’s
_______________
69 Id., at p. 428; pp. 585-586, citing Release of

Accused by Judge Muro in Non-Bailable Offense, 419
Phil. 567, 581; 367 SCRA 285, 299 (2001) [Per
Curiam, En Banc], People v. Gako, Jr., 401 Phil. 514,
541; 348 SCRA 334, 352 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-
Reyes, Third Division], Pineda, Ernesto, The Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, p. 193 (2003), which in
turn cited De la Rama v. People’s Court, supra note
63, Archer’s case, 6 Gratt 705, Ex parte Smith, 2 Okla.
Crim. Rep. 24, 99 Pfc. 893, and Max Rothman, Burton
Dunlop, and Pamela Entzel, Elders, Crime and The
Criminal Justice System, pp. 233-234 (2000).

345
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 345

inference as to the existence of very serious

debilitating illnesses may have been too
speculative or premature.
Significantly, there is no guidance to the
Sandiganbayan as to whether bail then
can be cancelled motu propio or upon
motion. There is no guidance as to whether
that motion to cancel bail should be filed
before the Sandiganbayan or before this

court.
The crime charged in petitioner’s case is
one where the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua. The Constitution and
our rules require that bail can only be
granted after granting the prosecution the
opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt
is strong. The special grant of bail, due to
medical conditions, is unique,
extraordinary, and exceptional. To allow
petitioner to go about his other duties
would be to blatantly flaunt a violation of
the provisions of the Constitution and our
rules.
In other words, there is no rule on
whether the grant of provisional liberty on
the basis of humanitarian considerations
extends even after the medical emergency
has passed. Again, a case of a decision
especially tailored for petitioner.

VIII

There is no evidentiary basis for the
determination of P1,000,000.00 as the
amount for bail. The original proposal of
the member in charge was P100,000.00.
This was increased to P500,000.00 in its
revised proposal circulated on August 14,
2015. Then, upon the request of one
member who voted with the majority, it
was then increased to P1,000,000.00.
The rules guide courts on what to
consider when setting the amount of bail.71
The majority opinion is sparse on the

evidence it
_______________
71 See Rev. Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 114, Sec. 9,

which states:
SEC. 9. Amount of bail; guidelines.—The judge
who issued the warrant or granted the application
shall fix a reasonable

346

ANNOTATED
considers for setting this particular

amount. Again, the more prudent course of
action would have been for the
Sandiganbayan, not this court, to exercise
its discretion in setting the amount of bail.
IX

There are no specific and binding
international law provisions that compel
this court to release petitioner given his
medical condition. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, relied upon
in the majority opinion, is a general
declaration72 to uphold the value and
dignity of every person.73 It does not
prohibit the arrest of any accused based on

lawful causes nor does it prohibit the
detention of any person accused of crimes.
It only implies that any arrest or detention
must be carried out in a dignified and
humane manner.
_______________
amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited

to, the following factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the
trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from
justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is
on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
72 In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 504,
545; 407 SCRA 10, 57 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc],
this court stated: “Although the signatories to the
Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding
document, being only a declaration, the Court has
interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally
accepted principles of international law and binding
on the State.”
73 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 1
states that “[a]ll human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights.”

347
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 347

The majority opinion cites Government

of Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr.74 as basis for the
grant of bail on humanitarian reasons.75
However, Government of Hong Kong does
not apply to this case because the issue
was on whether bail could apply to
extradition cases. This court stated that
because of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, whose principles are now
embodied in the Constitution, bail applies
to all instances where an accused is
detained pending trial, including
administrative proceedings such as
extradition. This court, however, does not
state that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights mandates that bail must be
granted in instances where the accused is
of advanced age and frail health.
Petitioner’s remedies under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
that safeguard his fundamental right to
liberty are qualified by the Constitution.
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution
clearly states that bail is available to all
persons before conviction “except those
charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt

is strong[.]” Even Article 29(2) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the same document used by the majority
opinion, provides that:
(2) In the exercise of his rights and

freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for
the purpose of securing due recognition and
respect for the rights and freedoms of others
and of meeting the just requirements of
morality, public order and the general welfare
in a democratic society.

In any case, even this court in
Government of Hong Kong was wary to
grant bail without evidence presented that
the accused was not a flight risk. For this
reason, it remanded
_______________
74 550 Phil. 63, 72; 521 SCRA 470, 482 (2007) [Per
J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
75 Ponencia, pp. 305-306.

348

ANNOTATED
the case to the trial court76 instead of

applying the provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and
categorically stating that based on these
principles alone, the accused was entitled
to bail.
It is true that the Constitution is replete
with provisions on both the respect for
human dignity and the protection of
human rights. These rights are applicable
to those who, during the dark days of
Martial Law, were illegally detained,
tortured, and even involuntarily
disappeared. There is, of course, no reason
for these rights and the invocation of
human dignity not to be applicable to
Senators of our Republic.
However, the mere invocation of the
broadest concept of human rights is not
shibboleth. It should not be cause for us to
be nonchalant about the existence of other
constitutional and statutory provisions and
the norms in our Rules of Court. The mere
invocation of human rights does not mean
that the Rule of Law is suspended. It is not
a shortcut to arrive at the conclusion or
result that we want. Rather, human rights
are best entrenched with the Rule of Law.
Suspending the applicability of clear legal
provisions upon the invocation of human
rights compels this court to do a more
conscious and rigorous analysis of how
these provisions violate specific binding
human rights norms.
The majority opinion fails in this
respect.
Liberty is indeed a cherished value. It is

an intrinsic part of our humanity to fight
for it and ensure that it allows all of us to
lead the kind of lives that we will consider
meaningful.
_______________
76 See Government of Hong Kong Special

Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., 550 Phil. 63, 77;
521 SCRA 470, 488 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez,
En Banc]. The dispositive portion reads: “WHERE-
FORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is
REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of
‘clear and convincing evidence.’ If not, the trial court
should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his
immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the
extradition proceedings with dispatch.”

349
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 349

This applies to petitioner as accused. Yet it

also applies with equal force to all the
individuals in our communities and in this
society.
Our collective liberty, the kind that
ensures our individual and collective
meaningful existence, is put at risk if
justice is wanting. Special privileges may

be granted only under clear, transparent,
and reasoned circumstances. Otherwise,
we accept that there are just some among
us who are elite. Otherwise, we concede
that there are those among us who are
powerful and networked enough to enjoy
privileges not shared by all.
This dissent rages against such a
premise. It is filled with discomfort with
the consequences of the majority’s position.
It cannot accept any form of impunity.

X

Plunder is not the only crime statutorily
punished with the imposable penalty of
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Under the Revised Penal Code, the
following crimes, among others, carry this
as maximum penalty:
(1) Parricide;77
(2) Murder;78
(3) Kidnapping and serious illegal
detention;79
(4) Robbery with homicide;80
(5) Robbery with rape;81

_______________
77 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 246.

78 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 248, as amended by Rep.
Act No. 7659 (1993), Sec. 6, and Rep. Act No. 9346
(2006), Sec. 1.
79 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 267, as amended by Rep.

Act No. 7659 (1993), Sec. 8, and Rep. Act No. 9346
(2006), Sec. 1.
80 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 294(1), as amended by
Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), Sec. 9.
81 Id.

350

ANNOTATED
(6) Robbery with serious physical

injuries;82
(7) Attempted or frustrated robbery
with homicide;83
(8) Rape;84
(9) Rape of children under 12 years
old;85
(10) Sexual assault;86 and
(11) Incestuous rape.87

Under special laws, the following
crimes, among others, carry the maximum
penalty of life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua:
(1) Carnapping with homicide or rape;88
(2) Sale of illegal drugs regardless of
quantity and purity;89
(3) Illegal possession of 10 grams or
more of heroin, 10 grams or more of
cocaine, 50 grams or more of shabu, 500

grams or more of marijuana, or 10 grams
or more of ecstasy;90
(4) Illegal possession of 10 grams to less
than 50 grams of shabu;91
_______________
82 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 294(2), as amended by

Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), Sec. 9.
83 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 297.
84 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 266-A, as amended by Rep.
Act No. 8353 (1997), Sec. 2.
85 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 266-A(1)(d), as amended
by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), Sec. 2.
86 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 266-A(2), as amended by
Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), Sec. 2.
87 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 266-B(1), as amended by
Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), Sec. 2.
88 Rep. Act No. 6539 (1972), Sec. 14, as amended
by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), Sec. 20 and Rep. Act No.
9346 (2006), Sec. 1.
89 Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 5.
90 Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 11, 1st par. (3)(4)
(5)(7)(8).
91 Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 11, 2nd par. (1).

351
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 351

(5) Illegal possession of 5 grams to less

than 10 grams of heroin, cocaine, shabu, or
ecstasy;92
(6) Child prostitution;93
(7) Child trafficking;94
(8) Forcing a street child or any child to
beg or to use begging as a means of
living;95
(9) Forcing a street child or any child to
be a conduit in drug trafficking or
pushing;96
(10) Forcing a street child or any child
to commit any illegal activities;97 and
(11) Murder, homicide, other intentional
mutilation, and serious physical injuries of
a child under 12 years old.98

If we are to take judicial notice of
anything, then it should be that there are
those accused of murder, trafficking, sale
of dangerous drugs, incestuous rape, rape
of minors, multiple counts of rape, or even
serious illegal detention who languish in
overcrowded detention facilities all over
our country. We know this because the
members of this court encounter them
through cases appealed on a daily basis.
Many of them suffer from diseases that
they may have contracted because of the
conditions of their jails. But they and their
families cannot afford hospitals better than
what government can provide them. After
all, they remain in jail because they may
not have the resources to launch a full-
scale legal offensive marked with the
creativity of well-networked defense

counsel. After all,
_______________
92 Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 11, 2nd par. (2).
93 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 5.
94 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 7.
95 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 10(e)(1).
96 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 10(e)(2).
97 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 10(e)(3).
98 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 10.

352

ANNOTATED
they may have committed acts driven by

the twin evils of greed or lust on one hand
and poverty on the other hand.
For them, there are no special
privileges. The application of the law to
them is often brute, banal, and canonical.
Theirs is textbook equal treatment by
courts.
Our precedents show that when there
are far less powerful, less fortunate, poorer
accused, this court has had no difficulty
denying a motion to fix bail or motion to
set bail where the crime charged carries
the imposable penalty of reclusion

perpetua. With less powerful accused, we
have had no difficulty reading the plain
meaning of Article III, Section 13 of the
Constitution. With those who are less
fortunate in life, there are no exceptions.
Petitioner in this case is unbelievably
more fortunate.
There is a right, just, and legal way to
do things for the right, just, and legal
result. In my view, it is not right, just, and
legal to grant bail, even for P1,000,000.00,
without clearly articulating why the
Sandiganbayan’s actions were arbitrary,
capricious, and whimsical.
In truth, the Sandiganbayan acted in
accordance with law and with sufficient
compassion. It did not gravely abuse its
discretion. Thus, this Petition should be
dismissed.

XI

Those that read a decision which does
not fully respond to the legal issues
outlined in this dissent may be tempted to
conclude that the decision is the result of
obvious political accommodation rather
than a judicious consideration of the facts
and the law. This case may benefit one
powerful public official at the cost of
weakening our legal institutions. If it is
pro hac vice, then it amounts to selective
justice. If it is meant to apply in a blanket
manner for all other detainees, then it will
weaken the administration of justice
because the judicial standards are not

clear.

353
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 353

Without further clarity, our signal to

the various divisions of the Sandiganbayan
hearing these complex and politically laden
plunder cases can be misinterpreted.
Rather than apply the Rule of Law without
fear or favor, the sitting justices will
become more sensitive to the demands of
those who have political influence. After
all, in their minds, even if they do what is
expected of them, this court may still
declare that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion.
The granting of bail is a judicial
function circumscribed within the bounds
of the Constitution. Our duty is to ensure
the realization of the Rule of Law even in
difficult cases. This case does not really
present any kind of legal complexity if we
blind ourselves as to who is involved. It is
complex only because it is political.
The grant of provisional liberty to
petitioner without any determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong
violates the clear and unambiguous text of
the Constitution. It may be that, as
citizens, we have our own opinions on or

predilections for how the balance of
fundamental rights, liberties, and
obligations should be. It may be that, as
citizens, such opinions are founded on our
wealth of knowledge and experience.
But, as members of this court, our duty
is to enforce the exact textual formulation
of the fundamental document written and
ratified by the sovereign. This fealty to the
text of the Constitution will provide us
with a stable anchor despite the potential
political controversies that swirl over the
legal questions that we need to decide. It is
also this fealty to the text of the
Constitution that gives this court the
legitimacy as the final bastion and the
ultimate sentinel of the Rule of Law.
As the apex of the judiciary, the very
sentinels of the Rule of Law, the court from
whom all other courts — like the
Sandiganbayan — should find inspiration
and courage, we should apply the law
squarely and without fear or favor. We
should have collectively carried the burden
of doing justice properly and denied this
Petition.

354

ANNOTATED
Indeed, mercy and compassion temper

justice. However, mercy and compassion
should never replace justice. There is
injustice when we, as the court of last
resort, conveniently rid ourselves of the
burden of enforcing the Rule of Law by
neglecting to do the kind of rigorous,
deliberate, and conscious analysis of the
issues raised by the parties. There is
injustice when we justify the result we
want with ambiguous and unclear
standards.
Compassion as an excuse for injustice
not only fails us as justices of this court. It
also fails us in our own humanity.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS
the Petition. The Motion to Fix Bail should
be treated by the Sandiganbayan as a
petition for bail under Rule 114, Section 5
of the Rules of Court.
Petition granted, resolutions of

Sandiganbayan (Third Division) annulled
and set aside.
Notes.—After a judgment of conviction

has been rendered by the trial court and
cancellation of the bail bond of the accused,
his appropriate remedy against the court’s
order cancelling his bond is by filing with
the Court of Appeals a motion to review
the said order in the same regular appeal
proceedings, as an incident of his appeal —
the filing of a separate petition via a
special civil action or special proceeding
questioning such adverse order before the
appellate court is proscribed. (Chua vs.

Court of Appeals, 520 SCRA 729 [2007])
Under the present rule, the grant of bail
is a matter of discretion upon conviction by
the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment; The allowance of bail
pending appeal should be exercised not
with laxity but with grave caution and only
for strong reasons, considering that the
accused has been in fact convicted by the
trial court. (Qui vs. People, 682 SCRA 94
[2012])

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7/10/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 767 Copy

G.R. No. 213847. August 18, 2015.*

Constitutional Law; Criminal

presence of the accused when so required,

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 283

with a capital offense, or with an offense

punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life

284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

lated the conditions of his bail without

guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, 279

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 285

strong, discharge the accused upon the

Same; Same; Same; This national

a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both

286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

imperiling his health and life would not

better argument for the accused at the expense

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 287

Same; Same; Same; View that the

evidence of guilt is strong.—The mandatory bail

conclusions, and the disposition of the case may

288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

phasis supplied) But this member

essence, the majority now insists on granting

bail, the prosecution is now deprived of a fair

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 289

portunity to cross-examine the evidence,

conditions and are also undergoing trial for

also be an existing proposition for the “selective

290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ity’s inference as to the existence of very

to cancel bail should be filed before the

P500,000.00 in its revised proposal circulated

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 291

more prudent course of action would have

every person. It does not prohibit the arrest of

analysis of how these provisions violate specific

invocation of the broadest concept of human

pro hac vice, then it amounts to selective

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 293

Estelito P. Mendoza, Susan A.

Malabanan, Eleazar B. Reyes, Joseph B.

1 See Lindermayer, Ariana, What the Right Hand

294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution

4 Id., at pp. 107-108.

12 Id., at pp. 249-256.

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 295

July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions,

x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall

not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no

296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of

consideration. These circumstances will only be

14 Id., at pp. 84-88.

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 297

is entitled to bail as a matter of

mandatory that a bail hearing be

16 Id., at pp. 16-19.

298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

bail considers the imposable penalty,

innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due