I.
General Principles ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION OF
II. Rule 72
A. Exclusions
Hernaez vs IAC
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS; FILIATION; ACTION FOR
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION OF MINOR
NATURAL CHILDREN; GOVERNED BY
ORDINARY RULES ON CIVIL ACTIONS. — An
action for compulsory recognition of minor
natural children is not among cases of special
proceedings mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72 of
the Rules of Court. Consequently, such an
action should be governed by the rules on
ordinary civil actions. The case at bar does not
fall under Rule 105 of the Rules of Court since
the same applies only to cases falling under
Article 281 of the Civil Code where there has
been a voluntary recognition of the minor
natural child, i.e., prior recognition of the
minor natural child in a document other than a
record of birth or a will, which is absent in the
instant case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SHOULD BE BROUGHT
AGAINST THE PUTATIVE FATHER;
EXCEPTIONS. — Private respondent’s claim
that notice of an action for compulsory
recognition should also be given to the wife
and legitimate children of the putative parent,
Teodoro Hernaez, Sr., is unmeritorious. First of
all, in a case for compulsory recognition, the
party in the best position to oppose the same
is the putative parent himself. Secondly,
implicit in both Articles 283 and 285 of the Civil
Code is the general rule that an action for
compulsory recognition should be brought
against the putative father, the exceptions
being the instances when either the putative
parent died during the minority of the child, or
when after the death of the parent a document
should appear of which nothing had been
heard and in which either or both of the
parents recognize the child, in which cases the
action is brought against the putative parent’s
heirs.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE;
SERVICE OF SUMMONS; SHOULD BE BROUGHT
AGAINST THE PUTATIVE FATHER IN AN
MINOR NATURAL CHILD. — An action for
compulsory recognition is an ordinary civil
action. Thus, service of summons on the
putative parent shall be as provided for under
Rule 14. Said action shall be brought against
the putative parent only; his heirs may be
made party defendants only under the
circumstances mentioned in Article 285.
Facts:
This case stemmed out from the decision made by
the CA which held void the declaration of the RTC
upholding Teodoro Palmes Hernaez as the
recognized natural child of private respondent
Teodoro Hernaez and entitling the former a 400php
monthly support.
The factual antecedents of the case suggests
that Evelyn Palmes filed a complaint with the
then Juvenile and Domestic Court (now
Regional Trial Court) against Teodoro Hernaez
for acknowledgment and support with support
pendente lite.
The RTC in its decision declared Teodoro
Palmes as the natural child of the respondent
and ordered the latter to provide support of
400php to the minor until he reaches the age
of majority.
CA dismissed the decision of the RTC declaring
the petitioner as natural child of the
respondent, since the same is not a special
proceeding and the same should be an
ordinary civi action.
Issue: Whether or not the CA is correct in
dismissing the decision of the rtc?
Held: NO.
An action for compulsory recognition of minor
natural children is not among cases of special
proceedings mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72 of
the Rules of Court. Consequently, such an
action should be governed by the rules on
ordinary civil actions.
The case at bar does not fall under Rule 105 of
the Rules of Court since the same applies only
to cases falling under Article 281 of the Civil
Code where there has been a voluntary
recognition of the minor natural child, i.e.,
prior recognition of the minor natural child in a
document other than a record of birth or a will,
which is absent in the instant case.
Private respondents’ claim that notice of an
action for compulsory recognition should also
be given to the wife and legitimate children of
the putative parent, Teodoro Hernaez, Sr., is
unmeritorious. First of all, in a case for
compulsory recognition, the party in the best
position to oppose the same is the putative
parent himself.
Secondly, implicit in both Articles 283 7 and
285 8 of the Civil Code is the general rule that
an action for compulsory recognition should be
brought against the putative father, 9 the
exceptions being the instances when either the
putative parent died during the minority of the
child, or when after the death of the parent a
document should appear of which nothing had
been heard and in which either or both of the
parents recognize the child, in which cases the
action is brought against the putative parent’s
heirs.
In fine, an action for compulsory recognition is
an ordinary civil action. Thus, service of
summons on the putative parent shall be as
provided for under Rule 14. Said action shall
be brought against the putative parent only;
his heirs may be made party defendants only
under the circumstances mentioned in Article
285.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Ariola vs Ariola
Facts:
John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed
Special Civil Action with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 254, Las Piñas City (RTC)
against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G.
Arriola (petitioners) for judicial partition of the
properties of decedent Fidel Arriola (the
decedent Fidel).
Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with
his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while
petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel
with his second wife, petitioner Vilma.
RTC: Decided the Special civil action ordering
the partition of the parcel of land
The decision became final on March 15, 2004. 4
The parties failed to agree on how to partition
among them the land covered subject land,
respondent sought its sale through public
auction, and petitioners acceded to it.5 
RTC favored the public auction of the land, but
it had to be reset in a different schedule since
the petitioners refused to include in the auction
sale the subject house--- This prompted
respondent to file with the RTC an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of
Court,8 praying that petitioners be declared in
contempt.
The RTC denied the motion in subsequent
order and declared the refusal of the
petitioners to be justified since the evidence
adduced leading to the auction sale did not
include the house in the adjudication.
Plaintiffs in this case filed an MR which was
subsequently denied leading to the filing of a
petition for certiorari under rule 65.
CA
CA granted the petition for certiorari and
reinstated the order of the RTC to proceed with
the auction sale which includes the house.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
but the CA denied the same in its
Resolution14 of April 30, 2007.
ISSUE:
whether the subject house should be included
in the public auction of the subject land?
Held:
The supreme court ruled in the negative since
the subject house and the land which it stands
are considered a family home under the Family
Code
The Supreme court use as basis Articles 158
and 159 of the family code. Although the High
court agreed that in partition proceedings, it is
not necessary to allege in the auction sale the
house in the subject land since it is considered
already as an accessory thereto. It cannot be
denied that the subject house is considered as
a family home under Art. 152 and the land
which it stands as part of the family home.
It being settled that the subject house (and the
subject lot on which it stands) is the family
home of the deceased and his heirs, the same
is shielded from immediate partition under
Article 159 of The Family Code, viz:
Article 159. The family home shall continue
despite the death of one or both spouses or of
the unmarried head of the family for a period
of ten years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition
the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule
shall apply regardless of whoever owns
the property or constituted the family
home. (Emphasis supplied.)
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the
disintegration of the family unit following the
death of its head. To this end, it preserves the
family home as the physical symbol of family
love, security and unity by imposing the
following restrictions on its partition: first, that
the heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for
a period of 10 years from the death of one or
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the
family, or for a longer period, if there is still a
minor beneficiary residing therein; and second,
that the heirs cannot judicially partition it
during the aforesaid periods unless the court
finds compelling reasons therefor. No
compelling reason has been alleged by the
parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling
reason to order the partition of the family
home, either by physical segregation or
assignment to any of the heirs or through
auction sale as suggested by the parties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the
proscription against the immediate partition of
the family home regardless of its ownership.
This signifies that even if the family home has
passed by succession to the co-ownership of
the heirs, or has been willed to any one of
them, this fact alone cannot transform the
family home into an ordinary property, much
less dispel the protection cast upon it by the
law. The rights of the individual co-owner or
owner of the family home cannot subjugate the
rights granted under Article 159 to the
beneficiaries of the family home.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family
home - - consisting of the subject house and
lot on which it stands - - cannot be partitioned
at this time, even if it has passed to the co-
ownership of his heirs, the parties herein.
Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003.32 Thus,
for 10 years from said date or until March 10,
2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a
minor beneficiary residing therein, the family
home he constituted cannot be partitioned,
much less when no compelling reason exists
for the court to otherwise set aside the
restriction and order the partition of the
property.
SPOUSES AUTHER G.
KELLEY v. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC.
Facts:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther)
acquired agricultural chemical products on
consignment from respondent Planters
Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther's
failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed an
action for sum of money against him in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
57 (RTC Makati City).
RTC
After trial on the merits, the RTC Makati City
decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of
execution. Pursuant thereto, respondent
sheriff Jorge A. Ragutana sold on execution
real property in Naga City. A certificate of
sale was issued in favor of PPI as the highest
bidder.
After being belatedly informed of the said
sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris A.
Kelley (Doris) filed a motion to dissolve or
set aside the notice of levy in the RTC Makati
City on the ground that the subject property
was their family home which was exempt
from execution.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a complaint
for declaration of nullity of levy and sale of
the alleged family home with damages
against Ragutana and PPI in the Regional
Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19 (RTC
Naga City).
The case was, however, dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. The
dismissal was upheld by the CA.
CA upheld the dismissal by the RTC
Petitioners now come to us in this Petition
for Review on Certiorari contending that the
CA erred in upholding the dismissal of Civil
Case by the RTC Naga City. They claim that
Doris was a stranger2 to Civil Case (in the
RTC Makati City) who could not be forced to
litigate therein.
Petitioners anchor their action in Civil Case
No. 2000-0188 on their contention that TCT
No. 15079 is the Kelley family home. No
doubt, a family home is generally exempt
from execution3 provided it was duly
constituted as such.
There must be proof that the alleged family
home was constituted jointly by the husband
and wife or by an unmarried head of a
family.4  constitution of the family home;
It must be the house where they and their
family actually reside and the lot on which it
is situated.5
 The family home must be part of the
properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive
properties of either spouse with the latter's
consent, or on the property of the unmarried
head of the family.6
 The actual value of the family home shall
not exceed, at the time of its constitution,
the amount of P300,000 in urban areas
and P200,000 in rural areas.7
Under the Family Code, there is no need to
constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed
after the effectivity of the Family Code
(August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by
operation of law. All existing family
residences as of August 3, 1988 are
considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family
Code.8
The exemption is effective from the time of
the constitution of the family home as such
and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein.9 Moreover, the
debts for which the family home is made
answerable must have been incurred after
August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was
incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the
alleged family home must be shown to have
been constituted either judicially or
extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The
Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for
the following exceptions:
Article 155. The family home shall be
exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the
(3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the
premises before or after such constitution;
and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics,
architects, builders, materialmen and others
who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Article 160. When a creditor whose claim is
not among those mentioned in Article 155
obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has
reasonable grounds to believe that the family
home is actually worth more than the
maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he
may apply to the court which rendered the
judgment for an order directing the sale of
the property under execution. The court shall
so order if it finds that the actual value of
the family home exceeds the maximum
amount allowed by law as of the time of its
constitution. If the increased actual value
exceeds the maximum amount allowed by
law in Article 157 and results from
subsequent voluntary improvements
introduced by the person or persons
constituting the family home, by the owner
or owners of the property, or by any of the
beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure
shall apply.
x x x           x x x          x x x
We grant the petition only to the extent of
allowing petitioners to adduce evidence in
the trial court that TCT No. 15079 is in fact
their family home as constituted in
accordance with the requirements of law.
This is in consonance with our ruling
in Gomez v. Sta. Ines10 where we held:
[The husband and children] were not parties
to the Pasig RTC case and are third-party
claimants who became such only after trial in
the previous case had been terminated and
the judgment therein had become final and
executory. Neither were they indispensable
nor necessary parties in the Pasig RTC case,
and they could not therefore intervene in
said case. As strangers to the original case,
respondents cannot be compelled to present
their claim with the Pasig RTC which issued
the writ of execution.xxx
In said case, the alleged family home was
sold on execution by the sheriff of the Pasig
RTC.chanrobles virtual law library The
husband and children of the judgment debtor
filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the
levied property in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya where the alleged family home was
situated. As they were considered strangers
to the action filed in the Pasig RTC, we ruled
that the Nueva Vizcaya RTC had jurisdiction
over the complaint and that they could
vindicate their alleged claim to the levied
property there.11
WHEREFORE, Civil Case No. 2000-0188
captioned Spouses Auther G. Kelley, Jr. and
Doris A. Kelley v. Planters Products, Inc. and
Jorge A. Ragutana is
hereby REINSTATED and this case is
hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Naga City, Branch 19 for
determination whether or not the property
covered by TCT No. 15079 is a duly
constituted family home and therefore
exempt from execution.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 185920 : July 20, 2010
JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, ALMA RAMOS
WORAK, MANUEL T. RAMOS, JOSEFINA R.
ROTHMAN, SONIA R. POST, ELVIRA P. MUNAR,
and OFELIA R. LIM, Petitioners, v. DANILO
PANGILINAN, RODOLFO SUMANG, LUCRECIO
BAUTISTA and ROLANDO ANTENOR, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondents filed in 2003 a complaint1  for illegal cralaw
dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company
owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of
herein petitioners. By Decision2  of April 15, 2005, the
cralaw
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered
Ramos and the company to pay the aggregate amount
of P1,661,490.30 representing their backwages,
separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive
leave pay.
The Decision having become final and executory and
no settlement having been forged by the parties, the
Labor Arbiter issued on September 8, 2005 a writ of
execution3  which the Deputy Sheriff of the National
cralaw
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by
levying a property in Ramos' name covered by TCT No.
38978, situated in Pandacan, Manila (Pandacan
property).
Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family
home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the
judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to
quash the writ of execution. 4  Respondents, however,
cra cralaw
averred that the Pandacan property is not the Ramos
family home, as it has another in Antipolo, and the
Pandacan property in fact served as the company's
business address as borne by the company's
letterhead. Respondents added that, assuming that the
Pandacan property was indeed the family home, only
the value equivalent to P300,000 was exempt from
execution.
By Order5  of August 2, 2006, the Labor Arbiter denied
cralaw
the motion to quash, hence, Ramos and the company
appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the Labor
Arbiter's Order.
Ramos and the company appealed to the Court of
Appeals during the pendency of which Ramos died and
was substituted by herein petitioners. Petitioners also
filed before the NLRC, as third-party claimants, a
Manifestation questioning the Notice to Vacate issued
by the Sheriff, alleging that assuming that the
Pandacan property may be levied upon, the family
home straddled two (2) lots, including the lot covered
by TCT No. 38978, hence, they cannot be asked to
vacate the house. The Labor Arbiter was later to deny,
by Decision of May 7, 2009, the third-party claim,
holding
that Ramos' death and petitioners' substitution as his
compulsory heirs would not nullify the sale at auction
of the Pandacan property. And the NLRC6  would later
cralaw
affirm the Labor Arbiter's ruling, noting that petitioners
failed to exercise their right to redeem the Pandacan
property within the one 1 year period or until January
16, 2009. The NLRC brushed aside petitioners'
contention that they should have been given a fresh
period of 1 year from the time of Ramos' death on July
29, 2008 or until July 30, 2009 to redeem the
property, holding that to do so would give petitioners,
as mere heirs, a better right than the Ramos'.
As to petitioners' claim that the property was covered
by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains and as
such only Ramos' share can be levied upon, the NLRC
ruled that petitioners failed to substantiate such claim
and that the phrase in the TCT indicating the
registered owner as "Ernesto Ramos, married to
Juanita Trinidad, Filipinos," did not mean that both
owned the property, the phrase having merely
described Ramos' civil status.
Before the appellate court, petitioners alleged that the
NLRC erred in ruling that the market value of the
property was P2,177,000 as assessed by the City
Assessor of Manila and appearing in the documents
submitted before the Labor Arbiter, claiming that at
the time the Pandacan property was constituted as the
family home in 1944, its value was way
below P300,000; and that Art. 153 of the Family Code
was applicable, hence, they no longer had to resort to
judicial or extrajudicial constitution.
In the assailed Decision7  of September 24, 2008, the
cralaw
appellate court, in denying petitioners' appeal, held
that the Pandacan property was not exempted from
execution, for while "Article 1538  of the Family Code
cralaw
provides that the family home is deemed constituted
on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence, [it] did not mean that the article has
a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code."
The appellate court went on to hold that what was
applicable law were Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil
Code, hence, there was still a need to either judicially
or extrajudicially constitute the Pandacan property as
petitioners' family home before it can be exempted;
and as petitioners failed to comply therewith, there
was no error in denying the motion to quash the writ
of execution.
The only question raised in the present petition for
review on certiorari is the propriety of the Court of
Appeals Decision holding that the levy upon the
Pandacan property was valid.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Indeed, the general rule is that the family home is a
real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and
the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a
particular family the right to enjoy such properties,
which must remain with the person constituting it and
his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in
certain special cases. 9
cra cräläwvirtualibräry
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc. 10  lays down the
cra cralaw
rules relative to the levy on execution over the family
home, viz:
No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from
execution provided it was duly constituted as such.
There must be proof that the alleged family home was
constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an
unmarried head of a family. It must be the house
where they and their family actually reside and the lot
on which it is situated. The family home must be part
of the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of
either spouse with the latter's consent, or on the
property of the unmarried head of the family. The
actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at
the time of its constitution, the amount of P300,000 in
urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas.
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute
the family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family
homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family
Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by
operation of law. All existing family residences as of
August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the
constitution of the family home as such and lasts as
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made
answerable must have been incurred after August 3,
1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to
August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be
shown to have been constituted either judicially or
extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code. (emphasis
supplied)
For the family home to be exempt from execution,
distinction must be made as to what law applies based
on when it was constituted and what requirements
must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of
rules are applicable.

If the family home was constructed before the

effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3,
1988, then it must have been constituted either
judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles
225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. 11  Judicial cra cralaw

constitution of the family home requires the filing of a

verified petition before the courts and the registration
of the court's order with the Registry of Deeds of the
area where the property is located. Meanwhile,
extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to
24212  of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a
cralaw

public instrument which must also be registered with

the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with either
one of these two modes of constitution will bar a
judgment debtor from availing of the privilege.

On the other hand, for family homes constructed after

the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988,
there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or
judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time
it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries under Art. 15413  actually resides therein. cralaw

Moreover, the family home should belong to the

absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if
exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have
been with consent of the other, and its value must not
exceed certain amounts depending upon the area
where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for
which the exemption does not apply as provided under
Art. 15514  for which the family home is made
cralaw

answerable must have been incurred after August 3,

1988.

And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the

Family Code, it is not sufficient that the person
claiming exemption merely alleges that such property
is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set
up and proved. 15 cra cräläwvirtualibräry

In the present case, since petitioners claim that the

family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988,
or as early as 1944, they must comply with the
procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being
absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was
judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos'
family home, the law's protective mantle cannot be
availed of by petitioners. Parenthetically, the records
show that the sheriff exhausted all means to execute
the judgment but failed because Ramos' bank
accounts16  were already closed while other properties
cralaw

in his or the company's name had already been

transferred,17  and the only property left was the
cralaw

Pandacan property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.