Criminal Case Digest: People vs Lucas, GR Nos.

108172-73, May 25, 1994 (233 SCRA

537)
People vs Lucas, GR Nos. 108172-73, May 25, 1994 (233 SCRA 537)
Criminal Case Digest:
Digested Cases 

Facts:

In a sworn statement 1 taken on 16 February 1991, Chanda Lucas y Austria, then seventeen
years old, charged her natural father, accused Jose Conrado Lucas, of attempted rape
committed against her on 12 February 1991. She revealed therein that she was first raped
by him when she was only nine years old, or, as disclosed in a handwritten note at the left-
hand margin of her sworn statement
On 19 February 1991, Chanda, assisted by her mother, Ofelia Austria-Lucas, filed two
separate sworn criminal complaints for rape 2 and for attempted rape 3 against her father
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The complaints, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-91-18465 and Q-91-18466, were subsequently assigned to Branch 104 of the said
court
That on or about the 26th day of November 1982 and sometime thereafter in Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd designs and by means of violence and intimidation did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned CHANDA LUCAS Y
AUSTRIA, who was then nine (9) years old, now 17 yrs. of age, against her will, to her
damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of
the New Civil Code.
while that for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 reads:

That on or about the 12th day of February 1991, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation,
commence the commission of the crime of rape directly by overt acts by then and there
taking advantage of complainant's tender age and innocence, by then and there putting his
hand inside the panty of the undersigned and mashing her vagina while his other hand was
pressing her nipples and at the same time kissing her on the lips, face and neck, thereafter
accused placed himself on top of her but said accused did not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the said offense of rape by reason of the fact that the
brother and sister of the undersigned was awakened and shouted upon the accused, a
cause other than the spontaneous desistance of the said accused, that the aforesaid act of
the said accused was done against the will of the undersigned, to her damage and prejudice
in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the New Civil Code.

On the witness stand, the accused testified that he and Chanda's mother, Ofelia Austria, are
not married; however, since 1969, they had been living together as husband and wife until
1972, when he was detained for alleged gunrunning and when Ofelia and the children
moved to Cotabato.  He denied having raped his second daughter, Chanda, and alleged that
the brothers and sisters of Ofelia, particularly Leonardo Austria, were all angry at him and
instigated the filing of the fabricated charges against him. On 28 October 1992, the trial
court promulgated its decision 16 in the two cases finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two crimes of rape. 

On 4 November 1992, the accused filed a notice of appeal. 18 In his brief submitted to this
Court, he alleges that the trial court erred:
I
. . . IN GIVING UNMERITED VERACITY TO THE INCREDIBLE,
UNPERSUASIVE AND UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES AND IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.
II
. . . IN CONVICTING HIM OF THE CRIME OF RAPE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-91-18466
INASMUCH AS THE SAME IS MORE SERIOUS THAN THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
III
. . . IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO
Q-91-18465 DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. 19
issue: whether or not the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt
        IN CONVICTING HIM OF THE CRIME OF RAPE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-91-18466
INASMUCH AS THE SAME IS MORE SERIOUS THAN THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
        the court UNMERITED VERACITY TO THE INCREDIBLE,
UNPERSUASIVE AND UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES AND IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.

Held:  In rape cases, this Court has been guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 23
Conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie heavily on the sound
judgment of the trial court. Accordingly, in the appreciation of the evidence, the appellate
court accords due deference to the trial court's views on who should be given credence
since the latter is in a better position to decide the question of the credibility of witnesses,
having seen and heard these witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. The trial court's findings concerning the credibility of witnesses
carry great weight and respect and will be sustained by the appellate court unless the trial
court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which would have affected the result of the case.
After a careful examination of the records and the evidence, we are unable to find any
cogent reason to disturb the finding of the trial court that the accused raped his daughter,
Chanda, on 26 November 1983 and 12 February 1991.

People v Lucas (The 1995 case is connected on the 1994 case. Facts based on the
1994 case. Doctrine based on 1995 case).
CA Labitoria Gallardo

Chanda Lucas, 17 years old, charged her natural father Conrado Lucas of rape and
attempted rape. Accordingly, she was first raped when she was only 9 years old. Her father
molested her many times after that incident. However, at the age of 17, her father
attempted to rape her again by putting himself on top of her while placing his hand inside
her panty, but her siblings were awakened and shouted upon their father. Conrado
however denied and claimed that the charges were fabricated as the siblings do not like
him. The Supreme Court however in 1994 found him guilty Accordingly, in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution. In this case
however, the trial court found the testimony of the witness that she was raped by her own
father credible. In fact, it was a consummated rape given that he already inserted his penis
to her vagina. Given however that the information only charged attempted rape, he could
only be convicted of attempted rape, with the aggravating circumstance of relationship.

The issue in the 1995 case lies with the applicable penalty. Prior to R.A. No. 7659, the
presence of modifying circumstances would not affect the penalty for rape because such a
penalty was then indivisible. Under Art 63 of the RPC, when the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed. However,
pursuant to Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659, reclusion perpetua has now a defined duration, i.e.,
from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years. There is, however, no
corresponding amendment to Article 76 of the same Code for the purpose of converting
reclusion perpetua into a divisible penalty. Nonetheless, the court applied Art 65 of the RPC
and divided the penalty into 3 equal portions for the purpose of applying the aggravating
circumstance. The accused was sentenced to 34 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
perpetua.

Issue in 1995 case: W/N the SC in the 1994 case correctly divided an “indivisible penalty”
into 3 portions for the purpose of applying the aggravating circumstance

Held: No, SC corrected itself. Again, Art 63 of the RPC clearly provides that in cases of
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance that may have attended the commission of the deed. Although Section 17 of
R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and
one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear
legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. Reclusion
perpetua, therefore, retains its nature as having no minimum, medium and maximum
periods and is imposed in its entirety regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime. Hence, the court
modified its ruling by deleting the discussion about the divisibility of penalties, and applied
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

People v Latupan, 360 SCRA 60

Facts:
At the arraignment on May 25, 1993, accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of frustrated
murder. During the pre-trial conference of the four cases, accused offered to change his
plea of not guilty to guilty of the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder.
The prosecution did not interpose any objection. Thus, on July 20, 1993, the trial court re-
arraigned the accused. He withdrew his plea of not guilty and instead pleaded guilty to the
single offense of multiple murder with multiple frustrated murder. The facts are as follows:
On April 29, 1991, at around 4PM, accused Latupan went to the house of Ceferino Dagulo
with the intent to kill but later on told Ceferino to bring him to the authorities and tried to
give the knife to Ceferino. Ceferino refused to touch the knife and told accused to go to the
authorities by himself. Hearing this advice, accused ran away.
Meanwhile, the house of Emilio Asuncion (hereafter Emy) was 100 meters from Ceferino’s
house. At around 4PM of the same day, Emy upon returning to his house from a store found
his wife, Lilia dead on the ground with several stab wounds on her body and his one-year
old son, Leo, was lying on top of Lilia Asuncion. Emy picked up Leo and saw that the left
side of Leo’s face was lacerated. He ran upstairs and saw that Jose was wounded. He asked
Jose who stabbed him. Jose replied, “Uncle Jerry, Tatang.” Sadly, Jose died subsequently.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Latupan of the complex crime of double
murder and incorrectly assumed that the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation was included in the plea of guilty
Held:
The trial court erred in convicting accused- appellant of the “complex crime of double
murder” and separate offenses of serious physical injuries. Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code provides: "When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period." The instant
case does not fall under any of the two mentioned instances when a complex crime is
committed. The killing of Lilia and Jose Asuncion and the wounding of Jaime and Leo
resulted not from a single act but from several and distinct acts of stabbing. "Where the
death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two
separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed." Thus, accused-appellant is
liable, not for a complex crime of double murder, but for two separate counts of murder,
and separate counts of physical injuries. Further, the trial court incorrectly assumed that
the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was included in the plea of guilty.
Qualifying and aggravating circumstances, which are taken into consideration for the
purpose of increasing the degree of penalty to be imposed, must be proven with equal
certainty as the commission of the act charged as criminal offense. Thus, evident
premeditation cannot be presumed against accused-appellant. To warrant a finding of
evident premeditation, it must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the
crime prior to the moment of its execution but also that this decision was the result of
meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt. In this case, there was no proof,
direct or circumstantial, offered by the prosecution to show when accused-appellant
meditated and reflected upon his decision to kill the victim and the intervening time that
elapsed before this plan was carried out. When it is not shown as to how and when the plan
to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident
premeditation cannot be considered.