LAW ON PROPERTY – CO-OWNERSHIP
G.R. No. L-4656 November 18, 1912
RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ and
VICENTA ORTIZ Y FELIN DE PARDELL, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
GASPAR DE BARTOLOME Y ESCRIBANO and
MATILDE ORTIZ Y FELIN DE BARTOLOME, defendants-appellants.
Gaspar de Bartolome, in his own behalf.
B. Gimenez Zoboli, for appellees.
TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, from the judgment of October 5, 1907, whereby
the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, judge, absolved the defendants from the complaint,
and the plaintiff from a counterclaim, without special finding as to costs.
Counsel for the spouses Ricardo y Cruz and Vicente Ortiz y Felin de Pardell, the first
of whom, absent in Spain by reason of his employment, conferred upon the second
sufficient and ample powers to appear before the courts of justice, on June 8, 1905, in
his written complaint, alleged that the plaintiff, Vicente Ortiz, and the defendant,
Matilde Ortiz, are the duly recognized natural daughters of the spouses Miguel Ortiz
and Calixta Felin y Paula who died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882, respectively;
that Calixta Felin, prior to her death, executed on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative will
in Vigan whereby she made her four children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and
Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs of all her property; that,
of the persons enumerated, Manuel died before his mother and Francisca a few years
after her death, leaving no heirs by force of law, and therefore the only existing heirs
of the said testatrix are the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz and the defendant Matilde Ortiz;
that, aside from some personal property and jewelry already divided among the heirs,
the testatrix possessed, at the time of the execution of her will, and left at her death
the real properties which, with their respective cash values, are as follows:
1. A house of strong material, with the lot on which it is built, situated
P6,000.00
on Escolta Street, Vigan, and valued at
2. A house of mixed material, with the lot on which it stands, at No. 88
1,500.00
Washington Street, Vigan; valued at
3. A lot on Magallanes Street, Vigan; valued at 100.00
4. A parcel of rice land, situated in the barrio of San Julian, Vigan;
60.00
valued at
5. A parcel of rice land in the pueblo of Santa Lucia; valued at 86.00
6. Three parcels of land in the pueblo of Candon; valued at 150.00
1| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
Total 7,896.00
That, on or about the first months of the year 1888, the defendants, without judicial
authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the
administration and enjoyment of the said properties and collected the rents, fruits,
and products thereof, to the serious detriment of the plaintiffs' interest; that,
notwithstanding the different and repeated demands extrajudicially made upon
Matilde Ortiz to divide the aforementioned properties with the plaintiff Vicente and
to deliver to the latter the one-half thereof, together with one-half of the fruits and
rents collected therefrom, the said defendant and her husband, the self-styled
administrator of the properties mentioned, had been delaying the partition and
delivery of the said properties by means of unkept promises and other excuses; and
that the plaintiffs, on account of the extraordinary delay in the delivery of one-half of
said properties, or their value in cash, as the case might be, had suffered losses and
damages in the sum of P8,000. Said counsel for the plaintiffs therefore asked that
judgment be rendered by sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome, and
Matilde Ortiz Felin de Bartolome, to restore and deliver to the plaintiffs one-half of
the total value in cash, according to appraisal, of the undivided property specified,
which one-half amounted approximately to P3,948, or if deemed proper, to recognize
the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz to be vested with the full and absolute right of ownership
to the said undivided one-half of the properties in question, as universal testamentary
heir thereof together with the defendant Matilde Ortiz, to indemnify the plaintiffs in
the sum of P8,000, for losses and damages, and to pay the costs.
Counsel for the defendants, in his answer denied the facts alleged in paragraphs 1, 4,
6, 7, and 8 thereof, inasmuch as, upon the death of the litigating sister's brother
Manuel, their mother, who was still living, was his heir by force of law, and the
defendants had never refused to give to the plaintiff Vicente Ortiz her share of the said
properties; and stated that he admitted the facts alleged in paragraph 2, provided it
be understood, however, that the surname of the defendant's mother was Felin, and
not Feliu, and that Miguel Ortiz died in Spain, and not in Vigan; that he also admitted
paragraph 3 of the complaint, with the difference that the said surname should be
Felin, and likewise paragraph 5, except the part thereof relating to the personal
property and the jewelry, since the latter had not yet been divided; that the said
jewelry was in the possession of the plaintiffs and consisted of: one Lozada gold
chronometer watch with a chain in the form of a bridle curb and a watch charm
consisting of the engraving of a postage stamp on a stone mounted in gold and bearing
the initials M. O., a pair of cuff buttons made of gold coins, four small gold buttons, two
finger rings, another with the initials M. O., and a gold bracelet; and that the
defendants were willing to deliver to the plaintiffs, in conformity with their petitions,
one-half of the total value in cash, according to appraisement, of the undivided real
properties specified in paragraph 5, which half amounted to P3,948.
In a special defense said counsel alleged that the defendants had never refused to
divide the said property and had in fact several years before solicited the partition of
 LAW ON PROPERTY
the same; that, from 1886 to 1901, inclusive, there was collected from the property
on Calle Escolta the sum of 288 pesos, besides a few other small amounts derived
from other sources, which were delivered to the plaintiffs with other larger amounts,
in 1891, and from the property on Calle Washington, called La Quinta, 990.95 pesos,
which proceeds, added together, made a total of 1,278.95 pesos, saving error or
omission; that, between the years abovementioned, Escolta, and that on Calle
Washington, La Quinta, 376.33, which made a total of 1,141.71, saving error or
omission; that, in 1897, the work of reconstruction was begun of the house on Calle
Escolta, which been destroyed by an earthquake, which work was not finished until
1903 and required an expenditure on the part of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of
5,091.52 pesos; that all the collections made up to August 1, 1905, including the rent
from the stores, amounted to only P3,654.15, and the expenses, to P6,252.32, there
being, consequently, a balance of P2,598.17, which divided between the sisters, the
plaintiff and the defendant, would make the latter's share P1,299.08; that, as shown
by the papers kept by the plaintiffs, in the year 1891 the defendant Bartolome
presented to the plaintiffs a statement in settlements of accounts, and delivered to the
person duly authorized by the latter for the purpose, the sum of P2,606.29, which the
said settlement showed was owing his principals, from various sources; that, the
defendant Bartolome having been the administrator of the undivided property
claimed by the plaintiffs, the latter were owing the former legal remuneration of the
percentage allowed by law for administration; and that the defendants were willing
to pay the sum of P3,948, one-half of the total value of the said properties, deducting
therefrom the amount found to be owing them by the plaintiffs, and asked that
judgment be rendered in their favor to enable them to recover from the latter that
amount, together with the costs and expenses of the suit.
The defendants, in their counter claim, repeated each and all of the allegations
contained in each of the paragraphs of section 10 of their answer; that the plaintiffs
were obliged to pay to the administrator of the said property the remuneration
allowed him by law; that, as the revenues collected by the defendants amounted to no
more than P3,654.15 and the expenditures incurred by them, to P6,252.32, it followed
that the plaintiffs owed the defendants P1,299.08, that is one-half of the difference
between the amount collected from and that extended on the properties, and asked
that judgment be therefore rendered in their behalf to enable them to collect this sum
from the plaintiffs, Ricardo Pardell and Vicenta Ortiz, with legal interest thereon from
December 7, 1904, the date when the accounts were rendered, together with the sums
to which the defendant Bartolome was entitled for the administration of the
undivided properties in question.
By a written motion of August 21, 1905, counsel for the plaintiffs requested
permission to amend the complaint by inserting immediately after the words "or
respective appraisal," fifth line of paragraph 5, the phrase "in cash in accordance with
the assessed value," and likewise further to amend the same, in paragraph 6 thereof,
by substituting the following word in lieu of the petition for the remedy sought: "By
reason of all the foregoing, I beg the court to be pleased to render the judgment by
sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome and Matilde Ortiz Felin de
2| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
Bartolome, to restore and deliver to the plaintiffs an exact one-half of the total vale of
the undivided properties described in the complaint, such value to be ascertained by
the expert appraisal of two competent persons, one of whom shall be appointed by
the plaintiffs and the other by the defendants, and, in case of disagreement between
these two appointees such value shall be determined by a third expert appraiser
appointed by the court, or, in a proper case, by the price offered at public auction; or,
in lieu thereof, it is requested that the court recognize the plaintiff, Vicenta Ortiz, to
be vested with a full and absolute right to an undivided one-half of the said properties;
furthermore, it is prayed that the plaintiffs be awarded an indemnity of P8,000 for
losses and damages, and the costs." Notwithstanding the opposition of the
defendants, the said amendment was admitted by the court and counsel for the
defendants were allowed to a period of three days within which to present a new
answer. An exception was taken to this ruling.
The proper proceedings were had with reference to the valuation of the properties
concerned in the division sought and incidental issues were raised relative to the
partition of some of them and their award to one or the other of the parties. Due
consideration was taken of the averments and statements of both parties who agreed
between themselves, before the court, that any of them might at any time acquire, at
the valuation fixed by the expert judicial appraiser, any of the properties in question,
there being none in existence excluded by the litigants. The court, therefore, by order
of December 28, 1905, ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to acquire, at the
valuation determined by the said expert appraiser, the building known as La Quinta,
the lot on which it stands and the warehouses and other improvements comprised
within the inclosed land, and the seeds lands situated in the pueblos of Vigan and
Santa Lucia; and that the defendants were likewise entitled to acquire the house on
Calle Escolta, the lot on Calle Magallanes, and the three parcels of land situated in the
pueblo of Candon.
After this partition had been made counsel for the defendants, by a writing of March
8, 1906, set forth: That, having petitioned for the appraisement of the properties in
question for the purpose of their partition, it was not to be understood that he desired
from the exception duly entered to the ruling made in the matter of the amendment
to the complaint; that the properties retained by the defendants were valued at
P9,310, and those retained by the plaintiffs, at P2,885, one-half of which amounts each
party had to deliver to the other, as they were pro indiviso properties; that, therefore,
the defendants had to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3,212.50, after deducting the
amount which the plaintiffs were obliged to deliver to the defendants, as one-half of
the price of the properties retained by the former; that, notwithstanding that the
amount of the counterclaim for the expenses incurred in the reconstruction of the pro
indiviso property should be deducted from the sum which the defendants had to pay
the plaintiffs, the former, for the purpose of bringing the matter of the partition to a
close, would deliver to the latter, immediately upon the signing of the instrument of
purchase and sale, the sum of P3,212.50, which was one-half of the value of the
properties alloted to the defendants; such delivery, however, was not to be
 LAW ON PROPERTY
understood as a renouncement of the said counterclaim, but only as a means for the
final termination of the pro indiviso status of the property.
The case having been heard, the court on October 5, 1907, rendered judgment holding
that the revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence enjoyed by
the defendant party, that no losses or damages were either caused or suffered, nor
likewise any other expense besides those aforementioned, and absolved the
defendants from the complaint and the plaintiffs from the counterclaim, with no
special finding as to costs. An exception was taken to this judgment by counsel for the
defendants who moved for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did
not warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. This
motion was denied, exception whereto was taken by said counsel, who filed the
proper bill of exceptions, and the same was approved and forwarded to the clerk of
this court, with a transcript of the evidence.
Both of the litigating sisters assented to a partition by halves of the property left in
her will by their mother at her death; in fact, during the course of this suit,
proceedings were had, in accordance with the agreement made, for the division
between them of the said hereditary property of common ownership, which division
was recognized and approved in the findings of the trial court, as shown by the
judgment appealed from.
The issues raised by the parties, aside from said division made during the trial, and
which have been submitted to this court for decision, concern: (1) The indemnity
claimed for losses and damages, which the plaintiffs allege amount to P8,000, in
addition to the rents which should have been derived from the house on Calle Escolta,
Vigan; (2) the payment by the plaintiffs to the defendants of the sum of P1,299.08,
demanded by way of counterclaim, together with legal interest thereon from
December 7, 1904; (3) the payment to the husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of
a percentage claimed to be due him as the administrator of the property of common
ownership; (4) the division of certain jewelry in the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta
Ortiz; and (5) the petition that the amendment be held to have been improperly
admitted, which was made by the plaintiffs in their written motion of August 21, 1905,
against the opposition of the defendants, through which admission the latter were
obliged to pay the former P910.50.lawphil.net
Before entering upon an explanation of the propriety or impropriety of the claims
made by both parties, it is indispensable to state that the trial judge, in absolving the
defendants from the complaint, held that they had not caused losses and damages to
the plaintiffs, and that the revenues and the expenses were compensated, in view of
the fact that the defendants had been living for several years in the Calle Escolta
house, which was pro indiviso property of joint ownership.
By this finding absolving the defendants from the complaint, and which was
acquiesced in by the plaintiffs who made no appeal therefrom, the first issue has been
decided which was raised by the plaintiffs, concerning the indemnity for losses and
damages, wherein are comprised the rents which should have been obtained from the
3| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
upper story of the said house during the time it was occupied by the defendants,
Matilde Ortiz and her husband, Gaspar de Bartolome.
Notwithstanding the acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs, assenting to the said
finding whereby the defendants were absolved from the complaint, yet, as such
absolution is based on the compensation established in the judgment of the trial court,
between the amounts which each party is entitled to claim from the other, it is
imperative to determine whether the defendant Matilde Ortiz, as coowner of the
house on Calle Escolta, was entitled, with her husband, to reside therein, without
paying to her coowner, Vicenta Ortiz, who, during the greater part of the time, lived
with her husband abroad, one-half of the rents which the upper story would have
produced, had it been rented to a stranger.
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:
Each coowner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in
accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of
the community nor prevent the coowners from utilizing them according to their
rights.
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a
dwelling, in the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so
doing, the said Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interest of the community
property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story
according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented
and accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
Each coowner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property
and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure
the interests of his coowners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the
respective part of each holder can not be determined and every one of the coowners
exercises, together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso
property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz,
plaintiff, and Matilde Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and
were in the care of the last named, assisted by her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta
with her husband was residing outside of the said province the greater part of the
time between 1885 and 1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is not at all
strange that delays and difficulties should have attended the efforts made to collect
the rents and proceeds from the property held in common and to obtain a partition
of the latter, especially during several years when, owing to the insurrection, the
country was in a turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that founded on the right of
coownership of the defendants, who took upon themselves the administration and
care of the properties of joint tenancy for purposes of their preservation and
improvement, these latter are not obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of
the rents which might have been derived from the upper of the story of the said house
 LAW ON PROPERTY
on Calle Escolta, and, much less, because one of the living rooms and the storeroom
thereof were used for the storage of some belongings and effects of common
ownership between the litigants. The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with
her husband the upper floor of the said house, did not injure the interests of her
coowner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter from living therein, but
merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as coowner of the property.
Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-ownership rights which
entitled the defendants to live in the upper story of the said house, yet in view of the
fact that the record shows it to have been proved that the defendant Matilde's
husband, Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or a part of the lower
floor of the same house on Calle Escolta, using it as an office for the justice of the peace,
a position which he held in the capital of that province, strict justice, requires that he
pay his sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one half of the monthly rent which the said quarters
could have produced, had they been leased to another person. The amount of such
monthly rental is fixed at P16 in accordance with the evidence shown in the record.
This conclusion as to Bartolome's liability results from the fact that, even as the
husband of the defendant coowner of the property, he had no right to occupy and use
gratuitously the said part of the lower floor of the house in question, where he lived
with his wife, to the detriment of the plaintiff Vicenta who did not receive one-half of
the rent which those quarters could and should have produced, had they been
occupied by a stranger, in the same manner that rent was obtained from the rooms
on the lower floor that were used as stores. Therefore, the defendant Bartolome must
pay to the plaintiff Vicenta P384, that is, one-half of P768, the total amount of the rents
which should have been obtained during four years from the quarters occupied as an
office by the justice of the peace of Vigan.
With respect to the second question submitted for decision to this court, relative to
the payment of the sum demanded as a counterclaim, it was admitted and proved in
the present case that, as a result of a serious earthquake on August 15, 1897, the said
house on Calle Escolta was left in ruins and uninhabitable, and that, for its
reconstruction or repair, the defendants had to expend the sum of P6,252.32. This
expenditure, notwithstanding that it was impugned, during the trial, by the plaintiffs,
was duly proved by the evidence presented by the defendants. Evidence,
unsuccessfully rebutted, was also introduced which proved that the rents produced
by all the rural and urban properties of common ownership amounted, up to August
1, 1905, to the sum of P3,654.15 which, being applied toward the cost of the repair
work on the said house, leaves a balance of P2,598.17, the amount actually advanced
by the defendants, for the rents collected by them were not sufficient for the
termination of all the work undertaken on the said building, necessary for its
complete repair and to replace it in a habitable condition. It is therefore lawful and
just that the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz, who was willing to sell to her sister Matilde for
P1,500, her share in the house in question, when it was in a ruinous state, should pay
the defendants one-half of the amount expanded in the said repair work, since the
building after reconstruction was worth P9,000, according to expert appraisal.
Consequently, the counterclaim made by the defendants for the payment to them of
4| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
the sum of P1,299.08, is a proper demand, though from this sum a reduction must be
made of P384, the amount of one-half of the rents which should have been collected
for the use of the quarters occupied by the justice of the peace, the payment of which
is incumbent upon the husband of the defendant Matilde, as aforesaid, and the
balance remaining, P915.08, is the amount which the plaintiff Vicenta must pay to the
defendants.
The defendants claim to be entitled to the collection of legal interest on the amount of
the counterclaim, from December 7, 1904. This contention can not be sustained,
inasmuch as, until this suit is finally decided, it could not be known whether the
plaintiffs would or would not be obliged to pay the sum whatever in reimbursement
of expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in the repair work on the said house on Calle
Escolta, whether or not the defendants, in turn, were entitled to collect any such
amount, and, finally, what the net sum would be which the plaintiff's might have to
pay as reimbursement for one-half of the expenditure made by the defendants. Until
final disposal of the case, no such net sum can be determined, nor until then can the
debtor be deemed to be in arrears. In order that there be an obligation to pay legal
interest in connection with a matter at issue between the parties, it must be declared
in a judicial decision from what date the interest will be due on the principal
concerned in the suit. This rule has been established by the decisions of the supreme
court of Spain, in reference to articles 1108, 1109, and 1110 of the Civil Code,
reference on April 24, 1867, November 19, 1869, and February 22, 1901.
With regard to the percentage, as remuneration claimed by the husband of the
defendant Matilde for his administration of the property of common ownership,
inasmuch as no stipulation whatever was made in the matter by and between him and
his sister-in-law, the said defendant, the claimant is not entitled to the payment of any
remuneration whatsoever. Of his own accord and as an officious manager, he
administered the said pro indiviso property, one-half of which belonged to his wife
who held it in joint tenancy, with his sister-in-law, and the law does not allow him any
compensation as such voluntary administrator. He is merely entitled to a
reimbursement for such actual and necessary expenditures as he may have made on
the undivided properties and an indemnity for the damages he may have suffered
while acting in that capacity, since at all events it was his duty to care for and preserve
the said property, half of which belonged to his wife; and in exchange for the trouble
occasioned him by the administration of his sister-in-law's half of the said property,
he with his wife resided in the upper story of the house aforementioned, without
payment of one-half of the rents said quarters might have produced had they been
leased to another person.
With respect to the division of certain jewelry, petitioned for by the defendants and
appellants only in their brief in this appeal, the record of the proceedings in the lower
court does not show that the allegation made by the plaintiff Vicenta is not true, to the
effect that the deceased mother of the litigant sisters disposed of this jewelry during
her lifetime, because, had she not done so, the will made by the said deceased would
have been exhibited in which the said jewelry would have been mentioned, at least it
would have been proved that the articles in question came into the possession of the
 LAW ON PROPERTY – CO-OWNERSHIP
plaintiff Vicenta without the expressed desire and the consent of the deceased mother plaintiffs in their amendment to the complaint; and, (5) that no participation shall be
of the said sisters, for the gift of this jewelry was previously assailed in the courts, made of jewelry aforementioned now in the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz.
without success; therefore, and in view of its inconsiderable value, there is no reason The said judgment, as relates to the points appealed, is affirmed, in so far as its
for holding that the said gift was not made. findings agree with those of this decision, and is reversed, in so far as they do not. No
special finding is made regarding the costs of both instances. SO ORDERED.
As regards the collection of the sum of P910.50, which is the difference between the
assessed value of the undivided real properties and the price of the same as
determined by the judicial expert appraiser, it is shown by the record that the ruling
of the trial judge admitting the amendment to the original complaint, is in accord with
the law and principles of justice, for the reason that any of the coowners of a pro
indiviso property, subject to division or sale, is entitled to petition for its valuation by
competent expert appraisers. Such valuation is not prejudicial to any of the joint
owners, but is beneficial to their interests, considering that, as a general rule, the
assessed value of a building or a parcel of realty is less than the actual real value of
the property, and this being appraiser to determine, in conjunction with the one
selected by the plaintiffs, the value of the properties of joint ownership. These two
experts took part in the latter proceedings of the suit until finally, and during the
course of the latter, the litigating parties agreed to an amicable division of the pro
indiviso hereditary property, in accordance with the price fixed by the judicial expert
appraiser appointed as a third party, in view of the disagreement between and
nonconformity of the appraisers chosen by the litigants. Therefore it is improper now
to claim a right to the collection of the said sum, the difference between the assessed
value and that fixed by the judicial expert appraiser, for the reason that the increase
in price, as determined by this latter appraisal, redounded to the benefit of both
parties.

In consideration of the foregoing, whereby the errors assigned to the lower court have
been duly refuted, it is our opinion that, with a partial reversal of the judgment
appealed from, in so far as it absolves the plaintiffs from the counterclaim presented
by the defendants, we should and hereby do sentence the plaintiffs to the payment of
the sum of P915.08, the balance of the sum claimed by the defendants as a balance of
the one-half of the amount which the defendants advanced for the reconstruction or
repair of the Calle Escolta house, after deducting from the total of such sum claimed
by the latter the amount of P384 which Gaspar de Bartolome, the husband of the
defendant Matilde, should have paid as one-half of the rents due for his occupation of
the quarters on the lower floor of the said house as an office for the justice of the peace
court of Vigan; and we further find: (1) That the defendants are not obliged to pay
one-half of the rents which could have been obtained from the upper story of the said
house; (2) that the plaintiffs can not be compelled to pay the legal interest from
December 7, 1904, on the sum expanded in the reconstruction of the aforementioned
house, but only the interest fixed by law, at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, from the
date of the judgment to be rendered in accordance with this decision; (3) that the
husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz is not entitled to any remuneration for the
administration of the pro indiviso property belonging to both parties; (4) that, neither
is he entitled to collect from the plaintiffs the sum of P910.50, the difference between
the assessed valuation and the price set by the expert appraisal solicited by the

5| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
 LAW ON PROPERTY
G.R. No. 72876 January 18, 1991
FLORENCIO IGNAO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JUAN IGNAO, substituted by his
Legal Heirs, and ISIDRO IGNAO, respondents.
Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Offices for petitioner.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
In this petition for review by certiorari, petitioner seeks the reversal of the
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) affirming in
toto the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, ordering petitioner
Florencio Ignao to sell to private respondents Juan and Isidro Ignao, that part of
his property where private respondents had built a portion of their houses.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his uncles private respondents Juan Ignao and
Isidro Ignao were co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 534 square meters
situated in Barrio Tabon, Municipality of Kawit, Cavite. Pursuant to an action for
partition filed by petitioner docketed as Civil Case No. N-1681, the then Court of
First Instance of Cavite in a decision dated February 6, 1975 directed the partition
of the aforesaid land, alloting 133.5 square meters or 2/8 thereof to private
respondents Juan and Isidro, and giving the remaining portion with a total area
of 266.5 square meters to petitioner Florencio. However, no actual partition was
ever effected.1
On July 17, 1978, petitioner instituted a complaint for recovery of possession of
real property against private respondents Juan and Isidro before the Court of
First Instance of Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 2662. In his complaint
petitioner alleged that the area occupied by the two (2) houses built by private
respondents exceeded the 133.5 square meters previously alloted to them by the
trial court in Civil Case No. N-1681.
Consequently, the lower court conducted an ocular inspection. It was found that
the houses of Juan and Isidro actually encroached upon a portion of the land
belonging to Florencio. Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court ordered a
licensed geodetic engineer to conduct a survey to determine the exact area
occupied by the houses of private respondents. The survey subsequently
6| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
disclosed that the house of Juan occupied 42 square meters while that of Isidro
occupied 59 square meters of Florencio's land or a total of 101 square meters.
In its decision, the trial court (thru Judge Luis L. Victor) ruled that although
private respondents occupied a portion of Florencio's property, they should be
considered builders in good faith. The trial court took into account the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Cavite in the action for partition2 and quoted:
. . . . Hence, it is the well-considered opinion of the Court that although it
turned out that the defendants had, before partition, been in possession of
more than what rightfully belongs to them, their possession of what is in excess
of their rightful share can at worst be possession in good faith which exempts
them from being condemned to pay damages by reason thereof.3
Furthermore, the trial court stated that pursuant to Article 448 of the Civil Code,
the owner of the land (Florencio) should have the choice to either appropriate
that part of the house standing on his land after payment of indemnity or oblige
the builders in good faith (Juan and Isidro) to pay the price of the land. However,
the trial court observed that based on the facts of the case, it would be useless
and unsuitable for Florencio to exercise the first option since this would render
the entire houses of Juan and Isidro worthless. The trial court then applied the
ruling in the similar case of Grana vs. Court of Appeals,4 where the Supreme Court
had advanced a more "workable solution". Thus, it ordered Florencio to sell to
Juan and Isidro those portions of his land respectively occupied by the latter. The
dispositive portion of said decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and—
(a) Ordering the plaintiff Florencio Ignao to sell to the defendants Juan and
Isidro Ignao that portion of his property with an area of 101 square
meters at P40.00 per square meter, on which part the defendants had
built their houses; and
(b) Ordering the said plaintiff to execute the necessary deed of conveyance to
the defendants in accordance with paragraph (a) hereof.
Without pronouncement as to costs.5
Petitioner Florencio Ignao appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. On
August 27, 1985, the Appellate Court, Second Civil Cases Division, promulgated a
decision,6 affirming the decision of the trial court.
Hence the instant petition for review which attributes to the Appellate Court the
following errors:
 LAW ON PROPERTY
1. That the respondent Court has considered private respondents builders
in good faith on the land on question, thus applying Art. 448 of the Civil
Code, although the land in question is still owned by the parties in co-
ownership, hence, the applicable provision is Art. 486 of the Civil Code,
which was not applied.
2. That, granting for the sake of argument that Art. 448 . . . is applicable, the
respondent Court has adjudged the working solution suggested in Grana
and Torralba vs. CA. (109 Phil. 260), which is just an opinion by way of
passing, and not the judgment rendered therein, which is in accordance
with the said provision of the Civil Code, wherein the owner of the land to
buy (sic) the portion of the building within 30 days from the judgment or
sell the land occupied by the building.
3. That, granting that private respondents could buy the portion of the land
occupied by their houses, the price fixed by the court is unrealistic and
pre-war price.7
The records of the case reveal that the disputed land with an area of 534 square
meters was originally owned by Baltazar Ignao who married twice. In his first
marriage, he had four children, namely Justo (the father of petitioner Florencio),
Leon and private respondents Juan and Isidro. In his second marriage, Baltazar
had also four children but the latter waived their rights over the controverted
land in favor of Justo. Thus, Justo owned 4/8 of the land which was waived by his
half-brothers and sisters plus his 1/8 share or a total of 5/8. Thereafter, Justo
acquired the 1/8 share of Leon for P500.00 which he later sold to his son
Florencio for the same amount. When Justo died, Florencio inherited the 5/8
share of his father Justo plus his 1/8 share of the land which he bought or a total
of 6/8 (representing 400.5 square meters). Private respondents, Juan and Isidro,
on the other hand, had 1/8 share (66.75 square meters) each of the land or a total
of 133.5 square meters.
Before the decision in the partition case was promulgated, Florencio sold 134
square meters of his share to a certain Victa for P5,000.00 on January 27, 1975.
When the decision was handed down on February 6,1975, the lower court alloted
2/8 of the land to private respondents Juan and Isidro, or a total of 133.5 square
meters.
It should be noted that prior to partition, all the co-owners hold the property in
common dominion but at the same time each is an owner of a share which is
abstract and undetermined until partition is effected. As cited in Eusebio vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court,8 "an undivided estate is co-ownership by the
heirs."
7| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
As co-owners, the parties may have unequal shares in the common property,
quantitatively speaking. But in a qualitative sense, each co-owner has the same
right as any one of the other co-owners. Every co-owner is therefore the owner
of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at
the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract, because until
division is effected such portion is not concretely determined.9
Petitioner Florencio, in his first assignment of error, asseverates that the court a
quo erred in applying Article 448 of the Civil Code, since this article contemplates
a situation wherein the land belongs to one person and the thing built, sown or
planted belongs to another. In the instant case, the land in dispute used to be
owned in common by the contending parties.
Article 448 provides:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works,
sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles
546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of
the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner
of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Whether or not the provisions of Article 448 should apply to a builder in good
faith on a property held in common has been resolved in the affirmative in the
case of Spouses del Campo vs. Abesia,10 wherein the Court ruled that:
The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply
where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for
then he did not build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to
another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person
under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-
ownership.
However, when, as in this case, the ownership is terminated by the partition and
it appears that the home of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square
meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built
in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should
apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of the Civil
 LAW ON PROPERTY – CO-OWNERSHIP
Code may apply even when there is a co-ownership if good faith has been SO ORDERED.
established.11

In other words, when the co-ownership is terminated by a partition and it

appears that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion
pertaining to another co-owner which was however made in good faith, then the
provisions of Article 448 should apply to determine the respective rights of the
parties.

Petitioner's second assigned error is however well taken. Both the trial court and
the Appellate Court erred when they peremptorily adopted the "workable
solution" in the case of Grana vs. Court of appeals,12 and ordered the owner of the
land, petitioner Florencio, to sell to private respondents, Juan and Isidro, the part
of the land they intruded upon, thereby depriving petitioner of his right to choose.
Such ruling contravened the explicit provisions of Article 448 to the effect that
"(t)he owner of the land . . . shall have the right to appropriate . . .or to oblige the
one who built . . . to pay the price of the land . . . ." The law is clear and
unambiguous when it confers the right of choice upon the landowner and not
upon the builder and the courts.

Thus, in Quemuel vs. Olaes,13 the Court categorically ruled that the right to
appropriate the works or improvements or to oblige the builder to pay the price
of the land belongs to the landowner.

As to the third assignment of error, the question on the price to be paid on the
land need not be discussed as this would be premature inasmuch as petitioner
Florencio has yet to exercise his option as the owner of the land.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

Petitioner Florencio Ignao is directed within thirty (30) days from entry of
judgment to exercise his option to either appropriate as his own the portions of
the houses of Juan and Isidro Ignao occupying his land upon payment of
indemnity in accordance with Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code, or sell to
private respondents the 101 square meters occupied by them at such price as
may be agreed upon. Should the value of the land exceed the value of the portions
of the houses that private respondents have erected thereon, private respondents
may choose not to buy the land but they must pay reasonable rent for the use of
the portion of petitioner's land as may be agreed upon by the parties. In case of
disagreement, the rate of rental and other terms of the lease shall be determined
by the trial court. Otherwise, private respondents may remove or demolish at
their own expense the said portions of their houses encroaching upon
petitioner's land.14 No costs.

8| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
 LAW ON PROPERTY
G.R. No. 174727 August 12, 2013
ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY MANUEL VILLANUEVA, TEODORA
VILLANUEVA-FRANCISCO, CAMILO FRANCISCO, ADOLFO FRANCISCO, LUCIMO
FRANCISCO, JR., MILAGROS FRANCISCO,* CELEDONIO FRANCISCO,
HERMINIGILDO FRANCISCO; RAMON TRESVALLES, ROBERTO TAJONERA,
NATIVIDAD INING-IBEA (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY EDILBERTO IBEA, JOSEFA
IBEA, MARTHA IBEA, CARMEN IBEA, AMPARO IBEA-FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ,
EUGENIO RUIZ AND PASTOR RUIZ; DOLORES INING-RIMON (DECEASED)
SURVIVED BY JESUS RIMON, CESARIA RIMON GONZALES AND REMEDIOS
RIMON CORDERO; AND PEDRO INING (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY ELISA TAN
INING (WIFE) AND PEDRO INING, JR., PETITIONERS,
vs.
LEONARDO R. VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES VEGA, RESTONILO I. VEGA,
CRISPULO M. VEGA, MILBUENA VEGA-RESTITUTO, AND LENARD VEGA,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter
and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot
effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the
decedent’s heirs.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the March 14, 2006 Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74687 and its September 7, 2006
Resolution3 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.4
Factual Antecedents
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-
square meter parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. (24071) RO-6305 (OCT RO-630). Leon and Rafaela died without
issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria
Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein
respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is
survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega,
Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.
Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children: petitioners Natividad
Ining-Ibea (Natividad), Dolores Ining-Rimon (Dolores), Antipolo, and Pedro; Jose; and
9| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
Amando. Natividad is survived by Edilberto Ibea, Josefa Ibea, Martha Ibea, Carmen
Ibea, Amparo Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is survived by
Jesus Rimon, Cesaria Rimon Gonzales and Remedios Rimon Cordero. Antipolo is
survived by Manuel Villanueva, daughter Teodora Villanueva-Francisco (Teodora),
Camilo Francisco (Camilo), Adolfo Francisco (Adolfo), Lucimo Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo
Jr.), Milagros Francisco, Celedonio Francisco, and Herminigildo Francisco
(Herminigildo). Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa Tan Ining and Pedro Ining, Jr.
Amando died without issue. As for Jose, it is not clear from the records if he was made
party to the proceedings, or if he is alive at all.
In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto
Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria’s
heirs).
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as
Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo,
Aklan Civil Case No. 52756 for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with
damages, against Gregoria’s heirs. In his Amended Complaint,7 Leonardo alleged that
on several occasions, he demanded the partition of the property but Gregoria’s heirs
refused to heed his demands; that the matter reached the level of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa, which issued a certification to file a court action sometime in 1980;
that Gregoria’s heirs claimed sole ownership of the property; that portions of the
property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera, which portions must be collated and
included as part of the portion to be awarded to Gregoria’s heirs; that in 1979, Lucimo
Francisco, Sr. (Lucimo Sr.), husband of herein petitioner Teodora, illegally claimed
absolute ownership of the property and transferred in his name the tax declaration
covering the property; that from 1988, Lucimo Sr. and Teodora have deprived him
(Leonardo) of the fruits of the property estimated at ₱1,000.00 per year; that as a
result, he incurred expenses by way of attorney’s fees and litigation costs. Leonardo
thus prayed that he be declared the owner of half of the subject property; that the
same be partitioned after collation and determination of the portion to which he is
entitled; that Gregoria’s heirs be ordered to execute the necessary documents or
agreements; and that he (Leonardo) be awarded actual damages in the amount of
₱1,000.00 per year from 1988, attorney’s fees of ₱50,000.00, and lawyer’s appearance
fees of ₱500.00 per hearing.
In their Answer8 with counterclaim, Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and
Herminigildo claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they
have become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who
acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn
acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact; that they were in
continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and exclusive possession of the property with
a just title; that they have been paying the taxes on the property; that Leonardo’s
claim is barred by estoppel and laches; and that they have suffered damages and were
forced to litigate as a result of Leonardo’s malicious suit. They prayed that Civil Case
 LAW ON PROPERTY
No. 5275 be dismissed; that Leonardo be declared to be without any right to the
property; that Leonardo be ordered to surrender the certificate of title to the
property; and that they be awarded ₱20,000.00 as moral damages, ₱10,000.00 as
temperate and nominal damages, ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and double costs.
The other Gregoria heirs, as well as Tresvalles and Tajonera were declared in default.9
As agreed during pre-trial, the trial court commissioned Geodetic Engineer Rafael M.
Escabarte to identify the metes and bounds of the property.10 The resulting
Commissioner’s Report and Sketch,11 as well as the Supplementary Commissioner’s
Report,12 were duly approved by the parties. The parties then submitted the following
issues for resolution of the trial court:
1. Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate;
2. Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and
3. Whether Leonardo’s claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by estoppel or
laches.13
In the meantime, Leonardo passed away and was duly substituted by his heirs, the
respondents herein.14
During the course of the proceedings, the following additional relevant facts came to
light:
1. In 1995, Leonardo filed against petitioners Civil Case No. 4983 for partition
with the RTC Kalibo, but the case was dismissed and referred to the Kalibo
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), where the case was docketed as Civil Case No.
1366. However, on March 4, 1997, the MTC dismissed Civil Case No. 1366 for
lack of jurisdiction and declared that only the RTC can take cognizance of the
partition case;15
2. The property was allegedly sold by Leon to Enriquez through an unnotarized
document dated April 4, 1943.16 Enriquez in turn allegedly sold the property
to Lucimo Sr. on November 25, 1943 via another private sale document; 17
3. Petitioners were in sole possession of the property for more than 30 years,
while Leonardo acquired custody of OCT RO-630;18
4. On February 9, 1979, Lucimo Sr. executed an Affidavit of Ownership of Land19
claiming sole ownership of the property which he utilized to secure in his
name Tax Declaration No. 16414 (TD 16414) over the property and to cancel
Tax Declaration No. 20102 in Leon’s name;20
5. Lucimo Sr. died in 1991; and
6. The property was partitioned among the petitioners, to the exclusion of
Leonardo.21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
10 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision, 22 which decreed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
Dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs’ right of action has long
prescribed under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code;
Declaring Lot 1786 covered by OCT No. RO-630 (24071) to be the common property
of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining and by virtue whereof, OCT No. RO-630 (24071)
is ordered cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Aklan is directed to
issue a transfer certificate of title to the heirs of Natividad Ining, one-fourth (1/4)
share; Heirs of Dolores Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Antipolo Ining, one-
fourth (1/4) share; and Heirs of Pedro Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share.
For lack of sufficient evidence, the counterclaim is ordered dismissed.
With cost against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.23
The trial court found the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale to be
spurious. It concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn,
Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained
part of Leon’s estate at the time of his death in 1962. Leon’s siblings, Romana and
Gregoria, thus inherited the subject property in equal shares. Leonardo and the
respondents are entitled to Romana’s share as the latter’s successors.
However, the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years from Leon’s death in
1962 – or up to 1992 – within which to file the partition case. Since Leonardo
instituted the partition suit only in 1997, the same was already barred by
prescription. It held that under Article 1141 of the Civil Code,24 an action for partition
and recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land is a real action over
immovable property which prescribes in 30 years. In addition, the trial court held that
for his long inaction, Leonardo was guilty of laches as well. Consequently, the
property should go to Gregoria’s heirs exclusively.
Respondents moved for reconsideration25 but the same was denied by the RTC in its
February 7, 2002 Order.26
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Only respondents interposed an appeal with the CA. Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
74687, the appeal questioned the propriety of the trial court’s dismissal of Civil Case
 LAW ON PROPERTY
No. 5275, its application of Article 1141, and the award of the property to Gregoria’s
heirs exclusively.
On March 14, 2006, the CA issued the questioned Decision,27 which contained the
following decretal portion:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 8, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 5275 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as successors-
in-interest of Romana Roldan;
2. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the defendants as
successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining;
3. Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of the portion described in
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Commissioner’s Report (Supplementary) to the
herein plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the cancellation of OCT No. RO-630 (24071) in the name of Leon
Roldan and the Register of Deeds of Aklan is directed to issue transfer
certificates of title to the plaintiffs in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 of
the sketch plan as embodied in the Commissioner’s Report (Supplementary)
and the remaining portion thereof be adjudged to the defendants.
Other claims and counterclaims are dismissed.
Costs against the defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED.28
The CA held that the trial court’s declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and
November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively,
became final and was settled by petitioners’ failure to appeal the same. Proceeding
from the premise that no valid prior disposition of the property was made by its
owner Leon and that the property – which remained part of his estate at the time of
his death – passed on by succession to his two siblings, Romana and Gregoria, which
thus makes the parties herein – who are Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs – co-owners
of the property in equal shares, the appellate court held that only the issues of
prescription and laches were needed to be resolved.
The CA did not agree with the trial court’s pronouncement that Leonardo’s action for
partition was barred by prescription. The CA declared that prescription began to run
not from Leon’s death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of
Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of
the property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-
11 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership," the CA held that it was only when Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit
of Ownership of Land in 1979 and obtained a new tax declaration over the property
(TD 16414) solely in his name that a repudiation of his co-ownership with Leonardo
was made, which repudiation effectively commenced the running of the 30-year
prescriptive period under Article 1141.
The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.’s sole possession of the property for more than
30 years to the exclusion of Leonardo and the respondents as a valid repudiation of
the co-ownership either, stating that his exclusive possession of the property and
appropriation of its fruits – even his continuous payment of the taxes thereon – while
adverse as against strangers, may not be deemed so as against Leonardo in the
absence of clear and conclusive evidence to the effect that the latter was ousted or
deprived of his rights as co-owner with the intention of assuming exclusive
ownership over the property, and absent a showing that this was effectively made
known to Leonardo. Citing Bargayo v. Camumot29 and Segura v. Segura,30 the
appellate court held that as a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to
be adverse to the other co-owners but will be held to benefit all, and that a co-owner
or co-heir is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in
representation of his co-owners or co-heirs if he administers or takes care of the rest
thereof with the obligation to deliver the same to his co-owners or co-heirs, as is the
case of a depositary, lessee or trustee.
The CA added that the payment of taxes by Lucimo Sr. and the issuance of a new tax
declaration in his name do not prove ownership; they merely indicate a claim of
ownership. Moreover, petitioners’ act of partitioning the property among themselves
to the exclusion of Leonardo cannot affect the latter; nor may it be considered a
repudiation of the co-ownership as it has not been shown that the partition was made
known to Leonardo.
The CA held further that the principle of laches cannot apply as against Leonardo and
the respondents. It held that laches is controlled by equitable considerations and it
cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud; it cannot be utilized to deprive
the respondents of their rightful inheritance.
On the basis of the above pronouncements, the CA granted respondents’ prayer for
partition, directing that the manner of partitioning the property shall be governed by
the Commissioner’s Report and Sketch and the Supplementary Commissioner’s
Report which the parties did not contest.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration31 which the CA denied in its
assailed September 7, 2006 Resolution.32 Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
 LAW ON PROPERTY
Petitioners raise the following arguments:
I. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT
LUCIMO FRANCISCO REPUDIATED THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY ON
FEBRUARY 9, 1979.
II. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF
PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.33
Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners insist in their Petition and Reply34 that Lucimo Sr.’s purchase of the
property in 1943 and his possession thereof amounted to a repudiation of the co-
ownership, and that Leonardo’s admission and acknowledgment of Lucimo Sr.’s
possession for such length of time operated to bestow upon petitioners – as Lucimo
Sr.’s successors-in-interest – the benefits of acquisitive prescription which proceeded
from the repudiation.
Petitioners contend that Leonardo’s inaction – from Lucimo Sr.’s taking possession in
1943, up to 1995, when Leonardo filed Civil Case No. 4983 for partition with the RTC
Kalibo – amounted to laches or neglect. They add that during the proceedings before
the Lupon Tagapamayapa in 1980, Leonardo was informed of Lucimo Sr.’s purchase
of the property in 1943; this notwithstanding, Leonardo did not take action then
against Lucimo Sr. and did so only in 1995, when he filed Civil Case No. 4983 – which
was eventually dismissed and referred to the MTC. They argue that, all this time,
Leonardo did nothing while Lucimo Sr. occupied the property and claimed all its fruits
for himself.
Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, argue in their Comment35 that –
For purposes of clarity, if [sic] is respectfully submitted that eighteen (18) legible
copies has [sic] not been filed in this case for consideration in banc [sic] and nine (9)
copies in cases heard before a division in that [sic] all copies of pleadings served to
the offices concern [sic] where said order [sic] was issued were not furnished two (2)
copies each in violation to [sic] the adverse parties [sic] to the clerk of court, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines; to the Honorable Court of Appeals so
that No [sic] action shall be taken on such pleadings, briefs, memoranda, motions, and
other papers as fail [sic] to comply with the requisites set out in this paragraph.
The foregoing is confirmed by affidavit of MERIDON F. OLANDESCA, the law secretary
of the Petitioner [sic] who sent [sic] by Registered mail to Court of Appeals, Twentieth
12 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
Division, Cebu City; to Counsel for Respondent [sic] and to the Clerk of Court Supreme
Court Manila [sic].
These will show that Petitioner has [sic] violated all the requirements of furnishing
two (2) copies each concerned party [sic] under the Rule of Courts [sic].36
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and
had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part
of Leon’s estate.
One issue submitted for resolution by the parties to the trial court is whether Leon
sold the property to Lucimo Sr.1âwphi1 The trial court, examining the two deeds of
sale executed in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., found them to be spurious. It then
concluded that no such sale from Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever took place. Despite this
finding, petitioners did not appeal. Consequently, any doubts regarding this matter
should be considered settled. Thus, petitioners’ insistence on Lucimo Sr.’s 1943
purchase of the property to reinforce their claim over the property must be ignored.
Since no transfer from Leon to Lucimo Sr. took place, the subject property clearly
remained part of Leon’s estate upon his passing in 1962.
Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who
thus inherited the property in equal shares. In turn, Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs –
the parties herein – became entitled to the property upon the sisters’ passing. Under
Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of death.
Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property.
Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana, petitioners
and respondents became co-owners thereof. As co-owners, they may use the property
owned in common, provided they do so in accordance with the purpose for which it
is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or
prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights.37 They have the
full ownership of their parts and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may
alienate, assign or mortgage them, and even substitute another person in their
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.38 Each co-owner may demand
at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.39 Finally, no prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against
the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.40
 LAW ON PROPERTY
For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner.
Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the
share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In
order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting
to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and
convincing."41
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that the trial court erred in reckoning
the prescriptive period within which Leonardo may seek partition from the death of
Leon in 1962. Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that prescription
shall begin to run in favor of a co-owner and against the other co-owners only from
the time he positively renounces the co-ownership and makes known his repudiation
to the other co-owners.
– CO-OWNERSHIP
In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property; Teodora is.
Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the co-ownership, which he
was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against
Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of the property has not been lost.
Likewise, petitioners’ argument that Leonardo’s admission and acknowledgment in
his pleadings – that Lucimo Sr. was in possession of the property since 1943 – should
be taken against him, is unavailing. In 1943, Leon remained the rightful owner of the
land, and Lucimo Sr. knew this very well, being married to Teodora, daughter of
Antipolo, a nephew of Leon. More significantly, the property, which is registered
under the Torrens system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leon’s name. Leon’s
ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his death when the property passed on to his
heirs by operation of law.
In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-
ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time.

Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardo’s co-ownership of the property only sometime in WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed March 14, 2006 Decision and the
1979 and 1980, when the former executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land, September 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74687are
obtained a new tax declaration exclusively in his name, and informed the latter – AFFIRMED.
before the Lupon Tagapamayapa – of his 1943 purchase of the property. These
apparent acts of repudiation were followed later on by Lucimo Sr.’s act of withholding SO ORDERED.
Leonardo’s share in the fruits of the property, beginning in 1988, as Leonardo himself
claims in his Amended Complaint. Considering these facts, the CA held that
prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 – or even in 1980 – when it
has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-
ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded
that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from
1979, is clearly within the period prescribed under Article 1141.

What escaped the trial and appellate courts’ notice, however, is that while it may be
argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be characterized as a repudiation of
the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an
heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s
daughter Teodora.42 Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary
basis for succession, exclude relations by affinity.

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

13 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
 LAW ON PROPERTY – CO-OWNERSHIP
G.R. No. 189420 March 26, 2014 (1) Whether or not respondents are withholding their consent in the sale of
the subject properties; and
RAUL V. ARAMBULO AND TERESITA A. DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs. (2) In the affirmative, whether or not withholding of consent of sale by the
GENARO NOLASCO AND JEREMY SPENCER NOLASCO, Respondents. respondents is prejudicial to the petitioners.6

DECISION On 19 September 2002, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered
respondents to give their consent to the sale. The dispositive portion of the
PEREZ, J.: decision reads:

This is a Petition for Review of the 7 October 2008 Decision1 and 30 July 2009 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76449, which reversed and the petitioners and against the respondents:
set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 51,
dated 19 September 2002. 1. Directing respondents Genaro Nolasco and Jeremy Spencer A. Nolasco to
give their consent to the sale of their shares on the subject properties;
Petitioners Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita A. Dela Cruz, along with their mother 2. Allowing the sale of the aforementioned properties;
Rosita Vda. De Arambulo, and siblings Primo V. Arambulo, Ma. Lorenza A. Lopez, 3. Directing the petitioners and the co-owners, including the respondents
Ana Maria V. Arambulo, Maximiano V. Arambulo, Julio V. Arambulo and Iraida herein to agree with the price in which the subject properties are to be
Arambulo Nolasco (Iraida) are co-owners of two (2) parcels of land located in sold and to whom to be sold; and
Tondo, Manila, with an aggregate size of 233 square meters. When Iraida passed 4. Directing the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the
away, she was succeeded by her husband, respondent Genaro Nolasco and their aforementioned properties in the following proportion:
children, Iris Abegail Nolasco, Ingrid Aileen Arambulo and respondent Jeremy
Spencer Nolasco. a.) Rosita V. Vda. De Arambulo -1/9
b.) Primo V. Arambulo -1/9
On 8 January 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief under Article 491 of the c.) Maximiano V. Arambulo -1/9
Civil Code with the RTC of Manila, alleging that all of the co- owners, except for d.) Ana Maria V. Arambulo -1/9
respondents, have authorized petitioners to sell their respective shares to the e.) Ma. Lorenza A. Lopez -1/9
subject properties; that only respondents are withholding their consent to the f.) Julio V. Arambulo -1/9
sale of their shares; that in case the sale pushes through, their mother and siblings g.) Raul V. Arambulo -1/9
will get their respective 1/9 share of the proceeds of the sale, while respondents h.) Teresita A. dela Cruz -1/9
will get 1/4 share each of the 1/9 share of Iraida; that the sale of subject i.) Genaro Nolasco, Jr. -1/4 of 1/9
properties constitutes alteration; and that under Article 491 of the Civil Code, if j.) Jeremy Spencer A. Nolasco -1/4 of 1/9
one or more co-owners shall withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing k.) Iris Abegail A. Nolasco -1/4 of 1/9
owned in common, the courts may afford adequate relief.4 l.) Ingrid Aileen Arambulo -1/4 of 1/97

In their Answer, respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for being
premature. Respondents averred that they were not aware of the intention of
petitioners to sell the properties they co-owned because they were not called to
participate in any negotiations regarding the disposition of the property.5
After the pre-trial, two (2) issues were submitted for consideration:
Going along with petitioners’ reliance on Article 491 of the Civil Code, the trial
court found that respondents’ withholding of their consent to the sale of their
shares is prejudicial to the common interest of the co-owners.
Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal and the trial court gave due course to the
appeal and the entire records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals.

14 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
 LAW ON PROPERTY
In a Decision dated 7 October 2008, the Court of Appeals granted the appeal and
reversed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals held that the respondents
had the full ownership of their undivided interest in the subject properties, thus,
they cannot be compelled to sell their undivided shares in the properties. It
referred to the provisions of Article 493 of the Civil Code. However, the Court of
Appeals, implying applicability of Article 491 also observed that petitioners failed
to show how respondents’ withholding of their consent would prejudice the
common interest over the subject properties.
Hence, the instant petition seeking the reversal of the appellate court’s decision
and praying for the affirmance of the trial court’s decision that ordered
respondents to give their consent to the sale of the subject properties. Petitioners
emphasize that under Article 491 of the Civil Code, they may ask the court to
afford them adequate relief should respondents refuse to sell their respective
shares to the co-owned properties. They refute the appellate court’s finding that
they failed to show how the withholding of consent by respondents becomes
prejudicial to their common interest. Citing the testimony of petitioner Teresita
A. Dela Cruz, they assert that one of the two subject properties has an area of 122
square meters and if they decide to partition, instead of selling the same, their
share would be reduced to a measly 30-square meter lot each. The other property
was testified to as measuring only 111 square meters. Petitioners reiterate that
all the other co- owners are willing to sell the property and give respondents their
share of the proceeds of the sale.
At the core of this petition is whether respondents, as co-owners, can be
compelled by the court to give their consent to the sale of their shares in the co-
owned properties. Until it reached this Court, the discussion of the issue moved
around Article 491 of the Civil Code. We have to remove the issue out of the
coverage of Article 491. It does not apply to the problem arising out of the
proposed sale of the property co-owned by the parties in this case.
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the provision of Article 493 of the Civil
Code, which states:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Upon the other hand, Article 491 states:
15 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make
alterations in the thing owned in common, even though benefits for all would
result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by one or more of
the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford
adequate relief.
As intimated above, the erroneous application of Article 491 is, in this case, an
innate infirmity. The very initiatory pleading below was captioned Petition For
Relief Under Article 491 of the New Civil Code. Petitioners, likewise petitioners
before the RTC, filed the case on the submission that Article 491 covers the
petition and grants the relief prayed for, which is to compel the respondent co-
owners to agree to the sale of the co-owned property. The trial court took up all
that petitioners tendered, and it favored the pleading with the finding that:
x x x To this court, the act of respondents of withholding consent to the sale of the
properties is not only prejudicial to the common interest of the co-owners but is
also considered as an alteration within the purview of Article 491 of the New Civil
Code. x x x. Hence, it is deemed just and proper to afford adequate relief to herein
petitioners under Article 491 of the New Civil Code.8
That a sale constitutes an alteration as mentioned in Article 491 is an established
jurisprudence.1âwphi1 It is settled that alterations include any act of strict
dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has been held
implicitly to be an act of alteration.9 Alienation of the thing by sale of the property
is an act of strict dominion.10 However, the ruling that alienation is alteration
does not mean that a sale of commonly owned real property is covered by the
second paragraph of Article 491, such that if a co- owner withholds consent to the
sale, the courts, upon a showing of a clear prejudice to the common interest, may,
as adequate relief, order the grant of the withheld consent. Such is the conclusion
drawn by the trial court, and hinted at, if not relied upon, by the appellate court.
Ruling that the trial court erred in its conclusion, the Court of Appeals correctly
relied on Article 493 in support of the finding that respondents cannot be
compelled to agree with the sale. We affirm the reversal by the Court of Appeals
of the judgment of the trial court.
1. There is co-ownership whenever, as in this case, the ownership of an undivided
thing, belongs to different persons.11 Article 493 of the Code defines the
ownership of the co-owner, clearly establishing that each co-owner shall have full
ownership of his part and of its fruits and benefits.
Pertinent to this case, Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein as
co-owners with full ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part. The
 LAW ON PROPERTY
sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership by the
respondents of the part that belongs to them. Their part which petitioners will
sell shall be that which may be apportioned to them in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. With the full ownership of the respondents
remaining unaffected by petitioners’ sale of their parts, the nature of the
property, as co-owned, likewise stays. In lieu of the petitioners, their vendees
shall be co-owners with the respondents. The text of Article 493 says so.
2. Our reading of Article 493 as applied to the facts of this case is a reiteration of
what was pronounced in Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals.12 The rights of a co-
owner of a certain property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the Civil Code.
Thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it[,] and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or [the] mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other
co-owners who did not consent to the sale.13 This is because under the
aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his
undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his
grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.14 Consequently, by virtue
of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect
to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in
the sale to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a
co- owner of the disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court since
the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment
thereof.15
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co- owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of
the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.16 (Italics theirs).
Nearer to the dispute at hand are the pronouncements in the 1944 case of Lopez
v. Vda. De Cuaycong.17 Citing Manresa on Article 399 which is the present Article
493 of the Civil Code, the Court said:
16 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
x x x Article 399 shows the essential integrity of the right of each co-owner in the
mental portion which belongs to him in the ownership or community.
xxxx
To be a co-owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of every
recognition of the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right within the
circumstantial conditions of such judicial status, nor is it necessary, for the use
and enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that the previous consent of all the
interested parties be obtained.18 (Underscoring supplied).
The Court in Lopez further cited Scaevola:
2nd. Absolute right of each co-owner with respect to his part or share. – With
respect to the latter, each co-owner is the same as an individual owner. He is a
singular owner, with all the rights inherent in such condition. The share of the co-
owner, that is, the part which ideally belongs to him in the common thing or right
and is represented by a certain quantity, is his and he may dispose of the same as
he pleases, because it does not affect the right of the others. Such quantity is
equivalent to a credit against the common thing or right and is the private
property of each creditor (co-owner). The various shares ideally signify as many
units of thing or right, pertaining individually to the different owners; in other
words, a unit for each owner.19 (Underscoring supplied).
The ultimate authorities in civil law, recognized as such by the Court, agree that
co-owners such as respondents have over their part, the right of full and absolute
ownership. Such right is the same as that of individual owners which is not
diminished by the fact that the entire property is co- owned with others. That part
which ideally belongs to them, or their mental portion, may be disposed of as they
please, independent of the decision of their co-owners. So we rule in this case.
The respondents cannot be ordered to sell their portion of the co-owned
properties. In the language of Rodriguez v. Court of First Instance of Rizal,20
"each party is the sole judge of what is good for him."21
3. Indeed, the respected commentaries suggest the conclusion that, insofar as the
sale of co-owned properties is concerned, there is no common interest that may
be prejudiced should one or more of the co-owners refuse to sell the co-owned
property, which is exactly the factual situation in this case. When respondents
disagreed to the sale, they merely asserted their individual ownership rights.
Without unanimity, there is no common interest.
Petitioners who project themselves as prejudiced co-owners may bring a suit for
partition, which is one of the modes of extinguishing co- ownership. Article 494
 LAW ON PROPERTY – CO-OWNERSHIP
of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing
owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Article
498 of the Civil Code states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and
the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify
the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is
resorted to (a) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the
co-owners but because of the nature of the property, it cannot be subdivided or
its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-
owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned
the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners.22 This is the
result obviously aimed at by petitioners at the outset. As already shown, this
cannot be done while the co-ownership exists.

Essentially, a partition proceeding accords all parties the opportunity to be heard,

the denial of which was raised as a defense by respondents for opposing the sale
of the subject properties.

The necessity of partition could not be more emphasized than in

Rodriguez v. Court of First Instance of Rizal,23 to wit:

x x x That this recourse would entail considerable time, trouble and expense,
unwarranted by the value of the property from the standpoint of the
[respondents], is no legal justification for the apportionment of the property not
agreeable to any of the co-owners. Disagreements and differences impossible of
adjustment by the parties themselves are bound to arise, and it is precisely with
such contingency in view that the law on partition was evolved.24

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is DENIED without prejudice

to the filing of an action for partition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 76449 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

17 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
 LAW ON PROPERTY
G.R. No. 166519 March 31, 2009
NIEVES PLASABAS and MARCOS MALAZARTE, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Special Former Ninth Division), DOMINADOR LUMEN,
and AURORA AUNZO, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court are the May 12, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 43085 and the December 1, 2004 Resolution2 denying reconsideration of the
challenged decision.
The pertinent facts and proceedings follow.
In 1974, petitioners3 filed a complaint for recovery of title to property with
damages before the Court of First Instance (now, Regional Trial Court [RTC]) of
Maasin, Southern Leyte against respondents. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. R-1949. The property subject of the case was a parcel of coconut land in
Canturing, Maasin, Southern Leyte, declared under Tax Declaration No. 3587 in
the name of petitioner Nieves with an area of 2.6360 hectares.4 In their complaint,
petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered confirming their rights and legal
title to the subject property and ordering the defendants to vacate the occupied
portion and to pay damages.5
Respondents, for their part, denied petitioners’ allegation of ownership and
possession of the premises, and interposed, as their main defense, that the subject
land was inherited by all the parties from their common ancestor, Francisco
Plasabas.6
Revealed in the course of the trial was that petitioner Nieves, contrary to her
allegations in the complaint, was not the sole and absolute owner of the land.
Based on the testimonies of petitioners’ witnesses, the property passed on from
Francisco to his son, Leoncio; then to Jovita Talam, petitioner Nieves’
grandmother; then to Antonina Talam, her mother; and then to her and her
siblings—Jose, Victor and Victoria.7
After resting their case, respondents raised in their memorandum the argument
that the case should have been terminated at inception for petitioners’ failure to
implead indispensable parties, the other co-owners – Jose, Victor and Victoria.
18 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
In its April 19, 1993 Order,8 the trial court, without ruling on the merits,
dismissed the case without prejudice, thus:
This Court, much as it wants to decide the instant case on the merits, being one of
the old inherited cases left behind, finds difficulty if not impossibility of doing so
at this stage of the proceedings when both parties have already rested their cases.
Reluctantly, it agrees with the defendants in the observation that some important
indispensable consideration is conspicuously wanting or missing.
It is not the Court’s wish to turn its back on the crucial part of the case, which is
the pronouncement of the judgment to settle the issues raised in the pleadings of
the parties once and for all, after all the time, effort and expense spent in going
through the trial process.
But, rules are rules. They have to be followed, to arrive at a fair and just verdict.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
"x x x Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants."
What the Court wants to say here is that the instant case should have been
dismissed without prejudice a long time ago for lack of cause of action as the
plaintiffs spouses Marcos Malazarte and Nieves Plasabas Malazarte have no
complete legal personality to sue by themselves alone without joining the
brothers and sisters of Nieves who are as INDISPENSABLE as the latter in the final
determination of the case. Not impleading them, any judgment would have no
effectiveness.
They are that indispensable that a final decree would necessarily affect their
rights, so that the Court cannot proceed without their presence. There are
abundant authorities in this regard. Thus –
"The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires
the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their
presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. (Borlasa v.
Polistico, 47 Phil. 345, 348) For this reason, our Supreme Court has held that
when it appears of record that there are other persons interested in the subject
matter of the litigation, who are not made parties to the action, it is the duty of
the court to suspend the trial until such parties are made either plaintiffs or
defendants. (Pobre, et al. v. Blanco, 17 Phil. 156). x x x Where the petition failed
to join as party defendant the person interested in sustaining the proceeding in
the court, the same should be dismissed. x x x When an indispensable party is not
 LAW ON PROPERTY
before the court, the action should be dismissed. (People, et al. v. Rodriguez, et al.,
G.R. Nos. L-14059-62, September 30, 1959) (sic)
"Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action
shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. (Sec. 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
The burden of procuring the presence of all indispensable parties is on the
plaintiff. (39 Amjur [sic] 885). The evident purpose of the rule is to prevent the
multiplicity of suits by requiring the person arresting a right against the
defendant to include with him, either as co-plaintiffs or as co-defendants, all
persons standing in the same position, so that the whole matter in dispute may
be determined once and for all in one litigation. (Palarca v. Baginsi, 38 Phil. 177,
178).
"An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or
subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without
inquiring or affecting such interest; a party who has not only an interest of such
a nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or
leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be
wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. (67 C.J.S. 892).
Indispensable parties are those without whom no action can be finally
determined." (Sanidad v. Cabataje, 5 Phil. 204)
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, both the
complaint and the counterclaim in the instant case are ordered DISMISSED
without prejudice. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.9
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In the challenged May 12, 2004
Decision,10 the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The CA,
further, declared that the non-joinder of the indispensable parties would violate
the principle of due process, and that Article 487 of the Civil Code could not be
applied considering that the complaint was not for ejectment, but for recovery of
title or a reivindicatory action.11
With their motion for reconsideration denied in the further assailed December 1,
2004 Resolution,12 petitioners filed the instant petition.
The Court grants the petition and remands the case to the trial court for
disposition on the merits.
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an
action for ejectment.1avvphi1.zw+ The article covers all kinds of actions for the
19 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reivindicatory
action. A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-
owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit
of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-
owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of
the unimpleaded co-owners.13
With this disquisition, there is no need to determine whether petitioners’
complaint is one for ejectment or for recovery of title. To repeat, Article 487 of
the Civil Code applies to both actions.
Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners as
parties. The only exception to this rule is when the action is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus, entitled to the
possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff
impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.14
Here, the allegation of petitioners in their complaint that they are the sole owners
of the property in litigation is immaterial, considering that they acknowledged
during the trial that the property is co-owned by Nieves and her siblings, and that
petitioners have been authorized by the co-owners to pursue the case on the
latter’s behalf.15 Impleading the other co-owners is, therefore, not mandatory,
because, as mentioned earlier, the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit
of all.
In any event, the trial and appellate courts committed reversible error when they
summarily dismissed the case, after both parties had rested their cases following
a protracted trial commencing in 1974, on the sole ground of failure to implead
indispensable parties. The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead
the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the
court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable
party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition
for the plaintiff’s/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the
case is REMANDED to the trial court for appropriate proceedings. The trial court
is further DIRECTED to decide on the merits of the civil case WITH DISPATCH.
SO ORDERED.
 LAW ON PROPERTY
G.R. No. 182585 November 27, 2009
JOSEPHINE MARMO,* NESTOR ESGUERRA, DANILO DEL PILAR and MARISA DEL
PILAR, Petitioners,
vs.
MOISES O. ANACAY Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 filed by the spouses Josephine
Marmo and Nestor Esguerra and the spouses Danilo del Pilar and Marisa del Pilar
(collectively, the petitioners), to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 dated December
28, 2007 and the Resolution3 dated April 11, 2008 of the Former Special Eleventh
Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 94673. The assailed CA
Decision dismissed the petitioners’ petition for certiorari challenging the Orders
dated March 14, 20064 and May 8, 20065 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 90,
Dasmariñas, Cavite in Civil Case No. 2919-03, while the assailed CA Resolution denied
the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the case, as gathered from the parties’ pleadings, are briefly summarized
below:
On September 16, 2003, respondent Moises O. Anacay filed a case for Annulment of
Sale, Recovery of Title with Damages against the petitioners6 and the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 2919-03.7 The complaint
states, among others, that: the respondent is the bona-fide co-owner, together with
his wife, Gloria P. Anacay (now deceased), of a 50-square meter parcel of land and the
house built thereon, located at Blk. 54, Lot 9, Regency Homes, Brgy. Malinta,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-815595 of the
Register of Deeds of Cavite; they authorized petitioner Josephine to sell the subject
property; petitioner Josephine sold the subject property to petitioner Danilo for
₱520,000.00, payable in monthly installments of ₱8,667.00 from May 2001 to June
2006; petitioner Danilo defaulted in his installment payments from December 2002
onwards; the respondent subsequently discovered that TCT No. 815595 had been
cancelled and TCT No. T-972424 was issued in petitioner Josephine’s name by virtue
of a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20, 2001; petitioner Josephine
subsequently transferred her title to petitioner Danilo; TCT No. T-972424 was
cancelled and TCT No. T-991035 was issued in petitioner Danilo’s name. The
respondent sought the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20,
2001 and the cancellation of TCT No. T-991035; in the alternative, he demanded
20 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
petitioner Danilo’s payment of the balance of ₱347,000.00 with interest from
December 2002, and the payment of moral damages, attorney’s fees, and cost of suit.
In her Answer, petitioner Josephine averred, among others, that the respondent’s
children, as co-owners of the subject property, should have been included as plaintiffs
because they are indispensable parties.8 Petitioner Danilo echoed petitioner
Josephine’s submission in his Answer.9
Following the pre-trial conference, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the case
for the respondent’s failure to include his children as indispensable parties.10
The respondent filed an Opposition, arguing that his children are not indispensable
parties because the issue in the case can be resolved without their participation in the
proceedings.11
THE RTC RULING
The RTC found the respondent’s argument to be well-taken and thus denied the
petitioners’ motion to dismiss in an Order dated March 14, 2006. 12 It also noted that
the petitioners’ motion was simply filed to delay the proceedings.
After the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration,13 the petitioners elevated their
case to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.14
They charged the RTC with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
for not dismissing the case after the respondent failed to include indispensable
parties.
THE CA RULING
The CA dismissed the petition15 in a Decision promulgated on December 28, 2007. It
found that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioners’ motion to dismiss, noting that the respondent’s children are not
indispensable parties.
The petitioners moved16 but failed17 to secure a reconsideration of the CA Decision;
hence, the present petition.
Following the submission of the respondent’s Comment18 and the petitioners’ Reply,19
we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.20 Both parties complied.21
Meanwhile, on April 24, 2009, the petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings due to the pendency of the present petition. The RTC denied the motion
to suspend as well as the motion for reconsideration that followed. The petitioners
responded to the denial by filing with us a petition for the issuance of a temporary
 LAW ON PROPERTY
restraining order (TRO) to enjoin the RTC from proceeding with the hearing of the
case pending the resolution of the present petition.
THE PETITION and THE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS
The petitioners submit that the respondent’s children, who succeeded their deceased
mother as co-owners of the property, are indispensable parties because a full
determination of the case cannot be made without their presence, relying on Arcelona
v. Court of Appeals,22 Orbeta v. Sendiong,23 and Galicia v. Manliquez Vda. de Mindo.24
They argue that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is a fatal jurisdictional
defect.
The respondent, on the other hand, counters that the respondent’s children are not
indispensable parties because the issue involved in the RTC – whether the signatures
of the respondent and his wife in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20, 2001
were falsified - can be resolved without the participation of the respondent’s children.
THE ISSUE
The core issue is whether the respondent’s children are indispensable parties in Civil
Case No. 2919-03. In the context of the Rule 65 petition before the CA, the issue is
whether the CA correctly ruled that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that the respondent’s children are not indispensable parties.
OUR RULING
We see no merit in the petition.
General Rule: The denial of a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order
which is not the proper subject of an appeal or a petition for
certiorari.
At the outset, we call attention to Section 1 of Rule 41 25 of the Revised Rules of Court
governing appeals from the RTC to the CA. This Section provides that an appeal may
be taken only from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or
of a matter therein when declared by the Rules to be appealable. It explicitly states as
well that no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order.
In law, the word "interlocutory" refers to intervening developments between the
commencement of a suit and its complete termination; hence, it is a development that
does not end the whole controversy.26 An "interlocutory order" merely rules on an
incidental issue and does not terminate or finally dispose of the case; it leaves
something to be done before the case is finally decided on the merits.27
21 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
An Order denying a Motion to Dismiss is interlocutory because it does not finally
dispose of the case, and, in effect, directs the case to proceed until final adjudication
by the court. Only when the court issues an order outside or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate
and expeditious relief, will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail
an interlocutory order.28
In the present case, since the petitioners did not wait for the final resolution on the
merits of Civil Case No. 2919-03 from which an appeal could be taken, but opted to
immediately assail the RTC Orders dated March 14, 2006 and May 8, 2006 through a
petition for certiorari before the CA, the issue for us to address is whether the RTC, in
issuing its orders, gravely abused its discretion or otherwise acted outside or in
excess of its jurisdiction.
The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners’ Motion
to Dismiss; the respondent’s co-owners are not indispensable parties.
The RTC grounded its Order dated March 14, 2006 denying the petitioners’ motion to
dismiss on the finding that the respondent’s children, as co-owners of the subject
property, are not indispensable parties to the resolution of the case.
We agree with the RTC.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court 29 defines indispensable parties as
parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action and
who, for this reason, must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants.
Jurisprudence further holds that a party is indispensable, not only if he has an interest
in the subject matter of the controversy, but also if his interest is such that a final
decree cannot be made without affecting this interest or without placing the
controversy in a situation where the final determination may be wholly inconsistent
with equity and good conscience. He is a person whose absence disallows the court
from making an effective, complete, or equitable determination of the controversy
between or among the contending parties. 30
When the controversy involves a property held in common, Article 487 of the Civil
Code explicitly provides that "any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment."
We have explained in Vencilao v. Camarenta31 and in Sering v. Plazo32 that the term
"action in ejectment" includes a suit for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful
detainer (desahucio).33 We also noted in Sering that the term "action in ejectment"
includes "also, an accion publiciana (recovery of possession) or accion
reinvidicatoria34 (recovery of ownership)." Most recently in Estreller v. Ysmael,35 we
applied Article 487 to an accion publiciana case; in Plasabas v. Court of Appeals36 we
categorically stated that Article 487 applies to reivindicatory actions.
 LAW ON PROPERTY
We upheld in several cases the right of a co-owner to file a suit without impleading
other co-owners, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code. We made this ruling in
Vencilao, where the amended complaint for "forcible entry and detainer" specified
that the plaintiff is one of the heirs who co-owns the disputed properties. In Sering,
and Resuena v. Court of Appeals,37 the co-owners who filed the ejectment case did not
represent themselves as the exclusive owners of the property. In Celino v. Heirs of
Alejo and Teresa Santiago,38 the complaint for quieting of title was brought in behalf
of the co-owners precisely to recover lots owned in common.39 In Plasabas, the
plaintiffs alleged in their complaint for recovery of title to property (accion
reivindicatoria) that they are the sole owners of the property in litigation, but
acknowledged during the trial that the property is co-owned with other parties, and
the plaintiffs have been authorized by the co-owners to pursue the case on the latter’s
behalf.
These cases should be distinguished from Baloloy v. Hular40 and Adlawan v.
Adlawan41 where the actions for quieting of title and unlawful detainer, respectively,
were brought for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claimed to be the sole owner.
We held that the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff impleaded the other co-
owners who are indispensable parties. In these cases, the absence of an indispensable
party rendered all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority
to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
We read these cases to collectively mean that where the suit is brought by a co-owner,
without repudiating the co-ownership, then the suit is presumed to be filed for the
benefit of the other co-owners and may proceed without impleading the other co-
owners. However, where the co-owner repudiates the co-ownership by claiming sole
ownership of the property or where the suit is brought against a co-owner, his co-
owners are indispensable parties and must be impleaded as party-defendants, as the
suit affects the rights and interests of these other co-owners.
In the present case, the respondent, as the plaintiff in the court below, never disputed
the existence of a co-ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner of the
litigated lot. In fact, he recognized that he is a "bona-fide co-owner" of the questioned
property, along with his deceased wife. Moreover and more importantly, the
respondent’s claim in his complaint in Civil Case No. 2919-03 is personal to him and
his wife, i.e., that his and his wife’s signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
petitioner Josephine were falsified. The issue therefore is falsification, an issue which
does not require the participation of the respondent’s co-owners at the trial; it can be
determined without their presence because they are not parties to the document;
their signatures do not appear therein. Their rights and interests as co-owners are
adequately protected by their co-owner and father, respondent Moises O. Anacay,
since the complaint was made precisely to recover ownership and possession of the
properties owned in common, and, as such, will redound to the benefit of all the co-
owners.421avvphi1
22 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
In sum, respondent’s children, as co-owners of the subject property, are not
indispensable parties to the resolution of the case. We held in Carandang v. Heirs of
De Guzman43 that in cases like this, the co-owners are not even necessary parties, for
a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since
the suit is presumed to be filed for the benefit of all.44 Thus, the respondent’s children
need not be impleaded as party-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2919-03.
We cannot subscribe to the petitioners’ reliance on our rulings in Arcelona v. Court of
Appeals,45 Orbeta v. Sendiong46 and Galicia v. Manliquez Vda. de Mindo,47 for these
cases find no application to the present case. In these cited cases, the suits were either
filed against a co-owner without impleading the other co-owners, or filed by a party
claiming sole ownership of a property that would affect the interests of third parties.
Arcelona involved an action for security of tenure filed by a tenant without
impleading all the co-owners of a fishpond as party-defendants. We held that a tenant,
in an action to establish his status as such, must implead all the pro-indiviso co-
owners as party-defendants since a tenant who fails to implead all the co-owners as
party-defendants cannot establish with finality his tenancy over the entire co-owned
land. Orbeta, on the other hand, involved an action for recovery of possession,
quieting of title and damages wherein the plaintiffs prayed that they be declared
"absolute co-owners" of the disputed property, but we found that there were third
parties whose rights will be affected by the ruling and who should thus be impleaded
as indispensable parties. In Galicia, we noted that the complaint for recovery of
possession and ownership and annulment of title alleged that the plaintiffs’
predecessor-in-interest was deprived of possession and ownership by a third party,
but the complaint failed to implead all the heirs of that third party, who were
considered indispensable parties.
In light of these conclusions, no need arises to act on petitioners’ prayer for a TRO to
suspend the proceedings in the RTC and we find no reason to grant the present
petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for its failure to
show any reversible error in the assailed Decision dated December 28, 2007 and
Resolution dated April 11, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94673, both
of which we hereby AFFIRM. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 LAW ON PROPERTY
G.R. No. L-22621 September 29, 1967
JOSE MARIA RAMIREZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, RITA D. RAMIREZ, BELEN T. RAMIREZ, DAVID
MARGOLIES, MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, in its capacity as judicial administrator of the Testate Estate of
the late Jose Vivencio Ramirez, defendants-appellants,
ANGELA M. BUTTE, defendant-appellee.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
Ramirez and Ortigas for defendants-appellants.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by the defendants from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Plaintiff, Jose Maria Ramirez, brought this action1 against defendants Jose
Eugenio Ramirez, Rita D. Ramirez, Belen T. Ramirez, David Margolies, Manuel Uy
& Sons, Inc., the Estate of the late Jose Vivencio Ramirez represented by its
judicial administrator, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, and Angela M. Butte —
hereinafter referred to collectively as defendants — for the partition of a parcel
of land situated at the Northwestern corner of Escolta street and Plaza Sta. Cruz,
Manila — otherwise known as Lot 1 of Block 2120 of the Cadastral Survey of
Manila and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 53946
of the Register of Deeds for said City — and belonging pro indiviso to both parties,
one-sixth (1/6) to the plaintiff and five-sixths (5/6) to the defendants.
Manuel Uy & Sons expressed its conformity to the partition, "if the same can be
done without great prejudice to the interests of the parties." Defendant Butte
agreed to the partition prayed for. The other defendants objected to the physical
partition of the property in question, upon the theory that said partition is
"materially and legally" impossible and "would work great harm and prejudice to
the co-owners." By agreement of the parties the lower Court referred the matter
to a Commission composed of:
(1) Delfin Gawaran, Deputy Clerk of said court, as Chairman,
(2) Artemio U. Valencia, President of the Manila Board of Realtors, as
commissioner for plaintiff, and
(3) Ramon F. Cuervo, President of the Perpetual Investment Corporation, Inc.,
as commissioner for defendants,
to determine whether the property is susceptible of partition, and submit a plan
therefor, if feasible, as well as to report thereon. Subsequently, the
commissioners submitted their individual reports with their respective plans for
the segregation of plaintiff's share.
23 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
After due hearing, the Court rendered a decision declaring that plaintiff is entitled
to the segregation of his share, and directing that the property be partitioned in
accordance with the plan submitted by commissioner Valencia, and that the
expenses incident thereto be paid by both parties proportionately. Hence, this
appeal by, the defendants, except Mrs. Butte. Appellants maintain that the lower
court has erred: 1) in holding that said property is legally susceptible of physical
division; 2) in accepting the recommendation of commissioner Valencia, instead
of that of commissioner Cuervo, or a proposal made by the very plaintiff; and 3)
in not ordering that the incidental expenses be borne exclusively by him.
We find no merit in the appeal.
With respect to the first alleged error, it is urged that a physical division of the
property will cause "inestimable damage" to the interest of the co-owners. No
evidence, however, has been introduced, or sought to be introduced, in support
of this allegation. Moreover, the same is predicated upon the assumption that a
real estate suitable for commercial purposes — such as the one herein sought to
be partitioned — is likely to suffer a proportionately great diminution in value
when its area becomes too small. But, then, if plaintiff's share of 260.26 square
meters were segregated from the property in question, there would still remain
a lot of 1,301.34 square meters for appellants herein and Mrs. Butte. A real estate
of this size, in the very heart of Manila, is not, however, inconsequential, in
comparison to that of the present property of the community. In other words, we
do not believe that its value would be impaired, on account of the segregation of
plaintiff's share, to such an extent as to warrant the conclusion that the property
is indivisible.
Appellants argue that, instead of making the aforementioned segregation,
plaintiff's share should be sold to them. In support of this pretense, they cite the
provision of Article 495 of our Civil Code, to the effect that:
. . . Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the co-owners
cannot demand a physical division of the thing owned in common, when to do
so would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended. But the
co-ownership may be terminated in accordance with article 498.
They apparently assume, once again, that the alleged "inestimable damage" to be
suffered by the property, if plaintiff's share were segregated, is equivalent to
rendering it "unserviceable for the use for which it is intended." Independently of
the fact that the minor premise of this syllogism — the alleged "inestimable
damage" — has not been established, the conclusion drawn by appellants does
not follow necessarily. Indeed, the record shows that there are two (2) buildings
on the land in question, namely: 1) a two-storey commercial building — known
as "Sta. Cruz Building" — abutting on the one (1) side, 2 on the Escolta, and, on the
other 3 on Plaza Santa Cruz; and 2) a small two-storey residential building, on the
 LAW ON PROPERTY – CO-OWNERSHIP
Northwestern end of the lot, and behind the first building, adjoining the Estero As regards the last alleged error, it is obvious that the segregation of plaintiff's
de la Reina, which constitutes the Southwestern boundary of the property. There share inures to the benefit not only of the plaintiff, but, also, of the defendants,
is nothing to show that, after segregating plaintiff's share, the buildings left on the and that both should, consequently, defray the incidental expenses.
remaining 1,301.34 square meters, representing defendants' share, would be
unserviceable, either for commercial or for residential purposes. On the contrary, WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby the costs of this instance
it seems obvious that plaintiff would not insist upon the partition prayed for, if against herein defendants-appellants. It is so ordered.
his share 4 were unserviceable for either — particularly the commercial —
purpose. In fact, every one of the aforementioned commissioners, including the
one representing defendants herein, recommended the segregation of plaintiff's
share. The commissioners merely failed to agree on the precise configuration
thereof.
This brings us to the second issue raised by appellants: whether the lower court
should have adopted the plan submitted by their own commissioner, or "in not
taking into consideration," at least, a proposal made by plaintiff herein. In this
connection, it appears that said commissioner 5 recommended that plaintiff's
share be given a frontage of 6.14 lineal meters at Plaza Sta. Cruz, whereas the
commissioner for the Court 6 favored a frontage of 12.66 square meters at said
Plaza; that defendants' main objection to the plan recommended by
commissioner Valencia 7 and adopted by the lower court, is that it left behind the
portion awarded to plaintiff, a lot of 169 square meters, which would have to be
divided among the defendants, should they later wish to have their individual
shares segregated; and that, in order to offset this objection, plaintiff expressed
— in one of the pre-trials held in the lower court and in order to "facilitate early
termination" of the case — the willingness "to buy from the other co-owners the
remaining portion of the land behind his lot at P1,000 per square
meter."1awphîl.nèt
The record does not show that this offer of the plaintiff had not been "taken into
consideration" by the lower court. Moreover, defendants had not accepted it. And
neither do they accept it now, for they would want the plaintiff to pay a price
higher than that offered by him. Upon the other hand, the disadvantage resulting
to the defendants from the existence of said lot of 169 square meters, behind that
awarded to the plaintiff, is offset by the fact that the remaining portion of the land
in question — representing defendants' collective share — has, in addition to a
frontage of around 40 meters on Plaza Santa Cruz, a frontage of 24.13 meters on
Escolta Street, which apart from being, admittedly, the most valuable one, is
totally denied to the plaintiff. Then, again the Cuervo plan giving plaintiff a 6.14
meters frontage of Plaza Sta. Cruz, goes all the way down to the Western end of
the property, the Estero de la Reina, and would require a partition of the
residential building, on that part of the property in question, which the very
plaintiff says is indivisible, because it would render said building "unserviceable
for the purpose for which it is intended." 8

24 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
 LAW ON PROPERTY
G.R. No. 187987 November 26, 2014
VICENTE TORRES, JR., CARLOS VELEZ, AND THE HEIRS OF MARIANO VELEZ,
NAMELY: ANITA CHIONG VELEZ, ROBERT OSCAR CHIONG VELEZ, SARAH JEAN
CHIONG VELEZ AND TED CHIONG VELEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
LORENZO LAPINID AND JESUS VELEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the
petitioners assailing the 30 January 2009 Decision2 and 14 May 2009 Resolution3 of the
Twentieth Division of the Corni of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02390, affirming the 15
October 2007 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC Cebu City) which
dismissed the complaint for the declaration of nullity of deed of sale against respondent
Lorenzo Lapinid (Lapinid).
The facts as reviewed are the following:
On 4 February 2006, Vicente V. Torres, Jr. (Vicente), Mariano Velez (Mariano)5 and Carlos
Velez (petitioners) filed a Complaint6 before RTC Cebu City praying for the nullification of
the sale of real property by respondent Jesus Velez (Jesus) in favor of Lapinid; the recovery
of possession and ownership of the property; and the payment of damages.
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they, including Jesus, are co-owners of several
parcels of land including the disputed Lot. No. 43897 located at Cogon, Carcar, Cebu.
Sometime in 1993, Jesus filed an action for partition of the parcels of land against the
petitioners and other co-owners before Branch 21 of RTC Cebu City. On 13 August 2001, a
judgment was rendered based on a compromise agreement signed by the parties wherein
they agreed that Jesus, Mariano and Vicente were jointly authorized to sell the said
properties and receive the proceeds thereof and distribute them to all the co-owners.
However, the agreement was later amended to exclude Jesus as an authorized seller.
Pursuant totheir mandate, the petitioners inspected the property and discovered that
Lapinid was occupying a specific portion of the 3000 square meters of Lot No. 4389 by
virtue of a deed of sale executed by Jesus in favor of Lapinid. It was pointed out by
petitioner that as a consequence of what they discovered, a forcible entry case was filed
against Lapinid.
The petitioners prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and void arguing that the sale
of a definite portion of a co-owned property without notice to the other co-owners is
without force and effect. Further, the complainants prayed for payment of rental fees
amounting to ₱1,000.00 per month from January 2004 or from the time of deprivation of
property in addition to attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
25 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
Answering the allegations, Jesus admitted that there was a partition case between him and
the petitioners filed in 1993 involvingseveral parcels of land including the contested Lot
No. 4389. However, he insisted that as early as 6 November 1997, a motion 8 was signed
by the co-owners (including the petitioners) wherein Lot No. 4389 was agreed to be
adjudicated to the co-owners belonging to the group of Jesus and the other lots be divided
to the other co-owners belonging to the group of Torres. Jesus further alleged that even
prior to the partition and motion, several coowners in his group had already sold their
shares to him in various dates of 1985, 1990 and 2004.9 Thus, when the motion was filed
and signed by the parties on 6 November 1997, his rights asa majority co-owner (73%) of
Lot No. 4389 became consolidated. Jesus averred that it was unnecessary to give notice of
the sale as the lot was already adjudicated in his favor. He clarified that he only agreed
with the 2001 Compromise Agreement believing that it only pertained to the remaining
parcels of land excluding Lot No. 4389.10
On his part, Lapinid admitted that a deed of sale was entered into between him and Jesus
pertaining to a parcel of land with an area of 3000 square meters. However, he insistedon
the validity of sale since Jesus showed him several deeds of sale making him a majority
owner of Lot No. 4389. He further denied that he acquired a specific and definite portion
of the questioned property, citing as evidence the deed of sale which does not mention any
boundaries or specific portion. He explained that Jesus permitted him to occupy a portion
notexceeding 3000 square meters conditioned on the result of the partition of the co-
owners.11
Regarding the forcible entry case, Jesus and Lapinid admitted that such case was filed but
the same was already dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Carcar, Cebu. In that
decision, it was ruled that the buyers, including Lapinid, were buyers in good faith since a
proof of ownership was shown to them by Jesus before buying the property.12
On 15 October 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint of petitioners in this wise:
Therefore, the Court DISMISSES the Complaint. At the same time, the Court NULLIFIES the
site assignment made by Jesus Velez in the Deed of Sale, dated November 9, 1997, of
Lorenzo Lapinid’s portion, the exact location of which still has to be determined either by
agreement of the co-owners or by the Court in proper proceedings.13
Aggrieved, petitioners filed their partial motion for reconsideration which was denied
through a 26 November 2007 Order of the court.14 Thereafter, they filed a notice of appeal
on 10 December 2007.15
On 30 January 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed16 the decision of the trial court. It
validated the sale and ruled that the compromise agreement did not affect the validity of
the sale previously executed by Jesus and Lapinid. It likewise dismissed the claim for rental
payments, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of the petitioners.
Upon appeal before this Court, the petitioners echo the same arguments posited before the
lower courts. They argue that Lapinid, as the successor-in-interest of Jesus, is also bound
by the 2001 judgment based on compromise stating that the parcels of land must be sold
jointly by Jesus, Mariano and Vicente and the proceeds of the sale be divided among the
 LAW ON PROPERTY
coowners. To further strengthen their contention, they advance the argument that since
the portion sold was a definite and specific portion of a co-owned property, the entire deed
of sale must be declared null and void.
We deny the petition.
Admittedly, Jesus sold an area ofland to Lapinid on 9 November 1997. To simplify, the
question now iswhether Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell a portion of the property
heco-owns in favor of another person. We answer in the affirmative.
A co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and proindiviso share in the co-
owned property.17 He has the right to alienate, assign and mortgage it, even to the extent
of substituting a third person in its enjoyment provided that no personal rightswill be
affected. This is evident from the provision of the Civil Code:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
A co-owner is an owner of the whole and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion,
but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract.18 Hence, his co-
owners have no right to enjoin a coowner who intends to alienate or substitute his abstract
portion or substitute a third person in its enjoyment.19
In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of Lapinid, free from
any opposition from the co-owners. Lapinid, as a transferee, validly obtained the same
rights of Jesus from the date of the execution of a valid sale. Absent any proof that the sale
was not perfected, the validity of sale subsists. In essence, Lapinid steps into the shoes of
Jesus as co-owner of an ideal and proportionate share in the property held in common.20
Thus, from the perfection of contract on 9 November 1997, Lapinid eventually became a
co-owner of the property.
Even assuming that the petitioners are correct in their allegation that the disposition in
favor of Lapinid before partition was a concrete or definite portion, the validity of sale still
prevails.
In a catena of decisions,21 the Supreme Court had repeatedly held that no individual can
claim title to a definite or concrete portion before partition of co-owned property. Each co-
owner only possesses a right to sell or alienate his ideal share after partition. However, in
case he disposes his share before partition, such disposition does not make the sale or
alienation null and void. What will be affected on the sale is only his proportionate share,
subject to the results of the partition. The co-owners who did not give their consent to the
sale stand to be unaffected by the alienation.22
26 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
As explained in Spouses Del Campo v. Court of Appeals:23
We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a
particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners.
However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything atall in case a
physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the
coowner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale
between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights
as the vendor had asco-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given
under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as
co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common.24
Also worth noting is the pronouncement in Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong:25
x x x The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portionof the
hacienda does not render the sale void, for it is a wellestablished principle that the binding
force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. "Quando res
non valet ut ago, valeat quantumvalere potest." (When a thing is of no force as I do it, it
shall have as much force as it can have).26 (Italics theirs).
Consequently, whether the disposition involves an abstract or concrete portion of the co-
owned property, the sale remains validly executed.
The validity of sale being settled,it follows that the subsequent compromise agreement
between the other co-owners did not affect the rights of Lapinid as a co-owner.
Records show that on 13 August 2001, a judgment based on compromise agreement was
rendered with regard to the previous partition case involving the same parties pertaining
to several parcels of land, including the disputed lot. The words of the compromise state
that: COME NOW[,] the parties and to this Honorable Court, most respectfully state that
instead of partitioning the properties, subject matter of litigation, that they will just sell
the properties covered by TCT Nos. 25796, 25797 and 25798 of the Register of Deeds of
the Province of Cebu and divide the proceeds among themselves.
That Jesus Velez, Mariano Velez and Vicente Torres, Jr. are currently authorized to sell said
properties, receive the proceeds thereof and distribute them to the parties.27
Be that as it may, the compromise agreement failed to defeat the already accrued right of
ownership of Lapinid over the share sold by Jesus. As early as 9 November 1997, Lapinid
already became a co-owner of the property and thus, vested with all the rights enjoyed by
the other co-owners. The judgment based on the compromise agreement, which is to have
the covered properties sold, is valid and effectual provided as it does not affect the
proportionate share of the non-consenting party. Accordingly, when the compromise
agreement was executed without Lapinid’s consent, said agreement could not have
affected his ideal and undivided share. Petitioners cannot sell Lapinid’s share absent his
consent. Nemo dat quod non habet – "no one can give what he does not have."28
 LAW ON PROPERTY
This Court has ruled in many cases that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his,
the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not
consent tothe sale. This is because the sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects only
his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in
the partition of the thing owned in common.29
We find unacceptable the argument that Lapinid must pay rental payments to the other
co-owners.1âwphi1
As previously discussed, Lapinid,from the execution of sale, became a co-owner vested
with rights to enjoy the property held in common.
Clearly specified in the Civil Code are the following rights:
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the
interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to
their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by agreement, express or
implied.
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall havethe full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rightsare involved. But
the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
Affirming these rights, the Court held in Aguilar v. Court of Appeals that:30
x x x Each co-owner of property heldpro indivisoexercises his rights over the whole
property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not
injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the
respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-ownerexercises, together
with his coparticipants joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his
use and enjoyment of the same.31 From the foregoing, it is absurd to rule that Lapinid,
who is already a co-owner, be ordered to pay rental payments to his other co-owners.
Lapinid’s right of enjoyment over the property owned in common must be respected
despite opposition and may notbe limited as long he uses the property to the purpose for
which it isintended and he does not injure the interest of the co-ownership.
– CO-OWNERSHIP
1. When exemplary damages are awarded;
2. When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interests;
3. In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
4. In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
5. Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff’s plainly valid and demandable claim;
6. In actions for legal support;
7. In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled
workers;
8. In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability
laws;
9. In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a cnme;
10. When at least double judicial costs arc awarded;
11. In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees
and expenses oflitigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
Petitioners cite Jesus' act of selling a definite portion to Lapinid as the reason which forced
them to litigate and file their complaint. However, though the Court may not fault the
complainants when they filed a complaint based on their perceived cause of action, they
should have also considered thoroughly that it is well within the rights of a co-owner to
validly sell his ideal share pursuant to law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 January 2009 and 14 May 2009 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Finally, we find no error on denial of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

Pursuant to Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation,
in the absence of stipulation, are awarded only in the following instances:

xxxx

27 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
 LAW ON PROPERTY
G.R. No. 215038, October 17, 2016
NORMA C. MAGSANO, ISIDRO C. MAGSANO, RICARDO C. MAGSANO, ROQUE
C. MAGSANO, JR., NIDA M. CAGUIAT, PERLITA MAGSANO, AND SALVADOR C.
MAGSANO, Petitioners,
v.
PANGASINAN SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC. AND SPOUSES EDDIE V.
MANUEL AND MILAGROS C. BALLESTEROS, SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS:
GEMMA C. MANUELPEREZ, ANGELO JOHNDREW MANUEL, AND RESSY C.
MANUEL, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2
dated February 14, 2014 and the Resolution3 dated October 2, 2014 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 99519, which affirmed the Decision4 dated April
27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 41 (RTC) dismissing
the complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage, certificate of sale, sheriffs
final sale, deed of sale, and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 48754 5 filed by
herein petitioners Norma, Isidro, Ricardo, Roque, Jr., Perlita, arid Salvador, all
surnamed Magsano, and Nida M. Caguiat (petitioners) against herein respondent
Pangasinan Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.6 (respondent bank), respondents
spouses Eddie V. Manuel and Milagros C. Ballesteros (Sps. Manuel), and Sheriff
Reynaldo C. Daroy (Sheriff Daroy), but deleted the awards of exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, appearance fee, and litigation expenses in the latter's favor.
The Facts
On July 1, 1991, spouses Roque Magsano (Roque) and Susana Capelo (Susana;
collectively, mortgagors), the parents of petitioners,7 purportedly executed in
favor of respondent bank a Real Estate Mortgage8 over a 418 square-meter parcel
of land located in Dagupan City, covered by TCT No. 48754,9 as well as the
improvements thereon (subject property), as security for the payment of their
P35,000.00 loan.10
The mortgagors, however, defaulted in the payment of their loan obligation when
it fell due, causing respondent bank to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged
property11 in accordance with Act No. 3135,12 as amended, with notice to the
mortgagors,13 and, in the process, respondent bank emerged as the highest
bidder in the public auction sale held on March 21, 1994 for a total bid price of
P65,826.69.14 The mortgagors then failed to redeem the property within the
28 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
redemption period15 which led to the cancellation of TCT No. 48754 and the
issuance of TCT No. 6539416 in the name of respondent bank.17 The latter
subsequently sold18 the same to Sps. Manuel who were issued TCT No.
67491.19chanrobleslaw
Despite repeated demands, the mortgagors refused to vacate the premises;
hence, respondent bank applied for20 and was granted a writ of possession21 over
the subject property and, thereafter, a writ of demolition,22 resulting in the
demolition of petitioners' houses.23
Consequently, on September 6, 2004, petitioners filed a complaint 24 for
annulment of Real Estate Mortgage, Certificate of Sale, Sheriff's Final Sale, Deed
of Sale, and TCT No. 4875425 against respondent bank, Sps. Manuel, and Sheriff
Daroy (defendants) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 2004-0316-D,
which they amended26 on September 3, 2007.27 They averred that Roque had
already passed away on April 17, 1991,28 or prior to the execution of the Real
Estate Mortgage on July 1, 1991; hence, the said mortgage was null and void, and
could not have conferred any right on the subject property in favor of respondent
bank which it could pass to Sps. Manuel.29 They further claimed that the said
property is their family home, but the consent of the majority of the beneficiaries
had not been secured. They likewise asserted that Sps. Manuel were aware that:
(a) the foreclosure proceedings were invalid; and (b) petitioners were in
possession of the subject property, hence, purchasers in bad faith.30
For their part,31 defendants denied knowledge of the death of Roque, 32 and
averred that petitioners have no cause of action to seek the annulment of the Real
Estate Mortgage since they were not parties thereto.33 They contended that
assuming that the latter have a cause of action, the same had prescribed pursuant
to Articles 1144, 1149, and 1150 of the Civil Code.34 They further argued that
petitioners are estopped from questioning the validity of the Real Estate
Mortgage, considering that they: (a) are bound by the acts of their mother,
Susana, who signed the same, and is presumed to be the author of the
misrepresentation/falsification, and benefited from the proceeds of the loan;35
and (b) participated in the proceedings for the issuance of the writ of
possession.36chanrobleslaw
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision37 dated April 27, 2012, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit.38 It declared that petitioners have no cause of action against the
defendants,39 holding them bound by the misrepresentation of their mother who
signed the Real Estate Mortgage, the authenticity of whose signature they never
contested.40 And even assuming that petitioners have a cause of action, the RTC
 LAW ON PROPERTY
ruled that the same is barred by prescription, considering that the action to annul
the Real Estate Mortgage and the foreclosure sale was filed beyond the
prescriptive period from the time their causes of action accrued,41 pursuant to
Articles 1144,42 1149,43 and 115044 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the RTC deemed
it proper to grant respondent bank's claims for attorney's fees, appearance fees,
litigation expenses, exemplary damages, and costs of suit.45
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated46 the matter before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision47 dated February 14, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings, but
deleted the awards of exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and
litigation expenses for lack of factual and legal bases.48 On the main, it held that
while the Real Estate Mortgage was void as to the share of Roque who was shown
to be already deceased at the time the same was executed, rendering respondent
bank a mortgagee in bad faith, it declared Sps. Manuel innocent purchasers for
value whose rights may not be prejudiced.49
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,50 which was, however, denied in a
Resolution51 dated October 2, 2014; hence, the instant petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The essential issues for the Court's resolution are whether or not: (a) the Real
Estate Mortgage was void; and (b) Sps. Manuel were purchasers in good faith.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly granted.
Preliminarily, the rule is settled that the remedy of appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only questions of law, not of fact. While
it is not the function of the Court to re-examine, winnow and weigh anew the
respective sets of evidence of the parties,52 there are, however, recognized
exceptions,53 one of which is when the inference drawn from the facts was
manifestly mistaken, as in this case.
It is undisputed that at the time the Real Estate Mortgage was constituted on July
1, 1991, Roque was already deceased. Upon his death on April 17, 1991, the
conjugal partnership between him and his spouse, Susana, was dissolved
pursuant to Article 126 (1)54 of the Family Code,55 and an implied ordinary co-
ownership arose among Susana and the other heirs of Roque with respect to his
29 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
– CO-OWNERSHIP
share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending liquidation. The ensuing
implied ordinary co-ownership is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code,56 to
wit:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, although Susana is a co-owner with her children with respect to Roque's
share in the conjugal partnership, she could not yet assert or claim title to any
specific portion thereof without an actual partition of the property being first
done either by agreement or by judicial decree.57 While she herself as co-owner
had the right to mortgage or even sell her undivided interest in the subject
property, she could not mortgage or otherwise dispose of the same in its entirety
without the consent of the other co-owners. Consequently, the validity of the
subject Real Estate Mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure proceedings
therefor conducted in favor of respondent bank should be limited only to the
portion which may be allotted to it, as Susana's successor-in-interest, in the event
of partition, thereby making it a co-owner58 with petitioners pending partition.
Thus, in Rural & Bank of Cabadbaran, Inc. v. Melecio-Yap,59 the Court held:
While Erna, as herself a co-owner, by virtue of Article 493 of the Civil Code, had
the right to mortgage or even sell her undivided interest in the said properties,
she, could not, however, dispose of or mortgage the subject properties in their
entirety without the consent of the other co-owners. Accordingly, the validity of
the subject real estate mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure proceedings
therefor conducted in favor of RBCI should be limited only to the portion
which may be allotted to it (as the successor-in-interest of Erna) in the
event of partition. In this relation, the CA's directive to remand the case to the
RTC in order to determine the exact extent of the respective rights, interests,
shares and participation of respondents and RBCI over the subject properties,
and thereafter, effect a final division, adjudication and partition in accordance
with law remains in order. Meanwhile, the writ of possession issued in favor of
RBCI, and all proceedings relative thereto should be set aside considering that the
latter's specific possessory rights to the said properties remain undetermined. 60
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, although the Court concurs with the CA's finding that respondent bank
was a mortgagee in bad faith for having failed to exercise greater care and due
diligence in verifying the ownership of the subject property,61 contrary to the CA,
 LAW ON PROPERTY – CO-OWNERSHIP
the Court finds that Sps. Manuel are not innocent purchasers for value who can invocation of the legal presumption of good faith, i.e., that everyone is presumed
acquire title to the subject entire property. to act in good faith.70

While the rule is that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely Besides, the fact that respondent bank succeeded in consolidating ownership
on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no over the subject property in its name did not terminate the existing co-ownership
way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the between it and petitioners.71 In Nufable v. Nufable,72 the Court had the occasion
property, where the land sold is in the possession of a person other than the to rule:
vendor, as in this case, the purchaser must go beyond the certificate of title
and make inquiries concerning the actual possessor.62 As this Court [A] co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a co-owned property when his
explained in the case of Sps. Mathay v. CA:63 share is mortgaged by another co-owner without the former's knowledge and
consent as in the case at bar. It has likewise been ruled that the mortgage of the
Although it is a recognized principle that a person dealing [with] a registered land inherited property is not binding against co-heirs who never benefitted.
need not go beyond its certificate of title, it is also a firmly settled rule that where
there are circumstances which would put a party on guard and prompt him to xxxx
investigate or inspect the property being sold to him, such as the presence of
occupants/tenants thereon, it is, of course, expected from the purchaser of a
x x x [W]hen the subject property was mortgaged by Angel Custodio, he had no
valued piece of land to inquire first into the status or nature of possession
right to mortgage the entire property but only with respect to his 1/4 pro indiviso
of the occupants, i.e., whether or not the occupants possess the land en concepto share as the property was subject to the successional rights of the other heirs of
de dueño, in concept of owner. As is the common practice in the real estate
the late Esdras. Moreover, in case of foreclosure, a sale would result in the
industry, an ocular inspection of the premises involved is a safeguard a cautious
transmission of title to the buyer which is feasible only if the seller can be
and prudent purchaser usually takes. Should he find out that the land he intends
in a position to convey ownership of the things sold. And in one case, it was
to buy is occupied by anybody else other than the seller who, as in this case, is not held that a foreclosure would be ineffective unless the mortgagor has title to the
in actual possession, it would then be incumbent upon the purchaser to verify the
property to be foreclosed. Therefore, as regards the remaining 3/4 pro
extent of the occupant's possessory rights. The failure of a prospective buyer
indiviso share, the same was held in trust for the party rightfully entitled
to take such precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and thereto, who are the private respondents herein.
would thereby preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights of a
"purchaser in good faith."64 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to Article 1451 of the Civil Code, when land passes by succession to any
Here, petitioners were in possession of the subject property when Sps. Manuel
person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is
bought the same on February 19, 1997 (and even up to the filing of the amended
established by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner. Likewise,
complaint before the RTC on September 3, 2007).65 However, records do not under Article 1456 of the same Code, if property is acquired through mistake or
show that Sps. Manuel inspected the property and inquired into the nature of
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied
petitioners' possession and/or the extent of their possessory rights as a measure
trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. In the case of
of precaution which may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a similar
Noel vs. [CA], this Court held that "a buyer of a parcel of land at a public auction
situation, and thereby discover the irregularity in the acquisition of title by the to satisfy a judgment against a widow acquired only one-half interest on the
respondent bank. Sps. Manuel, therefore, failed to exercise the diligence required
land corresponding to the share of the widow and the other half belonging
in protecting their rights; as such, the Court cannot ascribe good faith to them. 66
to the heirs of her husband became impressed with a constructive trust in
behalf of said heirs."
Furthermore, as correctly pointed out67 by petitioners, the claim that one is an
innocent purchaser for value is a matter of defense. 68 Hence, while petitioners
alleged that Sps. Manuel were purchasers in bad faith, 69 the rule is that he who Neither does the fact that DBP succeeded in consolidating ownership over the
asserts the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value has the burden of subject property in its name terminate the existing co ownership. Registration of
proving the same, and this onus probandi cannot be discharged by mere property is not a means of acquiring ownership. When the subject property was
sold to and consolidated in the name of DBP, it being the winning bidder in the
30 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020
 LAW ON PROPERTY – CO-OWNERSHIP
public auction, DBP merely held the 3/4 portion in trust for the private
respondents. When petitioner Nelson purchased the said property, he
merely stepped into the shoes of DBP and acquired whatever rights and
obligations appertain thereto.73 (Emphases supplied)
In light of the foregoing, Sps. Manuel merely stepped into the shoes of respondent
bank and acquired only the rights and obligations appertaining thereto. Thus,
while they have been issued a certificate of title over the entire property, they
shall: (a) only acquire what validly pertains to respondent bank as successor-in-
interest of Susana in the event of partition; and (b) hold the shares therein
pertaining to the co-owners who did not consent to the mortgage, i.e., petitioners,
in trust for the latter74 pending partition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated February

14, 2014 and the Resolution dated October 2, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 99519 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is
ENTERED as follows:

(1) DECLARING the Real Estate Mortgage dated July 1, 1991 VOID with
respect to the share of deceased Roque Magsano;
(2) DECLARING respondents-spouses Eddie V. Manuel and Milagros C.
Ballesteros (Sps. Manuel) as co-owners of the subject property with
respect to the undivided share of Susana Capelo therein, together with
petitioners Norma, Isidro, Ricardo, Roque, Jr., Perlita, and Salvador, all
surnamed Magsano, and Nida M. Caguiat (petitioners);
(3) CANCELLING Transfer Certificate of Title No. 67491 in the name of Sps.
Manuel; and
(4) REMANDING the records of the case to the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City to determine the exact extent of the respective rights,
interests, shares, and participation of petitioners and Sps. Manuel over
the subject property and, thereafter, effect a final division, adjudication,
and partition in accordance with law.

The Writ of Possession issued in favor of respondent Pangasinan Savings and

Loan Bank, Inc., formerly Pangasinan Savings and Loan Association, Inc., and all
proceedings relative thereto, are further SET ASIDE, considering that the latter's
specific possessory rights to the said properties remain undetermined.

SO ORDERED.

31 | Elixir C. Langanlangan
Property – Atty. Soraya Laut
XU- College of Law, 2019 – 2020