LAW ON PROPERTY – POSSESSION CASE DIGESTS
G.R. No. 93451 March 18, 1991
LIM KIEH TONG, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE ROGELIO M. PIZARRO, Presiding Judge of
Branch 16 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, and REGINALDO Y.
LIM, respondents.
FACTS:
 Plaintiff and his family had for some time resided in Room 301 of the building
adverted to in the next preceding paragraph, until they transferred to their
present residence at No. 3 Igdalig Street, Quezon City;
 The said room 301 has thereafter been utilized by plaintiff as a place where he
keeps some of his important belongings, such as his law books, important
documents, appliances, etc.;
 The aforementioned building has only one common main door through which all
the occupants of the various rooms therein, including that of plaintiff, can get in
and out therefrom;
 Accordingly, each and every occupant of any and all of the rooms of the building
including plaintiff has been given a key or a duplicate key to the doorlock by Rafael
Lim, the Officer-in-Charge of defendant corporation;
 When plaintiff wanted to go inside his room in the following morning of
September 30, 1987 to fetch three (3) of his law books, which he needed to read
in connection with a case he is handling, he was surprised to find out that the key
given him could no longer fit the door lock which was then already changed;
 Consequently, plaintiff had to buy three (3) new law books for which he incurred
expenses in the sum of Pl,253.00, if only to be able to prepare for his cases;
ALLEGATIONS IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER FOR PRELIMINARY MANDATORY
INJUNCTION/RESTRAINING ORDER
 Plaintiff repleads all the foregoing allegations by way of reference to form part of
the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction;
 The failure and/or refusal of defendant to furnish plaintiff the appropriate key,
above-cited, constitutes a violation of the substantial rights of plaintiff, who has a
clear and unmistakable right to the use and enjoyment of Room 301 of the building
owned by defendant corporation, such that there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction/restraining order
1| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
commanding defendant to furnish plaintiff the appropriate key in order to prevent
great and and/or irreparable damages and injury upon plaintiff.
THESE ARE THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCES PRAYED FOR BY THE APPELLEE
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction/restraining order commanding defendant to
provide plaintiff the appropriate key or a duplicate key to the lock of the main door of
the building be immediately issued, and, after hearing the case on its merits, judgment
be rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant ordering:
1. the injunction prayed for in the complaint;
2. defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of Pl,253.00 as actual compensatory
damages;
3. defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and
4. the cost of suit.
Plaintiff prays for such other reliefs and/or remedies which the Honorable Court may
deem just and proper in the premises. (p. 13, orig. rec.)
 On October 2, 1987, by reason of the unjustifiable ouster of private respondent
from said premises, he instituted Civil Case No. 122546 entitled Reginaldo Y. Lim
vs. Rafael Lim and Lim Kieh Tong & Co., Inc. before the Metropolitan Trial Court
which was raffled to Branch 25. Said complaint was denominated as an action for
damages with injunction despite the allegations contained therein . . .. The
aforesaid case was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
 On October 23, 1987, private respondent again instituted another action at the
Metropolitan Trial Court docketed as Civil Case No. 122775 which was raffled to
Branch 16. The complaint reiterated the same allegations . . .
 On November 2, 1987, a temporary restraining order was issued by respondent
judge pending trial on the merits, commanding petitioner to deliver the
appropriate keys to private respondent and allow him to enter the premises and
occupancy of Room No. 301 of the building . . .
 On November 3, 1987, petitioners instituted the instant petition;
 On the same date after an ex-parte hearing, the Executive Judge of this Court, in
order to obviate any possible injustice pending the determination of the issuance
of the injunctive writ, issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the
enforcement of the temporary restraining order earlier issued by respondent
judge and from further taking cognizance of said Civil Case No. 122775;
 LAW ON PROPERTY – POSSESSION CASE DIGESTS
ISSUE: The issue of whether a complaint filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
is one for forcible entry and detainer or one for specific performance is the center of
this litigation.
HOLDING: From the foregoing facts alleged in the complaint, the Court holds that the
suit is one for forcible entry and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Private
respondent retained the possession of Room 301 of petitioner's building which he
claimed to have the right to use and enjoy, but petitioner prevented him from enjoying
his right by depriving him of the right of egress and ingress through the main door of
the building. Through stealth, petitioner changed the key to the main door thus
depriving private respondent of the possession of his rented room.
Any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part thereof, may file an
action for forcible entry and detainer in the proper inferior court against the person
unlawfully depriving or withholding possession from him 4This relief is not only
available to a landlord, vendor, or vendee, but also to a lessee or tenant or any other
person against whom the possession of any land or building, or a part thereof, is
unlawfully withheld, or is otherwise unlawfully deprived possession thereof, within
one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
SARMIENTO V. CA|CRUZ, 250 SCRA 108
FACTS: Generosa Cruz owned a parcel of land in Bataan. The adjacent land belongs to
the Nuguids but is being used and occupied by Eufemia Sarmiento for several years
now. It was found out by the Geodetic Engineer that Sarmiento’s fence is encroaching
Cruz’s land for about 71 meters. Cruz requested Sarmiento to remove the fence, but the
latter refused so Cruz filed a complaint for ejectment in the Municipal Trial Court.
MTC decided for Cruz. Sarmiento appealed in the RTC, assailing the jurisdiction of the
MTC. RTC decided for Sarmiento and held that the MTC had no jurisdiction to hear the
case. CA reversed RTC and reinstated the MTC decision.
2| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
Issue: Whether or not the court of origin (MTC) had jurisdiction over the ejectment
case? (Apparently, Cruz failed to state details on how the encroachment was done.)
Held: No. To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or
deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such statement
of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes
provide a remedy, as the proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show
enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint
fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as when it does not
state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at
bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in
the proper regional trial court.
FACTS: Cruz was the owner of a parcel of land. Adjacent to this lot is one wherein
Sarmiento had a house built on. On trying to cause the relocation of her lot, Cruz found
out that Sarmiento was encroaching on her property. When Cruz talked to Sarmiento
about constructing a new fence, which will cover her true property, the latter
vehemently refused to do so and threatened Cruz with legal action. For fear of being
sued in court, she sought judicial relief. The trial court decided in favor of
Cruz. Sarmiento tried to assail this decision by saying that the issue was on ownership
of the portion of land and thus, the action should have been an accion reivindicatoria
and not forcible entry.
HELD: A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint filed by Cruz reveals
that the action is neither of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially
involves a boundary dispute, which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria on
the issue of ownership over the portion of a lot.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are distinct actions.
Cruz cannot belatedly claim that petitioner’s possession of the controverted
portion was by mere tolerance. The complaint didn’t characterize
Sarmiento’s alleged entry on the land — whether legal or illegal. The complaint
admitted also of the fact that the fence had already preexisted on the lot when she
acquired the same.
This was definitely not a situation obtained in and gave rise to an ejectment suit for
 LAW ON PROPERTY – POSSESSION CASE DIGESTS
two reasons. First, forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the
lawful possessor, the violation of which right authorizes the speedy redress in the
inferior court provided for in the Rules. Second, if a forcible entry action in the court is
allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be no action of
forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical
possession, the plaintiff may just throw in a demand, file a suit in court and summarily
throw him out of the land.
Pecson v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 115814, May 26, 1995, 244 SCRA 407
Davide, Jr. J.
FACTS: Pedro Pecson owned a commercial lot situated in Kamias street, Quezon City,
on which he built a a four-door, two-storey apartment building. But because of failure
to pay realty taxes amounting to P12,000.00, the commercial lot owned was sold at a
public auction. It was purchased by Nepomuceno, which later sold the same to the
Nuguid spouses for P103,000 on October 12, 1983. Pecson then challenged the sale,
alleging that the apartment building, contrary to the claim of the Nuguid spouses, was
not included in the sale. The lower court judged in favor of Pecson, declaring that the
apartment building was indeed not included in the subject sale. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the same. The Spouses Nuguid then filed a motion for delivery of possession
of the lot and the apartment building. The lower court ruled in favor of the private
respondents, but subject to the reimbursement to Pecson of the cost of constructing the
apartment building minus the rents due to the spouses (calculated at P21,000 from
June 23, 1993 to September 23, 1993). With the said decision at hand, the spouses then
made a move to eject Pecson and as well as the tenants residing therein. However, the
spouses have yet to pay Pecson for the construction costs.
ISSUE: Whether the Nuguid Spouses can eject Pecson even if reimbursement hasn’t
been given for the construction costs.
HELD: No. The Court ruled that since the spouses still haven’t reimbursed Pecson for
the cost of construction of the building, the latter has the right to retain the property,
and along with it, the fruits of which during such possession.
The court ruled that though Article 448 do not apply in the case at bar. By its clear
language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more
parties, one of whom has built some works, or sown or planted something. The
3| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
building, sowing or planting may have been made in good faith or in bad faith. As in
this case, since the owner himself was the one who constructed the improvement, good
faith and bad faith becomes irrelevant. However, by analogy, the indemnity may be
applied, considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced
co-ownership and that the parties agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are
applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid, although they differ as to
the basis of the indemnity. Since the spouses have opted to appropriate the apartment
building, Pecson is thus entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the apartment
building, until he is paid the proper indemnity, as well as of the portion of the lot where
the building has been constructed. This is so because the right to retain the
improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or
possession in fact of the land on which it is built, planted or sown. The petitioner not
having been so paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of the building and,
necessarily, the income therefrom.
PRECY BUNYI and MILA BUNYI v. FE S. FACTOR
G.R. No. 172547, June 30, 2009
FACTS: Fe S. Factor is one of the co-owners of a piece of land in Las Pinas City owned
by her grandparents. Her father Enrique caused the construction of several houses in
the compound. When Enrique Factor died the administration of the Factor compound
was transferred to respondent’s sister, Gloria Factor-Labao who lives with her husband
Ruben Labao in Tipaz, Taguig but visited and sometimes stayed in the rest house to
collect rentals and oversee the Factor compound. Gloria died in 2001 and the
administration of the Factor compound passed on to respondent Fe as coowner of the
property. Ruben Labao married petitioner Precy Bunyi. On November 10, 2002, Ruben
Labao died. At about this time, respondent discovered that petitioners forcibly opened
the doors of the rest house and stole all the personal properties owned by the Factor
family and then audaciously occupied the premises. Respondent alleged that
petitioners unlawfully deprived her and the Factor family of the subject propertys
lawful use and possession. Respondent filed a complaint for forcible entry against
herein petitioners. Petitioners, questioned Fes claim of ownership of the subject
property and the alleged prior ownership of her father Enrique Factor.
ISSUE: Who has better right of physical and material possession of the subject property.
 LAW ON PROPERTY – POSSESSION CASE DIGESTS
HELD: SC found in favor of the respondent. In ejectment cases, the only issue for
resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants.
While petitioners claim that respondent never physically occupied the subject
property, they failed to prove that they had prior possession of the subject property.
The right of respondents predecessors over the subject property is more than sufficient
to uphold respondents right to possession over the same. The words by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth include every situation or condition under
which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who
has had prior possession therefrom. So when petitioners entered said property without
the consent and permission of the respondent and the other coowners, the latter were
deprived of its possession.
Petition is DENIED.
LUCIANO BRIONES and NELLY BRIONES v. JOSE MACABAGDAL, FE D.
MACABAGDAL and VERGON REALTY INVESTMENTS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 150666, VILLARAMA, JR., J
FACTS:
 Respondent-spouses purchased from Vergon Realty Investments Corporation
(Vergon) Lot No. 2-R, a 325-square-meter land
 petitioners are the owners of Lot No. 2-S, which is adjacent to respondents land
 After obtaining the necessary building permit and the approval of Vergon,
petitioners constructed a house on Lot 2-R
 which they thought was Lot No. 2-S
 Respondent-spouses immediately demanded petitioners to demolish the house
and vacate the property
 Respondent-spouses filed an action to recover ownership and possession
 CA affirmed the RTC’s finding
 contracts to sell, and the survey report made by the geodetic engineer, petitioners’
house was built on the lot of the respondent-spouses.
 CA further ruled that petitioners cannot use the defense of allegedly being a
purchaser in good faith for wrongful occupation of land
4| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
ISSUE: Whether CA was correct in affirming the decision of the trial court ordering the
petitioner to demolish their only house and vacate the lot and pay damages
HELD:
 The petition is partly meritorious.
 Trial court and ca erred
 Article 527[14] of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to
show that the mistake was done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be
presumed to have built the house in good faith.
 When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, Article 448 of the Civil
Code governs
 The builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between
appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder
to pay the price of the land.
 The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle
of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way
around.
 He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to remove the building
from the land without first exercising either option.
 It is only if the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to
purchase it where its value is not more than the value of the improvements, that
the owner may remove the improvements from the land.
 The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his
land, the other party fails to pay for the same
 Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and
useful expenses they may have made on the subject property
 This case must be remanded to the RTC which shall conduct the appropriate
proceedings to assess the respective values of the improvement and of the land
NENITA QUALITY FOODS CORPORATION, v. CRISOSTOMO GALABO, ADELAIDA
GALABO, and ZENAIDA GALABO-ALMACBAR, G.R. No. 174191, January 30, 2013
(Accion Interdicatal / Possession De Jure)
FACTS: The respondent are heirs of Donato Galabo. Donato obtained Lot 722, a portion
of the Arakaki Plantation owned by National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation.
Donato and respondents assumed that their Lot includes Lot. 102 as per survey of 1916
 LAW ON PROPERTY – POSSESSION CASE DIGESTS
– 1920. When the Board of Liquidators (BOL) took over the administration of the
Arakaki Plantation, it had Lot No. 722 resurveyed. Allegedly, the resurvey did not
include Lot No. 102; thus, when Donato acquired Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
21496 for Lot No. 722, Lot No. 102 was not included. The respondents, however,
continue to posses, occupy and cultivate Lot No. 102.
NQFC offered to buy Lot 102 which Donato declined. Crisostom fenced off the entire
Lot 102 and built his house on it. Respondents received a letter from Santos Nantin
demanding that they vacate Lot No. 102. Santos claimed ownership of this lot per the
Deed of Transfer of Rights, which the respondents and their mother allegedly executed
in Santos’ favor. To perfect their title, the respondents applied for free patent over Lot
No. 102.
NQFC’s workers with policemen forcibly entered Lot 102 to fence it. NQFC demanded
from Crisostom to remove his house. NQFC, for its part, claimed that Santos
immediately occupied and possessed Lot No. 102 after he purchased it from the
respondents in 1972 and declared it under his name for taxation purposes. Santos was
also granted Free Patent over the property by the Bureau of Lands, and obtained a OCT
over it. That the heirs of Santos conveyed Lot No. 102 to NQFC via the Deed of Absolute
Sale. NQFC then filed a petition for cancellation of the respondents’ patent application
over Lot No. 102, which the BOL-Manila granted, on the ground that Donato failed to
perfect his title over Lot No. 102 which has long been titled in Santos’ name.
Respondent filed a forcible entry suit against NQFC before the MTCC alleging that: (1)
they had been in prior physical possession of Lot No. 102; and (2) NQFC deprived them
of possession through force, intimidation, strategy, threats and stealth. MTCC relied on
the BOL-Manila Ruling and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the RTC denied the
appeal and relied on the finding of BOL-Manila as well. RTC also resolved the question
of ownership, as justified under the Rules, explaining that the NQFC’s possession of Lot
No. 102 was anchored on a Deed of Absolute Sale, while that of the respondents was
based merely on the allegation of possession and occupation by Donato, and not on any
title.
A petition for review with the CA was filed. CA found errors in the RTC decision thus it
ordered NQFC to vacte the lot. That in a forcible entry case, only has to prove prior
material and physical possession of the property in litigation and undue deprivation of
it by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. These, the respondents
averred in the complaint and sufficiently proved, thus entitling them to recover
possession of Lot No. 102. Relying on the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, the CA especially took note of the letters and the
5| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
Certification which the BOL sent to the respondents acknowledging Donato as the
awardee of Lot No. 102 and the respondents as the actual occupants and possessors. A
petition for review on certiorari was filed with the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not NQFC to support its claim of prior possession can invoke the
principle of tacking of possession, that is, when it bought from Santos, its possession is,
by operation of law, tacked to that of Santos and even earlier, or at the time Donato
acquired Lot No. 102?
HELD: NQFC’s reliance on this principle is misplaced. True, the law allows a present
possessor to tack his possession to that of his predecessor-in-interest to be deemed in
possession of the property for the period required by law. Possession in this regard,
however, pertains to possession de jure and the tacking is made for the purpose of
completing the time required for acquiring or losing ownership through prescription.
We reiterate – possession in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than physical
possession, not legal possession.
The CA brushed aside NQFC’s argument on the respondents’ failure to perfect their title
over Lot No. 102. It held that the issue in this case is not of possession de jure, let alone
ownership or title, but of possession de facto. We agree with the CA; the discussions
above are clear on this point.
We agree, too, as we have indicated in passing above, that the issue of ownership can
be material and relevant in resolving the issue of possession. The Rules in fact expressly
allow this: Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of ownership
shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is
intertwined with the issue of ownership. But this provision is only an exception and is
allowed only in this limited instance-- to determine the issue of possession and only if
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership. Save for this instance, evidence of ownership is not at all material, as in the
present case.
OLEGARIO v. MARI
G.R. No. 147951 | 14 December 2009
CIVIL LAW – PROPERTY
 LAW ON PROPERTY – POSSESSION CASE DIGESTS
DOCTRINE: Possession, to constitute the foundation of acquisitive prescription, must be
possession under a claim of title or must be adverse. Acts of a possessory character
performed by one who holds the property by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not in
the concept of an owner and such possessory acts, no matter how long continued, do not
start the running of the period of prescription.
FACTS:
 As early as 1916 Juan Mari (father of respondent) declared his ownership
over a parcel of land in Nancasalan, Mangatarem for tax purposes. He took
possession by delineating the limits with a bamboo fence, planted fruit
bearing trees and bamboos and constructed a 2 storey house.
 After a survey was made in 1950, tax declaration for 1951 specified the
property as residential land with an area of 897 sqm.
o Boundaries- North - Magdalena Fernandez; South - Catalina Cacayorin;
East - Camino Vecinal; and West - Norberto Bugarin.
 In 1974, by virtue of a deed of sale it was transferred to respondent, Pedro
Mari.
 However, in 1947, Wenceslao Olegario (husband of Magdalena Fernandez and
father of petitioner Arsenio Olegario) filed a new tax declaration. For a 50 sqm
parcel of land.
o Boundaries- North - Cesario and Antonio Fernandez; South - Juan Mari;
East - Barrio Road; and West - Norberto Bugarin.
 In May 14, 1961, Wenceslao executed a "Deed of Quit-Claim of Unregistered
Property in favor of Arsenio Olegario. Transferring the 50 sqm property to him.
 In 1961-1962 cadastral survey, the lots were identified as Lot No. 17526, 17553 and
14356. Wenceslao disputed Juan Mari’s claim over Lot Nos. 17526 and 17553.
o 2 corresponding survey notification cards dated September 28, 1968
claimant appeared as "Juan Mari v. Wenceslao Olegario".
o With regard to Lot No. 14356, the survey notification card named Juan
Mari as the claimant.
 In 1988 respondent filed with DENR regional office in Pangilinan a protest against
petitioners because of their encroachment into the disputed property.
o The office decided in favor of respondent and found that he is the
owner of Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and 14356. Petitioners didn’t appeal,
decision became final and executory.
 In 1989 Arsenio caused an amendment of his tax declaration of the 50 sqm
property.
6| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
o Amendments- (1) lot increased to 341 sqm; (2) cadastral lot no as
17526, Pls-768-D; (3) the boundaries as: North-NE Lot 16385 & Road;
South-NW-Lots 14363 & 6385, Pls-768-D; East-SE-Lot 17552, Pls-768-D
and West-SW-Lot 14358, Pls-768-D.
 After discovering the amendments of Arsenio, respondent filed a complaint
with RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan for Recovery of Possession and Annulment
of Tax Declaration No. 4107-R.
o Respondent alleged that Juan Mari, and subsequently his successor, was
deprived by the Olegarios of the possession of portions of subject realty
which respondent owned.
 Petitioner asserts that they have been in possession of the disputed lots since
1948 or for more than 30 yrs already. Hence they acquired ownership by
virtue of prescription.
 Respondent asserts that petitioner can only claim ownership over 50 sqm
and not 341 sqm.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision in adjudicating ownership
of the said lots in favor of the respondent and in giving great weight to the
respondent’s evidence?
2. Whether or not action is barred by laches?
HELD:
1. No. The evidence of petitioner is weak that as early as 1937, they had built
a nipa hut and lived on the land owned by their mother Magdalena
Fernandez. Petitioner’s evidence supports the conclusion that in 1937 they
were in possession of the 50 sqm lot but not Lot No 1726. Petitioner failed
to prove that they’ve been occupying the disputed lots in 1937. The evidence
of a hollow block fence that was placed by petitioner in 1965 doesn’t prove
that it was placed exactly on the area where the bamboo fence was placed
before to demarcate the boundary. The Tax Declaration No. 9404 for the
year of 1947, survey plan of 1961 and 1992 are evidence that cannot be
mistaken as inaccurate compared to petitioner’s mere assertion that his
predecessor merely made a mistake and indicated that the petitioner’s
occupied portion of 50 sqm expanded to 377 sqm. CA correctly found that
the earliest petitioner occupied the disputed lot was in 1965 when they built
the hollow block fence. The ownership of Juan Mari (respondent’s father)
clearly shows that he was in the possession of the lot in the concept of
 LAW ON PROPERTY – POSSESSION CASE DIGESTS
owner, publicly and peacefully since 1916 when he declared the lot for tax
purposes, planted trees and bamboos, constructed a 2 storey house and
bamboo fence. Compared to petitioner when they entered the disputed lot
in 1965. According to Article 538 of the Civil Code, respondent it the
preferred possessor since 1916. Despite respondent occupying the lots for
25 years, they cannot acquire ownership because there was no evidence the
disputed lots were transferred to them by petitioner’s predecessors. Hence,
respondent cannot acquire the lots by ordinary prescription of 10 yrs and
ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Petitioners were only
tolerated by the owner and no matter how long petitioners were tolerated
it cannot start the prescriptive period. Material possession of land is not
adverse possession and it’s insufficient to vest title.
2. No. Essential elements of laches are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of
one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in
asserting complainant's rights after he had knowledge of defendant's acts and after
he has had the opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that
the complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit and (d) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the complainant. In
this case, the 2nd and 3rd element is missing. Petitioners knew all along the position
of respondent and Juan Mari. The stand of respondent and predecessor was
recorded in the notification cards. Respondent continued to declare the 897 sqm
property in his name and pays taxes. It was only in 1989 that petitioners suddenly
changed the area of the property to claim ownership public and unequivocal over
Lot. 17526.
Spouses Padilla vs. Velasco, et.al
G.R. No. 169956 (2009, Nachura)
Facts: Velasco et al (respondents) are the heirs of Artemio who died, leaving a parcel of
land. He acquired it by virtue of a deed of sale in his favor. The Padilla sps (petitioners)
entered the land as trustees by virtue of a deed of sale executed by a bank in favor of the
Solomon sps. Velascos demanded that the Padillas vacate the property.
Padillas cut trees, built a house and harvested crops. Velascos filed a complaint for accion
publiciana before the RTC. Velascos presented deed of sale in favor of Artemio, while
Padillas presented deed of sale between bank and Solomons. The Padillas also argue that the
Solomon sps acquired the land in good faith and for value and that they argue that Lot 2161
7| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
(the one they are occupying) and Lot 76-pt (the lot the Solomon spouses bought) are one and
the same.
Held: The Velascos have a better right to the land. The instant case is for accion publiciana,
or for recovery of the right to possess. Accion publiciana is also used to refer to an ejectment
suit where the cause of dispossession is not among the grounds for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost for more than one year and can no longer
be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership. The Velascos were able to establish lawful possession of the land when the
Padillas occupied the property. The OCT was issued to the original owners who then sold
the land to Artemio. From then on, he was in continuous possession of the land until his
death. It was only in 1987, when the Padillas occupied the property. The argument that the
lots are one and the same is a collateral attack on the title over the property which is
registered in the name of Artemio, which cannot be countenanced.
Suarez v. Emboy, G.R. No. 187944 (March 12, 2014) Case Digest
Ownership > Ownership in General > Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership >
Actions Available to Owner > Recovery of Real Property > Forcible Entry and Unlawful
Detainer
Facts: A parcel of land was partitioned into 5 among the heirs of the Carlos and
Asuncion. Lot No. 1907-A-2 was occupied by Felix and Marilou Emboy, who were
claiming that they inherited it from their mother Claudia Emboy, who inherited it from
her parents Carlos and Asuncion.
Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins to vacate Lot No. 1907-A-2 and transfer
to Lot No. 1907-A-5. They refused to comply and insisted that Claudia's inheritance
pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2.
In 2004, Felix and Marilou received a demand letter from Carmencita requiring them
to vacate the lot and informed them that she had already purchased the lot from the
former's relatives. Felix and Marilou did not heed the demand so Carmencita filed
before the MTCC a complaint against unlawful detainer against them.
Felix and Marilou argued that the complaint for unlawful detainer was fundamentally
inadequate. There was practically no specific allegation as to when and how possession
by tolerance of them began.
 LAW ON PROPERTY – POSSESSION CASE DIGESTS
Issue: Whether or not the complaint for unlawful detainer was inadequate.
Held: In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following requisites must be alleged:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In ejectment cases, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show a statement
of facts to determine the class of case and remedies available to the parties. When the
complaint fails to state the facts constituting a forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
where it does not state how entry was effected or how the dispossession started, the
remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reinvidicatoria.
In this case, the first requisite was absent. Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove
how Emboy entered the lot and constructed a house upon it. She was also silent about
the details on who specifically permitted Emboy to occupy the lot, and how and when
such tolerance came about.
Hence, the complaint should not have been for unlawful detainer and the CA did not
commit an error in dismissing Carmencita's complaint.
EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp. v. Santos
184 SCRA 614
DOCTRINE: Possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to
title. There is no need to produce a receipt.
FACTS:
EDCA Publishing sold 406 books to a certain Professor Jose Cruz who ordered these by
telephone, which was agreed to be payable on delivery. The books were subsequently
delivered to him with the corresponding invoice, and he paid with a personal check.
Cruz then sold the 120 of the books to Leonor Santos who asked for verification, and
was then showed the invoice for the books.
8| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even before
clearing of his first check, made inquiries with the De la Salle College where he had
claimed to be a dean and was informed that there was no such person in its employ.
Further verification revealed that Cruz had no more account or deposit with the
Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had drawn the payment check. EDCA then
went to the police, which set a trap and arrested Cruz on October 7, 1981. Investigation
disclosed his real name as Tomas de la Peña and his sale of 120 of the books he had
ordered from EDCA to Santos.
On the night of the same date, EDCA sought the assistance of the police in Precinct 5 at
the UN Avenue, which forced their way into the store of the private respondents and
threatened Leonor Santos with prosecution for buying stolen property. They seized the
120 books without warrant, loading them in a van belonging to EDCA, and thereafter
turned them over to the petitioner.
Protesting this high-handed action, the Santos sued for recovery of the books after
demand for their return was rejected by EDCA. A writ of preliminary attachment was
issued and the petitioner, after initial refusal, finally surrendered the books to the
private respondents.
MTC ruled that the ownership of the books of Santos. RTC and CA sustained the MTC’s
ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the owner was unlawfully deprived of the property -- NO
HELD:
Santos was a good faith buyer after taking steps to verify the identity of the seller. When
she was showed the invoice, she reasonably believed that he was a legitimate seller.
With regard to unlawful deprivation, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the property
by mere failure of consideration. There was already a perfected contract of sale. Proof
was even substantiated when EDCA gave the invoice as proof of payment upon delivery
of the books. This did not amount to unlawful taking, because by the delivery of EDCA
to Cruz, ownership of the books already transferred to him.