G.R.

 No.  137873              April  20,  2001   WHEREFORE,  judgment  is  hereby  rendered  ordering  defendant  to  pay  plaintiff,  
D.  M.  CONSUNJI,  INC.,  petitioner,    vs.  COURT  OF  APPEALS  and  MARIA  J.  JUEGO,   as  follows:  
respondents.    
KAPUNAN,  J.:   1.  P50,000.00  for  the  death  of  Jose  A.  Juego.  
At  around  1:30  p.m.,  November  2,  1990,  Jose  Juego,  a  construction  worker  of  D.   2.  P10,000.00  as  actual  and  compensatory  damages.  
M.  Consunji,  Inc.,  fell  14  floors  from  the  Renaissance  Tower,  Pasig  City  to  his   3.  P464,000.00  for  the  loss  of  Jose  A.  Juego’s  earning  capacity.  
death.   4.  P100,000.00  as  moral  damages.  
  5.  P20,000.00  as  attorney’s  fees,  plus  the  costs  of  suit.  
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PO3  Rogelio  Villanueva  of  the  Eastern  Police  District  investigated  the  tragedy  and   SO  ORDERED.  
filed  a  report  dated  November  25,  1990,  stating  that:    
  On  appeal  by  D.  M.  Consunji,  the  Court  of  Appeals  (CA)  affirmed  the  decision  of  
x  x  x.  [The]  [v]ictim  was  rushed  to  [the]  Rizal  Medical  Center  in  Pasig,  Metro   the  RTC  in  toto.  
Manila  where  he  was  pronounced  dead  on  arrival  (DOA)  by  the  attending    
physician,  Dr.  Errol  de  Yzo[,]  at  around  2:15  p.m.  of  the  same  date.   D.  M.  Consunji  now  seeks  the  reversal  of  the  CA  decision  on  the  following  
  grounds:  
Investigation  disclosed  that  at  the  given  time,  date  and  place,  while  victim  Jose  A.    
Juego  together  with  Jessie  Jaluag  and  Delso  Destajo  [were]  performing  their  work   • THE  APPELLATE  COURT  ERRED  IN  HOLDING  THAT  THE  POLICE  REPORT  
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as  carpenter[s]  at  the  elevator  core  of  the  14  floor  of  the  Tower  D,  Renaissance   WAS  ADMISSIBLE  EVIDENCE  OF  THE  ALLEGED  NEGLIGENCE  OF  
Tower  Building  on  board  a  [p]latform  made  of  channel  beam  (steel)  measuring   PETITIONER.  
4.8  meters  by  2  meters  wide  with  pinulid  plywood  flooring  and  cable  wires    
attached  to  its  four  corners  and  hooked  at  the  5  ton  chain  block,  when  suddenly,   • THE  APPELLATE  COURT  ERRED  IN  HOLDING  THAT  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  RES  
the  bolt  or  pin  which  was  merely  inserted  to  connect  the  chain  block  with  the   IPSA  LOQUITOR  [sic]  IS  APPLICABLE  TO  PROVE  NEGLIGENCE  ON  THE  
[p]latform,  got  loose  xxx  causing  the  whole  [p]latform  assembly  and  the  victim  to   PART  OF  PETITIONER.  
fall  down  to  the  basement  of  the  elevator  core,  Tower  D  of  the  building  under    
construction  thereby  crushing  the  victim  of  death,  save  his  two  (2)  companions   • THE  APPELLATE  COURT  ERRED  IN  HOLDING  THAT  PETITIONER  IS  
who  luckily  jumped  out  for  safety.   PRESUMED  NEGLIGENT  UNDER  ARTICLE  2180  OF  THE  CIVIL  CODE,  AND  
   
It  is  thus  manifest  that  Jose  A.  Juego  was  crushed  to  death  when  the  [p]latform   • THE  APPELLATE  COURT  ERRED  IN  HOLDING  THAT  RESPONDENT  IS  NOT  
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he  was  then  on  board  and  performing  work,  fell.  And  the  falling  of  the  [p]latform   PRECLUDED  FROM  RECOVERING  DAMAGES  UNDER  THE  CIVIL  CODE.  
was  due  to  the  removal  or  getting  loose  of  the  pin  which  was  merely  inserted  to    
the  connecting  points  of  the  chain  block  and  [p]latform  but  without  a  safety   Petitioner  maintains  that  the  police  report  reproduced  above  is  hearsay  and,  
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lock.   therefore,  inadmissible.  The  CA  ruled  otherwise.  It  held  that  said  report,  being  an  
  entry  in  official  records,  is  an  exception  to  the  hearsay  rule.  
On  May  9,  1991,  Jose  Juego’s  widow,  Maria,  filed  in  the  Regional  Trial  Court  (RTC)    
of  Pasig  a  complaint  for  damages  against  the  deceased’s  employer,  D.M.   The  Rules  of  Court  provide  that  a  witness  can  testify  only  to  those  facts  which  he  
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Consunji,  Inc.  The  employer  raised,  among  other  defenses,  the  widow’s  prior   knows  of  his  personal  knowledge,  that  is,  which  are  derived  from  his  perception.  
availment  of  the  benefits  from  the  State  Insurance  Fund.   A  witness,  therefore,  may  not  testify  as  what  he  merely  learned  from  others  
  either  because  he  was  told  or  read  or  heard  the  same.  Such  testimony  is  
After  trial,  the  RTC  rendered  a  decision  in  favor  of  the  widow  Maria  Juego.  The   considered  hearsay  and  may  not  be  received  as  proof  of  the  truth  of  what  he  has  
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dispositive  portion  of  the  RTC  decision  reads:   learned.  This  is  known  as  the  hearsay  rule.  
   
Hearsay  is  not  limited  to  oral  testimony  or  statements;  the  general  rule  that   hearsay.  The  rest  of  the  report,  such  as  the  summary  of  the  statements  of  the  
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excludes  hearsay  as  evidence  applies  to  written,  as  well  as  oral  statements.   parties  based  on  their  sworn  statements  (which  were  annexed  to  the  Report)  as  
  well  as  the  latter,  having  been  included  in  the  first  purpose  of  the  offer  [as  part  
The  theory  of  the  hearsay  rule  is  that  the  many  possible  deficiencies,   of  the  testimony  of  Major  Enriquez],  may  then  be  considered  as  independently  
suppressions,  sources  of  error  and  untrustworthiness,  which  lie  underneath  the   relevant  statements  which  were  gathered  in  the  course  of  the  investigation  and  
bare  untested  assertion  of  a  witness,  may  be  best  brought  to  light  and  exposed   may  thus  be  admitted  as  such,  but  not  necessarily  to  prove  the  truth  thereof.  It  
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by  the  test  of  cross-­‐examiantion.  The  hearsay  rule,  therefore,  excludes  evidence   has  been  said  that:  
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that  cannot  be  tested  by  cross-­‐examination.    
  "Where  regardless  of  the  truth  or  falsity  of  a  statement,  the  fact  that  it  has  been  
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The  Rules  of  Court  allow  several  exceptions  to  the  rule,  among  which  are  entries   made  is  relevant,  the  hearsay  rule  does  not  apply,  but  the  statement  may  be  
in  official  records.  Section  44,  Rule  130  provides:   shown.  Evidence  as  to  the  making  of  such  statement  is  not  secondary  but  
  primary,  for  the  statement  itself  may  constitute  a  fact  in  issue,  or  be  
Entries  in  official  records  made  in  the  performance  of  his  duty  made  in  the   circumstantially  relevant  as  to  the  existence  of  such  a  fact."  
performance  of  his  duty  by  a  public  officer  of  the  Philippines,  or  by  a  person  in    
the  performance  of  a  duty  specially  enjoined  by  law  are  prima  facie  evidence  of   When  Major  Enriquez  took  the  witness  stand,  testified  for  petitioners  on  his  
the  facts  therein  stated.   Report  and  made  himself  available  for  cross-­‐examination  by  the  adverse  party,  
  the  Report,  insofar  as  it  proved  that  certain  utterances  were  made  (but  not  their  
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In  Africa,  et  al.  vs.  Caltex  (Phil.),  Inc.,  et  al.,  this  Court,  citing  the  work  of  Chief   truth),  was  effectively  removed  from  the  ambit  of  the  aforementioned  Section  44  
Justice  Moran,  enumerated  the  requisites  for  admissibility  under  the  above  rule:   of  Rule  130.  Properly  understood,  this  section  does  away  with  the  testimony  in  
  open  court  of  the  officer  who  made  the  official  record,  considers  the  matter  as  
(a)  that  the  entry  was  made  by  a  public  officer  or  by  another  person  specially   an  exception  to  the  hearsay  rule  and  makes  the  entries  in  said  official  record  
enjoined  by  law  to  do  so;   admissible  in  evidence  as  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  facts  therein  stated.  The  
(b)  that  it  was  made  by  the  public  officer  in  the  performance  of  his  duties,  or  by   underlying  reasons  for  this  exceptionary  rule  are  necessity  and  trustworthiness,  
such  other  person  in  the  performance  of  a  duty  specially  enjoined  by  law;  and   as  explained  in  Antillon  v.  Barcelon.  
(c)  that  the  public  officer  or  other  person  had  sufficient  knowledge  of  the  facts  by    
him  stated,  which  must  have  been  acquired  by  him  personally  or  through  official   The  litigation  is  unlimited  in  which  testimony  by  officials  is  daily  needed;  the  
information.   occasions  in  which  the  officials  would  be  summoned  from  his  ordinary  duties  to  
The  CA  held  that  the  police  report  meets  all  these  requisites.  Petitioner  contends   declare  as  a  witness  are  numberless.  The  public  officers  are  few  in  whose  daily  
that  the  last  requisite  is  not  present.   work  something  is  not  done  in  which  testimony  is  not  needed  from  official  
  sources.  Were  there  no  exception  for  official  statements,  hosts  of  officials  would  
The  Court  notes  that  PO3  Villanueva,  who  signed  the  report  in  question,  also   be  found  devoting  the  greater  part  of  their  time  to  attending  as  witnesses  in  
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testified  before  the  trial  court.  In  Rodriguez  vs.  Court  of  Appeals,  which  involved   court  or  delivering  deposition  before  an  officer.  The  work  of  administration  of  
a  Fire  Investigation  Report,  the  officer  who  signed  the  fire  report  also  testified   government  and  the  interest  of  the  public  having  business  with  officials  would  
before  the  trial  court.  This  Court  held  that  the  report  was  inadmissible  for  the   alike  suffer  in  consequence.  For  these  reasons,  and  for  many  others,  a  certain  
purpose  of  proving  the  truth  of  the  statements  contained  in  the  report  but   verity  is  accorded  such  documents,  which  is  not  extended  to  private  documents.  
admissible  insofar  as  it  constitutes  part  of  the  testimony  of  the  officer  who   (3  Wigmore  on  Evidence,  Sec.  1631).  
executed  the  report.    
  The  law  reposes  a  particular  confidence  in  public  officers  that  it  presumes  they  
x  x  x.  Since  Major  Enriquez  himself  took  the  witness  stand  and  was  available  for   will  discharge  their  several  trusts  with  accuracy  and  fidelity;  and,  therefore,  
cross-­‐examination,  the  portions  of  the  report  which  were  of  his  personal   whatever  acts  they  do  in  discharge  of  their  duty  may  be  given  in  evidence  and  
knowledge  or  which  consisted  of  his  perceptions  and  conclusions  were  not  
shall  be  taken  to  be  true  under  such  a  degree  of  caution  as  to  the  nature  and    
circumstances  of  each  case  may  appear  to  require.   While  negligence  is  not  ordinarily  inferred  or  presumed,  and  while  the  mere  
  happening  of  an  accident  or  injury  will  not  generally  give  rise  to  an  inference  or  
It  would  have  been  an  entirely  different  matter  if  Major  Enriquez  was  not   presumption  that  it  was  due  to  negligence  on  defendant’s  part,  under  the  
presented  to  testify  on  his  report.  In  that  case  the  applicability  of  Section  44  of   doctrine  of  res  ipsa  loquitur,  which  means,  literally,  the  thing  or  transaction  
Rule  143  would  have  been  ripe  for  determination,  and  this  Court  would  have   speaks  for  itself,  or  in  one  jurisdiction,  that  the  thing  or  instrumentality  speaks  
agreed  with  the  Court  of  Appeals  that  said  report  was  inadmissible  since  the   for  itself,  the  facts  or  circumstances  accompanying  an  injury  may  be  such  as  to  
aforementioned  third  requisite  was  not  satisfied.  The  statements  given  by  the   raise  a  presumption,  or  at  least  permit  an  inference  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  
sources  of  information  of  Major  Enriquez  failed  to  qualify  as  "official   the  defendant,  or  some  other  person  who  is  charged  with  negligence.  
information,"  there  being  no  showing  that,  at  the  very  least,  they  were  under  a    
duty  to  give  the  statements  for  record.   x  x  x  where  it  is  shown  that  the  thing  or  instrumentality  which  caused  the  injury  
  complained  of  was  under  the  control  or  management  of  the  defendant,  and  that  
Similarly,  the  police  report  in  this  case  is  inadmissible  for  the  purpose  of  proving   the  occurrence  resulting  in  the  injury  was  such  as  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things  
the  truth  of  the  statements  contained  therein  but  is  admissible  insofar  as  it   would  not  happen  if  those  who  had  its  control  or  management  used  proper  care,  
constitutes  part  of  the  testimony  of  PO3  Villanueva.   there  is  sufficient  evidence,  or,  as  sometimes  stated,  reasonable  evidence,  in  the  
  absence  of  explanation  by  the  defendant,  that  the  injury  arose  from  or  was  
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In  any  case,  the  Court  holds  that  portions  of  PO3  Villanueva’s  testimony  which   caused  by  the  defendant’s  want  of  care.  
were  of  his  personal  knowledge  suffice  to  prove  that  Jose  Juego  indeed  died  as  a    
result  of  the  elevator  crash.  PO3  Villanueva  had  seen  Juego’s  remains  at  the   One  of  the  theoretical  based  for  the  doctrine  is  its  necessity,  i.e.,  that  necessary  
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morgue,  making  the  latter’s  death  beyond  dispute.  PO3  Villanueva  also   evidence  is  absent  or  not  available.  
conducted  an  ocular  inspection  of  the  premises  of  the  building  the  day  after  the    
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incident  and  saw  the  platform  for  himself.  He  observed  that  the  platform  was   The  res  ipsa  loquitur  doctrine  is  based  in  part  upon  the  theory  that  the  defendant  
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crushed  and  that  it  was  totally  damaged.  PO3  Villanueva  also  required  Garcia   in  charge  of  the  instrumentality  which  causes  the  injury  either  knows  the  cause  
and  Fabro  to  bring  the  chain  block  to  the  police  headquarters.  Upon  inspection,   of  the  accident  or  has  the  best  opportunity  of  ascertaining  it  and  that  the  plaintiff  
he  noticed  that  the  chain  was  detached  from  the  lifting  machine,  without  any  pin   has  no  such  knowledge,  and  therefore  is  compelled  to  allege  negligence  in  
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or  bolt.   general  terms  and  to  rely  upon  the  proof  of  the  happening  of  the  accident  in  
  order  to  establish  negligence.  The  inference  which  the  doctrine  permits  is  
What  petitioner  takes  particular  exception  to  is  PO3  Villanueva’s  testimony  that   grounded  upon  the  fact  that  the  chief  evidence  of  the  true  cause,  whether  
the  cause  of  the  fall  of  the  platform  was  the  loosening  of  the  bolt  from  the  chain   culpable  or  innocent,  is  practically  accessible  to  the  defendant  but  inaccessible  to  
block.  It  is  claimed  that  such  portion  of  the  testimony  is  mere  opinion.  Subject  to   the  injured  person.  
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certain  exceptions,  the  opinion  of  a  witness  is  generally  not  admissible.    
  It  has  been  said  that  the  doctrine  of  res  ipsa  loquitur  furnishes  a  bridge  by  which  
Petitioner’s  contention,  however,  loses  relevance  in  the  face  of  the  application  of   a  plaintiff,  without  knowledge  of  the  cause,  reaches  over  to  defendant  who  
res  ipsa  loquitur  by  the  CA.  The  effect  of  the  doctrine  is  to  warrant  a  presumption   knows  or  should  know  the  cause,  for  any  explanation  of  care  exercised  by  the  
or  inference  that  the  mere  fall  of  the  elevator  was  a  result  of  the  person  having   defendant  in  respect  of  the  matter  of  which  the  plaintiff  complains.  The  res  ipsa  
charge  of  the  instrumentality  was  negligent.  As  a  rule  of  evidence,  the  doctrine  of   loquitur  doctrine,  another  court  has  said,  is  a  rule  of  necessity,  in  that  it  proceeds  
res  ipsa  loquitur  is  peculiar  to  the  law  of  negligence  which  recognizes  that  prima   on  the  theory  that  under  the  peculiar  circumstances  in  which  the  doctrine  is  
facie  negligence  may  be  established  without  direct  proof  and  furnishes  a   applicable,  it  is  within  the  power  of  the  defendant  to  show  that  there  was  no  
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substitute  for  specific  proof  of  negligence.   negligence  on  his  part,  and  direct  proof  of  defendant’s  negligence  is  beyond  
  plaintiff’s  power.  Accordingly,  some  court  add  to  the  three  prerequisites  for  the  
The  concept  of  res  ipsa  loquitur  has  been  explained  in  this  wise:   application  of  the  res  ipsa  loquitur  doctrine  the  further  requirement  that  for  the  
res  ipsa  loquitur  doctrine  to  apply,  it  must  appear  that  the  injured  party  had  no   Petitioner  apparently  misapprehends  the  procedural  effect  of  the  doctrine.  As  
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knowledge  or  means  of  knowledge  as  to  the  cause  of  the  accident,  or  that  the   stated  earlier,  the  defendant’s  negligence  is  presumed  or  inferred  when  the  
party  to  be  charged  with  negligence  has  superior  knowledge  or  opportunity  for   plaintiff  establishes  the  requisites  for  the  application  of  res  ipsa  loquitur.  Once  
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explanation  of  the  accident.   the  plaintiff  makes  out  a  prima  facie  case  of  all  the  elements,  the  burden  then  
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  shifts  to  defendant  to  explain.  The  presumption  or  inference  may  be  rebutted  
The  CA  held  that  all  the  requisites  of  res  ipsa  loquitur  are  present  in  the  case  at   or  overcome  by  other  evidence  and,  under  appropriate  circumstances  disputable  
bar:   presumption,  such  as  that  of  due  care  or  innocence,  may  outweigh  the  
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  inference.  It  is  not  for  the  defendant  to  explain  or  prove  its  defense  to  prevent  
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There  is  no  dispute  that  appellee’s  husband  fell  down  from  the  14  floor  of  a   the  presumption  or  inference  from  arising.  Evidence  by  the  defendant  of  say,  due  
building  to  the  basement  while  he  was  working  with  appellant’s  construction   care,  comes  into  play  only  after  the  circumstances  for  the  application  of  the  
project,  resulting  to  his  death.  The  construction  site  is  within  the  exclusive   doctrine  has  been  established.1âwphi1.nêt  
control  and  management  of  appellant.  It  has  a  safety  engineer,  a  project    
superintendent,  a  carpenter  leadman  and  others  who  are  in  complete  control  of   In  any  case,  petitioner  cites  the  sworn  statement  of  its  leadman  Ferdinand  Fabro  
the  situation  therein.  The  circumstances  of  any  accident  that  would  occur  therein   executed  before  the  police  investigator  as  evidence  of  its  due  care.  According  to  
are  peculiarly  within  the  knowledge  of  the  appellant  or  its  employees.  On  the   Fabro’s  sworn  statement,  the  company  enacted  rules  and  regulations  for  the  
other  hand,  the  appellee  is  not  in  a  position  to  know  what  caused  the  accident.   safety  and  security  of  its  workers.  Moreover,  the  leadman  and  the  bodegero  
Res  ipsa  loquitur  is  a  rule  of  necessity  and  it  applies  where  evidence  is  absent  or   inspect  the  chain  block  before  allowing  its  use.  
not  readily  available,  provided  the  following  requisites  are  present:  (1)  the    
accident  was  of  a  kind  which  does  not  ordinarily  occur  unless  someone  is   It  is  ironic  that  petitioner  relies  on  Fabro’s  sworn  statement  as  proof  of  its  due  
negligent;  (2)  the  instrumentality  or  agency  which  caused  the  injury  was  under   care  but,  in  arguing  that  private  respondent  failed  to  prove  negligence  on  the  
the  exclusive  control  of  the  person  charged  with  negligence;  and  (3)  the  injury   part  of  petitioner’s  employees,  also  assails  the  same  statement  for  being  
suffered  must  not  have  been  due  to  any  voluntary  action  or  contribution  on  the   hearsay.  
part  of  the  person  injured.  x  x  x.    
  Petitioner  is  correct.  Fabro’s  sworn  statement  is  hearsay  and  inadmissible.  
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No  worker  is  going  to  fall  from  the  14  floor  of  a  building  to  the  basement  while   Affidavits  are  inadmissible  as  evidence  under  the  hearsay  rule,  unless  the  affiant  
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performing  work  in  a  construction  site  unless  someone  is  negligent[;]  thus,  the   is  placed  on  the  witness  stand  to  testify  thereon.  The  inadmissibility  of  this  sort  
first  requisite  for  the  application  of  the  rule  of  res  ipsa  loquitur  is  present.  As   of  evidence  is  based  not  only  on  the  lack  of  opportunity  on  the  part  of  the  
explained  earlier,  the  construction  site  with  all  its  paraphernalia  and  human   adverse  party  to  cross-­‐examine  the  affiant,  but  also  on  the  commonly  known  fact  
resources  that  likely  caused  the  injury  is  under  the  exclusive  control  and   that,  generally,  an  affidavit  is  not  prepared  by  the  affiant  himself  but  by  another  
management  of  appellant[;]  thus[,]  the  second  requisite  is  also  present.  No   who  uses  his  own  language  in  writing  the  affiant’s  statements  which  may  either  
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contributory  negligence  was  attributed  to  the  appellee’s  deceased  husband[;]   be  omitted  or  misunderstood  by  the  one  writing  them.  Petitioner,  therefore,  
thus[,]  the  last  requisite  is  also  present.  All  the  requisites  for  the  application  of   cannot  use  said  statement  as  proof  of  its  due  care  any  more  than  private  
the  rule  of  res  ipsa  loquitur  are  present,  thus  a  reasonable  presumption  or   respondent  can  use  it  to  prove  the  cause  of  her  husband’s  death.  Regrettably,  
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inference  of  appellant’s  negligence  arises.  x  x  x.   petitioner  does  not  cite  any  other  evidence  to  rebut  the  inference  or  
  presumption  of  negligence  arising  from  the  application  of  res  ipsa  loquitur,  or  to  
Petitioner  does  not  dispute  the  existence  of  the  requisites  for  the  application  of   establish  any  defense  relating  to  the  incident.  
res  ipsa  loquitur,  but  argues  that  the  presumption  or  inference  that  it  was    
negligent  did  not  arise  since  it  "proved  that  it  exercised  due  care  to  avoid  the   Next,  petitioner  argues  that  private  respondent  had  previously  availed  of  the  
accident  which  befell  respondent’s  husband."   death  benefits  provided  under  the  Labor  Code  and  is,  therefore,  precluded  from  
  claiming  from  the  deceased’s  employer  damages  under  the  Civil  Code.  
 
Article  173  of  the  Labor  Code  states:   fault  of  the  employers  or  whether  they  may  avail  themselves  cumulatively  of  
  both  actions,  i.e.,  collect  the  limited  compensation  under  the  Workmen’s  
Article  173.  Extent  of  liability.  –  Unless  otherwise  provided,  the  liability  of  the   Compensation  Act  and  sue  in  addition  for  damages  in  the  regular  courts.  
State  Insurance  Fund  under  this  Title  shall  be  exclusive  and  in  place  of  all  other    
liabilities  of  the  employer  to  the  employee,  his  dependents  or  anyone  otherwise   In  disposing  of  a  similar  issue,  this  Court  in  Pacaña  vs.  Cebu  Autobus  Company,  
entitled  to  receive  damages  on  behalf  of  the  employee  or  his  dependents.  The   32  SCRA  442,  ruled  that  an  injured  worker  has  a  choice  of  either  to  recover  from  
payment  of  compensation  under  this  Title  shall  not  bar  the  recovery  of  benefits   the  employer  the  fixed  amounts  set  by  the  Workmen’s  Compensation  Act  or  to  
as  provided  for  in  Section  699  of  the  Revised  Administrative  Code,  Republic  Act   prosecute  an  ordinary  civil  action  against  the  tortfeasor  for  higher  damages  but  
Numbered  Eleven  hundred  sixty-­‐one,  as  amended,  Republic  Act  Numbered  Six   he  cannot  pursue  both  courses  of  action  simultaneously.  [Underscoring  
hundred  ten,  as  amended,  Republic  Act  Numbered  Forty-­‐eight  hundred  sixty-­‐four   supplied.]  
as  amended,  and  other  laws  whose  benefits  are  administered  by  the  System  or    
by  other  agencies  of  the  government.   Nevertheless,  the  Court  allowed  some  of  the  petitioners  in  said  case  to  proceed  
  with  their  suit  under  the  Civil  Code  despite  having  availed  of  the  benefits  
The  precursor  of  Article  173  of  the  Labor  Code,  Section  5  of  the  Workmen’s   provided  under  the  Workmen’s  Compensation  Act.  The  Court  reasoned:  
Compensation  Act,  provided  that:    
  With  regard  to  the  other  petitioners,  it  was  alleged  by  Philex  in  its  motion  to  
Section  5.  Exclusive  right  to  compensation.  –  The  rights  and  remedies  granted  by   dismiss  dated  May  14,  1968  before  the  court  a  quo,  that  the  heirs  of  the  
this  Act  to  an  employee  by  reason  of  a  personal  injury  entitling  him  to   deceased  employees,  namely  Emerito  Obra,  Larry  Villar,  Jr.,  Aurelio  Lanuza,  
compensation  shall  exclude  all  other  rights  and  remedies  accruing  to  the   Lorenzo  Isla  and  Saturnino  submitted  notices  and  claims  for  compensation  to  the  
employee,  his  personal  representatives,  dependents  or  nearest  of  kin  against  the   Regional  Office  No.  1  of  the  then  Department  of  Labor  and  all  of  them  have  been  
employer  under  the  Civil  Code  and  other  laws  because  of  said  injury  x  x  x.   paid  in  full  as  of  August  25,  1967,  except  Saturnino  Martinez  whose  heirs  decided  
  that  they  be  paid  in  installments  x  x  x.  Such  allegation  was  admitted  by  herein  
Whether  Section  5  of  the  Workmen’s  Compensation  Act  allowed  recovery  under   petitioners  in  their  opposition  to  the  motion  to  dismiss  dated  may  27,  1968  x  x  x  
said  Act  as  well  as  under  the  Civil  Code  used  to  be  the  subject  of  conflicting   in  the  lower  court,  but  they  set  up  the  defense  that  the  claims  were  filed  under  
decisions.  The  Court  finally  settled  the  matter  in  Floresca  vs.Philex  Mining   the  Workmen’s  Compensation  Act  before  they  learned  of  the  official  report  of  
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Corporation,  which  involved  a  cave-­‐in  resulting  in  the  death  of  the  employees   the  committee  created  to  investigate  the  accident  which  established  the  criminal  
of  the  Philex  Mining  Corporation.  Alleging  that  the  mining  corporation,  in   negligence  and  violation  of  law  by  Philex,  and  which  report  was  forwarded  by  the  
violation  of  government  rules  and  regulations,  failed  to  take  the  required   Director  of  Mines  to  then  Executive  Secretary  Rafael  Salas  in  a  letter  dated  
precautions  for  the  protection  of  the  employees,  the  heirs  of  the  deceased   October  19,  1967  only  x  x  x.  
employees  filed  a  complaint  against  Philex  Mining  in  the  Court  of  First  Instance    
(CFI).  Upon  motion  of  Philex  Mining,  the  CFI  dismissed  the  complaint  for  lack  of   WE  hold  that  although  the  other  petitioners  had  received  the  benefits  under  the  
jurisdiction.  The  heirs  sought  relief  from  this  Court.   Workmen’s  Compensation  Act,  such  my  not  preclude  them  from  bringing  an  
  action  before  the  regular  court  because  they  became  cognizant  of  the  fact  that  
Addressing  the  issue  of  whether  the  heirs  had  a  choice  of  remedies,  majority  of   Philex  has  been  remiss  in  its  contractual  obligations  with  the  deceased  miners  
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the  Court  En  Banc,  following  the  rule  in  Pacaña  vs.  Cebu  Autobus  Company,   only  after  receiving  compensation  under  the  Act.  Had  petitioners  been  aware  of  
held  in  the  affirmative.   said  violation  of  government  rules  and  regulations  by  Philex,  and  of  its  
WE  now  come  to  the  query  as  to  whether  or  not  the  injured  employee  or  his   negligence,  they  would  not  have  sought  redress  under  the  Workmen’s  
heirs  in  case  of  death  have  a  right  of  selection  or  choice  of  action  between   Compensation  Commission  which  awarded  a  lesser  amount  for  compensation.  
availing  themselves  of  the  worker’s  right  under  the  Workmen’s  Compensation   The  choice  of  the  first  remedy  was  based  on  ignorance  or  a  mistake  of  fact,  which  
Act  and  suing  in  the  regular  courts  under  the  Civil  Code  for  higher  damages   nullifies  the  choice  as  it  was  not  an  intelligent  choice.  The  case  should  therefore  
(actual,  moral  and  exemplary)  from  the  employers  by  virtue  of  the  negligence  or   be  remanded  to  the  lower  court  for  further  proceedings.  However,  should  the  
petitioners  be  successful  in  their  bid  before  the  lower  court,  the  payments  made   police  investigators  which  appellee  may  not  have  even  known.  This  may  explain  
under  the  Workmen’s  Compensation  Act  should  be  deducted  from  the  damages   why  no  complainant  is  mentioned  in  the  preliminary  statement  of  the  public  
that  may  be  decreed  in  their  favor.  [Underscoring  supplied.]   prosecutor  in  her  memorandum  dated  February  6,  1991,  to  wit:  "Respondent  
  Ferdinand  Fabro  x  x  x  are  being  charged  by  complainant  of  "Simple  Negligence  
The  ruling  in  Floresca  providing  the  claimant  a  choice  of  remedies  was  reiterated   Resulting  to  Homicide."  It  is  also  possible  that  the  appellee  did  not  have  a  chance  
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in  Ysmael  Maritime  Corporation  vs.  Avelino,  Vda.  De  Severo  vs.  Feliciano-­‐Go,   to  appear  before  the  public  prosecutor  as  can  be  inferred  from  the  following  
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and  Marcopper  Mining  Corp.  vs.  Abeleda.  In  the  last  case,  the  Court  again   statement  in  said  memorandum:  "Respondents  who  were  notified  pursuant  to  
recognized  that  a  claimant  who  had  been  paid  under  the  Act  could  still  sue  under   Law  waived  their  rights  to  present  controverting  evidence,"  thus  there  was  no  
the  Civil  Code.  The  Court  said:   reason  for  the  public  prosecutor  to  summon  the  appellee.  Hence,  notice  of  
  appellant’s  negligence  cannot  be  imputed  on  appellee  before  she  applied  for  
In  the  Robles  case,  it  was  held  that  claims  for  damages  sustained  by  workers  in   death  benefits  under  ECC  or  before  she  received  the  first  payment  therefrom.  
the  course  of  their  employment  could  be  filed  only  under  the  Workmen’s   Her  using  the  police  investigation  report  to  support  her  complaint  filed  on  May  9,  
Compensation  Law,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  further  claims  under  other  laws.  In   1991  may  just  be  an  afterthought  after  receiving  a  copy  of  the  February  6,  1991  
Floresca,  this  doctrine  was  abrogated  in  favor  of  the  new  rule  that  the  claimants   Memorandum  of  the  Prosecutor’s  Office  dismissing  the  criminal  complaint  for  
may  invoke  either  the  Workmen’s  Compensation  Act  or  the  provisions  of  the  Civil   insufficiency  of  evidence,  stating  therein  that:  "The  death  of  the  victim  is  not  
Code,  subject  to  the  consequence  that  the  choice  of  one  remedy  will  exclude  the   attributable  to  any  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  respondents.  If  at  all  and  as  
other  and  that  the  acceptance  of  compensation  under  the  remedy  chosen  will   shown  by  the  records  this  case  is  civil  in  nature."  (Underscoring  supplied.)  
preclude  a  claim  for  additional  benefits  under  the  other  remedy.  The  exception  is   Considering  the  foregoing,  We  are  more  inclined  to  believe  appellee’s  allegation  
where  a  claimant  who  has  already  been  paid  under  the  Workmen’s   that  she  learned  about  appellant’s  negligence  only  after  she  applied  for  and  
Compensation  Act  may  still  sue  for  damages  under  the  Civil  Code  on  the  basis  of   received  the  benefits  under  ECC.  This  is  a  mistake  of  fact  that  will  make  this  case  
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supervening  facts  or  developments  occurring  after  he  opted  for  the  first  remedy.   fall  under  the  exception  held  in  the  Floresca  ruling.  
(Underscoring  supplied.)    
  The  CA  further  held  that  not  only  was  private  respondent  ignorant  of  the  facts,  
Here,  the  CA  held  that  private  respondent’s  case  came  under  the  exception   but  of  her  rights  as  well:  
because  private  respondent  was  unaware  of  petitioner’s  negligence  when  she    
filed  her  claim  for  death  benefits  from  the  State  Insurance  Fund.  Private   x  x  x.  Appellee  [Maria  Juego]  testified  that  she  has  reached  only  elementary  
respondent  filed  the  civil  complaint  for  damages  after  she  received  a  copy  of  the   school  for  her  educational  attainment;  that  she  did  not  know  what  damages  
police  investigation  report  and  the  Prosecutor’s  Memorandum  dismissing  the   could  be  recovered  from  the  death  of  her  husband;  and  that  she  did  not  know  
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criminal  complaint  against  petitioner’s  personnel.  While  stating  that  there  was   that  she  may  also  recover  more  from  the  Civil  Code  than  from  the  ECC.  x  x  x.  
no  negligence  attributable  to  the  respondents  in  the  complaint,  the  prosecutor    
nevertheless  noted  in  the  Memorandum  that,  "if  at  all,"  the  "case  is  civil  in   Petitioner  impugns  the  foregoing  rulings.  It  contends  that  private  respondent  
nature."  The  CA  thus  applied  the  exception  in  Floresca:   "failed  to  allege  in  her  complaint  that  her  application  and  receipt  of  benefits  
  from  the  ECC  were  attended  by  ignorance  or  mistake  of  fact.  Not  being  an  issue  
x  x  x  We  do  not  agree  that  appellee  has  knowledge  of  the  alleged  negligence  of   submitted  during  the  trial,  the  trial  court  had  no  authority  to  hear  or  adjudicate  
appellant  as  early  as  November  25,  1990,  the  date  of  the  police  investigator’s   that  issue."  
report.  The  appellee  merely  executed  her  sworn  statement  before  the  police    
investigator  concerning  her  personal  circumstances,  her  relation  to  the  victim,   Petitioner  also  claims  that  private  respondent  could  not  have  been  ignorant  of  
and  her  knowledge  of  the  accident.  She  did  not  file  the  complaint  for  "Simple   the  facts  because  as  early  as  November  28,  1990,  private  respondent  was  the  
Negligence  Resulting  to  Homicide"  against  appellant’s  employees.  It  was  the   complainant  in  a  criminal  complaint  for  "Simple  Negligence  Resulting  to  
investigator  who  recommended  the  filing  of  said  case  and  his  supervisor  referred   Homicide"  against  petitioner’s  employees.  On  February  6,  1991,  two  months  
the  same  to  the  prosecutor’s  office.  This  is  a  standard  operating  procedure  for   before  the  filing  of  the  action  in  the  lower  court,  Prosecutor  Lorna  Lee  issued  a  
resolution  finding  that,  although  there  was  insufficient  evidence  against   That  lack  of  knowledge  of  a  fact  that  nullifies  the  election  of  a  remedy  is  the  basis  
petitioner’s  employees,  the  case  was  "civil  in  nature."  These  purportedly  show   for  the  exception  in  Floresca.  
that  prior  to  her  receipt  of  death  benefits  from  the  ECC  on  January  2,  1991  and    
every  month  thereafter,  private  respondent  also  knew  of  the  two  choices  of   It  is  in  light  of  the  foregoing  principles  that  we  address  petitioner’s  contentions.  
remedies  available  to  her  and  yet  she  chose  to  claim  and  receive  the  benefits    
from  the  ECC.   Waiver  is  a  defense,  and  it  was  not  incumbent  upon  private  respondent,  as  
  plaintiff,  to  allege  in  her  complaint  that  she  had  availed  of  benefits  from  the  ECC.  
When  a  party  having  knowledge  of  the  facts  makes  an  election  between   It  is,  thus,  erroneous  for  petitioner  to  burden  private  respondent  with  raising  
inconsistent  remedies,  the  election  is  final  and  bars  any  action,  suit,  or   waiver  as  an  issue.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  the  defendant  who  ought  to  plead  
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proceeding  inconsistent  with  the  elected  remedy,  in  the  absence  of  fraud  by  the   waiver,  as  petitioner  did  in  pages  2-­‐3  of  its  Answer;  otherwise,  the  defense  is  
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other  party.  The  first  act  of  election  acts  as  a  bar.  Equitable  in  nature,  the   waived.  It  is,  therefore,  perplexing  for  petitioner  to  now  contend  that  the  trial  
doctrine  of  election  of  remedies  is  designed  to  mitigate  possible  unfairness  to   court  had  no  jurisdiction  over  the  issue  when  petitioner  itself  pleaded  waiver  in  
both  parties.  It  rests  on  the  moral  premise  that  it  is  fair  to  hold  people   the  proceedings  before  the  trial  court.  
responsible  for  their  choices.  The  purpose  of  the  doctrine  is  not  to  prevent  any    
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recourse  to  any  remedy,  but  to  prevent  a  double  redress  for  a  single  wrong.   Does  the  evidence  show  that  private  respondent  knew  of  the  facts  that  led  to  her  
  husband’s  death  and  the  rights  pertaining  to  a  choice  of  remedies?  
The  choice  of  a  party  between  inconsistent  remedies  results  in  a  waiver  by    
election.  Hence,  the  rule  in  Floresca  that  a  claimant  cannot  simultaneously   It  bears  stressing  that  what  negates  waiver  is  lack  of  knowledge  or  a  mistake  of  
pursue  recovery  under  the  Labor  Code  and  prosecute  an  ordinary  course  of   fact.  In  this  case,  the  "fact"  that  served  as  a  basis  for  nullifying  the  waiver  is  the  
action  under  the  Civil  Code.  The  claimant,  by  his  choice  of  one  remedy,  is   negligence  of  petitioner’s  employees,  of  which  private  respondent  purportedly  
deemed  to  have  waived  the  other.   learned  only  after  the  prosecutor  issued  a  resolution  stating  that  there  may  be  
  civil  liability.  In  Floresca,  it  was  the  negligence  of  the  mining  corporation  and  its  
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Waiver  is  the  intentional  relinquishment  of  a  known  right.   violation  of  government  rules  and  regulations.  Negligence,  or  violation  of  
  government  rules  and  regulations,  for  that  matter,  however,  is  not  a  fact,  but  a  
[It]  is  an  act  of  understanding  that  presupposes  that  a  party  has  knowledge  of  its   conclusion  of  law,  over  which  only  the  courts  have  the  final  say.  Such  a  
rights,  but  chooses  not  to  assert  them.  It  must  be  generally  shown  by  the  party   conclusion  binds  no  one  until  the  courts  have  decreed  so.  It  appears,  therefore,  
claiming  a  waiver  that  the  person  against  whom  the  waiver  is  asserted  had  at  the   that  the  principle  that  ignorance  or  mistake  of  fact  nullifies  a  waiver  has  been  
time  knowledge,  actual  or  constructive,  of  the  existence  of  the  party’s  rights  or  of   misapplied  in  Floresca  and  in  the  case  at  bar.  
all  material  facts  upon  which  they  depended.  Where  one  lacks  knowledge  of  a    
right,  there  is  no  basis  upon  which  waiver  of  it  can  rest.  Ignorance  of  a  material   In  any  event,  there  is  no  proof  that  private  respondent  knew  that  her  husband  
fact  negates  waiver,  and  waiver  cannot  be  established  by  a  consent  given  under  a   died  in  the  elevator  crash  when  on  November  15,  1990  she  accomplished  her  
mistake  or  misapprehension  of  fact.   application  for  benefits  from  the  ECC.  The  police  investigation  report  is  dated  
  November  25,  1990,  10  days  after  the  accomplishment  of  the  form.  Petitioner  
A  person  makes  a  knowing  and  intelligent  waiver  when  that  person  knows  that  a   filed  the  application  in  her  behalf  on  November  27,  1990.  
right  exists  and  has  adequate  knowledge  upon  which  to  make  an  intelligent    
decision.   There  is  also  no  showing  that  private  respondent  knew  of  the  remedies  available  
  to  her  when  the  claim  before  the  ECC  was  filed.  On  the  contrary,  private  
Waiver  requires  a  knowledge  of  the  facts  basic  to  the  exercise  of  the  right   respondent  testified  that  she  was  not  aware  of  her  rights.  
waived,  with  an  awareness  of  its  consequences.  That  a  waiver  is  made  knowingly    
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and  intelligently  must  be  illustrated  on  the  record  or  by  the  evidence.   Petitioner,  though,  argues  that  under  Article  3  of  the  Civil  Code,  ignorance  of  the  
  law  excuses  no  one  from  compliance  therewith.  As  judicial  decisions  applying  or  
interpreting  the  laws  or  the  Constitution  form  part  of  the  Philippine  legal  system   MAGNO,  and  the  COURT  OF  APPEALS  (Second  Division),  Respondents.  
(Article  8,  Civil  Code),  private  respondent  cannot  claim  ignorance  of  this  Court’s  
ruling  in  Floresca  allowing  a  choice  of  remedies.      
  D  E  C  I  S  I  O  N  
The  argument  has  no  merit.  The  application  of  Article  3  is  limited  to  mandatory  
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and  prohibitory  laws.  This  may  be  deduced  from  the  language  of  the  provision,   MONTEMAYOR,  J.:  
which,  notwithstanding  a  person’s  ignorance,  does  not  excuse  his  or  her  
compliance  with  the  laws.  The  rule  in  Floresca  allowing  private  respondent  a   On  August  22,  1950,  Efren  Magno  went  to  the  3-­‐story  house  of  Antonio  Peñaloza,  
choice  of  remedies  is  neither  mandatory  nor  prohibitory.  Accordingly,  her   his  stepbrother,  located  on  Rodriguez  Lanuza  Street,  Manila,  to  repair  a  “media  
ignorance  thereof  cannot  be  held  against  her.   agua”  said  to  be  in  a  leaking  condition.  The  “media  agua”  was  just  below  the  
  window  of  the  third  story.  Standing  on  said  “media  agua”,  Magno  received  from  
Finally,  the  Court  modifies  the  affirmance  of  the  award  of  damages.  The  records   his  son  thru  that  window  a  3’  X  6’  galvanized  iron  sheet  to  cover  the  leaking  
do  not  indicate  the  total  amount  private  respondent  ought  to  receive  from  the   portion,  turned  around  and  in  doing  so  the  lower  end  of  the  iron  sheet  came  into  
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ECC,  although  it  appears  from  Exhibit  "K"  that  she  received  P3,581.85  as  initial   contact  with  the  electric  wire  of  the  Manila  Electric  Company  (later  referred  to  as  
payment  representing  the  accrued  pension  from  November  1990  to  March  1991.   the  Company)  strung  parallel  to  the  edge  of  the  “media  agua”  and  2  1/2  feet  
Her  initial  monthly  pension,  according  to  the  same  Exhibit  "K,"  was  P596.97  and   from  it,  causing  his  death  by  electrocution.  His  widow  and  children  fled  suit  to  
present  total  monthly  pension  was  P716.40.  Whether  the  total  amount  she  will   recover  damages  from  the  company.  After  hearing,  the  trial  court  rendered  
eventually  receive  from  the  ECC  is  less  than  the  sum  of  P644,000.00  in  total   judgment  in  their  favor  —  P10,000  as  compensatory  damages;  chan  
damages  awarded  by  the  trial  court  is  subject  to  speculation,  and  the  case  is   roblesvirtualawlibraryP784  as  actual  damages;  chan  roblesvirtualawlibraryP2,000  
remanded  to  the  trial  court  for  such  determination.  Should  the  trial  court  find   as  moral  and  exemplary  damages;  chan  roblesvirtualawlibraryand  P3,000  as  
that  its  award  is  greater  than  that  of  the  ECC,  payments  already  received  by   attorney’s  fees,  with  costs.  On  appeal  to  the  Court  of  Appeals,  the  latter  affirmed  
private  respondent  under  the  Labor  Code  shall  be  deducted  from  the  trial  court'’   the  judgment  with  slight  modification  by  reducing  the  attorney’s  fees  from  
award  of  damages.  Consistent  with  our  ruling  in  Floresca,  this  adjudication  aims   P3,000  to  P1,000  with  costs.  The  electric  company  has  appealed  said  decision  to  
to  prevent  double  compensation.   us.  
  The  findings  of  fact  made  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  which  are  conclusive  are  stated  
WHEREFORE,  the  case  is  REMANDED  to  the  Regional  Trial  Court  of  Pasig  City  to   in  the  following  portions  of  its  decision  which  we  reproduce  
determine  whether  the  award  decreed  in  its  decision  is  more  than  that  of  the   below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary  
ECC.  Should  the  award  decreed  by  the  trial  court  be  greater  than  that  awarded  
by  the  ECC,  payments  already  made  to  private  respondent  pursuant  to  the  Labor   “The  electric  wire  in  question  was  an  exposed,  uninsulated  primary  wire  
Code  shall  be  deducted  therefrom.  In  all  other  respects,  the  Decision  of  the  Court   stretched  between  poles  on  the  street  and  carrying  a  charge  of  3,600  volts.  It  was  
of  Appeals  is  AFFIRMED.   installed  there  some  two  years  before  Peñaloza’s  house  was  constructed.  The  
  record  shows  that  during  the  construction  of  said  house  a  similar  incident  took  
SO  ORDERED.   place,  although  fortunate]y  with  much  less  tragic  consequences.  A  piece  of  wood  
  which  a  carpenter  was  holding  happened  to  come  in  contact  with  the  same  wire,  
Davide,  Jr.,  Puno,  Pardo,  and  Ynares-­‐Santiago,  JJ.,  concur.   producing  some  sparks.  The  owner  of  the  house  forthwith  complained  to  
  Defendant  about  the  danger  which  the  wire  presented,  and  as  a  result  Defendant  
[G.R.  No.  L-­‐8328.    May  18,  1956.]   moved  one  end  of  the  wire  farther  from  the  house  by  means  of  a  brace,  but  left  
the  other  end  where  it  was.  
MANILA  ELECTRIC  COMPANY,  Petitioner,  vs.  SOTERO  REMOQUILLO,  in  his  own  
behalf  and  as  guardian  of  the  minors  MANUEL,  BENJAMIN,  NESTOR,   “At  any  rate,  as  revealed  by  the  ocular  inspection  of  the  premises  ordered  by  the  
MILAGROS,  CORAZON,  CLEMENTE  and  AURORA,  all  surnamed  MAGNO,  SALUD   trial  court,  the  distance  from  the  electric  wire  to  the  edge  of  the  ‘media  agua’  on  
which  the  deceased  was  making  repairs  was  only  30  inches  or  2  1/2  feet.   chan  roblesvirtualawlibrarythat  negligence  cannot  be  determined  by  a  simple  
Regulations  of  the  City  of  Manila  required  that  ‘all  wires  be  kept  three  feet  from   matter  of  inches;  chan  roblesvirtualawlibrarythat  all  that  the  city  did  was  to  
the  building.’  Appellant  contends  that  in  applying  said  regulations  to  the  case  at   prescribe  certain  minimum  conditions  and  that  just  because  the  ordinance  
bar  the  reckoning  should  not  be  from  the  edge  of  the  ‘media  agua’  but  from  the   required  that  primary  electric  wires  should  be  not  less  than  3  feet  from  any  
side  of  the  house  and  that,  thus  measured,  the  distance  was  almost  7  feet,  or   house,  the  obligation  of  due  diligence  is  not  fulfilled  by  placing  such  wires  at  a  
more  then  the  minimum  prescribed.  This  contention  is  manifestly  groundless,  for   distance  of  3  feet  and  one  inch,  regardless  of  other  factors.  The  appellate  court,  
not  only  is  a  ‘media  agua’  an  integral  part  of  the  building  to  which  it  is  attached   however,  refrained  from  stating  or  suggesting  what  other  precautionary  
but  to  exclude  it  in  measuring  the  distance  would  defeat  the  purpose  of  the   measures  could  and  should  have  been  adopted.  
regulation.  Appellant  points  out,  nevertheless,  that  even  assuming  that  the  
distance,  within  the  meaning  of  the  city  regulations,  should  be  measured  from   After  a  careful  study  and  discussion  of  the  case  and  the  circumstances  
the  edge  of  the  ‘media  agua’,  the  fact  that  in  the  case  of  the  house  involved   surrounding  the  same,  we  are  inclined  to  agree  to  the  contention  of  Petitioner  
herein  such  distance  was  actually  less  than  3  feet  was  due  to  the  fault  of  the   Company  that  the  death  of  Magno  was  primarily  caused  by  his  own  negligence  
owner  of  said  house,  because  the  city  authorities  gave  him  a  permit  to  construct   and  in  some  measure  by  the  too  close  proximity  of  the  “media  agua”  or  rather  its  
a  ‘media  agua’  only  one  meter  or  39  1/2  inches  wide,  but  instead  he  built  one   edge  to  the  electric  wire  of  the  company  by  reason  of  the  violation  of  the  original  
having  a  width  of  65  3/4  inches,  17  3/8  inches  more  than  the  width  permitted  by   permit  given  by  the  city  and  the  subsequent  approval  of  said  illegal  construction  
the  authorities,  thereby  reducing  the  distance  to  the  electric  wire  to  less  than  the   of  the  “media  agua”.  We  fail  to  see  how  the  Company  could  be  held  guilty  of  
prescribed  minimum  of  3  feet.   negligence  or  as  lacking  in  due  diligence.  Although  the  city  ordinance  called  for  a  
distance  of  3  feet  of  its  wires  from  any  building,  there  was  actually  a  distance  of  7  
“It  is  a  fact  that  the  owner  of  the  house  exceeded  the  limit  fixed  in  the  permit   feet  and  2  3/4  inches  of  the  wires  from  the  side  of  the  house  of  Peñaloza.  Even  
given  to  him  by  the  city  authorities  for  the  construction  of  the  ‘media  agua’,  and   considering  said  regulation  distance  of  3  feet  as  referring  not  to  the  side  of  a  
that  if  he  had  not  done  so  Appellants  wire  would  have  been  11  3/8  (inches)  more   building,  but  to  any  projecting  part  thereof,  such  as  a  “media  agua”,  had  the  
than  the  required  distance  of  three  feet  from  the  edge  of  the  ‘media  agua’.  It  is   house  owner  followed  the  terms  of  the  permit  given  him  by  the  city  for  the  
also  a  fact,  however,  that  after  the  ‘media  agua’  was  constructed  the  owner  was   construction  of  his  “media  agua”,  namely,  one  meter  or  39  3/8  inches  wide,  the  
given  a  final  permit  of  occupancy  of  the  house  cralaw  .   distance  from  the  wires  to  the  edge  of  said  “media  agua”  would  have  been  3  feet  
and  11  3/8  inches.  In  fixing  said  one  meter  width  for  the  “media  agua”  the  city  
“  cralaw  The  wire  was  an  exposed,  high  tension  wire  carrying  a  load  of  3,600   authorities  must  have  wanted  to  preserve  the  distance  of  at  least  3  feet  between  
volts.  There  was,  according  to  Appellant,  no  insulation  that  could  have  rendered   the  wires  and  any  portion  of  a  building.  Unfortunately,  however,  the  house  
it  safe,  first,  because  there  is  no  insulation  material  in  commercial  use  for  such   owner  disregarding  the  permit,  exceeded  the  one  meter  fixed  by  the  same  by  17  
kind  of  wire;  chan  roblesvirtualawlibraryand  secondly,  because  the  only   3/8  inches  and  leaving  only  a  distance  of  2  1/2  feet  between  the  “Media  agua”  as  
insulation  material  that  may  be  effective  is  still  in  the  experimental  stage  of   illegally  constructed  and  the  electric  wires.  And  added  to  this  violation  of  the  
development  and,  anyway,  its  costs  would  be  prohibitive…  ”   permit  by  the  house  owner,  was  its  approval  by  the  city  through  its  agent,  
The  theory  followed  by  the  appellate  court  in  finding  for  the  Plaintiff  is  that   possibly  an  inspector.  Surely  we  cannot  lay  these  serious  violations  of  a  city  
although  the  owner  of  the  house  in  constructing  the  “media  agua”  in  question   ordinance  and  permit  at  the  door  of  the  Company,  guiltless  of  breach  of  any  
exceeded  the  limits  fixed  in  the  permit,  still,  after  making  that  “media  agua”,  its   ordinance  or  regulation.  The  Company  cannot  be  expected  to  be  always  on  the  
construction  though  illegal,  was  finally  approved  because  he  was  given  a  final   lookout  for  any  illegal  construction  which  reduces  the  distance  between  its  wires  
permit  to  occupy  the  house;  chan  roblesvirtualawlibrarythat  it  was  the  company   and  said  construction,  and  after  finding  that  said  distance  of  3  feet  had  been  
that  was  at  fault  and  was  guilty  of  negligence  because  although  the  electric  wire   reduced,  to  change  the  stringing  or  installation  of  its  wires  so  as  to  preserve  said  
in  question  had  been  installed  long  before  the  construction  of  the  house  and  in   distance.  It  would  be  much  easier  for  the  City,  or  rather  it  is  its  duty,  to  be  ever  
accordance  with  the  ordinance  fixing  a  minimum  of  3  feet,  mere  compliance  with   on  the  alert  and  to  see  to  it  that  its  ordinances  are  strictly  followed  by  house  
the  regulations  does  not  satisfy  the  requirement  of  due  diligence  nor  avoid  the   owners  and  to  condemn  or  disapprove  all  illegal  constructions.  Of  course,  in  the  
need  for  adopting  such  other  precautionary  measures  as  may  be  warranted;   present  case,  the  violation  of  the  permit  for  the  construction  of  the  “media  agua”  
was  not  the  direct  cause  of  the  accident.  It  merely  contributed  to  it.  Had  said   grasped  the  electric  wire  and  was  electrocuted.  The  person  electrocuted  in  said  
“media  agua”  been  only  one  meter  wide  as  allowed  by  the  permit,  Magno   case  was  a  boy  who  was  in  no  position  to  realize  the  danger.  In  the  present  case,  
standing  on  it,  would  instinctively  have  stayed  closer  to  or  hugged  the  side  of  the   however,  the  wires  were  well  high  over  the  street  where  there  was  no  possible  
house  in  order  to  keep  a  safe  margin  between  the  edge  of  the  “media  agua”  and   danger  to  pedestrians.  The  only  possible  danger  was  to  persons  standing  on  the  
the  yawning  2-­‐story  distance  or  height  from  the  ground,  and  possibly  if  not   “media  agua”,  but  a  “media  agua”  can  hardly  be  considered  a  public  place  where  
probably  avoided  the  fatal  contact  between  the  lower  end  of  the  iron  sheet  and   persons  usually  gather.  Moreover,  a  person  standing  on  the  “media  agua”  could  
the  wires.   not  have  reached  the  wires  with  his  hands  alone.  It  was  necessary  as  was  done  
by  Magno  to  hold  something  long  enough  to  reach  the  wire.  Furthermore,  
We  realize  that  the  presence  of  the  wires  in  question  quite  close  to  the  house  or   Magno  was  not  a  boy  or  a  person  immature  but  the  father  of  a  family,  
its  “media  agua”  was  always  a  source  of  danger  considering  their  high  voltage   supposedly  a  tinsmith  trained  and  experienced  in  the  repair  of  galvanized  iron  
and  uninsulated  as  they  were,  but  the  claim  of  the  company  and  the  reasons   roofs  and  “media  agua”.  Moreover,  in  that  very  case  of  Astudillo  vs.  Manila  
given  by  it  for  not  insulating  said  wires  were  unrefuted  as  we  gather  from  the   Electric  Co.,  supra,  the  court  said  that  although  it  is  a  well-­‐  established  rule  that  
findings  of  the  Court  of  Appeals,  and  so  we  have  to  accept  them  as  satisfactory.   the  liability  of  electric  companies  for  damages  or  personal  injuries  is  governed  by  
Consequently,  we  may  not  hold  said  company  as  guilty  of  negligence  or  wanting   the  rules  of  negligence,  nevertheless  such  companies  are  not  insurers  of  the  
in  due  diligence  in  failing  to  insulate  said  wires.  As  to  their  proximity  to  the  house   safety  of  the  public.  
it  is  to  be  supposed  that  distance  of  3  feet  was  considered  sufficiently  safe  by  the  
technical  men  of  the  city  such  as  its  electrician  or  engineer.  Of  course,  a  greater   But  even  assuming  for  a  moment  that  under  the  facts  of  the  present  case  the  
distance  of  say  6  feet  or  12  feet  would  have  increased  the  margin  of  safety  but   Defendant  electric  company  could  be  considered  negligent  in  installing  its  electric  
other  factors  had  to  be  considered  such  as  that  the  wires  could  not  be  strung  or   wires  so  close  to  the  house  and  “media  agua”  in  question,  and  in  failing  to  
the  posts  supporting  them  could  not  be  located  too  far  toward  the  middle  of  the   properly  insulate  those  wires  (although  according  to  the  unrefuted  claim  of  said  
street.  Thus,  the  real  cause  of  the  accident  or  death  was  the  reckless  or  negligent   company  it  was  impossible  to  make  the  insulation  of  that  kind  of  wire),  
act  of  Magno  himself.  When  he  was  called  by  his  stepbrother  to  repair  the   nevertheless  to  hold  the  Defendant  liable  in  damages  for  the  death  of  Magno,  
“media  agua”  just  below  the  third  story  window,  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  due  to   such  supposed  negligence  of  the  company  must  have  been  the  proximate  and  
his  age  and  experience  he  was  qualified  to  do  so.  Perhaps  he  was  a  tinsmith  or   principal  cause  of  the  accident,  because  if  the  act  of  Magno  in  turning  around  
carpenter  and  had  training  and  experience  for  the  job.  So,  he  could  not  have   and  swinging  the  galvanized  iron  sheet  with  his  hands  was  the  proximate  and  
been  entirely  a  stranger  to  electric  wires  and  the  danger  lurking  in  them.  But   principal  cause  of  the  electrocution,  then  his  heirs  may  not  recover.  Such  was  the  
unfortunately,  in  the  instant  care,  his  training  and  experience  failed  him,  and   holding  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Taylor  vs.  Manila  Electric  Railroad  and  Light  
forgetting  where  he  was  standing,  holding  the  6-­‐feet  iron  sheet  with  both  hands   Company,  16  Phil.,  8.  In  that  case,  the  electric  company  was  found  negligent  in  
and  at  arms  length,  evidently  without  looking,  and  throwing  all  prudence  and   leaving  scattered  on  its  premises  fulminating  caps  which  Taylor,  a  15-­‐  year  old  
discretion  to  the  winds,  he  turned  around  swinging  his  arms  with  the  motion  of   boy  found  and  carried  home.  In  the  course  of  experimenting  with  said  
his  body,  thereby  causing  his  own  electrocution.   fulminating  caps,  he  opened  one  of  them,  held  it  out  with  his  hands  while  
another  boy  applied  a  lighted  match  to  it,  causing  it  to  explode  and  injure  one  of  
In  support  of  its  theory  and  holding  that  Defendant-­‐Appellant  was  liable  for   his  eyes  eventually  causing  blindness  in  said  eye.  Said  this  Tribunal  in  denying  
damages  the  Court  of  Appeals  cites  the  case  of  Astudillo  vs.  Manila  Electric  Co.,   recovery  for  the  injury:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary  
55  Phil.,  427.  We  do  not  think  the  case  is  exactly  applicable.  There,  the  premises  
involved  was  that  elevated  portion  or  top  of  the  walls  of  Intramuros,  Manila,  just   “  cralaw,  so  that  while  it  may  be  true  that  these  injuries  would  not  have  been  
above  the  Sta.  Lucia  Gate.  In  the  words  of  the  Court,  it  was  “a  public  place  where   incurred  but  for  the  negligent  act  of  the  Defendant  in  leaving  the  caps  exposed  
persons  come  to  stroll,  to  rest  and  to  enjoy  themselves”.  The  electric  company   on  its  premises,  nevertheless  Plaintiff’s  own  act  was  the  proximate  and  principal  
was  clearly  negligent  in  placing  its  wires  so  near  the  place  that  without  much   cause  of  the  accident  which  inflicted  the  injury.”  
difficulty  or  exertion,  a  person  by  stretching  his  hand  out  could  touch  them.  A  
boy  named  Astudillo,  placing  one  foot  on  a  projection,  reached  out  and  actually   To  us  it  is  clear  that  the  principal  and  proximate  cause  of  the  electrocution  was  
not  the  electric  wire,  evidently  a  remote  cause,  but  rather  the  reckless  and  
negligent  act  of  Magno  in  turning  around  and  swinging  the  galvanized  iron  sheet  
without  taking  any  precaution,  such  as  looking  back  toward  the  street  and  at  the  
wire  to  avoid  its  contacting  said  iron  sheet,  considering  the  latter’s  length  of  6  
feet.  For  a  better  understanding  of  the  rule  on  remote  and  proximate  cause  with  
respect  to  injuries,  we  find  the  following  citation  
helpful:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary  

“A  prior  and  remote  cause  cannot  be  made  the  basis  of  an  action  if  such  remote  
cause  did  nothing  more  than  furnish  the  condition  or  give  rise  to  the  occasion  by  
which  the  injury  was  made  possible,  if  there  intervened  between  such  prior  or  
remote  cause  and  the  injury  a  distinct,  successive,  unrelated,  and  efficient  cause  
of  the  injury,  even  though  such  injury  would  not  have  happened  but  for  such  
condition  or  occasion.  If  no  danger  existed  in  the  condition  except  because  of  the  
independent  cause,  such  condition  was  not  the  proximate  cause.  And  if  an  
independent  negligent  act  or  defective  condition  sets  into  operation  the  
circumstances  which  result  in  injury  because  of  the  prior  defective  condition,  
such  subsequent  act  or  condition  is  the  proximate  cause.”  (45  C.J.  pp.  931-­‐332.).  

We  realize  that  the  stringing  of  wires  of  such  high  voltage  (3,600  volts),  
uninsulated  and  so  close  to  houses  is  a  constant  source  of  danger,  even  death,  
especially  to  persons  who  having  occasion  to  be  near  said  wires,  do  not  adopt  
the  necessary  precautions.  But  may  be,  the  City  of  Manila  authorities  and  the  
electric  company  could  get  together  and  devise  means  of  minimizing  this  danger  
to  the  public.  Just  as  the  establishment  of  pedestrian  lanes  in  city  thoroughfares  
may  greatly  minimize  danger  to  pedestrians  because  drivers  of  motor  vehicles  
may  expect  danger  and  slow  down  or  even  stop  and  take  other  necessary  
precaution  upon  approaching  said  lanes,  so,  a  similar  way  may  possibly  be  found.  
Since  these  high  voltage  wires  cannot  be  properly  insulated  and  at  reasonable  
cost,  they  might  perhaps  be  strung  only  up  to  the  outskirts  of  the  city  where  
there  are  few  houses  and  few  pedestrians  and  there  step-­‐down  to  a  voltage  
where  the  wires  carrying  the  same  to  the  city  could  be  properly  insulated  for  the  
better  protection  of  the  public.  

In  view  of  all  the  foregoing,  the  appealed  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  is  
hereby  reversed  and  the  complaint  filed  against  the  Company  is  hereby  
dismissed.  No  costs.  

Paras,  C.J.,  Bengzon,  Padilla,  Reyes,  A.,  Jugo,  Bautista  Angelo,  Labrador,  
Concepcion,  Reyes,  J.B.L.,  and  Endencia,  JJ.,  concur.