IX. Termination of official relations
It should be noted,
Abandonment
• Salazar v. Mathay 73 SCRA 275
Facts: On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed by the Auditor
General “confidential agent” in the Office of the Auditor General, Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS). Her appointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service. On March 28,
1962 and on February 12, 1965 she was extended another appointment by way of promotion, as
“confidential agent” in the same office.
On March 18, 1966, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor General that her services as
“confidential agent” have been terminated as of the close of office hours on March 31, 1966. On
March 31, 1966, the Auditor General upon favorable recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo,
Auditor of the GSIS issued an appointment to petitioner as Junior Examiner in his office which
was approved by the Commission of Civil Service. On the same day, petitioner assumed the
position.
On December 27, 1966, petitioner wrote the Commissioner of Civil Service requesting that she
be reinstated to her former position as “confidential agent”. However, no action was taken on
said letter. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel the Auditor
General to reinstate her to her former position but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition
without prejudice to her filing the proper action to the Court of First Instance.  FACTS:
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential or not.
(2) Whether or not the services of petitioner as “confidential agent” was validly terminated
on the alleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not, whether or not she could still
be reinstated to said position after accepting the position of Junior Examiner in the
same office.
Held:
(1) The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential. There are two instances
when a position may be considered primarily confidential: (1) When the President
upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Civil Service
Commission) has declared the position to be primarily confidential; or (2) In the
absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the office, there
exists “close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power which insures
freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals
of personal trust or confidential matters of state.” In the case before us, the provision
of Executive Order No. 265, declaring “...confidential agents in the several department
and offices of the Government, unless otherwise directed by the President, to be
primarily confidential” brings within the fold of the aforementioned executive order the
position of confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS, as among those
positions which are primarily confidential.
(2) Yes. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the
termination of her services as confidential agent is in violation of her security of tenure,
primarily confidential positions are excluded from the merit system, and dismissal at
pleasure of officers or employees therein is allowed by the Constitution. This should
not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily confidential
position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power.
however, that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not
“removed” or “dismissed” from office — his term merely “expires,” in much the the
same way as officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for
which he had been appointed or elected, is not and cannot be deemed “removed” or
“dismissed” therefrom, upon the expiration of said term. The main difference between
the former — the primarily confidential officer — and the latter is that the latter's term
is fixed of definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time
of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the
appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the
incumbent. When this even takes place, the latter is not “removed” or “dismissed” from
office — his term has merely “expired.”
But even granting for the sake of argument, that petitioner's position was not primarily
confidential and that therefore her removal from said position for loss of confidence
was in violation of her security of tenure as a civil service employee, yet by her
acceptance of the position of Junior Examiner in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS on
April 1, 1976, she was deemed to have abandoned former position of “confidential
agent” in the same office.
• Dario v. Mison 176 SCRA 84 Impeachable officials
• Pres. Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, providing for the intention of the
President to, “completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive
structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.” Subsequently, Pres.
Aquino promulgated E.O. No. 127, “Reorganizing the Ministry of Finance”, where, in
Sec. 59, it provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs. Pursuant to the
reorganization, Commissioner Misonissued separation notices to a total of 394
officials, including the petitioner, Cesar Dario, in his capacity as Deputy
Commissioner. 
• Thus, Cesar Dario petitioned for reinstatement on the ground that the Provisional
Constitution giving the power to dismiss public officials without cause ended on
February 25, 1987, seeing as the public officials enjoyed security of tenure under the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution. However, respondent
Commissioner Mison contended that Sec. 16, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions)
allows the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs under E.O. No. 127 (authorizing
separation without cause) to continue even after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution – citing the case of Jose v. Arroyo, wherein the Court decided in favor of
a similar notion. Thus, there was no violation of security of tenure.  
• The Civil Service Commission, nevertheless, ordered the reinstatement of the
petitioner. Whereas, the respondent motioned for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Does E.O. No. 127, providing reorganization, allow the “separation” of Dario from
the Bureau of Customs despite his right to security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution?
• HELD: No. The Court held that E.O. No. 127, providing reorganization, does not allow
the “separation” of Dario from the Bureau of Customs despite his right to security of
tenure under the 1987 Constitution. 
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 • In line with this, the Court maintains that reorganization entails that an office is
abolished, thus there actually no separation or dismissal such that these concepts
imply that there is an office to be separated from. However, the Court asserts that,
reorganizations abolishing an office would only be valid if it passes the test of good
faith. A Reorganization carried out in good faith must have for its purpose the
efficiency of both the economy and bureaucracy. In this case, there is lack of good
faith such that there is no showing that legitimate structural changes were made, only
that personnel were reduced. Thus, it cannot be said that it was done by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions. Thus, since there is lack of good faith, there is
no valid reorganization that would allow the “separation” of the petitioners, in keeping
with their security of tenure. The act of reorganization of the Bureau of Customs
dismissing Dario is unconstitutional
Forfeiture
• Larin v. Executive Secretary 280 SCRA 713
FACTS:
• Petitioner Aquilino Larin is the Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, and he also appears to be a co- accused in two criminal cases for violating
Section 268(4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 of R.A. 3019.
Subsequently petitioner was convicted and this was reported to the President, the
then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary by the authority of the president issued Memo
order 164 creating an executive committee to investigate the administrative charges.
The committee required that petitioner filed a position paper with regard to the charges
against him, the petitioner complied, and however his statement was that he cannot
comment on the merits of the case for fear of being cited in contempt by the court.
Petitioner also alleged that the committee doesn’t have any jurisdiction over his
person, that the case cannot be validly filed without violating res judicata, his rights
against double jeopardy and lastly to proceed with the investigation would be
redundant and oppressive against him. While all this is pending, the president issued
an order for the streamlining of BIR, in which case the office of the petitioner was
abolished by the order. His office being abolished, the petitioner was not reinstated as
an assistant commissioner of BIR, instead another Administrative order was issued in
which it stated that he is being dismissed for being guilty of grave misconduct
in connection to the criminal cases filed against him.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the dismissal of the petitioner was valid or not. a. Who has the power
to discipline the petitioner b. Was due process observed c. What is the effect of the
petitioners acquittal in the criminal case d. Does the president have the power to reorganize
BIR e. Was the reorganization done in bad faith.
HELD: The court ruled that the office of the petitioner falls under the category of Career
Executive Service, which is appointed by the president and being a presidential appointee,
it follows that the president have the power to discipline the petitioner. Despite the fact that
the constitution grants the president the power to appoint and the inherent power to
remove, such power is not without limit. Under the Administrative code of 1987, career
services are characterized to have security of tenure, therefore the petitioner is protected
from being willfully removed by the president, the only way that the petitioner can be validly
removed is for a valid cause and in accordance with the procedural due process. According
to the Court it found that, although the procedural due process was followed and complied
with the petitioner was not removed for a valid cause, since to start with the committee was
created to investigate the administrative aspect of the criminal cases being faced by the
petitioner at that time. Now taking into consideration that the petitioner was acquitted from
the criminal cases, the court believes that there is no ground for the administrative case to
continue. It is admitted that criminal cases and administrative cases usually progress
independently, however in this case it was proven in the criminal case that the petitioner
never committed any of the alleged acts, therefore the case for the administrative case was
also terminated, and therefore there is no longer any valid cause for the removal of the
petitioner.
As for the validity of E.O. 132 which reorganized the BIR, the court ruled that the president
has the authority to do so, as seen in the preamble of the E.O. which stated the
legal basis of its issuance. Though it is admitted that the president had the power to
reorganize the BIR, the court stated that such power is not limitless, the reorganization to
be valid must be done in good faith. In the instant case the court found that the
reorganization was done in bad faith or at least there are indications of bad faith, such as
when the E.O. abolished the intelligence and investigation office and at the same time
creating Intelligence and Investigation service to do the same functions of the abolished
office. Most importantly is the non reappointment of the petitioner, the petitioner being a
holder of a career service, should have been prioritized or preferred in appointing people to
new offices created by the reorganization, but in this case the petitioner was never
reappointed instead he was dismissed from service without any separation benefits at all.
The court ruled that the petitioner is reinstated as an assistant commissioner and is entitled
to back wages.
Death
• Malanyaon v. Lising 106 SCRA 237
Facts:
Mayor Pontanal was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
He was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency, and while the case was
pending. The case was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner sought the payment of the Mayor's
salary during his period of suspension pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019 which provides -
should a public officer be convicted by final judgement he shall lose all retirement or gravity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits to which he failed to receive during his suspension. Malanyaon was a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur. He filed an action to declare illegal
the disbursement made by Goleta as Municipal Treasurer to the widow of Mayor Pontanal a
portion of the salary of the late Mayor as such Mayor of such municipality during the period of his
suspension from August 16, 1977 up to November 28, 1979. However, Judge Lising dismissed
the action on the ground that the criminal case against Mayor Pontanal due to his death
amounted to acquittal.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the case due to the death of the accused constitutes
acquittal.
Held: No. It is obvious that the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted". It
means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court is of the
opinion that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case
against the suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to acquittal.
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