##June 05, 2014: Narendra Modi Should Visit Japan ASAP

Narendra Modi should visit Japan as his first trip abroad as prime minister.

Bilateral relations between India and Japan have been on a positive swing since
2000, when former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori’s visit to India
normalized relations after Japan sanctioned India for its 1998 nuclear tests.
More significantly, after the two nations declared their “Strategic Global
Partnership” in 2006 (a declaration made under Abe’s first tenure as prime
minister) economic and security ties between the two countries have grown
rapidly. While the convergence between India and Japan is in part due to the
rise of China and its growing assertiveness towards its interests in the Asia-
Pacific, China at the same time was a limiting factor for India’s United
Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, which feared upsetting China by
making any moves that would be perceived by Beijing as overt encirclement.
Narendra Modi and the BJP, by contrast, see the benefits of growing ever closer
with Tokyo as outweighing the costs of raising suspicions in Beijing.

Even ignoring security issues and the China factor, Modi would do well to
engage Japan early in his tenure as prime minister. India and Japan have a free-
trade agreement in the form of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreement (CEPA) and Japan is a major investor in Indian infrastructure projects
such as the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC). Modi has made
economic growth and good governance a priority for his administration —
enlisting Japan as a reliable partner could only have benefits.

Shinzo Abe, similarly, has much to gain by actively reaching out to Modi and
the BJP. In fact, Modi is precisely the sort of Indian leader that Abe would
admire. Abe is a well-known Indophile.

For Abe, India and Japan are the pegs of an Asian security order that will serve
to keep China in check and promote prosperity along the Asian rimland. Abe
outlined this basic vision in a 2007 speech in India where he pitched Japan as
the guardian of the Pacific and India as the guardian of the Indian Ocean —
their strategic cooperation takes place at the “Confluence of the Two Seas” (the
title of that speech). Abe additionally envisaged India as a peg in his now-
forgotten “Quadrilateral Initiative” that also included Washington and Canberra.
Indeed, Abe hearkened back to this rhetoric in his keynote speech at the
Shangri-La Dialogue this past weekend:

In India, Mr Narendra Modi has become Prime Minister through another free
and fair election. I am absolutely certain that when I welcome Prime Minister
Modi to Tokyo we will successfully confirm that Japan-India cooperation, as
well as trilateral cooperation, including our two countries, will make the
‘confluence of the two seas’ that is the Pacific and the Indian Ocean peaceful
and more prosperous.
Abe’s Shangri-La statements seemed to invite India to join the U.S.-Japan
alliance which is the “cornerstone for regional peace and stability” in his view.
By repeatedly referencing trilateral cooperation, Abe seems keen to bring the
United States and India together as important partners for Japan. Under Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh, Japan, India, and the United States did interface
trilaterally on security matters. Furthermore, the navies of the three nations have
conducted exercises together.

Despite the great deal of strategic convergence between the two leaders and the
strong motives for Modi and Abe to communicate early into the former’s prime
ministerial term, India and Japan have unfinished bilateral business that needs
tending to. While economic ties between the two countries are strong on paper,
Japan’s investment in and trade with India remains woefully under-
capitalized in part owing to India’s relatively investor-unfriendly domestic
policies.

Modi has indicated that he will do all he can to make India more friendly and
accessible for foreign investors, including Japan. On defense matters, India’s
new defense minister, Arun Jaitley, has said that he would place an emphasis on
speeding up India’s lethargic procurement process. To this end, Modi and Abe
could finally conclude the ShinMaywa US-2 sale, which would mark an
important milestone in defense cooperation between the two countries.

By visiting Japan, Modi would let India, Asia, and the world know that he is
serious about India’s ‘Look-East’ Policy, about working with Tokyo to actively
uphold the status quo order in Asia, and about developing India’s strategic
partnership with Japan.

##June 13, 2014: Narendra Modi to Visit Japan in Early July

Narendra Modi will visit Tokyo in early July 2014.

India and Japan have held annual prime ministerial summits since declaring a
Strategic Global Partnership in 2006. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe most
recently visited New Delhi as the chief guest at India’s Republic Day
celebrations in January 2014.

According to the Indian Express, Modi’s agenda in Tokyo will focus primarily on
civil nuclear cooperation — long an outstanding issue in the relatively warm
relationship between India and Japan — and trade. Regarding the latter, Modi is
likely to speak with Abe about the implementation of the 2008 India-Japan
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) which relaxed tariffs
and encouraged more trade between India and Japan. CEPA came into force in
2011 and is expected to result in a major increase in bilateral trade between
India and Japan, which has been woefully under-capitalized given the
economic synergies between the two countries. Given Modi’s interest in
developing India into a trading powerhouse, he would do well to consult with
Abe to ensure that Japan is fully committed to making the most of CEPA.
From the March 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami up until Shinzo Abe’s
election in December 2012, India-Japan relations remained relatively stagnant
despite the huge strategic momentum from CEPA’s entry into force.

Another significant issue that hasn’t been mentioned too widely in press
coverage of India-Japan relations is the pending sale of ShinMaywa US-2
amphibious aircraft from Japan to India. India will purchase 15 of these
aircraft and the deal should be concluded sometime in 2014. Modi’s visit to
Tokyo would be as good a time as any. Once the deal is concluded, India will
become the first country to purchase defense equipment from Japan since
1967 — Japan implemented a self-imposed ban on weapons exports that has
recently been relaxed under Shinzo Abe.

##June 19, 2014: US, India, Japan to Hold Trilateral Naval Exercise
The navies of India, Japan and the United States will conduct a trilateral naval
exercise in the Northern Pacific.

India, the United States, and Japan are gearing up for the next iteration of
the Malabar series of naval exercises.

The exercise is seen as a symbol of growing trilateral security cooperation

between these three democracies.

The exercise has been regarded by China as an attempt at containment by India,

Japan and the United States. Despite China’s participation in the United States’
RIMPAC exercise this year, Malabar continues to be reminder of the burgeoning
cooperation between Asia’s largest democracy and its richest one. For China,
which lacks immediate access to the Indian Ocean and does not enjoy the
immediate access to Pacific sea lines that Japan does, Malabar is a source of
concern.

The first time India and Japan jointly held a naval exercise — along with three
other nations — China issued a formal demarche. That was for Malabar 2007,
which was held in the Bay of Bengal, significantly away from Chinese shores.
That this year’s exercise will take place in the northern Pacific is likely to raise
Beijing’s ire as tensions remain high with Tokyo over disputed islets in the East
China Sea.

China is attempting to reset relations with India following Modi’s election and
will be watching India’s continued strategic convergence with Japan closely.

##July 25, 2014: India, Japan, and the US Hold Joint Naval Exercises
India and Japan inch closer to greater maritime security cooperation.

Japan’s participation, however, is bound to ruffle feathers in China, as it did in

2007 and 2009, the last two times Japan also participated in the Malabar
Exercise. While India is keen on strengthening relations with Japan, it is wary of
being seen as part of an alliance designed to contain China. However, despite
attempts by both countries to improve relations, there are enduring tensions
over an unresolved border dispute. This means that India will continue to
cultivate a closer security relationship with Japan. According to C. Raja Mohan,
a former assistant chief of India’s naval staff, “India is hedging its bets by taking
its relations with both China and Japan forward.”

According to analysts, India’s decision to invite Japan to participate in this year’s

exercises signals a more confident and forceful maritime policy. Additionally, it
shows that India is becoming more open to the idea of collective military
action.

The prevailing belief is that closer cooperation between the navies of Japan,
India, and the U.S. will ensue as a result of these exercises. This assists the U.S.
Pivot to Asia as well as the security preparedness of the Indian and Japanese
navies.

##July 25, 2014: Can India Become a Multilateral Maritime Leader?

In addition to maritime bilateralism, India should expand its multilateral
leadership.
By Ankit Panda

India, Japan, and the United States are set to begin the latest iteration of the
Malabar series of naval exercises. The event is notable for involving three of the
most capable navies from democratic countries that operate in the broader Asia-
Pacific region. The exercise is a source of anxiety for China as it’s a stark
reminder of what Asian waters could look like should its rivals work together to
contain it. In 2007 and 2009, China protested Japan’s participation in what was
originally envisaged as a bilateral exercise between the United States and India.
For India, Malabar represents a step in the right direction. Despite its improving
relations with China on the economic front, it is important for India to invest in
the future of Asia’s maritime security order.

The Malabar exercise itself is not concerned with broad strategic cooperation,
but merely tactical issues, including improving the interoperability of the
participating navies in disaster relief, anti-piracy, humanitarian and other
missions. Indian naval analyst Uday Bhaskar notes that New Delhi’s initiative is
“a reflection of the new strategic environment where there is a degree of unease
in India and elsewhere over Chinese activities.”

Similarly, as China has ramped up its assertive behavior in the East and South
China Seas since 2012, these sorts of multilateral exercises are a good reminder
of the Asian powers that will stand in the way of Chinese attempts to unilaterally
revise the status quo.

Outside of Malabar, India ought to take up the banner of leading multilateral

exercises in the Indian Ocean, its own strategic backyard. As Asia’s second
largest country, India could take the lead in hosting an Indian Ocean exercise in
the vein of the United States’ RIMPAC exercise which takes place biannually in
the Pacific Ocean. If done right, India’s leadership in the Indian Ocean need not
be threatening to China.

This year’s Malabar exercise is an important reminder that India is seeking to

“shape the environment by building collective capability,” as Bhaskar notes.
Indian foreign policy’s legacy of non-alignment continues to have lingering
effects today on the country’s willingness to assertively band together with other
nations. With a combination of deft bilateralism and proactive
multilateralism, however, India can emerge as the sort of guardian of regional
security it deserves to be.

##August 22, 2014: The Abe-Modi Summit Should Be a Signal to China

The two leaders should coordinate on China while increasing economic
cooperation.
By Kunal Singh

The converging geo-political interests of India and Japan in curbing the growing
assertiveness of China in the Asia-Pacific is certainly one of the major factors
binding the two nations together. While the unresolved border dispute between
India and China has continued for more than six decades, a relatively newer
aggressive posture by China vis-à-vis Japan over the ownership of the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea has opened up new opportunities
for cooperation between India and Japan.

India and Japan also share a basic commitment to liberal democratic

governance, which sets them apart from authoritarian China. China also
opposes India and Japan being given permanent seats on the United Nations
Security Council.

In light of these reasons, a joint statement in the upcoming visit has to be high
on rhetoric. The statement will do well to recognise India as a “friend” of Japan,
which will be eligible to reap the benefits of the reinterpretation of Article 9 of
the Japanese Constitution.

The statement should also adopt a mix of subtle and open references to Chinese
claims in both the East China Sea and the Indian territories of Ladakh and
Arunachal Pradesh. The statement should warn against any sort of unilateral
adventurism adopted by any country (read China) to settle territorial disputes.
The joint statement should go a step further to condemn any sort of invasion,
including “cartographic invasion,” a method deftly and routinely adopted by the
Chinese. The statement should also reaffirm the joint demands of India and
Japan to become permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. With John
Kerry reaffirming the U.S. support for Indian Security Council membership,
three of the four largest economies of the world are on board to broaden the
Council’s membership. China should not be allowed to nix the proposal.

The absence of a bitter historical dispute between India and Japan allows Modi
and Abe, two nationalist prime ministers, to increase mutual cooperation. It is
true that the relationship saw a difficult period following the Pokhran nuclear
tests in 1998, with Japan imposing various sanctions on India. The impasse was
later resolved with global reconsideration of India’s security imperatives,
and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori paying a visit to India in 2000.

While the civil nuclear cooperation deal is on the table, efforts should be made
to dramatically increase trade between the two countries. The current trade
volume of $19 billion paints a picture of missed opportunities between the third
and fourth largest economies of the world. India also needs Japan to finance its
ambitious infrastructure projects like railway modernization, highway
construction, the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor and the building of “smart”
cities.

The potential of economic cooperation backed by the convergence of geo-

political interests, lays the foundations of long-term strategic cooperation
between the two countries. Abe in his book Towards a Beautiful Country says,
“It will not be a surprise if in another decade Japan-India relations overtake
Japan-U.S. and Japan-China ties.” While eight years have passed since the book
was published, India-Japan relations have not moved closer to Abe’s vision. If
trade is one indicator, Japan-U.S. ties ($204 billion) and Japan-China ties ($312
billion) are far ahead of Japan-India ties ($19 billion). A correction is in order.
While addressing the joint session of the Indian Parliament in 2007, Abe
said the “Japan-India relationship is blessed with the largest potential for
development of any bilateral relationship anywhere in the world.” Now is the
time to translate those words into action.

##August 22, 2014: Japan and India to Sign ‘Two-Plus-Two’ Dialogue

Mechanism
Plus signs of thawing Sino-Japanese relations. Weekend Japan foreign policy
links.

Additionally, the last “two-plus-two” dialogue Japan conducted resulted in

significant defense deals with Australia. Aside from security, the two sides are
also likely to reach an accord on the “peaceful use of nuclear energy,” which is
required before Japan’s nuclear reactor technology can be exported, and Abe is
expected to try to propose Japan’s bullet train technology for India’s proposed
rail link between Mumbai and Ahmadabad. However, high-speed rail is not
likely a viable option given India’s budget restraints, and the much higher
consumer cost it would entail.

##August 23, 2014: India and Japan Will Deepen Strategic Cooperation at
September Summit
Narendra Modi’s trip to Japan in early September will be one to watch in the
Asia-Pacific this year.

The two countries will formalize a “two-plus-two” bilateral framework between

their defense and foreign ministers allowing for improved strategic
communication.

Currently, India and Japan hold prime ministerial summits every year–a rare
feature in the foreign policy of each country.

India and Japan have come together since 2006 when they signed a Strategic
and Global Partnership. The strategic convergence between the two countries–
one being Asia’s richest democracy and the other its most populous–was largely
precipitated by China’s rise.

In recent years, as Beijing has grown more assertive in its near seas, India and
Japan have concomitantly scaled up their relations.
During September’s summit, expect to see both Modi and Abe come together in
expressing their support for status quo principles governing the use of Asia’s
inner seas, including preserving the freedom of navigation and the safety of vital
sea lanes.
The United States, meanwhile, will be happy to see India and Japan come
together to preserve the existing order in the Asia-Pacific.

Abe is a known Indophile who makes no secret of his deep admiration for India.
He additionally sees India as a pivotal element of an Asian security order
alongside Japan, Australia, and the United States.

##September 02, 2014: Modi-Abe Summit High on Rhetoric, Lagging in

Agreements
Significant nuclear, rail and diplomatic deals have been “pushed forward,” yet
China remains a concern.

While both leaders are keen to play up both their personal relationship and the
size of the cooperation between the two countries, final agreement on key deals
expected from the summit were lacking. While this does not mean the bilateral
meeting was a failure, it does indicate that the two sides have a longer way to
go before deepening their ties into a more strategic relationship. This is
especially noteworthy given how at least indirectly influential China was in
some of the most important aspects of their meeting.

Most of the progress that was made during Monday’s meeting was on the
economic front, as Japanese investors are anxious to enter India’s vast and still
largely underdeveloped market, and India seeks to benefit from Japanese
corporate and government investment in badly needed infrastructure. Abe said
Japan plans to spend 3.5 trillion yen ($33.9 billion) in yen denominated loans
and investments in India over the next five years, according to the Jiji Press. The
funds will be a mixture of private sector investment and official development
assistance to be spent on infrastructure (including rail, roads and industrial
parks), rural development projects and food processing.
India’s decision last month to raise the insurance and defense industry cap on
foreign investment from 26 percent to 49 percent, and plans to allow for
complete foreign ownership of rail enterprises, are very large incentives for
Japanese investment.

While these investment deals are significant, two of the most anticipated and
important (at least for Japan in terms of exporting critical technology) made little
real progress. While a deal on the export of Japanese high-speed rail, or
shinkansen, technology was not realistically expected to be announced, Modi
had been intent on signing a civilian nuclear power pact.

Japan still appears to be apprehensive about India’s desire to reprocess spent

nuclear fuel, something Japan has not previously agreed to with other
countries.

Likewise, while India’s new increase in its defense industry’s investment cap
will be highly enticing to Japan now that it has passed legislation allowing
military exports, no final deal was reached on the export of the Japanese US-2
amphibious aircraft, although both sides said they would continue to work
toward that goal.

The two leaders did agree to hold “regular joint naval exercises with the U.S.,”
as well as committing to upgrading defense ties. However, one of Japan’s most
anticipated deals with India, the so-called “two-plus-two” ministerial
framework failed to materialize, which is an upgraded diplomatic framework in
which the countries’ defense and foreign secretaries meet regularly to discuss
cooperation. Such a framework is important for Japan, and it has one with its
largest allies like the U.S., France and Australia.

The summit was indeed high on rhetoric. Abe referred to their meeting as a
“strategic relationship,” while Modi said that during their talks the two had
decided to “step up the strategic relationship to a ‘special’ strategic
relationship.” Both leaders understand the large economic benefits of a closer
relationship, while mindful of the security component such a heightened
relationship would entail, particularly vis-à-vis China. However, the relationship
with China cuts two ways, particularly with India.

Indeed, while India has its own security issues with China, particularly along its
northern border, those problems are nowhere as intense as those China and
Japan are experiencing. Additionally, India is in much greater need of Chinese
development, beyond the amount that Japan is able to offer. India may choose
in the end to favor Japan in areas like high-speed rail, nuclear technology, and
defense deals, but that favoritism will likely be tempered by India’s need to
work with its much more powerful northern neighbor, particularly when it
comes to investment.

##September 03, 2014: Modi in Japan: Mission Accomplished (For Now)

Modi’s first trip to Japan demonstrates his priorities abroad.

For Modi, this trip to Tokyo is a signal to both his critics and supporters that he
is setting out to do what he said he would during his campaign for prime
minister: lead India’s foreign policy with its economic interests in mind. The
announcement that Japan will commit to investing $34 billion in India’s private
and public sectors represents a significant coup for the Modi government.

In Tokyo, Modi declared, “Just as India is focusing on [a] Look East policy, we
expect a Look at India policy from Japan.” Additionally, in an effort to advertise
India’s value as a choice destination for Japanese investment, Modi assured
Japanese investors that “there is no red tape but red carpet in India. We have
eased off lot[s] of regulations.”

While the $34 billion investment deal — which will finance infrastructure and
other projects in India — received the most attention, Modi and Abe signaled
their intention to accelerate talks on other issues.

Still, with a nod to Beijing’s assertive regional policy, Modi called for India and
Japan to operate as examples of “development, or vikaswaad,” not
“expansionism or vistarwaad.” Strategic and normative issues weren’t entirely
sidelined in the name of fostering closer economic ties.

## September 03, 2014 - Modi, Japan and Diplomatic Balancing

Fresh from an effusive visit to Japan, Modi now needs to balance New Delhi’s
relations with Tokyo and Beijing.

By Nitin A. Gokhale

Although the only reference – and an oblique one at that – to China came from
Modi, the joint statement was dominated by plans to cooperate on security
issues that will have far-reaching implications in Asia. “Everywhere around us,
we see an 18th-century expansionist mind-set: encroaching on another country,
intruding in others’ waters, invading other countries and capturing territory,”
Modi told his Japanese audience without mentioning China.

Prime Minister Abe briefed Prime Minister Modi on Japan’s policy of ‘Proactive
Contribution to Peace’ and Japan’s Cabinet Decision on development of
seamless security legislation.

The joint statement was labeled “Tokyo Declaration for India – Japan Special
Strategic and Global Partnership,” a fact that would not have gone unnoticed in
Beijing. While the fine print of various agreements will be known in due course,
the larger message of Modi’s visit is loud and clear: For the first time India is
willing to throw its lot in with Japan, a known U.S. ally. So far, New Delhi has
refrained from an overt alliance with the U.S. but it has accepted a need to have
closer defense cooperation with both Tokyo and Washington. One early
manifestation of this was the recent trilateral naval cooperation Exercise
Malabar held off the Japan coast in June.

This was a significant departure from the recent past. Since 2007, Japan had
kept away from Exercise Malabar after Beijing had protested in the wake of a
five-nation exercise in the Indian Ocean. But under Abe’s leadership, Japan is
turning many of its defensive policies on their head. The easing of Japan’s
defense exports rules will allow Japanese defense firms to participate in India’s
huge weapons market. An amphibious military aircraft is likely to be one of the
first exports to India. A civil nuclear deal is also progressing well, although
much against Modi’s wishes it could not be clinched during his visit. However,
Japan’s commitment to invest around $34 billion in India’s key infrastructure
projects over the next five years will boost the India-Japan partnership further.

In less than a fortnight after Modi ended his successful Japan trip, Chinese
President Xi Jingping is expected in India. Xi has an ambitious agenda for his
visit. China wants to take full advantage of a pro-business regime under the new
prime minister and raise bilateral trade beyond 100 billion dollars. Economic
partnerships apart, China would want to keep its negotiations on the
contentious border issue going, if only to keep India interested since India is
now being wooed by the world.

The U.S. has already sent three of its cabinet secretaries to India, all before
Modi has even visited America. That visit is due in late September, where he
will hold a summit meeting with President Barack Obama. Clearly, Washington
wants to reboot ties with New Delhi after a downslide in relationship over the
past four years.

Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott has left for Mumbai and New Delhi, and
is expecting to sign a deal to supply uranium to India. Canberra has already
indicated it wants much closer defense cooperation with India.

Modi’s foreign minister Sushma Swaraj has toured Vietnam – one of several of
China’s neighbors that have territorial disputes with Beijing – and Bangladesh to
re-establish India’s primacy in the region. The prime minister has himself
decided to reach out to smaller but important nations in the Indian sub-
continent by visiting Bhutan and Nepal, the two Himalayan countries wedged
between India and China. His decision to call off talks with Pakistan also shows
he is prepared to make a departure from conventional practice. Clearly, Modi is
the international flavor of the season. His challenge will, however, be to
balance competing interests between the U.S., Japan and China even as he
pursues an independent Indian foreign policy based on national interest.
##September 03, 2014: India Must Choose Both China and Japan
India’s ties with Japan cannot come at the cost of its relations with China.
By Sanjay Kumar

Indian foreign policy cannot afford to develop close relations with Japan at the
cost of China. Even though Beijing has traditionally been seen as a rival to India,
India cannot discount the fact that a deeper economic and strategic relationship
with China is a must in order for it to realize its domestic economic interests
and geopolitical vision. This is despite the fact that China is a one-party
Communist state while India is the world’s largest democracy.

Contrary to the popular view that a deeper engagement with Tokyo is important
to balance the rising influence of China in Asia, New Delhi would lose out by
advocating this

Professor Su Hao of CFAU notes: “Yes, I know Japan is trying to woo India and
make it a part of the Western axis which is aimed at containing China, but New
Delhi is known to take an independent stand which suits its larger political and
geopolitical interests.”

Su Hao also underlined the importance of “creating a new Asia which is based
on the shared interest of India and China. Japan is not a voice of larger Asia, [as]
it is closer to the West.”

Considering the history of acrimony and animosity between New Delhi and
Beijing, Japan is seen as a natural ally for India. The case for closer relations
with Japan is further strengthened by Japan’s own rivalry with China in the East
China Sea. However, an entente between Japan and India is not in the interests
of India if aimed at containing China. It will have repercussions at the Sino-
Indian border and inject tension into their relationship and into South Asia as
China might further strengthen its relationships with India’s neighbors.

India cannot remain a prisoner of history forever. The defeat of India at the
hands of China in 1962 cannot remain a cause for permanent distrust. India
itself was also responsible for the war with China.

Many Indian foreign policy hawks suggest that India should develop a strategic
alliance with Japan in order to contain Chinese influence in the region and
block its rising supremacy in Asia. But such a brazen approach will not serve
India’s larger economic and geostrategic interests. India needs China for
economic investment and for stabilizing Afghanistan. Both India and China
have large financial and strategic stakes in Afghanistan.

Later this month, Chinese President Xi Jinping will visit India. This will be a
historic opportunity for India and China to rebuild and strengthen their ties, as
in the 1950s.
##September 04, 2014: How India Can ‘Balance’ Relations with Japan and
China
Decoupling economic issues from strategic issues might be the best way for
New Delhi to keep both Tokyo and Beijing happy.
By Ankit Panda

Both Nitin Gokhale and Sanjay Kumar have cautioned in these pages that as
India deepens its strategic partnership with Japan, it must be careful to consider
its bilateral position vis-a-vis China.

While neither India nor Japan can independently stand against China on most
standard measures of state power, together they form a considerably robust
bulwark for the status quo in the region. For New Delhi, the ideal scenario
would be to maintain positive economic relations with both countries while
deepening security and strategic cooperation with Tokyo and maintaining an
amicable detente with Beijing. In short, New Delhi seeks a positive-sum
outcome with both countries. Achieving this won’t necessarily require
traditional balancing, where New Delhi modifies its behavior to comply with
the preferences of other actors (in this case Beijing). Rather, India’s interests
would be best served by decoupling material and economic questions from
broader strategic and security issues.

“Decoupling” is something that nearly every diplomatically mature state does —

or at least tries to do. Simply put, the term describes the management of
economic relations, including investment, development, and trade agreements,
independent of broader strategic issues. The contemporary relationship between
the United States and China is a good example of a relatively successfully
decoupled bilateral relationship — major strategic issues persist but economic
interdependency is amply developed, resulting in stability and mutual growth.
India would do well to take this diplomatic paradigm to heart when it comes to
interactions with both Beijing and Tokyo.

In broader terms, since the 2006 declaration of a “Strategic and Global

Partnership,” economic and strategic relations have grown at different paces.

Furthermore, what makes decoupling a viable option for New Delhi today is
the recent Chinese “charm offensive” since Modi’s election. Beijing has been
uncharacteristically keen to normalize relations with India, moving away from
the troubling April 2013 border stand-off and other issues. New Delhi would do
well to seize on this Chinese overture, significantly expanding economic
relations between Asia’s two giants. This is easier said than done, however. As
we’ve discussed here at The Diplomat before, the asymmetric nature of the
strategic rivalry between India and China has manifested in a way that is
detrimental for India in terms of its material relations with China. When it
comes to its relations with Beijing, New Delhi finds it almost impossibly difficult
to conduct productive and stoic diplomacy despite the legacy of the 1962 war,
current border disputes, and repeated Chinese slights along the McMahon line.
This must change. This isn’t a call for appeasement or for ignoring the important
differences that continue to persist between these two countries; instead, New
Delhi should conduct economic diplomacy pragmatically and remain vigilant
regarding strategic issues. Xi Jinping’s upcoming visit to India will be important
to watch in this regard.

Ultimately, it should be New Delhi’s goal to establish a state of affairs with

Beijing where economic interdependence is sufficiently high that even if Beijing
should express displeasure over continued India-Japan rapprochement, it would
balk at materially pressuring or sanctioning New Delhi. Given current
circumstances and the apparent dynamism of the new leadership in New Delhi,
this should be a guiding principle of Indian diplomacy towards China. What
would prove detrimental to India’s national interest is an excessive concern with
how its relationship with Tokyo will affect Beijing’s perceptions. This carries the
risk of leading to a scenario where New Delhi grows
increasingly reticent toward Tokyo, and meanders along, leaving the “Strategic
and Global Partnership” woefully under-capitalized.

While Modi’s approach toward Japan is encouraging and largely compliant with
the rubric I’ve laid out, his approach and thinking toward Beijing is less so.
Modi has repeatedly made pointed comments about Chinese expansionism,
including during his trip to Japan. Additionally, his government has
demonstrated a propensity to go tit-for-tat with Beijing on certain sensitive
issues, including border disputes. As I noted above, we’ll learn more about
Modi’s intentions for China during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s highly
anticipated trip to India this month. Beijing has already begun to decouple its
approach to India, emphasizing the room for positive-sum cooperation between
the two countries. New Delhi should embrace this opportunity.

Discussing economics first and all other issues second will give India the
diplomatic latitude it needs to appropriately nurture its partnership with Japan
while capitalizing on all that China has to offer.

##September 05, 2014: Rebalancing India’s Maritime Posture in the Indo-

Pacific
India could help maintain strategic equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific, if it is
prepared to broaden its thinking.
By Abhijit Singh

Following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s successful visit to Japan, New Delhi
and Tokyo have upgraded their relationship to a “Special Strategic and Global
Partnership.”
Following last month’s commissioning of two indigenous warships –
Kolkata and Kamorta – most commentary in the Indian media focused on the
Indian Navy’s role as “protector” of India’s economic interests in the Indian
Ocean. The generous references to the navy’s contribution in ensuring the safety
of maritime trade and the protection of India’s offshore energy interests, seemed
driven by a deep concern for the security of the sea-lines of communication
(SLOCs) in the IOR.

The growing emphasis on the Indian Navy’s economic-security role, though

well-intentioned, appeared to detract from the Navy’s larger role in defending
India’s strategic equities in the Indo-Pacific region. A navy is, after all, a military
arm primarily meant for use in traditional conflict scenarios involving a clash of
broader strategic interests. By first principles, it is a weapon of defense in
situations where the nation’s strategic stakes are threatened by a rival maritime
power.

The proponents of the Indian Navy’s economic role are buoyed by views
expressed on the subject by Narendra Modi himself. As he commissioned
INS Kolkata a few days ago, Modi stressed the Navy’s role in securing the sea
lanes, drawing attention to the “inextricable connection between maritime
power and national growth story” and “the Indian navy’s potential to inspire
confidence among those involved in maritime trade.” His observations, though
legitimate from an economic-security perspective, highlight a deeper reality:
popularly elected governments today increasingly look upon maritime forces to
protect national economic interests, sometimes at the cost of other strategic
functions. Having been elected into office on a plank of economic renewal, the
NDA government too is likely to pursue a maritime policy aimed at supporting
domestic growth. As a corollary – and regardless of the political warmth
between India and Japan – New Delhi will not do anything to antagonize
Beijing. If anything, its maritime policy will be built around the twin principles
of strategic risk avoidance, and robust multilateral engagement.

This, interestingly, marks a curious continuity with the previous UPA

government’s approach to maritime security, which largely restricted the Indian
navy to cooperative endeavors in the Indian Ocean. New Delhi’s central
argument, for some time, has been that the Indian Ocean and Pacific are two
strategically diverse theaters and that any conceptual framework that treats them
as a single coherent strategic space is fundamentally flawed.

A majority of India’s policy elite believe that the principal threats in the Indian
Ocean Region (IOR) are of the irregular kind and must be dealt through a
process of region-wide consensus building and multilateral collaboration. The
Pacific, on the other hand, is seen as a “strategic swamp” – a domain of political
dissonances and an intractable conflict, which hasn’t been able to extricate
itself from the morass of military brinkmanship, diplomatic posturing, and
alliance politics.
There is, admittedly, some merit in the above argument. Maritime forces in the
Indian Ocean have for some time been grappling with non-traditional
challenges such as piracy, maritime terrorism, trafficking and humanitarian
crises. The region is yet to countenance maritime confrontation of the kind long
seen in the Western Pacific. But Indian policymakers believe that the problems
in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific are so different, they almost shout out for
variable solutions.

Unfortunately, this line of reasoning doesn’t hold up to scrutiny in a larger

strategic context – especially if one were to consider the real reason why the
Indian Ocean lacks a strategic dialectic. One doesn’t need deep nautical insight
to detect that the Indian Ocean Region’s (IOR) relatively peaceful status is
mainly a result of India’s prominent maritime status in the region. Not only is
the Indian Navy the most powerful in South Asia, it is also a principal security
provider in the central Indian Ocean. With no real challenge to its strategic
primacy in the IOR, it has had the luxury of focusing on humanitarian relief and
irregular threats.

India cannot, however, be assured that the strategic scenario that exists in the
Indian Ocean today will remain unchanged in the future. China’s economic
interests in the region have been growing rapidly. In time, as the People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) gears up for a larger role in the IOR, India’s
policy elite are bound to come up against an acute security dilemma: cooperate
with China on Beijing’s terms, or prepare to take on its superior naval might in
the Indian Ocean region. In the event, there are no guarantees that the Indian
Ocean’s future strategic dynamic would be any less adversarial than the one
that attends the Pacific today.

While there is no imminent threat to India’s Indian Ocean stakes presently, the
situation could change dramatically once the PLA-N succeeds in establishing a
more durable presence in the region. The Maritime Silk Route (MSR), which
Beijing is actively promoting, heralds the beginning of that process. From
developing maritime infrastructure in Gwadar, Hambantota and Chittagong in
South Asia, to building and revitalizing port facilities in Mombasa, Dar-e-Salam
and Bagamoyo on the East Coast of Africa, Beijing appears intent on creating a
Chinese trade-corridor in the Indian Ocean.

The latest to join the list of Chinese port development projects is the Kenyan
port city of Lamu. A Chinese firm recently signed a nearly $500 million deal
to construct three berths at Lamu. The project is part of the Kenya-South Sudan-
Ethiopia Transport, or LAPSSET corridor, with a potentially defining role in the
Africa-section of the MSR. Maritime watchers worry that at some stage China’s
expanding naval footprint in the Indian Ocean would come into conflict with
India’s sphere of strategic influence, triggering a chain of events that could
eventually lead a larger strategic confrontation.
For the moment, India is rightly wary of countervailing China’s maritime power
in the Indo-Pacific. New Delhi neither has the naval capability at its disposal,
nor the political capital to resist China’s broader nautical endeavors in
maritime-Asia. But it needs to search for an answer to end its strategic
predicament. For one thing, in the larger contest for regional dominance, New
Delhi will need the Indian Navy to deliver on its principal mandate of defending
national stakes by remedying power asymmetries that undermine regional
stability. For this, it must consider playing the role of a gentle “stabilizer” in the
Indo-Pacific.

As opposed to an active China containment strategy, a stabilizing role would

only entail a discreet commitment by New Delhi to oppose any unilateral
military means that could potentially cause conflict. As a corollary, India would
need to increase its involvement in political discussions concerning maritime
security in the Pacific. This would mean taking active part in the deliberations of
the ARF, the East Asia Summit, ADMM plus and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime
Forum (EAMF). It also implies India would need to articulate its stand on
maritime security matters clearly in forums such as the Shangri-La dialogue. As
a supporting strategy, New Delhi will have to reinvigorate its trilateral
diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific. Tripartite discussions have a unique quality of
conferring legitimacy and sense of urgency to shared security concerns; India
would need to leverage this feature to its advantage.

The Indian Navy would also need to expand its operational engagement in East
Asia. Notwithstanding the recent addition of a maritime component to “Look
East” policy, the Navy’s Pacific forays have been limited in both scope and
intensity. For a more durable strategic presence, it will need to interact on the
higher-end of the operational spectrum, and gain institutionalized access to
refueling and resupply facilities in the Pacific littorals. Logistical arrangements
with friendly Southeast states and new littoral warfare assets will provide the
Navy with the vital tools it needs to undertake strategic missions. Most
importantly, the Indian Navy will need a new doctrinal framework that would
give the military-security function as much emphasis as the benign and
constabulary role, presently soaking up the most of its operational energies. The
key would be to enhance its strategic capabilities to enable a credible distant-
seas presence.

While the Indian Navy has participated in a series of engagements in the Pacific
recently – including an interaction with the PLA-N at Qingdao, the U.S.-led Rim
of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises, and the U.S.-India MALABAR exercises (also
joined by Japan this year) – it has tended to treat all its maritime engagements as
isolated and unconnected events, thereby hindering the creation of a coherent
strategic picture. The Navy’s operational managers will know well that in the
absence of a cogent and considered strategy of graded engagement, all maritime
cooperation is a largely pointless endeavor. While the Indian Navy is entitled to
engage with all its strategic partners, the need for the “balance of narrative” to
point in a single direction is acute.
Far from translating into an anti-China coalition, a comprehensive maritime
partnership with Japan has the potential to provide substantive security in the
broader Indo-Pacific. After the re-interpretation of Article 9 of its Constitution in
July this year, Japan is well placed to be a potent military partner. More
importantly, a maritime relationship with Japan will provide the Indian Navy
with the opportunity to redefine its strategic posture in the Indo-Pacific.
Ultimately, if India needs its navy to play a defining role in safeguarding
national equities, it must not only be a “protector” of SLOCs in the Indian
Ocean but also a “defender” of its strategic stakes. The Indian Navy could play
an instrumental part in maintaining a stable geopolitical equilibrium, but the
strategic messaging for that will need to be as effectively directed, as it is well-
honed.

Abhijit Singh is a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and
Analyses at New Delhi and looks at maritime security issues. He is co-author
of Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.

##September 15, 2014: No, India Should Not Seek an Alliance With Japan
It is hard to see how an alliance with Japan could be of benefit to India.
By Swati Arun

The maiden visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Japan has been
touted as the crown jewel in India’s East Asia diplomacy this year. New Delhi
not only secured unprecedented economic investment from Tokyo but also
found a partner for economic growth. India’s need for a financial boost for its
economy cannot be overstated and the trip has clearly bolstered bilateral ties.

It is worth asking what benefits Japan reaps from these gestures towards India.
The jury is still out on whether the bonhomie will pave the way for future
security cooperation amid rising tensions in East Asia. Is this strategic
partnership a harbinger of a future alliance? Can a New Delhi-Tokyo
relationship evolve into a long-term security-oriented alignment? How is China
positioning itself to counter such moves?

Japan would certainly welcome more reliable investment and trade partners. Its
difficult relations with China may have nudged it to look for other options
offering similar opportunities. For India, this is good news, as it can now more
confidently present itself to the world as the next best investment option after
China. For his part, Modi ably flaunted the two assets India has that China does
not: democracy and non-aggressive diplomacy.

To realize its full economic and demographic potential, India needs a partner
that can provide multi-sector support. On this recent trip, however, Modi and
Abe went further, discussing their nascent military engagements, triggering
speculation over a gradually solidifying Indo-Japanese strategic alliance,
particularly through the prism of the “China threat.”

But an alliance requires certain common denominators. The most potent of

these is geography. Countries that share land borders with a common hostile
actor are more likely to join an alliance than island states are. In World War I,
France and Russia did not need an added incentive to ally against Germany as
its rise was equally threatening to both. An island state meanwhile has a natural
buffer against invasion.

Japan and India might have a common concern, but the ground on which a
lasting alliance might be formed looks shaky. Japan is an island state, and as
such its threat perception is different from India’s, which shares a land border
with China. Geography would complicate relations and Japan would find it a
burden to fulfill its alliance commitments to India. In any conflict scenario, India
would be fighting a land war, whereas Japan would be engaged in naval
conflict. The strategies and resources required would differ. In the domestic
realm, it would be tough to convince Indians to fulfill a commitment to help
Japan in a conflict with China, given the risk that doing so would invite massive
Chinese retaliation. Japan and India helping each other would be complicated,
not complementary. Finally, given the presence of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific,
for India and Japan to commit to a bilateral alliance would be redundant.

It is also clear from its mounting investment in Gujarat that many foreign
governments are keen to be on good terms with Modi. Modi has made
economic development a priority. His business friendly stance represents
opportunity for both Japan and China. And with deteriorating China-Japan
relations, India is surely looking more appealing to investors.

But India will have to balance its relations with these two countries wisely. As a
neighbor, China must surely remain India’s priority. National interest will drive
India to seek peaceful relations with China. In the meantime, closer defense
engagement with Japan might be helpful in ensuring its longevity. This does
need not be anti-China in nature (which India can ill-afford anyway), but rather
a contribution to maintaining peace and prosperity in the region.

It is best, then, to put to rest any debate over a potential security alliance
between India and Japan. Such an arrangement would likely be detrimental to
India’s long-term interests, forcing it to take a side.

##April 07, 2015: India-Japan ‘Soft Power’ Cooperation in Myanmar

There is scope for these two increasingly friendly countries to work together in
Myanmar.
By Purnendra Jain and Tridivesh Singh Maini
With economic reform processes in place and an elected government since
2010, Myanmar is now considered Asia’s new frontier, or even its final frontier,
as prospects for investment and international trade increase. Countries that had
imposed sanctions in the past are now willing to invest and do business with
Myanmar, which boasts abundant resources and an economy with enormous
potential for growth.

Many countries have already made inroads into Myanmar, with China leading
the way. China’s influence is all pervasive, whether it be in trade, aid or
infrastructure development. Yet China is now increasingly viewed as a hegemon
and resentment towards Beijing appears to be mounting, with large sections of
the Burmese population believing that China seeks to exploit Myanmar’s natural
resources. Recent clashes in Kokang along the China-Myanmar border have
complicated the bilateral relationship still further.

Myanmar is now open for business, encouraging countries around the world to
consider it as a strong destination for investment. Singapore, Japan and India,
among others, are in the process of establishing an economic footprint in the
Southeast Asian country. Two nations of particular importance to Myanmar are
Japan and India, both Asian giants.

Japan in Myanmar
Although Japan – operating under U.S. pressure – applied sanctions during the
rule of the junta in Myanmar, cutting its aid, Tokyo did not cut ties entirely.
Through private diplomacy and individual connections, Tokyo maintained its
networks with businesses and officials in Yangon and since 2005 with
Naypyidaw, the new capital. Japan resumed aid to Myanmar when the junta
was replaced with a civilian government. In fact, Japan has been a long-time
donor to Mayanmar, which was the first recipient of Japanese reparations in
Southeast Asia in 1954. That aid connection remained strong. When the civilian
government came in power in Naypyidaw, Tokyo waived close to $3 billion in
debt and committed to new loans for a range of infrastructure projects. A
substantial amount of Japanese aid has been devoted to assisting with the
development of the local rail system, health facilities, and other civic amenities.

Meanwhile, Japan’s direct investment has been steadily rising in recent years,
and indeed Japan is catching up with China. In 2013 for instance, Japanese
investment in Myanmar was $55.7 million, not far behind China’s $56.9
million. Japanese banks along with Japan’s aid agency, the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) will be jointly developing the Thilawa Special
Economic Zone just outside Yangon. It appears Japanese aid to Myanmar will
only rise, as Japanese corporations involved in development projects are likely
to benefit.

India’s Presence
India has also been making steady inroads into Myanmar over the past decade.
Bilateral trade, just over $1 billion in 2009, had risen to nearly $2 billion in
2013-2014. Estimates suggest that this figure may rise to $3 billion by 2015 and
both sides are aiming to achieve an ambitious $10 billion by 2020.

A number of Indian companies have also set up operations in Myanmar,

including oil and gas players like the ONGC Videsh and GAIL. Like Japan, India
has not confined its relations to trade. New Delhi is assisting Myanmar in areas
such as information technology, agriculture, and infrastructure. Recently, India
offered to assist Myanmar in bolstering its trade training institutes, and to train
Myanmar trade officials on WTO-related issues.

While both Japan and India have an economic interest in Myanmar, even more
significant is its strategic location. India’s Look East Policy – recently redubbed
“Act East” by the current government – will be a non-starter without greater
connectivity and robust relations with Myanmar. It is in this context that former
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh travelled to Myanmar in 2012 – the first
official visit by an Indian prime minister since 1987. Singh subsequently visited
Myanmar in 2014, but that was in connection with the BIMSTEC Summit. Prime
Minister Narendra Modi visited Myanmar in 2014 to attend the East Asian
Summit, and a bilateral visit is also likely soon.

Soft Power Cooperation

Meanwhile, India-Japan relations have strengthened over the past decade, and
the scope has widened to include security and defence cooperation. Both
countries have strategic interests in Myanmar. Of course, any military
cooperation has the potential to ratchet up tensions with China. But there is
potential for India and Japan to explore other synergies in Myanmar.

The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is investing $100 million in

developing infrastructure in Northeast India, which will not just help in
the development of that region but will also enhance connectivity with
Myanmar.

Looking beyond economics, assisting Myanmar, for example with institution-

building and developing cultural assets – areas that might be considered to
come under soft power – could serve the interests of both Japan and India in the
long run and provide a useful platform for launching other form of cooperation,
including economic. Both India and Japan could also help develop Myanmar’s
information technical sector by establishing training institutions. Other possible
areas could be the development of a Buddhist tourist circuit extending from
Eastern India to Myanmar. Buddhism is an important link between the three
countries, and Japan has already provided generous assistance for reviving the
Nalanda University in Bihar. The two countries can also cooperate to develop
world class research centers in Myanmar focussing on Buddhism.

While a Japan-India partnership in a third country has yet to take shape,

Myanmar could be a good place to start. In fact, it makes perfect sense given the
increasing strategic congruence between India and Japan, and the fact that the
nature of the assistance they provide is very similar, even if the scale is not.

Purnendra Jain is Professor in Asian Studies at the University of

Adelaide. Tridivesh Singh Maini is a Senior Research Associate with The Jindal
School of International Affairs, Sonepat.

## July 28, 2015: Asia’s New Geopolitics Takes Shape Around India, Japan,
and Australia
Japan, India, and Australia will be instrumental in determining Asia’s fate in the
21st century.
By Harsh V. Pant

New configurations in Asian geopolitics are emerging thick and fast. Last month
saw the initiative of a new trilateral involving India, Japan, and Australia when
Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar met his Australian counterpart and the
Japanese vice foreign minister. Japan will also be a part of bilateral India-U.S.
annual naval exercises–the Malabar–slated to be held over the next few months.
Though Japan has participated in these exercises in the past as well, this will be
only the second time when Japan will join these exercises in the geostrategically
critical Indian Ocean region.

There is a growing convergence in the region now that the strategic framework
of the Indo-Pacific remains the best way forward to manage the rapidly shifting
contours of Asia. Proposed first by Japan and adopted with enthusiasm by
Australia under the Tony Abbott government, in particular, the framework has
gained considerable currency, with even the U.S. now increasingly articulating
the need for it. Though China views the framework with suspicion, many in
China are acknowledging that the Indo-Pacific has emerged as a critical
regional space for India and China needs to synchronize its policies across the
Indian Ocean region and the Pacific.

These developments underscore the changing regional configuration in the

Indo-Pacific on account of China’s aggressive foreign policy posture as well as a
new seriousness in India’s own China policy. Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi’s outreach to Japan and Australia has been a significant part of his
government’s foreign policy so far as strong security ties with Tokyo and
Canberra are now viewed as vital by Delhi.

China’s increasing diplomatic and economic influence, coupled with domestic

nationalistic demands, has led to an adjustment of its military power and the
adoption of a bolder and more proactive foreign policy. China’s land
reclamation work in the Spratly Islands has been the most dramatic affirmation
of Beijing’s desire to change the ground realities in the region in its favor. This
has generated apprehensions about a growing void in the region to balance
China’s growing dominance.
With the U.S. consumed by its own domestic vulnerabilities and never ending
crises in the Middle East, regional powers such as India, Japan, and Australia
have been more proactive than in the past in managing this turbulence. The
new trilaterals emerging in Asia go beyond past attempts at rudimentary joint
military exercises. In December 2013, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force
(JMSDF) conducted its first bilateral maritime exercise with the Indian Navy in
the Indian Ocean Region. With growing strategic convergence between the
two, in 2014 India invited the JMSDF to participate in the annual Malabar
exercises with the U.S. Navy in the Pacific waters.

India and Japan have an institutionalized trilateral strategic dialogue partnership

with the United States, initiated in 2011. Maintaining a balance of power in the
Asian-Pacific as well as maritime security in the Indo-Pacific waters has become
an important element of this dialogue. A similar dialogue exists between the
U.S., Japan, and Australia. And now a new trilateral involving India, Japan, and
Australia has joined these initiatives, which can potentially to transform into a
‘quad’ of democracies in the Indo-Pacific region. The roots of this potential
partnership were laid as early as late-2004, when navies from the U.S., India,
Japan, and Australia collaborated in tsunami relief operations all across the
Indian Ocean.

Japan was one of the earliest vocal supporters of such initiatives. In 2007,
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, in his earlier stint as prime minister,
lobbied for Asia’s democracies to come together in a ‘quadrilateral.’ This was
also actively supported by the United States. Such an initiative resulted in a five
nation naval exercise in Bay of Bengal in September 2007. However, China,
perceiving a possible ganging-up of Asia’s democracies, issued demarches to
New Delhi and Canberra, causing this initiative to lose steam, since both
Australia and New Delhi felt it unwise to provoke China. However, as China
becomes more aggressive in the region, there are signs that India and Australia
may be warming up to the idea again.

The uncertainty of Chinese power and intentions in the region as well as the
future of American commitment to maintaining the balance of power in Asia
rank high in the strategic thinking of regional powers. This rapidly evolving
regional geopolitics is forcing Asia’s middle powers – India, Japan and Australia
– to devise alternative strategies for balancing China. Though still continuing
their security partnership with the United States, these powers are actively
hedging against the possibility of America’s failure to eventually balance
China’s growing power. Asia’s geopolitical space is undergoing a
transformation. While China’s rise is the biggest story still unfolding, other
powers are also recalibrating and their influence will be of equal, if not greater,
consequence in shaping the future of global politics in the Asia-Pacific.
November 30, 2015: Japan-India Maritime Surveillance Aircraft Deal May
Come Before the New Year
Tokyo and New Delhi may complete four-year-long negotiations on the sale of
Japan’s US-2 surveillance aircraft to India.

December 09, 2015: Abe’s Upcoming India Visit: Breaking New Ground in
Japan-India Relations
The trip could see some further boosts to cooperation between the two Asian
giants.

On Friday, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will begin his three day visit to
India, where he will meet his counterpart, Narendra Modi.

This will be the ninth time for Japan and India to hold annual summit-level talks
at the prime ministerial level. Relations between the two countries began to pick
up during Abe’s previous term, and he was the chief guest at India’s Republic
Day celebrations in January 2014 during the tenure of former Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh, a first for any Japanese premier. That is an indicator
of the fact that closer ties with Japan enjoys bipartisan support in India.

During his visit, apart from the regular meetings he will hold, Abe is also
expected to visit Varanasi, which is also the Lok Sabha constituency of Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi. A partnership city arrangement was signed
between Varanasi and Kyoto during Modi’s visit to Japan last year.

What is the significance of Abe’s visit? There are five points to keep in mind that
provide important context for both what is likely to occur during this visit as
well as the backdrop against which it is occurring.

First, Abe’s visit will sustain the momentum already built up in bilateral ties.
Japan was the first country Modi visited outside the Indian subcontinent after he
took office in May last year. This return visit by Abe will be a boost in the other
direction. During Modi’s Japan visit, the relations were upgraded to a “Special
Strategic and Global Partnership.”

Second, economically, this visit by Abe is expected to see the finalization of the
deal for Japan to supply its Shinkansen (bullet train) technology to India,
beginning with the Mumbai-Ahmedabad bullet train corridor in western India.

Third, turning to the security realm, the trip comes against the backdrop of a
Japan that is looking to enhance its contributions to regional and global security.
In that vein, during Abe’s visit, a deal may also be reached for India to buy the
Japanese-made US-2 maritime reconnaissance aircraft, marking a first for Japan,
which has traditionally been reticent to supply Japanese-made military
hardware to other countries. It is also likely that a technology-sharing agreement
for this aircraft will be concluded.
Fourth, Abe’s India visit will also strengthen security ties at a time when broader
convergences are occurring between India and Japan as well as other countries
like the United States and Australia. After years of not being invited by New
Delhi to participate in the India-U.S. Malabar naval exercises for fear of
alienating Beijing, Japan was invited this year. The exercises were held in
October in the Bay of Bengal. India, Japan, and the United States have also
been holding a trilateral dialogue among themselves which started in December
2011. Although India is not an ally of the United States, during the visit of U.S.
President Barack Obama to India as the chief guest during the Republic Day
celebrations in January this year, the two countries issued a joint statement
affirming “the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring
freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, especially in the
South China Sea.” In the past, India has been wary of being drawn into the
South China Sea dispute, but this statement marked a break from the past.

Fifth, India is one of four outside bases Japan has selected for its specialized
intelligence gathering unit to collect information on terrorist activities (the other
three are Jordan, Egypt, and Indonesia). Terrorism has been a growing concern
for Tokyo. In addition to helping save Japanese lives at home and abroad,
intelligence will boost Japanese security as it prepares for the G-7 Summit in
May next year at Ise-Shima in Mie Prefecture and the Tokyo Olympics in 2020.

This is not to say that there aren’t challenges for Japan-India relations. For
example, the two prime ministers will have to do some heavy lifting in order to
boost trade levels. Even though a Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreement (CEPA) was signed between the two countries and implemented
from August 2011, bilateral trade stood at just $16.31 billion during the fiscal
year 2013-14, which represents just around 1 percent of Japan’s total foreign
trade. In addition, it remains to be seen if a civilian nuclear deal between Japan
and India can be finalized during this visit. There are still many details to be
worked out and Abe is likely to face huge domestic opposition back home if he
does sign a civilian nuclear pact with India.

Both Abe in Japan and Modi in India lead majority governments and hence are
not prone to the pulls and pressures of coalition politics. All the more reason,
then, for both of them to seize the initiative and take the bilateral relations to a
new high.

December 14, 2015: Abe’s Visit Takes Japan-India Security Relations to the
Next Level
India-Japan security relations have flourished since Abe’s first term in office.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi on December 12. As Abe concluded his short two-day visit to India the
end of their meeting, the two leaders issued Japan-India Vision 2025 Special
Strategic and Global Partnership. In this document, Abe and Modi agreed on
expanding bilateral cooperation in a wide range of issues from investment,
disaster risk management, and people-to-people exchange. They also
acknowledged that stability of the Indo-Pacific region to be “indispensable” to
their respective national security and prosperity, calling for a more robust
cooperation in security issues.

The Japan-India relationship is among the core relationships that Abe has
focused on since he served prime minister for the first time, from 2006-2007. In
fact, shortly after Abe returned to power in December 2012, he contributed an
important commentary to Project Syndicate on December 27, 2012. In this
commentary, he introduced the “Diamond Concept (daiyamondo kousou), in
which he envisioned that the United States, Japan, Australia, and India would
form a virtual security “diamond” and work together to maintain the peace and
stability of the Indo-Pacific region. When reflecting on the major foreign policy
decisions that Abe has made since then, it is clear that Abe’s moves to pursue
more robust relationships with Australia and India, while continuing to anchor
these relationships with its alliance with the United States, are remarkably
consistent with this “Diamond Concept.” It is also a critical component of his
government “proactive contribution to peace” principle articulated in
the National Security Strategy.

This weekend, as the two leaders agreed to elevate their bilateral relationship to
“special strategic and global partnership,” the Japanese and Indian government
signed two important security agreements.

One is a Japan-India agreement on defense equipment and technology transfer.

With elements such as the establishment of a Japan-India Joint Committee for
the oversight and prohibition of third-party transfers without prior approval, this
agreement paves the way for a more robust Japan-India cooperation in the area
of defense technology.

The other is the Agreement Concerning the Security Measures for the Protection
of Classified Military Information. Commonly referred to as the general security
of military information agreement (GSOMIA), this agreement obligates both
Japan and India to protect classified military information exchanged between
the two countries, thereby facilitating more robust intelligence exchanges
between the Indian Armed Forces and the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF).
That, in turn, creates a foundation for a more robust defense cooperation
between the two.

These agreements build on the progress in Japan-India bilateral defense

relations, which was jump-started when Abe visited India in August 2007 during
his first stint as prime minister. Since then, the deepening of Japan-India
relations, along with Japan-Australia relations, has enjoyed bipartisan support in
Japan. Indeed, it was under Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) rule that Japan and
India signed two critical documents that serve as the stepping stoned of today’s
relationship — the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan
and India in October 2008, and the Action Plan in December 2009 to
implement what was agreed upon in the Joint Declaration on Security.

In 2013, the leaders of the two countries signed an agreement in which the both
sides agreed to allow the Indian Navy and Japan Maritime Self Defense Force
(JMSDF) to hold joint training on a regular basis. JMSDF also has already
participated in the U.S.-India bilateral exercise Malabar as an observer. Now
that the agreements on defense technology transfer and GSOMIA both in place,
Japan-India security relations have become one of Japan’s most institutionalized
relationships, only after security ties with the United States and Australia.

Similar to its security partnership with Australia, Japan’s security cooperation

with India allows Japan to engage one of the biggest security partners for the
United States on a host of security issues. A close security partnership with
Australia has afforded Japan the opportunity to be more active in areas, such as
capacity building in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, that are critical for
the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. A closer security relationship with India
benefits Japan in a similar way. With a solid institutional framework in place, it
is up to the defense leaders in Tokyo to optimize this framework and achieve a
concrete result, thereby adding real meat to the bones of this growing
relationship.

India and Japan Boost Ties During Abe Visit

Tokyo and New Delhi get serious about deepening their partnership.
By Harsh V. Pant
December 14, 2015

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was in India last week to take part in the
9th annual India-Japan summit talks with his Indian counterpart, Narendra
Modi.

During Modi’s visit last year, Japan had announced the doubling of its private
and public investment in India, to about $34 billion, over a period of five
years. The two leaders wanted to ensure that the momentum in economic ties is
maintained — and they did not disappoint.

The biggest announcement during Abe’s visit was the Indian decision to adopt
Japanese bullet train technology for its first high-speed railway. This 505 km
corridor linking Mumbai with Ahmedabad will be financed by a Japanese loan
at just 0.5 percent interest. This is significant for both Japan and India. Earlier
this year, Japan lost out to China in bidding to build a high-speed railway in
Indonesia. And India has been concerned about China’s growing role in
infrastructure development in South Asia over the last decade. This decision
brings Japan to the center stage of infrastructure development in India. Abe
underscored this by expressing his commitment to support India’s efforts by
sharing advanced skills and technologies and through the active mobilization of
Japanese public and private sector involvement, including Japan’s Official
Development Assistance (ODA), of which India is one of the largest recipients.

In line with the Modi government’s “Make in India” initiative, a broader defense
agreement underpinning joint development of weapon systems was unveiled.
The framework will enhance Indo-Japanese defense and security cooperation by
making available defense equipment and technology necessary to implement
joint research and joint production. Japan will also now permanently join India
and the United States for the annual Malabar exercises.

The two nations also signed a pact to share classified intelligence, which is
likely to be a precursor to the long pending deal to jointly produce the US-2
search and rescue amphibious military aircraft. This defense partnership
between the two Asian powers is embedded in their “unwavering commitment
to realize a peaceful, open, equitable, stable and rule-based order in the Indo-
Pacific region and beyond,” as well as the need to “uphold the principles of
sovereignty and territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of disputes; democracy,
human rights and the rule of law;” and (pointedly) “freedom of navigation and
overflight.”

Though the much awaited nuclear deal between the two nations still remains a
work in progress, Japan has now agreed to the principle that it can conclude a
civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India, making an exception to its rule
of not conducting nuclear commerce with a state that is not a signatory of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This pact still remains highly contested
between the bureaucracies of the two nations, but Modi and Abe’s personal
relationship has given it a new momentum.

The relationship between India and Japan is perhaps the best it has ever been,
largely because they have prime ministers who look at the region and the world
in very similar terms. Both leaders are emblematic of a new, ambitious and
nationalistic Asian landscape. They have decisive mandates to reshape the
economic and strategic futures of their respective nations. Modi has underlined
that India and Japan share a “fundamental identity of values, interests and
priorities.” Japan’s economic and technological development has inspired Modi
to emulate the Japan model, with flexible and bold fiscal policy that encourages
private investment in infrastructure and technology.

Meanwhile, Abe, a longstanding admirer of India, has been a strong votary of

strategic ties between New Delhi and Tokyo. For Abe, “a strong India is in the
best interest of Japan, and a strong Japan is in the best interest of India.” He was
one of the first Asian leaders to envision a “broader Asia,” linking the Pacific
and Indian oceans to form the Indo-Pacific. And as he has gone about
reconstituting Japan’s role as a security provider in the region and beyond,
India, of all Japan’s neighbors, seems most willing to acknowledge Tokyo’s
centrality in shaping the evolving security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.
The United States is playing a significant role in bringing India and Japan closer
as well. The three nations had their first trilateral meeting at the foreign
ministerial level earlier this year in September. This was followed up by the six-
day Malabar 2015 naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal in October, which
reflected the priorities of three nations and a convergence of India’s Act East
policy, Japan’s growing focus on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea,
and the Obama administration’s “strategic rebalance” toward the Indo-Pacific.

Other trilateral configurations are also emerging, with Japan, Australia, and
India interacting at a regional level. There is a growing convergence in the
region now that the strategic framework of the Indo-Pacific remains the best
way forward to manage the rapidly shifting contours of Asia. Proposed first by
Japan and adopted with enthusiasm by Australia, in particular, the framework
has gained considerable currency, with even the United States now increasingly
articulating the need for it. Though China views the framework with suspicion,
many in China are acknowledging that the Indo-Pacific has emerged as a
critical regional space for India and China needs to synchronize its policies
across the Indian Ocean region and the Pacific.

These developments underscore the changing regional configuration in the

Indo-Pacific on account of China’s aggressive foreign policy posture as well as a
new seriousness in India’s own China policy. Modi’s outreach to Japan has been
a significant part of his government’s foreign policy so far as strong security ties
with Tokyo are now viewed as vital by Delhi. Abe’s visit has further reinforced
these trends and, if nurtured seriously, can pay great dividends to both India and
Japan.

February 12, 2016: A Japan-Singapore-India Maritime Partnership

A strategic partnership could be key to dealing with Indo-Pacific challenges.
By Satoru Nagao and Koh Swee Lean Collin

The Indo-Pacific region has been fraught with maritime issues, including an
array of non-traditional security threats, notably seaborne piracy and terrorism –
two salient challenges highlighted by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
when he addressed the valedictory function of India’s recent International Fleet
Review. This warning came at an apt moment when regional waters have seen a
recent spike in the number of piratical attacks and sea robberies. At the same
time, the prospect of extremism and militancy spreading from land to the
maritime domain constitutes a very real threat.

But without a doubt, simmering tensions in the East and South China Seas have
overshadowed reports of, say, pirates in regional waters. There are already
concerns over the evolving Sino-U.S. military power balance in view of China’s
growing military capabilities, which contrast with the budget constraints faced
by the U.S. military. One such example is the area of submarines. The
expansion of China’s undersea capabilities is part of the regional proliferation of
submarines, which may constitute a source of destabilization when seen in the
context of existing maritime flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific.

Therefore, faced with the myriad of traditional and non-traditional maritime

security challenges, coupled with the geopolitical uncertainties surrounding the
shifts in the region’s military power balance, countries in the Indo-Pacific may
need to prepare for the worst-case scenario in the longer term. In this respect,
what kind of options do these countries have? To hedge against the growing
uncertainties and evolving maritime challenges, promoting defense self-
reliance, and fostering interstate cooperation become increasingly essential.
While the U.S. has cultivated a network of allies and partners in the Indo-
Pacific, the onus now falls on regional powers to share the security burden.

Calling for Partners

In this regard, Indo-Japanese maritime cooperation becomes increasingly

important. Now under Modi’s watch, this relationship looks set to grow as an
important part of the “Act East Policy.”

Strategic convergences enhance the Indo-Japanese security relationship. China

is often cited as a common source of geopolitical concern for both countries,
given that both have their own sets of problems with Beijing. However, often
overlooked is the logical convergences stemming from mutual dependence in
the maritime realm. On the one hand, India relies on uninterrupted access to
sea lines of communications (SLOCs) plying the Western Pacific waters for the
purpose of commerce and trade. On the other, Japan is dependent for its energy
needs on the same access to SLOCs through the Indian Ocean region. SLOC
security therefore constitutes a key driver of this Indo-Japanese nexus in the
maritime domain.

Southeast Asia is one such geographical area where India and Japan see their
strategic maritime interests coincide, given their common interest in ensuring
continued access to SLOCs through this region. Both countries have already
started to assist Southeast Asian countries in building their maritime security
capacities to cope with the evolving array of challenges at sea, in a way also
helping Washington share the security burden in the region. To date, though,
such assistance has taken the form of direct bilateral arrangements individually
struck by New Delhi and Tokyo with Southeast Asian partners. If Japan and
India were to collaborate, these initiatives may become even more effective and
efficient through better coordination in providing aid and avoiding a duplication
of efforts.

At any rate, it appears that both India and Japan are viewing Southeast Asia as a
region of increasing importance. During his recent speech in Thailand, Indian
Vice President Shri M. Hamid Ansari placed the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) at the core of the “Act East Policy” and at the center of India’s
dream of an Asian century. But an Indo-Japanese partnership in Southeast Asia
will not make good headway without the involvement of ASEAN member states.

The Potential of Singapore

Perhaps it may not be realistic to conceive of a broad India-Japan-ASEAN

maritime partnership, given the diverse and sometimes conflicting interests
amongst Southeast Asian governments. A “building block” approach may work
better, allowing the parties involved to explore initiatives and gradually expand
the scope of maritime cooperation in terms of both the substance and number of
participants.

One potential candidate to spearhead an eventual trilateral maritime partnership

between India, Japan and ASEAN would be Singapore, a geostrategically well-
located, small island-city state that is heavily dependent on SLOC security for its
national survival and prosperity. Singapore also shares with India and Japan
common ideas where it comes to upholding the international rule of law in
governing the global commons. Equally important is that Singapore has long
been a strong advocate for maritime cooperation. In this regard, it has leveraged
its expertise and resources to aid in regional maritime security capacity-
building. The creation of the Information Fusion Centre at Changi Naval Base is
one such noteworthy example.

Singapore has cultivated strong maritime security ties with both India and
Japan. With the former, the strong links are exemplified by the annual
Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX) which has its roots back in
the early-1990s. With the latter, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is a
noteworthy regional initiative. However, Japan and Singapore do not have a
joint maritime training and exercise arrangement similar to SIMBEX.

As an active member within the ASEAN-centric regional architecture, Singapore

could serve as an effective interlocutor for this growing Indo-Japanese
partnership, allowing regional governments to tap their vast maritime security
capacities. However, it needs pointing out that because Singapore does not
participate in formal alliances, the eventual pathway to a broader India-Japan-
ASEAN maritime partnership should not be seen as deliberately aimed at
containing China. In this respect, Singapore’s traditionally close diplomatic,
economic and sociocultural ties with Beijing can help in fostering confidence
building and cooperation between these three Asian Great Powers in the
maritime sphere, in a way helping ameliorate potential misperceptions.

Not an Alliance, But a Network

There is certainly considerable potential for both India and Japan to enhance
and expand their existing maritime partnership, spawning tangible benefits to
other countries in the Indo-Pacific region. To advance this partnership and
maximize those benefits for Southeast Asia in particular – clearly the point of
convergence for both New Delhi and Tokyo where SLOC security is concerned
– Singapore can play a pivotal role in eventually establishing a broader India-
Japan-ASEAN maritime partnership.

But it needs to be emphasized here that such an arrangement should not be

misconstrued as an alliance of sorts; rather, it would be part of a growing
network of maritime partnerships that has proliferated throughout the Indo-
Pacific. The underlying motivation ought to be primarily to safeguard freedom
of navigation, which is so closely linked to SLOC security.

In fact, such small multilateral (or perhaps “mini-lateral” is better) partnerships

have already existed, for instance the Malacca Straits Patrol initiative between
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Another example occurred back
in 2012, when India first established the National Security Advisor-level
Trilateral Meeting on Maritime Security Cooperation involving Maldives and Sri
Lanka. It was later expanded to include Mauritius and Seychelles. This form of
“building block” approach in fostering practical cooperation in the maritime
sphere is therefore certainly not alien. In fact, it might even be a more
productive approach than huge, unwieldy frameworks involving too many
actors and their diverse interests.

To promote this tripartite maritime partnership between India, Japan and

Singapore, the first logical move would be to establish a mechanism for trilateral
strategic dialogue, through which the three countries can share information,
better identify the maritime security capacity-building requirements of ASEAN
countries and coordinate on ways to support such initiatives. This dialogue
should also be premised on common principles, especially adherence to the
international rule of law. Concurrently or in the next phase, it might be
plausible to build on existing India-Japan and India-Singapore joint maritime
training and exercises to eventually conceive of a trilateral arrangement
involving both civilian maritime law enforcement agencies and navies. This
aims at promoting interoperability and may even be a test-bed for evaluating the
efficacy of existing mechanisms, such as the Code of Unplanned Encounters at
Sea (CUES).

Such nascent moves, if they succeed, could potentially be the first real step
towards an India-Japan-ASEAN maritime partnership that contributes to peace
and stability in the Indo-Pacific.

India Is Making a Move on the South China Sea

Make no mistake: India is charting a new course on South China Sea.
By Harsh V. Pant
February 25, 2016
At a time when China is deploying advanced radar systems to its man-made
island in Cuarteron Reef in the Spratly Islands archipelago and the United States
is nudging its allies to carry out their own freedom of navigation operations in
the South China Sea to challenge China’s controversial assertions of maritime
sovereignty, India’s role in the dispute is also assuming a new dimension.

It was recently reported in sections of the media that the United States and India
have held talks about conducting joint naval patrols that could possibly include
the disputed South China Sea. U.S. and Indian government officials were quick
to dismiss the report. Washington suggested that while the U.S. and India have a
shared vision of peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia, the two countries were
not planning joint maritime patrols in the Indian Ocean or the South China
Sea. New Delhi also argued that there was no change in its policy of joining an
international military effort only under the UN flag.

China, not surprisingly, reacted swiftly and angrily, warning the United States
and India that “[c]ountries from outside the area must stop pushing forward the
militarization of the South China Sea, cease endangering the sovereignty and
national security of littoral countries in the name of ‘freedom of navigation,’ and
harming the peace and stability of the region.”

Even though it seems clear that the U.S. and India are not yet politically ready
for joint patrols, the trial balloon itself is indicative of the rapidly evolving
Indian position on one of the key disputes in the Asian strategic landscape. A
number of factors are forcing India’s hand. The United States itself has been
forced to adopt a more robust posture in the Indo-Pacific. The dramatic
acceleration in U.S. military commitment to the region is largely a function of
the astonishing rise of China. China is today on the cusp of becoming a serious
regional military power and this transition appears all the more menacing
because of its aggressive posturing in the East and South China Seas,
challenging the freedom of navigation in these waters and open access to the
global commons.

In their recent high-level joint statements, both the United States and India have
repeatedly declared their support for freedom of navigation in the South China
Sea, signaling that the Modi government is not reluctant to highlight New
Delhi’s convergence with Washington on regional issues. India’s engagements
with states like Japan, Vietnam, and Philippines have become more serious.
India has publicly supported Vietnam and Philippines in their disputes with
China. Indian naval ships have been visiting Vietnam in the South China Sea
and the two nations have continued to cooperate on hydrocarbon exploration in
the South China Sea, despite Beijing’s warnings.

India and Japan have also taken a public stand on South China Sea issue in
recent years. During Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to India in December last
year, the two nations called upon all states to avoid unilateral actions that could
lead to tensions in the region in view of the critical importance of open sea
lanes of communications in the South China Sea for regional energy security,
trade, and commerce, which underpin the continued peace and prosperity of
the Indo-Pacific. India and Japan also underscored the need for full and effective
implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea and an early conclusion of the negotiations to establish a Code of
Conduct in the South China Sea by consensus. China promptly expressed its
disapproval of this by labeling India and Japan as “countries outside the region.”

Make no mistake: India is charting a new course on South China Sea. Though its
full implications will come to the fore only after some time, it is clear that it will
have significant impact on how regional states and the United States view India
as a regional balancer in the Asia-Pacific.

More on south china sea here

https://thediplomat.com/tag/south-china-sea-disputes/
https://thediplomat.com/tag/south-china-sea/

March 05, 2016: Is the Japan-India Military Aircraft Deal Dead?

Tokyo says it has no immediate plans to sell US-2 amphibious aircraft to New
Delhi.

A Japan-India defense deal over the procurement of 12 ShinMaywa US-2

amphibious search-and-rescue aircraft for the Indian Navy is facing additional
delays and an uncertain future. Japan has no plan for “selling or delivering” the
US-2 maritime surveillance aircraft in the immediate future.

Despite the recent lack of progress, a contract could still be signed this or next
year.

March 12, 2016: India Opens Door to Japanese Assistance in Andaman and
Nicobar Islands
For the first time, India is accepting foreign infrastructure assistance on the
strategically important islands.

By Ankit Panda

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands, located in the Bay of Bengal, northwest of
the pivotal maritime choke point at the Strait of Malacca, are an immensely
valuable geopolitical asset for India, particularly as it looks to ‘Act East’ and play
an increasingly more visible role in the eastern Indian Ocean and beyond. The
islands host an Indian tri-service command, the first of its kind, positioning them
as an important outpost for the Indian military. For the first time, New Delhi has
opened the door to collaborating with Japan on developing and upgrading
civilian infrastructure on the islands.

The New York Times reports that the two countries are discussing a modest
project to build a 15-megawatt diesel power plant on South Andaman Island. As
the report notes, by opening talks with Japan, India is shifting on its
longstanding policy of rejecting foreign investment on the strategically
important and sensitive islands.

As their partnership has matured over the years, Japan has become a
considerable source of foreign investment for major infrastructure initiatives in
India. Notably, Tokyo is partly underwriting the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial
Corridor, which is among the largest infrastructure projects in the world.
Moreover, India continues to be a major recipient of Japanese official
development assistance (ODA) loans. Since 2010, Japanese ODA loan aid to
India has been increasing every year.

Since 2012, the two states have held regular bilateral naval exercises (JIMEX)
and, starting last year, Japan became a permanent member of the U.S.-India
Malabar series of exercises. Japan is also in talks to sell New Delhi maritime
patrol aircraft, though that deal has run into some roadblocks lately.

China’s increasingly assertive behavior in the East and South China Seas and its
simultaneous pursuit of civilian port infrastructure along the Indian Ocean
littoral has in part driven New Delhi and Tokyo closer together.

September 05, 2016: Long Overdue: India and Japan Are Ready for a Full-
Fledged Civil Nuclear Deal
Tokyo and New Delhi have much to gain and little to lose by signing a civil
nuclear agreement.
By Satoru Nagao

Closer cooperation between Japan and India on a range of issues is more and
more plausible today than in the past. Japan-India civil nuclear cooperation, in
particular, is a good example of an area with immense promise.

At a bilateral summit in New Delhi last December, Japanese Prime Minister

Shinzo Abe and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed a memorandum of
agreement on civil nuclear cooperation.

Before the two sides can conclude a nuclear cooperation pact, they must
resolve their differences over key issues, such as Japanese companies’ liability
for nuclear accidents, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (important because
the plutonium produced through reprocessing of nuclear fuel can be used in
nuclear weapons), and the consequences of any future testing of nuclear
weapons by India. Despite these thorny issues, it is likely that this agreement
will be one of the most important strategic developments for the entire Indo-
Pacific balance.

From an economic standpoint, an agreement on the transfer of civil nuclear

technology between Japan and India is vital to India’s continued economic
growth. But energy is the booming Indian economy’s Achilles’ heel. Given the
current state of technology, nuclear power is the only realistic means of
ensuring a steady supply of energy to meet the nation’s burgeoning demand for
electric power without producing large-scale carbon emissions.

With this in mind, New Delhi has already concluded a civil nuclear
cooperation agreement with a number of countries. U.S. and French companies
are eager to launch nuclear power projects in India, but they cannot proceed
without large forged components from Japan, some of which claim 80 percent
of the global market. And Japan cannot supply those components without a full-
fledged nuclear agreement resolving the aforementioned issues. For this reason,
a Japan-India nuclear deal is crucial.

This is not India’s problem alone. Just as China’s economic slowdown has
affected the many countries around the world that trade with China, Japan and
other nations in the Indo-Pacific region have a large stake in the Indian
economy. A Japan-India nuclear agreement is an essential accomplishment to
ensure the steady growth of India’s economy and, by extension, that of the
entire region.

Some would argue that the Japanese government should not enter into a civil
nuclear agreement with a country that has not committed to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). India never signed the treaty and maintains that
it is arbitrary and unfair to acknowledge the right of China to possess nuclear
weapons, but to deny the same right to India simply because it began testing its
weapons a decade later. However, if one considers the matter carefully, it
becomes clear that civil nuclear cooperation between Japan and India will have
virtually no negative impact on the nonproliferation regime.

First of all, India has demonstrated a firm commitment to nonproliferation

principle in practice. It clearly differs from countries like North Korea, Pakistan,
and Iran, which have conducted shady dealings on the “nuclear black market.”
If India continues to control its nuclear technology as carefully as it has for the
past half-century, cooperation on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes should not undermine the NPT regime. This is why eleven countries
have already signed civil nuclear cooperation agreements with India, namely,
the United States, Russia, Britain, France, Australia, Canada, South Korea,
Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Argentina, and Namibia.

Secondly, even if the international community admits to India’s status as the

“sixth nuclear great power” along with the United States, Russia, the United
Kingdom, France, and China, it is feasible that other great powers will not claim
the “seventh” or “eighth” position in the near future. North Korea, Pakistan, and
Iran have all disqualified themselves by their involvement in illicit trading of
nuclear technology. Other countries that may have had nuclear weapons
programs in the past (such as South Korea, Taiwan, Libya, Brazil, Argentina, and
South Africa) have already shut them down. Although Israel is assumed to have
nuclear weapons, it has a longstanding policy of refusing to publicly affirm the
fact.

Regardless of these international trends, some in Japan nonetheless argue that

the country, as the only nation to experience atomic bombings, must maintain
exceptionally rigorous anti-proliferation standards. But the truth of the matter is
that India’s nuclear policies are very similar to Japan’s. Both countries are
committed to the “total elimination of nuclear weapons,” as they reaffirmed in
last December’s joint statement. At the same time, both countries realistically
acknowledge the need for nuclear deterrence in today’s world—India with its
own nuclear weapons and Japan under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

When China began testing nuclear weapons in 1964, both Japan and India were
deeply alarmed. Japanese policymakers weighed the idea of developing an
independent nuclear capability—possibly in cooperation with West Germany—
but such a step was ultimately deemed unnecessary on the grounds that the U.S.
“nuclear umbrella” afforded sufficient deterrence. What few people realize is
that, as Stephen P. Cohen recounts in his 2001 book India: Emerging Power,
India also appealed to the United States, USSR, United Kingdom, and France for
a nuclear umbrella but they declined India’s request. Developing nuclear
weapons itself was the only option left for India.

India has conducted nuclear tests on two occasions, in 1974 and 1998. Many in
Japan were highly critical of India. But we need to keep in mind that Japan’s
long-term commitment to abolishing nuclear weapons has not prevented it from
taking advantage of the deterrent power of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. In this
respect, Tokyo’s position differs very little from New Delhi’s. Japan’s
commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and the NPT should not be regarded as
a fundamental obstacle to the conclusion of a civil nuclear cooperation
agreement with India.

Nonproliferation issues aside, a Japan-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement

has important strategic implications. Japan and India share deep concerns over
China’s growing presence and its expanding influence in the East China Sea,
South China Sea, Indo-China border, and Indian Ocean. And, in this case,
countries in the Indo-Pacific region are concerned regarding how much longer
they can rely on U.S. power alone. Between 2000 and 2015, China added 42
new submarines to its fleet while the United States commissioned just 13. Japan
and India need to cooperate to fill the gap left by a declining U.S. presence in
the region.

In addition to military power, the export of infrastructure is one of the tools that
China has used to bring these countries under its sway. The urgency of this is
underlined by the fact that China is exporting nuclear plants to Pakistan. Hence,
through the civil nuclear deal, Japan should cooperate with India to
counterbalance against China’s activities to maintain the Asian power balance
and dissuade China’s assertiveness.
Overall, given the economic, nonproliferation, and regional power balance
issues examined above, it is clear that full-fledged Japan-India civil nuclear
cooperation is fundamentally a development to be welcomed. The question
remains regarding whether India is likely to conduct further testing of nuclear
weapons and how such tests would impact the bilateral agreement.

India has said that it already has all the test data it needs to ensure the
performance of its nuclear weapons. However, if it turns out that the data is
insufficient, then further tests might be needed in order to maintain India’s
nuclear deterrent capability.

If India were to conduct a nuclear test, nuclear cooperation between Japan and
India—even for peaceful purposes—would become untenable, since there
would be no assurance that resources provided by Japan had not been diverted
to India’s nuclear weapons program. The depth of Japan’s concern over this can
be gathered from the inclusion of the following item in the December 2015
Japan-India joint statement: “Prime Minister Abe stressed the importance of
early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
which should lead to nuclear disarmament.”

Unfortunately, the CTBT can only go into effect after all 44 states listed in
Annex 2 of the treaty have ratified it and eight of those states have yet to do so.
But the fact that Japan insisted on including this reference in the joint statement
is an indication of its concern over the possibility of future testing. India needs
to respect Japan’s worries on this point.

Provided that India appreciates the need to refrain from nuclear testing, civil
nuclear cooperation could well become the basis for a long-term cooperative
relationship with major benefits. Such a development would give true meaning
and substance to the idea of a “special strategic and global partnership” that
Tokyo and New Delhi claim to enjoy.

October 21, 2016: India-Japan Amphibious Aircraft Deal Moves Forward

New Delhi and Tokyo reportedly have agreed on a price for 12 amphibious
search-and-rescue aircraft.

India and Japan have reportedly moved closer toward concluding the first-ever
bilateral defense deal between the two countries. New Delhi and Tokyo have
agreed on a price for 12 ShinMaywa US-2i amphibious search-and-
rescue/maritime surveillance aircraft for service in the Indian Navy.

Consequently, while settling on a price shows some progress, it is far from a

done deal.

So far the Indian MOD has only indicated that it would like to purchase two
US-2i aircraft in fly-away condition, whereas the remaining ten (sources say that
the Indian Navy requirement is pegged at 12-18 aircraft) should be built in India
under Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘Make in India’ initiative.
ShinMaywa, however, thinks that license-building ten US-2i is impracticable
and too costly given the small number of aircraft.

“Given its range of 4,500 kilometers (2,796 miles), the Indian Navy was
tentatively planning to station the USi-2 aircraft off the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands in the Bay of Bengal, from where they would have been able to conduct
surveillance patrols of the eastern Indian Ocean region,”

The export of search-and-rescue aircraft would be Japan’s first defense deal in

its post-war history.

November 11, 2016: Modi in Japan: Why China Should Be Worried

Japan and India are expected to advance defense, economic, and even nuclear
cooperation.
By Varun Tomar

In August 1977, Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda emphasized on the

“three main pillars” of his trip to Manila. Those “pillars” went on to become the
major principles of Japan’s foreign policy toward Asia, known as the Fukuda
Doctrine of “Heart to Heart Relations.” In particular, Fukuda pledged that Japan,
while possessing the means and capability, would never walk the path of
militarization ever again. This policy guided Japanese foreign policy toward the
rest of Asia until very recently. The growing aggressive stance of China in the
region and the coming to power of a revisionist prime-minister, Shinzo Abe, has
marked a clear shift in Tokyo’s regional security policy.

When Indian Prime Minister Narnedra Modi visits Japan on November 11, on a
48-hour trip for the Third Annual Summit meeting, Tokyo is expected to sign its
first major defense deal in the last 50 years, the sale of US-2 Amphibious aircraft
to India. Sources also say that the aircraft will bear the name US-2i, which
clearly indicates how serious Modi is about promoting the “Make in India”
campaign. The US-2 aircraft will enable India to better surveil its Exclusive
Economic Zone in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean region. This will in
turn speed up an Indian Navy response to incidents near the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands, major strategic holdings from a geopolitical viewpoint.

Modi’s visit will also reportedly see a civil nuclear deal. Such a deal, if
concluded between New Delhi and Tokyo, would definitely antagonize Beijing.
China has continuously tried to stop India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) citing as a reason that India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). New Delhi should understand that China wants to
penalize it for growing closer to the United States and engaging with Japan in
the pacific region. Beijing also does not want to let down its all-weather ally
Pakistan by accepting India’s global role as a responsible nuclear power. By
convincing Tokyo to sign the civil nuclear deal, New Delhi has played a major
trump card. Reports suggest that the deal between India and Japan would be
concluded along the lines of the NPT, and Tokyo would walk out of the deal of
India carries out a nuclear test, which it is highly unlikely to do considering its
past record.

From an economic viewpoint, also, the civil nuclear deal is highly lucrative for
both India and Japan. For India, the burgeoning demand for electricity to feed its
mushrooming industry since the liberalization of economy in 1991 has emerged
as a major problem. With increasing levels of pollution in Indian cities and the
catastrophic rise of pollutants in New Delhi this week, nuclear energy seems to
be the only viable solution to ensure a clean and sufficient supply of energy for
India. Meanwhile, with Japan trying to phase out nuclear power after the
Fukushima disaster in 2011, Tokyo is now looking for new markets in which to
sell its nuclear technology.

This is true in other fields as well –with Korea and China giving stiff competition
to Japanese consumer goods, Japan is desperately looking for new markets for
its products. High-speed rail is one such example, with Japan having agreed to
develop a 505 km corridor for India between Mumbai and Ahmedabad. This
move came straight after Japan lost a high-speed railway bid to China in
Indonesia earlier in 2015. Today, the Chinese economy stands on the massive
Japanese investment made during 1970s, and now Japan needs to similarly
support India in its development in order to have a strong and reliable partner in
Asia.

On the strategic and geopolitical front, with Donald Trump having been elected
as the new U.S. president, Japan’s military clout in East Asia is poised to grow
stronger amid uncertainty about Trump’s commitment to U.S. allies. If Trump
decides to reframe the U.S.-Japan security pact, Tokyo would have to look for
new partners to counter the growing Chinese presence in the Asia-Pacific
region. It is in both India and Japan’s favor to mutually cooperate and benefit
from the idea of a “special strategic and global partnership.”

November 16, 2016: Can India Capitalize on Its Nuclear Deal With Japan?
The nuclear deal could hold the key to overcoming India’s chronic energy
woes.

By K.S. Venkatachalam
November 16, 2016

However, one of the roadblocks for accelerating the pace of India’s

development is the shortage of power to meet its growing demands. India is
currently producing 1,068,923 million units of electricity annually, which falls
short of actual needs by 3.6 percent. It is estimated India would require over
1.50 million units to meet its energy requirements by 2024.
India’s present per capita power consumption is around 940 kilowatt-hours
(kWh), which is among the lowest in the world. By comparison, China’s per
capita consumption is over 4,000 kWh. If India wants to be anywhere near
China, huge investments are required in the power sector, especially in clean
energy.

The present power requirements heavily depends on coal, as it accounts for

60 percent of India’s power needs. Due to supply constraints, India is already
importing coal to meet its requirements. If India is to augment its energy needs,
it has to invest heavily in solar power and wind energy, as well as nuclear
power.

India is also looking to augment its energy supply by building 20 more nuclear
reactors. Notably, importing uranium is significantly cheaper than importing
gas, coal, or petroleum. This is significant for a country that is faced with
depleting natural resources.

Against this backdrop comes the recent signing of a civil nuclear agreement
with Japan during Modi’s visit to Tokyo. The deal with Japan comes on the back
of 123 nuclear agreement signed with the United States in 2008.

However, India will face two major challenges in building new reactors. First,
acquiring land is complex and has to overcome legal impediments because of
an archaic land act. The opposition parties, led by Congress, have refused to
support a move made by the government to amend the Land Acquisition Act
because they feel it would deprive the farmers of their livelihood.

Second, nuclear projects in India has historically faced strong public opposition.
There were widespread protests when the Kudankulam nuclear power plant was
being built with Russian assistance in the state of Tamil Nadu, especially from
the fishermen residing near the plant, because of the fear of radiation leaks.
Similarly, there were protests by local villagers against the building of Jaitapur
Nuclear Power Project, whose technology has been provided by France, in
Ratnagiri district in the state of Maharashtra. The anti-nuclear lobby and the
local residents don’t want Fukushima and Chernobyl-like incidents happening
in India.

In that sense, it is ironic that Japan, which canceled the construction of over 12
new nuclear reactors in its own country after the meltdown at the Fukushima
Daiichi power plant in 2011, should have agreed to sign a civil nuclear
agreement with India. The Japanese decision comes in the wake of the inability
of Japanese companies to compete with low-cost reactors being built by Russia
and South Korea. Thus signing of the agreement probably represents an attempt
to bail out companies like Toshiba and Hitachi, allowing them to recover huge
investments in research and development as well as capital costs. Now Japanese
nuclear power has a massive new market in India.
The growing friendship between India and Japan is part of the changing
geopolitical landscape in South and Southeast Asia. Japan is fearful of Chinese
dominance and sees in India a perfect ally to act as a counterweight to China.
However, it is in India’s interests to maintain cordial relations with China, as
any conflict with that country would only impede India’s economic progress.
Moreover, Modi has been trying to improve India’s relations with all its
neighbors, including China. India has a lot to gain from China, as China can
assist India in setting up manufacturing facilities, constructing
infrastructure, building the power sector and modernizing India’s rail
transportation system, where China has considerable expertise.

On the other hand, China continues to act against India’s interests, like it did by
blocking India’s membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and by siding
with Pakistan to block India’s request for a United Nations ban on Pakistan
based Masood Azhar, chief of Jaish-e Mohammad, who was allegedly, involved
in the Mumbai and Pathankot attacks. If China continues with its policy, it will
only succeed in unwittingly forcing India to look for other options to safeguard
its interests, which may not be in China’s interest. The nuclear deal with Japan
is just the latest example.

## November 17, 2016: Modi’s Trip to Tokyo: Takeaways for India-Japan

Relations
The India-Japan strategic partnership is enjoying a new synergy.
By Prakash Panneerselvam

After six years of consultation, India and Japan inked a civil nuclear agreement
on the sidelines of their annual summit, this year held in Tokyo. India is the first
non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to have signed such
a deal with Japan.

While the nuclear deal stole headlines, the bilateral annual summit also
undertook a detailed assessment of the “Special Strategic and Global
Partnership” as outlined in the “India and Japan Vision 2025,” released at last
year’s summit. After discussion on a wide range of bilateral and regional issues,
a substantive joint statement was issued on November 11, 2016. The joint
statement put in perspective areas in which India and Japan could work closely,
which the statement clearly indicated could encompass not only bilateral
concerns but also Indo-Pacific regional issues.

The joint statement clearly represents the tectonic shift in India-Japan

relationship in four areas: nuclear cooperation, counterterrorism, coordination
on regional issues, and defense industry cooperation.

India-Japan Civil Nuclear Cooperation

On November 11, India and Japan signed the “Agreement for Cooperation in
the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy” and a supplementary document, called
“Note on Views and Understanding,” which is also legally binding, to ensure
the implementation of the main deal. The “Note on Views and Understanding”
describes a statement delivered in Vienna on September 5, 2008 by then-
External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee on the Civil Nuclear Initiative.
According to the Note, that speech will constitute the “essential basis for
cooperation between the two states under the agreement.” In the 2008 speech,
Mukherjee emphasized India’s commitment to a voluntary moratorium on
nuclear testing, non-proliferation, and the global disarmament of nuclear
weapons.

Henceforth, any violation of the September 5, 2008 statement could be viewed

as a serious departure from the status quo. In that situation, Japan has reserved
the right to suspend reprocessing of nuclear material at any facility with due
consultation from both side, as described in Article 14(9) of the main text of the
nuclear agreement. The preconditions laid down by Japan in the agreement has
raised serious concern about India’s right to undertake future nuclear test or to
amend its No First Use Policy.

Commenting on the termination clause, Indian Foreign Secretary S.

Jaishankar said that the “nuclear agreement has a termination and cessation
clause – similar to the Indo-U.S. agreement.” To allay Japanese concern, the
deal has given much emphasis on nuclear safety and security, Jaishankar
explained. Professor Takako Hirose, an expert in South Asia nuclear
issues, opines that the “termination clause” is more symbolic than practical,
meant to show that Japan has not compromised its position on disarmament by
signing a nuclear agreement with a country that is not a signatory to the NPT.

But Indian media and strategic circles remain apprehensive about the “Note on
Views and Understanding,” which gives Japan the right to terminate its
cooperation with India if the latter opts to test nuclear weapons in the future.
Any deviation from the present status quo would severely undermine Indo-Japan
civil nuclear cooperation.

India and Japan Statement on Cross-Border Terrorism

After the attack on a military base in Uri, India’s government has stepped up
both military action and diplomatic initiatives against Pakistan. As part of India’s
proactive diplomacy toward cross-border terrorism, India has taken several
steps in international fora to pressure Pakistan to suspend covert activity in
Jammu and Kashmir. Japan, known for maintaining a balanced view on the
India-Pakistan conflict, for the first time has not only condemned terrorist
activity in the 2016 joint statement but also urged Pakistan to take punitive
actions against terrorist groups operating from its territory. This was a major
diplomatic triumph for India in isolating Pakistan internationally.

At the same time, it is important to note that in the post-9/11 period Japan has
maintained a strong relationship with Pakistan to support the U.S. coalition
effort in Afghanistan. Japan also views Pakistan as a forefront in the fight against
terrorism and continues aid and support to stabilize Pakistan’s political and
economic situation. Now, by condemning Pakistan for aiding terrorist activity
against India, Japan has taken a proactive step forward to support New Delhi’s
counterterrorism initiative globally.

Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy

The joint statement highlights the importance of “strengthening rules-based

international order in the Indo-Pacific region” and building a partnership to
counter Chinese influence in the region. Both the prime ministers have called
for a peaceful solution to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and last
week they reaffirmed their “commitment to respecting freedom of navigation
and over flight, and unimpeded lawful commerce, based on the principles of
international law.”

Moreover, new joint initiatives to develop Chabahar port in Iran would

significantly improve India and Japan’s connectivity with Afghanistan and
Central Asia. Japan has recently stepped up its engagement with Iran and is
seeking to expand its footprints in the region. This could complement India’s
effort to counter China-Pakistan trade activity in the region. At the same time,
Chabahar port, located close to major oil-shipping routes, will allow Japan to
monitor Japanese vessels’ movement in the region.

According to news reports, Japan is also seeking to extend its financial support
via the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to upgrade naval air
bases and construct new signals intelligence stations along the Andaman and
Nicobar Island chain, with the goal of monitoring Chinese submarine activity in
the region. The network will eventually be integrated into the existing U.S.-
Japan “Fish Hook” Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) network. This would
boost India’s trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan in
countering China’s assertive maritime policy in the Indo-Pacific region. Further,
the leaders also agreed to strengthen the maritime cooperation between the
three navies to protect the maritime commons.

India-Japan Defense Industrial Cooperation

Recently, defense industry cooperation has been gaining significant importance

in the India-Japan relationship. At the summit, Modi reiterated the importance of
cooperation between defense industries from the two countries. He also
underlined the importance of co-development and co-production in niche
technological areas. Under Modi’s so-called Make in India policy, Japan is also
eagerly looking forward to positive engagement with India in the defense and
aerospace sectors. Keeping in view the negotiations on a possible US2i sale to
India, Japan’s Overseas Human Resources and Industry Development
Association (HIDA) is inviting Indian aircraft industry personnel to training
programs in Japan to deepen aerospace cooperation.
However, the long pending US2i amphibious aircraft deal has yet to get
approval from India. According to India’s External Affair Ministry sources, the
deal is still in the negotiation phase and “India is still evaluating the need” for
such aircraft. Japan is hopeful that the deal will bring a new round of
cooperation in the defense industry and specifically the aerospace sector.

In conclusion, the 2016 annual summit clearly envisages a greater role for India
and Japan in the Indo-Pacific region. The two countries share a similar vision
for building peace and stability in the region and are ready to expand the scope
of strategic and defense cooperation. This year’s bilateral talks clearly represent
a more proactive approach to emerging security challenges in the Indo-Pacific
region.

November 15, 2016: India-Japan Military Aircraft Deal Faces Further Delays
India’s MOD is seeking clarification over the Indian Navy’s requirement for 12
amphibious aircraft from Japan.

Once inducted, the Indian Navy has tentative plans to station a number of US-2i
aircraft off the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal, from where
they could conduct both surveillance patrols and, given the US-2i’s short take-
off capability, search and rescue operations in the eastern Indian Ocean region.
(The aircraft has a range of about 4,500 kilometers.)

December 12, 2016: The Importance of a Japan-India Amphibious Aircraft

Deal
The conclusion of an India-Japan deal for the transfer of ShinMaywa US-2
amphibious aircraft will bear immense strategic importance.
By Satoru Nagao

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Japan in November 2016, Japan
and India concluded an agreement for cooperation in the peaceful use of
nuclear energy. Since the visit, it has been readily apparent that Japan-India
relations have progressed very quickly. Consequently, one is prompted to ask:
What will be the next steps in this relationship? Like the civil nuclear agreement
another issue is pending: Japan has long sought a ShinMaywa US-2 amphibious
plane deal with the Indian Navy. After the civil nuclear cooperation agreement,
this deal is the most significant pending issue between Japan and India.

Why is this deal, merely for a rescue plane, such an important part of the
agenda for Japan-India relations? It is highly probable that this trade is not
merely for the provision of military equipment. It has a broader strategic
significance.

What can India accomplish with the US-2; what are the implications of the sale
for Japan-India relations; and what is the next step?

What can India accomplish with the US-2?

If India were to possess US-2 amphibious planes, what could it accomplish
strategically? One answer is that India could project a stronger presence into the
Indian Ocean and beyond without arousing suspicion in other countries. For
instance, if India deploys this plane for rescuing people or for disaster
management in other countries, then it will be perceived as symbolic of India’s
willingness to extend tangible support to those in need and thereby mark India’s
presence. These countries’ image of India will improve and New Delhi can thus
expand its influence peacefully and concretely in these countries.

Why does India need to show a presence now? The simple answer is Chinese
assertiveness.

Currently, China has been expanding military activities in the East China Sea,
South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Viewed in light of historical
experience, the changing military balance affects China’s propensity for
assertiveness. For example, when France withdrew from Vietnam in the 1950s,
China occupied half of the Paracel Islands. China occupied the other half of the
Paracel Islands in 1974 immediately after the Vietnam War ended and the
United States withdrew from the region.

After the Soviet Union withdrew from Vietnam, China attacked the Spratly
Islands, controlled by Vietnam, in 1988. Along similar lines, after the U.S.
withdrew from the Philippines, China occupied Mischief Reef, which is claimed
by both the Philippines and Vietnam. Furthermore, after the Cold War, the U.S.-
China military balance has changed. For example, since 2000, the United States
has acquired only 13 submarines whereas China has acquired at least 42
submarines. In February 2015, U.S. Vice Admiral Joseph Mulloy, deputy chief
of naval operations for capabilities and resources, reported that China has more
diesel- and nuclear-powered submarines than the United States.

Therefore, countries bordering China, including India, must show more

presence to fill the power vacuum created by a declining U.S. role in the region
and deter China’s assertiveness to maintain peace and prosperity. The rescue
plane is a useful tool for asserting such a presence. In this sense, the US-2 is not
merely a military tool. It is more a strategic tool that will affect India’s relations
with many other countries.

What are the implications of the sale for Japan–India relations?

The US-2 deal will have important effects on Japan-India relation and the view
of the relationship from the current domestic political situation in Japan. The
US-2 trade will be a symbolic first step to find new overseas markets for Japan.
This symbolic first step is extremely important because some hesitation persists
in Japan about exporting arms.

Public opinion also remains divided on the question because most Japanese
people have been educated as pacifists. Under those circumstances, the
“defense industry” in Japan also hesitates to export weapons. In Japan, most big
companies related with defense have not relied on the defense component of
their business.

As described above, under such a situation, a symbolic first trade is an

extremely important political step to change the mood in Japan. If India
concludes the US-2 trade, then people who support the arms trade will get
political power and will be active to suggest further arms trade. Therefore, a US-
2 deal should not be regarded as a single transaction; it can open the door to
the procurement of a wider varieties of defense-related technologies for India
from Japan.

What is the next step?

If India concludes the US-2 deal with Japan, what kind of defense technologies
can India expect to get in the near future as a next step? Japan has a
considerable number of sophisticated technologies and know-how. For
example, to protect India’s aircraft carriers, India must address China’s anti-ship
ballistic missiles, which can attack India’s aircraft carriers at any time.
Therefore, New Delhi needs a sea-based missile defense system. Under the joint
Japan-U.S. development of sea-based missile defense systems, Tokyo is taking
the lead on developing important components. Consequently, Japan and India,
along with the United States, can potentially cooperate in the missile defense
sector. Furthermore, because missile defense systems are closely related with
space technologies, the possibility exists that Japan-U.S.-India cooperation in
the missile defense sector will extend to cooperation in space as well.

Moreover, minesweepers are an important tool for India to deal with Chinese
submarine incursions because submarines can deploy sea mines, providing a
powerful area denial capability. Japan has good know-how and equipment to
dispose of sea mines.

Finally, Japan’s submarine detection sensors are sophisticated because Tokyo

has placed an emphasis on detecting Russian submarine activities since the
1980s. Japan’s systems are world-class in this regard. Therefore, to address
China’s naval activities in the Indian Ocean, Japan-India strategic cooperation
in this area can also be extremely effective and useful.

Strategic benefits to come

Therefore, as described above, this US-2 sale is has critical strategic potential.
Despite rescue being the main purpose of the aircraft, it can also be used as a
concrete display of the India’s presence and power projection. Furthermore,
asserting presence is of vital importance to maintaining peace and prosperity
throughout the Indo-Pacific amid a potentially declining U.S. role.
If those who support arms trade in Japan gain power by concluding this US-2
trade, then India will receive more access to Japan’s sophisticated defense-
related technologies. Therefore, those in both countries that regard security
cooperation between Japan and India as an important priority, must not hesitate
in promoting the conclusion of this deal, thereby opening the way to strategic
benefits for both countries.

February 04, 2017: The US-India-Japan Trilateral: Economic Foundation for a

Grand Strategy
What happens when the world’s oldest, largest, and most responsible
democracies meet?
By Hemal Shah

What happens when the world’s oldest, largest, and most responsible
democracies meet? Six years ago, the United States, India and Japan set up their
first official trilateral meeting and decided to meet annually. Together, they
represent 25 percent of the world’s population and 35 percent of global GDP.
Common goals of economic development, managing China’s territorial
aggression in South and East Asia, and preservation of the liberal democratic
order bind them together. Undoubtedly, they make a compelling strategic logic
to come forward and work together to ensure peace and stability in the Indo-
Pacific region.

But so far, this trilateral has failed to graduate from constructive symbolism to
actual substance. The absence of a robust economic foundation is stunting its
strategic potential. A deeper economic engagement will enmesh each other’s
priorities, giving shape and form to their strategic goals in the Indo-Pacific
region.

Skeptics are right when they question the real value of this partnership: The
Obama Administration’s “pivot to Asia” is arguably dead and Asian allies and
partners are rethinking their reliance on the United States. In a last-ditch effort,
despite his unpredictability, hopes are pinned on President Trump’s promise of
standing up to China’s belligerence. In India, one wonders if Prime Minister
Modi’s “Look East” policy involves the United States, or is a strategy to
exclusively strengthen East Asian camaraderie. India is still a developing
country, remains uncomfortable with any labels of “alliances,” and its
relationship with Japan is largely defined by development assistance rather a
trade partnership. Meanwhile, the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans Pacific
Partnership and Trump’s inward-looking trade policies signal a huge blow to
Prime Minister Abe’s attempt at addressing Japan’s economic woes.

China unites them. Its military continues to encroach on India’s northeastern

border; while refusing to scale down its territorial infringement on international
waters in the East and South China Sea. But China also divides them: The trio
flirted with establishing a “democratic quadrilateral” with Australia in 2007,
which was quickly dismantled for fear of ruffling China’s feathers. The
combined trilateral trade of $400 billion pales in comparison with U.S.-China
trade of $660 billion alone.
Yet this combination — America’s commitment to democracy and robust
military capabilities, the promise of India’s rapid economic growth and strategic
location in the Indian Ocean, and Japan’s initiative to protect the collective
freedom of navigation for trade — cannot be squandered away. For the trilateral
to succeed and mount the pinnacle, economic goals should drive the
relationship to move from symbolism to functionality, and eventually substance.
It will also help assert India’s foreign policy posture in the region.

First, the trilateral should be used to strengthen the respective bilateral

relationships. The United States and India have never been closer but need to
act on a clear plan to rise from their goal of $100 billion to $500 billion in
bilateral trade. They need to prioritize the free trade deal and operationalize the
nuclear deal that marked the peak of their relationship.

The shifting dynamic of the revered U.S.-Japan alliance should be addressed. In

their upcoming bilateral summit, both Trump and Abe need to resolve qualms
on trade and tariffs, cost of basing U.S. forces, and a renewed Japanese
commitment to stand up for the United States with the reinterpretation of the
Constitution on collective self-defense. While the India-Japan relationship
enjoys an enviable bonhomie, their bilateral trade currently hovers just around
$15 billion. Leadership chemistry could tie the partnership well together. For
instance, the indomitable kinship between Modi and Abe, and their respective
optimistic beginnings with Trump, should be leveraged for the upcoming
dialogue in Delhi this summer.

Second, the United States and Japan should double down to propel economic
reform in India. As a non-ally of the United States, India is the odd man in the
relationship. As a developing country, joint strategic goals also mean
opportunity costs when capital is deployed to scale up economic prowess. At
the government level, the United States and Japan are best placed to work
together to share recommendations with India on ease of doing business and
global best practices on trade facilitation. Modi is competitive and wants India
to rise up the ranks of global indices measuring business friendliness. The
United States and Japan should also help develop India into a major logistics
hub in the Indian Ocean region – witness to 40 percent of global trade – and
help design the criteria for their new ranking on logistics performance for states.
They should also work as partners to improve India’s innovation and intellectual
property environment to enable defense technology transfer as well as address
liability issues with regard to their respective nuclear deals with India.

Third, the government-level dialogue should create a forum on the sidelines to

involve the private sector. This will inject the missing ingredient to pivot the
economic relationship forward. The three countries could start with a shortlist of
jointly investable projects and exclusively identify special economic zones. For
example, the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor currently being developed by
Japan offers several opportunities for U.S. companies. As India moves into a
cashless economy, already well-established U.S. financial services companies
could help set up payment systems for the Japanese high speed rail project
between Mumbai and Ahmedabad in India. The United States and Japan could
also adopt a Smart City in India to develop urban infrastructure.

In light of Trump’s deal-making nature, Modi’s incremental shift away from a

nonaligned foreign policy, and Abe’s vision of a more assertive Japan, a stronger
trilateral partnership makes sense. It is heartening to see their annual Malabar
naval exercise graduating from a relationship of trust and goodwill to that of
building joint capabilities. Japan’s emphasis on a long term Asia strategy and
patience with India can help neutralize America’s impatience to socialize India
to play a bigger role in regional strategic affairs, and ultimately use the platform
to reaffirm the liberal world order. A strong economic foundation would best
dictate the grand strategy of this trilateral partnership.

February 23, 2017: Japan and India: Deepening Ties in the Age of Uncertainty
With both countries concerned about U.S. leadership in Asia, a strong
partnership looks more and more inevitable.
By Tan Ming Hui and Nazia Hussain

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe held his first official summit with U.S.
President Donald Trump on February 10-11. Being Japan’s most important ally,
it was crucial for Abe to reaffirm bilateral security and trade ties with the United
States. In many aspects, the summit was deemed a great diplomatic success for
Abe. During their joint press conference, Trump called the U.S.-Japan alliance
“the cornerstone of peace and stability in the Pacific region” and indicated his
administration’s commitment to “the security of Japan and all areas under its
administrative control.”

While there is little doubt about the ability of the longstanding alliance to ride
out a few diplomatic storms, uncertainties about the Trump administration’s
foreign policy direction remain. Such uncertainties pose a risk of strategic
miscalculation for Japan, underscoring the need for Tokyo to seek a degree of
self-reliance and additional stability beyond the alliance. Under such a
geopolitical climate, Japan will benefit from improving its relations with other
regional players, and it will likely pursue deeper ties with India — a natural
partner for Japan.

Japan and India as Natural Allies

Without the burden of historical baggage or outstanding disputes, and with a

shared vision for democracy, Japan and India are natural allies and are ready to
expand the scope of their economic, strategic, and defense cooperation.
In fact, Japan is the only country New Delhi has allowed to tread in the
politically sensitive region of northeastern India, where Japan is investing in
socioeconomic development projects. Tokyo has been providing official
development assistance (ODA) loans in the fields of energy, water supply,
forestry, and urban development in India’s northeast since 1981. Also, New
Delhi has for the first time allowed for foreign investment in the strategically
critical Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The Modi government is open to
collaborating on upgrading civilian infrastructure on the islands with Japan; the
first project being discussed is a 15-megawatt diesel power plant on South
Andaman Island. The Japanese Embassy in India has confirmed that Japan was
eager to use ODA to enhance India’s “connectivity” with countries that are
members of ASEAN or the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC).

The regional security environment also remains a prominent factor. A joint

statement following the 2016 summit outlined a convergence of interests on
bilateral issues and regional concerns, including nuclear cooperation,
counterterrorism, coordination on regional issues, and defense industry
cooperation. Furthermore, Japan and India inked a civil nuclear agreement in
2016, making India the first non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty to have signed such a deal with Japan.

Unpredictability in the Age of Trump

Meanwhile, Japan and India share concerns over the Trump administration’s
unpredictable foreign policy decisions. During his presidential campaign,
Trump alarmingly suggested that U.S. Asian allies Japan and South Korea
should pursue their own nuclear armaments as a deterrent, showing a lack of
understanding of the complexities in Northeast Asian relations.

Recent developments, including Trump’s immediate withdrawal from the Trans-

Pacific Partnership (TPP) and his unfortunate phone call with the Australian
prime minister over an Obama-era refugee agreement, have also called the
credibility of U.S. leadership and commitment to its partners into question.

There is also uncertainty over who calls the shots when it comes to U.S. foreign
policy strategy.

Despite being one of the United States’ strongest allies, Japan was a foreign
policy target during Trump’s campaign. Besides portraying Japan as a free-
rider on the U.S. security guarantee, Trump also criticized Japan’s automotive
trade practices and accused Japan of devaluing its currency. During the recent
summit, Abe made deliberate moves to underplay these economic
disagreements in favor of promoting a positive relationship with Trump. It is a
smart diplomatic move at this stage; however, simply sidestepping such issues is
not sustainable in the long run.

Meanwhile, Trump seems to be keen on developing close ties with India.

Overall, Trump’s rhetoric toward India and Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi has been largely positive. Nevertheless, such development may not be a
permanent fixture. One major source of potential contention might be Trump’s
move to clamp down on H-1B visa programs, which would affect Indian
outsourcing firms. The biggest beneficiaries of H-1B visas are Indians; in 2014,
Indians accounted for 70 percent of the total H-1B petitions approved.

A Timely Partnership
Several members of ASEAN remain embroiled in tension with China over the
South China Sea disputes. This, combined with the possibility of the United
States playing a reduced role in the region, may make some countries nervous
at the prospect of China’s emergence as the sole regional leader. As such, the
strengthening of Japan-India relations is timely and offers an alternative to
China’s otherwise unhindered dominance.

Although a more robust Japan-India partnership will be welcomed as a

counterbalance to China’s assertiveness, bandwagoning against China will be
counterproductive. To this end, Japan and India are already working to engage
with other regional players; Abe recently visited the Philippines, Australia,
Indonesia and Vietnam in January to promote close cooperation while Modi’s
“Act East” policy hinges on connectivity with Asian nations. To ensure stability,
however, they should also engage with China to promote peaceful solutions to
regional conflicts.

Some might argue that India lacks the political will to assume a greater
leadership role in the Asia-Pacific. However, India is already gearing up to keep
a check on China’s expanding footprint in the Indian Ocean littorals, which
have traditionally been under India’s sphere of influence. New Delhi will not
want to rely just on a shaky White House to cope with a rising China. It is likely
that the Modi leadership will adopt a more proactive foreign policy approach,
looking for natural allies in Asia. If there are any reservations about India’s past
reputation as a passive actor in world affairs, there is enough indication of
political will now, which signals a more proactive stance. This will certainly be
welcomed by the Abe administration.

April 01, 2017: Japan and India: Concerted Efforts at Regional Diplomacy
How Japan and India can cooperate to increase engagement with ASEAN –
without alarming China.
By Tan Ming Hui and Nazia Hussain

Facing an uncertain geopolitical climate, Japan and India will benefit from
working closely to play a greater leadership role in the region as they share
converging strategic and security interests. Given the possibility that the United
States may disengage from the Asia-Pacific, both Tokyo and New Delhi are
concerned about Beijing’s increasing assertiveness and will seek to increase
their collective capabilities to counterbalance China’s otherwise unhindered
dominance. Competitive behavior vis-a-vis China is likely to continue in arenas
such as the South China Sea, Official Development Assistance (ODA), and
infrastructure projects.
Although neither Japan nor India is party to territorial disputes in the South
China Sea, they are both committed to upholding freedom of navigation and a
rules-based regime, and have vital commercial and strategic stakes that keep
their interest alive in the troubled waters.

Japan has been increasing its strategic engagement in the contested region by
providing capacity building assistance to ASEAN member states,
notably Vietnam and the Philippines. Japan is also planning to send its largest
warship, the Izumo helicopter carrier, on a three-month tour through the South
China Sea, before it joins the Malabar joint naval exercises with India and the
United States in the Indian Ocean in July. This signals that Tokyo has the
political will and capacity to play a larger maritime role.

Meanwhile, the success of India’s “Act East” policy hinges on connectivity and
trade with ASEAN and the far-eastern Pacific. As such, India is seeking to
expand its role to ensure a stable regional maritime order. India has become
increasingly engaged with states like Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines,
asserting the Permanent Court of Arbitration judgment in support of Manila’s
claims. Indian naval ships have increased their presence in the South China Sea,
cooperating with Vietnam on hydrocarbon exploration despite Beijing’s
warnings and training Vietnamese submariners in India. Talks are also
underway for New Delhi to impart submarine training to Indonesia.

Economic Means to a Strategic End

However, to arouse less suspicion and backlash from China, Japan and India
can choose to focus on socio-economic engagement of the region, and take a
lead on non-traditional security issues.

Japan has given the region development aid since the 1950s. In 2015, the
Japanese government replaced its ODA Charter with the Development
Cooperation Charter, which clearly links Japan’s aid with its strategic goals.
Rather than just providing assistance, Japan seeks to use its aid to promote
development partnerships, such as with India. Japan and India have been and
will continue to use infrastructure and connectivity projects to promote their
shared interests. Japan is actively engaged in funding connectivity projects in
the strategic Northeastern region of India, which links India to Southeast Asia.
Japan has pledged Rs. 67.1 billion ($1 billion) to improve roads in India’s
Northeast, targeting National Highways 40 and 55, which provide links to
Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Additionally, Japan and India can leverage their technological prowess. They
can provide research and capacity-building leadership to drive sectors such as
clean technology, renewable energy, cybersecurity, and space technology, to
support the region’s societal and commercial development.
Space technology applications can reap socio-economic benefits for the region,
including disaster warning and management, environmental monitoring, and
communications and navigation. Japan and India can explore joint development
of their space programs, play a bigger role in regional space activities, and
engage other nations interested in space development. In November 2017, India
will host the 24th Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum. This is an
opportunity for India and Japan to present a strong bilateral cooperative
framework, which may lead the way for increased regional cooperation.

The Domestic Variable

Japan and India’s ability to pursue wider regional engagement for the long term
is dependent on the stability and longevity of the ruling administrations.

While the expansion of Japan’s security role has been pursued by Abe, the
Japanese public is still wary of a more active security policy. In these
circumstances, it will be pragmatic for him to focus on non-security tools to
achieve Japan’s strategic goals.

ASEAN’s Response

ASEAN will welcome greater engagement by Japan and India in the region since
both countries have always acknowledged the notion of ASEAN centrality and
have stakes in reaffirming the status quo — that is, the ASEAN role in the U.S.-
led regional order. As long as Japan and India continue to articulate their
support for ASEAN and recognize that it is crucial for peace and stability in the
region, ASEAN member states stand to benefit from increased engagement by a
stronger Japan-India partnership. More importantly, ASEAN member states do
not wish to be embroiled in a big power rivalry, or be forced to choose sides.

Overall, Japan and India must adopt a discrete counterbalance to avoid

alarming China and destabilizing the region. If they focus on economic
diplomacy and cooperation on non-traditional security issues, there might be
possibilities to extend an opportunity to China for more cooperation and
engagement, which will ultimately enable ASEAN to maintain its erstwhile role
in the regional security architecture. This will help to assure China and the
region that it is not a zero-sum game.

April 28, 2017: India, Japan, Australia, and the US: The Return of Asia’s ‘Quad’
Like-minded democracies in Asia are increasingly drawn together.
By Harsh V. Pant

After making a pitch for an observer status during this year’s Malabar trilateral
naval exercises scheduled to be held in July, Australia has indicated that it is
keen for a logistics support agreement with India along the lines of the one
concluded with the United States last year. This comes at a time when there is a
lot of hue and cry in India about Australia scrapping its skilled visa program —
the employer-sponsored temporary work visas, popularly known as the 457
visa. While the government of Malcolm Turnbull may have taken a short-
sighted approach in its engagement with India by moving ahead with its new
visa restrictions, New Delhi would be equally short-sighted if it just focuses on
this issue at the risk of overlooking larger shifts in regional balance of power.

The current transition of power in the Asia-Pacific, underlined by America’s

relative decline and China’s growing power, has significant implications for
most Asian states. Though the uncertainty around the future of international
politics, norms, and institutions does impinge upon all members of the
international society, the Asian states find themselves at the forefront of this
transition. For them the current transition of power is not only an ideological
contest over the form and nature of the international political system but is
inextricably linked to their own national security imperatives in a number of
ways. India, Japan, and Australia are at the center of this strategic flux in the
Indo-Pacific.

With the coming of Modi government, Japan’s participation in Malabar has

been institutionalized. Both Japan and the United States have repeatedly
expressed their desires to expand the scope of Malabar exercise. The vision
document signed by the Modi and Abe in September 2014 called out for the
“regularization of bilateral maritime exercises as well as to Japan’s continued
participation in India.”

India and Japan have an institutionalized trilateral strategic dialogue partnership

with the United States. Initiated in 2011. Maintaining a balance of power in the
Asian-Pacific as well as maritime security in Indo-Pacific waters became an
important element of this dialogue. A similar dialogue exists between the United
States, Japan, and Australia. Under Modi, such security trilateralism in Asia has
received not only new momentum and is being expanded to incorporate other
regional powers: in June 2015, India, Australia, and Japan held their first ever
high level dialogue in New Delhi. These trilateral initiatives have a serious
potential to transform into a ‘quad’ of democracies in the Indo-Pacific region.
The roots of this potential partnership were laid in late 2004 when navies from
the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia collaborated in tsunami relief operations all
across the Indian Ocean. Japan has been the most vocal supporter of such an
initiative. In 2007, Abe, in his earlier stint as Prime Minister, lobbied for Asia’s
democracies to come together. This was also actively supported by the United
States. Such an initiative resulted in a five nation naval exercise in Bay of Bengal
in September 2007 code-named Malabar 07-02. However, perceiving a
possible ganging-up of Asia’s democracies, China issued demarches to New
Delhi and Canberra, causing this initiative to lose steam, since both Australia
and New Delhi felt it unwise to provoke China. As China becomes more
aggressive in the region, there are signs that India and Australia may be
warming up to the idea again.

India and Australia are wary of China’s assault on maritime security and
freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region. These common concerns have
strengthened the need for greater maritime cooperation between the two nations
and the two have started conducting joint naval combat exercises. During
Modi’s visit to Australia, a security framework agreement was signed by the two
countries, further underscoring the importance of defense cooperation in the
Indian Ocean region. India and Australia are leading powers in the Indian
Ocean region. The two countries are also at the helm of Indian Ocean Regional
Association (IORA), a formal grouping consisting of the Indian Ocean Littoral
States. Australia is also a permanent member of Indian Ocean Naval
Symposium, which brings together the local navies of Indian Ocean region. The
extent of their regional cooperation in Indian Ocean can also be ascertained by
their annual trilateral dialogues with countries like Japan and Indonesia.

The need of the hour is to push for greater engagement with such like-minded
nations. Australia has been long keen on joining the Malabar exercises along
with the U.S. and Japan. India should favorably consider this request as the idea
of an Indo-Pacific democratic quad needs resurrection at the earliest.

June 03, 2017: Thinking Africa: India, Japan, and the Asia-Africa Growth
Corridor
Outlining India and Japan’s approaches to Africa, separately and bilaterally.
By Titli Basu

Modi and Shinzo Abe have looked to the Indo-Pacific theater to further expand
the scope of India-Japan cooperation. Besides exploring prospects for
cooperation in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and adjoining regions like Iran and
Afghanistan, Indian and Japanese leaders have marked Africa as a priority in this
regard.

While the continent has been included in Tokyo and New Delhi’s bilateral
discussions since the institution of India-Japan Dialogue on Africa in 2010, the
leadership infused further momentum with the conceptualization of the Asia-
Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) in November 2016. The AAGC is an important
component of the India-Japan Vision 2025 for Indo-Pacific Region. It further
converges with Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy and Expanded
Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI) and India’s development
cooperation with Africa and Act East Policy.

Following up, India hosted a special session on India-Japan cooperation for the
development of Africa at the 52nd Annual Meeting of the African Development
Bank (AfDB) in May 2017. Reiterating the bilateral commitment toward African
development, Modi argued that India, in cooperation with Japan and African
stakeholders, is committed to pursue developmental cooperation that is
“responsive to the needs of African countries.”

The AAGC Vision Document, jointly crafted by India’s Research and

Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), Indonesia’s Economic
Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), and Japan’s Institute of
Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO), underscores that this growth corridor is
focused on four priority areas, including development projects, quality
infrastructure and institutional connectivity, skill development and capacity
building, and people-to-people cooperation. The objective is to pursue joint
initiatives in various sectors such as health, infrastructure, manufacturing, and
connectivity, in keeping with the development priorities of Africa and the
Sustainable Development Goals.

Japan is pushing for collaboration with India to decrease market risks in Africa.
Combining India’s experience and understanding of the African market with
Japan’s technological know-how and funding capabilities will lead to a ‘“win-
win scenario” in realizing Africa’s growth opportunities. At the special session
of the AfDB, stakeholders deliberated on the prospects of promoting African
business through private-public partnerships. Aligning with the African Union
(AU)-designed Agenda 2063 founded on inclusive growth, AAGC aims to
advance sustainable development and interconnectedness between and within
the two growth poles of Asia and Africa to encourage a free and open Indo-
Pacific.

While India instituted the India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) to further its
engagement with Africa, Japan’s Africa outreach is done primarily through the
Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). Tokyo is
concentrating on three important areas, in keeping with the focus of Japanese
private sectors, including the Northern corridor, Nacala corridor, and the
growth area in West Africa; resources and energy development; and urban
development. Japanese investment will be effected partially by using the
Enhanced Private Sector Assistance for Africa (EPSA), conceived in partnership
with the AfDB. In addition, Japan under the Abe Initiative 2.0 aims to nurture
“manufacturing and maintenance service personnel” and capacity building of
technical personnel in the field of natural resource development. Besides the
economic rationale, Japan also aims to garner African nations’ support for its
ambitions at the UN Security Council.

Japan’s Africa policy is founded on resource and economic diplomacy,

especially the export of infrastructure. The estimated infrastructure financing
deficit of Africa stands at $100 billion annually. Abe, committed to a “quality,
resilient, and stable Africa,” has pledged $30 billion in investment by 2018,
including $10 billion in infrastructure development. Japan aims to promote high
quality infrastructure partnerships and facilitate expansion to emerging markets.
The June 2013 Japan Revitalization Strategy articulated the significance of
creating new frontiers for growth by capturing the international infrastructure
market. It argued for tripling infrastructure sales by 2020. The Strategy looks to
Africa while discussing strategic initiatives for obtaining overseas markets.

India, meanwhile, has invested in the continent based on a “model of

cooperation… free of conditions,” prioritizing the needs of the African
stakeholders. The Delhi Declaration 2015, “Partners in Progress: Towards a
Dynamic and Transformative Development Agenda” adopted at the IAFS is
aligned with the objectives of Agenda 2063. India’s Africa policy draws strength
from India’s support for democracy, anti-colonialism, anti-racism, and India’s
contribution by way of developmental aid and participation in the UN
peacekeeping operations in Africa. At the 2015 IAFS, India extended $10 billion
aimed at development projects over five years and offered $600 million in grant
assistance, including an India-Africa development fund of $100 million. Indian
engagement has focused on education, capacity building, skill and human
resources development, and the Pan-African e-network supporting tele-
education, tele-medicine, and e-commerce.

Meanwhile, as Africa’s economic growth gathers momentum, India’s interests

are shaped by expanding African markets. The Federation of Indian Chambers
of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), in its report “The Rising Africa,” argued that
resources, a mounting consumer base, and generally positive economic
projections influence interest in the continent as a business and investment
target. With an objective of achieving $100 billion in bilateral trade in the next
two years, the focus is on power, pharmaceuticals, ICT, and services.

India’s energy stakes are another important variable shaping New Delhi’s
approach toward Africa. Africa’s hydrocarbon sector is of interest in order to
fuel the Indian economic engine. 2014 crude import statistics reflect that India
sourced16 percent of its consumption (32 million metric tonnes, or MMT) from
Africa: 3 MMT from North Africa and 29 MMT from West Africa, primarily from
Nigeria and Angola.

Drawing from India and Japan’s respective stakes in the continent, as well as
their bilateral and regional ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, Tokyo and New Delhi
have paved the way for greater coordination in Africa. Where there is an
alignment of interests, India has invested in strengthening relations with
likeminded countries. New Delhi is working with Washington and Tokyo to
support African development.

Founded on a consultative and inclusive approach, the idea of AAGC is aimed

at cultivating value chains, integrating and developing a competitive economic
bloc, thereby accelerating Africa and Asia’s development trajectory. However,
translating the idea into deliverables will require India and Japan to conceive of
joint projects aiding capacity building, infrastructure, and connectivity;
synergize their resources and capabilities; and most importantly ensure the
efficient implementation of these projects to demonstrate bilateral commitment
to African partners.

Titli Basu is an associate fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses
(IDSA), New Delhi.
June 12, 2017: Japan’s Outreach to Northeastern India
Japanese investment will play an important role in linking India’s northeast with
Myanmar and Bangladesh.
By Tridivesh Singh Maini and Sandeep Sachdeva

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his three years in office, has repeated
his commitment to increasing the involvement of northeastern states in the
country’s outreach toward Southeast Asia. During his visit to Assam, for the
inauguration of the 9.15-kilometer Dhola-Sadiya Bridge (India’s longest), Modi
reiterated the role of the northeastern region in India’s Act East Policy.

Last year, while speaking at the dedication of various projects in

Meghalaya, Modi stated: “My government has been proactively following the
‘Act East Policy.’ I consider the northeastern region as the gateway to Southeast
Asia. As part of this policy, it is our mission to upgrade the infrastructure in
road, rail, telecom, power, and waterways in the region.”

The Modi government has been paying special attention to key infrastructural
projects that will enhance connectivity with Myanmar. These include key
projects such as the India-Myanmar-Thailand highway and the Kaladan Multi-
Modal Transit Transport Project.

An interesting development has been the participation of Japan in key

infrastructure projects in India’s northeast. This has sent a strong message to
China that New Delhi will explore all possible options. In April 2017, the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) signed an agreement with the Union
government in New Delhi to provide over 67 billion yen ($610 million) for
Phase I of the North East Road Network Connectivity Improvement Project.
Phase 1 will see the enhancement of National Highway 54 and National
Highway 51 in Mizoram and Meghalaya.

NH-54 is located in central Mizoram, and a stretch of the targeted section of

NH-54, spread over 350 kilometers, extends from Aizawl to Tuipang in
Mizoram.

The improvement of NH-54 is not just vital for the state, but also will enhance
connectivity of the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Corridor, which seeks to link
India’s northeastern states with the rest of India via Myanmar, by roads, inland
water transport, and marine transport. These projects will also complement the
Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor, something the previous U.S.
administration had pushed for. The Corridor seeks to enhance connectivity
between South Asia and Southeast Asia through Myanmar and Bangladesh.

Japanese participation in the northeast is very much in sync with the December
2015 declaration issued during Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit.
Seeking synergy between India’s Act East policy and Japan’s “Partnership for
Quality Infrastructure,” Abe and Modi agreed to create top class, durable
infrastructure that would improve connectivity not just within India, and
between India and other countries in the region.

This cooperation between India and Japan is of course not restricted to South
Asia and Southeast Asia. India and Japan will work jointly to enhance
connectivity between Asia and Africa as well. During a meeting of the African
Development Bank (AfDB) in Ahmedabad, Modi released a vision document on
the “Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC),” an idea which had been discussed
during his visit to Japan in November 2016.

Of late, there has also been greater interaction between northeastern states and
Japan.

On May 20, Japanese Ambassador to India Kenji Hiramitsu visited Imphal, the
capital of Manipur, where he paid floral tribute to all people who lost their lives
in the battle of Imphal 73 years ago. The battle was fought in 1944 between the
Japanese army and the Allied forces in the areas surrounding Imphal. While
reiterating the important ancient links between Japan and India’s northeast, the
ambassador also spoke about the potential of cooperation in a number of areas,
with a special thrust on greater people-to-people contact.

While Japanese investments in the Northeast, especially in infrastructure, will

facilitate India’s Act East Policy, they will also give a fillip to development and
prosperity in the northeastern region, which is imperative for India’s growth.

August 02, 2017: Japan Is Building India’s Infrastructure

Japan should help develop India’s northeast, and in so doing send a message to
China.
By Tridivesh Singh Maini and Sandeep Sachdeva

In recent years, India-Japan relations have considerably improved in both the

economic and strategic spheres. July provided two important examples of how
strategic ties have improved immensely. First, there were the week-long
trilateral naval exercises between India, Japan, and the United States, which this
year came amidst the standoff between India-China over the Doklam plateau.
Then on July 20, the landmark India-Japan civil nuclear agreement came into
force. According to the deal, six new nuclear reactors will be built for power
generation. India and Japan are also working on Asia-Africa Growth Corridor
(AAGC), which was unveiled on May 23, 2017 during the 52nd Annual Meeting
of the African Development Bank (AfDB) held in Gandhinagar, Gujarat.

In the area of infrastructure too, India is seeking to benefit from Japanese

expertise. Japan is already associated with the assistance and know-how it
provided for Phase 1 of the Delhi Metro. Now, according to some media
reports, the Mumbai-Ahmedabad bullet-train project going to be launched
during Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to India from September 12-
14. The Japanese are also involved in other mega projects, like the Delhi-
Mumbai Industrial Corridor, which began a decade ago.

Over the past decade and a half, Japanese investment has played significant role
in India’s growth story. Japanese invested more than $25 billion in different
sectors across the India during the period from 2000-2017. Currently, Japan is
the third biggest investor in India, and investment from Japan increased
substantially during 2016-17. Japanese investments in India during this
period reached $4.7 billion, an 80 percent increase over the $2.6 billion of
2015-16. Most importantly Japan has pledged investments of around $35
billion for the period of 2014-19 to boost India’s manufacturing and
infrastructure sectors. The Japanese government even specially tasked Mizuho
Financial Group with finding investment opportunities in India.

Earlier Japanese investments were mainly concentrated in a few sectors such as

automobiles, telecommunications, and electrical equipment. But now in recent
years, FDI from Japan has grown both vertically and horizontally. According to
the Economic Times, “Investments from Japan are getting diverse and sectors
that have received FDI during 2016-17 period include retail, textile, consumer
durables, food & beverages, and banking (credit card services).”

Interestingly, according to a survey conducted by the Japanese government, the

state of Haryana in north India received the most investment. Japan has also
planned to set up around 12 industrial parks across the India in different states.

Neemrana, roughly three hours drive from New Delhi, is home to big Japanese
companies such as Toyota Motor Corp., Daikin Industries Ltd, and Hitachi Ltd
on an industrial complex of 1,100 acres dedicated exclusively to Japanese
corporations. The complex provides direct employment to approximately
10,000 people.

It is interesting to note that Japanese investment and industrial parks are spread
all over India — except for eastern and northeastern India. That may be
changing. Lately, increasing importance is being given to the role of the
northeast in India’s outreach to Southeast Asia. Modi has pointed out that “We
have to make the northeast a gateway for Southeast Asia.”

Japan is also playing important role in infrastructure development in the

northeast. In April 2017, the Japan International Cooperation Agency
(JICA) signed an agreement with the Union government in New Delhi to provide
over 67 billion yen ($610 million) for Phase I of the North East Road Network
Connectivity Improvement Project, which will see the enhancement of
important projects in Meghalaya and Mizoram.

But there is still huge demand for infrastructure development and investment in
range of sectors. As per a report from Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC),
investment of Rs 3.06 trillion ($48 billion) is required to develop the road
networks in the region.

Of late, northeastern states like Assam have been engaging with Japan directly.
The Japanese ambassador to India, Kenji Hiramatsu, visited Manipur in May
2017, to commemorate the 73rd anniversary of the battle of Imphal. Between
the battles of Imphal and Kohima, 70,000 Japanese soldiers lost their lives. The
ambassador said that his country will build a war museum in the state.

Japan should look at increasing its presence in the northeast by investing in its
infrastructure. Greater Japanese cooperation with India to develop infrastructure
and enhance connectivity with Southeast Asia through Myanmar will also send
a clear message to China — that New Delhi’s approach toward its northeast can
not be dictated by Beijing, which pays scant respect to New Delhi’s concerns
regarding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

September 08, 2017: Japanese PM Shinzo Abe Is Set to Visit India: What to
Expect
The Japanese prime minister’s upcoming visit to India marks the start of a new
era in bilateral ties.

While India was embroiled in the standoff over Doklam with China, which has
since been resolved, North Korea’s shenanigans have upset the security
dynamics in Northeast Asia. Pyongyang’s recent hydrogen bomb test and its
overflight of a missile over Japan have forced Tokyo to take another look at its
options on how to deal with this problem.

During this upcoming visit, Abe will be laying the foundation stone for the
construction of India’s first high-speed railway corridor between India’s
commercial capital, Mumbai, and Ahmedabad in Gujarat. Abe has been
looking to export Japan’s famed shinkansen (bullet train) technology and after
the setback in Indonesia, where Japan lost out to China, India represents good
tidings for the Japanese railway sector and assorted industries.

Under Abe, Tokyo is also trying to claw its way back into the high-stakes tussle
for influence in the Indian Ocean region, particularly in the light of Beijing’s
growing aggressiveness in the region. Tokyo’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Strategy” is critical to its economic security and stability. At the same time, the
construction of the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka by China was a wake-up call
for New Delhi as Beijing has now entered what many in India considered as its
own backyard.

Meanwhile, India’s non-participation in Beijing’s signature One Belt, One Road

(OBOR) initiative has put the onus on New Delhi to offer alternate models of
infrastructure development. While it is doing so with projects like the India-
Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) trilateral highway, it is also teaming up with Japan in
the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) initiative, which aims to pool together
Indian and Japanese expertise and funding in building infrastructure in Africa.
Japan also has the “Partnership for Quality Infrastructure” initiative which aims
to build quality infrastructure in Asia.

A maritime security deal is also on the cards given their growing cooperation in
the maritime realm. Earlier in July this year, India, Japan, and the United States
had brought in their biggest naval assets to the Malabar naval exercises in the
Bay of Bengal. Given that Japan maintains a base in Djibouti and the Indian
Ocean is a key conduit for the net energy importer, a maritime cooperation deal
could mark a new high in the maritime ties between India and Japan. The two
nations have also been holding a bilateral naval exercise, the JIMEX, since
2012.

Another big area of cooperation could be in the field of civilian nuclear energy,
given that the Japan-India civilian nuclear deal recently came into force.

On the flip side, during this trip, it remains to be seen whether Japan and India
can clinch a deal for the supply of Japanese-made US-2i maritime
reconnaissance aircraft, which has been stuck for many years now.

Hence, given the huge commonality of their interests, Abe’s upcoming India trip
could very well set the tone for the next stage of the Japan-India relationship.

September 13, 2017: Will India and Japan Finally Conclude a Long-Pending
US-2 Amphibious Aircraft Defense Deal?
Will Abe’s coming trip to India result in the conclusion of this long-pending
deal?

As Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe arrives in India, there are rumors once
again that this visit will be the one to see the conclusion of a long-pending
defense deal between India and Japan.

The deal would represent Japan’s largest overseas defense deal since it lifted its
decades-long self-imposed ban on defense exports in 2014. It would
additionally represent an important milestone in the India-Japan strategic
relationship.

Since 2014, despite political sanction at the highest levels in both countries,
negotiations had been bogged down over New Delhi’s concerns regarding the
per-unit price and questions regarding potential technology transfer and
domestic manufacturing in India.

According to the Hindu, the deal will be announced during Abe’s visit to India,
where he will confer with Modi on a range of issues of bilateral, regional, and
global importance.
Since India and Japan set up their Strategic and Global Partnership in 2006, they
have had annual rotating prime ministerial meetings; the arrangement is the
only reciprocal arrangement of its kind for either country at the head-of-
government level.

In addition to the conclusion of the long-pending US-2 deal, there are other
prospects for Japan-India defense commercial cooperation.
Earlier this summer, Japan’s Mitsubishi-Kawasaki consortium received a Request
For Information (RFI) from the Indian Navy for an $8 billion advanced air-
independent propulsion (AIP) attack submarine contract.

September 19, 2017: US, Japan, India Hold Trilateral Ministerial Meeting on
UN Sidelines
The second U.S.-India-Japan Ministerial-level Trilateral Dialogue was convened
in New York.

On Monday, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Indian Minister of External

Affairs Sushma Swaraj, and Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Kono met
for a trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly
in New York.

The meeting was the second U.S.-India-Japan Ministerial-level Trilateral

Dialogue. The three senior officials discussed a range of international matters,
ranging from the threat posed by North Korea, which had just flown another
ballistic missile over Japan last week and conducted a nuclear bomb test earlier
in the month, to the South China Sea.

According to a readout of the meeting released by the U.S. State Department,

the “ministers discussed the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific region
underpinned by a resilient, rules-based architecture that enables every nation to
prosper.”

All three countries have reiterated the importance of a rules-based order in Asia
in their recent high-level bilateral statements as well. Most recently, Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosted Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in
India.

“The ministers also affirmed the importance of the freedoms of navigation and
overflight and the free flow of lawful commerce in the region and around the
globe, including in the South China Sea,” the U.S. readout continued.

On North Korea, according to the U.S. readout, the three ministers “affirmed
and applauded the international community’s firm resolve to oppose the DPRK’s
unlawful acts, as reflected in UN Security Council Resolution 2375, and called
for continuing international action to curtail the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic
missile programs.”

A readout released by the Indian side emphasized that the three ministers
discussed “connectivity initiatives” in Asia. The Indian readout noted that “the
importance of basing them on universally recognized international norms,
prudent financing and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity was
underlined.”

The U.S. statement echoed this as well, noting discussion on efforts to “expand
cooperation on regional connectivity.”

In May, India stated its opposition to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and chose
not to attend Beijing’s Belt and Road Forum. In June, when Modi met U.S.
President Donald J. Trump in Washington, D.C., the two also referred to
connectivity cooperation in their statement.

Japan and the United States, meanwhile, do not participate in China-led

institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which was set
up to assist in the implementation of various connectivity projects. India is a
founding member of the AIIB.

February 28, 2018: Japan’s Belt and Road Puzzle, Decoded

Japan’s support for the Belt and Road is contingent on shaping China into a
responsible global player.
By Titli Basu

Has Japan, a staunch supporter of the U.S.-led, universal value-based

international order, embraced China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)? Since the
Belt and Road Forum (BRF) in 2017, in what may appear to be a sudden shift,
traditional U.S. ally Japan has been embracing the BRI, which is often
understood as Beijing’s grand strategy to employ every component of national
strength to assert its influence and redesign the regional order. But a closer look
at Japan’s strategy suggests Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is involved in a carefully
considered attempt to discard a narrow approach — pursued in the case of the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) — and engage with China with the
objective of shaping it as a responsible actor and upholding the highest
standards of global governance in accordance with international norms.

As Beijing is becoming increasingly confident of its national power, it is

pursuing geopolitical and geoeconomic interests through grand designs like the
BRI.

As Beijing is becoming increasingly confident of its national power, it is

pursuing geopolitical and geoeconomic interests through grand designs like the
BRI. The BRI is an important instrument to realize President Xi Jinping’s goal of
making China a “global leader in terms of composite national strength and
international influence” by the middle of the 21st century. As Xi pursues the
Chinese Dream under the narrative of “the great rejuvenation of
the Chinese nation,” Beijing is increasingly putting the U.S.-led, universal value-
based order to test. Whether it is designing a new regional security architecture
marked by an “Asia for Asians” approach, testing U.S. resolve in the South
China Sea, effectively employing “institutional statecraft” by designing
alternatives like the AIIB, or leading regional economic architecture with the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), China is putting the
U.S. role to the test. While traditionally a U.S.-led liberal order dominated East
Asia, the arrival of China as a major power is altering the regional balance of
power.

As the debate around the future of the U.S.-led regional order intensifies,
traditional allies like Japan have stepped up to reinforce the foundations and
resilience of the U.S.-led system. The initial articulation of this was witnessed in
Shinzo Abe’s strategic vision, culminating in Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Strategy in 2016. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), conceived in
collaboration with India, is one of the key manifestations of this strategy.

2017 was a significant year for Japan’s strategy. While in mid-May, the BRF was
attended by Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Secretary General Toshihiro
Nikai and Keidanren chief Sadayuki Sakakibara, later that month the AAGC
Vision Document was launched by Japan and India with the aim of furthering
the agenda of liberal value-based order. Clearing up the ambiguity on Japan’s
approach to the BRI, Abe, speaking at the Future of Asia Conference in early
June, categorically underlined the importance of keeping infrastructure
construction open, transparent, and fair and stressed the economic feasibility of
projects without hurting the debtor nation’s finances. Coincidentally, Abe
articulated Japan’s position on the BRI from the same platform where he had
launched his signature Partnership for Quality Infrastructure in May 2015, a
month before the founding member nations signed the China led AIIB’s Articles
of Agreement in the Great Hall of the People in June.

Since Abe’s June 2017 speech, debate has intensified over Japan’s posturing on
the BRI. Subsequently, on several occasions including policy speeches before
the Japanese Diet and at Da Nang on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Meeting, Abe underscored Japanese
expectations of engaging with the BRI “in a forward-looking way…adequately
incorporating the thinking held in common by the international community
regarding the openness, transparency, economic efficiency, financial soundness,
and other such aspects of the infrastructure.” Tokyo is attempting a cautious
engagement with China without compromising on international norms and
principles, with the aim of making China more adaptable to global standards
and rule of law. Japan’s strategy has not really changed but, as Shin Kawashima
argues, Tokyo’s tactics have become more sophisticated. Previously concerns
over international norms and governance standards were referred to as
deterrents to Japanese engagement with the Chinese project. Now Japan is
employing the same set of variables as preconditions for Tokyo’s participation in
the BRI.

Geoeconomically, Japan has identified infrastructure exports as a top priority,

which serves as a new growth engine for reviving the Japanese economy in
addition to firming up strategic networks with like-minded countries. The June
2013 Japan Revitalization Strategy enunciated the need to create new frontiers
for growth by capturing the international infrastructure market and set the target
of tripling infrastructure sales by 2020.

Keidanren (the Japan Business Federation) has supported the strategic promotion
of infrastructure exports and a positive relationship with China given the two
countries’ intertwined economies. Chairman Sadayuki Sakakibara reiterated that
“Japan would join other nations in cooperating actively with the One Belt One
Road initiative, provided that the two sides could reach agreement on principles
including openness, transparency, and economic viability. For Japan, these are
the fundamental guiding principles in dealing with One Belt, One Road.”
Japan’s conditional support to the BRI based on economic viability, fiscal
soundness, openness, transparency, and fairness was again underscored during
the Japan-China CEO Summit held in December 2017.

As Abe frequently underlines the importance of complying with international

norms and governance standards, Japan and the United States have reinforced
cooperation aimed at offering high-quality infrastructure investment alternatives
in the Indo-Pacific region.

August 21, 2018: Ministerial Dialogue Puts India-Japan Defense Ties in the
Spotlight
India and Japan begin their first-ever defense technology collaboration on
unmanned ground vehicles.

Japan’s defense minister, Itsunori Onodera, was in India for a bilateral defense
ministerial dialogue on August 19 and 20. He met with his Indian counterpart,
Nirmala Sitharaman, and the two discussed a range of issues related to the
India-Japan defense cooperation agenda. New Delhi and Tokyo treat each other
as strategic partners and, since a 2008 joint declaration on security cooperation,
have grown closer as partners on defense issues.

This year’s meeting saw a sharp emphasis on maritime security in the Indian
Ocean and Pacific Ocean regions, under the aegis of Japan’s Indo-Pacific
strategy and India’s “Act East” policy.
Onodera and Sitharaman acknowledged growing Indo-Japanese cooperation on
a range of issues, including a bilateral cooperation agreement between the
Indian Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF). The two
ministers also focused on capacity building the Indo-Pacific region.

The two ministers acknowledged ongoing defense technology cooperation

between the top defense research and development organizations in both
countries.

Curiously, this year’s Indian joint press statement on the dialogue gave no
updates on the status of a long-pending sale of Japanese ShinMaywa US-2
amphibious aircraft for the Indian Navy. India-Japan cooperation on defense
issues is expected to continue, regardless of progress on the US-2 sale itself.

July 02, 2018: Japan and India Are Better Off Aligned Than Allied
Both Japan and India may be best served by their existing alignment instead of
pursuing an alliance.
By Rohan Mukherjee

In 2015, however, the United States and India announced that Japan would
rejoin Malabar as a permanent member.

It was also around this time that a growing chorus of analysts began either
predicting or advocating a Japan-India alliance based on the incredible rate at
which Japan and India have deepened their strategic partnership since the turn
of the century. Predating them slightly was Japanese leader Taro Aso, who as
deputy prime minister in 2013 had said, “I see India and Japan as an alliance,
linked by their philosophy and moved by their values.” While Aso’s statement
may have been aspirational, leaders on both sides have taken the sentiment
seriously, as has China. When Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe visited New
Delhi in September 2017, the Chinese foreign ministry warned that “regional
countries should stand for dialogue without confrontation and work for
partnership instead of alliance.”

Although journalists and policy wonks may use the term alliance loosely, it has
a specific meaning for diplomats and statesmen. All the more so for a country
like Japan that has been in an alliance with the United States for decades. An
alliance is a formal agreement between two or more states for the use (or non-
use) of force in specified circumstances against one or more other states. Given
that Japanese leaders themselves are using the term, it bears examining whether
Japan and India might actually come to such an agreement with regard to their
most obvious shared threat, China.
In a recent article in International Affairs, I argue there are three reasons why a
Japan-India alliance is unlikely to materialize.

First, despite the best efforts of the BJP government led by Narendra Modi, New
Delhi remains deeply conflicted between its traditional commitment to
nonalignment—now labelled strategic autonomy—and newer impulses to
become a “leading power” in international affairs. Strategic autonomy dictates a
position of standing firm against China without getting too close to its potential
adversaries, i.e. the United States and Japan. The uncertainty generated by this
policy can even act as a source of leverage for India in its interactions with
China. But as far as a Japan-India alliance is concerned, strategic autonomy
means that while India is content to throw its diplomatic weight behind Japan,
New Delhi will be unwilling to commit its forces to the defense of Japan.
Second, alliances carry with them the risk and fear of getting entangled in an
alliance partner’s conflicts. A formal arrangement whereby India and Japan are
committed to use force in aid of each other’s defense would risk Japan getting
drawn into a potential conflict between India and Pakistan—a higher-
probability event than an India-China military conflict. Conversely, India would
risk getting drawn into a potential conflict between Japan and North Korea. Not
only would these entanglements create political problems at home, they would
also be virtually impossible to sustain militarily. Despite their respective strength
and sophistication, the Indian Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force are
nowhere close to being able to sustain military operations thousands of miles
away from their home bases.

Finally, even if a Japan-India alliance were designed to operate only with regard
to China, it would suffer from a major commitment problem at its
core. Alliances are prone to buck-passing when geography and the state of
military technology render the cost of defense lower than the cost of attack. In
other words, if either country perceives its alliance partner as being able to
successfully defend or stalemate a Chinese attack, it will have less incentive to
get involved when a Chinese attack actually materializes. Arguably the South
Asian and East Asian theaters currently favor the defense, thus increasing the
likelihood that both parties will find reasons not to honor their alliance
commitments when the time comes.

An even more intractable commitment problem originates in China’s own

policy toward a putative Japan-India alliance. With a nuclear arsenal, military,
and economy far superior to both countries, China is unlikely to passively
witness the formation of a Japan-India alliance. New Delhi and Tokyo know
this, and are therefore rightly wary of going beyond the rhetoric of alliance to
actually taking any steps toward formalizing a mutual defense pact. Concerns
about a Chinese backlash remain a powerful limiting factor on Japan-India
relations.

Given the above realities, it is hardly surprising that having experienced a near-
confrontation with China last year at Doklam, Prime Minister Narendra Modi
revived the notion of India’s strategic autonomy during his speech at the
Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore last month. Moreover, this
month’s Malabar exercise was marked by India’s refusal of Australia’s request to
participate, a refusal that amounted to India distancing itself from the much-
hyped Quad that Japan has strenuously championed.

Although the prospects may be dim for a Japan-India alliance, the good news
for both countries is that their strategic partnership is thriving. So long as Japan
continues to invest in India’s hard-power potential and India continues to
coordinate strategy with Japan, both countries will find themselves stronger in
the event of a future diplomatic or military crisis. Japan and India are better off
aligned—as they currently are—than allied.

Rohan Mukherjee is an assistant professor of political science at Yale-NUS

College, Singapore.

##Left out articles

https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/is-japan-truly-a-powerful-country/
https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/one-belt-one-road-and-one-big-competition/