Assignment 8

PROPERTY
 
Arts. 414-439

001.   Midway Maritime and Technological Foundation v. Castro, [732 SCRA

192 (2014)] All improvements subsequently introduced or owned by the
mortgagor on the encumbered property are deemed to form part of the
mortgage.
 
002.   Manila Electric Company v. The City Assessor, [765 SCRA 52 (2015)]
Machinery, being an immovable property, is subject to real property tax. In
determining whether machinery is real property subject to real property tax, the
definition and requirements under the Local Government Code are controlling. 
 
003.   Capitol Wireless, Inc. v. Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, [791 SCRA
272 (2016)] Submarine or undersea communications cables are akin to electric
transmission lines which are immovable properties by destination, and may
qualify as "machinery" subject to real property tax under the Local Government
Code.

004.   Laurel v. Abrogar, [576 SCRA 41 (2009)] The words “personal property”
standing alone, covers both tangible and intangible properties and are subject to
theft under the Revised Penal Code. The statutory definition of “taking” and
“movable property” indicates that, clearly, not all personal properties may be the
proper subjects of theft.
 
005.   PLDT v. Alvarez, [718 SCRA 54 (2014)]
The business of providing telecommunications and the telephone service are
personal property under Art 308 of the RPC. The court ruled that even prior to
the passage of the RPC, jurisprudence is settled that, "any personal property,
tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be
the object of theft". 
 
006.   Manila International Airport Authority v. CA, [495 SCRA 591 (2006)].
Property of public dominion is one "intended for public use.” Airport lands and
buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for
international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that MIAA collects
terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove its character
as properties for public use. 
 
007.   Manila International Airport Authority v. City of Pasay, [583 SCRA 234
(2009)] MIAA is a government “instrumentality” that does not qualify as a
“government-owned or controlled corporation.” As explained in the 2006 MIAA
case: “A government-owned or controlled corporation must be “organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation.” MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock
divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. x x x”

008.   Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) v. City of Lapu-lapu,

[757 SCRA 323 (2015).] Airport lands and buildings of MCIAA are properties
devoted to public use and are, thus, properties of public dominion owned by the
State which are not subject to real property tax.
 
009.   Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, [534
SCRA 490 (2007)] The port built by the state is a property of Public Dominion
and cannot be subject for execution or foreclosure sale. The only way the
government can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law
authorizing such sale.
 
010.   Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, [590 SCRA 214 (2009)] Philippine
Ports authority (PPA) is not a GOCC but a government instrumentality and that
the docks, piers and buildings it administers are owned by the Republic and,
thus, outside the commerce of man. Such being the case, PPA’s monies,
facilities and assets are government properties which are exempt from
execution.
011.   Palbel Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, [497 SCRA 185 (2006)]
Lands located at and below the elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which
form part of the bed of the lake.

012.   Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc. vs. Republic, [764 SCRA 524
(2015)] Parcels of land which are classified as of public dominion such as
reservations for public or quasi-public uses are non-alienable and non-
disposable lands are outside the commerce of men. They are not subject of
sale, disposition or encumbrance, otherwise it shall be void for being contrary to
law and public policy.

013.   General Mariano Alvarez Services Cooperative, Inc. v. NHA , [750 SCRA
156 (2015)] Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject
to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale.  Any
encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public
dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. 
 
 014.   Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and AMARI Coastal Development
Corporation, [433 Phil. 506 (2002)] Reclaimed lands are no longer foreshore or
submerged lands, and thus may qualify as alienable agricultural lands of the
public domain provided the requirements of public land laws are met.

015.   Republic v. City of Parañaque, [677 SCRA 246 (2012)]  An incorporated
instrumentality of the National Government, it is exempt from payment of real
property tax except when the beneficial use of the real property is granted to a
taxable person.
 
016.   Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, [704 SCRA 561 (2013)] Alienable
public land held by a possessor, openly, continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period does not convert it to private property when such
requirement is not sufficiently complied with even with a subsequent declaration
that the subject land is alienable and disposable
 
017.   Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, [587 SCRA 172 (2009)] Absent
the express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
 
 
018. Dream Village Neighborhood Associated, Inc. v. BCDA, [702 SCRA 222
(2013)] Under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become
patrimonial property only if there is a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable, together with an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth. Absent such an express declaration by the
State, the land remains to be property of public dominion.

019.   Republic v. Tan, [783 SCRA 643 (2016)] While a prior declaration that the
property has become alienable and disposable is sufficient in an application for
judicial confirmation of title under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree (PRD), it does not suffice for the purpose of prescription under the Civil
Code.
 
020. Castro v. Monsod, [641 SCRA 486 (2011)] An owner, by virtue of his
surface right, may make excavations on his land, but his right is subject to the
limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient
lateral or subjacent support. 
 
 021.   Republic v. Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc., [664 SCRA 233 (2012)]. The
fair market value of the land to be expropriated should be based on the zonal
valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
 
Arts. 440-475
 
022.   Aquino v. Aguilar, [760 SCRA 444 (2015)] Property; Builder in Bad Faith;
Petitioners, as the owners of the land, have the right to appropriate what has
been built on the property, without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor;and
that respondents have no right to a refund of any improvement built therein,
pursuant to Articles 449 and 450 of the Civil Code.
 
023.   Community Cagayan, Inc. v. Nanol, [685 SCRA 453 (2012)] Article 448 of
the Civil Code applies when the builder believes that he is the owner of the land
or that by some title he has the right to build thereon, or that, at least, he has a
claim of title thereto.

024.   Automat Realty and Development Corp. v. Dela Cruz, Sr., [737 SCRA
395 (2014)] Builders in Good Faith; Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that if
the landowner opts to “appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,” he
must pay indemnity to the builder, planter, or sower in good faith in accordance
with the relevant provisions of the Code.—In the alternative, if the facts can
show that the proper case involves the Civil Code provisions on builders,
planters, and sowers, respondent spouses may be considered as builders,
planters, or sowers in good faith, provided such is proven before the proper
court. 
 
025.   Department of Education v. Casibang, [782 SCRA 326 (2016)]. The
lawful owners have a right to demand the return of the property at any time as
long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated. This right is never
barred by laches. 
 
026.   Heirs of Victorino Sarili v. Lagrosa, [713 SCRA 726 (2014)]. A buyer who
has knowledge that the deed of sale was fraudulently contracted and
subsequently built an immovable property therein is deemed a builder in bad
faith.
 
027.   Mirallosa v. Carmel Development, Inc., [711 SCRA 30 (2013)] All judicial
decisions form part of the law of the land, and a matter of mandatory judicial
notice, hence ignorance to judicial decisions amounts to a builder in bad faith,
he thus loses whatever he has built on the property, without right to indemnity,
in accordance with Article 449 of the Civil Code.
 
028.   Heirs of Cipriano Trazona v. Heirs of Dionisio Cañada, [712 SCRA 300
(2013)] Persons who occupy land by virtue of a temporary arrangement or by
tolerance of the owners are not possessors in good faith, may be terminated at
any time and cannot refuse to vacate the property or eventually demand
reimbursement of necessary and useful expenses.
 
029.   Feliciano v. Zaldivar, [503 SCRA 182 (2006)] If the claimant’s possession
of the land is merely tolerated by its lawful owner, the latter’s right to recover
possession is never barred by laches. 
 
030.   Narvaez v. Alciso, [594 SCRA 60 (2009)] If a contract should contain
some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment
provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation.
 
031.   Heirs of the Late Joaquin Limense v. Vda. de Ramos, [604 SCRA 599
(2009)] When the co-ownership is terminated by a partition, and it appears that
the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to
another co-owner, but the encroachment was in good faith, then the provisions
of Article 448 should apply to determine the respective rights of the parties.
032.   VSD Realty & Development Corp. v. Uniwide Sales, Inc., [684 SCRA 470
(2012)] In an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who
claims a better right to it must prove the identity of the land claimed and his title
thereto. He should establish by clear and convincing evidence that the land
sought to be reconveyed is his. He must rely on the strength of his title and not
on the weakness of the defendant’s claim.
 
 033.   Sulo sa Nayon, Inc. v. Nayong Pilipino Foundation, [576 SCRA 655
(2009)]
Improvements on the leased premises does not give the petitioners the right of
retention and reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a builder in good faith. 
 
 034.   Moralidad v. Pernes, [497 SCRA 532 (2006)] The subject usufruct may
be deemed terminated or extinguished by the occurrence of the resolutory
conditions provided for in the title creating the usufruct.
 
035.   Cheng v. Donini, [590 SCRA 406 (2009)] To be entitled to reimbursement
for useful improvements introduced on the property, respondents must be
considered builders in good faith. Articles 448 and 546 apply only to a
possessor in good faith or one who builds on land in the belief that he is the
owner thereof and who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time
he builds on it.

036.   Torbela v. Rosario, [661 SCRA 633 (2011)] The accessory follows the
principal. The right of accession is recognized under Article 440 which states
that the ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which
is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either
naturally or artificially.

037.   Benedicto v. Flores, [632 SCRA 446 (2010)] A landowner is given the
option to either appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the
proper amount of indemnity, or sell the land to the possessor in good faith.
However, a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the
necessary and useful expenses incurred with a right of retention. 
 
038.   Arangote v. Maglunob, [579 SCRA 620 (2009)] Title to immovable
property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a Deed of
Donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the
donor duly notified thereof.
 
039.   Tuatis v. Escol, [604 SCRA 471 (2009)] The owner of the land has the
option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to
oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent.
He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is
authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by
the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
 
040.   Nuguid v. CA, [452 SCRA 243 (2005)] A builder in good faith cannot be
compelled to pay rentals during the period of retention nor be disturbed in his
possession by ordering him to vacate; The owner of the land is prohibited from
offsetting or compensating the necessary and useful expenses with the fruits
received by the builder-possessor in good faith.

041.   Vda. de Roxas v. Our Lady’s Foundation, Inc., [692 SCRA 578 (2013)] In
the event that the owner elects to sell the lot encroached upon, the computation
of the value of the property should be fixed at the prevailing market value,
reckoned at the time the landowner elected his choice.

042.   Heirs of Francisco I. Narvasa v. Imbornal, [(G.R. No. 182908 August 6,

2014)]. Failure to prove ownership of a land adjoining bank of river shall likewise
fail the claim over the alluvial deposit to such land.

043.   Republic v. Santos III, [685 SCRA 51 (2012)] The drying up of the river is
not accretion as defined by the Civil Code. Hence, the dried-up river bed
belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner,
unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.

044.   New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, Jr., [585 SCRA 329 (2009)] A
person dealing with registered land may safely rely upon the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go
behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property.

045.   Office of the City Mayor of Parañaque City v. Ebio, [621 SCRA 555
(2010)]
While it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is
formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its
banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law. It
belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only
restriction is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same
under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to
acquisition through prescription by third persons. 

046.   Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, [755 SCRA 1 (2015)] Article 461 of the

Civil Code, states that River beds which are abandoned through the natural
change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands
are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. The fact that the
present cause of action is based on an accretion claim does not prevent the
application of res judicata.
 
047.   Galang v. Reyes, [678 SCRA 523 (2012)] Article 461 can be applied
when the following elements are present: a) the old course of the creek, b) the
new course of the creek, and c)  the change of course of the creek from the old
location to the new location by natural occurrence.
 
 
Arts. 476-561
 
048.   Torres, Jr. v. Lapinid, [742 SCRA 646 (2014)] A co-owner is an owner of
the whole and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the
same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract.
 
049.   Quintos v. Nicolas, [726 SCRA 482 (2014)] Article 494 of the Civil Code is
an exception of Rule 17 Section 3 of the Rules of Court which will not defeat the
right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no
actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet.
 
050.   Rizal v. Naredo, [668 SCRA 114 (2012)] There is no co-ownership when
the different portions owned by different people are already concretely
determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described.

051.   Panganiban v. Oamil, [542 SCRA 166 (2008)] During the existence of the
co - ownership, no individual can claim title to any definite portion of the
community property until the partition thereof; and prior to the partition, all that
the co - owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the
entire land or thing.
 
052.   Cruz v. Catapang, [544 SCRA 512 (2008)] A co-owner cannot give valid
consent to another to build a house on the co-owned property, which is an act
tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.
 
053.   Esteban v. Marcelo, [703 SCRA 82 (2013)] Mere failure to pay rents does
not ipso facto make unlawful tenant's possession of the premises. It is the
owner's demand for tenant to vacate the premises, when the tenant has failed to
pay the rents on time, and tenant’s refusal or failure to vacate, which make
unlawful withholding of possession.
 
054.   Catedrilla v. Lauron, [696 SCRA 341 (2013)] A co-owner may bring an
ejectment suit without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.
 
055.   Heirs of Albina Ampil v. Manahan, [684 SCRA 130 (2012)] Ownership
over the land cannot be acquired by mere occupation. While it is true that tax
declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they, nevertheless,
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. It
strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

056.   Basbas v. Sayson, [656 SCRA 151 (2011)] A co-owner may, by himself
alone, bring an action for the recovery of the co-owned property pursuant to the
well-settled principle that “in a co-ownership, co-owners may bring actions for
the recovery of co-owned property without the necessity of joining all the other
co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed for
the benefit of his co-owners.
 
057.   Plasabas v. CA (Special Former Ninth Div.), [582 SCRA 686 (2009)] A
co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any
judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but
if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the un-
impleaded co-owners.
 
058.   Clidoro v. Jalmanzar, [729 SCRA 350 (2014)] A co-owner, by himself
alone, can bring an action for the recovery of the co-owned property even
through an action for revival of judgment. This is due to the enforcement of
judgment that would result in the recovery of property. Thus, it is not necessary
that all parties, in whose favor the case for the partition was adjudged, be made
plaintiffs to the action. 
 
059. Coja v. CA, [539 SCRA 517 (2007)] The presumption that the property is
conjugal property may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and
convincing evidence—there must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of
one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.
 
060. Cabales v. CA, [531 SCRA 691 (2007)]. Legal redemption can only be
exercised by the co-owner who did not part with his or their pro indiviso share in
the property held in common.
 
061. Taghoy v. Tigol, Jr.,[626 SCRA 341 (2010)] In the interpretation of
contracts, the intention of the parties is accorded primordial consideration; such
intention is determined from the express terms of their agreement, as well as
their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.  

062.   Arambulo v. Nolasco, [720 SCRA 95 (2014)] Co-owners have over their
part, the right of full and absolute ownership; That part which ideally belongs to
them, or their mental portion, may be disposed of as they please, independent
of the decision of their co-owners. 

063.   Republic v. Heirs of Francisca Dignos-Sorono, [549 SCRA 58 (2008)] A

sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-
owners is not null and void, however, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

064.   Vda. de Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gerilla, [690 SCRA 495 (2013)] As co-

owners, each of them has full ownership of her part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto. Each of them also has the right to alienate the co-
owned lot but only insofar as the extent of her portion was affected.

065.   Vagilidad v. Vagilidad, Jr., [507 SCRA 94 (2006)] A Co-owner has full
ownership of his pro indivisio share and has the right to alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and substitute another person for its enjoyment
 
066.   Cabrera v. Ysaac, [740 SCRA 612 (2014)] Sale of a portion of the
property is considered an alteration of the thing owned in common.Under the
Civil Code, such disposition requires the unanimous consent of the other co-
owners.
Prior to partition, a sale of adefinite portion of common property requires the
consent of all co-owners because it operates to partition the land with respect to
theco-owner selling his or her share.
 
067.   Gochan v. Mancao, [709 SCRA 438 (2013)] A co-owner of a thing may
exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or
of any of them, are sold to a third person.
 
068.   Calma v. Santos, [590 SCRA 359 (2009)]. The co-owners, being the
owners of their respective aliquots or undivided shares in the subject property,
can validly and legally dispose of their shares even without the consent of all
other co-heirs.
 
069. Pascual v. Ballesteros, [666 SCRA 297 (2012)] Respondents and the
predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners are co-owners of the subject property
considering that the petitioners failed to adduce any evidence showing that the
respective shares of each of the registered owners thereof were indeed
particularized, specified and subdivided.
 
070.   Barcellano v. Bañas, [657 SCRA 545 (2011)] Without a written notice, the
period of thirty days within which the right of legal pre-emption may be
exercised, does not start.

071.   Gosiengfiao Guillen v. CA, [589 SCRA 399 (2009)] Petitioner-heirs have
not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the
sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run.
 
072.   Francisco v. Boiser, [332 SCRA 792 (2000)] Receipt of summons by a
co-owner in a civil case for collection of a share in the rentals by an alleged
buyer of a co-owned property constitutes actual knowledge of the sale.
 
073.   Heirs of Jose Reyes, Jr. v. Reyes, [626 SCRA 758 (2010)]. In Equitable
mortgage the act of a co-owner declaring the land in question in his name for
taxation purposes and paying the land taxes did not constitute an unequivocal
act of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owner and could not
constitute adverse possession as basis for title by prescription. His remedy is to
demand from the other co-owners the partition of the co-owned property and to
reimbursement from the co-owners of the amount advanced to repay the
obligation. He may also seek from the co-owners the proportional
reimbursement of the realty taxes paid for the property, pursuant to Article 488
of the Civil Code.
 
074.   Fangonil-Herrera v. Fangonil, [531 SCRA 486 (2007)] The fact that it was
petitioner’s money that was used for the repurchase of the properties does not
make her the owner thereof, in the absence of convincing proof that would
indicate such; Although the Court recognizes that real tax receipts indicating
payment of realty tax and possession of the parcels are indicia of ownership,
such are not conclusive proof of ownership in the absence of other
circumstances and evidence showing otherwise.
 
075.   Generosa v. Prangan-Valera, [500 SCRA 620 (2006)] In order that title
may prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he
has repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his claim
of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period begins to
run. The evidence relative to the possession, as a fact, upon which the alleged
prescription is based, must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to
establish said prescription without shadow of doubt.

076.   Monteroso v. CA, [553 SCRA 66 (2008)] The right to seek partition is
imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches; The only exception to the
imprescriptibility of an action for partition against a co-owner is when a co-owner
repudiates the co-ownership.
 
 
 
077.   Heirs of Rogelio Isip, Sr. v. Quintos, [678 SCRA 104 (2012)]. It is not
necessary that the owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy the property
as someone in his name may perform the act. 
 
078.   Aliño v. Heirs of Angelica Lorenzo, [556 SCRA 139 (2008)]. An action for
reconveyance prescribes in 10 years. However, if the person claiming the owner
of the property is the actual possessor of the subject property, then the action
for reconveyance does not prescribe. There is simulation of a sale of land when
the buyer does not attempt in any manner to assert his right or any act of
dominion over the property.
 
079.   Ballesteros v. Abion, [482 SCRA 23 (2006)] Every possessor in good faith
becomes a possessor in bad faith from the moment he becomes aware that
what he believed to be true is not so. 
 
080.   Nuguid v. CA, [452 SCRA 243 (2005)] During the period of retention, a
builder in good faith cannot be compelled to pay rentals nor be disturbed in his
possession by ordering him to vacate. The owner of the land is prohibited from
offsetting or compensating the necessary and useful expenses with the fruits
received by the builder-possessor in good faith. 
 
081.   Mangaser v. Ugay, [744 SCRA 13 (2014)]. Possession can be acquired
not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the
action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right.
 
082.   Bunyi v. Factor, [591 SCRA 350 (2009)] Possession can be acquired not
only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the
action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right.
 
083.   Gaza v. Lim, [395 SCRA 261, 269 (2003)] Where a dispute over
possession arises between two persons, the person first having actual
possession is the one who is entitled to maintain the action granted by law;
otherwise, a mere usurper without any right whatever, might enter upon the
property of another and, by allowing himself to be ordered off, could acquire the
right to maintain the action of forcible entry and detainer, however momentary
his intrusion might have been
 
084.   Yu v. Pacleb, [512 SCRA 402 (2007)] Same as 83.  There are two
paramount considerations in possession: occupancy, apprehension or taking,
and intent to possess. It is not necessary that the person in possession should
himself be the occupant. The occupancy can be held by another in his name. 
 
085.  Palero-Tan v. Urdaneta, Jr., [555 SCRA 28 (2008)] Whoever finds a
movable, which is not treasure, must return it to its previous possessor. If the
latter is unknown, the finder shall immediately deposit it with the mayor of the
city or municipality where the finding has taken place.
 
086.   BPI Family Bank v. Franco, [538 SCRA 184 (2007)] The quality of being
fungible depends upon the possibility of the property, because of its nature or
the will of the parties, being substituted by others of the same kind, not having a
distinct individuality.
 
Arts. 562-711
 
087.   Moralidad v. Pernes, [497 SCRA 532 (2006)] Usufruct gives a right to
enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and
substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. Usufruct
allows one to enjoy another's property temporarily, including both the jus utendi
and the jus fruendi, with the owner retaining the jus disponendi or the power to
alienate the same.

088.   NHA v. CA, [456 SCRA 17 (2005)] Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor
of a town, corporation, or association for more than fifty years. If it has been
constituted, and before the expiration of such period the town is abandoned, or
the corporation or association is dissolved, the usufruct shall be extinguished by
reason thereof.
089.  Pilar Development Corp. v. Dumadag, [693 SCRA 96 (2013)] Those
intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the state, bank, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character are of public dominion. Easement established for public use shall be
governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto.
 
 090.   Heirs of the Late Joaquin Limense v. Vda. de Ramos, [604 SCRA 599
(2009)] An easement is a real right on another's property, corporeal and
immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing
somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of
another person or tenement. 
 
091.   Privatization and Management Office v. Legaspi Towers [300, Inc., 593
SCRA 382 (2009)] When the owner of two properties alienates one of them and
an apparent sign of easement exists between the two estates, entitlement to it
continues, unless there is a contrary agreement, or the indication that the
easement exists is removed before the execution of the deed.
 
092.   Unisource Commercial and Development Corp. v. Chung, [593 SCRA
230 (2009)] An easement is a real right on another’s property, corporeal and
immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing
somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of
another person or tenement.

093.   Valdez v. Tabisula, [560 SCRA 332 (2008)] An easement or servitude is a

real right constituted on another’s property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue
of which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody
else to do something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person.

094.   Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos [(G.R. No. 180282, April 11, 2011)]. Mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis
of setting up a compulsory easement. When there is already an existing
adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even when the
said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up
another servitude is entirely unjustified.
  
095.   Borbajo v. Hidden View Homeowners, Inc., [450 SCRA 315 (2005)] A
registered co-owner of road lots is entitled to avail of all the attributes of
ownership under the Civil Code - jus utendi, fruendi, abutendi, disponendi et
vindicandi. Art. 428 of the NCC is explicit that the owner has the right to enjoy
and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.

096.   Salimbangon v. Tan, [610 SCRA 426 (2010)] In an Easement of Right of

Way, the existence of a dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible
with the idea that both estates belong to the same person.
 
097.   Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Inc. (BAPCI) v. Obias, [603
SCRA 173 (2009)] The easement of right of way is characterized as a
discontinuous easement because its use is in intervals and depends on the act
of man. Because of this character, an easement of a right of way may only be
acquired by virtue of a title as per Art. 622 of the New Civil Code. 

098. Liwag v. Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association, Inc., [675 SCRA 744
(2012)] Easements or servitudes are encumbrances imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner,
for the benefit of a community, or for the benefit of one or more persons to
whom the encumbered estate does not belong. Here, the water facility is an
encumbrance on the subject lot. It is continuous and apparent, because it is
used incessantly without human intervention, and because it is continually kept
in view by the overhead water tank, which reveals its use to the public.
 
099. Privatization and Management Office v. Legaspi Towers 300, Inc.,[593
SCRA 382 (2009)] When both properties are owned by the same person, article
613 will not apply because no true easement was constituted or existed.
 
100.   Reyes v. Valentin, [750 SCRA 379 (2015)] An easement is a limitation on
the owner's right to use his or her property for the benefit of another. By
imposing an easement on a property, its owner will have to forego using it for
whatever purpose he or she deems most beneficial.
 
101.   Goldcrest Realty Corp. v. Cypress Gardens Condominium Corp., [584
SCRA 435 (2009)] The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the
prescribed restrictions on its rights on the servient estate. Any violation
constitutes impairment of the easement.

102.   Calimoso v. Roullo, [781 SCRA 624 (2016)] The right-of-way must be
established on the tenement where the distance to the public road or highway is
shortest and where the least damage would be caused. If the two criteria do not
concur in a single tenement, the least prejudice criterion prevails over the
shortest distance criterion.

103.   Quintanilla v. Abangan, [544 SCRA 494 (2009)] Mere convenience for the
dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a
compulsory easement.

104.   Lee v. Carreon, [534 SCRA 218 (2007)] To be entitled to an easement of

right of way, the following requisites should be met: 1. the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway (Art. 649, par. 1); 2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par.
1); 3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate
(Art. 649,last par.); and 4. The right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest
(Art. 650). 

105.   Woodridge School, Inc. v. ARB Construction Co., Inc., [516 SCRA 176
(2007)] The road lots in a private subdivision are private property, hence, the
local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or
expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a    public road. Otherwise, they
remain to be private properties of the owner-developer.
106.   Mejorada v. Vertudazo, [535 SCRA 578 (2007)] The owner of an estate
may claim a legal or compulsory right of way only after he has established the
existence of these four (4) requisites: (a) the estate is surrounded by other
immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) after
payment of the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's
own acts; and (d) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate
 
107.   De Guzman v. Filinvest Development Corp., [746 SCRA 65 (2015)] In
Easement of Right of Way, the proper indemnity shall consist of the value of the
land plus the damages caused to the servient estate. The land may consist of a
network of roads, or series of road lots which leads from the dominant estate to
the highway.

108.   Castro v. Monsod, [641 SCRA 486 (2011)] Article 437 of the Civil Code
provides that the owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of
everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works, or make any
plantations and excavations which he may deem proper. An easement or
servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of
another immovable belonging to a different owner. There are two kinds of
easements according to source. An easement is established either by law or by
will of the owners. The courts cannot impose or constitute any servitude where
none existed. They can only declare its existence if in reality it exists by law or
by the will of the owners. There are therefore no judicial easements. An owner,
by virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on his land, but his right is
subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or building of
sufficient lateral or subjacent support.
 
109.   Rana v. Wong, [727 SCRA 539 (2014)] Unless a nuisance is a nuisance
per se, it may not be summarily abated.
 
110.   Cruz v. Pandacan Hiker’s Club, Inc., [778 SCRA 385 (2016)] Unless a
nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not be summarily abated. Under the Civil
Code, a Chief Executive of the local government or a Punong Barangay is not
authorized to determine the propriety of a summary abatement. When a thing by
itself or by its nature, is not injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort
of the community, it may not be abated as a nuisance without the benefit of a
judicial hearing.
 
111.   Smart Communications Inc. v. Aldecoa, [705 SCRA 392, 422
(2013)]. The Court in a long line of cases has held that before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of
all administrative processes afforded him.

112.   AC Enterprises, Inc. v. Frabelle Properties Corp., [506 SCRA 625 (2006)].
The noise generated by the blower of an air-conditioning system is considered a
private nuisance.
 
113.   Perez v. Madrona, [668 SCRA 696, 706 (2012)] Unless a thing is a
nuisance per se one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property
and may be summarily abated without judicial intervention.

114. Aquino vs. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, [737 SCRA 145 (2014)]; Despite
the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the Supreme
Court (SC) still finds in this case that the Local Government Unit (LGU) may
nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the
exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of
individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government. 

115.   Parayno v. Jovellanos, [(495 SCRA 185 (2006)] The abatement of a

nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se or
one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property.

116.   Gancayco v. City Government of QC, [658 SCRA 853 (2011)]

Sangguniang Bayan does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular
thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it
authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance
which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be
determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.
117.   City of Manila v. Judge Laguio, Jr., [(G.R. No. 118127, Apr. 25, 2005)].
The Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs
personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes
statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not
sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its
sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no
power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
 
118.   Telmo v. Bustamante, [592 SCRA 552 (2009)] A nuisance per se is that
which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. Evidently, the concrete
posts summarily removed by petitioner did not at all pose a hazard to the safety
of persons and properties, which would have necessitated immediate and
summary abatement. What they did, at most, was to pose an inconvenience to
the public by blocking the free passage of people to and from the national road.

119.   Tayaban v. People, [517 SCRA 488 (2007)] The exercise of police power
by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of
the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of a common
right.
 
 
Arts. 712-773
 
120.   Heirs of Anacleto B. Nieto v. Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan, [540
SCRA 100 (2007)]. An action to recover possession of a registered land under
the Torrens system does not prescribe and neither title thereto may be acquired
by prescription. Imprescriptibility of registered lands extends to the heirs by
operation of law. Laches cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an
imprescriptible legal right.
 
121.   Bartola M. Vda. De Tirona v. Encarnacion, [ 534 SCRA 394, 409 (2007)]
The defense of laches is an equitable one and does not concern itself with the
character of the defendant's title, but only with whether or not by reason of
plaintiff's long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from
asserting his claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable
and unjust to defendant.
 
122.   Fernando, Jr. v. Acuña, [657 SCRA 499 (2011)] An action for
reconveyance of registered land based on implied trust prescribes in ten (10)
years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the
date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property; the ten-year
prescriptive period applies only when the person enforcing the trust is not in
possession of the property. If a person claiming to be its owner is in actual
possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect
seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason is that the
one who is in actual possession of the land claiming to be its owner may wait
until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right.

123.   Calanasan v. Dolorito, [710 SCRA 411 (2013)] Under the old Civil Code,
it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed not by the
law on donations but by the rules on contracts.
 
124.   CJ Yulo & Sons, Inc. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo [G.R. No.
133705 March 31, 2005] A pure or simple donation is one where the underlying
cause is plain gratuity. This is donation in its truest form
 
125.   Pablo, Inc., [454 SCRA 279 (2005)]. Donation, as a mode of acquiring
ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the
donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose certain
conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order and public policy. The prohibition in the
deed of donation against the alienation of the property for an entire century,
being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of
ownership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the
contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically
stated in said statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as not
imposed.
 
126.   Bascara v. Javier, [759 SCRA 105 (2015)] Donation Mortis Causa;
Considering that the alleged donation is one of mortis causa, the same partake
of the nature of testamentary provision.—It is not amiss to point that the
execution of Pardo of donation mortis causa in favor of petitioner does not
immediately transfer title to the property to the latter. Considering that the
alleged donation is one of mortis causa, the same partake of the nature of
testamentary provision. As such, said deed must be executed in accordance
with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles 805 and
806 of the New Civil Code; otherwise, the donation is void and would produce
no effect.
 
127.   Villanueva v. Branoco, [640 SCRA 308 (2011)] One of the distinguishing
characteristics of donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be void if the
transferor should survive the transferee.
 
128.   Del Rosario v. Ferrer, [630 SCRA 683 (2010)] If a donation by its terms is
inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis
causa. In case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter
vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership
of the property subject of the deed.
 
129. Villanueva v. Branoco, [640 SCRA 308 (2011)]. Doubts on the nature of
dispositions are resolved to favor inter vivos transfers “to avoid uncertainty as to
the ownership of the property subject of the deed.”
 
130. Catalan v. Basa, [528 SCRA 645 (2007)]. A person suffering from
schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose
of his property. A donation is valid even if such donor will be declared judicially
as incompetent.
 
131.   Arangote v. Maglunob, [579 SCRA 620 (2009)] There are three requisites
for the validity of a simple donation of a real property, to wit: (1) it must be made
in a public instrument; (2) it must be accepted, which acceptance may be made
either in the same Deed of Donation or in a separate public instrument; and (3)
if the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor must be notified in
an authentic form, and the same must be noted in both instruments.
 
132.   Shopper’s Paradise Realty & Development Corp. v. Roque, [419 SCRA
93 (2004)] A person dealing with registered land may not required to go beyond
the certificate to determine the condition of the property but, where such party
has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he
acquired a right thereto, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest would
have the effect of registration as regards to him.
 
133. Heirs of Rosendo Sevilla Florencio vs. Heirs of Teresa Sevilla De Leon
[G.R. No. 149570 March 12, 2004]. In order that the donation of an immovable
property may be valid, it must be made in a public document. Registration does
not vest title; it is merely evidence of such title over a particular parcel of land.
The necessity of registration comes into play only when the rights of third
persons are affected. 
 
134. Dolar v.  Barangay Lublub  (now  P.D.  Monfort North), Municipality of
Dumangas, [475 SCRA 458 (2005)] If the corresponding contract of donation
expressly provides for automatic rescission and/or reversion in case of breach
of the condition therein, and the donee violates or fails to comply with the
condition, the donated property reverts back automatically to the donor

135.   Secretary of Education v. Heirs of Rufino Dulay, Sr., [480 SCRA 452
(2006)]
Non-fulfillment of a donnee of a condition imposed by the donor brings about the
right of the latter to revoke the donation. Prescriptive period of an onerous
donation such as this is governed by Art. 1144 of the Civil Code (10 years) as
opposed to Art. 764 of the Civil Code (4 years)
 
 
 
WILLS & SUCCESSION
 
 
Arts. 774-819, NCC
 
Arts. 390-391, NCC
 
136.   NHA vs. Almeida, [525 SCRA 383 (2007)] One’s interest over a property
is not extinguished by death. One’s death would transfer all property, rights and
obligations to the estate including whatever interest one has or may have had
over disputed properties. That interest should go to the estate upon demise to
be able to properly distribute them later to the heirs in accordance with a will or
by operation of law.
 
137.   Santos v. Lumbao, [519 SCRA 408 (2007)] While an estate remains
undivided, co-owners have each full ownership of their respective aliquots or
undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them. The co-
owner, however, has no right to sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of
the thing owned in common, because such right over the thing is represented by
an aliquot or ideal portion without any physical division. 
 
138.   Hacbang v. Alo, [772 SCRA 36 (2015)] There is no basis to apply the
provisions on intestacy when testate succession evidently applies.

139.   Calalang-Parulan v. Calalang-Garcia, [725 SCRA 402 (2014)]

Successional rights are vested only at the time of death. The capacity of the heir
is determined as of the time the decedent died; the legitime is to be computed
as of the same moment, and so is the inofficiousness of the donation inter vivos.
The legacies of credit and remission are valid only in the amount due and
outstanding at the death of the testator, and the fruits accruing after that instant
are deemed to pertain to the legatee.

140.   Heirs of Gregorio Lopez v. DBP, [741 SCRA 153 (2014)] The heirs
cannot alienate the shares that do not belong to them. Each co-owner shall
have full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, even substitute another
person in the enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.

141.   Alfonso v. Andres, [626 SCRA 149 (2010)] The title of the property owned
by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. 
 
142.   Arrogante v. Deliarte, [528 SCRA 63 (2007)] Prior to the death of the
decedent, the interest of the heir over the inheritance is merely inchoate or a
mere expectancy.
143.   Ferrer v. Diaz, [619 SCRA 226 (2010)] The Waiver of Hereditary Rights
and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) is not valid and that same
cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation.

144.   Seangio v. Hon. Reyes, [508 SCRA 177 (2006)] It is a fundamental

principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and
within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in
succession; Holographic wills, being usually prepared by one who is not learned
in the law, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert,
taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
instrument and the intention of the testator.

145.   Baltazar v. Laxa, [669 SCRA 249 (2012)] The state of being forgetful
does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit
to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind
 
146.   Lee v. Tambago [(A.C. No. 5281  February 12, 2008)]. A will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. Failure
to do renders the entire will invalid.
 
147.   Testate Estate of the Late Alipio Abada v. Abaja, [450 SCRA 264 (2005)]
There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew
the language or dialect used in the will. This is a matter that a party may
establish by proof aliunde.

148.  Azuela v. CA [G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006] The failure to state in the
attestation clause the number of pages on which the will was written remains a
fatal flaw, since it is required to safeguard against possible interpolation or
omission of one or some of its pages. However, there is substantial compliance
with this requirement if the will states elsewhere the number of pages it is
comprised of.
149.   Aluad v. Aluad,[569 SCRA 697 (2008)] The attestation clause is separate
and apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results
in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand
margin, the only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated elemental facts
would be their signatures on the attestation clause. 

150.   Samaniego-Celada v. Abena, [556 SCRA 569 (2008)] In the absence of

bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used
therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact
executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of
Article 805.
 
151.   Echavez v. Dozen Construction and Development Corp., [632 SCRA 594
(2010)] A donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities prescribed by
law for the validity of wills, "otherwise, the donation is void and would produce
no effect."  Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code should have been applied.
 
152.   Lopez v. Lopez, [685 SCRA 209 (2012)]- attestation must state the
number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is
to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its
pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.
 
153. Guerrero v. Bihis, [521 SCRA 394 (2007)]-One of the formalities required
by law in connection with the execution of a notarial will is that it must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
notary public must take the acknowledgement of the testatrix and the
instrumental witnesses within the territorial jurisdiction of his notarial
commission to make it valid.

Arts. 820-885
 
154.   Heirs of Rosendo Lasam v. Umengan, [510 SCRA 496 (2006)] Before
any will can have force or validity it must be probated.
 
155.   Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibanez, [452 SCRA 228 (2005)] The filing
of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is
mandatory. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of
the claims against the decedent’s estate in order to settle the affairs of the
estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.

156.   Del Rosario v. Ferrer, [630 SCRA 683 (2010)] An acceptance clause
indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only
for such kinds of donations, donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will,
need not be accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime.

157.   Morales v. Olondriz, [783 SCRA 151 (2016)] The preterition of a

compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the
devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not
impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the
preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy.
 
158.   Palaganas v. Palaganas, [640 SCRA 538 (2011)] Our laws do not prohibit
the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not
yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. The rules do
not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in
the country of its execution.
 
159.   JLT Agro, Inc. v. Balansag, [453 SCRA 211 (2005)] For the inheritance to
be considered as future, the succession must not have been opened at the time
of the contract. 
 
160.   Heirs of Policarpio M. Ureta, Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, [657 SCRA
555 (2011)] In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no
substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it; The main
characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really
desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical
situation of the parties—lacking in an absolutely simulated contract is consent
which is essential to a void and enforceable contract.
 
161.   Orendain, Jr. v. Trusteeship of the Estate of Doña Margarita Rodriguez,
[591 SCRA 285 (2009)] The general rule is that upon the expiration of the
twenty-year allowable period, the estate may be disposed of under Article 870 of
the New Civil Code, which regards as void any disposition of the testator
declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than 20 years.

Arts. 886-959
 
162.   Arellano v. Pascual, [638 SCRA 826 (2010)] Siblings are collateral
relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime—that part of the
testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it
for compulsory heirs. 

163.   Bravo-Guerrero v. Guerrero, [465 SCRA 244 (2005)] Bravo-Guerrero v.

Guerrero [465 SCRA 244 (2005)] Any co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-
ownership. This action for partition does not prescribe and is not subject to
laches.
 
164.   Delgado Vda. dela Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian,
[480 SCRA 334] The right of representation in the collateral line takes place only
in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.
 
165. Mendoza v. Delos Santos, [694 SCRA 74 (2013)] First cousins of the
prepositus are fourth degree relatives and, thus, they cannot be reservees or
reservatarios.
 
166.   Seangio v. Reyes, [508 SCRA 177 (2006)] For disinheritance to be valid,
Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a
will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified; Maltreatment of a parent
by a child presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of the latter.
 
 
Arts. 960-1116
 
167.   Carlos v. Sandoval, [574 SCRA 116 (2008)]. The presence of
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children or a surviving spouse excludes
collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. Conversely, if
there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
decedent.
 
168.   Bagunu v. Piedad, [347 SCRA 571 (2000)] Among collateral relatives,
except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with
their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962 of the Civil
Code, is an absolute rule.

169.  Delgado Vda de Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian,
[480 SCRA 334 (2006)]. The right of representation in the collateral line takes
place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
It cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. 
  
170.   Ining v. Vega, [703 SCRA 407 (2013)] Under the Family Code, family
relations, which is the primary basis for succession, exclude relations by affinity.
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the
latter. 
 
171.  Arado vs. Alcoran [G.R. No. 163362, July 8, 2015]. Illegitimate filiation is
proved in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Considering that the
putative father had a direct hand in the preparation of the birth certificate of his
illegitimate son, reliance on said birth certificate as evidence of his paternity was
fully warranted. 
 
172.   Capitle v. Elbambuena, [509 SCRA 444 (2006)] Respondent remained
his wife and legal heir, mere estrangement not being a legal ground for the
disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. Rights
to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
 
173.   Guy v. CA, [502 SCRA 151 (2006)] The law provides that filiation of an
illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment, or an admission by means of a public document or a private
handwritten instrument. Action for recognition may be brought by the child
during his/her lifetime. However, action must be based upon open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
 
174.   Arellano v. Pascual, [638 SCRA 826 (2010)] The purposes of collation
are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and
to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious
donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when there are compulsory
heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If
there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.

175.   Balus v. Balus, [610 SCRA 178 (2010)] Inheritance consists of the
property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his
death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession.
 
 
 
176.   Heirs of Policarpio M. Ureta, Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, [657 SCRA
555 (2011)] Where a deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid
but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void for lack of
consideration. Where the essential requisites of a contract are present and the
simulation refers only to the content or terms of the contract, the agreement is
absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their successors in
interest.
177.   J.L.T. Agro, Inc. v. Balansag, (453 SCRA 211) All things, even future
ones which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a
contract, except that no contract may be entered into with respect to future
inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the partition inter vivos
referred to in Article 1080.

178.  Arrogante v. Deliarte [G.R. No. 152132, July 24, 2007] A contract entered
into upon future inheritance characterized as void. However, the prohibition on
contracts respecting future inheritance admits of exceptions as when a person
partitions his estate by an act inter vivos, insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the compulsory heirs.

179.  Cua v. Vargas, [506 SCRA 374] The period of one month shall be
reckoned from the time that a co-heir is notified in writing by the vendor of the
actual sale. Written notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual knowledge of
the sale acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It
cannot be counted from the time advance notice is given of an impending or
contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir thirty days from the time written
notice of the actual sale to decide whether to repurchase or effect the
redemption. The purpose of Article 1088 is to keep strangers to the family out of
a joint ownership.
 
180.   Figuracion-Gerilla v. Vda. de Figuracion, [499 SCRA 484] The right to an
inheritance is transmitted immediately to the heirs by operation of law, at the
moment of death of the decedent.