G.R. No.

L-24190             July 13, 1926

GEORGE L. PARKS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PROVINCE OF TARLAC, MUNICIPALITY OF TARLAC, CONCEPCION CIRER, and
JAMES HILL, her husband, defendants-appellees.

Doctrine: The law itself recognizes the prescriptibility of the action for the revocation of a
donation, providing a special period of five years for the revocation by the subsequent birth
of children (art. 646, Civil Code), and one year for the revocation by reason of ingratitude.
If no special period is provided for the prescription of the action for revocation for
noncompliance of the conditions of the donation (art. 647, Civil Code), it is because in this
respect the donation is considered onerous and is governed by the law of contracts and the
general rules of prescription. Under the law in force (sec. 43, Code of Civ. Proc.) the period
of prescription of this class of action is ten years.

FACTS: In 1910, Concepcion Cirer and James Hill donated parcels of land to the municipality
of Tarlac on the condition that it be used absolutely and exclusively for the erection of a central
school and public parks, the work to commence within six months. The president of the
municipality of Tarlac accepted and registered the donation. In 1921, Cirer and Hill sold the
same property to George L. Parks.Later on the, the municipality of Tarlac transferred their rights
in the property to the Province of Tarlac. Parks filed a complaint seeking the annulment of the
donation and asking that he be declared the absolute owner of the property. Parks allege that the
conditions of the donation were not complied with.

ISSUE: W/N the action to revoke has prescribed?

HELD: Yes. The action to revoke the donation has prescribed. The prescriptive periods are: 5
years for the revocation by the subsequent birth of children, 1 year if by reason of ingratitude. If
no special period is prescribed, 10 years, for an onerous donation following the law of contracts
and general rules on prescriptions. The donation was made in 1910, the cause of action accrued
in 1911, while the action to revoke was filed 1924, twenty three years later.

G.R. No. 171897 October 14, 2015

PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner

vs.
FLORO ROXAS and EUFEMIA ROXAS, Respondents

Doctirine: Under Article 1279, in order for legal compensation to take place, the following
requisites must concur: (a) that each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at
the same time a principal creditor of the other; (b) that both debts consist in a sum of money, or
if the things due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the
latter has been stated; (c) that the two debts be due; (d) that they be liquidated and
demandable; and (e) that over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced
by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor.

Under Article 1231 of the Civil Code, payment and compensation are modes of
extinguishing an obligation. Although legally distinct, both must be pleaded in the same
case if the obligation sought to be extinguished and the parties thereto arc identical;
otherwise, it would constitute splitting of causes of action.

G.R. No. 167519               January 14, 2015

THE WELLEX GROUP, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
U-LAND AIRLINES, CO., LTD., Respondent.

Doctrine: ART. 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of
the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.

G.R. No. 213014 October 14, 2015

MAYBANK PHILIPPINES, INC. (Formerly PNB-Republic Bank ), Petitioner 1

vs.
SPOUSES OSCAR and NENITA TARROSA, Respondents

Doctrine: An action to enforce a right arising from a mortgage should be enforced within ten
(10) years from the time the right of action accrues, i.e., when the mortgagor defaults in the
payment of his obligation to the mortgagee; otherwise, it will be barred by prescription and
the mortgagee will lose his rights under the mortgage.

In order that the debtor may be in default, it is necessary that: (a) the obligation be
demandable and already liquidated; (b) the debtor delays performance; and (c) the
creditor requires the performance judicially or extrajudicially, unless demand is not
necessary – i.e., when there is an express stipulation to that effect; where the law so
provides; when the period is the controlling motive or the principal inducement for the
creation of the obligation; and where demand would be useless. Moreover, it is not
sufficient that the law or obligation fixes a date for performance; it must further state
expressly that after the period lapses, default will commence.

G.R. No. 123855               November 20, 2000

NEREO J. PACULDO, petitioner,
vs.
BONIFACIO C. REGALADO, respondent.

Doctrine: Under the law, if the debtor did not declare at the time he made the payment to
which of his debts with the creditor the payment is to be applied, the law provided the
guideline--no payment is to be made to a debt that is not yet due  and the payment has to be
applied first to the debt most onerous to the debtor.