Civ 1 Case Digests

INMATES OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON, Petitioners,
Vs.
SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA-DOJ and
SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II - DILG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 212719; June 25, 2019

PERALTA, J.
En Banc
Retroactivity of Laws
FACTS: In May 2013, R.A. No. 10592 was enacted. It provides for credit of preventive
imprisonment and good conduct time allowance (GCTA) against a prisoner’s term of
imprisonment. Section 4 of Rule 1 of the IRR of said law provides for a prospective application
of the grant of GCTA.
SECTION 4. Prospective Application. - Considering that these Rules provide for new
procedures and standards of behavior for the grant of good conduct time allowance as
provided in Section 4 of Rule V hereof and require the creation of a Management,
Screening and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) as provided in Section 3 of the same Rule,
the grant of good conduct time allowance under Republic Act No. 10592 shall be
prospective in application.
In June 2014, convicted prisoners of the New Bilibid Prison filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition (with Prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction) against respondent officials
contending that the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are penal in nature and beneficial to the
inmates; hence, should be given retroactive effect in accordance with Article 22 of the RPC. the
Free Legal Assistance Group in its Petition-in-Intervention argues that Section 4, Rule I of the
IRR is facially void for being contrary to the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution; it
discriminates, without any reasonable basis, against those who would have been benefited from
the retroactive application of the law; and is also ultra vires, as it was issued beyond the authority
of respondents to promulgate. Petitioners assert that Article 22 of the RPC applies because R.A.
No. 10592 is a penal law. They claim that said law has become an integral part of the RPC as
Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 thereof. Edago et al. further argue that if an amendment to the RPC
that makes the penalties more onerous or prejudicial to the accused cannot be applied
retroactively for being an ex post facto law, a law that makes the penalties lighter should be
considered penal laws in accordance with Article 22 of the RPC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law may be applied retroactively, thus rendering the subject IRR
provision invalid insofar as it provides for a prospective application of the law
RULING: Yes.
Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC, however, a penal law that
is favorable or advantageous to the accused shall be given retroactive effect if he is not a habitual
criminal. This is an exception to the general rule that all laws are prospective, not retrospective.
SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 1 of 65

Further, case law has shown that the rule on retroactivity under Article 22 of the RPC applies to
said Code and its amendments, as well as to special laws.
While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or provide/prescribe/establish a penalty as
it addresses the rehabilitation component68 of our correctional system, its provisions have the
purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the crime. The further reduction on
the length of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the ultimate analysis, beneficial to the detention
and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls for the application of Article 22 of the RPC.
The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10592 actually works to the
disadvantage of petitioners and those who are similarly situated. It precludes the decrease in the
penalty attached to their respective crimes and lengthens their prison stay; thus, making more
onerous the punishment for the crimes they committed.
Under the IRR of R.A. No. 10592, the MSECs are established to act as the recommending body
for the grant of GCTA and TASTM. They are tasked to manage, screen and evaluate the
behavior and conduct of a detention or convicted prisoner and to monitor and certify whether
said prisoner has actually studied, taught or performed mentoring activities.
The creation of the MSEC, however, does not justify the prospective application of R.A. No.
10592. Nowhere in the amendatory law was its formation set as a precondition before its
beneficial provisions are applied. What R.A. No. 10592 only provides is that the Secretaries of
the DOJ and the DILG are authorized to promulgate rules and regulations on the classification
system for good conduct and time allowances, as may be necessary to implement its
provisions.80 Clearly, respondents went outside the bounds of their legal mandate when they
provided for rules beyond what was contemplated by the law to be enforced.
Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under

legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying the law's general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be
expanded by such IRRSs, because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

DANA S. SANTOS, Petitioners,
Vs.
LEODEGARIO R. SANTOS, Respondent.
GR No. 214593; July 17, 2019

A. REYES, JR., J.
Third Division
Validity of Marriage - Compromise
FACTS: On September 2003, Leodegario filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage with Dana, alleging psychoological incapacity on the part of the latter. Dana filed her
Answer, alleging that Leodegario filed the petition in order to marry his paramour, with whom
he had a son. When it was Dana’s turn to present evidence, her counsel failed to appear, thus the
RTC declared Dana to have waived her right to present evidence. The RTC declared the
marriage between Dana and Leodegario null and void, holding that Dana was afflicted with
grave, incurable, and juridically antecedent Histrionic Personality Disorder.
Dana filed a Notice of Appeal but later withdrew it and instead filed a Petition for Relief from
Judgment. The RTC denied Dana’s petition ruling that there was no sufficient allegation of fraud
or mistake in the petition. Aggrieved, Dana filed a petition for certiorari against the RTC with the
CA. The CA referred Dana’s petition to the Philippine Mediation Center.
On June 6, 2011, under the auspices of the appellate court mediator, Dana and Leodegario
entered into a compromise agreement, where they agreed to transfer the titles to their conjugal
real properties in the name of their four common children. On June 16, 2011, Dana moved for
the archival of the case.
On August 14, 2012, Dana filed a Motion to Reopen and Reinstate the Petition, wherein she also
reiterated her allegations of Leodegario’s noncompliance with the Compromise Agreement. The
CA denied Dana’s Motion to Reopen, finding compliance on the part of Leodegario. Undaunted,
Dana filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Submit Petition for Decision (with Plea to
Preserve Marital Union), asserting that the Compromise Agreement was never intended to settle
the issue of the validity and subsistence of her marriage to Leodegario.
The CA found the Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Submit Petition for Decision
unmeritorious. It held that the marital ties between Dana and Leodegario had been severed by the
trial court's decision of June 24, 2009; hence, the compromise agreement did not involve the
validity of their marriage but only their property relations. Furthermore, the CA found that Dana,

in her Motion to Archive Case, had conceded her intention to have the case dismissed upon
compliance with the stipulations of the Compromise Agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not that part of the CA resolutions declaring the the case terminated by
reason of the compromise agreement is erroneous for being contrary to the State's legal mandate
to defend the sanctity of marriage
RULING: Yes.
A judgment upon compromise which is contrary to law is a void judgment.
The petition which gave rise to these proceedings is for the declaration of nullity of Dana and
Leodegario's marriage. Dana's Petition for Certiorari with the CA, which is nothing but a
consequence of the proceedings before the RTC, alleges the fraudulent deprivation of her chance
to refute and controvert Leodegario's allegations and to present her side of the issue, which she
also lays down in her Petition for Relief from Judgment. The core issue of Dana's petition is,
therefore, the validity of her marriage to Leodegario. The termination of the case by virtue of the
compromise agreement, therefore, necessarily implies the settlement by compromise of the issue
of the validity of Dana and Leodegario's marriage.
It was, therefore, erroneous for the CA to terminate Dana's suit - which puts in issue the validity
of her marriage - by virtue of the execution of the Decision 11 Q.R. No. 214593 compromise
agreement which only covers the property relations of the spouses. While these issues are
intertwined, a compromise of the latter issue should not and cannot operate as a compromise of
the former, per Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
The Court cannot give its imprimatur to the dismissal of the case at bar even if, as the appellate
court held, it was Dana's intention to have the case terminated upon the execution of the
compromise agreement. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the appellate court when it ruled
that the scope of the compromise agreement is limited to Dana and Leodegario's property
relations vis-à-vis their children, as Article 2036 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] compromise
comprises only those objects which are definitely stated therein, or which by necessary
implication from its terms should be deemed to have been included in the same."
Nevertheless, the Court is constrained to uphold the appellate court's decision, because the trial
court's denial of Dana's petition for relief from judgment does not amount to grave abuse of
discretion. A careful perusal of the petitions filed by Dana before the trial court, the appellate
court, and this Court betrays the lack of allegations sufficient to support a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38. Dana's allegations in her petition for relief fall way short of the
jurisprudential threshold for extrinsic fraud.

ROLANDO D. CORTEZ, Petitioner,
Vs.
LUZ G. CORTEZ, Respondent.
GR No. 224638; April 10, 2019

PERALTA, J.
Third Division
Psychological Incapacity
FACTS: Rolando and Luz were married on March 5, 1990. In June 2003, Rolando filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of his and Luzs
psychological incapacity. Rolando alleged that in February 1990, he was invited to a birthday
party of Luz’s cousin where he got drunk and thereafter woke up to find himself in bed with Luz
clad only in his underwear. Luz got pregnant. Rolando claimed that he was forced by Luz’s
brothers to marry her before he went to work abroad as a seaman, that he supported the children
in even though he doubted his paternity over them just to avoid being harassed; that he never
cohabited with Luz; that based on a semenal examination showing that he had low sperm count,
he did not have the capacity to impregnate a woman. On the contrary, Luz alleged that they’ve
known each other since 1988 and became sweethearts before their marriage; that when Rolando
left for abroad they continued to stay in touch and Rolando supported her and the children; that
their marital woes started in 1994 when Rolando admitted that he wants to be with another
woman.
Rolando consulted Dr. Felicitas Artiaga-Soriano, a psychiatrist, whose psychiatric evaluation

report stated that Rolando is a person with dependency inclination and has a passive aggressive
personality disorder, and was emotionally scarred and bitter for having been forced to marry Luz
without love, hence, he had no intention whatsoever to do the duties and obligations of a husband
and a father. On the other hand, she found Luz to be suffering from an anti-social personality
disorder and that her deceitfulness and persistence in getting money from Rolando had
traumatized the latter even more. She declared both parties psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage.

The RTC denied the Petition. The CA sustained the RTC’s decision, and gave credence to Luz's
claim that she and Rolando had an initially loving and harmonious relationship that turned sour
after her husband decided to be with another woman. It found that the totality of the established
facts and circumstances did not prove psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36
of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's finding that the totality of evidence
presented by Rolando failed to show that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with their essential marital obligations which would result in the nullity
of their marriage
RULING: No.
Rolando’s claim that he married Luz not out of love but because he was forced to marry her in
order to lift the hold departure order made by the POEA and to be able to work abroad as a
seaman, hence, he is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, does not rise to the level of psychologically incapacity that would
nullify his marriage.
Neither did Dr. Soriano’s report show how Rolando's personality traits incapacitated him from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage. On the contrary, the report established that
because Rolando was forced to marry Luz without love, he had no intention to do his full
obligations as a husband. Mere "difficulty," "refusal," or "neglect" in the performance of marital
obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition or illness.
Notably, Rolando admitted that it was only when he learned in 1994 that Luz had a child prior to
their marriage in 1990 that he stopped giving support to Luz and their two children; that because
of the abandonment case filed against him and the threats coming from Luz's brothers if he
would stop supporting Luz and the children that he entered into a compromise agreement with
Luz regarding the financial support for their children; that despite giving support, however, he
refused to live with Luz. Rolando's showing of ill-will and refusal to perform marital obligations
do not amount to psychological incapacity on his part.
Rolando's claim of lack of realization that he has marital obligation to perform as husband to Luz
is not a consideration under Article 36 of the Family Code as what the law requires is a mental
illness that leads to an inability to comply with or comprehend essential marital obligations.
We, likewise, agree with the CA's and the RTC's findings that Luz was not shown to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations.
As the CA found, Luz was shown to be a caring wife and a loving mother to her children. The
findings and conclusions made by Dr. Soriano that Luz did not have the mind, will and heart to
perform the obligations of marriage as she did not show concern for Rolando and was just
contented to get money from the latter cannot be given credence. There was no other basis for
Dr. Soriano to arrive at such finding other than the information supplied by Rolando. To make
conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the information

fed by only one side is not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness
of the content of such evidence. Moreover, such finding was contradicted by Luz's letters to
Rolando which were attached to Rolando's Reply filed with the RTC where she wrote how much
she wished for Rolando's good health and safety; that the money she received from Rolando's
allotment was used to pay for the house rental, children's education and other incidental
expenses; that she would like to save money to buy a house for the future of their children; and
that she asked for forgiveness for nagging him because of jealousy and that she still loves him.
Luz had shown that she is capable of fulfilling her marital obligations and that she valued her
marriage as she even opposed the petition for annulment of her marriage and participated in the
trial of the case.
GERARDO A. ELISCUPIDEZ, Petitioner,

Vs.
GLENDA C. ELISCUPIDEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 226907, July 22, 2019

PERALTA, J.
Third Division
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the Ground of Psychological Incapacity
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent first met in 1986. They eventually became lovers, maintaining an "on-
and-off" relationship as respondent would still entertain her other admirers, until they finally
exchanged marital vows on November 20, 1990. They begot two children.4
On March 13, 2012, petitioner filed before the RTC of Taguig City a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Summon by publication was allowed
because respondent could not be located in her last known address.
While living with petitioner's parents in Manila so as to save money, would have frequent fights,
with respondent having a habit of throwing things at petitioner; respondent allegedly tried to
avoid getting pregnant, with her repeatedly asking their househelp to buy abortifacient medicines
and to accompany her to a manghihilot, with respondent eventually suffering a miscarriage with
their supposed first child; respondent forbade petitioner from looking at other females, from

meeting up with his friends and relatives, and from wearing nice clothes, so that he could not flirt
with other women; respondent asked petitioner to resign from his work to avoid meeting other
people; on one occasion, respondent allegedly hit petitioner with a knife, injuring his right arm,
just because respondent did not want him to attend to his assigned work project; petitioner was
once admonished by his superior after respondent, thinking that petitioner was having an affair,
went to his office, made a scene in front of his colleagues; respondent would often insult and
berate the petitioner because of the latter's meager income, but despite the petitioner giving the
respondent all his salary, respondent still incurred debts from their co-workers, the employees'
cooperative, and from her credit cards; while petitioner was working in Milan, Italy, respondent
neglected her responsibilities to their children; respondent engaged in an illicit affair with
another man, with whom she lived together and begot two children; to save their marriage,
petitioner repeatedly asked respondent to live with him, but the latter refused; in 2002 or 2003,
respondent worked overseas where she had another affair with a married man.
Petitioner presented as his witness Irene V. Oro (Oro) who worked as kasambahay for him and
respondent when the two of them were still living together. Oro confirmed petitioner's testimony
that respondent was irritable, was a "war freak," and that whenever petitioner and respondent
would quarrel, respondent would throw things at the petitioner. Oro further claimed that the
couple had a heated argument when petitioner found out that respondent had taken abortion pills.
Oro added that the petitioner would be hurt whenever the couple fought with each other. She
was, thus, forced to leave her work out of fear for her life, as petitioner and respondent's quarrels
were becoming more frequent.
Petitioner, likewise, presented the Psychological Evaluation Report (Report) of clinical

psychologist Dr. Nedy L. Tayag. Dr. Tayag conducted her psychological evaluation of petitioner
through personal examination while her assessment of the psychological behavior of respondent
was based on her interviews of petitioner, Oro, and Vilma Cascabel Viernes (Viernes), the
respondent's sister. In her Report, she diagnosed respondent to be harboring traits of a
personality deficit classified as HISTRIONIC PERSONALITY DISORDER with Anti Social
Personality Traits.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is psychological incapacity that renders respondent truly
incognizant of her essential marital obligations
RULING: No.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.
To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of
the evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was
grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.

The the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to prove psychological
incapacity of the respondent to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause
of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Dr. Tayag’s finding in her Report were solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions
and characterizations of respondent rendered by petitioner and his witnesses. The conclusion of
Dr. Tayag that respondent's psychological incapacity existed early in her life were merely based
on the information provided by Viernes that she and respondent were their father's second
family, and that respondent was very manipulative. Dr. Tayag merely generalized her
explanations as to the reason behind and the extent of respondent's alleged personality disorder.
Dr. Tayag's Report failed to explain in detail how respondent's condition could be characterized
as grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within the doctrinal context of "psychological incapacity.
An examination of the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated is not

required. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
In the present case, however, the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner fails to
convince this Court that respondent suffered from a psychological incapacity that is permanent
or incurable, and that has existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Although
respondent was said to have exhibited "dramatic, extroverted behavior" who was "prone to
insecurities and aggressive outbursts of emotions," these characterizations fell short of proving
that she was psychologically incapacitated to assume her marital responsibilities.
MARY CHRISTINE GO-YU, Petitioner,
Vs.
ROMEO A. YU, Respondent.
G.R. No. 230443; April 03, 2019

PERALTA, J.
Third Division
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the Ground of Psychological Incapacity
FACTS:
Petitioner Mary Christine was well provided for as a child. She grew up a self-assured,
independent and confident person. She has studied in a prominent school abroad, came back to
the Philippines, worked in various companies, then joined their family business where she
worked her way up to be the its Senior Vice President. She and respondent Romeo were casually
introduced by her mother and after a few months of dating, they got married on June 11, 1999.
They stayed at Romeo’s family where Mary Christine had to contend with the constant meddling
of her mother-in-law. Romeo’s promise to her that they will eventually move out was never
fulfilled. She took on the responsibility of single-handedly running their household and making

all decisions as respondent was too busy in his involvement with his personal and social
activities outside their house; after their wedding, the parties' sexual activity decreased
considerably; petitioner was unable to conceive and even tried to convince respondent that she
undergo in vitro fertilization but the latter refused; as a result, the parties grew apart as a married
couple leading them to live separate lives even though they stay under the same roof.
Mary Christine filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Romeo. She
claimed to have been diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was found to exist
before the parties' marriage; and the fact that petitioner is comfortable with her behavior and sees
nothing wrong with it or the need to change renders treatment improbable. Romeo, on the other
hand, expressed desire for them to reconcile and save their marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Mary Christine was able to sufficiently prove her
psychological incapacity as to warrant the nullification of her marriage to Romeo
RULING: No. Petitioner was unable to present sufficient evidence to show that she has the right
to the relief she seeks.
“Psychological incapacity" has been intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted
in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
As held in Ting v. Velez-Ting: By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36,
it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions,
while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable
evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological
incapacity, however, did not mean that the same would have automatically ensured the granting
of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in
all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions
presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their
proceedings.
Apart from the opinion raised by Dr. Padilla, there appears to be no other competent and credible
proof that the alleged disorder is in fact grave enough to bring about the disability and that said

disorder is permanent or clinically incurable. The testimony of Dr. Padilla, who is supposed to be
the expert witness of Go-Yu, at large, merely established that the parties are having great marital
difficulties, which, however, do not warrant a declaration of nullity of marriage. Worse, the
[bases] for Dr. Padilla's conclusion were mere interviews with several Individuals, including
[herein petitioner] Go-Yu, who was never even referred to any psychological testing for a clearer
and more reliable evaluation.
Petitioner claims to be afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which is defined as a

mental condition in which people have an inflated sense of their own importance, a deep need for
excessive attention and admiration, troubled relationships, and a lack of empathy for others.
Indeed, contrary to petitioner's claim that she is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
ordinary duties and responsibilities of a married woman, petitioner's evidence prove such
capacity: first, petitioner expressed concern over the decrease in their sexual activity after their
wedding, that she also has needs and that, unlike her and respondent, it is normal for married
couples to have a healthy sexual relationship;28second, she wanted to have a baby with
respondent because she believes and understands that one of the purposes of marriage is
procreation and she also thought that having a baby could somehow save their marriage; third,
she made adjustments and sacrifices by giving up luxuries she had gotten used to when her
husband's financial resources started to dwindle; and fourth, she helped her husband manage their
finances and run their household.
All the foregoing clearly show that petitioner unquestionably recognizes both spouses'
obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, render mutual help and
support, provide for the support of the family, and manage their household. The fact that she
gradually became overwhelmed by feelings of disappointment or disillusionment toward her
husband and their marriage is not a sufficient ground to have such marriage declared null and
void.
To be tired and to give up on one's situation and on one's spouse are not necessarily signs of
psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. xxx An unsatisfactory
marriage is not a null and void marriage.
JACINTO J. BAGAPORO, Petitioner,

Vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
GR No. 211929; January 30, 2019

REYES, J. JR., J.
Second Division
Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death
FACTS: Petitioner Jacinto was charged and convicted by the RTC of the crime of bigamy.
Jacinto appealed his case but the CA dismissed his appeal for failure to file the required
appellant's brief. Entry of Judgment then followed after the dismissal became final on August 31,

2013. The present petition essentially seeks the reopening of petitioner's lost appeal and reasserts
the merits of his case.
Framed as one raising questions of law, petitioner argues that Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, particularly the last clause, violates the equal protection clause and the due process clause.
Petitioner claims good faith and that there is no need for a judicial declaration of a disputable
presumption (of death of the absent spouse) that has already been provided by law. He argues
that it was the prosecution's burden to prove that his absent wife was still alive when he
contracted his second marriage. What if his absent spouse was in fact already dead, which is
undeniably possible? Petitioner contends that there is no substantial distinction between such a
situation and that of a present spouse who contracts a subsequent marriage with the knowledge
that the absent spouse is already dead.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should have first obtained a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of his absent wife before contracting a subsequent marriage to claim good faith as a
defense against a bigamy charge
RULING: Yes.
As discussed in Manuel vs. People, such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the
petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the
private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case.
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an
aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive
death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains
and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and
convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution, "the State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public
policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the marital relation should be
surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes
specified by law. The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety,
good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing
essential to the validity of the proceedings.
The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so
serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most
positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse
after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the requirement of the
declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the
present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first
spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they wish to be true," is a maxim of the old jurists. To
sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other to be
dead would make the existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts,
easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of individuals.
Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages.
Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not
only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of
accurate judicial cognizance, namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.
GENEVIEVE ROSAL ARREZA, A.K.A. "GENEVIEVE ARREZA TOYO, Petitioner,

Vs.
TETSUSHI TOYO, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents.
GR No. 213198; July 1, 2019

LEONEN, J.
Second Division

Divorce
FACTS: On April 1, 1991, Genevieve, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi Toyo (Tetsushi), a
Japanese citizen, were married in Quezon City. They bore a child whom they named Keiichi
Toyo. After 19 years of marriage, the two filed a Notification of Divorce by Agreement, which
was later recorded in Tetsushi's family register as certified by the Mayor of Toyonaka City,
Osaka Fu. On May 24, 2012, Genevieve filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry. Among the
documents submitted was an English translation of the Civil Code of Japan.
The RTC denied Genevieve's Petition. It decreed that while the pieces of evidence presented by
Genevieve proved that their divorce agreement was accepted by the local government of Japan,
she nevertheless failed to prove the copy of Japan's law. It noted that the copy of the Civil Code
of Japan and its English translation submitted by Genevieve were not duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign
Affairs.
Genevieve argued that the trial court erred in not treating the English translation of the Civil
Code of Japan as an official publication in accordance with Rule 131, Section 3(gg) of the Rules
of Court. That it is an official publication, she points out, makes it a self-authenticating evidence
of Japan's law under Rule 132, Section 25 of the Rules of Court. She further contends that the
trial court erred in not considering the English translation of the Japan Civil Code as a learned
treatise and in refusing to take judicial notice of its authors' credentials.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Genevieve has sufficiently proven the Japan divorce law as a
fact as to warrant the recognition of her divorce
RULING: No.
When a Filipino and an alien get married, and the alien spouse later acquires a valid divorce
abroad, the Filipino spouse shall have the capacity to remarry provided that the divorce obtained
by the foreign spouse enables him or her to remarry. Article 26 of the Family Code, as amended,
provides:
ARTICLE 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
The second paragraph was introduced as a corrective measure to resolve an absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse even after their marital bond had
been severed by the divorce decree obtained abroad. Through this provision, Philippine courts

are given the authority "to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage." It bestowed
upon the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage considered dissolved,
granting him or her the capacity to remarry.
Nonetheless, settled is the rule that in actions involving the recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment, it is indispensable that the petitioner prove not only the foreign judgment granting the
divorce, but also the alien spouse's national law. This rule is rooted in the fundamental theory
that Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. As explained in
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered
by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must
be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made
in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his [or her] claim or defense.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The English translation submitted by petitioner was published by Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc., a

private company in Japan engaged in publishing English translation of Japanese laws, which
came to be known as the EHS Law Bulletin Series. However, these translations are "not
advertised as a source of official translations of Japanese laws;" rather, it is in the KANPO or the
Official Gazette where all official laws and regulations are published, albeit in Japanese.
Accordingly, the English translation submitted by petitioner is not an official publication
exempted from the requirement of authentication.
Neither can the English translation be considered as a learned treatise. Under the Rules of Court,
"[a] witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his [or her] personal knowledge.
The rule excluding hearsay evidence is not limited to oral testimony or statements, but also
covers written statements. Here, the Regional Trial Court did not take judicial notice of the
translator's and advisors' qualifications. Nor was an expert witness presented to testify on this
matter. The only evidence of the translator's and advisors' credentials is the inside cover page of
the English translation of the Civil Code of Japan. Hence, the Regional Trial Court was correct in
not considering the English translation as a learned treatise.
JULIET RENDORA MORAÑA, Petitioner,

Vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 227605; December 05, 2019

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.
First Division
In RE: Petition for Judicial Recognition of Divorce
FACTS:
In June 2002, Minoru Takahashi and petitioner Juliet Morana got married in San Juan and
thereafter moved to live in Japan where they bore two children. Ten (10) years later, they got
estranged; the husband refused to give support and started cohabiting with another woman.
Because of her persistent demand for financial support, her husband suggested they secure a
divorce so the Japanese government would give financial assistance to their children and send
them to school. Believing it was for the good of their children, petitioner agreed to divorce her
husband. Consequently, they jointly applied for divorce before the Office of the Mayor of
Fukuyama City, Japan who granted their application and issued the corresponding Divorce
Report.
In October 2012, petitioner filed an action for recognition of the Divorce Report. Both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, declined to consider the Divorce Report as the
Divorce Decree itself. According to the trial court, the Divorce Report was "limited to the report
of the divorce granted to the parties." On the other hand, the Court of Appeals held that the
Divorce Report "cannot be considered as act of an official body or tribunal as would constitute
the divorce decree contemplated by the Rules."
ISSUE:
Whether the Divorce Report, in lieu of divorce decree, can sufficiently prove the fact of divorce
RULING: Yes.
The Divorce Report clearly bears the fact of divorce by agreement of the parties. Records show
that the Divorce Report is what the Government of Japan issued to petitioner and her husband
when they applied for divorce. There was no "divorce judgment" to speak of because the divorce
proceeding was not coursed through Japanese courts but through the Office of the Mayor of
Fukuyama City. In any event, since the Divorce Report was issued by the Office of the Mayor of
Fukuyama City, the same is deemed an act of an official body in Japan. By whatever name it is
called, the Divorce Report is clearly the equivalent of the "Divorce Decree" in Japan, hence, the
best evidence of the fact of divorce obtained by petitioner and her former husband.
Notably, the fact of divorce was also supported by the Certificate of All Matters issued by the
Japanese government to petitioner's husband Minoru Takahashi, indicating the date of divorce,
petitioner's name from whom he got divorced and petitioner's nationality as well. More,

petitioner submitted below a duly authenticated copy of the Divorce Certificate issued by the
Japanese government. The fact alone that the document was submitted to the trial court without
anyone identifying it on the stand or making a formal offer thereof in evidence does not call for
dismissal of the petition. Still, another, the Divorce Report, Certificate of All Matters, and
Divorce Certificate were all authenticated by the Japanese Embassy. These are proofs of official
records which are admissible in evidence under Sections 19 and 24, Rule 132 of the Rules on
Evidence.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was able to prove the applicable law on divorce in Japan
RULING: No.
The Japanese law on divorce must still be proved. The burden of proof lies with the "party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. It is
well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
At any rate, considering that the fact of divorce was duly proved in this case, the higher interest
of substantial justice compels that petitioner be afforded the chance to properly prove the
Japanese law on divorce, with the end view that petitioner may be eventually freed from a
marriage in which she is the only remaining party.
The case is remanded to the RTC for presentation in evidence of the pertinent Japanese law on
divorce following the procedure in Racho v. Tanaka.

MARLYN MONTON NULLADA, Petitioner,
Vs.
THE HON. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA, AKIRA ITO, SHIN ITO AND ALL
PERSONS WHO HAVE OR CLAIM ANY INTEREST, Respondents.
G.R. No. 224548; January 23, 2019

A. REYES, JR., J.
Third Division
Petition for Registration and/or Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decree and Cancellation of
Entry of Marriage under Rule 108
FACTS:
Akira Ito and petitioner Marlyn Nullada got married in Japan. Their union resulted to the birth of
one child. Their relationship, however, eventually turned sour and so they later decided to obtain
a divorce by mutual agreement. In 2009, Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce decree in Japan.
The Divorce Certificate was issued by the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines.
Marlyn filed with the RTC the above petition. The RTC dismissed the petition ratiocinating that
under the Article 17 of the New Civil Code is a policy of non-recognition of divorce. For the trial
court, the fact that Marlyn also agreed to the divorce and jointly filed for it with Akira barred the
application of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. While the intent of the law
is to equalize Filipinos with their foreigner spouses who are free to marry again after the divorce,
the Filipino spouse cannot invoke the intention of equity behind the law when he or she is an
initiator or active participant in procuring the divorce.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code may apply to cases where the divorce
was mutually agreed upon by the spouses
RULING: Yes.
As held in Republic vs. Manalo, in determining whether a divorce decree obtained by a foreigner
spouse should be recognized in the Philippines, it is immaterial that the divorce is sought by the
Filipino national. To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a

favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry
will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance
as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. The dismissal of
Marlyn's petition based on the RTC’s interpretation of Article 26 of the Family Code is
erroneous in light of the Court's disposition in Manalo. The fact that the divorce was by the
mutual agreement of Marlyn and Akira was not sufficient ground to reject the decree in this
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce decree should be recognized considering that it was not disputed by
the OSG
RULING: No. Petition is remanded to the RTC.
Under prevailing rules and jurisprudence, the submission of the decree should come with
adequate proof of the foreign law that allows it. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.
The records only include a photocopy of excerpts of The Civil Code of Japan, merely stamped
LIBRARY, Japan Information and Culture Center, Embassy of Japan, 2627 Roxas Boulevard,
Pasay City 1300. This clearly does not constitute sufficient compliance with the rules on proof of
Japan's law on divorce. In any case, similar to the remedy that was allowed by the Court
in Manalo to resolve such failure, a remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings and
reception of evidence on the laws of Japan on divorce is allowed, as it is hereby ordered by the
Court.

MELINDA M. MALABANAN, Petitioner,
Vs.
FRANCISCO MALABANAN, JR., SPOUSES RAMON AND PRESCILA MALABANAN,
and SPOUSES DOMINADOR III AND GUIA MONTANO, Respondents.
GR No. 187225; March 6, 2019

LEONEN, J.
Third Division
Presumption of Conjugality
FACTS: Petitioner Melinda is the widow of Jose Malabanan. In a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
December 18, 1984, they acquired from Maria Cristina Rodriguez a 310-square meter lot and in
in February 1985, a Transfer Certificate of Title No.188590 over the said property was
accordingly issued to "Jose, married to Melinda,”. The spouses built a house on the lot which the
family had possessed since 1984. In June 1985, Jose was murdered prompting Melinda to return
home. She subsequently returned to Libya and came home finally on November 1990.
Melinda discovered that T-188590 had long been cancelled thru a string of transactions. An SPA
was allegedly executed by Jose in favor of his father Francisco Malabanan, Jr., to mortgage,
lease or sell the property. On the basis of said SPA, Franscisco sold the property to his brother in
law but within three months bought it back again and had it titled under his name and his wife.
When Jose’s mother Adelfina died, in an extrajudicial settlement of her estate, the property was
awarded to Ramon, Jose’s brother, who in turn sold the property to the Montano Spouses.
Melinda filed a complaint for Annulment of Title with Damages, claiming that the SPA in favor
of Francisco is void as her signature therein is forged. Malabanan Respondents claimed that
Francisco and Adelfina bought the property for their son, Jose, and Melinda as an advance on
Jose's legitime and that they paid for the construction of the house on the property. Francisco
claimed that Melinda and Jose had no means to purchase the lot as they were jobless.
The RTC, ruling in favor of Melinda, found that she has proved her ownership over the property,
which was fraudulently transferred through Francisco's clever scheme. The CA reversed the RTC

ruling, finding that in the SPA, Jose himself acknowledged executing it as gratitude to his
parents who actually paid for the whole cost of said property and caused the registration of the
same in his name. Since Jose acquired the gift by gratuitous title during marriage, the property
was excluded from the conjugal partnership of gains and Jose can dispose it without Melinda's
consent. Hence, Melinda's signature being forged in the SPA did not invalidate the authority Jose
had given his father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property sold by the husband was conjugal, and thus, rendering its
sale without the wife's consent void.
RULING: Yes.
The circumstances here transpired prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Thus, petitioner and Jose's marriage and property relations are governed by the Civil Code.
Under the Civil Code, property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal. There is no
need to prove that the money used to purchase a property came from the conjugal fund. What
must be established is that the property was acquired during marriage. Only through "clear,
categorical, and convincing" proof to the contrary will it be considered the paraphernal property
of one (1) of the spouses. Here, the pieces of evidence presented by respondents, who had the
burden of proving that the property was not conjugal, were insufficient to overturn this
presumption.
A certificate of title is the best evidence of ownership of a property. Respondents neither alleged
fraud nor assailed the issuance of the title in Jose's favor. This certificate of title, when taken
with the Deed of Absolute Sale between Jose and Rodriguez, as well as the tax declarations in
Melinda's name, weigh more heavily than respondents' bare claims. Respondent Francisco, on
the contrary, failed to present any evidence to prove that he paid for the kind and the construction
of the house on the property.
Since this case involves conjugal property, Articles 165 and 166 of the Civil Code are relevant:
ARTICLE 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership.
ARTICLE 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift,
or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate
or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. If
she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the
same.
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnership before the
effective date of this Code.
This Court, applying those Civil Code provisions, ruled in a number of cases that the sale of
conjugal property by a spouse without the other's consent is void. All subsequent transferees of

the conjugal property acquire no rights whatsoever from the conjugal property's unauthorized
sale.
Here, Jose had no right to either unilaterally dispose the conjugal property or grant respondent
Francisco this authority through the supposed SPA.
ESTRELLA ABID-BABANO, Petitioner,

Vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 201176; August 28, 2019

BERSAMIN, C.J.
En Banc
Separation of Property
FACTS: Petitioner Babano is the second wife of her husband Macmod S. Pangandaman. They
are both Muslims. Petitioner’s husband did not live with her in her household but with his first
wife in separate household.
On the basis of an anonymous complaint, the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) found
a prima facie case to charge and later found Babano guilty with of simple neglect of duty for
failing to perform her legal obligation to disclose in her SALN all her assets, liabilities and [net
worth], including that of her spouse as mandated by law. According to PAGC, Section 8 (A) of
R.A. 6713 requires public officials and employees to file under oath their Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business Interest and Financial Connections and
those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households.
In her defense, petitioner contended that she was not obliged to include the properties of her
husband in her SALN because "her understanding was that she should include in her SALN

(only) the assets, liabilities, net worth and financial business interest of her husband found in
their common household.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner committed neglect in not including in her SALN the properties
of her husband
RULING: No.
Both petitioner and her husband were Muslims. She was his second wife. Article 38 of the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws specifically defines their regime of property relations as Muslims to be
one of complete separation of property. Article 42 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws lays
down the effect of the regime of complete separation of property for Muslim spouses, and each
spouse fully exercises all acts of ownership and administration over his or her own exclusive
property, without any need for consent from the other spouse.
In view of Section 38 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, the exemption of petitioner from
the disclosure requirement should be clear and undisputed. As such, petitioner's non-disclosure
in her SALN of the properties pertaining to her husband and held by her husband outside of her
own household with him was not actionable.
Each spouse in marriages covered by the regime of complete separation of property may exercise
complete dominion over his or her exclusive estate. No permission or consent is required before
one spouse can exercise acts of ownership or administration. Logically, under the regime of
complete separation of property, each spouse may unilaterally acquire or dispose property
without notifying the other spouse. Moreover, a spouse cannot prevent or interfere with the
ownership, disposal, possession, administration, and enjoyment of exclusive property by the
other spouse, including all fruits and earnings arising therefrom. The owner-spouse can even
bind or encumber his or her own exclusive property without the conformity or knowledge of the
other. Thus, to still require a public official or employee to include in his or her SALN the
separate property of his or her spouse is inequitable as well as cumbersome.
Without doubt, the objective for requiring the inclusion of the properties of the public employee's
spouse and their unmarried children pursuant to Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 is to obviate
the possibility that said public employee might use his or her spouse or unmarried children to
accumulate and conceal ill-gotten wealth, taking into account said public official may have
proprietary or controlling interest in the properties of his spouse or unmarried child.
The legislative intent to exempt the properties of children who are already 18 years old and older
from the SALN disclosure requirement appears to be rooted in the legal concept of
emancipation. Under Article 234 of the Family Code, as amended, emancipation takes place by
the attainment of majority which commences at the age of eighteen years. The law decrees that
the legal consequence of emancipation is the termination of "parental authority over the person
and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save
the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases."

If the rationale for excluding the properties of the public official's emancipated child from the
SALN is the child's legal capacity to hold property independently and separately from the
parents, that rationale should equally apply to a public official's spouse, who by law or by ante-
nuptial agreement, may unilaterally acquire and dispose of his or her own properties under a
regime of complete separation of property. Indeed, the evil sought to be prevented by our laws
on the SALN, i.e. that a spouse would be used to conceal from the public the full extent of a
government employee's wealth and financial/proprietary interests, does not exist in the case of a
public employee and his/her spouse whose property regime is complete separation of property
considering that whatever properties are held by each spouse is exclusively his/her own and can
only be counted towards his/her own "wealth."
HEIRS OF PAULA C. FABILLAR, as represented by AUREO* FABILLAR, Petitioners,

Vs.
MIGUEL M. PALLER, FLORENTINA P. ABAYAN, and DEMETRIA P. SAGALES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 231459; January 21, 2019

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Second Division
Recovery of Ownership, Possession of Land (with Necessity of Determining Filiation)
FACTS:
Respondents claimed that the subject 3 hectare agricultural land occupied by Spouses Custodio,
heirs of Paula Fabillar, was a portion of a bigger parcel of land owned by their grandfather
Marcelino. After his death, his children, among which are respondents’ father, Ambrosio, and
petitioner Paula’s grandmother, Ignacia, orally partitioned his properties and took possession of
their respective shares. Respondents claim right to the land by succession from their parent’s

death. The Custodios claimed to be legitimate and compulsory heirs of Marcelino who can
validly and legally possess the subject land which has not been partitioned, and thus, commonly
owned by his heirs. They further averred that Ambrosio is not a child of Marcelino and, as such,
has no right to claim the subject land.
To support respondents' claim that Ambrosio is a child of Marcelino, they presented before the
MCTC a copy of Ambrosio's baptismal certificate indicating that his father was Marcelino.
Subsequently, the Custodios filed a Demurrer to Evidence averring that respondents failed to
establish their claim that Ambrosio is a son of Marcelino, pointing out, among others, the lack of
documents/evidence other than Ambrosio's baptismal certificate to prove his filiation to
Marcelino.
The MCTC ruled in favor of respondents, giving weight to the baptismal certificate as sufficient
and competent proof of Ambrosio's filiation with Marcelino which the Custodios failed to
successfully overthrow. The RTC affirmed the MCTC ruling, considering the Custodios' failure
to rebut Ambrosio's baptismal certificate indicating that his father is Marcelino, concluding the
same to be his proof of pedigree. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision, finding Marcelino to be
the father of Ambrosio, thereby declaring that respondents, as children of Ambrosio, have a right
over the subject land.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ambrosio’s baptismal certificate alone can be considered as sufficient
proof of his filiation to Marcelino as to entitle respondents to rights of succession over the land
RULING: No.
In the absence of the record of birth and admission of legitimate filiation, Article 172 of the
Family Code provides that filiation shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. Such other proof of one's filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of
proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Rules). Article 175 of the same Code also
allows illegitimate children to establish their filiation in the same way and on the same evidence
as that of legitimate children.
However, it is jurisprudentially settled that a baptismal certificate has evidentiary value to prove
filiation only if considered alongside other evidence of filiation. Because the putative parent has
no hand in the preparation of a baptismal certificate, the same has scant evidentiary value if
taken in isolation; while it may be considered a public document, "it can only serve as evidence
of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified, but not the veracity of the entries
with respect to the child's paternity. As such, a baptismal certificate alone is not sufficient to
resolve a disputed filiation, and the courts must peruse other pieces of evidence instead of relying
only on a canonical record.
In this case, the MCTC, the RTC, and the CA did not appreciate any other material proof related
to the baptismal certificate of Ambrosio that would establish his filiation with Marcelino,
whether as a legitimate or an illegitimate son. Contrary to the ruling of the said courts, the

burden of proof is on respondents to establish their affirmative allegation that Marcelino is
Ambrosio's father, and not for petitioners to disprove the same, because a baptismal certificate is
neither conclusive proof of filiation/parentage nor of the status of legitimacy or illegitimacy of
the person baptized. Consequently, while petitioners have admitted that Marcelino's heirs had
partitioned Marcelino's properties among them, the Court finds respondents' evidence to be
inadequate to prove the claimed filiation with the property owner, Marcelino, as to entitle
Ambrosio and his successors-in-interest, herein respondents, to share in the properties left by
Marcelino.
GLENN M. MILLER, substituted by his SURVIVING LEGAL HEIRS, Petitioners,

Vs.
JOAN MILLER Y ESPENIDA A.K.A. JOHNLYN MILLER Y ESPENIDA and THE
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF GUBAT, SORSOGON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 200344; August 28, 2019

LEONEN, J.
Third Division

Petition for Correction of Entries in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108
FACTS:
John Miller and Beatriz Marcaida were legally married. Glenn is one of their children.
After John’s death, Joan Miller, through her mother Lennie Espineda, filed before the RTC a
Petition for Partition and Accounting of John's estate with a prayer for preliminary attachment,
receivership, support, and damages, alleging that she is John's illegitimate child with Lennie,
Joan presented her Certificate of Live Birth which showed John to be her registered father.
Glenn filed a separate Petition praying that Joan's Certificate of Live Birth be canceled, praying
that the Local Civil Registrar of Gubat, Sorsogon be directed to replace Joan's surname, Miller,
with Espenida instead of Miller in all official documents. Glenn claimed that John did not
acknowledge Joan as a natural child, pointing out that John's signature was not in her birth
certificate. It was also not shown that John knew and consented that his name would be indicated
in the certificate.
Joan countered that from 1978 until John's death in 1990, her mother Lennie and John had an
amorous relationship, out of which she was born on June 25, 1982. While she admitted that John
did not sign her birth certificate, he "openly and continuously recognized her as his child during
his lifetime." She narrated that she grew up in his ranch and went to John Miller Primary School
with John financing her studies. She alleged that despite John's failure to acknowledge Joan in
the birth certificate, their evidence-the letters, the holographic will, and the document assigning
Betty as Joan's guardian-preponderantly prove that he acknowledged Joan as his illegitimate
child.
The RTC ruled in favor of Joan, holding that the "due recognition of an illegitimate child in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further action is required. The
CA affirmed the RTC’s decision, finding that John's holographic will, where he gave Joan 1/8 of
his estate, sufficiently established his paternity.
Glen died and was substituted by his heirs, who argued that since private respondent was born on
June 25, 1982, the applicable provision is Article 368 of the Civil Code, which states that
illegitimate children shall bear their mother's surname. Thus, private respondent should use her
mother's surname in her birth certificate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the legitimacy and filiation of a child can be collaterally attacked in a petition for
correction of entries in her certificate of live birth
RULING: No.
Glenn's initiatory pleading before the RTC is a Petition for Correction of Entries in the
Certificate of Live Birth of Joan Miller y Espenida. This type of petition is governed by Rule 108

of the Rules of Court. The summary procedure for correction of entries in the civil registry under
article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is confined to "innocuous or
clerical errors, such as misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding" or corrections that are not controversial and are supported by indubitable
evidence.
Here, petitioners sought the correction of private respondent's surname in her birth certificate.
They want her to use her mother's surname, Espenida, instead of Miller, claiming that she was
not an acknowledged illegitimate child of John. What petitioners seek is not a mere clerical
change. It is not a simple matter of correcting a single letter in private respondent's surname due
to a misspelling. Rather, private respondent's filiation will be gravely affected, as changing her
surname from Miller to Espenida will also change her status. This will affect not only her
identity, but her successional rights as well. Certainly, this change is substantial.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,61 this Court
emphasized that "legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack. Moreover, impugning the legitimacy
of a child is governed by Article 171 of the Family Code, not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
SPOUSES JOON HYUNG PARK AND KYUNG AH LEE, Petitioners,

Vs.

HON. RICO SEBASTIAN D. LIWANAG, PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC-MAKATI,
BR.136, Respondent.
GR No. 248035; November 27, 2019

HERNANDO, J.
Second Division
Intercountry vs. Domestic Adoption
FACTS: Petitioner spouses are American citizens residing in the Philippines who petitioned for
the adoption of the minor Mayca (aka Innah) Alegado. Petitioner Park and Lee has been residing
in the Philippines since 2007 and 2009, respectively, and have been gainfully employed, Park
being president of two PEZA-located corporations and while is the Senior Adviser of BDO’s
Korean desk.
Innah was barely 22 days old when rescued by an NGO from trafficking and referred to the
DSWD. She was a little over one-year old when her care and custody was officially bestowed by
DSWD on January 2014 upon petitioners thru a Pre-Adoption Placement Authority. On May
2016, DSWD issued its Affidavit of Consent instructing petitioners to file a petition for adoption.
Judge Liwanag found that since petitioners are both foreigners, then the Petition for Adoption
with Change of Name presented a proper case of inter-country adoption, instead of considering
the petition to be properly filed under domestic adoption law. He directed the transmittal of the
petition to the ICAB for appropriate action. Petitioner spouses assailed the order issued by the
judge, contending that the Domestic Adoption Act clearly confers jurisdiction on Family Courts
to hear petition for adoption filed by aliens who have been residing in the Philippines for at least
three continuous years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the instant petition properly falls under the Domestic Adoption Act such
that respondent judge erred in referring the same to ICAB
RULING: Yes
Under the Domestic Adoption Act, an alien may adopt provided he/she has been residing in the
Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption and
such residency shall continue up until the adoption decree has been entered. Whereas under
Inter-Country Adoption, only an alien or Filipino permanently residing abroad may file an
application.
Petitioners who are foreign citizens have been residing and gainfully employed since 2007 and
2009 and are thus living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of
the petition, as required under the Domestic Adoption Act.
Under the Agreement entered into between the Supreme Court and ICAB, embodied in the
DSWD’s Memorandum dated June 1, 2018, re: Domestic Adoption by Foreigners Habitually
Residing in the Philippines, one of the documents required to be attached to the petition is a

Certification regarding the alien’s legal capacity to adopt and that his/her government allows the
adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted child. Foreigners should secure a certification
from their Foreign Adoption Agencies/Embassies that since they are not residents in their
countries and are habitualkly residing in the Philippines, they cannot issue the documents
required by the domestic courts in support of their petitions filed for domestice adoption. If ever
their cases will be endorsed to the ICAB by the courts, ICAB will fle a manifestation on this
matter so that the domestic adoption could be pursued.
Thus, even if the case would be referred to ICAB, as what the RTC did, there is still a high
probability that the ICAB will file a manifestation so that the domestic adoption before the trial
court could be pursued considering the circumstances of the case. Consequently, the referral to
the ICAB would only cause delay in the adoption proceedings, a matter that would be clearly
prejudicial to the interest of the adoptee and the petitioners.
Since the case properly falls under the Domestic Adoption Act, it is for the best interest of the
child that the case be speedily disposed by continuing the proceedings in the trial court instead of
inappropriately referring the case to the ICAB where the proceedings may have to start anew and
may be referred back to the trial court for the continuation of the domestic adoption proceedings.

HEIRS OF SATRAMDAS, Petitioners,
Vs.
GOP S. SADHWANI, Respondents.
GR No. 217365; August 14, 2019

CAGUIOA, J.
Second Division
National Law of the Decedent
FACTS: The dispute involves conflicting claims over a parcel of land in Bel Air, Makati and a
condominium unit at Ritz Tower, Ayala Avenue, Makati, allegedly purchased by the decedents
Spouses Satramdas and Kishnibai Sadhwani (Sps. Sadhwani) and the titles thereof were
allegedly placed in the name of their son, herein respondent Gop S. Sadhwani (respondent Gop),
in trust for his parents and siblings. Petitioners filed a Complaint for, among others,
reconveyance, partition and declaration of nullity of documents against their brother Gop, his
wife and mortgagee banks.
The RTC held, among others, that based on the death certificates attached to the Complaint, the
Sps. Sadhwani were Indian nationals. Hence, the Sps. Sadhwani were prohibited under Article
XII, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution from owning the subject properties or transmitting any
rights over the same to their children upon their deaths. Hence, the Complaint was dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action as petitioner heirs premised their action for reconveyance on
their purported rights as heirs of their parents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC correctly ruled that the complaint failed stated a cause of action
because petitioner heirs simply premised their action for reconveyance on their purported rights
as heirs of their parents.
RULING: Yes
The Court agrees with the RTC that petitioners failed to state a cause of action because they
premised their claim of ownership over the subject properties as heirs of the Sps. Sadhwani who
were unquestionably Indian nationals.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that, save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations,
or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also
disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of this constitutional provision is
the conservation of the national patrimony. Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right
to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least
sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.
Although the absolute prohibition against foreign ownership of lands does not necessarily apply
to foreign ownership of condominium units, the Court finds that petitioners likewise failed to
state a cause of action over the Ritz Condominium Unit.
As already discussed, petitioners premised their alleged right over the subject properties as heirs
of the Sps. Sadhwani under the Civil Code. Under Philippine law, however, successional rights
are governed by the national law of the decedent. Article 16 of the Civil Code pertinently
provides:
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
As the Sps. Sadhwani were Indian nationals, the laws of succession under the Civil Code do not
apply. Therefore, the complaint should have alleged, at the very least, that petitioners were legal
heirs of their parents and were entitled to inherit the Ritz Condominium Unit under the laws of
the Republic of India. In view of the foregoing provision, the Court holds that petitioner cannot
sidestep their burden of sufficiently pleading and eventually proving a cause of action under
foreign law even when claiming under Philippine law may be more favorable or expedient. As
they failed to sufficiently allege the basis for their right under the national law of their parents,
petitioners failed to state a cause of action over the condominium unit.
To reiterate, "[t]he elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint
alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded." The complaint miserably failed
this test. Even assuming that the facts alleged in the complaint (and amended complaint) were
true, petitioners would not be entitled to the reliefs demanded because: 1) petitioners premised
their right over the subject properties as heirs of aliens who may not own land or transmit rights
over the same by succession, and 2) petitioners failed to allege that they were in fact heirs of the
Sps. Sadhwani under the laws of the Republic of India. In other words, the allegations of the
complaint failed to sufficiently state the concurrence of the three elements for a cause of action,
particularly, the legal right to the relief demanded. In view of the foregoing, the complaint must
be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

ATTY. BERNARDO T. CONSTANTINO, Petitioner,
Vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
GR No. 225696; April 08, 2019

LEONEN, J.
Third Division
Formalities of Wills
FACTS: In June 1998, Severino suffered a stroke. When he was discharged from the hospital, he
returned to the family home where he was cared for his daughter Teresita Saliganan until his
death in December 6, 2003. In February 2005, a petition for the probate of Severino’s will was
filed with RTC-Laoag. The witnesses indicated in the will were Cu, Balintona Spouses, and Dr.
Ascuncion. It was notarized by petitioner Atty. Constantino.
In September 9, 2001, Atty. Constantino brought three copies of Severino’s last will to the
latter’s house for signing. Except for Dr. Ascuncion, the three other instrumental witnesses were
present. After Severino signed the will, the three witnesses present signed, after which Atty.
Constantino notarized the document.
Addressing the absence of Dr. Asuncion, whose name was indicated as an instrumental witness,
Atty. Constantino assured Severino that only three (3) witnesses were needed for the document.
He then allegedly instructed Severino to leave the document as it was and "not make any
erasures or crossing-out on it [in] order not to make it dirty."
Atty. Constatino took a copy and gave the two other copies to Severino. On his way out,
Saliganan took his copy telling him that Dr. Ascuncion already arrived. It turned out, however,
that Ferrer, Saliganan’s son-in-law, went to Dr. Ascuncion’s clinic and asked him to sign the
document. Dr. Ascuncion did as asked, having known Ferrer as a member of his motorcycle
club. Sometime later, Saliganan returned the copy, but Atty. Constantino failed to check if Dr.
Asuncion had signed it.
Atty. Constantino was charged with Falsification of a Public Document.

The trial court found Atty. Constantino liable for making it appear that Dr. Asuncion appeared
before him and witnessed the execution of the Last Will and Testament. It ruled that Atty.
Constantino should have been aware of the legal consequences to leaving Dr. Asuncion's name
on the document despite his absence. Likewise, the trial court cited the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, which prohibited notaries public from notarizing incomplete documents or false
information. It pointed out that removing Dr. Asuncion's name from the document was easy and
could have been accomplished within minutes. Agreeing with the trial court, the Court of
Appeals found that Atty. Constantino could have easily removed Dr. Asuncion's name if he
believed in good faith that only three (3) witnesses were needed.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Constantino, as a notary public, falsified a public document, punishable
under Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code, when he failed to delete Dr. Asuncion's name in
the Joint Acknowledgment upon notarization.
RULING: No.
The formalities required by law to prove a notarial will's authenticity do not pertain to the
notarization, but to the attestation and subscription of the testator and the attesting witnesses.
The subscription of the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses is made for the
purpose of authentication and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very same
instrument executed by the testator and attested to by the witnesses. Further, by attesting and
subscribing to the will, the witnesses thereby declare the due execution of the will as embodied
in the attestation clause.
An authentic attestation clause must not only contain the names of the instrumental witnesses.
Mere mention of their names in the attestation clause will not accurately represent the fact of
their attestation and subscription. Instead, the instrumental witnesses must also sign the
instrument before it is notarized by the notary public.
The prosecution must prove (1) that petitioner falsified a document "by causing it to appear that
persons have participated in any act or proceeding"; and (2) that "such person or persons did not
in fact so participate in the proceeding."
The due execution of a notarized will is proven through the validity of its attestation clause. The
prosecution must prove that either the testator could not have authored the instrument, or the
instrumental witnesses had no capacity to attest to the due execution of the will. This requires
that the notary public must have falsified or simulated the signatures appearing on the attestation
clause.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals, disregarded one crucial detail from its finding of facts:
Dr. Asuncion signed the Joint Acknowledgment after it was notarized by petitioner. Since Dr.
Asuncion did not sign the Joint Acknowledgment before it was notarized, he cannot be
considered as having attested and subscribed to its due execution at the time of its notarization.
Thus, when petitioner certified that the persons who attested and subscribed to the document
were present before him, there could have been no falsity. It was not petitioner who made it

appear that Dr. Asuncion participated in the execution of the Joint Acknowledgment, but Ferrer
and Dr. Asuncion himself. Petitioner, therefore, must be acquitted.
CATALINO TANCHANCO AND ROLANDO TANCHANCO, Petitioners,

Vs.
NATIVIDAD GARCIA SANTOS, Respondent.
GR No. 204793; June 8, 2020

HERNANDO, J.
Second Division
Formalities of Wills
FACTS: Consuelo (decedent) has two daughter with her deceased husband – Remedios and
Natividad. Remedios predeceased Consuelo in 1985 and left behind her children, including
petitioners Catalino and Rolando Tanchanco. After Consuelo passed away in 1997, Catalino filed
a petition to settle Consuelo’s intestate estate with RTC-Pasay, raffled to Branch 113. Natividad
moved for dismissal, stating that she already filed a petition for the probate of Consuelo’s will
with before Branch 115. The two cases were eventually consolidated before Branch 115.
Significantly, the Tanchancos argue that the will is fatally defective because it did not conform to
the formalities required under Article 805 of the Civil Code and the attestation clause failed to
state the number of pages upon which the will is written. They add that a statement in the
acknowledgment clause about the number of pages cannot be raised to the level of an attestation
clause. Thus, the will is null and void. They contend that substantial compliance as contemplated
under Article 809 of the Civil Code is not applicable in this case because the attendant
circumstances indicated bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and
influence in the execution of the will.
Natividad insists that the will conforms to the formalities required under Article 805 of the Civil
Code since the trial court and the CA held that the attestation clause substantially complied with

the directive of the aforementioned provision. The acknowledgment portion specifically
mentioned that the necessary signatures were affixed on every page of the will and referred to the
number of pages the will was written. She avers that the execution of the will was not attended
by bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue influence and improper pressure.
ISSUE: Whether or not Consuelo’s will is defective for failure of the attestation clause to state
the number of pages
RULING: No.
An examination of Consuelo's will shows that it complied with the formalities required by the
law, except that the attestation clause failed to indicate the total number of pages upon which the
will was written.
The so-called liberal rule, the Court said in Gil v. Murciano, 'does not offer any puzzle or
difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when
and where to stop; they draw the dividing line with precision. They do not allow
evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing details that should
appear in the will itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration into its confines,
to ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of
law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire
results.'
It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal
and correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed.
However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in
the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.
in Taboada vs. Hon. Rosal, the Court allowed the probate of a will notwithstanding that the
number of pages was stated not in the attestation clause, but in the Acknowledgment. In Azuela
vs. CA, the Court ruled that there is substantial compliance with the requirement, if it is stated
elsewhere in the will how many pages it is comprised of.
n the instant case, the attestation clause indisputably omitted to mention the number of pages
comprising the will. Nevertheless, the acknowledgment portion of the will supplied the omission
by stating that the will has five pages, to wit: "Ang HULING HABILING ito ay binubuo ng lima
(5) na dahon, kasama ang dahong kinaroroonan ng Pagpapatunay at Pagpapatotoong
ito."131 Undoubtedly, such substantially complied with Article 809 of the Civil Code. Mere
reading and observation of the will, without resorting to other extrinsic evidence, yields the
conclusion that there are actually five pages even if the said information was not provided in the
attestation clause. In any case, the CA declared that there was substantial compliance with the
directives of Article 805 of the Civil Code.
When the number of pages was provided in the acknowledgment portion instead of the
attestation clause, "[t]he spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although

there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure
the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not
affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator's will.
SPOUSES ISIDRO R. SALITICO AND CONRADA C. SALITICO, Petitioner,

Vs.
HEIRS OF RESURRECCION MARTINEZ FELIX, ET AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 240199; April 10, 2019

CAGUIOA, J.
Second Division
Succession – Testamentary Heirs - Devisee
FACTS: Decedent testator Amanda devised in favor of her niece, Resurreccion, a parcel of land.
Resurreccion, as the new owner of the subject property, transferred ownership over the parcel of
land in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico. The latter then took physical possession of the
subject property. Petitioners Sps. Salitico then received a demand letter requiring them to vacate
the subject property and surrender possession over it to the respondents heirs. In their Complaint
before the RTC, the petitioners Sps. Salitico sought the delivery and return in their favor of the
owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908 and the execution of the corresponding Deed of Absolute
Sale by way of confirming the Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa. They likewise prayed that OCT P-
1908 be cancelled and a new one be issued in their names.

ISSUE: Whether or not a devisee can sell his/her inheritance prior to the final distribution of the
decedent’s estate
RULING: Yes.
Article 777 of the Civil Code, which is substantive law, states that the rights of the inheritance
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Article 777 operates at the very
moment of the decedent's death ¬ meaning that the transmission by succession occurs at the
precise moment of death and, therefore, at that precise time, the heir is already legally deemed to
have acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance, "and not at the time of declaration of
heirs, or partition, or distribution." Thus, there is no legal bar to an heir disposing of his/her
hereditary share immediately after such death. The Court, early on in Teves de Jakosalem v.
Rafols, et al., explained that a sale made by a legal or intestate heir of his share in an inheritance
does not interfere with the administration of the estate.
As applied to the instant case, upon the death of Amanda, Resurreccion became the absolute
owner of the devised subject property, subject to a resolutory condition that upon settlement of
Amanda's Estate, the devise is not declared inofficious or excessive. Hence, there was no legal
bar preventing Resurreccion from entering into a contract of sale with the petitioners Sps.
Salitico with respect to the former's share or interest over the subject property.
In a contract of sale, the parties' obligations are plain and simple. The law obliges the vendor to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver the thing that is the object of sale to the vendee.[22]
Therefore, as a consequence of the valid contract of sale entered into by the parties, Resurreccion
had the obligation to deliver the subject property to the petitioners Sps. Salitico. In fact, it is not
disputed that the physical delivery of the subject property to the petitioners Sps. Salitico had
been done, with the latter immediately entering into possession of the subject property after the
execution of the Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa. Therefore, considering that a valid sale has been
entered into in the instant case, there is no reason for the respondents heirs to withhold from the
petitioners Sps. Salitico the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908. To reiterate, Resurreccion
already sold all of her interest over the subject property to the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
Therefore, the respondents heirs have absolutely no rhyme nor reason to continue possessing the
owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RD may already be compelled to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a
new title in the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico
RULING: No.
Under the applicable provisions of PD 1529 and the Rules of Court, it is only upon the issuance
by the testate or intestate court of the final order of distribution of the estate or the order in
anticipation of the final distribution that the certificate of title covering the subject property may
be issued in the name of the distributees.
In the instant case, there is no showing that, in the pendency of the settlement of the Estate of
Amanda, the Probate Court had issued an order of final distribution or an order in anticipation of

a final distribution, both of which the law deems as requirements before the RD can issue a new
certificate of title in the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
To clarify, this holding does not go against Article 777 of the Civil Code whatsoever. What the
aforesaid Civil Code provision signifies is that there is no legal bar preventing an heir from
disposing his/her hereditary share and transferring such share to another person, inasmuch as the
right thereto is vested or transmitted to the heir from the moment of the death of the decedent or
testator. The rule, however, does not state that the transferee may already compel the issuance of
a new certificate of title covering the specific property in his/her name.
Hence, reading Article 777 of the Civil Code together with the pertinent provisions of PD 1529
and the Rules of Court, while an heir may dispose and transfer his/her hereditary share to another
person, before the transferee may compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering
specific property in his/her name, a final order of distribution of the estate or the order in
anticipation of the final distribution issued by the testate or intestate court must first be had.
DR. NIXON L. TREYES, Petitioners,

Vs.
ANTONIO LARLAR, REV. FR., EMILIO L. LARLAR, HEDDY L. LARLAR, ET AL.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 232579; September 8, 2020

CAGUIOA, J.
En Banc
Intestate Succession – Surviving Spouse with Brothers and Sisters
FACTS: On May 1, 2008, Rosie Larlar Reyes, wife of petitioner Dr. Treyes who did not bear
any children with him, died without a will. Rosie also left behind seven siblings, respondents
herein. At the time of her death, Rosie owned with Dr. Treyes as their conjugal properties, 14

real properties in various locations in the Philippines. Dr. Treyes thereafter registered two
Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, one on March 24, 2011 and the other on June 5, 2011 claiming
to be the sole heir of his wife. Respondent siblings sent him two demand letters requesting for a
conference on the settlement of the estate of Rosie but this request fell on deaf ears. Later in
2012 they found that Dr. Treyes have managed have titles over the properties, except for two,
transferred in his name on the basis of the affidavits.
On July 12, 2013, Respondent siblings filed a complaint for annulment of the affidavits of self-
adjudication, cancellation of title and for the reconveyance of their successional share to the
estate of Rosie, being her legal heirs, partition and damages against Dr. Treyes.
Dr. Reyes filed a second Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the Complaint is dismissible on
grounds of improper venue, prescription and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. He
argued that the court has no jurisdiction because the determination of the status of legal heirs in a
special separate proceeding is a prerequisite to an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and
possession by the legal heirs.
The RTC denied the 2nd MR for lack of merit, except that it conceded that it does not have
jurisdiction over partition. The CA held that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
since the complaint partakes the nature of an ordinary civil action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the period for the filing of the complaint has already prescribed
RULING: No.
Section 4, Rule 74 relied upon by Dr. Treyes, which states the persons deprived of lawful
participation in the estate may compel settlement in the courts within two years after settlement
and distribution of the estate by extrajudicial partition, applies only to special proceedings and
not to ordinary civil actions; and only to persons who have participated or were represented or at
least had notice of the extrajudicial partition. Rather, it is the prescriptive period of 10 years for
constructive trusts (from the issuance of Torrens title in the name of the trustee) which finds
application in this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a special separate proceeding for the determination of the status of legal
heirs in this case is necessary before they can file an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and
possession.
HELD: No.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law determined from the allegations in the complaint. In the
Complaint, respondents alleged that their rights over the properties, by virtue of their being
siblings of the decedent, must be enforced by annulling the affidavits and ordering reconveyance
of the subject properties. The RTC has jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or
possession of real property or any interest therein where the assessed value exceeds P20,000
outside Metro Manila and exceeds P50,000 in Metro Manila.

In the Ypon case the Court held that the determination of who are legal heirs of the deceased
must be made in proper special proceedings, which must take precedence over an ordinary suit
for recovery and possession. Nevertheless, the Court ruled in the same case that, by way of
exception, the need to institute a prior separate special proceeding may be dispensed with for the
sake of practicality, as when the parties to the case have voluntarily submitted the issue and have
already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship and the RTC has consequently
rendered judgment thereon or when a special proceeding has been instituted but had been finally
closed and terminated and, hence, cannot be reopened.
Private respondents do not seek the establishment of their rights as intestate heirs but the
enforcement of their rights already granted by law. Under Art. 777, NCC, the rights of
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent, not at the time of
declaration of heirs, partition or distribution.
In partition cases, even before the properties are judicially partitioned, the heir are already
deemed co-owners, and thus, are deemed real parties in interest without a prior separate judicial
determination of heirship.
Under Article 1001, brothers and sisters, or their children, who survive with the spouse of the
decedent, are entitled to one-half of the latter’s estate. Hence, subject to the required proof,
without any need of prior judicial determination, private respondents siblings of Rosie, by
operation of law, are entitled to ½ of the inheritance of the decedent.
The successional rights of respondents as legal heirs of Rosie are not merely contingent or
expectant—they vested in them upon her death. By being legal heirs, they are entitled to institute
an action to protect their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession and are thus real
parties in interest to this case.
HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO ESPINAS, ET AL., Petitioners,

Vs.
HEIRS OF SIMON VELASCO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 229775, March 11, 2019

J. REYES, JR., J.

Second Division
Partition-Annulment of Extrajudicial Settlement
FACTS: Simon Velasco was the owner of several properties including a parcel of land in
Daraga, Albay. He had four children: Heriberto, Genoveva, Felisa and Juan. Respondent Felix
Luna, Jr. is the son of Genoviva while respondents Armando and Antonio Velasco are the
children of Heriberto. Leopoldo Espinas is the son of Felisa.
Upon the death of Simon, his children orally partitioned the estate among themselves, with each
one of them possessing their respective shares and exercising acts of ownership. The subject
property was the joint share of Juan and Felisa, who subsequently executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale on May 14, 1966, conveying the subject property to Leopoldo.
Petitioners argue that Juan and Felisa knew their brother and sister Genoveva and Heriberto had
already been given their due shares in the estate of Simon, thus, they no longer deemed it
necessary to have Genoviva and Heriberto sign the subject Deed. Respondents counter that a
deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no
knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious; and that after the death of
Simon, his children never partitioned his estate.
Petitioners contend that "a parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties
thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising
acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition:"
that for more than 44 years, no one among the heirs of Simon ever bothered to question
Leopoldo's open possession of the subject property which was the joint hereditary share of Felisa
and Juan; that Leopoldo's open and notorious possession of the subject property for 44 years
supports the presumption that there was already an actual partition among the heirs of Simon.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid partition among the children of Simon as to defeat
claim of respondents that the conveyance of the subject property to petitioners’ predecessor was
fraudulent
RULING: Yes.
Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to
whom it may belong. It may be effected extrajudicially by the heirs themselves through a public
instrument filed before the register of deeds.
However, as between the parties, a public instrument is neither constitutive nor an inherent
element of a contract of partition. Since registration serves as constructive notice to third
persons, an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors, are affected. Moreover, even the
requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions
effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not a
conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and
segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.

Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees
is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise,
or any other transaction.
In Hernandez v. Andal, the Court explained that regardless of whether a parol partition or
agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the
parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the
exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and
enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or
stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into
possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement,
that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the
possession in severalty. A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties
thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising
acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition. A
number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a
part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of
frauds.
In Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot, the Court declared that partition may be inferred from
circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Thus, after a long possession in
severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed. It has been held that recitals in deeds, possession
and occupation of land, improvements made thereon for a long series of years, and acquiescence
for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual partition of land either by deed
or by proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost and were not recorded.
No one among the children of Simon disturbed the status quo which has been going on from the
year 1966. Genoviva and Heriberto were not without knowledge that the subject property was
transferred to Leopoldo and that the latter had introduced improvements thereon. They could
have easily questioned the transfer, but they chose to remain silent precisely because they were
already given their respective shares in the estate. Hence, it can be gleaned unerringly that the
heirs of Simon agreed to orally partition his estate among themselves, as evinced by their
possession of the inherited premises, their construction of improvements thereon, and their
having declared in their names for taxation purposes their respective shares. Actual possession
and exercise of dominion over definite portions of the property in accordance with an alleged
partition are considered strong proof of an oral partition.
ROSETTE Y. LERIAS, Petitioner,

Vs.

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHERN LEYTE, Represented by
DAMIAN C. MERCADO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 193548; April 08, 2019

BERSAMIN, C.J.
Special en Banc
Quieting of Title
FACTS: Spouses Yniguez sued Philson Construction (Philson) and respondent Provincial
Government of Southern Leyte for quieting of title over a parcel of commercial land covered by
a TCT No. T-1089 and registered in their name. Southern Leyte had annotated an adverse claim
pursuant to a sanggunian resolution while Philson constructed a multi-purpose center on their
property without their consent. Spouses Yniguez claimed that the actions of Southern Leyte and
Philson resulted in a cloud of doubt in their title as owners of the property. Southern Leyte
claimed that the Province of Leyte had been paying tax on the property since 1918 and had been
in continued peaceful possession of the same and that the allege ownership of Spouses Yniguez
was based on donation of a lot purportedly covered by OCT No. 35 and TCT No. 150, which is
different from its lot; and that Spouses Yniguez, through fraud and misrepresentation managed to
secure a title covering its lot.
At the RTC level, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, by a resolution, agreed to enter into a
compromise with Spouses Yniguez, recognizing the latter’s ownership. The RTC rendered
judgment approving the compromise. Southern Leyte late, claiming that the compromise was
entered into without authority of the provincial governer, initiated its action for annulment with
the CA. Meanwhile, the Spouses Yñiguez donated the disputed property to the petitioner and
Alfredo O. Yñiguez by virtue of a deed of donation and a new TCT was issued in their name.
Southern Leyte applied thereafter for TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
enforcement of the judgment by compromise. The CA held that Southern Leyte had a clear right
to be protected because it owned the property since 1918, and because it was in actual possession
of the property thereby giving rise to the disputable presumption of ownership; and that the
adjudication of the ownership in the petitioner's favor did not automatically mean her being
entitled to the possession of the property because Southern Leyte still enjoyed a right that must
be protected.
ISSUE: Whether or not Southern Leyte has shown a clear and unmistakable right of ownership
to be protected by the injunction based on the tax declaration made in 1918 as compared to
petitioner’s ownership as borne out by her Torrens title
HELD: No.
Southern Leyte's claim to have owned the property since 1918 was supported only by the tax
declaration. In contrast, the petitioner's ownership was registered under the Torrens system (TCT
No. T-9542). The latter should be preferred because her Torrens certificate was evidence of her
indefeasible title to property as the person whose name appeared thereon. Indeed, the registration
of title under the Torrens system was a quieting of the title to the land in question. Her ownership

was consequently neither doubtful nor disputable, but certain and settled. At any rate, the law
expressly made her certificate of title, being indefeasible, not subject to collateral attack, but only
to a direct attack.
The CA stated that Southern Leyte's actual possession of the property gave rise to the disputable
presumption of ownership. The statement was inherently fallacious because the presumption of
ownership could not arise in the face of the ownership of the petitioner being already registered
under the Torrens system.
Lastly, the CA ratiocinated that Southern Leyte was entitled to the continued occupation of the
property despite the ownership already adjudged in favor of the Spouses Yñiguez. The CA
declared that Southern Leyte's right of occupation must be protected. Such declaration was
unwarranted, however, for the occupation of the property by Southern Leyte, even if it was true,
could not prejudice the petitioner's registered ownership unless Southern Leyte's possession was
based on some other right that must be respected, like that of a lessee. Yet, the CA nowhere
mentioned by what right Southern Leyte was entitled to remain in possession. In short, Southern
Leyte's right to remain in possession was either doubtful or non-existent; hence, the issuance of
the injunctive relief was improper.

HEIRS OF ALFREDO CULLADO, Petitioners,
Vs.
DOMINIC V. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 212938; July 30, 2019

CAGUIOA, J.
En Banc
Action for Recovery of Ownership – Accion Publiciana
FACTS:
In May 1995, an OCT over a parcel of land was issued in favor of respondent Dominic. In May
1997, Dominic, then a minor represented by his father, filed with the RTC an action for recovery
of ownership against Alfredo Cullado. He maintained that Cullado had been squatting on the
parcel of land covered by as early as 1977, and that despite repeated demands, Cullado refused to
vacate the said lot. Cullado, in his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, interposed the special and
affirmative defenses of his actual possession and cultivation of the subject parcel of land in an
open, adverse and continuous manner. He likewise asked for the reconveyance of the property,
considering that Dominic and his father fraudulently had the subject property titled in Dominic’s
name. Cullado died and was substituted by his heirs.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs. The CA granted Dominic’s petition for Annulment of
Judgment of the RTC, noting that Cullado’s defenses constitute a collateral attack against
Dominic’s title, which cannot be allowed in an accion publiciana, as the same require a review
of the registration decree made in Dominic’s favor. The CA ruled that the RTC is without
jurisdiction to resolve the twin issues of reconveyance and fraudulence raised by the heirs of
Cullado.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner’s raising the question of ownership in the accion publiciana constitutes a
collateral attack on title proscribed by PD 1529.
RULING: No.
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
real property independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of
one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding o possession
of the real property. In an ordinary ejectment suit, the certificate of title is never imperiled
because the decision of the ejectment court on the issue of ownership is merely provisional.

This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in an accion publiciana is to recover
possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the
courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the
property. This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for
the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably
linked to the issue of possession.
The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between
the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on
the issue of ownership. To repeat: when the issue of ownership is raised by the defendant in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
When the ejectment court thus resolves the issue of ownership based on a certificate of title to
determine the issue of possession, this is not situation where the Torrens title is being subjected
to a collateral attack proscribed by Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529 because
there is no real attack, whether direct or collateral, on the certificate of title in question for the
simple reason that the resolution by the ejectment court cannot alter, modify, or cancel the
certificate of title. In an accion publiciana, the defense of ownership (i.e., that the defendant, and
not the plaintiff, is the rightful owner) will not trigger a collateral attack on the plaintiffs Torrens
or certificate of title because the resolution of the issue of ownership is done only to determine
the issue of possession.
ISSUE: Whether after the lapse of one year from its issuance, a Torrens title can be questioned in
an ordinary civil action for recovery filed by the registered owner
RULING: No
Cullado's Answer questioned the OCT issued in Dominic's name. At that time, Dominic's OCT
had already become incontrovertible upon the lapse of the one-year period to question it by
reason of actual fraud. Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration
and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such
decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the
applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud. Dominic has a better right of possession
because his right is based on ownership recognized by OCT P-61499 registered and titled under
his name. The age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens title over the land is entitled to
possession thereof squarely applies in his favor.
While the RTC could have resolved the issue of ownership provisionally to determine the "better
right of possession," which is allowed in an accion publiciana, it was without any power or
jurisdiction to order the reconveyance of the land in dispute because that can be done only upon
a definitive ruling on the said issue - something that cannot be done in an accion publiciana.
It was erroneous for petitioners to question the Torrens Original Certificate of Title issued to
private respondent over Lot No. 986 in Civil Case No. 671, an ordinary civil action for recovery
of possession filed by the registered owner of the said lot by invoking as affirmative defense in

their answer the Order of the Bureau of Lands, dated July 19, 1978, issued pursuant to the
investigatory power of the Director of Lands under Section 91 of Public Land Law. Such a
defense partakes of the nature of a collateral attack against a certificate of title brought under the
operation of the Torrens system. The case law on the matter does not allow a collateral attack on
the Torrens certificate of title on the ground of actual fraud.
Since the special and affirmative defenses raised by the heirs of Cullado in the Answer pertain to
discrepancies or errors in Dominic's certificate of title, which necessarily entails a review of the
decree made in Dominic's favor, the RTC was bereft of any jurisdiction to rule on such defenses
in an action for recovery of possession or accion publiciana initiated by the registered owner.
RHEMA INTERNATIONAL LIVELIHOOD FOUNDATION, INC., ET AL., Petitioner,
Vs.
HIBIX, INC., represented by ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS, YOSHIMITSU TAGUCHE,
ET AL., Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 225353-54, Aug 28, 2019

CARANDANG, J.
First Division
Forcible Entry
FACTS:
Hibix allege that it bought the subject property from Philippine Fuji on November 1999 and TCT
No. 143048 covering said property was issued under its name. Since then, Hibix had been in
possession of the property until June 25, 2008, when a certain Romeo Prado (Prado), introducing
himself as a special sheriff, together with four policemen, six security guards, and a certain
Julian Go, claiming to be the owner of the property accompanied by two armed security guards,
took over the possession of the property through force, violence, and intimidation.
According to Hibix, Prado told the security guards of Hibix that they were implementing a
special writ of execution purportedly issued by the RTC of Pasay City, with respect to LRC Civil
Case No. 3957-P. Hibix, however, found out that as early as June 25, 2002, the CA had already
enjoined the enforcement of said order, making the writ of execution that Prado presented bogus.
Hibix lodged a complaint with the NBI relative to the unlawful and forcible take-over of the
property. On August 29, 2008, Hibix and the NBI took possession of the property.
Rhema alleged that by virtue of a donation from Marylou Bhalwart, it "became the owner of a
large tract of land consisting of 71,409,413 [square] meters with Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT)] No. 8037 Plan PSD_25211 with Decree No. 160 of March 19, 1905 and was issued
[Original Certificate of Title OCT)] 128.” Rhema averred that it previously enjoyed juridical and
physical possession of the property for years when suddenly, on August 29, 2008, Hibix,
together with armed men claiming to be members of the special action unit of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), forcibly evicted Rhema's personnel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the elements of forcible entry present in this case and, if so, which party
is guilty thereof.
RULING: HIBIX committed forcible entry against Rhema.
The elements of forcible entry are: (1) prior physical possession of the property; and (2) unlawful
deprivation of it by the defendant through force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth.23
Possession in forcible entry cases means nothing more than physical possession or possession de
facto; not legal possession. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue.24
For forcible entry to prosper, an appreciable length of time of prior physical possession is not
required. However short it is, for as long as prior physical possession is established, recovery of
possession under Rule 70 of the Rules may be granted.
In this case, it was shown that Hibix enjoyed possession of the property until June 25, 2008,
when Rhema wrestled possession of the property from Hibix. However, Hibix did not file a case
for forcible entry against Rhema. It was proven that on August 29, 2008, Hibix, aided by the NBI
and without any court order, retook possession of the property. Hence, Rhema had prior physical
possession of the property from June 25, 2008 to August 29, 2008.
Undeniably, it was Rhema who first used violence in order to deprive Hibix possession over the
property. The remedy, which the latter should have resorted to, is to file a case for forcible entry
against Rhema. Instead, Hibix went to the NBI to lodge a complaint and sought their aid to
wrestle possession back from Rhema. This is tantamount to putting the law into one's hands,
which is the evil sought to be avoided by the special civil action of forcible entry.
It must be stated that the purpose of an action for forcible entry is that, regardless of the actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned
out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution, the object of the
statute is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from the
withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some
advantage must accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of
property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to
assert their claims. This is the philosophy at the foundation of all these actions of forcible entry
and detainer which are designed to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the
law alone to obtain what he claims is his.

SPS. JULIAN BELVIS, SR., AND CECILIA BELVIS, SPS. JULIAN E. BELVIS, JR.,
AND JOCELYN BELVIS, SPS. JULIAN E. BELVIS III AND ELSA BELVIS, AND
JOUAN E. BELVIS, Petitioners,
Vs.
SPS. CONRADO V. EROLA AND MARILYN EROLA, AS REPRESENTED BY
MAUREEN* FRIAS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 239727; July 24, 2019

CAGUIOA, J.
Second Division
Right of Accession
FACTS: Respondent Spouses Erola are registered owners of Lot 597, a 29,772 sq.m. lot in
Pontevedra, Capiz. As the parties were close relatives, petitioner Cecilia being the sister of
respondent Conrado, respondents allegedly allowed petitioners to possess the lot, subject to the
condition that they would vacate the same upon demand.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that in 1979, the subject property was purchased by the
late Rosario V. Erola (Rosario), the mother of petitioner Cecilia and respondent Conrado.
Conrado, however, allegedly succeeded in registering the property solely in his name. Hence, an
implied trust was allegedly created over the ½ undivided hereditary share of petitioner Cecilia.
For over 34 years, petitioners alleged that they possessed and cultivated the lot in the concept of
an owner, believing in good faith that they were co-owners of the subject lot. In the course of
their possession, petitioners allegedly introduced various improvements thereon by planting
bamboos, nipa palms and coconut trees, and by constructing fishponds. Even assuming they were
not co-owners of the subject property, respondent Conrado never interrupted their possession
despite knowledge that petitioners were building substantial improvements on said lot.

The CA, the RTC and the MCTC consistently found that petitioners failed to prove that the
property was purchased by petitioners' mother or that it was only registered in respondent
Conrado's name in trust for the hereditary share of petitioner Cecilia. Rather, the lower courts
categorically held that respondents merely tolerated petitioners' possession of the subject
property and allowed them to stay, provided the latter would vacate the same upon demand. The
lower courts likewise held that petitioners could not be deemed builders in good faith as they
never constructed the alleged improvements in the concept of an owner under Article 448.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners may be considered builders/sowers/planters in good faith

considering that respondent allowed them to introduce improvements with knowledge and
consent of the latter.
RULING: Yes.
Generally, Article 448 of the New Civil Code covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or
planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. It
does not apply when the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or
usufructuary. Good faith is identified by the belief that the land is owned; or that — by some title
— one has the right to build, plant, or sow thereon.
The CA properly held that petitioners have no right to retain possession of the property under
Article 448 as they were aware that their tolerated possession could be terminated at any time.
Thus, they could not have built on the subject property in the concept of an owner.
Even assuming that petitioner Cecilia was a co-owner of the subject property, Article 448 may
not generally apply to a co-owner who builds, plants, or sows on a property owned in common,
"for then the co-owner did not build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another
but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances, and
the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership."
The reason for this rule is clear. Under Article 445 of the Civil Code rights of accession with
respect to immovable property apply to "[w]hatever' is built, planted or sown on the land of
another." A co-owner of a parcel of land, however, builds on his own land and not that of another
as "[a] co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he
exercises the right of dominion[;] but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly
ABSTRACT." More importantly, co-ownerships are governed by Articles 484-501 of the Civil
Code, which already specify the rights and obligations of a co-owner who builds, plants, and
sows on a co¬ owned property and the rules for the reimbursement thereof.
While petitioners cannot be deemed to be builders in good faith, it being undisputed that the land
in question is titled land in the name of respondents, the CA and the lower courts overlooked the
fact that petitioners constructed improvements on the subject lot with the knowledge and consent
of respondents. In exceptional cases. the Court has applied Article 448 to instances where a
builder, planter, or sower introduces improvements on titled land if with the knowledge and
consent of the owner. In Department of Education v. Casibang, the Court held:

Despite being a possessor by mere tolerance, the DepEd is considered a builder in good
faith, since Cepeda permitted the construction of building and improvements to conduct
classes on his property. Hence, Article 448 may be applied in the case at bar.
In the instant case, while respondents may have merely tolerated petitioners' possession,
respondents never denied having knowledge of the fact that petitioners possessed, cultivated and
constructed various permanent improvements on the subject lot for over 34 years. In fact, the
records are bereft of any evidence to show that respondents ever opposed or objected, for over 34
years, to the improvements introduced by petitioners, despite the fact that petitioner Cecilia and
respondent Conrado are siblings and that both parties reside in Pontevedra, Capiz. As such, the
Court finds that respondents likewise acted in bad faith under Article 453 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
ART. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sowed
on the land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the
other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done
with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
Pursuant to the aforementioned article, the rights and obligations of the parties shall be the same
as though both acted in good faith. Therefore, Article 448 in relation to Articles 54677 and
54878 of the Civil Code applies.
CAMARINES SUR TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. (CASTEA),
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DR. ANTONIO A. RALUTA, Petitioner,
Vs.
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR LUIS
RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR., Respondent.
G.R. No. 199666, October 07, 2019

CAGUIOA, J.
Second Division
Modal and Onerous Donation
FACTS: On September 1966, the Local Government of the Province of Camarines Sur
(Province) donated a portion of a land it owns to the CASTEA by a Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos. On October 24, 2007, the Province, through Governor Villafuerte exeuted a Deed of
Revocation of Donation, sent a copy thereof to CASTEA. On October 23, 2007, sent CASTEA a
demand letter to vacate the premises. On February 13, 2008, the Province filed a case for
Unlawful Detainer against CASTEA.
CASTEA claimed that the Province has ceased to be the owner of the property possessed and
occupied by CASTEA contending that the ownership thereof has already been transferred to
CASTEA by virtue of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos. CASTEA argued that its act of leasing
out to Bodega Glassware for a 20-year period a portion of the building it constructed on the

donated property does not constitute selling, mortgaging or encumbering the donated property or
any improvements thereof. CASTEA insists that the revocation of the subject Deed of Donation
should be made by the proper party through a court action.
ISSUE: Whether or not judicial intervention is necessary for the revocation of the donation in
this case
RULING: Yes.
The Deed clearly imposes a burden on the donee which is onerous or burdensome in character.
The donation to CASTEA can properly be classified as a modal donation (because of the
obligation to construct a building thereon) with a prestation not to alienate/encumber and an
automatic revocation clause. The donation may also be classified as an onerous donation because
there is a burden imposed on the donee absent proof that the burden or charge (cost of the
building) is superior or greater than the value of the donated 600 sq.m. lot at the time of the
donation in September 1966 (which facts are not borne in the records).
Article 732 provides that "[d]onations which are to take effect inter vivos shall be governed by
the general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined in this Title [on
Donation]" while Article 733 provides that "[d]onations with an onerous cause shall be governed
by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as
regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed. When a deed of donation, as
in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated,
the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of
the Civil Code.
Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy, then the stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of
donation without prior judicial action for that purpose is valid, subject to the determination of the
propriety of the rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court
will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
Where, however, the donee denies, as here, the rescission or challenges the propriety thereof,
then only the final award of the court can conclusively settle whether the resolution is proper or
not. In this case, since CASTEA contests the propriety of the Province's revocation of the Deed
of Donation then the mere invocation by the Province of the automatic revocation clause is
insufficient.
ISSUE: Whether or not the breach of negative prestation, in light of other prestatons of
CASTEA, is sufficient ground for its automatic revocation or rescission.
RULING: No.
While under Article 764, a single violation or non-fulfillment is sufficient to revoke a donation
based on the phrase "any of the conditions," its application must be circumscribed within the

rules on obligations and contracts wherein substantial and fundamental breach as to defeat the
object of the parties in making the agreement and substantial compliance are given due
recognition and importance.
The lease did not defeat the object of the Deed of Donation so that it can be considered as a
substantial and fundamental breach to warrant the resolution thereof. First, while an unregistered
lease for more than one year is an encumbrance, the encumbrance was not perpetual as it is time-
bound to only 20 years. It must be noted that the lease had expired on September 1, 2015.
Second, the lease did not cover the entire donated 600-square meter lot and the building that
CASTEA constructed; Only a portion of the building was leased. Third, the rentals that were
being collected were being given to members of CASTEA. That the giving of mutual aid and
death benefits to teachers and employees is meant to improve their plight and is expected to
contribute in the upliftment of education cannot be disputed. Also, CASTEA needs funds for the
upkeep, repair and maintenance of the building as well as the payment of real estate taxes due on
the donated lot and the building. Fourth, CASTEA had already complied with its main
prestation, which is the construction of the intended building, and based on the language of the
Deed of Donation it would appear that it is the non-commencement of building construction
within one year from the execution of the Deed of Donation that would trigger the automatic
revocation clause. With the full compliance of its main prestation credited in CASTEA's favor,
the effect of its breach should be lessened or diminished. xxx Lastly, if the prohibited acts: "sell,
mortgage or [e]ncumber" are to be interpreted in the light of the objective or "condition" of the
donation, then in order for the breach to reach the threshold of substantiality and fundamentality,
the breach by CASTEA should be of a permanent character as to totally and perpetually deprive
CASTEA of the use of the donated lot and the building that it constructed.
Thus, the perceived single violation by CASTEA when weighed against its substantial
compliance of the other "conditions" or prestations of the donation and the avowed purpose of
the donation is, as it should be, considered insignificant to trigger the application of the
automatic revocation clause.
MUNICALITY OF DASMARINAS, Petitioner,
Vs.
DR. PAULO CAMPOS, subsituted by his children JOSE PAULO CAMPOS, PAULO
CAMPOS, JR., AND ENRIQUE CAMPOS, Respondent.
GR No. 232675, Jul 17, 2019

REYES, A., JR., J.
Third Division
Revocation of Donation
FACTS: Respondent Dr. Campos executed a Deed of Donation involving a parcel of land in
favor of the NHA. Under thee Deed, the donee was to construct a 36-meter wide access road
from from Highway 17 to the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project. The NHA constructed a 20-m-
wide access road, in lieu of the stipulated 36-m-wide access road, reasoning that the volume of
the traffic at that time did not justify the outright construction of the 36-m-wide access road, and

that it had reserved the remaining 16 m for road widening purposes. The NHA also promised that
the property had not been diverted or used for any other purpose.
However, on June 13, 1993, without any notice to Dr. Campos, the NHA donated the subject
property to the Municipality of Dasmariñas, allegedly pursuant to Section 31 of P.D. No. 957.
Thus, on November 13, 2001, Dr. Campos filed an action for Revocation of Donation against the
NHA with the RTC of Dasmariñas, Branch 90. Dr. Campos claimed that the NHA failed to
comply with the condition attached to the donation and construct the 36-m-wide access road. He
also alleged that the NHA further violated the parties' agreement by subsequently donating the
subject property to the Municipality of Dasmariñas.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NHA committed a substantial breach that would justify the partial
revocation of the Deed of Donation
RULING: Yes.
The general rule is that rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the
contract, but only for such breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object
of the parties in making the agreement.
a substantial breach of contract was committed by the NHA when it only built a 20-m-wide
access road, and not a mere casual breach which the petitioners allege would render nugatory the
revocation of the donation.
As gleaned from the provisions, the object of the agreement is clearly the construction of a 36-m-
wide access road from Highway 17 to the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project, which was reiterated
no less than three times in the Deed of Donation. There was no allowance for any deviation from
that number, as stipulated or in the nature of the undertaking. The failure to construct the access
road with the expressly mentioned specifications is unmistakably a breach of the same.
The Court does not agree with the contention of the petitioners that the condition pertaining to
the construction of the access road was complied with because the unpaved 16-m portion was
still reserved to be completed. The stipulation in the Deed of Donation is clear that the entire 36-
m property must be used for actual construction of the access road, and non-usage of even a
portion would constitute contravention of the Deed of Donation, especially in this case when a
substantial portion of the property ultimately remained unused for the stated purpose and object
of the donation. Law and jurisprudence consistently hold that if the terms of a contract are clear
and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control.
The NHA's contention that outside factors, such as the volume of traffic at that time,[74] were to
blame for any apparent breach do not offer a semblance of validity. Even assuming that this was
true, almost two decades had lapsed from the time the property was donated, to the subsequent
donation from the NHA to the Municipality of Dasmariñas. It is simply inconceivable that in that
lengthy span of time, the NHA would have not been able to address the problem of traffic and/or

found a way to alleviate that specific obstacle in order to complete the construction of the access
road.
The contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the NHA and the Municipality of Dasmariñas
exacerbate the breach committed, and take it firmly out of the realm of slightness. the NHA
failed to show any concrete proof that it was bent on fulfilling its obligation to complete the
construction of the access road. The mere allegation that it "reserved" the remaining portion is
inconsistent with its simultaneous and concurrent acts, which include failing to build despite the
long period with the opportunity to do so. In fact, the current state of the property, which has
now seen developments started and completed by the Municipality of Dasmariñas, would readily
show that the remaining portion has obviously not been reserved.
The NHA's flimsy attempts to show that the non-fulfillment of the condition was out of its hands
and that it had every intention of completing the road, are contradicted by its own actions, not the
least of it was the subsequent donation to the Municipality of Dasmariñas. The petitioners cannot
also find solace in the provision stating that any delay in the development for the avowed
purposes would only allow the respondents-heirs to reserve the right to use the property until
such time that the original done, the NHA, is in a position to use the property. The act of
transferring the subject property to the Municipality of Dasmariñas, in effect, decimated any
opportunity for the NHA to comply with the condition stated in the Deed of Donation and, as
such, the NHA will never be in a position to utilize the property.
It is likewise untrue, as the petitioners allege, that the subsequent donation of the subject
property from the NHA to the Municipality of Dasmariñas was required by law, particularly
Section 31 of P.D. No. 957. the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project is neither a subdivision project
nor a condominium project, either of which would legally mandate a transfer.
The NHA showed bad faith by donating the property without substantially complying with the
condition that was the purpose for the donation in the first place, as well as failing to reproduce
the condition in the second donation contract. The Municipality of Dasmariñas showed bad faith
in the acquisition and its overall conduct in this case, by introducing structures and developing
the land even with the knowledge that there was not only a pending appeal, but with the
understanding that both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of revoking the donation.
NICOMEDES AUGUSTO ET. AL., Petitioners,

Vs.
ANTONIO CARLOTA DY, Respondent.
GR No. 218731; February 13, 2019

REYES, J. JR., J.
Second Division
Co-ownership

FACTS: Lot 4277, consisting of 5,3278 sq.m., was originally registered in the name of Spouses
Sixto Silawan and Marcosa Igoy under OCT No. RO-3456. Their only child is petitioner Roberta
Silawan. Marcosa died in October 1931. In March 1965, Sixto sold the entire to Severino. Sixto
died in December 1968. Respondent Antonio claims to have acquired a portion of the subject
land in 1989 from a series of sale following Sixto’s disposition of Lot 4277.
While in the process of securing his title, Antonio found out that TCT’s over Lot 4277 were
already issued to petitioners by virtue of a document entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement By Sole
and Only Heir with Confirmation of the Deed of Absolute Sale" executed by Sixto and Marcosa's
only heir, Roberta, on June 27, 2001 and which was annotated in OCT No. RO-3456 on
December 14, 2001
Thus, on July 16, 2002, Antonio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deeds, Titles,
Tax Declaration with Partition and/or Recovery of Shares, Attorney's Fees, Damages and Costs
against petitioners.
Antonio asserted that Roberta's act of executing the Extrajudicial Settlement, which apparently
paved the way for the succeeding sales to the other petitioners, had no basis because when she
executed said document, the property was already previously sold by the spouses Sixto and
Marcosa to Antonio's predecessors-in-interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sixto validly conveyed the entire property to Antonio’s predecessors-in-
interest
RULING: No.
The subject property is originally conjugal in nature
It must be stated at the outset that the disputed property, with an area of 5,327 sq m and covered
by OCT No. RO-3456, is conjugal in nature being registered under the names of spouses Sixto
and Marcosa. Since Sixto and Marcosa were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
and no marriage settlement was provided, their property relations were governed by the conjugal
partnership of gains as provided under Article 119 of the Civil Code. Thus, upon the death of
Marcosa on October 5, 1931, the conjugal nature of the property was dissolved and the interest
of Sixto (surviving spouse), with respect to his undivided one-half share on the conjugal property
goes to and becomes vested on him.
In other words, by virtue of such dissolution, one-half of the property should pertain to Sixto as
his share from the conjugal estate plus another one-fourth representing his share as surviving
spouse of Marcosa. Roberta, as the sole legitimate child of the spouses is entitled to the other
one-fourth of the property. This equal sharing between the surviving spouse and the legitimate
child to the deceased's estate is in accordance with Article 996[36] of the Civil Code as clarified
by this Court in the case of In Re: Santillon v. Miranda.
Upon the death of Marcosa, co-ownership was formed between Sixto and Roberta over the
subject property

After the death of Marcosa (one of the registered owners), the subject property became co-owned
by Sixto and Roberta.[38] In other words, before actual partition, co-ownership between Sixto
and Roberta was formed over the subject property. Thus, each co-owner of property which is
held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same
with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners.[39] Thus:
This Court has ruled in many cases that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the
sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to
the sale. This is because the sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects only his undivided
share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the
thing owned in common.
The sale between Sixto and Severino is valid up to Sixto's rightful undivided share in the subject
property
Hence, the sale transaction between Sixto and Severino could be legally recognized only with
respect to the former's pro indiviso share in the co-ownership. Clearly then, at the time of sale by
Sixto in favor of Severino, the former could only dispose of his three-fourths undivided share of
the entire property. The remaining one-fourth belonging to Roberta has yet to be partitioned.
Hencje, the sale executed by Sixto in favor of Severino in 1965 is valid up to three-fourths
undivided portion of the property, which is 3,995.25 sq m and void as to the remaining one-
fourth or 1,331.75 sq m, which pertains to Roberta's undivided share. This is consistent with the
rule that one cannot sell what he does not own.
SOCORRO T. CLEMENTE, substituted by SALVADOR T. CLEMENTE, Petitioner,

Vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DPWH-Region IV-A), Respondent.

G.R. No. 220008; February 20, 2019
CARPIO, J.
Second Division
Revocation of Donation of a Co-Owned Property
FACTS:
The Clemente Siblings were owners of a parcel of land. They executed a Deed of Donation over
one hectare of their property (Subject Property) in favor of the Republic. The Deed provided that
the property shall be used solely for the construction of a government hospital. Title to the
property was transferred to the Province of Quezon. The construction of a building for a hospital
was started in the following year. However, for reasons unknown, the construction was never
completed.
Socorro, an heir of Mayor Clemente, one of the siblings, inquired as to the status of the
construction but was informed that the DPWH no longer had a plan to construct a hospital at the
site and that the DPWH had no budget for the hospital construction. In 2004, almost 41 years
after the execution of the Deed, Socorro filed a complaint for the revocation of the donation and
reconveyance and recovery of the property on the ground that the Republic failed to comply with
the conditions imposed in the Deed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may still revoke the donation notwithstanding the transfer of title to the
government
RULING: Yes.
The nature of the donation made by the Clemente Siblings is a donation subject to a condition –
the condition being the construction of a government hospital and the use of the Subject Property
solely for hospital purposes. Upon the non-fulfillment of the condition, the donation may be
revoked and all the rights already acquired by the donee shall be deemed lost and
extinguished. This is a resolutory condition because it is demandable at once by the done 19 but
the non-fulfillment of the condition gives the donor the right to revoke the donation.20
In this case, upon the execution of the Deed of Donation and the acceptance of such donation in
the same instrument, ownership was transferred to the Republic, as evidenced by the new
certificate of title issued in the name of the Province of Quezon. Because the condition in the
Deed of Donation is a resolutory condition, until the donation is revoked, it remains
valid.21 However, for the donation to remain valid, the donee must comply with its obligation to
construct a government hospital and use the Subject Property as a hospital site. The failure to do
so gives the donor the right to revoke the donation.
The donee failed to comply with its obligation to construct a government hospital and to use the
premises as a hospital site. When the parties provided in the Deed of Donation that the donee

should construct a government hospital, their intention was to have such hospital built and
completed, and to have a functioning hospital on the Subject Property. The argument of
respondent that the mere construction of the foundation of a building complies with the condition
that a government hospital be constructed on the Subject Property is specious. A foundation of a
building is obviously not a government hospital.
ISSUE:
Whether there must be a settlement of estate before an heir of the co-owner can bring suit for the
recovery of the property
RULING: No.
It has been settled that a co-heir or co-owner may bring suit without impleading all the other co-
owners if the suit is for the benefit of all. The law now allows a co-owner to bring an action for
ejectment, which covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. As long as the co-
owner recognizes the co-ownership, there is no need to implead all the co-owners in all kinds of
action for recovery of possession. Under Article 487, NCC, any one of the co-owners may bring
an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession, i.e.,
forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion
publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion).
In this case, it is not disputed that Socorro is an heir of one of the donors. Moreover, her prayer
in her action was to revoke the Deed of Donation and to cancel the TCT issued in the name of
the Province of Quezon, and to issue a new certificate in the names of the heirs of the Clemente
Siblings, pro-indiviso, and to direct the Republic to surrender or reconvey possession over the
property to the heirs of the Clemente Sibling. It is clear, therefore, that Socorro acknowledges
and continues to recognize her co-heirs as co-owners of the Subject Property. Further, based on
the Complaint and Amended Complaint of Socorro, it is clear that the suit was intended for the
benefit of all the co-heirs of the Clemente Siblings. Thus, there is no need to implead the other
co-heirs for the action to proceed as it is for the benefit of the co-ownership.
Moreover, there is no need for the settlement of the estate before one of the heirs can institute an
action on behalf of the other co-heirs. Although an heir's right in the estate of the decedent which
has not been fully settled and partitioned is merely inchoate, Article 493 of the Civil Code gives
the heir the right to exercise acts of ownership.28 Thus, even before the settlement of the estate,
an heir may file an action for reconveyance of possession as a co-owner thereof, provided that
such heir recognizes and acknowledges the other co-heirs as co-owners of the property as it will
be assumed that the heir is acting on behalf of all the co-heirs for the benefit of the co-ownership.

ROGELIO LOGROSA, Petitioner,
Vs.
SPS. CLEOFE AND CESAR AZARES, ET AL., Respondents.
GR No. 217611; March 27, 2019

CAGUIOA, J.
Second Division
Co-ownership
FACTS: Petitioner Logrosa claims to co-own eight parcels of land in Tagum City with
Respondents. The TCTs over said lands all indicate Logrosa, together with Respondents, are co-
owners of the property. The notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the land was executed by the
parties bearing the signatures of respondents and Logrosa. The latter filed a complaint for
partition anchored on Article 494 of the New Civil Code, alleging that the co-ownership over the
properties had already existed for more than 10 years without the co-owners entering into any
subsequent agreement thereon. Spouses Azares denied Logrosa’s claim of being a co-owner,
claiming that he never contibuted to its acquisition much less paid taxes thereon. They claim that
Logrosa, being their cousin, used to work for them as a trusted laborer at their gold mining
tunnel and that, and was sent to school at their expense; and thus, without any capacity to acquire
the property. They further allege that they purchased all the properties to provide one place for
all the parties herein to live near each other for easy access and mutual security.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Logrosa is a co-owner of the property
RULING: Yes.
No one disputes the fact that there are eight certificates of title all of which clearly and
unequivocally identify petitioner Logrosa as one of the co-owners of the subject properties. It is a
fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. Such principle of
indefeasibility has long been well-settled in this jurisdiction and it is only when the acquisition of
the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine finds no application. In the instant
case, there is no accusation whatsoever that petitioner Logrosa was included as co-owner in the
TCTs through means of fraud or bad faith.
Aside from the foregoing, it is also not disputed by any party that a duly notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 14, 1987 was executed by all the parties, wherein it clearly states
without ambiguity that one of the vendees of the subject properties is petitioner Logrosa. It must
be stressed that respondents Sps. Azares do not deny whatsoever that petitioner Logrosa is a co-
vendee under the Deed of Absolute Sale. In fact, respondent Cleofe was even a co-signatory of
the said Deed of Absolute Sale, evidencing her assent and consent to petitioner Logrosa's status
as a co-vendee of the subject properties.

The Court has previously held that a document evidencing a sale transaction, such as a deed of
sale, which is duly notarized is considered a public document and therefore enjoys the
presumption of validity as to its authenticity and due execution. Section 23, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court likewise state that public documents are prima facie evidence of the fact which
gave rise to their execution.
Moreover, as held in Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago, one's assertion of ownership is

further strengthened and buttressed by the fact of possession, i.e., by building and occupying a
house on the subject lot, coupled with the lack of opposition of such possession on the part of the
other parties. In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner Logrosa possesses a portion of
the subject property with no opposition by the other parties, aside from respondents Sps. Azares,
who disclaimed petitioner Logrosa's status as co-owner only after more than two decades since
the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, and only as a mere reaction to the Complaint for
Partition filed by petitioner Logrosa.
Assuming arguendo that respondents Sps. Azares are indeed the true sole owners of the subject
properties, there was absolutely no need for them to include the other parties in the documents of
title if only to allow the latter to stay within the premises of the subject properties. The inclusion
of persons in a deed of sale and a certificate of title is by no means a prerequisite to allow such
persons to occupy such property.
Hence, no one in his right mind would include non-buyers or non-owners in a notarized deed of
absolute sale and in indefeasible certificates of title if he truly believes that he is the sole owner
of the property. Bearing in mind the strong presumption created by public documents such as a
notarized instrument and certificates of title, if respondents Sps. Azares really believed that they
are the sole owners of the subject properties, one would expect that they would, at the very least,
execute another document evidencing their true agreement as a precautionary measure.
It took respondents Sps. Azares more than two decades from the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale and issuance of the certificates of title to assert their sole ownership. Not only that,
such assertion was only a reaction to the Complaint for Partition filed by petitioner Logrosa.
Simply stated, the Court is convinced that the actuations and demeanor of respondents Sps.
Azares are wholly inconsistent with their contention that they are the sole owners of the subject
properties.
With respect to the tax declarations presented by respondents Sps. Azares, jurisprudence holds
that tax declarations and tax receipts as evidence of ownership cannot prevail over a certificate of
title which, to reiterate, is an incontrovertible proof of ownership. Hence, in order for
respondents Sps. Azares' tax declarations to successfully overturn the strong presumption of
petitioner Logrosa's co-ownership, it was incumbent upon respondents Sps. Azares to fortify
their position with other supporting evidence. As stated above, respondents Sps. Azares were not
able to do so.

SPS. TEDY GARCIA AND PILAR GARCIA, Petitioner,
Vs.
SPS. LORETA T. SANTOS AND WINSTON SANTOS, AND CONCHITA TAN,
Respondents.
GR No. 228334; June 17, 2019

CAGUIOA, J.
Second Division
Easement of Light and View
FACTS: Sps. Santos owned adjacent lots Lot 1 and Lot 2. They sold Lot 2 to Sps. Tedy and Pilar
Garcia in October 1998. At the time of the purchase, Lot 1 was an idle land without any
improvements while a one-storey residential house was already erected on the property. The
house and lot has been occupied by Sps. Garcia for about eleven years when Sps. Santos started
construction of a two-storey residential house. Upon inquiry from the construction workers, Tedy
was erroneously informed that Conchita Tan was the new owner of Lot 1.
Hence Sps. Garcia filed the instant Complaint alleging that Sps. Santos' building obstructed the
Sps. Garcia's right to light, air, and view. The Sps. Garcia bemoaned how, prior to the
construction on Lot 1, they received enough bright and natural light from their windows. The
construction allegedly rendered the Sps. Garcia's house dark such that they are unable to do their
normal undertakings in the bedroom, living room and other areas of the house without switching
on their lights. The Sps. Garcia likewise alleged that the said structure constructed on Lot 1 is at
a distance of less than three meters away from the boundary line, in violation of their easement.
The respondents argued that the mere presence of windows on the one-storey house of the Sps.
Garcia in itself does not give rise to an easement by title, stressing that there was no tenement
standing on Lot 1 at the time of the construction of the one-storey house standing on the subject
property. The respondents also argued that the Sps. Garcia failed to acquire an easement by
prescription because they never alleged that they made a formal prohibition of the construction
of a taller structure on Lot 1.
ISSUE: Whether the Sps. Garcia have acquired an easement of light and view with respect to Lot
1 owned by the Sps. Santos even in the absence of notarial prohibition
RULING: Yes.
While it is a general rule that a window or opening situated on the wall of the dominant estate
involves a negative easement, and, thus, may only be acquired by prescription, tacked from the

time of the formal prohibition upon the proprietor of the servient estate, it is not true that all
windows or openings situated on the wall of the dominant estate may only be acquired through
prescription.
Aside from prescription, easements may likewise be acquired through title. The term "title" does
not necessarily mean a document. Instead, it refers to a juridical act or law sufficient to create the
encumbrance. One such legal proviso which grants title to an easement is found in Article 624 of
the Civil Code.
Article 624 of the Civil Code reads:
x x x. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or

maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them be alienated,
as a title in order that the easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the
time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the
title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the
execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing
owned in common by two or more persons.
The mode of acquiring an easement under Article 624 is a "legal presumption or apparent sign."
Article 624 finds application in situations wherein two or more estates were previously owned by
a singular owner, or even a single estate but with two or more portions being owned by a
singular owner. Originally, there is no true easement that exists as there is only one owner.
Hence, at the outset, no other owner is imposed with a burden. Subsequently, one estate or a
portion of the estate is alienated in favor of another person, wherein, in that estate or portion of
the estate, an apparent visible sign of an easement exists. According to Article 624, there arises a
title to an easement of light and view, even in the absence of any formal act undertaken by the
owner of the dominant estate, if this apparent visible sign, such as the existence of a door and
windows, continues to remain and subsist, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is
divided, ( 1) the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or (2)
the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This is precisely the
situation that has occurred in the instant case.
ISSUE: Whether to grant Sps. Garcia's prayer that "respondents should therefore remove from
Lot 1 their building or structure which blocks or impedes petitioners' air, light and view."[68]
HELD: The Court answers the question with a qualified yes.
ART. 673. Whenever by any title a right has been acquired to have direct views,
balconies or belvederes overlooking an adjoining property, the owner of the servient
estate cannot build thereon at less than a distance of three meters to be measured in the
manner provided in Article 671. Any stipulation permitting distances less than those
prescribed in Article 670 is void.
Article 673 states a special rule covering a situation wherein a dominant estate has acquired a
right "to have direct views, balconies or belvederes, overlooking the adjoining property, the

owner of the servient estate may not build on his own property except at a distance of at least
three meters from the boundary line," the two-meter distance as provided in Article 670 is not
enough. The distance between the structures erected on the servient estate and the boundary line
of the adjoining estate must be at least three meters.
Simply stated, the distance between the structure erected by the Sps. Santos on Lot 1 and the
boundary line is only two meters, which is less than the three-meter distance required under
Article 673. Therefore, considering that the Sps. Garcia have acquired by title an easement of
light and view in accordance with Article 624 of the Civil Code, the Sps. Santos should
necessarily demolish or renovate portions of their residential building so that the three-meter
distance rule as mandated under Article 673 of the Civil Code is observed.

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INMATES OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 212719; June 25, 2019

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 1 of 65

Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 2 of 65

GR No. 214593; July 17, 2019

Validity of Marriage - Compromise

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 3 of 65

A judgment upon compromise which is contrary to law is a void judgment.

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 4 of 65

GR No. 224638; April 10, 2019

Rolando consulted Dr. Felicitas Artiaga-Soriano, a psychiatrist, whose psychiatric evaluation

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 5 of 65

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 6 of 65

GERARDO A. ELISCUPIDEZ, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 226907, July 22, 2019

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the Ground of Psychological Incapacity

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 7 of 65

Petitioner, likewise, presented the Psychological Evaluation Report (Report) of clinical

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 8 of 65

An examination of the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated is not

G.R. No. 230443; April 03, 2019

Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the Ground of Psychological Incapacity

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 9 of 65

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 10 of 65

Petitioner claims to be afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which is defined as a

JACINTO J. BAGAPORO, Petitioner,

GR No. 211929; January 30, 2019

Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 11 of 65

GENEVIEVE ROSAL ARREZA, A.K.A. "GENEVIEVE ARREZA TOYO, Petitioner,

GR No. 213198; July 1, 2019

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 13 of 65

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 14 of 65

The English translation submitted by petitioner was published by Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc., a

JULIET RENDORA MORAÑA, Petitioner,

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 15 of 65

G.R. No. 227605; December 05, 2019

In RE: Petition for Judicial Recognition of Divorce

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 16 of 65

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 17 of 65

G.R. No. 224548; January 23, 2019

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 18 of 65

RULING: No. Petition is remanded to the RTC.

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 19 of 65

GR No. 187225; March 6, 2019

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 20 of 65

ARTICLE 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership.

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 21 of 65

ESTRELLA ABID-BABANO, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 201176; August 28, 2019

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 22 of 65

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 23 of 65

HEIRS OF PAULA C. FABILLAR, as represented by AUREO* FABILLAR, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 231459; January 21, 2019

Recovery of Ownership, Possession of Land (with Necessity of Determining Filiation)

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 24 of 65

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 25 of 65

GLENN M. MILLER, substituted by his SURVIVING LEGAL HEIRS, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 200344; August 28, 2019

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 26 of 65

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 27 of 65

SPOUSES JOON HYUNG PARK AND KYUNG AH LEE, Petitioners,

SSC-R |Navarro, Shareyde F. | CivRev 1 Digests Page 28 of 65