I. Limitations To The Practice of Law A. Prohibitions (Relative and Absolute) I. Clerks of Court

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
I. LIMITATIONS TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW
a. PROHIBITIONS (RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE)
i. Clerks of court
1. Nate v. Judge Contreras, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2406, February 18, 2015
This administrative case concerns allegations that respondent Judge Lelu P. Contreras committed
three counts of grave misconduct while she was still holding the position Clerk of Court VI of the
Regional Trial Court in Iriga City, Camarines Sur (RTC-Iriga City). According to the complaint,
respondent allegedly notarized an administrative complaint; certified a document (a labor
complaint) as a true copy of the original; and appeared as counsel for her father in a hearing
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Clerks of court are indeed authorized to act as
ex officio notaries public under the Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to the 2002 Revised
Manual for Clerks of Court.1 On the other hand, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees2 prohibit public officials and employees from engaging in the
private practice of their profession. The 2004 Code of Conduct for Court Personnel3 and the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice4 were not yet in force when respondent committed the purported
offenses.
Complainant Atty. Benito B. Nate calls the attention of this Court to the supposed grave
misconduct of respondent Contreras while she was still clerk of court and ex officio provincial
sheriff of RTC–Iriga City. According to him, there were three instances in which respondent
abused her authority.
First, respondent Contreras allegedly notarized an administrative complaint that was prepared
by her own father and filed with this Court sometime in June 2003.5 Complainant Nate stresses
that respondent could not have legally notarized a document. He points out that Section 3, Rule
4 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice disqualifies notaries from performing a notarial act if
they are related to the principal within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
Furthermore, he argues that respondent acted beyond her authority when she notarized in Iriga
City a document that was signed in the Municipality of Buhi, which was outside that city. We
note that complainant was the subject of the administrative complaint filed by respondent’s
father. Next, complainant Nate claims that respondent certified a document as a true copy of the
original, and that her sister-in-law later on used the certified document in a labor case then
pending with the National Labor Relations Commission in Naga City.6 He points out that
respondent, as an ex officio notary public, was empowered to authenticate only those
documents that were in her custody. Since the document – an amended labor complaint – was
not a document pending before the RTC–Iriga City, respondent allegedly went beyond her
authority when she authenticated it.
Finally, purportedly without this Court’s prior written authority, respondent Contreras appeared
as her father’s counsel before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP.7 Complainant Nate
alleges that respondent herself admitted during the proceedings before the IBP that she had not
yet obtained a written authority.
Respondent Contreras admits to all of these allegations. However, she maintains that her actions
were allowed under the Manual for Clerks of Court. As regards the first act, she stresses that as
ex officio notary public, she was authorized to administer oaths and notarize documents so long
as no private document was involved. She then argues that the administrative complaint against
a lawyer, which was eventually filed with this Court, was not considered a private document. In
fact, it was her ministerial duty as clerk of court to sign the jurat portion of the complaint
regardless of her relationship with the principal. Furthermore, she explains that the municipality
of Buhi was within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC–Iriga City.
With respect to the second act, she explains that the Manual for Clerks of Court allowed her to
authenticate copies of documents, especially since the RTC in Iriga City did not have human
resource management officers. Furthermore, she stresses that the power of clerks of court to
authenticate documents as true copies of the original is not limited to copies of documents that
are in their custody. Rather, she argues that a clerk of court may certify the authenticity of the
copies so long as they are shown to be faithful reproductions of the original after a presentation
and comparison of the documents.
Regarding the last act, respondent Contreras points out that the intended first hearing before
the IBP was suspended, precisely because she informed the hearing officer that she had not yet
received authority to appear as counsel for her father. She clarifies that the proceedings pushed
through only when she was able to present her written authority8 from this Court.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) agrees with complainant as regards the first and the
second acts. The OCA reiterates that as clerk of court and ex officio notary, respondent
Contreras may notarize documents or administer oaths only when these are related to the
exercise of her official functions. It then explains that there was no connection between her
official functions and the administrative complaint of her father or the labor complaint of her
sister-in-law. On the other hand, with regard to the third act, the OCA is of the view that
respondent did not commit any irregularity, since she was authorized by this Court to represent
her father in the administrative case he had filed.
THE ISSUES
Whether Contreras is administratively liable for the following acts:
1. Affixing her signature to the jurat portion of the administrative complaint prepared by
her father
2. Authenticating documents as genuine copies of the original labor complaint
3. Appearing as counsel before the IBP on behalf of her father
THE RULING
Clerks of court are authorized to act as ex officio notaries public under Sections 419 and 4210 of
the Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to Section D(1),11 Chapter VI of the 2002 Revised
Manual for Clerks of Court.
Historically, justices of the peace courts, judges of municipal courts, and clerks of courts – as
public officers and by virtue of their respective offices – were authorized to perform any act
within the competency of regular notaries public.12 This meant that they had the power –
to administer all oaths and affirmations provided for by law, in all matters incident to his notarial
office, and in the execution of affidavits, depositions, and other documents requiring an oath,
and to receive the proof or acknowledgment of all writings relating to commerce or navigation x
x x, and such other writings as are commonly proved or acknowledged before notaries; to act as
a magistrate, in the writing of affidavits or depositions, and to make declarations and certify the
truth thereof under his seal of office, concerning all matters done by him by virtue of his
office.13 (Emphases supplied)
One of the main reasons why these public officers were allowed to perform any notarial act was
that there were still rural areas in the country that did not have regular notaries public.14 While
some areas had notaries, not all of them kept regular office hours.15 Thus, residents of these
communities had to travel to the provincial capital or to larger towns where they could find
lawyers who also practiced as notaries.16 Consequently, in the interest of public service and in
order for the people to have a more convenient and less expensive option, these public officers
were appointed ex officio notaries public with the authority to perform any act within the
competency of regular notaries public.17 As such, their services and the notarial fees they
charged were for the account of the government.18
As more lawyers and regular notaries public populated far-flung areas, the need for ex officio
notaries public diminished as did their power. Thus, ever since this clarification was made by the
Court in the 1980 case Borre v. Moya,19 the power of ex officio notaries public have been limited
to notarial acts connected to the exercise of their official functions and duties.20 This means that
since the promulgation of that ruling, they have no longer had the authority to notarize
documents that do not bear any relation to the performance of their official functions, such as
contracts and other acts of conveyance,21 affidavits,22 certificates of candidacy,23 special powers
of attorney,24 pleadings,25 sworn applications for business permits,26 or other similar
instruments. To repeat, the notarization of documents that have no relation to the performance
of their official functions is now considered to be beyond the scope of their authority as notaries
public ex officio.27 Any one of them who does so would be committing an unauthorized notarial
act,28 which amounts to engaging in the unauthorized practice of law29 and abuse of authority.30
Consequently, the empowerment of ex officio notaries public to perform acts within the
competency of regular notaries public – such as acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations,
jurats, signature witnessing, copy certifications, and other acts authorized under the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice31 – is now more of an exception rather than a general rule. They may
perform notarial acts on such documents that bear no relation to their official functions and
duties only if (1) a certification is included in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of
any other lawyer or notary public in the municipality or circuit; and (2) all notarial fees charged
will be for the account of the government and turned over to the municipal treasurer.32
To delve deeper into the question of what constitutes an action "connected to the exercise of
their official functions and duties" as ex officio notaries public, clerks of court in particular may
refer to the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court. Under the manual,33 they have general
administrative supervision over court personnel. As officers of the court, they serve as
custodians of court funds and revenues, records, properties, and premises. Thus, they generally
act as its treasurer, accountant, guard, and physical plant manager. In other words, they take
charge of the administrative aspects of the court’s business and chronicle its will and directions,
aside from performing their more obvious function of attending court sessions. Further, they
keep the records and the seal, issue processes, enter judgments and orders, and give – upon
request – certified copies of the court’s records.
According to the manual, below are the general functions and duties of a Clerk of Court VI in a
multiple-sala court:
XXX
Proceeding now to the first act complained about, we agree with the OCA findings that
respondent’s act of affixing her signature to the jurat portion of the administrative complaint
prepared by her father had no direct relation to her work as the then clerk of court of RTC–
IrigaCity. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the proceedings involving the disbarment and
discipline of attorneys shall be conducted before the IBP.34 This means that clerks of court are
not among the touch points in the regular procedure pertaining to complaints against an
attorney. Neither may a pleading in a case involving lawyers be filed with the RTC.
Respondent defends her actions by arguing that she was guided by the test of whether or not
the instrument she notarized was considered a private document. While we agree with her that
ex officio notaries public are not authorized to perform a notarial act in relation to private
documents, the applicable test is not based merely on the nature of the transaction as private,
but also on the relationship between the document and the official functions and duties of the ex
officio notary public.35 For clerks of court, a failsafe guideline for determining the coverage of
their authority as ex officio notaries public is to refer to the functions and duties of their position
as outlined in the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court.
We apply the same legal reasoning to the second act of respondent being complained about;
that is, her certification of a copy of her sister-in-law’s labor complaint.1âwphi1 Respondent
herself admits that the document was filed before the National Labor Relations Commission in
Naga City, not the RTC–Iriga City. Thus, in the regular course of her duties, she would not have
come across, encountered, or been in custody of the document. While we agree with her that
clerks of court are allowed to perform the notarial act of copy certification, this act must still be
connected to the exercise of their official functions and duties – meaning to say, it must be done
in connection with public documents and records that are, by virtue of their position, in their
custody.
With regard to the third act, we reiterate that the primary employment of court personnel must
be their full-time position in the judiciary,36 which is the chief concern requiring their dutiful
attention. Nevertheless, we recognize that the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees does allow for limited exceptions. Section 7(b)37 thereof in relation to
Rule X, Section 1(c)38 of its implementing rules, provides that public officials and employees are
prohibited from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution, law, or regulation; and under the condition that their practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with their official functions.
Thus, pursuant to the Court’s administrative supervision over all court personnel,39 we have on a
number of occasions, but on a case-by-case basis,[[40 granted41]] requests of court personnel
to appear as counsel on behalf of their immediate family members. This grant is premised on the
strict condition that their representation will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions. Furthermore, they must not use official time in preparing for the case and must file a
leave of absence every time they are required to attend to the case.
Respondent has satisfactorily proved that she was granted authority by this Court to "represent
her father in Administrative Case No. 6089 provided that she files the corresponding leaves of
absence on the scheduled dates of hearing of the case and that she will not use official time in
preparing for the case."42 We thus agree with the OCA recommendation that she did not commit
any irregularity when she represented her father before the IBP.
The Court has, in the past, sanctioned judges43 and clerks of court44 for notarizing – as ex officio
notaries public – documents that were later found to be unconnected with the exercise of their
official functions and duties. In Astorga v. Salas,45 the Court fined a clerk of court in the amount
of ₱5,000 for notarizing several documents and administering oaths involving matters unrelated
to her official duties. In Cruz v. Centron,46 we imposed a fine on the clerk of court who notarized
one document – a deed of sale – but the fine was in the lower amount of ₱2,000, since the act
was her first offense. All of them were given a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a
similar offense would be dealt with by the Court more severely. Considering, however, that the
documents notarized by respondent Contreras do not involve a private or commercial
undertaking, and that this is the first time that she has been charged, we agree with the
recommendation of the OCA that the penalty of reprimand, instead of a fine, is more appropriate
under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Lelu P. Contreras is found LIABLE for the unauthorized
notarization of documents unrelated to her office duties while she was serving as Clerk of Court
VI of the Regional Trial Court in Iriga City. She is hereby REPRIMANDED, with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or a similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
2. Query of Atty. Karen Buffe, A.M. No. 08-6-352, RTC, August 19, 2009
This administrative matter started as a letter-query dated March 4, 2008 of Atty. Karen M.
Silverio-Buffe (Atty. Buffe) addressed to the Office of the Court Administrator, which query the
latter referred to the Court for consideration. In the course of its action on the matter, the Court
discovered that the query was beyond pure policy interpretation and referred to the actual
situation of Atty. Buffe, and, hence, was a matter that required concrete action on the factual
situation presented.
The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, as
amended (or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). This
provision places a limitation on public officials and employees during their incumbency, and
those already separated from government employment for a period of one (1) year after
separation, in engaging in the private practice of their profession. Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No.
6713 provides:
SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions; or
xxx
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation,
retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above,
but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
In her letter-query, Atty. Buffe posed these questions: "Why may an incumbent engage in
private practice under (b)(2), assuming the same does not conflict or tend to conflict with his
official duties, but a non-incumbent like myself cannot, as is apparently prohibited by the last
paragraph of Sec. 7? Why is the former allowed, who is still occupying the very public position
that he is liable to exploit, but a non-incumbent like myself – who is no longer in a position of
possible abuse/exploitation – cannot?"1
The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned from her position effective February 1, 2008.
Thereafter (and within the one-year period of prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted
provision), she engaged in the private practice of law by appearing as private counsel in several
cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon.
Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential treatment to an
incumbent public employee, who may engage in the private practice of his profession so long as
this practice does not conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions. In contrast, a public
official or employee who has retired, resigned, or has been separated from government service
like her, is prohibited from engaging in private practice on any matter before the office where
she used to work, for a period of one (1) year from the date of her separation from government
employment.
Atty. Buffe further alleged that the intention of the above prohibition is to remove the exercise of
clout, influence or privity to insider information, which the incumbent public employee may use
in the private practice of his profession. However, this situation did not obtain in her case, since
she had already resigned as Clerk of Court of RTC-Branch 18 of Romblon. She advanced the
view that she could engage in the private practice of law before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon, so
long as her appearance as legal counsel shall not conflict or tend to conflict with her former
duties as former Clerk of Court of that Branch.
Then Deputy Court Administrator (now Court Administrator) Jose P. Perez made the following
observations when the matter was referred to him:
The general intent of the law, as defined in its title is "to uphold the time-honored principle of
public office being a public trust." Section 4 thereof provides for the norms of conduct of public
officials and employees, among others: (a) commitment to public interest; (b) professionalism;
and (c) justness and sincerity. Of particular significance is the statement under professionalism
that "[t]hey [public officials and employees] shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of
their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
Thus, it may be well to say that the prohibition was intended to avoid any impropriety or the
appearance of impropriety which may occur in any transaction between the retired government
employee and his former colleagues, subordinates or superiors brought about by familiarity,
moral ascendancy or undue influence, as the case may be.21avvphi1
Subsequently, in a Minute Resolution dated July 15, 2008, we resolved to refer this case to the
Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) for evaluation, report and recommendation.3 The OCAT took
the view that:
The premise of the query is erroneous. She interprets Section 7 (b) (2) as a blanket authority for
an incumbent clerk of court to practice law. Clearly, there is a misreading of that provision of
law.4 and further observed:
The confusion apparently lies in the use of the term "such practice" after the phrase "provided
that." It may indeed be misinterpreted as modifying the phrase "engage in the private practice
of their profession" should be prefatory sentence that public officials "during their incumbency
shall not" be disregarded. However, read in its entirety, "such practice" may only refer to
practice "authorized by the Constitution or law" or the exception to the prohibition against the
practice of profession. The term "law" was intended by the legislature to include "a
memorandum or a circular or an administrative order issued pursuant to the authority of law."
xxx
The interpretation that Section 7 (b) (2) generally prohibits incumbent public officials and
employees from engaging in the practice of law, which is declared therein a prohibited and
unlawful act, accords with the constitutional policy on accountability of public officers stated in
Article XI of the Constitution …
xxx
The policy thus requires public officials and employees to devote full time public service so that
in case of conflict between personal and public interest, the latter should take precedence over
the former.5[Footnotes omitted]
With respect to lawyers in the judiciary, the OCAT pointed to Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel – the rule that deals with outside employment by an incumbent
judicial employee and which limits such outside employment to one that "does not require the
practice of law."6 The prohibition to practice law with respect to any matter where they have
intervened while in the government service is reiterated in Rule 6.03, Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which governs the conduct of lawyers in the government service.7
In view of the OCAT findings and recommendations, we issued an En Banc Resolution dated
November 11, 2008 directing the Court Administrator to draft and submit to the Court a circular
on the practice of profession during employment and within one year from resignation,
retirement from or cessation of employment in the Judiciary. We likewise required the Executive
Judge of the RTC of Romblon to (i) verify if Atty. Buffe had appeared as counsel during her
incumbency as clerk of court and after her resignation in February 2008, and (ii) submit to the
Court a report on his verification.8
In compliance with this our Resolution, Executive Judge Ramiro R. Geronimo of RTC-Branch 81
of Romblon reported the following appearances made by Atty. Buffe:
Atty. Buffe herself was furnished a copy of our November 11, 2008 En Banc Resolution and she
filed a Manifestation (received by the Court on February 2, 2009) acknowledging receipt of our
November 11, 2008 Resolution. She likewise stated that her appearances are part of Branch 81
records. As well, she informed the Court that she had previously taken the following judicial
remedies in regard to the above query:
She also made known her intent to elevate the dismissal of the above cases "so that eventually,
the Honorable Supreme Court may put to rest the legal issue/s presented in the above petitions
which is, why is it that R.A. No. 6713, Sec. 7 (b)(2) and last par. thereof, apparently contains an
express prohibition (valid or invalid) on the private practice of undersigned’s law profession,
before Branch 81, while on the other hand not containing a similar, express prohibition in regard
to undersigned’s practice of profession, before the same court, as a public prosecutor – within
the supposedly restricted 1-year period?"
OUR ACTION AND RULING
Preliminary Considerations
As we stated at the outset, this administrative matter confronts us, not merely with the task of
determining how the Court will respond to the query, both with respect to the substance and
form (as the Court does not give interpretative opinions9 but can issue circulars and regulations
relating to pleading, practice and procedure in all courts10 and in the exercise of its
administrative supervision over all courts and personnel thereof11), but also with the task of
responding to admitted violations of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 and to multiple recourses
on the same subject.
After our directive to the Office of the Court Administrator to issue a circular on the subject of
the query for the guidance of all personnel in the Judiciary, we consider this aspect of the
present administrative matter a finished task, subject only to confirmatory closure when the
OCA reports the completion of the undertaking to us.
Atty. Buffe’s admitted appearance, before the very same branch she served and immediately
after her resignation, is a violation that we cannot close our eyes to and that she cannot run
away from under the cover of the letter-query she filed and her petition for declaratory relief,
whose dismissal she manifested she would pursue up to our level. We note that at the time she
filed her letter-query (on March 4, 2008), Atty. Buffe had already appeared before Branch 81 in
at least three (3) cases. The terms of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 did not deter her in any
way and her misgivings about the fairness of the law cannot excuse any resulting violation she
committed. In other words, she took the risk of appearing before her own Branch and should
suffer the consequences of the risk she took.
Nor can she hide behind the two declaratory relief petitions she filed, both of which were
dismissed, and her intent to elevate the dismissal to this Court for resolution. The first, filed
before the RTC, Branch 54, Manila, was dismissed on July 23, 2008 because the "court declined
to exercise the power to declare rights as prayed for in the petition, as any decision that may be
rendered will be inutile and will not generally terminate the uncertainty or
controversy."12 The second, filed with the RTC, Branch 17, Manila, was dismissed for being an
inappropriate remedy after the dismissal ordered by the RTC, Branch 54, Manila, on December
4, 2008.13 Under these circumstances, we see nothing to deter us from ruling on Atty. Buffe’s
actions, as no actual court case other than the present administrative case, is now actually
pending on the issue she raised. On the contrary, we see from Atty. Buffe’s recourse to this
Court and the filing of the two declaratory petitions the intent to shop for a favorable answer to
her query. We shall duly consider this circumstance in our action on the case.
A last matter to consider before we proceed to the merits of Atty. Buffe’s actions relates to
possible objections on procedural due process grounds, as we have not made any formal
directive to Atty. Buffe to explain why she should not be penalized for her appearance before
Branch 81 soon after her resignation from that Branch. The essence of due process is the grant
of the opportunity to be heard; what it abhors is the lack of the opportunity to be heard.14 The
records of this case show that Atty. Buffe has been amply heard with respect to her actions. She
was notified, and she even responded to our November 11, 2008 directive for the Executive
Judge of the RTC of Romblon to report on Atty. Buffe’s appearances before Branch 81; she
expressly manifested that these appearances were part of the Branch records. Her legal
positions on these appearances have also been expressed before this Court; first, in her original
letter-query, and subsequently, in her Manifestation. Thus, no due process consideration needs
to deter us from considering the legal consequences of her appearances in her previous Branch
within a year from her resignation.
The Governing Law: Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public
officials and employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice
of their profession during their incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee can
engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private
practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not
conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or
employee’s resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private
practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken even within the
one-year prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited period
applies with respect to any matter before the office the public officer or employee used to work
with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust; and
serve to remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions
between a former government official or employee and his or her former colleagues,
subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote the observance and the efficient use of
every moment of the prescribed office hours to serve the public.15
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only
prohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also
applies. The latter provision provides the definitive rule on the "outside employment" that an
incumbent court official or court employee may undertake in addition to his official duties:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all of the
following requirements:
(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law before the
courts or conducts business with the Judiciary;
(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working hours and is not
incompatible with the performance of the court personnel’s duties and responsibilities;
(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided, however, that
court personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law
schools, review or continuing education centers or similar institutions;
(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel to disclose
confidential information acquired while performing officials duties;
(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of
government, unless specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside
employment reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not
accept outside employment. [Emphasis supplied]
In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the quoted Canon 3, the practice of law
is covered; the practice of law is a practice of profession, while Canon 3 specifically mentions
any outside employment requiring the practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod,16 we defined the
practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill.17 Under both provisions, a common objective is to avoid
any conflict of interest on the part of the employee who may wittingly or unwittingly use
confidential information acquired from his employment, or use his or her familiarity with court
personnel still with the previous office.
After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
ceases to apply as it applies specifically to incumbents, but Section 7 and its subsection (b)(2) of
R.A. No. 6713 continue to apply to the extent discussed above. Atty. Buffe’s situation falls under
Section 7.
Atty. Buffe’s Situation
A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty. Buffe’s admission that she immediately
engaged in private practice of law within the one-year period of prohibition stated in Section
7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713. We find it noteworthy, too, that she is aware of this provision and only
objects to its application to her situation; she perceives it to be unfair that she cannot practice
before her old office – Branch 81 – for a year immediately after resignation, as she believes that
her only limitation is in matters where a conflict of interest exists between her appearance as
counsel and her former duties as Clerk of Court. She believes that Section 7 (b)(2) gives
preferential treatment to incumbent public officials and employees as against those already
separated from government employment.
Atty. Buffe apparently misreads the law. As the OCAT aptly stated, she interprets Section 7
(b)(2) as a blanket authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law. We reiterate what
we have explained above, that the general rule under Section 7 (b)(2) is to bar public officials
and employees from the practice of their professions; it is unlawful under this general rule for
clerks of court to practice their profession. By way of exception, they can practice their
profession if the Constitution or the law allows them, but no conflict of interest must exist
between their current duties and the practice of their profession. As we also mentioned above,
no chance exists for lawyers in the Judiciary to practice their profession, as they are in fact
expressly prohibited by Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel from
doing so. Under both the general rule and the exceptions, therefore, Atty. Buffe’s basic premise
is misplaced.
As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately
after her separation from the service and without any period limitation that applies to other
prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of court’s limitation is that she cannot
practice her profession within one year before the office where he or she used to work with. In a
comparison between a resigned, retired or separated official or employee, on the one hand, and
an incumbent official or employee, on the other, the former has the advantage because the
limitation is only with respect to the office he or she used to work with and only for a period of
one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only where specifically allowed by the
Constitution and the law and only in areas where no conflict of interests exists. This analysis
again disproves Atty. Buffe’s basic premises.
A worrisome aspect of Atty. Buffe’s approach to Section 7 (b)(2) is her awareness of the law and
her readiness to risk its violation because of the unfairness she perceives in the law. We find it
disturbing that she first violated the law before making any inquiry. She also justifies her
position by referring to the practice of other government lawyers known to her who, after
separation from their judicial employment, immediately engaged in the private practice of law
and appeared as private counsels before the RTC branches where they were previously
employed. Again we find this a cavalier attitude on Atty. Buffe’s part and, to our mind, only
emphasizes her own willful or intentional disregard of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713.
By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as "unlawful," Atty. Buffe contravened Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES
xxx
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As indicated by the use of the mandatory word "shall," this provision must be strictly complied
with. Atty. Buffe failed to do this, perhaps not with an evil intent, considering the misgivings she
had about Section 7 (b)(2)’s unfairness. Unlawful conduct under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, however,
does not necessarily require the element of criminality, although the Rule is broad enough to
include it.18 Likewise, the presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential to
bring his or her act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01, when it specifically prohibits
lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.19 Thus, we find Atty. Buffe liable under this quoted
Rule.
We also find that Atty. Buffe also failed to live up to her lawyer’s oath and thereby violated
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when she blatantly and unlawfully practised
law within the prohibited period by appearing before the RTC Branch she had just left. Canon 7
states:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. [Emphasis
supplied]
By her open disregard of R.A. No. 6713, she thereby followed the footsteps of the models she
cited and wanted to replicate – the former court officials who immediately waded into practice in
the very same court they came from. She, like they, disgraced the dignity of the legal profession
by openly disobeying and disrespecting the law.20 By her irresponsible conduct, she also eroded
public confidence in the law and in lawyers.21 Her offense is not in any way mitigated by her
transparent attempt to cover up her transgressions by writing the Court a letter-query, which
she followed up with unmeritorious petitions for declaratory relief, all of them dealing with the
same Section 7 (b)(2) issue, in the hope perhaps that at some point she would find a ruling
favorable to her cause. These are acts whose implications do not promote public confidence in
the integrity of the legal profession.22
Considering Atty. Buffe’s ready admission of violating Section 7(b)(2), the principle of res ipsa
loquitur finds application, making her administratively liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.23 In several cases, the Court has
disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where the facts
on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of their administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro,24 the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further
investigation after considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct;
the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also
inimical to public interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several
cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in
circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in
their cases.25 The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the
determination of respondents' administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the
matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur.26
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy,27 that no evidentiary hearing is
required before the respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already
established by the facts on record.
We applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur once more in In re: Wenceslao Laureta28 where we
punished a lawyer for grave professional misconduct solely based on his answer to a show-cause
order for contempt and without going into a trial-type hearing. We ruled then that due process is
satisfied as long as the opportunity to be heard is given to the person to be disciplined.29
Likewise in Zaldivar v. Gonzales,30 the respondent was disciplined and punished for contempt for
his slurs regarding the Court’s alleged partiality, incompetence and lack of integrity on the basis
of his answer in a show-cause order for contempt. The Court took note that the respondent did
not deny making the negative imputations against the Court through the media and even
acknowledged the correctness of his degrading statements. Through a per curiam decision, we
justified imposing upon him the penalty of suspension in the following tenor:
The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of
the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but
corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a
professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task
and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part
which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice
constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against
him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.31
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal
investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its
disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be
heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the
present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court.
A member of the bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.32 The appropriate penalty on an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.33
In this case, we cannot discern any mitigating factors we can apply, save OCAT’s observation
that Atty Buffe’s letter-query may really reflect a misapprehension of the parameters of the
prohibition on the practice of the law profession under Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713.
Ignorance of the law, however, is no excuse, particularly on a matter as sensitive as practice of
the legal profession soon after one’s separation from the service. If Atty. Buffe is correct in the
examples she cited, it is time to ring the bell and to blow the whistle signaling that we cannot
allow this practice to continue.1avvphi1
As we observed earlier,34 Atty. Buffe had no qualms about the simultaneous use of various fora
in expressing her misgivings about the perceived unfairness of Section 7 of R.A. 6713. She
formally lodged a query with the Office of the Court Administrator, and soon after filed her
successive petitions for declaratory relief. Effectively, she exposed these fora to the possibility of
embarrassment and confusion through their possibly differing views on the issue she posed.
Although this is not strictly the forum-shopping that the Rules of Court prohibit, what she has
done is something that we cannot help but consider with disfavor because of the potential
damage and embarrassment to the Judiciary that it could have spawned. This is a point against
Atty. Buffe that cancels out the leniency we might have exercised because of the OCAT’s
observation about her ignorance of and misgivings on the extent of the prohibition after
separation from the service.
Under the circumstances, we find that her actions merit a penalty of fine of ₱10,000.00, together
with a stern warning to deter her from repeating her transgression and committing other acts of
professional misconduct.35 This penalty reflects as well the Court’s sentiments on how seriously
the retired, resigned or separated officers and employees of the Judiciary should regard and
observe the prohibition against the practice of law with the office that they used to work with.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of professional

misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. She is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00), and
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of this violation and the commission of other acts of
professional misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.
Let this Decision be noted in Atty. Buffe’s record as a member of the Bar.
ii. Former government attorneys
CPR, Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
iii. President, members of cabinet, vice president, deputies and assistants

Art. VII, Section 13, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.
iv. Members of Congress
Sec. 14, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to
act on account of his office.
In Re David, A.M. No. 98, July 13, 1953
1. LAWYERS; SE defines "practice the profession." - Practice as a lawyer is to practice the acts of
his profession. To prepare and file motions requesting the execution of a sentence, the
demolition of the homes of the defendants in the case asking the court to order the sheriff to
betray him the amounts charged in the case are acts that fall within the exercise of the
profession advocacy; the allegation and submit memorandum to the Appeals Tribunal do is
practice as a lawyer, because an agent can not do it; the charge rents of more than a hundred
defendants to issue receipts and signed as the applicant's counsel is to exercise the profession.
2. Id .; Id .; - The fact that the lawyer had not put in his motion requesting execution acting as
a lawyer but as an agent and employee of the applicant, does not alter the nature of its services
are certainly professional services of a lawyer. Hiding acting as a lawyer and was only
pretending agent, their situation worsens; which is more guilty, covered with a mask, he shot
his enemy who makes a pool and a view of the public face.
3. ID .; ATTORNEY SUSPENDED exercising the profession. - The suspended lawyer practicing the
profession during the period of suspension will be completely disabled for such a profession in
the Philippines with the consequent cancellation of the certificate issued in their favor as such
attorney.
In the administrative case No. 35 respondent was suspended for misfeasance in the exercise of
his profession for a period of five years from the 9 November 1949. The appeal supports this
suspension in its report 17 March 1951; however, continued to exercise the profession within the
period of the suspension, November 9th 1949 and November 8, 1954.
On February 28, 1950 the Respondent submitted a claim (Exhibit J) in R. G. CA No. 4792-R
cause, Tan Tek v Sy. Maliwanag not as counsel for Sy Tan Tek, but with the following words: "for
and in Behalf of Tan Tek Sy"; on 26 January 1951 sent it by certified mail notification of the
decision in that case (Exhibit G), confirming the decision of the Court of First Instance; on March
13, 1951 filed a motion in this court - and returned the file - requesting the issuance of a
warrant of execution, which motion is signed as follows:
"TAN TEK SI
"By (Sgd.) FELIX P. DAVID,
"c/o Atty. Felix P. David,
"Corner Dagupan and Azcarraga St.,
"Filipinas Saw Mill & Construction,
"Manila"
The present appeal therefore written not as they do practicing lawyers, but as an agent Sy Tan
Tek. In the civil case No. 3658 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, called Malayan Saw Mill,
Inc. against Tolentino, the Respondent filed a brief on September 25, 1950, requesting an order
to demolish the homes of the respondents (Exhibit TO); on October 10, 1950 I filed a motion
asking the Sheriff of Manila was authorized to pay "the amount or other amount Such as May be
Collected by the Sheriff from time to time" (Exhibit B); on November 13, 1950 I present another
motion (Exhibit C) asking another demolition order, signing three letters, Exhibits A, B and C, as
counsel for the applicant; the exhibits B to B-34 show that was receiving payments amounts of
several defendants as counsel for the applicant; the oldest receipt is dated 12 February 1950
and last December 7, 1950. In defense resorted says appeared as counsel for Tan Tek Sy from
the Municipal Court of Manila in 1948; which, being suspended, he had advised his client to seek
other counsel to prepare the brief to be submitted to the Court of Appeal; when there were only
two or three days and his client could not submit, he himself wrote and presented at the request
of his client; the allegation that arrangement with the intention of his client to sign it, but as this
was in Dagupan and could not sign and there was more than one day, then I sign it as follows:
"Felix P. David, for and in Behalf of the appellee. " On September 25, 1950 I present to the
Court of Appeal a memorandum in reply to the appellant, signed as this allegation.
"In order - says the appeal - to show That I Did not Have the intention to disregard the
suspension of the Supreme Court, I did not With the knowledge of even Identified Sy Tan Tek
myself as the attorney for the appellee but in good faith, I signed for and in Behalf of the
appellee without designating That I am practicing as attorney-at-law. "cralaw virtua1aw library
We do not think this justified the performance of the resorted to submit the claim and its
memorandum on behalf of his client being suspended in the exercise of their profession;
knowing I was suspended, I ought to have presented either as an agent or a lawyer; I was in no
obligation to continue to serve his client before the Court of Appeal; I must have noticed that
your client was suspended in the exercise of his profession as a lawyer and was to advise him to
employ another in his place if he wanted to be represented; ought not contravene the express
order of this Court; He must know that he who is not a practicing lawyer can not appear for trial
before a court except before a justice of the peace. When presenting its case and its
memorandum with the words "For and in Behalf of the Appellee" violated Article 31 of Rule 127
which states that "In other courts, a party can run their own dispute personally or with the help
of a lawyer, and his appearance must be made in person or by a member of the Forum duly
authorized. " An agent or an attorney or a member of the Forum suspended may not appear for
trial.
To explain the presentation of motions in case No. 3655, Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. against
Tolentino, the appeal says I act in good faith, that I present not to disobey the decision of this
Court but to collect their fees. As an officer of the Forum, the lawyer must comply with the
judgment of the Court above all other considerations. We think not acting in good faith when,
putting his interest in collecting their fees, engaged in the profession knowing that he was
forbidden to exercise it. But he had not submitted their motions exhibits A, B and C and issued
receipts B to B-34 amounts recovered from the defendants, the Respondent could collect their
fees directly from their already demanding client, and claiming them in accordance with Article
33 Rule 127.
The appeal says that if appeared on March 2, 1950 in case No. 7679 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Juan de la Torre against Philippine Trust Co., was by request of his brother
Juan de la Torre and also the I do not charge fees for his appearance because he knew he was
suspended from the exercise of the profession. Although not taken into account this hearing, the
Respondent can not save for having provided various professional services and reported.
Practice as a lawyer is to practice the acts of his profession. To prepare and file motions
requesting the execution of the judgment, the demolition of the houses of the defendants,
asking the court to order the Sheriff to betray him the amounts collected are acts that fall within
the exercise of the legal profession; the allegation and submit memorandum to the Court of
Appeal is to exercise the legal profession, because an agent can not do it; the charge rents of
the 109 defendants issuing 35 receipts and signed as lawyer for the plaintiff, is to exercise the
profession.
The fact that he had not put in his motion for order execution in Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. against
Tolentino, who acted as a lawyer but as an agent and employee of the Philippines Sawmill and
Construction, does not alter the nature of its services they are certainly professional services of
a lawyer; but hiding who acted as counsel for Tan Tek Sy and pretending that it was only an
agent, their situation worsens: it is more guilty that covered with a mask, shot his enemy who
does open face and in view the public; Hence the criminal law imposes more severe sentence in
the first case.
The evidence of record shows that respondent Felix P. David practiced law attorney intentionally
disobeying the decision of the Court of September 30, 1949 , Administrative Case No. 35 .
Therefore , he is ineligible to practice as a lawyer in the Philippines , it is declared canceled the
certificate issued in their favor to practice and directed to return it to the Clerk of this Court.
FACTS: Respondent was suspended for bad practices in the exercise of his profession as a
lawyer for a period of five years from the November 9, 1949. The defendant admits this
suspension in `his written report filed on March 17, 1951, yet he continued to exercise the
profession within the period of suspension, November 9, 1949 to November 8, 1954.
On Feb 28 1950 the respondent file a claim in the case of Tan Tek vs Sy not as a lawyer but as
an agent. (For and in behalf of Tan Tek Sy) CFI decided in favor of Tan Tek, subsequently Atty
Felix David filed a motion for execution. In another civil case of the CFI called Malayan Saw Mill,
Inc vs Tolentino, defendant filed a brief for an order to demolish homes.
“In order - says the appeal - to show That I did not Have the intention to disregard the
suspension of the Supreme Court, I did not With The Knowledge of Tan Tek Identified Sy Even
myself as the attorney for the Appelles But In Good Faith, I signed for and in Behalf of the
appellee Without Designating That I am Practicing as attorney-at-law.”
ISSUE: Whether the acts of Atty Felix David is tantamount to practice of law.
HELD: Yes. Neither can he allow his name to appear in such pleading by itself or as part of firm
name under the signature of another qualified lawyer because the signature of an agent
amounts to signing of a non-qualified senator or congressman, the office of an attorney being
originally an agency, and because he will, by such act, be appearing in court or quasi-judicial or
administrative body in violation of the constitutional restriction. “He cannot do indirectly what
the Constitution prohibits directly.”
v. Fiscals / prosecutors
Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility
Rule 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
FACTS
14 SCRA 109 – Legal Ethics – Practice of Law – Isolated Appearance
In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the municipality of Alaminos in
Laguna. In said case, the private offended party asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule to
prosecute said case. Apparently, Fule was the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the
opposed the appearance of Fule as counsel for the offended party as he said that according to
the Rules of Court when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial
Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law
practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.
HELD: No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services. In the case at bar, Fule is not being compensated but rather he’s doing it for free
for his friend who happened to be the offended party. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Further, the fact that the Secretary of
Justice approved Fule’s appearance for his friend should be given credence.
Lim-Santiago v. Atty. Sagucio, A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006

This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law
while working as government prosecutor.
The Facts
Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of
his estate. 1 Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel
of Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. 4
Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber
concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government
sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997. 6
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint
entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240
("criminal complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the
management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their
salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary

investigation. 9 He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651
Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines. 13
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent,

being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of
Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and
deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant claims that
respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat
employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint. 15
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law
while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that
respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February
1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of
April 1996. 18
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while
working as government prosecutor.
Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely
aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her
expectation. 19
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from
Taggat for more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided
loyalty to Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary
preliminary investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of
impartiality when he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a
motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant
voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation. 25
Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression
that respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainant’s
statement during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:
xxx
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn’t think he would do it, Madam Witness?
A. Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he was working with my Dad and he was
supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x
x. 26
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing
Taggat employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty
as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. 27 Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that
respondent’s act was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28
Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases,
threatened and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of
proof because complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or present them for
cross-examination. 29
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of
retainer fees from complainant but claims that it
was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees
were paid for his consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent submits that
consultation is not the same as representation and that rendering consultancy services is not
prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without
the respondent’s asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as
or for retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a specie of ‘conflict of
interest’. Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the above-
mentioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat employees. 32
Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint
was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the
retained counsel or legal consultant. 33
While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file
651 Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor
of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was
dismissed. 35
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-
Abbas ("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. 37 Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas’ resignation, the case was reassigned
to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of
Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004
adopting with modification 39 IBP Commissioner Funa’s Report and Recommendation ("Report")
finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest,
and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government
prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years
suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will
require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of
Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was
being accused as having the "management and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov.
Pros. Office, supra).
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent
undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent,
undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent
undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore,
in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries
pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in that case are very much
familiar with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former
client, the duty to "maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything
which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him" (Natam v.
Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or
any interest except justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has
an immutable duty to a former client with respect to matters that he previously handled for
that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor
relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No.
97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have
been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a
Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related
and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.
xxxx
While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought
in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management
involved are the very personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal
Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat.
Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation and part of its management.
xxxx
As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant
while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while
being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government
prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and
Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v.
Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the
practice of law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the legal profession (In re:
David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the application of
law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v.
Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the
filing of criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a

former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while
being a government prosecutor. 40
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b),
Rule 139-B 41 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful
conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No.
6713 ("RA 6713").
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent
conflicting interests." 44 However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to
represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written
consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-
client relationship exists. 45 Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty. 46
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x
conduct." Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government
employee to "engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his]
official functions." 47
Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting
interests
In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests.
One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his
former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment. 49 In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the
client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any
matter in which he previously represented him. 50
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary
investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the
criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July
1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he
resigned sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented
to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information
acquired through his previous employment. The only established participation respondent had
with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary
investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any
confidential information from his previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving
the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient
basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a
former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with
the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s
interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters
that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus,
respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government

prosecutor
The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –

x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." 51
"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 52
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he
was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without
merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer
agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with
the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while
working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by
Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent
clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of
Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate
violations of RA 6713 – the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees – unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1,
which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while
serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule
1.01.
Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent
stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:
In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely
suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name removed from the
Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds:
xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in
his dealings with the public. 54
On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts. 55
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in
unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one
year. 56 We find this penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty.
Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this
Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
vi. Chairmen and members of constitutional commissions
Art. IX-A, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other
office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active
management or control of any business which in any way be affected by the functions of his
office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
vi. Members of the JBC
Art. IX-A, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other
office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active
management or control of any business which in any way be affected by the functions of his
office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
viii. Retired justices receiving pension
Sec. 1, R.A. 910
Section 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals who has rendered at
least twenty years' service either in the judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, or in
both, (a) retires for having attained the age of seventy years, or (b) resigns by reason of his
incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, he shall receive during the residue of his natural
life, in the manner hereinafter provided, the salary which he was receiving at the time of his
retirement or resignation. And when a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals
has attained the age of fifty-seven years and has rendered at least twenty-years' service in the
Government, ten or more of which have been continuously rendered as such Justice or as judge
of a court of record, he shall be likewise entitled to retire and receive during the residue of his
natural life, in the manner also hereinafter prescribed, the salary which he was then receiving. It
is a condition of the pension provided for herein that no retiring Justice during the time that he is
receiving said pension shall appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal
case wherein and officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office, or collect any fee for his appearance in any administrative proceedings to
maintain an interest adverse to the Government, insular, provincial or municipal, or to any of its
legally constituted officers.
ix. Judges and superior courts officials and employees
Sec. 35, Rule 138
Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.
x. Officials and employees of OSG
Sec. 35, Rule 138
Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.
xi. The Ombudsman and his deputies
Art. XI, Sec. 8(2), 1987 Constitution
SECTION 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines,
and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and
independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any
elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have for ten years
or more been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as
provided for in Section 2 of Article IX-A of this Constitution.
xii. Provincial governors, city and municipal mayors
Sec. 90(a), R.A. No. 7160
Section 90. Practice of Profession. -
(a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local
chief executives.
xiii. Members of the Sanggunian
Sec. 90(b), R.A. No. 7160

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who
are also members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government
unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse
party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office.
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the
local government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the government except when the sanggunian
member concerned is defending the interest of the government.
xiv. Civil service officers whose duties require their entire time devoted for the
government
Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon located at
959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu,
contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in the
building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was
initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District
of Manila4 where the parties reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation

meetings.5 When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a
certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel
for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a
public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over
the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear
complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint
of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task
with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties,
however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the
ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her
request. He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to
prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating
the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.7
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the
conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and
Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed
against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings
including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so
doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section

7(b)(2) of RA 6713:8
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands employee and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the

Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice
of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely.9 This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.10
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former

Government Lawyers
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government
service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service."
In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which
[they] had intervened while in said service."
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained
of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of

Profession of Elective Local Government Officials
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency,
from engaging in the private practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions." This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 716012 governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the
exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who
are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government
unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse
party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the
local government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when

the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work
only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive
monetary compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local
officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local
officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging
in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat
generalibus.13
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the
following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for
provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang
panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of
the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service.
They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official
duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang

panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike
governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular
sessions only at least once a week.14 Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice
their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no
longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or
office for any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial
board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to
practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on
the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.15 Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they
are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not
mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular
sessions only twice a month.16
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his
Department, as required by civil service regulations.
A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure
Prior Authority From The Head Of His Department
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the
disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written
permission of the head of the department concerned.17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers
and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission
to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by
the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or
employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the
discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or
become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of
the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for
Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of
the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and
promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as
the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission,
respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service
rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of
the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and
disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.19
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation
of the lawyer's oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional

misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the
records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall
furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Zeta v. Malinao, A.M. No. P-220, December 20, 1978
Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao court interpreter of the Court of First
Instance of Catbalogan, Samar charging as follows:
l — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. — MR. Malinao has been appearing in the

municipal court of this town for parties like attorney when he is not an attorney.
Reliable information also says he has been appearing in the municipal courts of
Daram, Zumarraga, Talalora and even Sta. Rita. He is not authorized to do so we
believe. He makes it his means of livelihood as he collects fees from his clients. He
competes with attorneys but does not pay anything. We believe that his doing so
should be stopped for a good government. These facts can be checked with records
of those municipal courts.
2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. — Being employed in the Court of First

Instance he would instigate persons, especially in his barrio to grab land rob or
coerce. In fact he has cases in the municipal court in this town involving himself
and his men. He incite them telling them not to be afraid as he is a court employee
and has influence over the judges. Those persons being ignorant would believe him
and so would commit crimes. This act of Mr. Malinao is contrary to good order and
peace as he is using his supposed influences to urge persons to commit crimes.
3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. — Information has it that he is unfaithfully filing his

time record in the CFI. Even he has been out practicing in the municipal courts
sometimes he would fill his time record as present. He receives salary for those
absent days. This can be checked with time record he has submitted and if he has
any application for leave. He may try to cure it by submitting application for leave
but this should not be allowed as he has already committed crime.
4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL SERVICE LAW.-WE have reliable

information it is prohibited for a civil service employee to engage in private practice
any profession or business without permission from the Department Head. Mr.
Malinao we are sure has not secured that permission because he should not be
allowed to practice as he is not an attorney. If that were so, he violated that
Executive Order and Civil Service Law and we are urgently and earnestly requesting
the Commissioner of Civil Service to investigate him on this. If warranted he should
be given the corresponding penalty as dismissal because we believe he deserve it.
(Page 2, Record.)
After respondent filed the following 3rd indorsement relative to the above complaint:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, Manila, thru the
Honorable District Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, and
thru the Honorable Judicial Superintendent, Department of Justice, Manila, the
undersigned's reply to the preceding endorsements, to wit: That the alleged letter-
complaint of one Julio Zeta is not inclosed in the first indorsement, which absence
has also been noticed and noted on the right hand corner of the said first
indorsement by the Clerk of Court, of this Court; that despite this absence, and
without waiving, however, his right to any pertinent provision of law, but for
respect and courtesy to a Superior, he hereby states that he has not violated any
rule or law, much less Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules; that his
participation for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the
services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality, said
assistance has also checked the miscarriage of justice by the Presiding Municipal
Judge, now resigned; that he is attaching herewith a carbon-original of a pleading
submitted by Atty. Simeon Quiachon the attorney of record for the defendants in
Civil Case No. 24, entitled 'Jose Kiskisan versus Fidel Pacate, et al. for Forcible
Entry, in the Municipal Court of Talalora, Samar, which is a 'Motion To Withdraw
Exhibits', as Annex 'A', as part of this reply. (Page 5, Rec.)
the Department of Justice that had jurisdiction over the matter then, referred the said complaint
and answer to District Judge Segundo Zosa, Court of First Instance, Catbalogan, Western
Samar, for investigation, report and recommendation, and after due hearing, Judge Zosa
submitted his report pertinent parts of which read thus:
Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the Court to subpoena the complainant, Julio
Zeta, who is said to be a resident of Zumarraga, Samar the same had failed
because the said Julio Zeta appears to be a fictitious person
Inspite of the failure of the complainant to appear in the investigation in connection

with his complaint against Felicisimo Malinao, the Court nevertheless proceeded to
investigate the case against him by calling Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita,
Samar, Judge Juanito Reyes of Zumarraga, Samar and Judge Miguel Avestruz of
Daram, Samar.
Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, declared that according to his docket
books the respondent appeared as counsel for Vicente Baculanlan in criminal case
No. 1247 in the Municipal Court of Sta. Rita, Samar, for grave threats and in
criminal case No. 1249 for the same accused and Romulo Villagracia for illegal
possession of firearm on August 5, 1960 and on September 17, 1970.
Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar, declared that the respondent appeared as
counsel in civil case No. 39 in the Municipal Court of Daram, Samar, entitled Felix
Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry on December 15, 1962,
January 26, 1963, February 18, 1963 and on March 1, 1963.
Judge Juanito Reyes declared that on March 27, 1969, the respondent appeared as
counsel for the defendant in civil case No. 318 of the Municipal Court of Zumarraga
entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry and again on June
17, 1970 in the same case.
From the certification of the Clerk of this Court, it appears that the respondent had
the following entries in his daily time record:
1. Was on leave from office on August 5, 1960 and September 17, 1960;
2. Was present in office on December l5, 1962;
3. Was present in office on January 26, 1963, and present also on February 18,
1963 but undertime by 1 hour;
4. Was on leave from office on March 1, 1963;
5. Was on leave from office on March 27, 1969; and
6. Was present in office on June 17, 1970 but undertime by 5 hours.
Comparing the dates when the respondent appeared before the aforementioned
Municipal Courts with his daily time records, he made it appear that on December
15, 1962 and February 18, 1963 he was present in his office although according to
the testimony of Judge Miguel Avestruz he was before his Court on December 15,
1962 as well as on February 18, 1963. Again according to Judge Juanito Reyes the
respondent appeared in his Court on June 17, 1970. The respondent again made it
appear in his daily time record that he was present with an undertime of five hours.
The respondent did not offer any plausible explanation for this irregularity.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the crime of falsification of his daily time record as shown by the
evidence, he had made it appear that he was present in his office on December 15,
1962, February 18, 1963 and June 17, 1970 when as a matter of fact he was in the
Municipal Court of Daram attending to a case entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor
Payao, et al., for forcible entry as well as in the Municipal Court of Zumarraga
attending to Civil Case No. 318 entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for
forcible entry. The Inquest Judge respectfully recommends that he be given stern
warning and severe reprimand for this irregularity.
With respect to the fourth charge, for violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, Republic
Act 2260, as amended, again the evidence shows that respondent had been
appearing as counsel in the municipal courts of Sta. Rita, Daram and Zumarraga in
violation of the rules of the Civil Service Law. (Pp. 28-31, Record.)
We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find the conclusions of fact of the Investigator to
be amply supported by the evidence, particularly the documents consisting of public records and
the declarations of the judges before whom respondent had appeared. It is clear to Us that
respondent, apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts without prior
permission of his superiors in violation of civil service rules and regulations, falsified his time
record of service by making it appear therein that he was present in his office on occasions when
in fact he was in the municipal courts appearing as counsel, without being a member of the bar,
which, furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law. We, therefore, adopt the above findings of
fact of the Investigator.
The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for defendants' cause was gratuitous as
they could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in
the locality" cannot, even if true, carry the day for him, considering that in appearing as counsel
in court, he did so without permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record
of service to conceal his absence from his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the number of
times that respondent acted as counsel under the above circumstances would indicate that he
was doing it as a regular practice obviously for considerations other than pure love of justice.
In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by respondent is grave, hence it
warrants a more drastic sanction than that of reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa. We find
no alternative than to separate him from the service, with the admonition that he desist from
appearing in any court or investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are allowed to
practice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as
interpreter in the Court of First Instance, CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to
reemployment in the judicial branch of the government.
b. INSTANCES WHEN LAWYERS ARE PROHIBITED TO APPEAR/REPRESENT
i. Small Claims – See Small Claims Procedure
Section 7. Affidavits - The affidavits submitted under this Rule shall state only facts of direct
personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in evidence.
A violation of this requirement shall subject the party, and the counsel who assisted the party in
the preparation of the affidavits, if any, to appropriate disciplinary action. The inadmissible
affidavit(s) or portion(s) thereof shall be expunged from the record.
Section 17. Appearance of Attorneys Not Allowed. - No attorney shall appear in behalf of or
represent a party at the hearing, unless the attorney is the plaintiff or defendant.
If the court determines that a party cannot properly present his/her claim or defense and needs
assistance, the court may, in its discretion, allow another individual who is not an attorney to
assist that party upon the latter's consent.
ii. Katarungan Pambarangay – Sec. 415, R.A. 7160
Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang pambarangay proceedings,

the parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or representative, except for
minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers.
c. WHEN NON-LAWYERS MAY APPEAR/REPRESENT
i. Law Student Practice Rule
Sec. 1,2,3,4,6,7,11,12 & 13, of A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC (Rule 138-A) – See separate file
ii. Certain admin proceedings
Labor (Art. 222, Labor Code)
Art. 222. Appearances and Fees.
a. Non-lawyers may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only:
1. If they represent themselves; or
2. If they represent their organization or members thereof.
b. No attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any
collective bargaining agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the
contracting union: Provided, However, that attorney’s fees may be charged against union
funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract, agreement or
arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void. (As amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1691, May 1, 1980)
Cadastral (Sec. 9, Act. No. 2259)
Sec. 9. Any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands, whether named in the notice
or not, shall appear before the Court by himself, or by some person in his behalf and shall file an
answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be allowed by the Court.
The answer shall be signed and sworn to by the claimant or by some person in his behalf, and
shall state whether the claimant is married or unmarried, and, if married, the name of the
husband or wife and the date of the marriage, and shall also contain:
iii. MTC cases
Section 34, Rule 138
Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the
purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.

I. Limitations To The Practice of Law A. Prohibitions (Relative and Absolute) I. Clerks of Court

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I. Limitations To The Practice of Law A. Prohibitions (Relative and Absolute) I. Clerks of Court

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PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

I. LIMITATIONS TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW

a. PROHIBITIONS (RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE)

1. Nate v. Judge Contreras, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2406, February 18, 2015

Whether Contreras is administratively liable for the following acts:

2. Authenticating documents as genuine copies of the original labor complaint

3. Appearing as counsel before the IBP on behalf of her father

OUR ACTION AND RULING

The Governing Law: Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713

Atty. Buffe’s Situation

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of professional

ii. Former government attorneys

iii. President, members of cabinet, vice president, deputies and assistants

Art. VII, Section 13, 1987 Constitution

iv. Members of Congress

Sec. 14, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution

In Re David, A.M. No. 98, July 13, 1953

"By (Sgd.) FELIX P. DAVID,

"c/o Atty. Felix P. David,

"Corner Dagupan and Azcarraga St.,

"Filipinas Saw Mill & Construction,

Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility

People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109

ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.

Lim-Santiago v. Atty. Sagucio, A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006

Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary

Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent,

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.

Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a

The Ruling of the Court

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

vi. Chairmen and members of constitutional commissions

Art. IX-A, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution

vi. Members of the JBC

Art. IX-A, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution

viii. Retired justices receiving pension

Sec. 1, R.A. 910

ix. Judges and superior courts officials and employees

Sec. 35, Rule 138

x. Officials and employees of OSG

Sec. 35, Rule 138

xi. The Ombudsman and his deputies

Art. XI, Sec. 8(2), 1987 Constitution

xii. Provincial governors, city and municipal mayors

Sec. 90(a), R.A. No. 7160

Section 90. Practice of Profession. -

xiii. Members of the Sanggunian

Sec. 90(b), R.A. No. 7160

Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former

Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of