G.R. No.

203335 February 11, 2014

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO
SONIDO, JR., Petitioners,

vs.

THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.

ABAD, J.;

FACTS:

The intention of the cybercrime law is to supervise online activities, yet those filing petitions contend
that the techniques it employs to manage undesired digital actions violate their constitutionally
protected rights. This series of petitions aims to contest the legality of several sections within Republic
Act (R.A.) 10175, known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. The contested sections are the
following:

a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;

c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;

d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;

e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;

f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;

g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;

h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;

i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;

j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;

k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;

l. Section 8 on Penalties;

m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;

n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;

o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;

p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;

q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;

r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;

s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;

t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and

u. Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions.

These actions categorized as cybercrimes, the corresponding penalties, governmental authority for
tracing and punishing offenders, and associated matters including assistance, penalties, data collection,
and hindering justice. Furthermore, specific petitioners question the constitutionality of particular
articles within the Revised Penal Code that pertain to libel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not specific clauses within the Cybercrime Prevention Act are in accordance with the
Constitution concerning the classification of particular actions as offenses, the establishment of
penalties for their commission, and the empowerment of the government to identify and punish those
who violate them.

RULING:

The Court finds that various sections of the Cybercrime Prevention Act are constitutionally valid,
including those addressing illegal access, data interference, cyber-squatting, computer-related identity
theft, cybersex, child pornography, and cyber-libel penalties. However, Section 5, penalizing aiding or
abetting cyber-libel, unsolicited communications, and child pornography, is deemed unconstitutional
due to vagueness and potential chilling effect on free speech. Section 6, imposing heavier penalties for
cybercrimes, is upheld. Section 7, allowing dual prosecution under the law and Revised Penal Code, is
unconstitutional for cyber-libel and child pornography. Section 8 on penalties is valid. Section 12,
allowing real-time traffic data collection, is overly broad and lacks restraint, violating privacy. Sections 13
and 17, on data preservation and destruction, do not unduly deprive property rights. Section 14,
disclosure of computer data, doesn't violate privacy. Section 15, on search and seizure, supplements
existing rules. Section 19, restricting data access, is unconstitutional for violating privacy and freedom of
expression. Section 20, punishing non-compliance, is constitutional. Sections 24 and 26, creating CICC,
are valid, with no undue delegation of power.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 157643 March 28, 2008

CRISTINELLI S. FERMIN, Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Cristy Fermin and Bogs Tugas of Gossip Tabloid published a libelous article accusing Annabelle Rama of
evading her conviction in an estafa case and misusing funds. Fermin was found guilty by the RTC, while
Tugas was acquitted due to non-participation. The CA affirmed Fermin's conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the publisher and the Editor-in-chief can be held responsible for libel based on the
defamatory article authored by Fermin.

RULING:

Yes. In the case of U.S. v. Taylor, it is established that publishers, editors, or proprietors of publications
can be held responsible for the words contained within them. Similarly, in People v. Topacio and
Santiago, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code was interpreted to encompass not only authors but also
those who print or publish the libelous matter. Therefore, proof of knowledge or participation in the
publication is not required if the accused is identified as an "author, editor, or proprietor" or
"printer/publisher" of the publication, as is the case with the petitioner and Tugas. Despite petitioner's
claims of lack of knowledge or participation, her control over the publication and her admission of roles
within the tabloid demonstrate her responsibility. As established in previous rulings, her guilt remains
even if she lacked direct knowledge. The conviction of Fermin for libel is upheld. However, the acquittal
of Tugas by the Court of Appeals cannot be overturned without violating his constitutional protection
against double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals decision is affirmed with modifications.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010

WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR.,
Petitioners,

vs.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ, Respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners were charged with libel for publishing a defamatory article against Malayan Insurance Co.
and the Yuchengco family on a website. They argued that the jurisdiction was improper and that
internet libel isn't covered by the relevant penal code articles. The Makati City Prosecutor found
probable cause, and the RTC was involved. The case hinges on issues of jurisdiction and whether
internet libel is applicable under Article 353 of the RPC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners’ Motion to Quash due to lack of jurisdiction is valid.

RULING:

Yes, venue is crucial in criminal cases, with the location of the crime determining jurisdiction. In libel
cases involving private individuals, venue is limited to where the complainant resides or where the
defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended Information inaccurately considered
the phrase "first published and accessed" as fulfilling the requirement for jurisdiction in Makati City. This
interpretation would allow libel suits to be filed in multiple locations, contradicting the purpose of
Republic Act No. 4363. This law specifies venue rules to prevent inconvenience to the accused by
allowing suits in distant municipal courts. Ultimately, the denial of the petitioner's motion to quash the
Amended Information constitutes grave abuse of discretion by the public respondent.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 197582 June 29, 2015

JULIE S. SUMBILLA, Petitioner,

vs.

MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:

The petitioner issued six bounced checks in payment of her loan, each valued at P6,667. She was found
guilty by the MTC and fined 80,000 based on the total value of the checks. Her motion for
reconsideration was dismissed as prohibited under summary procedure rules, and her notice of appeal
was rejected for being late. The judgment became final. The petitioner seeks relaxation of procedural
rules in the SC to modify the penalty. Respondent argues that the right to appeal is bound by rules and
cannot be revived through a certiorari petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not The penalty handed down by the MTC, which has now reached a point of being both
conclusive and enforceable, could potentially be altered.

RULING:

YES, The imposed penalty in this case is erroneous due to its inconsistency with Section 1 of BP 22,
which mandates that the maximum penalty for violating the law should not exceed double the amount
of the bounced check. Additionally, the computation of the penalty should be based on the face value of
each individual check that bounced, rather than the cumulative value of the bounced checks. This error
results in an excessive and unlawful penalty according to both legal provisions and established legal
precedents. Although the principle of unalterable judgments once they have become final is generally
upheld, the court possesses the authority to suspend its own rules and make exceptions when justice
demands it. This is in line with Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, which prioritizes substantial justice
over strict adherence to procedural rules. The court has historically reversed final judgments when
substantial justice and special reasons necessitate such action. In this case, the penalty imposed
significantly exceeds the limits outlined in Section 1 of BP 22. Therefore, to uphold substantial justice,
the imposed fine on the petitioner is rectified to align with the maximum limits set forth in Section 1 of
BP 22. As a result, the fine of P80,000.00 per count of BP 22 violation is revised to double the face value
of each individual rubber check, amounting to P13,334.00.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 215118, June 19, 2019

MARIA NYMPHA MANDAGAN, PETITIONER

Vs.

JOSE M. VALERO CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

CAGUIOA, J.:

FACTS:

Maria Nympha Mandagan was convicted of violating BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) by both the RTC and
CA. JMV Corporation entered a lease-to-own agreement with BPI Leasing Corporation for a Kia Rio
sedan, with Mandagan as the lessee. Mandagan issued 34 postdated checks to JMV for her monthly
payments, with ownership of the vehicle contingent upon full payment. Fourteen checks were honored,
but 11 were dishonored due to insufficient funds or closed account. Mandagan was informed of the
dishonored checks but failed to settle her obligations. JMV's demands for payment or return of the
vehicle were unheeded. The City Prosecutor's Office filed 8 counts of BP 22 violation against Mandagan,
with 3 charges dismissed due to insufficient evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals made a reversible mistake

RULING:

Certainly. In criminal cases, no principle is more established than the fact that a verdict of acquittal is
immediately final and cannot be appealed. This principle is rooted in the accused person's
constitutionally protected right against being tried again for the same offense, known as double
jeopardy. Therefore, once a judgment is pronounced in such cases, it cannot be amended or corrected,
regardless of claims of error or inaccuracies. The petitioner's argument lacks any assertion or evidence
that the prosecution's due process rights were violated or that the proceedings in the Court of Appeals
were biased to ensure Ando's acquittal. Thus, even if the Court of Appeals may have made mistakes in
interpreting the applicable law or evaluating evidence, unless it is shown that the Court of Appeals acted
arbitrarily or disregarded due process, its findings cannot be overturned without violating the rule
against double jeopardy.

To secure a conviction for a violation of B.P. 22, it is essential that the maker or drawer of the check
receives a notice of dishonor. This notice can be sent by the offended party or the bank where the check
is drawn. This notice must be provided in writing; an oral notice is insufficient. Failure to provide a
written notice is fatal to the prosecution's case. Admissions made by the accused in the same case's
pleadings do not necessitate additional proof, particularly when such an admission is explicit and
unambiguous. However, it is important to note that the accused submitted the counter affidavit after
the private complainant had already filed the complaint for the violation of B.P. 22 against her. It is
unclear if the accused was aware of the demand letter before the complaint was filed. She likely became
aware of the demand letter when she received the complaint-affidavit and its attachments from the
private complainant. To hold the accused liable for a violation of B.P. 22, the notice of dishonor or
demand letter must be served on the accused before the complaint is filed. The purpose of the notice of
dishonor is to give the accused an opportunity to pay the amount of the bounced checks to avoid
criminal prosecution. If such an admission is made after the complaint is filed, any admission by the
accused in the pleadings without specifying when she received the demand letter would not be
prejudicial. For an admission to be admissible against the accused, it must be clear and definite.
Similarly, reminders or verbal demands are insufficient to bind the accused. The notice of dishonor or
demand must be in written form as mandated by Sec. 3 of B.P. 22. Therefore, given the circumstances,
the accused cannot be convicted of violating B.P. 22 due to the prosecution's failure to prove all the
elements of the crime. The evidence presented is inadequate to establish her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, especially since there is no evidence other than alleged admissions made during the preliminary
conference and in her counter affidavit to prove that she received the lawyer's demand letter.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 203583 October 13, 2014

LEONORA B. RIMANDO, Petitioner,

vs.

SPOUSES WINSTON and ELENITA ALDABA and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

An Information was filed before the RTC charging Rimando with estafa for convincing Spouses Aldaba to
invest in her business, leading them to give her a check of P500,000. Rimando provided postdated
checks and an investment contract, but the checks bounced upon maturity. Rimando was acquitted of
BP 22 cases due to reasonable doubt. The RTC acquitted her of estafa due to the absence of deceit but
found her civilly liable for being an accommodation party. Rimando appealed, arguing her acquittal in
the BP 22 cases should absolve her from civil liability in the estafa case. The CA affirmed the RTC, stating
that BP 22 and estafa cases are distinct, so her acquittal in one doesn't automatically absolve her from
civil liability in the other.

ISSUE:

Whether or not The Court of Appeals accurately maintained Rimando's civil responsibility in the estafa
case even though she was acquitted and cleared of civil liability in the BP 22 cases.

RULING:

Rimando's acquittal in the estafa case does not absolve her from civil liability to Spouses Aldaba. The
distinction between criminal and civil liability is established when acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt, and the civil liability is not rooted in the crime charged. Rimando's civil liability arises from her
role as an accommodation party for a check issued to Spouses Aldaba, separate from the estafa charge.
The Court of Appeals correctly upheld her civil liability despite her estafa acquittal. The BP 22 cases'
outcome does not affect the estafa case, as they are separate causes of action. The petition is denied,
and the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 101127-31 November 18, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

CRESENCIA C. REYES, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Timoteo A. David for Oriental Assurance Corporation.

Rosendo C. Ramos for accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:

Lorie Garcia supplied rice to Cresencia Reyes as a favor to Manny Cabrera, who had no stock. Reyes
issued six checks for six separate rice deliveries. Only three of the checks were honored, and the rest
bounced due to insufficient funds. Garcia informed Reyes of the dishonored checks, and Reyes promised
to settle the amount. However, despite demands, Reyes did not fulfill her promise. As a result, three
cases for violation of BP 22 and two cases for estafa were filed against Reyes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a single instance of issuing a check lead to potential criminal charges for both violating
BP 22 and committing Estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING:

A single unlawful act has the potential to result in multiple offenses, especially when there are
differences in the elements of the offenses defined by distinct laws. The central element of the offense
addressed by BP 22 is the act of issuing a check that proves to be without value or is dishonored when
presented for payment, a behavior considered harmful to the public interest. BP 22 applies even if the
dishonored checks were issued as deposits or guarantees rather than actual payments, as the law
doesn't distinguish between these forms. Conversely, the checks in question were not meant as
payment for an existing debt but as compensation for individual rice deliveries. They were used to
induce the deceived party to surrender her property. Although Reyes honored three of the checks and
assured Garcia about the others, her failure to fulfill the remaining checks raises the presumption of
deceit.