1 anyone who saw the writing executed; (b) By evidence of
Whether a notice of lis pendens amounts to a
Spouses Dailon Vs. CA
GR 78903
NOT IN PUBLIC DOCUMENT
FACTS: This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision
of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the sale of a
parcel of land by petitioner Segundo Dalion in favor of private
respondent Ruperto Sabesaje,Jr. The facts of the case are: On
May 28, 1973, Sabesaje sued to recover ownership of a parcel
of land, based on a private document of absolute sale, dated
July 1, 1965, allegedly executed by Dalion, who, however
denied the fact of sale, contending that the document sued
upon is fictitious, his signature thereon, a forgery, and that
subject land is conjugal property, which he and his wife
acquired in 1960 from Saturnina Sabesaje as evidenced by the
"Escritura de Venta Absoluta". The spouses denied claims of
Sabesaje that after executing a deed of sale over the parcel of
land, they had pleaded with Sabesaje, their relative, to be
allowed to administer the land because Dalion did not have
any means of livelihood. They admitted, however,
administering since 1958, (5) parcels of land in Sogod,
Southern Leyte, which belonged to Leonardo Sabesaje,
grandfather of Sabesaje, who died in 1956. They never
received their agreed 10% and 15% commission on the sales
of copra and abaca, respectively. Sabesaje's suit, they
countered, was intended merely to harass, preempt and
forestall Dalion's threat to sue for these unpaid commissions.
Dalion impugns the validity of the sale on the ground that the
same is embodied in a private document, and did not thus
convey title or right to the lot in question since "acts and
contracts which have for their object the creation,
transmission, modification or extinction of real rights over
immovable property must appear in a public instrument" (Art.
1358, par 1, NCC).
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the contract of sale is valid  2.
Whether there is a necessity to execute a public document for
the transfer of ownership thereto.  for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens (a) it was improper
RULING: 1. Yes, Sale is valid. The appellate court upheld
the validity of the sale on the basis of Secs. 21 and 23 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. SEC. 21. Private
writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved.-Before
any private writing may be received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:(a) By
ISSUE:  
the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or(c) By
a subscribing witness. Here, people who witnessed the
execution of subject deed positively testified on the authenticity
thereof. They categorically stated that it had been executed
and signed by the signatories thereto. Defendant has
affirmatively alleged forgery, but he never presented any
witness or evidence to prove his claim of forgery. Each party
must prove his own affirmative allegations
2. NO. Public document not necessary. The
provision of Art. 1358 on the necessity of a public
document is only for convenience, not for validity or
enforceability. It is not a requirement for the validity of a
contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied
in a public instrument. A contract of sale is a consensual
contract, which means that the sale is perfected by mere
consent. No particular form is required for its validity. 
2 title of the adverse party, or, (2) when the annotation is not
Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 115402
Martinez, J.
ATTACK COLLATERALLY NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS
FACTS: After his mother's death, petitioner filed a complaint
against his father, private respondent, to partition the conjugal
properties of his parents.
In answer, respondent alleged that four parcels of land
registered in petitioner's name are conjugal properties. They
were only registered in petitioner's name because at the time,
he was the only Filipino citizen in the family. Accordingly,
respondent prayed for dismissal of the partition case and to
reconvey said parcel of lands to him.
In the meantime, respondent caused the annotation of
a notice of lis pendens on the land during pendency of case.
Petitioner moved to cancel the notice of lis pendens but trial
court dismissed his motion. Resorting to this Court, petitioner
primarily contends that in the resolution of an incidental motion
to thresh out the issue of ownership of the disputed lots since
ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case,
otherwise, (b) it would amount to a collateral attack of his title
obtained more than 28 years ago.
collateral attack of his title obtained more than 28 years ago
RULING: No, The annotation of lis pendens does not in any
case amount nor can it ever be considered as equivalent to a
collateral attack of the certificate of title for a parcel of land.
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate
of title and not the title. The certificate referred to is that
document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to
ownership which is represented by that document.
Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is
only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land.
Registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the
best evidence thereof.
1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the
necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to
be recorded.
3
Republic v. CA
G.R. No. L-46627-27, December 27, 1979
Aquino, J.
DOCTRINE OF LAW: R.A. No. 26 provides for a special
procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of
title that are missing and not fictitious titles or titles which
are existing. It is a patent absurdity to reconstitute
existing certificates of title that are on file and available in
the registry of deeds.
FACTS: This is a petition for review to annul the decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA). Respondents Laborada and
Bombast each filed separate petitions for reconstitution
alleging that they were the owners of the lots and titles
covering it. But these lots were registered under valid and
existing Torrens title in the name of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. In the absence of any opposition from the state
prosecutor and government lawyers, the lower court granted
the reconstitution for both cases. The State petitioned for the
cancellation and annulment of the reconstituted titles and this
was assigned to Judge Salvador, the same judge who had
ordered the reconstitution of the titles and to whom the two
1
cases for cancellation were assigned. He held that the titles,
whose reconstitution he had ordered allegedly in conformity
with law, could not be attacked collaterally and, therefore, "the
reconstituted titles and their derivatives have the same validity,
force and effect as the originals before the reconstitution." The
State appealed and the CA affirmed Judge Salvador’s
judgment holding that when the petitions for annulment and
cancellation of the reconstituted titles were filed, and that if
there were irregularities in the reconstitution, then, as between
two innocent parties, the State, as the party that made
possible the reconstitution, should suffer the loss.
ISSUES: W/N the reconstituted titles are valid given that the
original titles were still existing
RULING: NO, petition granted. The reconstitution
proceedings were simply devices employed by petitioners
for landgrabbing or for usurpation and illegal
appropriation. The existence of the two titles of the
Government ipso facto nullified the reconstitution
proceedings and signified that the evidence in the said
proceedings as to the alleged ownership of Laborada and
Bombast cannot be given any credence. The two
proceedings were sham and deceitful and were filed in
bad faith. Such humbuggery or imposture cannot be
countenanced and cannot be the source of legitimate
rights and benefits. The reconstitution proceedings are
void because they are contrary to Republic Act No. 26 and
beyond the purview of that law since the titles
reconstituted are actually subsisting in the registry of
deeds and do not require reconstitution at all
Case No. 4
Felisa Roxas  v Enriquez GR No, L-8539
Johnson, J.:
NO PERSONAL NOTICE
Doctrine of Law:
At the start of publication, posting of summons, and providing
notice to the interest parties; the court would have full and
complete jurisdiction towards the plaintiff, subject property and
interested parties upon the interest or lien of said property who
would then receive possession and control of the property. The
party who had deemed to gain possession and control of the Legarda vs. Saleeby
property will have full and complete jurisdiction as provided by GR No. L- 8936
law.  Johnson, J.
Facts: Maria Del Consuela Felisa Roxas had petitioned with STONE WALL STANDS
the Court of Land Registration for four parcels of land;
indicated as Parcel A, Parcel B, Parcel C, and Parcel D to be DOCTRINE OF THE LAW: The law guarantees the title of the
registered under the Torrens system in Binondo, Manila. The registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.
petition had also included the names of the adjoined owners
which included the heirs of Antonio Enriquez and Felisa FACTS: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of
Roxas. The examiner of the titles had reported and Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land
recommended that the registration was allowed. The clerk had where it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the
even mailed the copy of the said order to the adjoined owners. name of petitioner Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree
The sheriff had also post the notice and published it in the of registration is released in favor of Legarda, respondent
Manila Times and La Democracia.  Proceeding, Atty Modesto Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under the Torrens
Reyes, in behalf of the city, had pointed out an “error of system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter
closure” on Parcel A to the court. These errors were on the included the stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.
measurement of some of the sides of the plan. Unfortunately,
ISSUE: Whether Legarda should be the owner of a land and
the errors were not fixed. 
its improvement which has been registered under the name of
Upon filing this petition, the heirs of Antonio Enriquez had two persons.
failed to appear at the hearing which resulted to court ordering
RULING: YES. For the issue involved, The Land Registration
absolute property to Roxas. Roxas had eventually sold Parcel Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be construed
A to Masonic Temple Association of Manila. Roxas had
that where two certificates purport to include the same
then requested the court to register the lands to the latter. The registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold
heirs of Antonio Enriquez had assailed the registration on the
title and will prevail. The real purpose of the Torrens system
ground that they had received no notice of the original of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever
action to confirm the title.
to any question of the legality of the title, except claims
which were noted at the time of registration, in the
Issue: W/N the court erred in judgment for failure to provide
certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That
notice to each adjoined owner.
being the purpose of the law, once a title is registered the
Ruling: No, a personal notice was not a prerequisite for owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the court to render the property in favour of Roxas. As the portals of the court, or sitting in the “mirador de su
supported by Section 32, Act No. 496, the petitioner in casa,” to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
registration cases is not by law required to give any notice
to any person. It is done by the clerk. In order to show that
the absence of receiving notice is tantamount to unjust taking
of property, he must show that within a period of one year after
the decree of registration and grant of certificate that the he
was deprived land or real estate by fraud as mentioned in
Section 38, Act No, 496. Through record, the petitioner had
shown no signs of committing fraud for she had named all the
interested parties for the registration of the land in the original
action. 
5
2

6.
TIBURCIO V. PHHC G.R NO. L-13479
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
43 years possession
UP AND PEOPLES
DOCTRINE OF LAW: "A person dealing with registered land is
not required to go behind the register to determine the
condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the
burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the
register or the certificate of title. To require him to do more is
to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens system"
FACTS: This is an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land
located in Quezon City containing an area of about 430
hectares.
On October 11, 1957, plaintiffs filed an action before the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City alleging that for many
years prior to March 25, 1877 and up to the present they
and their ancestors have been in actual, adverse, open,
public, exclusive and continuous possession as owners of
the land in litigation; that they have been cultivating the
land and enjoying its fruits exclusively; that from time
immemorial up to the year 1955, they have been paying the
land taxes thereon; that in 1955 defendant People's
Homesite & Housing Corporation began asserting title
thereto claiming that its Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356
embraces practically all of plaintiffs' property, while the other
defendant University of the Philippines began also
asserting title thereto claiming that its Transfer of Certificate of
Title No. 9462 covers the remaining portion; that
defendants are not innocent purchasers for value, having had
full notice of plaintiffs' actual possession and claim of
ownership thereof; and that the inclusion of plaintiffs' property
within the technical boundaries set out in defendants' titles was
a clear mistake and that at no time had defendants'
predecessors-in-interest exercised dominical rights over
plaintiffs' property.
ISSUE: WON the plantiff can claim the title of the land
registered under Torrens system.
RULING: NO. they allowed a period of 43 years before they
woke up to invoke what they now claim to be erroneous
when the court decreed in 1914 the registration of the land
in the name of defendants' predecessor-in-interest.
Evidently, this cannot be done for under our law and
jurisprudence, a decree of registration can only be set aside
within one year after entry on the ground of fraud
provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired
the property.
Our law is clear that upon the expiration of the one-year period
within which to review the decree of registration, the decree as
well as the title issued in pursuance thereof becomes
incontrovertible. The purpose of the law in limiting to one year
the period within which the decree may be reviewed is to put a
limit to the time within which a claimant may ask for its
revocation. If after title to property is decreed an action
may be instituted beyond the one-year period to set aside
the decree, the object of the Torrens system which is to
guarantee the indefeasibility of the Title would be
defeated.
"A person dealing with registered land is not required to go
behind the register to determine the condition of the property.
He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property
which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of
title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary
objects of the Torrens System."
7 her children and counsel against TRB and the subsequent
G.R. No. 114299-TRADERS ROYAL BANK v. CA and
CAPAY et al.
G.R. No. 118862 – PATRIA et al v. SPS. SANTOS, et al
(SOLD TO MANY OWNERS
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS NOT ON TRB TITLE)
DOCTRINE OF THE LAW:  Between two innocent persons,
the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should
be the one to bear the resulting loss.
FACTS: These are consolidated cases of GR No. 114299 GR
No. 118862. In the first case, Spouses Capay executed a
mortgage which is a parcel of land pursuant to the loan
extended to them by the TRB. The loan became due and
having remained unpaid, TRB instituted an extra-judicial
foreclosure proceeding. To prevent foreclosure, Spouses
Capay filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
before the CFI, alleging that the mortgage was void since they
did not receive the proceeds of the loan. Petition was
granted. The Capays caused to be filed in the Register of
Deeds a notice of lis pendens over the disputed property.
Subsequently, the injunction issued by the trial court was lifted,
and the property was sold to TRB, title of Capay was
cancelled. The notice of lis pendens was not carried over in
the certificate of title of TRB. Capays filed with the CFI a
supplemental complaint for recovery of the property. CFI
declared the mortgage void for want of consideration. The
CFI cancelled the title of TRB and issue new title to Capay
spouses. TRB appealed to the CA. While the case was
pending, TRB sold the land to Santiago who was given a
new certificate of title but no notice of lis pendens.
Santiago in turn divided the land into 6 lots and sold these to
three other person who became co-owners thereof. Co-
owners developed the property and thereafter sold the 6 lots
to separate buyers with separate titles, again, bearing no
notice of lis pendens. The trial court issued a writ of
execution directing the Register of Deeds to cancel the title of
TRB, and to issue a new one in the name of Capay spouses. 
In the second case, because the writ could not be
implemented due to the successive subsequent transfers of
the subdivided property to buyers who obtained separate titles
thereto. Thus, a complaint for recovery of possession
ownership was filed before the RTC by petitioner Capay,
transferees of the property, the non-bank respondents in
GR118862 who bought the land. This petition is granted by
RTC. TRB and the non-bank respondents appealed to the CA.
In a Decision promulgated, the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court in toto. Meanwhile, the non-bank
respondents moved for a reconsideration of the CA' decision.
CA granted the motion for reconsideration. The certificate of
titles originally issued to them in their individual names is
restored and duly respected. The Capays thus filed with this
Court a petition for review to set aside the resolution of CA.
ISSUE: WON Capay has a better right than those non-bank
respondent buyers.
3
RULING: No. First, when TRB purchased the property at
the foreclosure sale, the notice of lis pendens that the
Capays caused to be annotated on their certificate of title
was not carried to the new one issued to TRB. Neither did
the certificate of title of Santiago, who purchased the
property from TRB, contain any such notice. When
Santiago caused the property to be divided, 6 new
certificates of title were issued, none of which contained
any notice of lis pendens, therefore, non-bank respondent
could not have been aware that the property in question
was the subject of litigation when they acquired their
respective portions of said property. Second, the foregoing
rule notwithstanding, the non-bank respondents nevertheless
physically inspected the properties and inquired from the
register of Deeds to ascertain the absence of any defect in
the title of the property they were purchasing — an
exercise of diligence above that required by law. Third,
between two innocent persons, the one who made it
possible for the wrong to be done should be the one to
bear the resulting loss. The Capays filed the notice of lis
pendens  but the same was not TRB's title. The Capays
and their counsel knew of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of
the property to TRB and the consolidation of title in the bank's
name following the lapse of the one-year period of redemption.
But, they did not bother to find out the status of their title or
whether the liens noted on the original certificate of title were
still existing considering that the property had already been
foreclosed. In the meantime, the subject property had
undergone a series of transfers to buyers in good and for
value. It was not until after the land was subdivided and
developed with the buyers building their houses on the other
lots when the Capays suddenly appeared and questioned the
occupants' titles. At the very least, the Capays are guilty of
laches.
The court Affirmed the decision of CA. In addition, because
the mortgage in favor of TRB had been declared null and void
for want of consideration, TRB is ordered to pay the Capays
the fair market value of the property at the time it was sold to
Santiago.
8.
G.R. No. 165427. March 21, 2011
Lacbayan v. Samoy
(illicit relationship)
Facts:
During Betty Lacbayan and Bayani Samoy’s illicit relationship,
they, together with three
more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower
services company, by which they acquired 5 parcels of
land, registered in their names, ostensibly as husband and
wife. Having parted ways eventually, both of them agreed to
divide the said properties and terminate their business
partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. Initially,
Samoy agreed to Lacbayan's proposal that the properties in
Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter,
while the ownership over the three other properties will go to
Samoy. However, when Lacbayan wanted additional
demands, Samoy refused.Thus, Lacbayan filed a complaint for
judicial partition of the said properties before the Quezon City
RTC. In his Answer, however, Samoy denied Lacbayan's claim
of cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out
of his own personal funds without any contribution from her.
Issue:
Does an action for partition preclude a settlement on the issue
of ownership?
Collateral attacked.
Ruling:
No. While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for
partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-
existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner
insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate
properties based on the TCTs covering the subject properties.
Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until
and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the
disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will not
even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even
have any rightful interest over the subject properties.
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition
Agreement indicates that the
document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement
of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to
whether the parties have the right to freely divide among
themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow
petitioner's argument would be to allow respondent not only to
admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as
well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the
said properties.
Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his
lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Petitioner
herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition
Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to
include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to
insist on the contents of an agreement she intentionally
refused to sign.
9
Lu v. Manipon
G.R. No. 147072. May 7, 2002
Panganiban, J.
DOCTRINE OF LAW: The registration of a sale of real
estate will not protect a buyer in bad faith, for the law
cannot be used as a shield for fraud. On the other hand,
the preferential right of a first registrant in a double sale is
always qualified by good faith.
FACTS: On May 9, 1981, Juan Peralta executed a [D]eed of
[S]ale by installment in favor of spouses Orlando and Rosita
Manipon. Therein, Juan Peralta agreed to sell by installment to
the said spouses 350 square meters of the 2,078 square-meter
lot he owned, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
137911 and located at Barrio Dilan, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
The said [D]eed was not registered with the Registry of
Deeds.
On June 10, 1981, Juan Peralta mortgaged the aforesaid lot
to Thrift Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (TSLAI). He
however failed to pay the loan he obtained for which the
mortgage was constituted and so the same was judicially
foreclosed and sold to TSLAI. The latter in turn sold the same
on July 15, 1988 in the amount of P80,000.00 to the
[petitioner]. Thereafter, on August 30, 1989, [petitioner] caused
the subdivision of the said lot into five (5) lots, one of which is
Lot 5582-B-7-D, which was earlier sold by installment to
[respondents]. The said lot is now covered by TCT No.
171497.
On January 22, 1990, petitioner through counsel wrote the
[respondents] regarding the presence of the latter's house,
4
which was also being occupied by them, on the lot in question.
Hence, on February 26, 1990, [petitioner] filed the present
action alleging therein that he is the owner of the lot in
question including that which was being occupied by
respondents. Petitioner further claims that his ownership was
confirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, Branch 49, in Civil Case No. U-4399.
In the Answer filed by [respondents], they claim that [petitioner]
is a buyer in bad faith because even before he bought the
2,078 square-meter lot, he knew for a fact that they already
bought Lot 5582-B-7-D from the original owner of the said
lot and have been residing therein since 1981.
[Respondents] also asserted that [petitioner] had knowledge of
their claim over the said property because when the whole lot
was foreclosed they shared the same problem as
[petitioner] also bought a lot with the 2,078 square-meter
lot of Juan Peralta. The trial court ruled that petitioner was not
a buyer in good faith despite the fact that he was able to
register his ownership of the disputed lot. The CA affirmed the
Decision of the trial court. The appellate court said that
petitioner knew that Lot 5582-B-7-D had already been sold by
Juan Peralta to respondents before the mother lot was
mortgaged, foreclosed and eventually purchased. He bought
the entire property from the foreclosing bank, because he
feared that he might lose what he had earlier bought in 1981 --
a 350 square meter lot which also formed part of the mother
lot.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner was in bad faith in the acquisition of the
lot in question.
RULING: Yes. In estoppel, a person who by deed or conduct
induces another to act in a particular manner is barred from
adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct
that thereby causes loss or injury to another. This equitable
principle will not apply to respondents, because they exercised
dominion over the property by occupying and building their
house on it. On the other hand, it was petitioner who,
despite having knowledge of the existence of
respondents' house on the disputed portion, bought the
whole lot. Before acquiring the mother lot from the bank,
he knew of respondents' claim of ownership and
occupation. He cannot now pretend to be an innocent
buyer in good faith.
Registration is not the equivalent of title. Under the
Torrens system, registration only gives validity to the
transfer or creates a Lien upon the land. It was not
established as a means of acquiring title to private land
because it merely confirms, but does not confer,
ownership.
10
Capitol Subdivision vs Province of Negros Oriental
G.R. No. L-16257
Concepcion, J.
DOCTRINE OF LAW: The main purpose of the Torrens
System is to avoid possible conflicts of title in and to real
estate, and to facilitate transactions relative thereto giving
the public the right to rely upon the face of Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the of inquiring
further, except when the party concerned has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry.   Hacienda to Benares and Petitioner-Corporation, it was
FACTS: Petitioner Capitol Subdivision, Inc., seeks to recover
from defendant, the Province of Negros Occidental, a 22,000
sqrmtr lot (Lot 378) in Bacolod with compensation for the use
and occupation therewith. The Lot was part of a Hacienda.
Benares (then owner) secured a loan which was
mortgaged to milling co and to and later foreclosed by
PNB which became the owner at the foreclosure sale.
Later PNB sold the hacienda to Petitioner-Subdivision
which contained a “caveat emptor” stipulation. Upon
execution of the deed of absolute sale, the Petitioner took
steps to take possession the Hacienda, it was discovered
that in the Lot stood the Provincial Hospital of Negros
Occidental. 
Petitioner made representations with the proper officials to
clarify the status of said occupation and, not being satisfied
with the explanations given by said officials, it brought the
present action. Defendant maintained that it had acquired
the Lot through an earlier expropriation proceedings. CFI
ruled in favor of Petitioner, but set aside by SC. It was
remanded to the CFI for further trial which rendered a decision
dismissing petitioner’s complaint and ordered to execute a
deed conveying the lot to respondent-province. 
ISSUE: W/N defendant-province acquired the lot in the
expropriation proceeding
RULING: NO. Petition granted. Decision is reversed. Lot 378
was not part of the expropriation. Defendant-Province was not
able to sufficiently prove that they have acquired the legal title
over the Lot. Several circumstances indicate that the
expropriation had not been consummated. First, there, the
entries in the docket pertaining to the expropriation case
refer only to its filing and the publication in the newspaper
of the notices. Second, there was an absence of a deed of
assignment and of a TCT in favour of the Province as
regards to the Lot. Third, the property was mortgaged to
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Lot 378 could not have been
expropriated without the intervention of the Milling Co.
And yet, the latter was not made a party in the expropriation
proceedings. And fourth, a second mortgage was
constituted in favour of the Back, which would not have
accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not belonged to the
mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been expropriated
without the Bank’s knowledge and participation. Furthermore,
in the deed executed by the Bank promising to sell the
explicitly stated that some particular lots had been
expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary implication, that
Lot 378 had not been expropriated. Petitioner is entitled to
recover from the defendant the fair and full equivalent to Lot
378, as of the time when possession thereof was actually
taken by the defendant, plus consequential damages
 
Cheng v. Genato and Spouses Da Jose
G.R. No. 129760 [December 29, 1998]
Martinez, J.
 
DOCTRINE: “Registration” means any entry made in the
books of the registry, including both registration in its
ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation,
and even marginal notes. In its strict acceptation, it is the
5
entry made in the registry which records solemnly and
permanently the right of ownership and other real rights.
FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul
and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Genato is the owner of two parcels of land.
Genato entered into an agreement with respondent-
spouses Da Jose spouses over the two parcels of land. The
agreement culminated in the execution of a contract to sell.
The contract was in a public instrument and was duly
annotated at the back of the two certificates of title on the
same day. The contract states that the spouses shall pay the
down payment and 30 days after verifying the authenticity
of the documents, they shall pay the remaining purchase
price. The Da Jose spouses, not having finished verifying the
titles, asked an extension of another 30 days which was
granted. Pending the effectivity of the aforesaid extension
period, and without due notice to the Da Jose spouses,
Genato executed an Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell, for
the vendee has committed a breach of contract.
Petitioner Cheng expressed interest in buying the subject
properties. Genato showed to Ricardo Cheng copies of his
transfer certificates of title and the annotations at the back
thereof of his contract to sell with the Da Jose spouses.
Genato also showed him the aforementioned Affidavit to Annul
the Contract to Sell which has not been annotated at the back
of the titles. Despite these, Cheng went ahead and issued a
check for P50,000.00 upon the assurance by Genato that
the previous contract with the Da Jose spouses will be
annulled. Genato caused the registration of the Affidavit to
Annul the Contract to Sell in the Registry of Deeds. While the
Da Jose spouses were at the Office of the Registry of Deeds,
processing the registration as well, they met Genato by
coincidence and discovered about the affidavit to annul their
contract. Da Joses were protested against the rescission of
their contract. The Da Jose spouses assured Genato that they
are willing and able to pay the balance of the agreed down
payment, later on in the day, Genato decided to continue the
Contract he had with them. The agreement to continue with
their contract was formalized in a conforme letter. Genato
advised Cheng of his decision to continue his contract with the
Da Jose spouses and completely returned to Cheng the
checks for their payments.
After having received the letter of Genato, Cheng, returned the
said check to the former. Cheng instituted a complaint for
specific performance to compel Genato to execute a deed
of sale to him of the subject properties and prayer for
preliminary attachment. In his complaint, Cheng averred that
the check he gave was a partial payment to the total agreed
purchase price of the subject properties and considered
as an earnest money for which Genato acceded. Thus, their
contract was already perfected. In Answer, thereto, Genato
alleged that the agreement was only a simple receipt of an
option-bid deposit, and never stated that it was a partial
payment, nor is it an earnest money and that it was subject
to the condition that the prior contract with the Da Jose
spouses be first cancelled. The Da Jose spouses, in their
Answer in Intervention, asserted that they have a superior right
to the property as first buyers. They alleged that the unilateral
cancellation of the Contract to Sell was without effect and
void. They also cited Cheng’s bad faith as a buyer being duly
informed by Genato. The RTC ruled in favor of Cheng  which
the CA set aside and reversed a ruling. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N there is perfected sale over the parcels of land
between Genato and Cheng such that it gives rise to obligatory
force.
RULING: NO. Petition denied. We have ruled before that when
a Deed of Sale is inscribed in the registry of property on the
original document itself, what was done with respect to said
entries or annotations and marginal notes amounted to a
registration of the sale. In this light, we see no reason why we
should not give priority in right the annotation made by the Da
Jose spouses with respect to their Contract to Sell. Moreover,
registration alone in such cases without good faith is not
sufficient. Good faith must concur with registration for such
prior right to be enforceable. In the instant case, the annotation
made by the Da Jose spouses on the titles of Genato of their
"Contract To Sell" more than satisfies this requirement.
Whereas in the case of Genato's agreement with Cheng such
is unavailing. For even before the receipt issued to Cheng
information of such pre-existing agreement has been brought
to his knowledge which did not deter him from pursuing his
agreement with Genato. Additionally, the Court held that one
who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect of
title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title
thereto in good faith as against an interest therein; and
the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge
of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and
investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with
the defects in the title of his vendor.
12
People vs. Benjamin Guerrero
GR. No. 133168
Garcia, J.
DOCTRINE OF LAW: It is a settled rule that a certificate of
title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving
public lands is as conclusive and indefeasible as any
other certificate of title issued upon private lands in
ordinary or cadastral registration proceedings. The effect
of registration of a homestead or any other similar patent
and the issuance of a certificate of title to the patentee is
to vest in him an incontestable title to the land, in the
same manner as if ownership had been determined by
final decree of the court, and the title so issued is
absolutely conclusive and indisputable.
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals. Respondent Guerrero filed
with the Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau) a
Miscellaneous Sales Application covering a parcel of land
situated at Quezon City, consisting of 256sqm. Guerrero’s
application was approved and Miscellaneous Sales Patent
No. 8991 was issued in favor of him as well as the Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-28. Angelina Bustamante filed a
protest claiming that respondent obtained the sales patent
through fraud and/or omission of material facts
considering that 174 sqm awarded to respondent covered
the land where her house is situated and where she has
been residing since 1961. The Director of Lands dismissed
the protest of Bustamante, affirmed by the Minister of Natural
Resources and Office of the President. Bustamante filed a MR.
The President then ordered that the case be remanded to the
DENR to conduct an ocular investigation. It was found that 83
sqm of the titled property of Guerrero is under actual
physical possession of Marcelo Bustamante (husband of
Angelina), thus, only 91 sqm is under the physical
possession of Guerrero. Pursuant to the directive of the
President, the Director of Lands instituted the instant action
(Petition for Amendment of Plan and Technical Description of
OCT No. 0-28 in the name of Benjamin Guerrero). Guerrero
filed a motion to dismiss the petition alleging that the RTC
6
of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the petition
and that it was defective in form and substance, inasmuch
as it failed to name who holds a certificate of title over the
properties subject of the petition. The lower court denied
the motion due to lack of merit. The RTC ruled that the original
certificate of title in the name of respondent acquired the
characteristics of indefeasibility after the expiration of one
year from the entry of the decree of registration. CA
affirmed. Petitioner then moved for a reconsideration but the
same was denied. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE: W/N the certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant
or patent involving public lands is conclusive and indefeasible
despite the fact that respondent’s title was procured through
fraud and misrepresentation.
RULING: YES. Petition denied. It must be pointed out that the
essential issue raised in this Petition ― the presence of fraud
― is factual. As a general rule, this Court does not review
factual matters, as only questions of law may be raised in
a petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court. And
as the Court has consistently held, factual findings of trial
courts, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are final and
conclusive on this Court. It bears to stress that the property in
question, while once part of the lands of the public domain and
disposed of via a miscellaneous sales arrangement, is now
covered by a Torrens certificate. Grants of public land were
brought under the operation of the Torrens system by Act No.
496, or the Land Registration Act of 1903. Under the Torrens
system of registration, the government is required to
issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that
the person named is the owner of the property described
therein. The Torrens system aims to obviate possible
conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon
the face of the Torrens certificate and to give him
complete peace of mind that he would be secured in his
ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of
any right over the covered land. Petitioner fails to
convince the Court that the facts relied upon constitutes
fraud. Fraud cannot be presumed, and the failure of
petitioner to prove it defeats its own cause. Petitioner argues
that the right of the State for the reversion of unlawfully
acquired property is not barred by prescription. True,
prescription, basically, does not run against the State and
the latter may still bring an action, even after the lapse of
one year, for the reversion to the public domain of lands
which have been fraudulently granted to private
individuals. However, this remedy of reversion can only be
availed of in cases of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion. In
the present case, petitioner cannot successfully invoke
this defense for it was never proven that respondent’s
patent and title were obtained through fraud.
13
Baranda vs. Hon. Gustilo
G.R. No. 81163
Gutierrez, J.
DOCTRINE OF LAW: The function of the Register of Deeds
with reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances,
instrument and the like is ministerial in nature.
FACTS: A petition for reconstitution of title was filed with the
CFI of Iloilo involving a parcel of land in the name of Romana
Hitalia. Eventually, the same was issued in the names of
petitioners Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo Baranda. The Court
issued a writ of possession, which respondents Gregorio
Perez, Maria Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor on
the ground that they also own the same lot by virtue of a
TCT. The Court later discovered that the said TCT was
fraudulently acquired by respondents and ordered that the writ
of possession be carried out. Thereafter, a writ of demolition
was issued. Petitions were filed by respondents in opposition
of the orders issued by the Court but the same were denied. In
compliance with the RTC orders, respondent Acting Register
of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order declaring
respondents’ TCT as null and void, cancelled the same and
issued new certificates of titles in the name of petitioners.  AGUSAN
However, by reason of a separate case that was still pending
in the CA, a notice of lis pendis was annotated in the new
certificate of title. This prompted petitioners to file a motion
directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the said
notice of lis pendens. Judge Gustilo granted the motion
and directed the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel.
However, the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion of
reconsideration contending that since the case is still pending
with the CA, it is the CA that can order the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens, and not this Court in a mere cadastral
proceeding. Judge Gustilo granted the Acting Register of
Deeds’ motion. Hence, this petition.  register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer
ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds
to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens
certificate of title?
RULING: Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states
that: “It shall be the duty of the register of deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which
complies with all the requisites for registration. If the
instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in
writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising
him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with
Section 117 of this Decree.” 
In the case at bar, Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in
sustaining the Acting Register of Deed’s stand that the notice
of lis pendens cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency
of the case in the CA. The function of the Register of Deeds
with reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances,
instrument and the like is ministerial in nature . The Acting
Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a
motion for reconsideration of the judge’s order directing him to
cancel the notice of lis pendens. He may not validly refuse to
register a deed of sale presented to him for registration.
Whether a document is valid or not is NOT for the Register
of Deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a
court of competent jurisdiction. 
TEODORO ALMIROL vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968
DOCTRINE:   The purpose of registration is merely to give
notice, then questions regarding the effect or invalidity of
instruments are expected to be decided after, not before,
registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence
that registration must first be allowed, and validity or
effect litigated afterwards.
FACTS: Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a
parcel of land. Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the
office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to
certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of
Deeds upon the following grounds: 1. That Original
7
Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of
Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal
presumption, is considered conjugal property; 2. That in
the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the
effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both
spouses sign the document; but 3. Since, as in this case,
the wife has already died when the sale was made, the
surviving husband cannot dispose of the whole property
without first liquidating and transferring in the name of the
surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased wife by
means of extrajudicial settlement or partition and that the
consent of such other heir or heirs must be procured by
means of another document ratifying this sale executed
by their father.  In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the
Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition for mandamus
to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale
and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can compel the Registry of
Deeds to register the deed of sale in question.
RULING: Yes. Whether a document is valid or not, is not
for the register of deeds to determine; this function
belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. The
register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of
Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment
and discretion when confronted with the problem of
whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground
that it is invalid.
SABTALUH
NOBLEZA V. NUEGA
G.R. NO. 193038
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
DOCTRINE OF LAW: A buyer cannot claim to be an
innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on the TCT
of the seller while ignoring all the other surrounding
circumstances relevant to the sale.
FACTS: Shirley B. Nuega and OFW was married to Rogelio
Nuega. She sent Rogelio money for the purchase of a
residential lot. Upon her arrival she settled the balance for the
equity over the subject property and paid for the succeeding
monthly amortizations. While overseas she learned that
Rogelio had brought home another woman and had been
introducing her as his wife. She then filed for Legal Separation
and Liquidation of Property. While the case was ongoing She
learned that Rogelio intends to sell the subject property.
Shirley then advised the interested buyers one of whom is the
petitioner Josefina V. Nobleza their neighbor of the existence
of the cases and cautioned them against buying the property
until the cases are closed and terminated. Nonetheless, under
a Deed of Absolute Sale, Rogelio sold the subject property to
petitioner without Shirley’s consent. The court ordered the
petitioner to reconvey the property to Shirley, hence, this
petition. Petitioner claims she is a buyer in good faith as
the TCT of the subject property states that its sole owner
is the seller Rogelio himself who was therein also
described as "single.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a purchaser in good
faith.  the court a quo for being void and made in excess of
RULING: No, the petitioner is not a buyer in good faith.  A
buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by
merely relying on the TCT of the seller while ignoring all the
other surrounding circumstances relevant to the sale. Had
petitioner been more prudent as a buyer, she could have
easily checked if Rogelio had the capacity to dispose of
the subject property. Had petitioner been more vigilant,
she could have inquired with such facility - considering
that her sister lived in the same Ladislao Diwa Village
where the property is located - if there was any person
other than Rogelio who had any right or interest in the
subject property. In the Deed of Absolute Sale, the civil
status of Rogelio as seller was not stated, while petitioner as
buyer was indicated as "single," It puzzles the Court that while
petitioner has repeatedly claimed that Rogelio is "single" under
TCT No. 171963 and Tax Declaration Nos. D-012-04723 and
D-012-04724, his civil status as seller was not stated in the
Deed of Absolute Sale - further creating a cloud on the
claim of petitioner that she is an innocent purchaser for
value.
Republic v. Sayo
GR No. L-60413
Narvasa, J.
FACTS: The case at bar started at 1961 whe the spouses
Casiano and Luz Sandoval filed an application for a parcel of
land, Lot 7454 originally party of Santiago but had since then
been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya. The registration was
opposed by Bayaua, Reyes, and the Philippine Cacao and
Farm Products.
The case went on until on 1981, 20 years after, the Heirs of
Sandoval, Heirs of Bayaua, and the Bureau of Lands and
Bureau of Forest Development entered a compromise
agreement, which effectively distributed parts of lot 7454
among the aforesaid parties and the counsel of the Heirs
of Sandoval as attorney's fees. The compromise
agreement was approved by the court and confirmed the
title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its
terms.
Having knowledge of the incident, the Solicitor General filed a
complaint before the court to annul the decision rendered by
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor
General contended that the Heirs of Sandoval et. al. did
not present any evidence to support their claims of
ownership or registration, nor did the government
agencies involve have a y authority to enter into the
compromise agreement, and finally, that he was not
notified of the proceedings and so had not opportunity to
take part therein.
As for the Heirs of Sandoval et.al.'s contention, they
asseverate that the land is not a public land as the possessory
information title in their name and of their predecessors in-
interest, the pre-war certification appearing in the Bureau
of Archives, and the fact that the proceeding of the
registration was brought under the Torrens act which
presupposes an existing title to be confirmed, are all
evidences that the land is a private land.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent's evidences can be considered as
proof that the lot 7454 is
a private land.
RULING: NO. Under the Regalian Doctrine all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Hence it is that all applicants
in land registration proceedings have the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain.  Unless the
applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing
evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his
8
ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title, or any other
means for the proper
acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part
of the public domain. The applicant must present competent
and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely
on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than
factual evidence of possession and title. 
In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document
relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration, to
prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of
their application, was a photocopy of a certification of the
National Library. But, as this Court has already had occasion
to rule, that Spanish document cannot be considered a title
to property, it not being one of the grants made during the
Spanish regime, and obviously not constituting primary
evidence of ownership. It is an inefficacious document on
which to base any finding of the private character of the
land in question.
It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a
quo is based solely on the compromise agreement of the
parties. But that compromise agreement included private
persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of their
ownership over the land subject of the registration proceeding.
Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to persons
or entities who had presented nothing whatever to prove their
ownership of any part of the land. The assent of the Directors
of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise
agreement did not and could not supply the absence of
evidence of title required of the private respondents.
As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the private
respondents, it should be pointed out that under the Spanish
Mortgage Law, it was considered a mode of acquiring title to
public lands, subject to two (2) conditions: first, the inscription
thereof in the Registry of Property, and second, actual, public,
adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the land for twenty
(20) years (later reduced to ten [10] years); but where, as here,
proof of fulfillment of these conditions is absent, the
informacion posesoria cannot be considered as anything more
than prima facie evidence of possession.  the land.
Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the
execution of the compromise agreement and its submission to
the Court for approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who
is the principal counsel of the Government; this is the reason
for our holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the
fiscal, acting as agent of the Solicitor General in land
registration cases, are not binding until they are actually
received by the Solicitor General."  reservation zone and still has to be reclassified as alienable
Republic vs. IAC, Mendoza, and Pasahol
(G.R. No. 71285)
DOCTRRINE OF THE LAW: To have the right to possess
the title of a military reservation zone, it must be first
reclassified as alienable public land.
FACTS: Petition for review by Certiorari. A petition was filed by
Esteban Mendoza and Leon Pasahol alleging ownership of the
land in question (Lot 444) by purchase from its original owners.
Evidence of ownership and possession show that (1)
Mendoza and Pasahol bought the land from Feliciano
Ignacio as shown by the deed of sale; (2) they had
possessed the land peacefully, openly and continuously
under claim of ownership, as had their predecessors-in-
interest before them; (3) that before the purchase of the
land, it had been declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Maria Nunez since 1932.
Solicitor General alleges that (1) petitioners' possession began
only in 1957, they could not tack their possession to their
predecessors-in-interest because of the failure of the latter to
lay claim to the property in question ; (2) it is claimed that
registration is not possible as said land is actually already
forest land and/or part of a military reservation.
The IAC (CA) ruled in favor of the respondents sstating that
the land may have been a military reservation in the past, but
no longer; because it had already been "delimited and
classified by our bureau (Forestry) as alienable and disposable
block under the Proposed Land Classification. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N Mendoza and Pasahol should be given the title of
RULING: NO. PETITION GRANTED, without prejudice to
the respondent’s recourse to the proper administrative
remedy. The SC held that though their possession of the land
to that of their predecessors-in-interest as a result of which
they now have more than thirty (30) years' possession of the
same, the fact remains that the subject land has not yet been
released from its classification as part of the military
public land. 
The SC also states that they are mindful that the private
respondents who have in good faith possessed and occupied
the disputed land for more than (30) years. That is why if what
is needed is only the formal release of the property from its
classification as a military reservation and its reclassification to
disposable agricultural land, the respondent should, for
equitable reasons, take the necessary steps towards the
declassification of the same.
18
Cariño vs. Insular Government
G.R. No. L-2746
FACTS: In 1903, Mateo Cariño, through his attorney in fact,
Metcalf Clarke, filed a petition in the Court of Land Registration
asking that he be inscribed as the owner of a parcel of land in
Baguio, Benguet, containing 146 hectares. He presented no
evidence except possessory information by provisions of
the Mortgage Law. This only produced those effects which
the laws give to mere possession. His main contention was his
use and occupation of the land since time immemorial. This
would lead to his award of a grant due to the prevailing
jurisprudence at the time. The State opposed the petition by
arguing that the land is part of the military reservation of the
US government. He countered by stating that the land is
agricultural and the government did not possess any titles of
ownership, thus the State is barred by the statute of limitations.
The Court of First Instance dismissed his petition. 
ISSUE: (1) Whether Cariño is the rightful owner due to his use
and occupation?
  (2) Whether prescription runs against the
government?
RULING: (1) NO. The possession of the land has not been of
such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No
one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for
anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions
thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has
9
apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of the
occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient
length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make
that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain
from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the
absolute owner.
(2) NO. It is well settled in the US that prescription
does not run against the government as to its public land.
In other words, if a person desires to obtain title to the public
lands of the US situated within the boundaries of the States,
he must do so in the way pointed out by the law. It is not
understood that a person in possession of unsurveyed public
lands in the State of Minnesota, for example, whose ancestors
had occupied that the land for forty years, could maintain in
court a claim that he was the legal owner of the lands by
granted the land to his ancestors. The same is true of the
public lands of Spain in the Philippine Islands.
Lee Hong Kok v. David
G.R. No. L-30389
Fernando, J.
DOCTRINE OF LAW: The land which is considered to be
Public Domain belongs to the Crown or State. Any
conveyance by the state to a Private Individual through
sale is valid and may only be questioned by the
Government for nullity. The period of 1 year is given in the
case the conveyed property by the state is a private
property wherein the rights of the private owners are
violated. Imperium is the authority by the state embraced
ibn the concept of sovereignty and dominion is the power
to own and acquire properties.
FACTS:  Petitioners Lee Hong Hok et al. claim that the
Torrens Title of Respondent David over the disputed
land (which is part of the Naga Cadastre) should be
declared null and void. The CA found no legal
justification for nullifying the right of David over the
disputed land arising from the grant made in his favor
by appropriate public officials.  filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 was
David had acquired lawful title over said land. The
Director of Lands awarded him an order for issuance
of a sales patent pursuant to his miscellaneous sales
application. Subsequently, on the basis of such order,
the Undersecretary of Agricultural and Natural
Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and
an OCT was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga
City in favor of the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyance of land to
David is valid?
RULING: YES. The property conveyed to defendant David
was part of the property owned by the state and therefore
the conveyance was valid. The only party with legal
standing to question the validity of such is the
government and that the period to contest and claim
otherwise is within 1 year only. The transaction followed
all the rules and procedures for patent sale to prosper and
no fraud was done as the auction sale and the document
processing were all made in public.
20
Heirs of Amunategui Vs. Director of forestry
GR 27873
FACTS: These two petitions have their genesis in an
application for confirmation of imperfect title and its
registration. The parcel of land sought to be registered is
known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz,
and has an area of 645,703 square meters. Roque Borre,
petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the
application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose
Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an
opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre.
At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot
No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters
be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose
Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, filed an opposition to the
application for registration of title claiming that the land was
mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and
part of the public domain.Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber
concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed
and registered in his name. During the progress of the trial,
applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and
interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan.
The Court of First Instance adjudicated 117,956 square meters
to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing
527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of
5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.
Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry
filed their respective appeals with the Court of Appeals. The
Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot
be classified as forest land because it is not thickly
forested but is a "mangrove swamp.  Furthermore, they
contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still
subject to land registration proceedings because the property
had been in actual possession of private persons for many
years, and therefore, said land was already "private land" 
ISSUE: W/N Lot No. 885 is public forest land which not
capable of registration in the names of the private applicants.
RULING: YES. A forested area classified as forest land of the
public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released
in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part
of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders
the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of
Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the presumption
that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but
that he has an interest or that he has had continuous, open,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of
his application. The possession of public land however long
the period thereof may have extended, never confers title
thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations
with regard to public land does not operate against the State,
unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of
the same under claim of ownership for the required number of
years to constitute a grant from the State.
10