6.

Security and anti-terrorism

measures
6.1 Introduction 6.5 Responses by the design team
6.2 The threats from terrorism 6.6 Conclusion
6.3 Authorities
6.4 Implications for management and
operation

6.1 Introduction in the event of fire in Section 14.6.2. The authors

would stress that anti-terrorist measures are a highly
Security in this context means the protection of a specialized subject, and expert advice is essen-
building or its occupants from various external tial. The level of threat is judged by the police, who
threats that might cause danger to the people in the should be consulted on this aspect throughout the
building, or interfere with its normal operation. These design process.
threats could be crime, natural disasters or human
error for example, and the actions to counter them
6.2 The threats from terrorism
will range from elements of the design of the build-
ing to operational procedures by the management or
The following is a summary list of some of the meth-
outside agencies. In recent years the threat from ter-
ods that terrorists could use to attack high-profile
rorism has become a factor that must be taken into
events, which has been extrapolated from the expe-
account when staging major sporting competitions
rience of past terrorist incidents. Note that the aim
and this chapter concentrates on that threat.
of terrorists can be to harm people, to take them
hostage or to cause alarm.
There can be no absolute answers in countering
such threats, and this chapter only gives an outline
Explosive devices
of some of the major issues. It should be read in
These may be delivered by a number of means
conjunction with the guidance on emergency egress
including parked vehicles; large vehicles driven by

75 75
Security and anti-terrorism measures
a suicide bomber; devices carried by an individual;
and explosives delivered by a missile. They could
include devices with radioactive ingredients. In the
past incidents they have been brought to the build-
ing on the day of the attack or delivered in advance
and detonated at a significant time.
Firearms
These can be brought into the sports venue or, in
the case of sniping, used from a long distance.
Chemical, biological or radiological agents
These include various agents that can act on the
body in different ways and can be delivered as pow-
ders, liquids or gas.
Incendiary devices
These could cause the greatest hazard in the con-
courses and interior spaces of the stadium.
Electronic devices
Modern buildings rely on a plethora of computer
systems from building management systems, tick-
eting systems to different types of communication
systems. Some of these can be disturbed by hack-
ing in over the internet and all of them by interfering
with the power supply.
6.3 Authorities
As mentioned in the introduction, it is important
to contact those public bodies who can give an
assessment of the perceived likelihood of terror-
ist attacks, and may already have planned out their
response. The authorities that may be involved
in dealing with a terrorist threat include the police;
local authorities; national security organizations; and
emergency services organizations. Proposed sta-
dia designs should be discussed with these agen-
cies, who will have valuable specialist knowledge to
contribute.
6.4 Implications for management and operation
6.4.1 Management responses
The accepted method of understanding the threat
and what to do about it is a ‘risk assessment’, which
is a formal method of setting out what is known
about the potential attacks, and then analyzing what
can be done both to reduce the likelihood of such
an attack succeeding, and to ensure the safety of
the occupants of the building when it does happen.
The management of a sports venue should prepare
contingency plans setting out how they would act in
the event of the various possible incidents. Different
events, even in the same venue, will have different
levels of threat associated with them and be vulner-
able in different ways.
It should be noted that the response to terrorist, and
all other serious threats, is a team effort, which will
normally be lead by the management of the venue,
except in some high-profile situations where it could
be lead by government security agencies.
6.5 Responses by the design team
The design of the facility can influence the way in
which managers and security authorities are able
to handle the emergency, and the way in which a
crowd will behave. The following notes summa-
rise some of the key matters, and should be read in
conjunction with Figure 3.3, showing the zoning of
stadium planning.
Firstly the terrorist threat is constantly changing, and
the ideas on how to counter it are evolving too, so a
building with space to allow some flexibility of activ-
ity within it will be more useful.
6.5.1 Vehicular parking and access
• Parked vehicles must be kept away from the
perimeter of the stadium.
• It must be ensured that vehicles do not pose any
threat, whether they are VIP or service vehicles
that enter the building before the event or on the
event days.
• It must be ensured that emergency vehicles can
enjoy unhindered access into the stadium through-
out any kind of terrorist incident. It may be diffi-
cult to reconcile such ready access with planned
security measures, and resolving this conundrum
will need discussion between the security advisers
and local authority.
Measures designed to protect buildings from vehic-
ular attack, such as bollards and other forms of
barriers, can often conflict with crowd flow, emer-
gency vehicle access, and the urban design of the

surroundings. A careful balance is required to pro-
vide security without the stadium coming to resem-
ble a prison.
6.5.2 Access into the stadium for spectators,
staff, and the media etc. through the perimeter
This is an early line of defence to prevent potential
malefactors from entering the facility. Significant
changes of practice and requirement may be
expected here in the future in locations where there
is thought to be a threat – for example, the increas-
ing use of search equipment as at airports. Space to
allow searching to take place should be allowed, nor-
mally outside the main ticket check line, but some-
times inside it.
6.5.3 Circulation inside the stadium
At overall planning stage the design team should as
far as possible ‘design out’ all potential places of
concealment, for instance by ensuring that the sta-
dium has clear simple spaces with no hidden nooks
and crannies.
At detail design stage it will be similarly helpful to
‘design out’ high-level places where threatening
packages could be placed out of sight. The use of
sloping upper surfaces on all high-level window sills
is one example of a sensible precaution.
6.5.4 Structural collapse
The aim is to delay the collapse of the building for
long enough, in the event of an explosion, to give
people ample time to escape.
The key factors for delayed collapse include
structural robustness, ductility, and redundancy.
Robustness essentially means a general sturdiness.
Ductility means the ability, particularly of joints and
connections, to stretch, bend, and deform rather
than break. Redundancy means the ability of a
structure to transfer loads from one set of members
to another, thus permitting the structure to survive
even if, for instance, a column is removed. Steel or
in-situ concrete frames score best against these cri-
teria. Load-bearing masonry scores badly; and so
do pre-cast concrete frames unless the connections
between components have been designed with very
great care.
Security and anti-terrorism measures
Design strategies may also include progressive col-
lapse, sacrificial façades, etc.; but it may be found
at the end of the day that an engineered solution
cannot be adequate to the challenge, and that other
and wider mitigation methods must be explored.
Again these are highly specialized matters and repu-
table experts must be consulted.
6.5.5 Air intakes
All ventilation intakes for artificial or natural ventila-
tion must be placed where they cannot be interfered
with, and where it is impossible to introduce chemi-
cal gases etc. into the facility. In addition considera-
tion should be given to control systems that can seal
off external air intakes in the event of an emergency.
6.5.6 Control rooms
It is vital that all control rooms (which are described
in more detail in Section 19.2.4) continue to oper-
ate throughout any kind of emergency. The following
measures can be incorporated in their design.
• The control room should be designed to remain
intact and functioning in the event of explosions or
other serious security problems in the stadium. For
increased security it may also be located where
it is invulnerable to such attack (e.g. an off-site
location); and a secondary back-up control room is
often incorporated in case the main one becomes
unusable.
• Electrical supply must be maintained throughout
any emergency.
• Provision can be made for command and com-
munications facilities (CCTV, PA, BMS, etc.) to
be remotely controlled off-site, or integrated with
national security services systems.
6.5.7 Glass
As a top priority, effective measures should be taken
to eliminate the horrific injuries that may result from
fly- ing glass, which typically causes around 95 per
cent of all injuries in an explosion. Glass, especially
in large sheets, should never be untreated annealed
glass, and can be made safe by one of three
methods:
• Using laminated safety glass. This consists of
layers of annealed glass (which for added
safety may be toughened, see
below) glued to interlayers of
Security and anti-terrorism measures
extremely tough plastic, thus producing a sand-
wich of material that offers a high degree of
resistance to explosions and also bullets. If the
glass does break the composite sheet still hangs
together, rather like a curtain, and does not disin-
tegrate into lethal flying shards. This is the most
expensive method.
• Using toughened safety glass. This is up to five
times stronger than conventional annealed glass,
and if the glass does break it disintegrates into
crumb-like fragments which are neither large
enough nor sharp enough to cause serious injury.
Typical cost may be about a fifth less than that of
laminated safety glass.
• Applying transparent safety film to ordinary
annealed glass. Though they are paper-thin, such
films will hold the glass together if broken, and
counteract the formation of flying shards. Typical
cost may be a third or a quarter of the cost for lam-
inated safety glass.
• More sophisticated blast-absorbing and wire-
catch systems are also available.
Frames and blast-resistant glazing should be
designed to resist blast loads together. The frames
may need to be reinforced to take the strain, and the
glass securely seated in deep rebates.
78
The words ‘to resist blast loads’ above should not
be taken to imply strengthening the outside of the
building to the point that blast loads cannot escape.
Some facades are now being designed to resist
the effect of an external blast on structure without
proper consideration of the likely effect of an internal
blast on this blast-resistant envelope. The question
must in these cases be asked ‘Where is the pressure
wave going to go?’ This must be allowed for.
6.6 Conclusion
It needs to be understood that no conceivable range
of security measures can provide 100% security to
a building or its occupants. The aim is threat miti-
gation, i.e. finding the right balance between the
perceived security threat, and the range of counter-
terror measures that are taken both in terms of sta-
dium design and event management, in a way that
won’t unduly disturb the operation of the building or
inconvenience the spectators. All the systems must
be integrated to work smoothly together – the build-
ing structure and materials; the information technol-
ogy, and the management strategies. Consultation
with the agencies mentioned in this section will be
essential.
78
7. Activity area
7.1 Playing surfaces
7.1 Playing surfaces
7.1.1 History
Informal sport has been played on grass fields, city
squares or open ground for hundreds of years but
it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century
that sports became organized and conditions were
defined under which the sport could be played fairly.
These early, rather loose, conditions later became
rules and eventually the laws of sport were born. A
notable exception is tennis which had its origins as
an indoor sport and only later took to the outdoors.
The surface to be played upon was often specified
in these rules, as it was recognized that the nature
of a game differed when the surface it was played
upon changed.
The established rule of ball sports being played on
natural surfaces was unchallenged until 1966 when
the Houston Astrodome opened. This was the first
completely covered stadium in the world and was
designed, using the best technology at the time,
with a transparent roof and natural turf playing sur-
face. Unfortunately, the grass did not grow below
the transparent roof for a number of reasons, one
of which was that the steel structure holding up the
7.2 Pitch dimensions, layout and boundaries
solid roof was substantial and hindered the nat-
ural light from penetrating to the playing surface. No
transparent or translucent roof has yet permitted the
growth of natural turf suitable for playing ball sports.
In order to avoid this show case stadium turning
into a disaster, a manufactured synthetic grass was
woven using green plastic and laid over the exist-
ing ground. This product was called ‘Astroturf’ after
its host venue, the ‘Astrodome’ and variants of this
original synthetic grass have covered many other
sports surfaces around the world.
Synthetic sports surfaces have since been developed
into more sophisticated constructions, all with the
enormous advantage to a stadium manager that he
can hold different events on the same playing sur-
face, one after the other. Although players and team
coaches tended to prefer a natural grass surface
for its playability, artificial surfaces were approved
for American football and spread quickly through
the USA. They are now officially accepted by FIFA
for soccer matches and are beginning to be installed
by clubs around the world, though they have not
yet been accepted by national federations for major
matches.
Activity area

7.1.2 Current requirements Disadvantages

Table 7.1 shows the playing characteristics of ten-
nis court surfaces, reproduced with the permission
of the Lawn Tennis Association.
7.1.3 Natural grass surfaces
Advantages
Natural grass remains the most user-friendly of sur-
faces, and the only permissible choice for some
sports. The advantages of natural grass are:
• It is aesthetically attractive.
• It gives a speed of rebound and a degree of roll-
ing resistance that is just about right for most ball
sports.
• It provides reasonable (though variable) purchase
for players feet when dry or wet.
• It gives a surface that is neither excessively hard
nor excessively soft for comfortable running.
• It is less injurious to players who fall than most
alternative finishes.
• If irrigated it is a relatively cool surface in hot
climates.
• It will continually self-repair and regenerate.
The major limitation to the use of grass surfaces is
that they cannot be used in roofed stadia, and are
difficult to keep healthy even under partial cover.
The reason is that grass needs ample light for really
healthy growth, and air movement, humidity and
temperature levels need to be kept within fairly
strict parameters. To date it has proved impossible
to arrange all these matters satisfactorily in a totally
enclosed stadium, even using the most transparent
roofing materials. In theory supplemental artificial
lighting does help but there are no real-life appli-
cations to demonstrate the effectiveness of this
solution, and in any case the energy costs of such
lighting may be prohibitive.
Even in a partly-roofed stadium the size of the roof
aperture, the shadow-effects of the surrounding
structure and other such factors may lead to dis-
appointing results. One example of failure is the
San Siro Stadium in Milan which was redeveloped
to accommodate 80 000 spectators for the soccer
World Cup in 1990. Only the spectator seating areas
are roofed, with a central opening over the playing
area; but even though this aperture is approximately

Surfaces Ball–surface Spin Player–surface

interaction interaction
Speed Height Trueness Topspin Slice Sliding/ Traction Resilience
of court of bounce of bounce firm footing (slip or (hardness)
non-slip)
Grass Fast Low Variable Little Yes Firm footing Slip Soft
with partial
slide
Synthetic Fast Medium to Variable Little Yes Firm footing but Mainly Medium to
turf low partial slide on non-slip
sand filled

Impervious Medium Medium Uniform Yes Yes Firm footing Non-slip Hard to me
acrylic
Porous Slow High Almost Yes Little Firm footing Non-slip Hard
macadam uniform
Shale Medium Medium Variable Yes Yes Sliding Slip Medium to
Continental Slow Medium Almost Yes Yes Sliding Non-slip Medium to
clay uniform
Source: Tennis Courts, published by the LTA Court Advisory Service. Reproduced by kind permission of Christopher Trickey.

Table 7.1 Playing characteristics of tennis court surfaces

80