Collective Action Theory and The Dynamics of Complex Societies

AN46CH12-DeMarrais ARI 7 September 2017 7:52
Annual Review of Anthropology

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Collective Action Theory

and the Dynamics of
Complex Societies
Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 2017.46:183-201. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
Elizabeth DeMarrais1 and Timothy Earle2

1
Department of Archaeology and Anthropology, University of Cambridge,
Cambridge CB2 3DZ, United Kingdom; email: ed226@cam.ac.uk
2
Department of Anthropology, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208;
email: tke299@northwestern.edu
Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 2017. 46:183–201 Keywords

First published as a Review in Advance on August collective action theory, cooperation, political economy, institutions,
7, 2017
power relations, anthropological archaeology
The Annual Review of Anthropology is online at
anthro.annualreviews.org Abstract
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-anthro-102116- Collective action theory, as formulated in the social sciences, posits rational
041409
social actors who regularly assess the actions of others to inform their own
Copyright c 2017 by Annual Reviews. decisions to cooperate. In anthropological archaeology, collective action the-
All rights reserved
ory is now being used to investigate the dynamics of large-scale polities of the
past. Building on the work of Margaret Levi, collective action theorists argue
that the more principals (rulers) depended on the populace for labor, trib-
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REVIEWS Further ute, or other revenues, the greater the agency (or “voice”) a population had
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theory, situating it in relation to existing theoretical approaches that address
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well as how institutions articulate shared interests and order sociopolitical
and economic interaction. Finally, we argue for a new synthesis of political
economy approaches with collective action theory.
183
INTRODUCTION
The formation and dynamics of complex societies are central points of consideration for theorists
in anthropological archaeology. In recent years, dissatisfaction with top-down models positing
hierarchical control by elites (or autocratic rulers) has led many researchers to consider alterna-
tives, as part of a search for distinctive “pathways to power” (Fargher et al. 2011b, Fargher &
Heredia Espinoza 2016, Price & Feinman 2012a). Just over two decades ago, Blanton et al. (1996)
drew attention to diversity in political economy strategies; ranged along a continuum, strategies
were more corporate or more exclusionary (or “network”). Widely cited, the article stimulated
debate about shifting emphases, or a gradual “cycling,” from one to the other, over the longue durée.
A strength lay in the authors’ delineation of clear archaeological correlates; more corporate strate-
gies involved substantial investment in monuments and abstract ideologies emphasizing agrarian
fertility. Exclusionary strategies, in contrast, were materialized in expressions of individual power,
genealogies of elite distinctiveness, and rich grave goods.
Since the 1990s, comparative studies of past political economies have become increasingly de-
tailed and nuanced, benefiting from the accumulated results of excavations as well as from improved
analytical methods and techniques. At issue for theorists now are questions about the nature of lead-
ership as well as understanding of how rulers negotiated their positions with tribute-paying pop-
ulations. Critics of top-down, coercive models have explored corporately organized polities as an
alternative; frequent citations of the article by Blanton et al. (1996) confirm the utility of the ideas.
More recently, refining theoretical approaches for “collective polities,” Blanton & Fargher
(2008) ask whether, and under what circumstances, collective action was a basis for building
institutions in premodern states. Counter to expectations, cooperative institutions structure many
traditional political systems (Blanton 2016). Introducing collective action theory to anthropology
and archaeology as part of a large-scale comparative analysis, Blanton & Fargher ask, If empirical
evidence indicates that collective polities existed in the past, how did they operate? At stake is an
inquiry about how, when, and why people would choose to cooperate or to comply with a ruler’s
demands. Additionally, what were the long-term consequences of collective action? How common
were these dynamics among large polities of the past? These are fundamental questions for the
social sciences, and archaeologists have the evidence to address them effectively.
Collective action theory, as formulated for the social sciences, posits rational social actors
who regularly assess the actions of rulers to inform their own decisions (Ostrom 2009). The
more principals (rulers) depend on the populace for labor, tribute, and other revenue, the greater
the agency (or “voice”) those people will have in negotiating public benefits (Levi 1988). Given
the degree to which many rulers in the past depended on corvée labor or staple finance, local
people frequently held some bargaining power. These negotiations are increasingly recognized
by anthropological archaeologists as central elements shaping statecraft and governance.
Related research themes include attention to nonelite agency, often framed as collective action,
collaboration, or cooperation. Subject groups had choices that ranged from compliance with
demands for tax or tribute to resistance, rebellion, or escape (Scott 2009). In accordance with these
changing interests, researchers have begun to shift their efforts away from excavations focused on
central political and religious places, elite burials, and lifestyles of rulers, toward the archaeology
of everyday life (Robin 2013, Smith 2010).
In this review, we evaluate the rapidly expanding literature on collective action theory. We dis-
cuss its strengths and limitations in the context of a wider set of approaches that similarly address
cooperation and consensus-building in the past. In the sections that follow, we (a) draw attention
to the importance of analyzing agency at multiple scales; (b) address the significance of institu-
tions in articulating shared interests and in ordering sociopolitical and economic interaction; and
184 DeMarrais · Earle

(c) argue for a synthesis of political economy approaches with collective action theory. As coauthors
whose theoretical interests and views are aligned, but not entirely similar, we also encourage more
active dialogue among diverse theorists who have interests in the complex societies of the past.
COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Founded on ideas that stretch back to Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, modern origins of collective
action theory are found in writings of the economist Olson (1965), who asked how and why individ-
uals decide to collaborate as a group, given that an individual’s self-interest often fails to coincide
with that of the wider collective (Lichbach 1996, Ostrom 2009). A decision to cooperate depends
on diverse factors, including the size of the group; its heterogeneity; the frequency of face-to face
interactions among members; the nature of public benefits; the extent to which reputation, trust,
and reciprocity exist within the group; and members’ abilities to monitor and sanction free riders.
Political Science Approaches

In her Presidential Address to the American Political Science Association, Ostrom (1998, p. 1)
called the theory of collective action “the central subject of political science,” arguing that collective
action takes place at all levels, from neighborhood associations to community organizations and
urban coalitions to trade agreements, defensive alliances, and collaborative initiatives at national
and international scales. The problem, succinctly, is that if “each individual selects strategies based
on a calculus that maximizes short-term material benefits to self, individuals will take actions that
generate lower joint outcomes than could have been achieved” (Ostrom 2009, p. 186).
Although rational actor models are foundational for collective action theory, comparative
studies in politics—and related disciplines—document diverse forms of collective action in specific
circumstances, shaped by norms, culture, and ideology (among many factors) (Hardin 1982, 1991;
Hechter 1983, 1987, 1990a,b; Lichbach 1994a,b; Ostrom 1986, 1990; Ostrom & Basurto 2011).
Additionally, human beings continually adapt their thinking, as they learn “norms, heuristics,
and full analytical strategies from one another, from the world, and from their own capacity to
engage in self-reflection. They are capable of designing new tools—including institutions—that
can change the structure of the worlds they face for good or evil purposes” (Ostrom 2009, p. 195).
Therefore, rational actor models are intuitively sensible starting points, but individuals’ self-
interest is modulated by levels of trust, past experience, perceived benefits, local circumstances,
culture, and ideology. People also frequently make mistakes or act in ways that they believe are in
their best interest but that have unintended consequences. As anthropologists recognize, detailed
knowledge of cultural and historical context is vital to understanding rationality at any scale.
THEORIZING COOPERATION IN ANTHROPOLOGY

AND ARCHAEOLOGY
We begin with a historical overview of research on cooperation in anthropology and anthropolo-
gical archaeology and then summarize current research, focusing first on evolutionary cooperation
and second on collective action theory as it is being used to theorize complex societies of the past.
Studies of Cooperation: A Brief Overview

Phrased as cooperation, analyses of collective action have always been a major theme in anthropo-
logical work examining community organizations. In Margaret Mead’s (1937) early, and frequently
www.annualreviews.org • Collective Action Theory 185

cited, definition, cooperation was “the act of working together to one end” (p. 8). Many scholars of
Mead’s era set cooperation in opposition to competition, seeing the two as fundamental dynamics
of social interaction. Indeed, throughout much of the twentieth century, structural-functionalists,
such as Mauss and Malinowski, emphasized cooperation within traditional societies as a primary
means to resolve problems of everyday life. Kinship, ritual, and reciprocity (or redistribution)
helped to manage conflict, reduce risk, or mitigate resource shortages. Although the mechanisms
of integration were shown to vary [from corporate descent (Radcliffe-Brown 1931) to mechani-
cal solidarity (Durkheim 1984)], researchers saw social organization as facilitating group identity
and survival. Leaders helped to organize cooperative undertakings, acting as “tribal bankers”
(Malinowski 1922), irrigation managers (Wittfogel 1957), redistributors of specialized goods
(Service 1962), or organizers in warfare (Carneiro 1970).
In developing an influential American offshoot of structural functionalism, cultural ecologist
Steward (1955) studied the “culture core” (those traits most involved with human adaptation) and
settlement patterns (the distribution of activities across the landscape). Foundational to the New
Archaeology, these ideas shaped a generation of anthropological archaeologists in the Americas
(and, selectively, elsewhere) (Willey & Sabloff 1974). For these scholars, cooperation at small—
and increasingly wider—scales was essential to solve shared problems (Service 1962). Yet a major
shortcoming of the New Archaeology was its limited understanding of agency. Traditional people
were seen as mindless followers of traditions that, in turn, somehow “evolved” to aid a group’s
survival. Institutions had roles to play in supporting the whole, in a manner analogous to the
contributions of organs to the functioning and survival of a living creature.
By the 1970s, anthropological archaeologists turned their attention to theories that recognized
internal conflicts—and competition for power—within societies (Brumfiel & Earle 1987; Brumfiel
& Fox 1994; DeMarrais et al. 1996; Earle 1978, 1997; Gilman 1981; Haas 1982; Hayden 1995;
Kristiansen 1991; Spriggs 1984). Drawing on Marxist traditions, they argued that some social
segments benefited disproportionately from control of economic activities or resources. A key
source of change in past societies, they argued, was the agency of individuals (or factions) who
pursued their own interests rather than shared interests. Focused on the political economy to
understand competitive power relations (Earle & Spriggs 2015), these researchers investigated
flows of surplus (and particularly efforts to control wealth goods or staples). Because their objective
was to clarify dynamics of complex societies, they considered minimally the agency of the general
populace, although they assumed that people would, in principle, resist excessive demands.
Political economy approaches brought attention not only to strategizing individuals or groups,
whose competition for power drove societal change, but also to internal conflicts within large-
scale polities. Into this context, Blanton et al. (1996) introduced ideas about corporately organized
strategies, providing new intellectual tools for thinking about the causal role of individual motiva-
tion and action. Equally important was these authors’ delineation of the archaeological signatures
of both elite and nonelite participation in sociopolitical and economic spheres of activity. In
short, even though the political economists of the 1970s and 1980s formulated critiques of struc-
tural functionalism, their analysis was ultimately incomplete because it ignored the cooperative
and collective elements of sociopolitical life that have always been important to anthropologists
(Blanton & Fargher 2008, pp. 8–10). Now, as Heredia Espinoza (2016) suggests, “Anthropological
theory has turned attention from kings, palaces, and flashy remains to confederations, councils,
and public architecture: in essence, more collective forms of governance to explain higher levels
of integration and complexity” (p. 79).
As a final point, the identification of strategies (both exclusionary and corporate) implemented
by competing factions was a precursor to debates about agency (Dobres & Robb 2000; see also Oka
& Kusimba 2008). In this sense, Brumfiel’s (1992) article, “Breaking and Entering the Ecosystem:

Gender, Class, and Faction Steal the Show,” was deeply influential, highlighting multiple inter-
nal divisions and conflicts of interest. These interests, in turn, underlay “social strategies” that,
together with “ecological strategies,” influenced long-term trajectories of sociopolitical change.
By challenging ideas that societies were well integrated, Brumfiel set the scene for more richly
theorized social actors in the past.
Evolutionary Cooperation
Two critical overviews of evolutionary arguments have been written for archaeologists. In the first,
Carballo et al. (2014) distinguish related, but distinct, directions for anthropological research on
cooperation: evolutionary cooperation and collective action. Following these authors, we discuss
each in turn.
Carballo and colleagues (2014) characterize evolutionary cooperation as (a) highly theoret-
ical research; (b) focused primarily on decision making by individuals (or occasionally by small
groups); (c) behavioral in its foci; and (d) less explicitly concerned with the analysis of ethno-
graphic or archaeological evidence. In a second overview, Blanton & Fargher (2013) reinforce
these observations.
Evolutionary cooperation investigates predispositions, culture-gene coevolution, and cog-
nitive factors that influence cooperation. Evolutionary psychologists and behavioral ecologists
have sought to unravel behavioral (or biological) dynamics of agency (Blanton & Fargher 2013,
Carruthers 2006, Gintis et al. 2005, Richerson & Boyd 2005, Sussman & Cloninger 2011). In-
vestigators have attempted to show that the survival of humans as low-density foragers (when
human cognition was emerging) depended on networks of cooperation; both Dunbar (1993) and
Tomasello (1999) highlight collaboration and reciprocity as distinctly human activities. Others
have endeavored to distinguish innately primate characteristics, such as dominance, hierarchy,
or kin altruism, from those that have origins in social interaction, such as collaboration, learned
behavior, and reciprocity.
Any consideration of agency must understand how interests are formulated, experienced, and
realized. A basic tenet of evolutionary thinking, expressed in terms of the “selfish gene” (Dawkins
1976), involves competition among individuals, as carriers of genes, to contribute genetically to
the next generation. In positing a biological basis for cooperation reflecting specific evolutionary
history (Bowles & Gintis 2011, Sussman & Cloninger 2011), researchers explore tensions between
individual fitness (grounded in competition) and cooperation (which can be costly to participants).
Boyd and colleagues (Richerson et al. 2003, Richerson & Boyd 2005) use game theory to model
the effects of group size on cooperation and to observe how sanctions levied against those who fail
to cooperate influence compliance rates.
Costly signaling theorists have explored seemingly irrational (costly) displays of status (Smith
& Bliege Bird 2005) or investigated human symbolic interactions in cooperative behavior (Gintis
et al. 2001). In archaeology, Kantner & Vaughn (2012) explain pilgrimages in Nasca (Peru) and
Chaco Canyon as costly signals of a pilgrim’s commitment to “prosocial” beliefs and values that
in turn foster cooperation. Investigating American Northwest Coast potlatches in these terms,
anthropologists argue that leaders, responsible for the accumulation, display, and distribution
of gifts, confirmed or enhanced their status (and likely reproductive success), whereas audiences
(members of neighboring groups) received valued objects (Codere 1961). From a wider perspec-
tive, these displays and exchanges appear to have sustained or strengthened broad networks of
interaction over time.
Although they are valuable, efforts to link evolutionary theories to the agency of coopera-
tion remain problematic, owing to the substantial difficulties involved in untangling cultural and

biological influences as well as in working from proximate to ultimate scales of explanation. Blanton
(2016) tackles these broader concerns in his most recent book.
Theorizing Collective Action for the Analysis of Complex Societies

Studies of collective action in larger-scale polities of the past require attention to the kinds of
questions highlighted by social theorists. Assessing and explaining how people, diverse networks,
multiple institutions, and changing interests might be reconciled over the long term is an im-
mensely complicated task. In contrast with studies of evolutionary cooperation, collective action
theorists have engaged more directly with evidence from case studies, composed of work by archae-
ologists and historians over many years. Archaeologists have, for several decades now, highlighted
variation in the archaeological remains of larger-scale polities (D’Altroy & Earle 1985, Earle 1997,
Renfrew 1974), whereas Blanton, Fargher, and their colleagues concur that analyses of variation
(e.g., pathways to power) align with work by political scientists on modern states. Among them,
Levi’s book, Of Rule and Revenue (1988; see also Levi 1981, 1997, 2002), is foundational to col-
lective action theory. For Levi, constraints on rulers and on taxpayer compliance in states are the
outcomes of bargaining. Taxpayers’ resources, as well as the degree to which rulers depend on
this revenue, determine the balance of these interests.
Levi’s (1981) “Predatory Theory of Rule” synthesizes a Marxist perspective with a more nu-
anced conception of the agency of rulers. She posits that even though rulers may act as members
of a dominant class (in line with Marx’s thinking), they calculate their interests as individuals who
seek to maximize wealth and power. A ruler’s success therefore depends on his/her “bargaining
power vis-à-vis subjects, agents, and external actors” (p. 438), particularly with respect to fiscal
appropriation. In short, the “history of state revenue production is the history of the evolution of
the state” (Levi 1988, p. 1). Moreover, rulers acquire power by forming coalitions, to whom they
remain accountable. Coalitions are unstable, owing to both internal competition and interaction
with rivals. Hence, for Levi, the state is an institution; “ its actions and behavior are nothing more
than the end result of concrete human action” (Levi 1981, p. 465).
In a remarkable comparative study of 30 historically documented premodern states, Blanton &
Fargher (2008) introduced collective action theory to anthropological archaeologists. Observing
how Western democracies offer potential for collective action and consensus, the authors asked
whether collective action also existed—in different institutional forms—in premodern states. Iden-
tifying indices of collective action (in the form of public goods), they investigated whether sources
of revenue correlated with the extent of provision of public goods (e.g., irrigation or transport
infrastructure), the elaboration of bureaucracies, and controls on leaders. They concluded that
those principals who relied more heavily on local revenue sources did implement more corporately
oriented strategies, endeavored to limit autocratic expressions of power, and invested significantly
in services that benefited the people.
Contributors to three subsequent volumes have explored further examples of collective action
(Blanton 2016, Carballo 2013, Fargher & Heredia Espinoza 2016). The emerging consensus is
that “state formation is a process involving rational social action on the part of taxpayers as well as
rulers” (Blanton & Fargher 2008) and that “it is only with great difficulty that tax-payer-funded
governments can be established and maintained . . . so that, in exchange for taxpayer compliance,
rulers provide public goods, control the agency of officials (bureaucratization), and relinquish
some aspects of their power (principal control) to validate their trustworthy participation in the
collective enterprise” (p. 252).
In premodern states, monitoring and enforcing compliance are exceptionally costly and diffi-
cult. By theorizing actors, conditions, and circumstances in which compromise takes place (e.g.,

reciprocity, negotiation, enforced compliance), this research follows a pragmatic political econ-
omy tradition that investigates how past peoples, working through institutions, managed conflicts
of interest, accommodated differences of opinion, and collaborated on large-scale projects. As
one example, archaeological evidence for the Inca conquest of the Xauxa region of highland Peru
revealed that living standards for local people improved during the period of imperial control (see
later discussion).
USING COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY: INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS,

AND SCALES OF ANALYSIS
In this section, we highlight central issues in the analysis of collective action. We discuss the
nature of “specific interests” (Roscoe 2013) that motivate agency and shape institutions, advocate
studying collective action at multiple social scales, and highlight the need to reconcile top-down
and bottom-up approaches.
Agency, Interests, Coalitions, and Institutions

Welcoming the observation that “agency theory [has] . . . put people back into culture along with
cognitive factors” (Saitta 2013, p. 129), Blanton & Fargher (2008) argue for “universal agency”
(p. 7). Viewing agency this way challenges assumptions (implicit in Marxist analyses) that the
false consciousness of nonelites in premodern states prevented active resistance to despotic rulers.
Universal agency implies ongoing decisions to cooperate (or not), as well as peasant resistance or
rebellion, the formulation of alternative ideologies, and the rejection of state ideologies (Brumfiel
1996, 1998; McGuire & Paynter 1991; Scott 2009).
Collective action, shaped by culture, norms, and ideology, is even more difficult to theorize
than rational action. Providing one direction, Roscoe (2013, p. 60) identifies specific interests
of social segments that align the agency of their members. Multiple social, ethnic, or political
factions may pursue particular goals, and membership can overlap. For example, collective action
theory contributes to understanding why, under conditions of regional warfare, volunteeristic
communities operated as corporate groups led by warriors. Alternatively, engaging in external
warfare (such as raiding for wealth) involves a more strongly network strategy (Blanton et al.
1996) that reflects individuals’ desire for status (Peregrine & Ember 2016).
Adopting a collective action perspective refocuses attention on ordinary people, as their shared
concerns for defense or security, risk management, infrastructure development, conflict resolution,
or status distinction can motivate compliance with principals. Similarly, although coercive rulers
certainly existed in the past, most leaders are likely to have maintained ongoing relationships
of give-and-take with their subjects. Perhaps surprisingly, whereas collective action theory has
attracted considerable attention among American archaeologists, it has to date been less widely
taken up by European prehistorians. For example, in Beyond Elites: Alternatives to Hierarchical
Systems in Modeling Social Formations, Kienlin & Zimmer (2012) argue that many activities in the
European Bronze Age did not involve elites but were handled by community cooperation, albeit
without reference to collective action theory.
Multiple Scales: Collective Action Across Time and Space

Collective action theorists highlight scale (group size) as a crucial factor influencing decisions
to cooperate; as a consequence, researchers need to pay attention to different levels of interac-
tion. The possibility and nature of cooperative action depend critically on the size of groups. For

example, Roscoe (2013, p. 60) argues that, to increase security against the risk of attack, the most
effective scale of collaboration is the largest feasible group size. With increasing scale, problems
of coordination, recruitment, monitoring, and sanctioning of nonparticipants become more sig-
nificant. In extended family groups, or village settings, face-to-face negotiations may resolve these
problems, whereas building or maintaining alliances across a region often requires coordination
by leaders. Collective action theory also draws attention to scalar stress, as studied by Johnson
(1982), and to potential benefits for those who successfully engage in cooperative activities.
With assistance from neighbors, a family or kin group can build houses and agricultural terraces
reciprocally and progressively. Community members can work together to erect small-scale facili-
ties such as cult houses (Adler & Wilshusen 1990). In contrast, however, a palisade built in response
to a threat of warfare must be completed rapidly and requires leadership (Roscoe 2013). As ritual
facilities or monuments expand in scale, larger labor forces may be more easily mobilized and sup-
ported by leaders (Artursson et al. 2016, Hayden 2014). As discussed later, studies of heterarchy and
political economy increasingly have tried to define (rather than assume) ways that individuals and
groups cohere around shared interests. The formation of stable institutions appears to be critical.
At wider scales, archaeologists are interested in the mix of strategies, actions, and agency
that constitute pathways to power (Fargher et al. 2011b, Price & Feinman 2012b). A broader
concern with the acknowledged diversity of leadership strategies is explicit, as are the gradations
of inequality and agency that archaeologists have documented (Drennan et al. 2012). Feinman
(2015) summarizes the research aims: “The dynamic and diverse social networks and interpersonal
tensions that juxtapose leaders and followers are viewed as key, with special emphasis on the varying
fiscal underpinnings of governance, leadership, and power” (p. 530).
Archaeological investigation of the sources of state revenue and collective action has prolif-
erated (Blanton 2010, 2011, 2013; Blanton & Fargher 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; Fargher &
Blanton 2007, 2012). As one example, Fargher and collaborators (Fargher et al. 2010, 2011a,b)
describe the coexistence of contrasting forms of governance in coeval, Late Postclassic Mesoameri-
can polities (AD 1250–1521). Given evidence for variable degrees of bureaucratization, commoner
voice, and infrastructural development in the archaeological record, the authors conclude that
distinct political formations existed contemporaneously. Some polities had more despotic rulers,
whereas other leaders relinquished some power, or voice, to the collectivity.
Identifying more corporate (collective) polities requires analysis of projects such as agricul-
tural intensification (terraces or irrigation) or infrastructure (monuments, roads, fortifications,
temples, and meeting places) (Blanton & Fargher 2008, p. 254). Consensus-building activities
minimally require meeting places (Stark 2016); the dimensions and spatial distribution of settings
for assemblies, forums, feasts, or negotiation activities range widely from one setting to another.
Along similar lines, archaeological evidence for buildings occupied by members of craft guilds,
merchants’ associations, religious orders, or bureaucracies can reveal the roles played by such
institutions and their relative influence or bargaining power.
From a diachronic perspective, trends in the expansion, or contraction, of public space may
reveal an increase, or diminution, in the relative bargaining power of either principals or taxpayers.
Fargher (2016) observes that “[s]tate builders interested in achieving collective action (e.g., the
delivering of public goods in response to taxpayer compliance with internal revenue demands) or
limiting the power of principals to act arbitrarily can implement corporate strategies” (p. 318).
Finally, archaeologists must also consider why one strategy was chosen over others (Feinman
& Nicholas 2016), as variation is shaped by historical circumstances and the political economy
(Earle 2016) or by patterns of violence (Peregrine & Ember 2016). Countering long-standing
narratives of traditional states as despotic, Blanton (2016) argues that, when revenues derive from
local labor, these polities deliver significant services to their populations.

Reconciling (and Linking) Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches

A final question involves the theoretical relationship between competition and cooperation. Be-
cause collective action theory responds to an overreliance on top-down theories, it would be un-
fortunate if these researchers’ emphasis on a mix of activities and bargaining at different scales were
misinterpreted. Indeed, although Blanton et al. (1996) never suggested that corporate and exclu-
sionary were discrete or opposing strategies, many have since treated them as binary opposites. In
problematizing the relationship between competition and cooperation (at different scales), draw-
ing on future research agendas (see Pennisi 2005), Pluckhahn (2013) argues that “cooperation and
conflict, rather than alternating in neat evolutionary progressions, are frequently counter-posed at
different social and spatial scales . . . . [T]hey remind us that individual motivations for cooperation
and competition are complex, compound, and potentially even conflicting” (p. 189).
If we investigate interaction at multiple scales, or over longer time scales, these problems
are easier to overcome. A clear example is provided by Janusek & Kolata (2004) to explain the
construction and use of raised fields around Lake Titicaca. They attribute the fields’ creation and
use to agency at multiple scales, from kin-group collaboration to state-sponsored intervention,
rather than to either state control of the field system or collaborative labor efforts organized at the
local level. Organization and use of fields, they argue, responded to changing sociopolitical realities
(and agencies) over time. Along similar lines for South Asia, Smith (2006) contends that shared
preference for rice, as a high-status crop, motivated farmers to cooperate with political authorities
in projects that raised rice yields, which benefited all participants. In addition, investigating the
El Gaván regional polity in Venezuela (AD 550–1000), Spencer (2013) observes that top-down
efforts at coordination paralleled bottom-up collaborative tactics; together, this mix of actions led
to short-term aggregation of autonomous settlements in response to threats of conflict.
ARCHAEOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE, ANARCHY, AGENT-BASED

MODELING, AND HETERARCHY
In this section, we consider how the insights of collective action theory inform, complement,
or revitalize related approaches. Our view is that collective action theory is best viewed not as a
trendy new theory borrowed from the outside. Instead, its strengths lie in natural alliances with
points of consideration already being discussed in anthropological archaeology: (a) the archaeology
of everyday life, (b) anarchy theory, (c) agent-based institutional economics, and (d) heterarchy
approaches.
The Archaeology of Everyday Life

The archaeology of everyday life emphasizes cooperative foundations of daily life within house-
holds and smaller-scale communities (Canuto & Yaeger 2000, D’Altroy & Hastorf 2001,
Overholtzer & Robin 2015, Smith 2010). Face-to-face interactions sustained over years, kinship,
and shared cosmologies foster trust, reciprocity, and reputation, which, in turn, facilitate coop-
eration. Likewise, social ties are maintained through gift exchange or shared ritual (DeMarrais
2011, 2013a; Creese 2016). Archaeological remains recovered from household excavations re-
veal, perhaps surprisingly, that conditions of daily life sometimes persisted unchanged, or even
improved, with the imposition of hierarchical control. The Inca Empire demanded corvée labor
and tribute from conquered peoples, but it also provided public goods (extended irrigation net-
works, cessation of hostilities, management of risk, and sponsorship of large-scale feasts). Phrasing
feasting in Andean idioms of reciprocity also encouraged compliance. Excavations in households

demonstrate that, in the Xauxa region, overall standards of living improved under Inca rule
(D’Altroy & Hastorf 2001).
Anarchy Theory
Anarchy theory has been adapted for the archaeology of decentralized societies to focus attention
on circumstances that favor voluntary alliances, mutual aid, and situational authority that are lim-
ited in time or scope. Angelbeck & Grier (2012) have argued that, among Coast Salish groups of
the Pacific Northwest, cooperative activities (such as building defensive structures) were under-
taken by allied groups, who also articulated protocols to maintain autonomy. A key contribution
of these authors is a clearer focus on agency, phrased as ongoing, active resistance to institutions
of control. They argue further that hierarchical leadership is resisted “through mutual aid, con-
sensual decision-making, and maintenance of decentralized networks” (p. 550). The philosophical
roots of anarchy theory lie with those advocating resistance to the demands of the modern state
through self-organizing collectives and mutual aid (Graeber 2004).
Ethnographers have also explored the principles of anarchy (Clastres 1989); Scott (2009) argues
that, among the “hill people” of Southeast Asia, culture, economy, and identity were “purposely
crafted both to thwart incorporation into the nearby state and to minimize the likelihood that
state-like concentrations of power will arise among them” (p. 8). Archaeologist Saitta (2007)
observes that his “primary interest is in collective action that emanates ‘from below’: the kind that
challenges the political and economic forces that marginalize, disenfranchise, and oppress” (p. 5).
To date, anarchy theory in archaeology has been used only to theorize the actions of low-density
populations in settings with abundant resources. Nonetheless, these alternative ways to organize
politics and collective action deserve attention because they may have been more common in
societies of the past.
Agent-Based Institutional Economic Theory

Agent-based institutional economic theory draws heavily on conceptions of individual agency in
relation to institutional forms and dynamics. Hodgson (2000) observes that “[i]n the writings
of Veblen and Commons [both long-standing theorists of institutions], there is both upward
and downward causation; individuals create and change institutions, just as institutions mold and
constrain individuals” (p. 326).
Institutions also contribute to more predictable interaction; by formalizing aspects of social or
political interaction, they help to reassure cooperators that beneficial outcomes will materialize.
Oka & Kusimba (2008) have shown how traders in the Indian Ocean in precolonial times created a
self-organizing system that provided predictability across a broad region characterized by different
ethnic and religious identities. Traders, they argue, followed strategies of ethnic and religious
affiliation to generate relationships of trust that, in turn, lowered transaction costs and risk.
Agent-based, bottom-up modeling in archaeology similarly examines dynamic systems involv-
ing cooperation and competition. Kohler and associates (Kohler & Reese 2014, Kohler & Varien
2012) have developed and tested models in Southwestern prehistory that link population growth
and distribution, rainfall, warfare, group size, and intercommunity relationships. Others have in-
vestigated the relationship between dry versus wet farming systems, differential risk, and warfare
in state formation in Hawaii (Ladefoged et al. 2009). The formation of cities has been modeled
through bottom-up processes that attract population aggregation for defense, trade, or ceremony
(Smith 2014). Although urbanization is frequently a defining trait of states, Jennings & Earle

(2016) argue that independent, agent-based relocations created some early cities; the resulting in-
tensification of interaction and technological creativity generated higher rates of economic growth
and opportunity (Bettencourt 2013, Ortman & Coffey 2015).
The principal short-coming of agent-based models is that they consider political and cultural
relationships only marginally. Collective action theory might, in future, enhance this research.
Heterarchy Approaches
Heterarchy approaches, introduced by Crumley (1995) as a direct challenge to neoevolutionary
typologies (and to the assumption that power relations are hierarchical), posited lateral, horizontal,
or network linkages among people and institutions. Intuitively appealing, heterarchy approaches
were initially used for describing sociopolitical organization rather than for documenting social
processes or explaining change over time. In more recent studies, researchers investigate the
dynamics of heterarchy (DeMarrais 2011, 2013b; Henry & Barrier 2016), consider heterarchies
from a relational perspective (DeMarrais 2017), and investigate cultural practices that foster trust
or reciprocity (enabling cooperation) or creative solutions that emerge through collaborative work
(Stark 2009). Beyond immediate family or kin group ties, social cohesion is always fragile, requiring
time and effort to sustain (Creese 2016).
As a group, then, bottom-up theories highlight how consensus and social cohesion are ar-
ticulated at distinct levels (see DeMarrais 2016). Historical archaeologists illustrate how groups
coalesce—and act—along lines of class, race, or gender identities (Hall & Silliman 2006; Leone
& Potter 1988, 1999; McGuire & Paynter 1991). Saitta (2013) underscores that the class inter-
ests of coal workers in Colorado derived from shared misery; working conditions created strong
solidarity that motivated a decision to strike, even in the face of clear risks to their jobs and lives.
Bottom-up theories also help to conceptualize the dynamics of smaller-scale societies, where
networks of informal interaction are organized flexibly or on an ad hoc basis. As Angelbeck &
Grier (2012) observe, a group “constantly renegotiates the terms of its socio-political relation-
ships . . . [leading to] shifts from autonomy to domination, from involuntary identifications to free
associations, from cooperation to competitiveness, from hierarchy to heterarchy, and from im-
posed to justified authorities” (p. 568). Along similar lines, McGuire & Saitta (1996), developing
their case for “dialectics,” highlighted how ongoing tensions and contradictions generate change.
Investigating Pueblo society in the pre-Hispanic American Southwest, they argued that a cooper-
ative ethos prevailed in times of abundance, only to be replaced by more exclusive organizational
dynamics in times of scarcity. In an early statement of a relational perspective, the authors argued
further that
[p]ower does not operate outside of society. It has no existence as an abstract quantity. People derive
power from the network of social, material, and ideological relationships of which they are a part.
Power, therefore, exists only in the social relations between people and/or groups of people. This
relational view of power recognizes that power exists in many forms, and that it is not reducible to a
single source, structure, or hierarchy. (McGuire & Saitta 1996, p. 208)
More ephemeral forms of interaction are obviously more difficult to document in the archae-
ological record. Nevertheless, an understanding of these bottom-up dynamics reminds us that
people in the past responded creatively to social tensions. Coalition building, consensus, and
collective action were among the solutions they improvised at a local level.

COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY:

TOWARD A RENEWED SYNTHESIS
Collective action theorists have criticized Marxist approaches for underspecifying agency and insti-
tutional structures (Blanton 2016). These critiques, we believe, refer to Marx’s nineteenth-century
formulations rather than to the contemporary use of Marxism by anthropological archaeologists.
As Earle & Spriggs (2015) argue, a political economy approach examines the creation of power
relationships that collective action theorists consider only peripherally. Until now, collective ac-
tion theorists in archaeology have devoted much attention to bottom-up agency in larger polities.
This emphasis was inspired, presumably, by a wish to demonstrate the utility of the ideas, as well
as to underscore the prevalence of compromise and negotiation among rulers and followers.
We question, however, whether collective action theory is best seen in opposition to, or as a
complement to, existing political economy approaches. Our suggestion is that considering them
together would facilitate a balanced understanding of the multiple pathways to complexity dis-
cussed earlier. In our view, the elegance of Levi’s (1988) thinking lies in the fact that the interests
motivating rulers (as individuals and as members of coalitions) may not be so different from those
motivating others. We suggest, therefore, that in combining the approaches, researchers can create
a renewed synthesis of considerable theoretical significance for archaeology.
Marxist perspectives, broadly conceived as considering the economic foundations of power,
have a continuing history in our discipline (Childe 1936, 1946; Earle & Spriggs 2015; Fried
1967; Harris 1999). At increasing scales, researchers have to pay careful attention to how power
relations were formalized in institutions. When individuals (or groups) gained control of crit-
ical resources, they perpetuated class-based inequalities and institutionalized unequal access to
surpluses ( Johnson & Earle 2000). Factions, classes, and divisions [along lines of age, gender,
local identity, or ethnicity (Brumfiel 1992)] characterize all large-scale polities; intrinsic to these
distinctions are overlapping, conflicting, and conjoined interests.
The institutions of leadership tend to be highly visible, given principals’ privileged access to
resources and their roles in materializing ideologies of legitimacy (DeMarrais et al. 1996). Archaeo-
logists are drawn to these power relationships, although the circumstances under which leaders
control “bottlenecks,” or constriction points, within systems of production or distribution (Earle &
Spriggs 2015) are rarer than we might imagine. In a significant number of cases, monopoly control
was not possible, and more collective polities emerged from compromise and negotiation. In these
settings, access to land, trade, or craft industries remained contentious. Farmers, merchants, and
artisans joined local associations to promote and to protect their shared interests. These settings,
where cooperative and collaborative political strategies proliferated, are precisely the cases to
which collective action theorists have the most to contribute.
To underscore this last point, from both a collective action theory and a Marxist perspective,
the establishment of political institutions in large-scale polities is always problematic. To quote
Blanton & Fargher (2013, p. 115), “[C]ooperation was established only with difficulty and against
great odds” (compare Earle 1997, p. 2). Because political power is more easily lost than gained,
theorists must conceive of balancing, or compromising, of interests over time. The bottlenecks
that allow for control of specific resources are effective only to the degree that alternatives do not
exist (Oka 2016) and that opportunities for escape are limited.
Marx and Engels surely knew the agency, or self-organizing potential, of classes, as seen in the
call to arms “workers of the world unite”; however, we suggest that archaeologists have been slow
to recognize the full implications of these activities. In this sense particularly, collective action
theory provides a productive refocusing of our efforts. Combining collective action theory with
Marxist approaches highlights how each social segment exercised agency. Such an analysis explains

the dynamics of institutions ranging from clan structures and sodalities to secret societies (in
smaller-scale societies) (Hayden & Villeneuve 2013, Saitta 1997, Ware 2014) to the brotherhood
associations or specialist craft guilds of medieval times. Craft sectors in traditional states, such
as those of Mesoamerica, Mesopotamia, or classic period Europe, were frequently organized to
protect their interests. Trading organizations in the Indian Ocean were self-organizing (Oka et al.
2009), as were those of city-states in Italy and the Hanseatic League of northern Europe.
In this light, “ruling” chieftains might best be viewed as yet another social segment pursuing
specific interests, for which a hierarchy of personalized, exclusionary relationships and institutions
was fashioned to consolidate its control and oversight. More generally, the structuring of political
institutions in all large-scale polities must be seen in dynamic terms, involving groups and factions
with different ideas and competing interests. Conflict and negotiation shaped specific historical
circumstances under which every political economy of the past took shape. Specific institutional
relationships, during a specific era, were one outcome of this unfolding process. A more general
implication of thinking in this way is that compromise—rather than oppression—would frequently

have been the outcome.
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Well-established in the social sciences, collective action theory investigates the complicated nature
of linkages among actors and institutions at distinct scales of social process. A collective action
perspective, as employed in recent work by archaeologists, highlights ways that individuals, who
pursue their self-interests, engage with others to build coalitions and, over time, to institutionalize
those relationships. Collective action theorists acknowledge that, as part of these endeavors, social
actors (including principals) negotiate their positions as they encounter others, with whom they
coexist, compete, or collaborate. A strength of the approach is its emphasis on people and their
agency within the framework of specific institutional structures.
A political economy approach focuses more explicitly on structured inequalities in access to
surplus and seeks to explain how they arise, how individuals and groups work strategically to
consolidate preferential access, and how (over the long term) inequalities become institutionalized
to create power differentials. Whereas collective action theorists focus on agents and their interests,
political economy theorists investigate specific points of articulation (in flows of labor, production,
or exchange) that can be transformed or restructured. An emphasis on strategies of political
economy encompasses individual agency but gives more explicit attention to what Mann (1986)
has called the organizational frameworks through which power operates. Also critical to an analysis
informed by Marxist theory are structural relationships that emerge to divide social segments.
A heterarchy approach reorients attention to those settings in the human past where bottom-
up processes predominated. In a heterarchical social order, institutions and coalitions may exist
alongside one another, rather than being arranged to create tiered, centralized, or hierarchical
systems. Social groups in heterarchies may be self-organizing, while power relations remain fluid
and flexible and therefore responsive to changing sociopolitical realities. Given the predominance
of horizontal linkages, face-to-face negotiations, and informal networks in heterarchies, life may be
more complicated for the individuals involved (Brumfiel 1995). However, heterarchy also preserves
autonomy and facilitates effective solutions to local problems. Although more heterarchical social
orders may not manage collaboration well at wider scales, leadership that is situational or justified
often works effectively when projects are limited in their scope, scale, or duration.
Our overarching aim in this review has been to evaluate the strengths of collective action theory,
as well as to show how it resembles—and differs from—existing approaches to power and politics.
Analysis of any complex society requires attention to nested scales of interaction, from household,

neighborhood, and community, to city, state, and region. It would make little sense to try to
encompass all these levels within a single body of theory. The past polities studied by archaeologists
and historians followed highly varied trajectories, recently characterized as distinctive pathways
to power. Pathways were shaped by agency, specific interests, and a host of cultural, historical,
and environmental factors. Understanding these local conditions is an essential first step. At the
same time, issues of agency and the dynamics of power relations remain fundamental to studying
social interaction. Investigating the articulation of agency, institutions, and power over the longue
durée remains a central objective for anthropological archaeologists.
Collective action theory adds nuanced understandings of the balance of interests among social
segments in complex societies. Its value lies in reconciling, to some degree, the gap separating
bottom-up approaches from top-down explanations. In our view, neither works well on its own,
as compromise underlies most political undertakings. Renewed attention to institution building is
a further, and useful, reminder that institutions impose order and help to render social interaction
more predictable. Of course, institutions also frequently serve group interests, rather than those
of society as a whole. In drawing attention to institutions, we are not seeking to reify them;
instead, we view institutions as channels for human agency that create and sustain more stable
relationships. In more complex societies, institutions leave archaeological traces to the extent that
they are associated with buildings, rituals, meeting places, objects, and symbols.
In conclusion, collective action theory brings renewed attention to the ongoing processes of
compromise that constitute political activities, both past and present. The research discussed
in this review also shows the value of comparative (as well as interdisciplinary) approaches for
investigating the past. We encourage anthropological archaeologists to integrate the insights of
collective action theory into future research. As a final point, we further encourage theorists in our
discipline to engage in dialogue across (rather than just within) the distinct theoretical approaches
we have mentioned in the course of this review.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that
might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.
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AN46_FrontMatter ARI 7 September 2017 20:51
Annual Review of
Anthropology
Contents Volume 46, 2017

Perspectives
Recovering the Body
Margaret Lock p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 1
Archaeology
Rock Art and Ontology
Andrew Meirion Jones p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 167
Collective Action Theory and the Dynamics of Complex Societies
Elizabeth DeMarrais and Timothy Earle p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 183
Archaeologies of the Contemporary World
Rodney Harrison and Esther Breithoff p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 203
The Archaeological Study of Sacrifice
Glenn M. Schwartz p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 223
Archaeology and Human–Animal Relations: Thinking Through
Anthropocentrism
Brian Boyd p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 299
Social Network Analysis in Archaeology
Barbara J. Mills p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 379
Biological Anthropology
Late Australopiths and the Emergence of Homo
Darryl J. de Ruiter, S.E. Churchill, J. Hawks, and L.R. Berger p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p99
Primate Positional Behavior Development and Evolution
Michelle Bezanson p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 279
The Monkeying of the Americas: Primate Biogeography in the
Neotropics
Jessica Lynch Alfaro p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 317
Brain Plasticity and Human Evolution
Chet C. Sherwood and Aida Gómez-Robles p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 399
vii
Anthropology of Language and Communicative Practices

Language and the Newness of Media
Ilana Gershon p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p15
Personal Narratives and Self-Transformation in Postindustrial
Societies
Cynthia Dickel Dunn p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p65

Human–Animal Communication
Don Kulick p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 357
Sociocultural Anthropology
Consuming DNA: The Good Citizen in the Age of Precision Medicine

Sandra Soo-Jin Lee p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p33
Precarious Placemaking
Melinda Hinkson p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p49
Marriage and Migration
Caroline B. Brettell p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p81
Fluid Drugs: Revisiting the Anthropology of Pharmaceuticals
Anita Hardon and Emilia Sanabria p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 117
Humans and Animals in Northern Regions
David G. Anderson p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 133
What Does Catastrophe Reveal for Whom? The Anthropology of
Crises and Disasters at the Onset of the Anthropocene
Roberto E. Barrios p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 151
A Bundle of Relations: Collections, Collecting, and Communities
Joshua A. Bell p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 241
The Datafication of Health
Minna Ruckenstein and Natasha Dow Schüll p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 261
China–Africa Encounters: Historical Legacies and Contemporary
Realities
Helen F. Siu and Mike McGovern p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 337
Epidemics (Especially Ebola)
Sharon Abramowitz p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 421
Theme: Human–Animal Interaction

Humans and Animals in Northern Regions
David G. Anderson p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 133
viii Contents
The Archaeological Study of Sacrifice

Glenn M. Schwartz p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 223
Primate Positional Behavior Development and Evolution
Michelle Bezanson p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 279
Archaeology and Human–Animal Relations: Thinking Through
Anthropocentrism
Brian Boyd p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 299
The Monkeying of the Americas: Primate Biogeography in the
Neotropics
Jessica Lynch Alfaro p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 317
Human–Animal Communication
Don Kulick p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 357
Indexes
Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 37–46 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 447

Cumulative Index of Article Titles, Volumes 37–46 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 451
Errata
An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Anthropology articles may be found at

http://www.annualreviews.org/errata/anthro
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AN46CH12-DeMarrais ARI 7 September 2017 7:52

Annual Review of Anthropology

Collective Action Theory

Elizabeth DeMarrais1 and Timothy Earle2

Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 2017. 46:183–201 Keywords

184 DeMarrais · Earle

COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Political Science Approaches

THEORIZING COOPERATION IN ANTHROPOLOGY

Studies of Cooperation: A Brief Overview

www.annualreviews.org • Collective Action Theory 185

186 DeMarrais · Earle

www.annualreviews.org • Collective Action Theory 187

Theorizing Collective Action for the Analysis of Complex Societies

188 DeMarrais · Earle

USING COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY: INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS,

and bottom-up approaches.

Agency, Interests, Coalitions, and Institutions

Multiple Scales: Collective Action Across Time and Space

www.annualreviews.org • Collective Action Theory 189

190 DeMarrais · Earle

Reconciling (and Linking) Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches

ARCHAEOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE, ANARCHY, AGENT-BASED

The Archaeology of Everyday Life

www.annualreviews.org • Collective Action Theory 191

Agent-Based Institutional Economic Theory

192 DeMarrais · Earle

www.annualreviews.org • Collective Action Theory 193

COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY:

194 DeMarrais · Earle

implication of thinking in this way is that compromise—rather than oppression—would frequently

SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS

www.annualreviews.org • Collective Action Theory 195

196 DeMarrais · Earle

www.annualreviews.org • Collective Action Theory 197

198 DeMarrais · Earle

America. World Archaeol. 48:87–109

www.annualreviews.org • Collective Action Theory 199

pp. 201–32. Walnut Grove, CA: AltaMira Press

200 DeMarrais · Earle

www.annualreviews.org • Collective Action Theory 201

Contents Volume 46, 2017

Anthropology of Language and Communicative Practices

Cynthia Dickel Dunn p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p65

Consuming DNA: The Good Citizen in the Age of Precision Medicine

Theme: Human–Animal Interaction

The Archaeological Study of Sacrifice

Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 37–46 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 447

An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Anthropology articles may be found at

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