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LEONARDO MORLINO
This article introduces three different notions of quality grounded in procedure, content
and result. Those three notions are at the core of three different notions of democratic
quality. Each of them has different implications for empirical research. Starting from
these premises, the article proposes some theoretical arguments fundamental to the
analysis of democratic quality and good democracy. In the first section definitions of
democracy and quality are suggested. The subsequent three sections analyse the
main emphasized dimensions, such as the rule of law, accountability, responsiveness,
freedom and equality. Such an analysis calls for indicators, certain measures that
reveal how and to what degree each dimension is present in various models of good
democracy, the numerous and related problems associated with empirical study, and
the essential conditions for its existence. The penultimate section indicates models
of good democracy and highlights the related and much more common models of
low quality democracies. The concluding remarks briefly mention the main directions
of future research on the topic.
Introduction
An analysis of the quality of democracy, that is, an empirical check on how
‘good’ a democracy is, requires not only that we assume some definition
of democracy, but also that we establish a clear notion of its quality. The
minimal definition of democracy1 suggests that such a regime has, at least,
the following: universal, adult suffrage; recurring, free, competitive and
fair elections; more than one political party; and more than one source of
information. Among those that meet these minimum criteria, further empirical
analysis is still necessary to detect the degree to which they have achieved the
two main objectives of an ideal democracy: freedom and political equality.
Thus, the analysis of a good democracy cannot include merely electoral
democracies,2 that is, hybrid regimes whose failure to ensure a minimum
level of civil rights keeps them below the minimum threshold requirements
for classification as strictly democratic. The defective democracies3 are also
Leonardo Morlino is Full Professor of Political Science at the University of Florence, Italy and
Director of the Research Centre on Southern Europe.
Democratization, Vol.11, No.5, December 2004, pp.10–32
ISSN 1351-0347 print=1743-890X online
DOI: 10.1080=13510340412331304589 # 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd.
WHAT IS A ‘GOOD’ DEMOCRACY? 11
the ‘counterparts’ of good democracies. In fact, as seen in this collection,
exclusive democracies, domain democracies, illiberal democracies, and
delegative democracies are themselves institutional hybrids that again fall
short of the minimum threshold specified above.
In contrast, delegative democracies, according to the different notion
proposed by O’Donnell,4 sometimes referred to as populist democracies, over-
come that minimal democratic threshold. These regimes are usually based on a
majority system, they host ‘clean elections’, ‘parties, parliament, and the press
are usually free to express their criticisms’, and ‘the courts block unconstitu-
tional policies’. In practice, however, citizens in these democracies ‘delegate
others to make decisions on their behalf’ when they cast their vote, and then
no longer have the opportunity to check and evaluate the performance of their
officials once they are elected. Other organs of government, even those meant
for this purpose, also neglect or fail to carry out their watchdog function and,
consequently, the so-called rule of law is only partially or minimally respected.5
Those who analyze populist democracies cite similar problems, evaluating
many current democracies as regimes in which the principle of representa-
tion, and thus those of the delegation of powers and accountability, are not
supported in reality. These principles are instead overcome by a supposed
‘direct’ democracy in which largely symbolic, irrational ties connect a
powerful leader, often a particularly strong president or prime minister, to a
relatively undifferentiated civil society. Certain countries in eastern Europe
and Latin America, and some suggest even Italy, come close to this model,
presenting clear flaws in providing a full and comprehensive guarantee of
civil rights, and of political rights as well.
As mentioned above, a second step in evaluating ‘good’ democracies
requires a clear definition of ‘quality’. A survey of the use of the term in the
industrial and marketing literatures suggests at least three different meanings:
needs. Ignoring, and not making these assumptions clear from the outset, would
be fallacious. It is also erroneous to consider each of them as a mere ideological
choice. One must rather acknowledge that western democracies have followed a
liberal-democratic trajectory and that any concrete analysis of the quality of a
given democracy must take this into account and shift towards a direction
marked by more egalitarian choices.
Freedom and equality, however they are understood, are necessarily linked
to accountability and responsiveness. Indeed, a higher implementation of
freedom and equality for citizens and civil society lies in the sphere of
those representative mechanisms. In addition, effective rule of law is also
indispensable for a good democracy. The rule of law is intertwined with
freedom in the same respect for all laws that directly or indirectly sanction
those rights and their concrete realization. As the next section will explain,
freedom, equality and even accountability are actually unobtainable if the
respect for law is ineffective or decisional efficacy is not granted by the gov-
ernment and the administration. These are the fundamental presuppositions
necessary for deciding on and realizing good democratic policies.
The principal subjects of such a democracy are individual citizens, territorial
communities and various forms of associations who share common values, tra-
ditions or aims. In this sense, the possibility for good democracy exists not only
for a defined territory with a specific population controlled by state institutions
under a democratic government, but also for wider-ranging entities. The main
point here is that the above-named subjects are at the heart of a democracy,
in which the most important processes are those that work from the bottom
up, and not vice-versa. In this way, the shift of the analysis of the dimensions
of democratic functioning from the national to the supra-national level,
though not entirely problematic, is nevertheless possible. The key is to hold con-
stant the same elements characteristic of each dimension.12
The necessity of capturing the complexity inherent in the notion of a
‘good’ democracy motivates the employment of the five dimensions
elaborated above. The present elaboration flags two aspects of each dimension:
Each might vary from the others, both in terms of form and relative degree of
development. As such, the analysis calls for indicators, that is to say certain
measures that reveal how and to what degree each dimension is present
both in various models of good democracy and in their practical application
in different countries. The empirical data should also enable an eventual
tracking of the growth of quality democracies.
. The application erga omnes of the legal system, also at the supra-national
level, guaranteeing the rights and equality of citizens.
. The absence of areas dominated by organized crime.
. The absence of corruption in the political, administrative, and judicial
branches.
. The existence of a local and centralized civil bureaucracy that
competently, effectively and universally applies the law and assumes
responsibility in the event of error.
. The existence of an efficient police force that respects the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by law.
. Equal, unhindered access of citizens to the legal system in the case of
lawsuits either between private citizens or between private citizens and
public institutions; this also implies that citizens know their rights and
can obtain representation.
. Reasonably swift resolution of criminal inquiries and of civil and
administrative lawsuits.
. The complete independence of the judiciary from any political influence.
All of the above concerns the effective application of the law and the fair
resolution of lawsuits within the legal system. Each can be represented by
various indicators, and the relevant data can be analyzed on a case-by-case
16 DEMOCRATIZATION
basis using both qualitative and quantitative techniques. The main character-
istics, and the degree to which the rule of law is respected, can be recon-
structed for each case in each country.15
It should be emphasized that the analysis implicitly proposed here would
be extremely expensive and practically impossible to apply to a high
number of cases. The level of detail and thoroughness of such an investigation
is suited to a limited number of cases, yielding the best results for a project
aimed at examining, at most, four or five countries. Additional cases would
require a reduction in the number of variables and the elimination of some
dimensions. Those that should be kept in the analysis at all costs, even in a
quantitative analysis involving many cases, include: the level of corruption,
with whatever data are available regarding the phenomenon; the access of
citizens to the court system; and the duration of legal proceedings using the
pertinent judiciary statistics. It is clear, however, that these few indicators
can provide only an incomplete picture.
A closer look at the concrete problems of implementation should be
accompanied by an awareness of some opposing forces that have recently
received attention in numerous papers and studies. First and foremost, a
rigorous application of laws or, in certain cases, the relationship with an
only superficially efficient bureaucracy can have particularly negative conse-
quences for the most socially weak and vulnerable members of society.16 Then
there is the possible use of the law as a genuine ‘political weapon’.17 Here we
see a persistent and diffuse temptation for politicians to use the election law
against their adversaries if, for example, a political party is condemned to
remain in opposition status for a long time and has no chance of electoral
victory in the near future. Politicians are also tempted to use judicial acts
to reinforce their own positions against the opposition. In other cases, when
there is collusion among politicians, the judges themselves, with the support
of the media, are tempted to turn to the judiciary when retaliating against
certain political decisions that they consider unacceptable. On a different
level, there is also a growing tendency among individual citizens or economic
groups to resort to the law to assert their own interests. Some scholars
note this phenomenon as a ‘juridification’ of contemporary democracy.18
Finally, and related to this, there is the popular and diffuse cultural attitude
that interprets the law as a severe impediment to realizing one’s own interests
that should be circumvented in any way possible. This attitude, common
in various countries throughout the world, from southern Europe to
Latin America and also eastern Europe, extends from the popular to the
entrepreneurial classes.
In summary, the analysis of the democratic rule of law in any one country
should be made carefully, with attention to trends that work against its
full realization. It remains an essential factor of democratic quality, and it
WHAT IS A ‘GOOD’ DEMOCRACY? 17
plays a very important role for the existence and development of the other
relevant dimensions.
What then, are the fundamental conditions that allow for at least a
moderate development of the rule of law? Research on various aspects of
this topic suggests that the diffusion of liberal and democratic values on
both the popular and, especially, the elite level, as well as the existence of a
bureaucratic tradition and the legislative and economic means necessary
for its full implementation, are necessary conditions for the democratic rule
of law. However, these conditions exist in very few countries, and they are
very difficult to create. Consequently, it is also difficult to cultivate and
grow this dimension of democratic quality. The most reasonable and concrete
strategy would be to proceed in short, measured steps that follow the reasoning
and objectives pursued above. This strategy is inherently critical of Putnam’s
conclusions that the institutional contours of a specific democratic regime
are fixed in the oldest civic traditions of that country, and that a country’s
institutions necessarily change extremely slowly.19
Accountability, the second dimension of democratic quality here con-
sidered, is the obligation of elected political leaders to answer for their
political decisions when asked by citizen-electors or other constitutional
bodies. Schedler suggests that accountability has three main features: infor-
mation, justification and punishment/compensation.20 The first element, infor-
mation on the political act or series of acts by a given politician or political
body (the government, parliament, and so on), is indispensable for attributing
responsibility. Justification refers to the reasons furnished by the governing
leaders for their actions and decisions. The third, punishment/compensation,
is the consequence drawn by the elector or other person or body following
an evaluation of the information, justifications and other aspects and interests
behind a given political act. All three of these elements require the existence of
a public sphere characterized by pluralism and independence and the real
participation of a range of individual and collective actors.
Accountability can be either vertical or horizontal. Vertical accountability
is that which electors can demand from their elected official, that the governed
can require of the governor in the light of certain acts that he has executed.
This first type of accountability has a periodic nature and is dependent
on the various national, local and, if they exist, supra-national election
dates. The voter makes the decision, either awarding the incumbent candidate
or slate of candidates with a vote in their favour, or punishing them by voting
for another candidate, abstaining from the vote, or by nullifying the ballot. The
actors involved in vertical accountability are the governor and the governed,
and are thus politically unequal. This dimension of democratic quality can
become less irregular only if one considers the various electoral occasions
at the local, national and, for European citizens, supra-national levels.
18 DEMOCRATIZATION
TABLE 1
QUALITY DEMOCRACIES
þ Effective
þ þ Responsible
þ þ þ Fully
legitimate
þ þ þ Free
þ þ þ þ Egalitarian
Note: The plus indicates a high presence of the dimension listed at the top of each respective
column.
28 DEMOCRATIZATION
TABLE 2
DEMOCRACIES WITHOUT QUALITY
2 Ineffective
2 2 Irresponsible
2 2 2 Illegitimate
2 2 2 Reduced
2 2 2 Unequal
Note: The minus sign indicates the lack of the dimension listed at the top of the relevant column.
disputes; and expensive (and thus exclusive) access to the court system.
O’Donnell’s concept of delegative democracies would correspond to ineffi-
cient democracy,44 with diffused corruption, the absence of horizontal
accountability and the weakness of vertical accountability. In some analyses,
populist democracies are party-less regimes in which the fragmentation of
political identities and ideological, as well as organizational confusion chara-
cterize the decline of representative mechanisms.45 Consequently, these
regimes see a weaker enforcement of accountability and a greater presence
of movements and the ‘masses’ in direct relation with political leaders.46
Irresponsible democracies, however, are characterized either by the
absence of electoral alternatives – little competition among the dominant
political forces active in parliament or in the country as a whole – or else
weak intermediary structures. Poorly legitimate or illegitimate democracies
stem from diffuse discontentment. They often experience multiple challenges
to their institutions by more or less organized groups that launch protests,
strikes and demonstrations on a more or less regular basis. The result of
such discontentment is that governments, in reaction to these challenges,
often defend themselves by cracking down on other freedoms. The experience
of terrorist movements in Italy and Germany, and the reactions of these
countries’ respective democratic regimes, are good examples of this
dynamic. However, the most recent and dramatic example is represented by
the United States after ‘September 11’.
For lack of a better term, I call the fourth ‘democracy without quality’
a reduced democracy. Here, social rights are ever more limited, and the
political right par excellence, the vote, is limited to choosing among lists
that are nominated by the oligarchy of the party. Information is often mono-
polized by a single media mogul, with the expected results in terms of exag-
gerated influence over public opinion and restricted alternatives for other
forms and sources of information.
Unequal democracies might spring up in the presence of deep economic
problems when the economic policies pursued by the government are rooted
WHAT IS A ‘GOOD’ DEMOCRACY? 29
in strong conceptions of the market and competition, but are not attenuated by
the presence of solidarity and social justice. In addition, high levels of immi-
gration of individuals who have no means of subsistence and are willing to
take any job can also contribute to the development of this type of regime.
In these democracies, social and economic distances between sub-groups of
the population steadily increase, rather than decline.
Concluding Remarks
The analysis of democratic quality could be continued in at least four different
directions. The first one is the empirical analysis of either one case or a few
cases through the development of indicators and field research.47 A second
direction refers to the development of typologies and models of democratic
quality following the analysis sketched out in the previous section of this
chapter. The basic idea is that there is no unique model of good democracy
available for consideration. A pluralism of notions has to be accepted, in so
far as such pluralism simply mirrors the different ideal choices that may be
made when we refer normatively to democracy. The explanations of the
levels of quality and of detected models should also be explored in depth.
This third direction of analysis largely overlaps with the research carried
out by Merkel, Puhle48 and others, who explicitly refer to explanatory
factors (see Merkel in this collection). Finally, there is also a fourth path
that is more focused on policy features and may be reduced to a few basic
questions. The main ones include the following: How is it possible to over-
come the authoritarian traditions of a given country and, from this perspective,
to cope with one of the main obstacles to the development of quality? Is there
a best institutional design for a ‘good’ democracy, with the help of which
some institutional adaptation and change might bring about higher quality?
Do international factors hinder a ‘good’ democracy? How, if this is so, can
such factors be circumvented or, as viewed from another vantage-point,
could external help be exploited to increase the quality of a given country’s
democracy? All four directions of research briefly mentioned here can be
usefully studied further and are relevant to the lives of everyone who lives
in a democracy.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The author thanks Wolfgang Merkel and Jürg Steiner for their very helpful comments on the first
draft of this study.
NOTES
1. Leonardo Morlino, Democracy between Consolidation and Crisis: Parties, Groups, and
Citizens in Southern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
30 DEMOCRATIZATION
35. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam (eds), Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling the
Trilateral Countries? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Russell J. Dalton,
Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam ‘What’s Troubling the Trilateral Democracies?’ in
Pharr and Putnam, Disaffected Democracies, p.25.
36. Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris, ‘Confidence in Public Institutions: Fate, Culture, or
Performance?’ in Pharr and Putnam, Disaffected Democracies (note 35) pp.52–73.
37. Donatella Della Porta, ‘Social Capital, Beliefs in Government and Political Corruption’, in
Pharr and Putnam (note 35) pp.202–29; for research on corruption, see Donatella Della
Porta and Yves Meny (eds), Democracy and Corruption in Europe (London: Washington,
Pinter, 1997), and Donatella Della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, Corrupt Exchanges.
Actors, Resources and Mechanisms of Political Corruption (New York: Aldine de Gruyter,
1999).
38. Robert A. Dahl, Poliarchy. Participation and Opposition, (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1971); Thomas H. Marshall, Sociology at the Crossroad (London: Heinemann, 1963).
39. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, Capitalist
Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp.269– 302.
40. This equality is also sanctioned by the legal system and covered in manuals of constitutional
rights. See Paolo Caretti, I diritti fondamentali: libertà e diritti sociali (Torino: Giappichelli
2002), esp. ch.5.
41. This is ‘simply’ part of paragraph 2, article 3 of the Italian constitution (see ibid., pp.150–51).
42. The web sites of the European Union and of the Italian Chamber of Deputies provide the text
of this charter, with the EU site offering commentary on and explanations of the document.
43. Leonardo Morlino, Democrazie e Democratizzazioni (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003), pp.225–54.
44. O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’ (note 4).
45. See, for example, Peter Mair, ‘Populist Democracy vs. Party Democracy’, in Yves Mény
and Yves Surel (eds), Democracies and the Populist Challenge (London: Palgrave, 2002),
pp.81–98.
46. The populist phenomenon, with its placing of ‘the people’ at the centre of democracy, has
recently been analysed as a reaction to the tensions, discontent, dissatisfaction and protest –
in a word, to the democratic ‘malaise’ that has surfaced in recent years in western Europe. See
Mény and Surel (note 45); Marco Tarchi, L’Italia populista (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003).
47. For an empirical implementation of the theoretical framework suggested above to the Italian
case see Leonardo Morlino, ‘What is a “Good” Democracy?’ (note 15) pp.14– 32.
48. Wolfgang Merkel, Hans-Jürgen Puhle et al., Defekte Demokratien (Opladen: VS Verlag,
2003).
Address for correspondence: Leonardo Morlino, Università degli Studi di Firenze, Via delle
Pandette, 21, I-50127 Firenze, Italy. E-mail: morlino@unifi.it