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GP 10-80
Applicability Group
Date 11 June 2008
GP 10-80
Well Testing
Group Practice
BP GROUP
ENGINEERING TECHNICAL PRACTICES
11 June 2008 GP 10-80
Well Testing
Foreword
This is the first issue of Engineering Technical Practice (ETP) BP GP 10-80 for Well Testing and
Clean Up Operations. This Group Practice (GP) has been developed to provide the basic framework
outlining how BP operations will manage Well Testing and Clean Up activities using temporary
surface process facilities and /or well completion installations.
All well testing and clean up operations shall be designed to conform with GP 10-80 (Well Testing ETP)
29.1 The equipment programmed for the Well Testing or Clean Up operations shall be designed to be
able to safely control the maximum potential pressures that the reservoirs may be able to
generate.
29.2 Timely HAZOP/HAZID reviews shall be conducted covering the Well Testing/Clean Up
equipment and operations plans for all newly programmed activities. A process safety specialist
should be involved in this review. However a generalised review covering a programme of
similar operations on multiple wells is acceptable as long as an appropriate MOC programme
addresses potential variations.
29.3 A detailed programme for Well Testing or Clean up operations shall be prepared for each well.
29.4 All installed Temporary Process Equipment shall be checked to confirm compliance with the
relevant documented P&ID (Process and Instrumentation Diagram).
29.5 BOP’s and associated equipment shall be tested immediately prior to running the test string.
29.6 All connections within test strings or completion strings with packers shall be tested to the
maximum anticipated pressure, plus a safety margin, prior to flowing the well.
29.7 The test string shall be designed to allow effective well kill in the event of any potential failed
closed valve within the string. The test string shall include the facility to allow the string
contents to be circulated or bullheaded prior to pulling out of hole.
29.8 All surface well testing or completion equipment potentially exposed to high operating
pressures shall be pressure tested to the maximum anticipated pressure, plus an acceptable
safety margin, prior to flowing the well.
29.9 All other process equipment shall be tested to its rated working pressure or to an appropriate
test pressure that will not actuate installed relief valves.
29.10 Test lines, relief lines, process equipment and all relevant temporary fittings shall be securely
anchored. Particular attention shall be given to line fixing at each end and along their length.
29.11 Relief lines shall be designed to accommodate the maximum potential fault flow rate without
exceeding their own pressure rating.
29.12 Emergency Shut Down systems shall be function tested and confirmed operational prior to the
start of well flowing.
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Well Testing
29.13 The air supply to burners shall be independent of the rig air supply. Non return valves should be
fitted between the compressors and burner head.
29.14 Unlatch equipment deployed for floating rig operations shall be function tested prior to running
tools into the well.
29.15 Subsea test trees and test string deployed safety valves shall be capable of shearing all coiled
tubing and wireline to be run through the test string.
29.16 The capability of the BOP’s to shear the Sub Sea tree slick joint shall be determined and
suitable safeguards installed to prevent the test string being pulled to position non shear-able
assemblies across the shear rams.
29.17 During testing sufficient main power, well control and installation services shall be available
and on line to service unplanned or emergency conditions that may occur during the test.
29.18 Nitrogen used to pre-charge DST tools or samplers shall be certified oxygen free or analysed on
site to confirm quality before use.
29.19 All rig installed and temporary gas detection systems and safety equipment shall be certified fit
for use prior to the start of flow.
29.20 After completing well testing or clean up operations reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure
that the well conditions are safe to allow tripping out of the hole to commence.
Copyright 2008, BP Group. All rights reserved. The information contained in this
document is subject to the terms and conditions of the agreement or contract under which
the document was supplied to the recipient’s organisation. None of the information
contained in this document shall be disclosed outside the recipient’s own organisation
without the prior written permission of BP Group, unless the terms of such agreement or
contract expressly allow.
Table of Contents
Page
Foreword ........................................................................................................................................ 2
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 5
1. Scope .................................................................................................................................... 6
2. Normative references............................................................................................................. 6
3. Terms and definitions............................................................................................................. 7
4. Symbols and abbreviations .................................................................................................... 7
5. Objectives of this document ................................................................................................... 9
6. Organisation and competencies............................................................................................. 9
6.1. Management accountability ........................................................................................ 9
6.2. Management delegation.............................................................................................. 9
6.3. Organisational structure ............................................................................................ 10
6.4. Senior Petroleum Engineer responsibilities ............................................................... 10
6.5. SPE and Testing support staffing requirements ........................................................ 10
6.6. Testing Contractor support requirements .................................................................. 11
6.7. Specialist services and other support requirements .................................................. 11
6.8. POB Management .................................................................................................... 11
6.9. Training Expectations ............................................................................................... 12
7. Well Test Planning and Design Concepts ............................................................................ 12
7.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 12
7.2. Test Basis of Design ................................................................................................. 13
7.3. Equipment Selection and Design Fundamentals ....................................................... 15
7.4. Programme Generation............................................................................................. 23
7.5. Equipment and Process Plant Commissioning.......................................................... 24
7.6. Start Up Limitations................................................................................................... 28
7.7. Performance Indicators ............................................................................................. 29
List of Tables
Introduction
Well Testing and Clean-up operations involve flowing significant quantities of flammable and
potentially explosive hydrocarbons. Safely conducting these operations, on installations primarily
designed for drilling, can be consistently achieved with correctly prepared, installed and
commissioned temporary process equipment.
This GP provides direction on the minimum standards required to design and manage these operations
whilst keeping within the spirit of the BP Group HSE Standard for “Process Safety/Integrity
Management”, as follows: “Mechanical and structural systems shall be operated, inspected, tested
and maintained, consistent with accepted standards to ensure that equipment is fit for service, so as to
avoid loss of containment and structural integrity”.
Good design and operating procedures are essential to deliver safe operations. All equipment installed
in any temporary process system needs to meet the correct design, maintenance, and inspection
standards and be certified as fit for use.
It should be noted that no specific reference is made in this document to any additional or special
procedures that relate to managing HPHT Well Testing or Clean-up operations. It is recognised that all
Testing and Clean Up operations introduce significant risk and the same demanding requirements that
are routinely placed on HPHT operations should be delivered consistently to all test operations.
1. Scope
This GP provides critical guidance on the design, planning, commissioning and operation of
temporary Well Testing and Clean Up operations.
The GP will not cover the following subject matter and these will need to be addressed by referring to
the relevant safety and operational standards:
2. Normative references
The following normative documents contain requirements that, through reference in this text,
constitute requirements of this technical practice. For dated references, subsequent amendments to, or
revisions of, any of these publications do not apply. However, parties to agreements based on this
technical practice are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of
the normative documents indicated below. For undated references, the latest edition of the normative
document referred to applies. Requirements in these documents not referenced are not requirements of
this technical practice
BP
GP 10-01 Casing & Tubing Design
BPA-D-003 Casing Design Manual
TS-D-007 Completion Design Manual
GP 04-30 Guidance on Practice for Design and Location of Occupied Permanent
Buildings Subject to Blast Fire and Gas Hazards on Onshore Facilities
GP 24-10 Guidance on Practice for Fire Protection Onshore
GP 24-20 Guidance on Practice for Offshore Fire & Explosion Hazard Management
GP 24-21 Guidance on Practice for Fire Hazard Analysis
GP 24-22 Guidance on Practice for Gas Explosion Hazard Analysis
GP 48-02 Guidance on Practice for Hazard and Operability Studies
GP 48-50 Guidance on Practice for Major Accident Risk Process
Industry Standards
API Spec 5CT Specification for casing and tubing
API RP 7G Recommended practice for drill stem design and operating limits
API Spec 6A Specification for valves and wellhead equipment
API Spec 14A Specification for sub surface safety valve equipment
API RP 14C Recommended practice for analysis design installation and testing of
basic surface safety systems on offshore production platforms
API RP 14E Recommended practice for design and installation of offshore production
platform piping systems
For the purposes of this GP, the following terms and definitions apply:
Shall
Shall defines a requirement that needs to be followed to be in compliance with the standard.
Should
Should defined as a preference that is expected to meet the spirit of the standard
May
Indicates a course of action that is permissible
Can
Can requirements are defined as “having the ability to” under the terms of the standard
Accountable
Person who has authority to approve or disapprove.
Responsible
Person who is responsible for carrying out the requirement
Technical Authority
Person(s) responsible for guiding safe and consistent application of regulatory, BP, and industry codes
and standards, and good engineering practices.
For the purpose of this GP, the following symbols and abbreviations apply:
DP Dynamic Positioning.
GP Group Practice
HP High Pressure
IA Inspection Authority.
NPT National Pipe Thread designed to American National Pipe Tapered Thread specification
POB Personnel on Board (reference to manning levels for offshore installations or camps)
PE Petroleum Engineer.
psi Pounds force per square inch Customary Oilfield Unit of Pressure
TA Technical Authority
The objectives of this document are to promote the safe and efficient well testing operations through
the application of consistently high standards in technical design, planning and operational procedures
a. Full time SPE cover within the Wells team should start a minimum of six months before
well spud is planned. Earlier part-time cover may be adequate for the initial test planning,
tender preparation and contractor selection activities. Additional early cover should be
sought during the rig selection process and ITT
b. SPE candidates shall be experienced, qualified, assessed as being competent for the work
that they do and endorsed by the Segment Technical Authority.
c. SPE office based cover may be provided on either a continuous or full time rotational
basis.
d. Ideally the office-based SPE(s) will assume the site-based SPE role
e. Site based SPE support will require a minimum of one SPE and an additional PE to
provide full time 12-hour shift cover.
f. Experienced office-based cover during the test phase is recommended, however remote
support may be possible where communications systems allow e.g. expert cover is
available at alternative BP office
a. Discussion with rig/camp management to ensure a suitable balance between rig and BP
third-party crews.
b. Manning levels when testing sour wells with high levels of H2S.sometimes require a three-
shift pattern due to the fatigue and stress when working with SCBA equipment and or
cascade air systems in exceptionally demanding ambient conditions e.g. 40°C and 100%
humidity.
c. Crew fatigue, related to extended site to camp travel,.
d. No crews should be accommodated on adjacent supply vessels against their will.
7.1. Introduction
Well Testing and Clean-up operations should manage the disposal of hydrocarbons and other
produced well fluids in a safe and environmentally sustainable manner. These activities
introduce abnormal risks compared with standard drilling activities and need to be addressed
appropriately. Correctly engineering the planning and design for these services is a critical
element in the delivery of safe operations.
In general plant and equipment found in oil & gas refineries is deigned to handle
steady state processes with known tightly controlled parameters that, once brought
on line, maintain fairly constant pressures, temperatures and flow regimes. The
processes allow for a high degree of automation. Minor changes in expected
conditions are regulated and reported automatically, major changes can initiate
central alarms and system shut downs as appropriate.
Conversely well testing process plant is designed to handle various fluids and solids
in a short time frame whose pressure, temperature and flow are nearly always of a
transient nature. It is neither possible nor desirable to design for the same level
automation as found in refineries. Continuous monitoring and intervention is
desirable and requires highly trained and experienced operators to maintain
control.
Well testing process equipment is designed to afford the flexibility to safely handle a
wide range of operating conditions. Should conditions develop, through equipment
or operation failure, that exceed predetermined safe operating levels then the system
is designed to shut down safely through, automatic valve operation, preventing
further influx from the well and contain hydrocarbon inventory in the system. In the
event of an automatic shutdown system failure or inadequate response time primary
protection for system over pressure is provided by dedicated relief valve and venting
systems for relevant system sections.
The desgn of the test should be such as to withstand the maximum range in
temperatures expected during the well test.
a) Modelling of temperature profiles within the well and BOP areas should be
conducted during the design phase. This may require specialist software not used
during drilling operations.
b) Suitable real time temperature monitoring systems should be run to monitor
BOP ram temperatures, to ensure that the BOP’s can be operated within their
specified operating envelope
c) Where Annular Pressure Build up is anticipated and cement placement is used to
provide potential leak off paths consideration should be given to install
temperature and pressure monitoring gauges in the relevant annular spaces.
d) Minimum extremes of temperature should be considered. Controls shall be
implemented when these values approach the lowest rated safe working
temperature for the equipment. A factor of safety similar to that applied for
pressure should be applied along with the controls.
3. Well Fluids: Reservoir Fluid Uncertainty
The fluid nature has a significant impact on the design of the well test. Specifically the
production of gas contrasts with that of oil in its behaviour and in the hazards
associated with handling in the process equipment. As much data as is available
should be included in the Basis of Design to describe the expected fluid. So that its
behaviour can be predicted and planned for.
Reservoir fluid should be assessed, where possible, using all appropriate tools,
however, well testing completion and process system designs should always meet sour
service NACE MR 01-75 specifications. Where detailed field knowledge can
confidently confirm that no H2S will be produced standard service equipment can
safely be used during the operations.
a) In exploration wells wireline formation tester tools – e.g MDT, RCI, RDT or
others should be run to collect samples prior to any well testing operations.
These samples should be carefully field analysed to provide detailed knowledge
of the fluid that will need to be managed. E.g fluid type, oil, estimated GOR and
density, potential for wax, gas, basic composition, estimated CGR, potential
contaminants, H2S, CO2, etc.
Improved operational safety will be achieved when a better understanding of
potential fluid type is available. An example of this is commissioning tests on gas
wells that have an exceptionally high concentration of CO2 and possible H2S. Gas
indications from logs and pressure data alone may not always highlight the
potential fluid risk.
4. Well Fluids : Mud and Completion Fluids
Mud and completions fluids are critical components that need effective management
to ensure they are suitable for the Well testing or Clean Up Operations. The well test
design should address mud or completion fluid types with the relevant experienced
mud engineers and drilling personnel to secure a suitable design and preparation
programme can be delivered ahead of the testing operation.
a) Mud and completion fluid design criteria shall address the justification for using
over balanced or under-balanced test designs.
b) Mud compatibility studies with DST and other tool elastomers, e.g. packers and
seal assemblies should be conducted to ensure suitability for the planned
operation
f. The primary testing contractor Project Manager or technical representative and the BP SPE
should be requested to conduct a rig visit as soon as possible to assess the exact
requirements and integration activities that are required to deliver a safe Well Testing or
Clean Up operation. Where previous testing activity has been conducted on the rig and
facilities are familiar to the primary testing contractor this visit may be delayed to coincide
with further assessment visits by specialist support groups should these prove necessary.
g. Additional process risk assessments should be conducted as indicated in 7.3.7 below
For Exploration and Appraisal wells, where no permanent completions will be installed,
temporary downhole DST tools will generally be run and installed for the duration of the testing
operation and then recovered from the well following completion of well kill operations.
The design of the test string shall be based around a knowledge of the fluids and the well
conditions of pressure and temperature :
a. Test tools with premium connections shall be utilised in general. Non premium
connections shall only be utilised for low pressure conditions.
b. All DST tools and systems should be designed to allow for commissioning pressure tests
of all tool connections to the maximum anticipated differential pressure likely during
testing operations.
c. DST tools and systems should be designed to withstand the maximum anticipated failure
conditions during testing operations.
System overpressure during fault conditions may damage downhole tools and make
them inoperative. It is important to review all potential failure conditions, especially
when operating close to the margins of the equipment. For example a potential
tubing leak close to the BOP’s could create maximum annular over-pressures that
exceed the annular design pressure of the tools and could lead to internal damage
which would create significant difficulties for both killing the well and subsequent
recovery of the DST string .
d. DST tools shall be designed to provide a single-shot back up circulating path to allow a
bypass kill or pressure equalisation fluid pathway to the formation in case the direct route
is obstructed by a failed closed tester or other in-line valve.
e. A single shot back up revering valve should be installed above all other DST tool
components to provide the best chance of achieving circulation.
f. DST system designs should incorporate a single-shot pump-through flapper safety valve
positioned below the lowest circulating device to restrict any further hydrocarbon influx
following breach, or controlled activation.
n. The kill wing outlet should have a non-return valve installed between the flowhead and the
kill Coflexip or Coflon line. This should prevent hydrocarbon ingress at the cement unit.
o. If the production standpipe is teed to the pits or other rig system, then the isolations of this
branch section shall require special controls and approval from senior management.
Well kill operations are best managed using reverse circulation techniques. The
introduction of the non return valve on the kill side outlet of the flowhead makes
these operations more difficult. To minimise man riding operations provision of a
secondary flow path back to the rig mud system via the flowline standpipe can
create a less risky rig up. This flexibility does create the potential interconnection of
the high pressure flowline and the rig mud system so stringent permit to work and
lock out systems shall be in place to address these risks.
p. Where the landing string may be utilised as a lubricator for wireline operations two
separate, independently controlled, lubricator valves shall be employed providing double
barrier isolation for staff involved in deploying the wireline toolstring. Lubricator valves
should be fail-as-is designs that provide pump through capability if they fail closed.
q. Lubricator valves should be positioned away from the telescopic riser slip joints. .
7.3.6. Surface Safety Valve Requirements – Jack Ups Platforms and Land Rigs
A fail safe closed remotely activated safety valve providing pump through capability positioned
within the BOP stack should be part of the DST string design for Well Testing operations being
conducted from Jack Up’s , Land Rigs or Platforms.
Standardisation on equipment used in service to 10,000 psi and 15,000 psi nominal
rated equipment has been chosen to minimise the risks associated with older
possibly less well maintained nominally rated 5,000 osi WP equipment. There may
still be cases where the use of suitably prepared and maintained 5,000 psi WP rated
equipment could deliver a safe and acceptable operational system, however these
should only be endorsed by exception and a clear documented risk assessment
undertaken before use of this equipment.
The primary risk associated with the use of 5,000 psi rated equipment comes from
poorer maintenance of older equipment normally used in low margin operations.
Additionally reduced familiarity with the equipment can enhance the potential
operational operating risks. The lower rated pressure also reduces the system safety
margins.
In general the use of older 5,000 psi rated equipment shall not be authorised except under
exceptional circumstances.
The effect of temperature shall also be evaluated for every design. Certain conditions,
particularly on gas well tests may take the surface process equipment close to its lower
operating temperature limit. The high pressure flexible hose is often a weak point in terms of its
ability to operate at extremes of temperature. Reference to the specifications for every
component should be made individually to verify its suitability to the conditions.
The reduced operating pressures for 10,000 and 15,000 psi equipment increase the potential
safety margin during operations. As a by-product it also means a more detailed risk assessment
to justify any dispensation to operate at pressures approaching the maximum design working
pressures. Where detailed reservoir and well pressure knowledge can be documented
dispensation to allow operation at pressures closer to the maximum working pressures may be
sought. However a HAZOP should be conducted with acceptable failure and mitigation
contingencies put in place to manage operations safely.
There is a broad spectrum of surface process equipment used during temporary well
testing and clean up operations. These systems have a number of interconnected
modules with different pressure operating ranges that need to be effectively
managed and protected through appropriate system design. Typically temporary
installations of surface process equipment, which are most frequently processing
transient fluid state,s can not fully utilise automatic control and shutdown systems
normally found in permanent installations and have to rely on competent operators
and processes to ensure safe operation (This is similar to commissioning and
process start up on most process plants). The intention of this ETP is to define the
critical areas and adopt processes to ensure the highest levels of safety during Well
Testing and Clean Up operations.
In addition to compliance with standards, the following points should also be considered when
planning the surface equipment design.:
a. Positioning of surface process equipment on a rig or wellsite location shall take into
account risks associated with proximity to permanently manned accommodation,
hazardous areas, and the risks associated with gas or hydrocarbon releases.
b. Gas dispersal, explosion and fire assessment reviews shall be addressed during the
planning stages for testing operations. Additional detailed studies for particular set ups
may be required if such an assessment is not in place or if the existing assessment is
inadequate for the conditions.
c. A pressure relief system designed to protect over pressure of any process equipment shall
be installed if fault or adverse operating conditions could result in system overpressure.
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Where over pressure risk are likely to be derived from upstream higher pressure rated
equipment pressure relief systems should be installed at the specification break.
The possibility of blockages in lower pressure lines may prevent a pressure relief
system from operating if it is positioned downstream of the fault.
d. Back pressure and PSV throughput caculations shall be performed to confirm the
suitability of the relieving device setup.
e. Pressure relief lines shall be adequately secured to suitable structural elements of the rig
for offshore operations. Relief lines installed on land locations should be secured to
suitable heavyweight stand alone structures that provide sufficient inertia to prevent pipe
movement. Particular care and focus should be taken to secure relief lines at their outlet
location .
Relief outlets are subject to high forces and bends close to the outlet can create
significant reaction. Where pipe work is not properly secured high forces can
accelerate pipework sufficiently to generate shock forces that could shear fixings.
Adequate positioning of fixing and restraint clamps are required to prevent the relief
line being propelled back to the vessel it is relieving causing fatal injuries to
operating staff
f. Adequate escape routes and unimpeded operational access to enable safe and efficient
operation of the plant shall be in place during all testing activities. This may require laying
walkways and use of scaffolding over pipework.
g. Temporary process equipment design layout shall provide for adequate artificial lighting to
ensure a minimum lighting intensity of 100 lux is achieved around all process vessels and
process line connections. Care should be taken not to place Ex d rated light fittings too
close to areas of potential hydrocarbon release such as sampling points nor directly above
the separator Daniel box to mitigate against a projectile breaking the light housing and
creating an ignition source in the test area.
h. Contingency spill plans shall be in place. These plans shall take into account the total
potential inventory of liquid hydrocarbons possible on deck.
i. Fire protection systems should be assessed for the process equipment area and suitable
provision made to manage any fire hazards that exist in the well testing process equipment
areas. The need for specialist foam supplies and monitors should be addressed to cover the
potential fire hazards that have been highlighted.
Methanol and other chemical additives that may be required for well testing
operations could create their own separate fire hazards. Adequate resources and
foam types may be required to fight these as well as the potential well fluids that are
to be flowed through the process system
j. Heat radiation protection systems should be designed and installed to cope with burning
the highest planned flow rates during the test. Generally high calorific black oils will create
the biggest radiation risk and reservoir information needs to be included into deciding heat
shield requirements.
k. Interconnection between well test temporary process equipment flow paths and well test
auxiliary support equipment should be avoided using appropriate protection devices:
1. Air compressor lines to the burners shall be fitted with separate check valves to
prevent hydrocarbons returning to the air receiver or compressors.
2. Chemical injection pumps shall be fitted with check valves at the pump outlet and at
the inlet connection to the process system flowline.
3. Steam supply lines from the steam generator shall be equipped with an in-line check
valve upstream of the steam exchanger inlet connection.
When a modification is to be incorporated during the testing sequence to the ESD system, this
modification is to be addressed in the detailed work procedure, and is to be implemented very
carefully with plenty of communication between the different parties involved with the well test.
All automated wellhead, temporary flowhead or stand alone shutdown valves deployed on a
temporary process plant shall have suitable access to a manual over-ride system. The
deployment of automatic valves can create conditions where actuator failure prevents well kill
or de-pressuring operations to take place.
Historically, simple pneumatic ESD systems have been used for temporary process
systems deployed for well testing and clean up operations. These systems have the
advantage of being simple known systems that industry staff is familiar with.
The pneumatic systems have two important disadvantages that could limit their
ability to provide adequate safety protection to the process safety system. They are
slower to activate, particularly if many pilot and shut down sensors are connected to
the pneumatic pilot circuit, and may allow short duration pressure fault conditions
to pass without shutdown activation. ( e.g rapid over pressure of a separator leading
to a relief valve lifting may occur too quickly to enable pneumatic control pressure
to exhaust so ESD is not initiated) .
They also often have no simple audit trail facility and false activations can be
difficult to track and correct. They are equally more difficult to integrate into other
more advanced rig and or other auxiliary process systems which can limit safe
operating protocols.
Whilst introduction of electrical based ESD systems are likely to introduce more
additional false shutdowns during operations, greater familiarity will minimise these
and overall enhanced process plant safety will result.
7.3.9. Small Bore fittings and test and instrumentation line management
Where possible the use of NPT style fittings and connections on high pressure lines should be
avoided. The use of Autoclave fittings is recommended.
Should NPT fittings be used adequate inspection of all NPT threadlets with go, no-go gauges
shall be carried out during pre-operational checks.
Certification records for small bore valving and small bore fittings are not always possible to
find and type certification and confirmation equipment has been sourced from reputable
suppliers should be assessed
The use of NPT threaded fittings for instrumentation and sampling port management
can create significant hazards if they are not managed correctly. NPT fittings use in
high pressure service lines (e.g > 1,500 psi) can lead to failure if thread related
corrosion is present, or the small bore fittings utilised are not properly
manufactured and certified.
The Detailed Well Testing Programme shall be reviewed and endorsed by the Wells Technical
Engineer and the Well Testing Technical Authority or the Segment Technical Authority where a
local Well Testing TA position does not exist.
Where a programme of similar well testing or clean up activities is being managed a primary
review of the first detailed programme would cover this requirement for all subsequent
operations and additional review support could be requested where significant changed to
programme scope was required
Confirming equipment integrity shall be achieved by reviewing all certification records and
subsequently witnessing pressure and function tests. The use of BP QA/IM teams to
independently review equipment certification records should be implemented prior to equipment
deployment
Following plant installation detailed cross-checking against the P&ID shall be carried out prior
to any full system checks and signed off by the BP Well Testing Engineer and the Senior
Contractor Supervisor.
Pressure and function testing of appropriate modules and valve assemblies shall be carried out
as per the detailed programme and all site based pre operational pressure test records shall be
fully documented and appended to the final well testing report.
Pressure testing of process equipment modules, valves, lines and vessels is an essential part of
the well testing equipment verification process. These activities introduce significant potential
risks as equipment failure during pressure test can result in personnel injury.
a. Initial integrity confirmation pressure testing of equipment shall only be conducted using
non-volatile low compressibility fluids. Ideally this should be fresh or sea water, however,
water glycol mixtures may prove more appropriate in some circumstances.
b. Pressure testing operations should, wherever possible, record and monitor pressure volume
relationships pumped and returned during testing operations. Expected pressure-volume
Secondary pressure qualification testing of process systems with inert gas e.g. a
Nitrogen or Helium/ Nitrogen mixture can only be justified where long- term plant
operations with minimal manning cover is anticipated and where equipment
integrity to a very low leak rate is deemed essential for the safe operation of the
plant.
7.5.2.1. Pressure testing DST, Sub Sea Test Tools,, Safety Valves and HP flow Equipment
Pre-deployment pressure testing of high pressure equipment modules and valves
generally test small volumes, which make pressure monitoring particularly sensitive
to fluid leakage. This sensitivity, and the additional ability to observe system leaks
outwith the process system, will provide the greatest assurance of system integrity,
so these operations should be carefully witnessed and assessed.
At low volumes care is needed to be aware of the potential for very significant
temperature related pressure increases that may mask potential leaks. Visual
inspection of an equipment item for leaks should always take place – but only once a
pressure appears stable. Inspection of equipment for a leak while pressure is
dropping should not be attempted in case the leak path suddenly worsens ahead of
catastrophic failure.
a. All Pressure tests should be clearly documented and recorded, preferably on a high
resolution electronic system.
b. Pressure tests should be conducted in a staged manner. Always perform a low pressure test
for 5 minutes prior to increasing the test to full test pressure.
c. High pressure tests should be held at full test pressure for a minimum of 15 minutes to
confirm an acceptable integrity test.
Pressure tests shall only be deemed acceptable where pressures are either stable or showing an
appropriate decreasing pressure fall off trend.
A detailed pre start up operations check list shall be developed and completed prior to initiating
flow on any well test or clean up operation
The following critical processes shall be checked and completed as part of the pre-start check
list. Additional area and process specific checks should be developed to complete preparations
1. A full rig abandonment and fire drill shall be conducted to include all personnel on
board prior to the well being flowed. All new arrivals to the rig will also be given a
full induction physically walking evacuation routes follow the standard rig induction
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process. Full crew briefing on safety requirements during the testing operations shall
be delivered at this stage or prior to start up activities.
2. A physical check of all initial process system and relevant rig system valve positions
shall be conducted by the BP Rep, OIM , BP SPE Rig Toolpusher and Testing
Service Company Rep
3. Physical checks of all automatic shut down activation controls shall be observed and
operations confirmed
4. Emergency response plans for medical evacuation and oil spill response should be
refreshed
5. Rig specific unlatch procedures for DP vessels shall be drilled where appropriate.
6. Fire and Gas protection systems and specialist personnel shall be in place and in full
working order.
7. Regulatory notifications to Coast Guards, Shore bases, adjacent vessels and platforms
shall be notified.
8. BOP tests shall be up to date
9. Well kill provisions shall be prepared to ensure suitable flexibility for well kill
activities.
10. Rig power, utilities, and BOP control systems shall be configured to provide
continuous supplies with minimum risk of failure during complete testing operations
11. First hydrocarbons should only be flowed to surface during daylight hours