The STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH vs BHERULAL(Supreme Court)

Practice and Procedure=Limitation=condonation of delay of 663 days in filing SLP=court

held that the Supreme Court cannot be a place for the Governments to walk in when they
choose ignoring the period of limitation prescribed=the reason for such an inordinate delay is
stated to be only “due to unavailability of the documents and the process of arranging the
documents=a preposterous proposition sought to be propounded that if there is some merit in
the case, period of delay is to be given a go-by=if a case is good on merits, it will succeed in
any case=this does not, of course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court in an appropriate
case to condone the delay=said approach is being adopted earlier in “certificate cases”=the
purpose of coming to Supreme Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government
suffers losses, it is time when the concerned officer responsible for the same bears the
consequences=where there are such inordinate delays, the Government or State authorities
coming before Supreme Court must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own
value=such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible=costs of Rs. 25,000/-
imposed on petitioner to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project
Committee=directions issued. (Paras 2 and 4 to 8)

(1987)2 SCC 107; (2012)3 SCC 563: 2012(2) PLJR (SC)371 : 2012(2) JLJR
(SC)252=Relied upon.

M. Ravindran (Supreme Court)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973=Section 167(2)=Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

Substances Act, 1985=Section 36-A(4)=appellant was remanded to judicial custody for
offences punishable under NDPS Act=after completion of 180 days from remand date, he
filed application for bail u/s 167(2) on 1.2.2019 at 10:30 a.m.=on the same day later during
hearing of bail application, complainant filed an additional complaint at 4:25 p.m. against
him and sought dismissal of bail petition=application for bail u/s 167(2), was not disposed of
by the time additional complaint was filed=Public Prosecutor had not filed any application
seeking extension of time to investigate into the crime prior to 10:30 a.m. on 1.2.2019 and
participated in the arguments on bail application till 4:25 p.m. on the day it was filed and only
thereafter additional complaint was lodged against appellant=appellant was deemed to have
availed of his indefeasible right to bail, the moment he filed an application for being released
on bail and offered to abide by the terms and conditions of the bail order, he was entitled to
be released on bail notwithstanding subsequent filing of an additional complaint=the
State/investigating agency in order to defeat indefeasible right of the accused to be released
on bail, filed an additional complaint before the court subsequent to conclusion of the
arguments of appellant on the bail application=if such a practice is allowed, right u/s 167(2)
would be rendered nugatory as IO could drag their heels till the time accused exercises his
right=irrespective of seriousness of the offence and reliability of evidence available, filing
additional complaints merely to circumvent the application for default bail is an improper
strategy=impugned judgment set aside=directions issued. (Paras 8, 17 to 17.2, 18.1, 18.2
and 19)

Section 167(2) and Fundamental Right to Life and Personal Liberty

Constitution of India=Article 21=Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973=Section 167(2)=Section
167(2) is integrally linked to the constitutional commitment u/Art. 21 promising protection of
life and personal liberty against unlawful and arbitrary detention, and must be interpreted in a
manner which serves this purpose=Section 167(2) provides that the investigative agency must
collect the required evidence within the prescribed time period, failing which the accused can
no longer be detained=this ensures that investigating officers are compelled to act swiftly and
efficiently without misusing the prospect of further remand=this also ensures that the Court
takes cognizance of the case without any undue delay from the date of giving information of
the offence, so that society at large does not lose faith and develop cynicism towards the
criminal justice system=therefore, the Courts cannot adopt a rigid or formalistic approach
whilst considering any issue that touches upon the rights contained in Article 21. (Paras 11.1
to 11.3, 11.5, 11.6 and 11.8)

(1978)1 SCC 248; 2020 SCC OnLine SC 529=Relied upon.

Interpretation of Statutes=Penal Statutes=in case of any ambiguity in the construction of a

penal statute, the Courts must favour the interpretation which leans towards protecting the
rights of the accused, given the ubiquitous power disparity between the individual accused
and the State machinery=this is applicable not only in the case of substantive penal statutes
but also in the case of procedures providing for the curtailment of the liberty of the accused.
(Para 11.8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973=Section 167(2)=interpretation of=with respect to the

Cr.PC, the Statement of Objects and Reasons is an important aid of construction=Section
167(2) has to be interpreted keeping in mind the objectives expressed by the legislature
namely ensuring a fair trial, expeditious investigation and trial, and setting down a
rationalized procedure that protects the interests of indigent sections of society=these objects
are nothing but subsets of the overarching fundamental right guaranteed u/Art. 21 of the
Constitution=the paramount consideration of the legislature while enacting Section 167(2)
and the Proviso thereto was that the investigation must be completed expeditiously and the
accused should not be detained for an unreasonably long period as was the situation
prevailing under the 1898 Code. (Paras 11.8 and 16.3)

Meaning of “if not already availed of” in “Sanjay Dutt case”

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973=Section 167(2)=the expression “if not already availed of”
used in “Sanjay Dutt case” must be understood to mean “when the accused files an
application and is prepared to offer bail on being directed”= decision in “Sanjay Dutt” merely
casts a positive corresponding obligation upon the accused to promptly apply for default bail
as soon as the prescribed period of investigation expires=the Court cannot suo motu grant bail
without considering whether the accused is ready to furnish bail or not=this is an inbuilt
safeguard within Section 167(2) to ensure that the accused is not automatically released from
custody without obtaining the satisfaction of the Court that he is able to guarantee his
presence for further investigation, or for trial, as the case may be=there could be rare
occasions where the accused voluntarily forfeits his right to bail=once a charge-sheet is filed,
such waiver of the right by the accused becomes final and Section 167(2) ceases to
apply=arguments of the State that expression “availed of” would only mean actual release
after furnishing the necessary bail would cause grave injustice to the accused and would
defeat the very purpose of Proviso to Section 167(2)=after expiry of the stipulated period, the
Court has no further jurisdiction to remand the accused to custody=the prosecution would not
be allowed to take advantage of its own default of not filing the investigation report/
complaint within the stipulated period. (Paras 12.2, 12.4 and 12.5)

Delay in deciding bail application

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973=Section 167(2)=delay in deciding bail application=in

“Uday Mohanlal Acharya case”, minority opinion was that a distinction can be made between
cases where the Court adopted dilatory tactics to defeat the right of the accused and where the
delay in deciding bail application is bona fide and unintentional=complainant in present case
also sought to distinguish “Uday Mohanlal Acharya case” and subsequent decisions
pertaining to Section 167(2) on the ground that there was no unjust delay which would make
the accused entitled to be released on bail=such a distinction cannot be adopted as it would
give rise to parallel litigations necessitating separate inquiries into the motivation of the Court
for delaying a bail application or for posting it for hearing on a particular date at a particular
time=delay in deciding the bail application could be due to a number of factors and there may
not be a clear-cut answer to the same in all circumstances=thus irrespective of the reasons for
delay in deciding bail application, the accused is deemed to have exercised his indefeasible
right upon filing of the bail application, though his actual release from custody is inevitably
subject to compliance with the order granting bail=as a cautionary measure, the counsel for
the accused as well as the magistrate ought to inform the accused of availability of
indefeasible right u/s 167(2) once it accrues to him, without any delay=this is especially
where the accused is from an underprivileged section of society and is unlikely to have access
to information about his legal rights. (Paras 12.6 and 12.7)

Import of Explanation I to Section 167(2)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973=Section 167(2), Explanation I=Explanation I applies only

to those situations where the accused has availed of his right to default bail and undertaken to
furnish bail as directed by the Court but subsequently failed to comply with the terms and
conditions of the bail order within the time prescribed by the Court=in such a scenario, if the
prosecution subsequently files a charge-sheet, it can be said that the accused has forfeited his
right to bail u/s 167(2)=notwithstanding the order of default bail passed by the Court, the
actual release of the accused from custody is contingent on the directions passed by the
competent Court granting bail=if the accused fails to furnish bail and/or comply with the
terms and conditions of the bail order within the time stipulated by the Court, his continued
detention in custody is valid=however, expression ‘the accused does furnish bail’ in Section
167(2) and Explanation I cannot be interpreted to mean that if the accused, in spite of being
ready and willing, could not furnish bail on account of pendency of bail application before
the Magistrate or because challenge to the rejection of his bail application was pending before
a higher forum, his continued detention in custody is authorized=right to be released on bail
cannot be defeated merely because the prosecution files the charge-sheet prior to furnishing
of bail and fulfil the conditions of bail of furnishing bonds, etc., so long as he furnishes the
bail within the time stipulated by the Court=plea that appellant is not entitled to the protection
of Section 167(2), if he has not furnished bail at the time the additional complaint was filed,
rejected. (Paras 13, 13.1 and 18.4)

Rights of the Prosecutor u/s 167(2) read with Section 36-A(4), NDPS Act

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973=Section 167(2)=Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

Substances Act, 1985=Section 36-A(4)=if the accused applies for bail u/s 167(2) r/w Section
36-A (4) upon expiry of 180 days or extended period, as the case may be, the Court must
release him on bail forthwith without any unnecessary delay after getting necessary
information from public prosecutor=observations in “Hitendra Vishnu Thakur” and “Sanjay
Dutt” cases that application for default bail and any application for extension of time made by
the Public Prosecutor must be considered together are only applicable where the Public
Prosecutor files a report seeking extension of time prior to the filing of application for default
bail by accused=in such a situation, notwithstanding the fact that period for completion of
investigation has expired, both applications would have to be considered together=however,
where the accused already applied for default bail, the Prosecutor cannot defeat the
enforcement of his right by subsequently filing a final report, additional complaint or report
seeking extension of time. (Para 14.1)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973=Section 167(2)=issuance of notice to the State on the

application for default bail filed under the Proviso to Section 167(2) is only so that the Public
Prosecutor can satisfy the Court that prosecution has already obtained an order of extension
of time from the Court or that the challan was filed in the designated Court before the expiry
of prescribed period or that prescribed period has actually not expired=prosecution can
accordingly urge the Court to refuse granting bail on the alleged ground of default=such
issuance of notice would avoid the possibility of accused obtaining default bail by deliberate
or inadvertent suppression of certain facts and also guard against multiplicity of proceedings=
however, Public Prosecutors cannot be permitted to misuse the limited notice issued to them
by the Court on bail applications filed u/s 167(2) by dragging on proceedings and filing
subsequent applications/reports for ‘buying extra time’ and facilitating filling up of lacunae in
the investigation by investigating agency. (Para 14.2)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973=Section 167(2)=right to be released on default bail

continues to remain enforceable if the accused has applied for such bail, notwithstanding
pendency of the bail application or subsequent filing of the charge-sheet or a report seeking
extension of time by the prosecution before the Court; or filing of the charge-sheet during the
interregnum when challenge to the rejection of the bail application is pending before a higher
Court=however, where the accused fails to apply for default bail when the right accrues to
him and subsequently a charge-sheet, additional complaint or a report seeking extension of
time is preferred before the Magistrate, the right to default bail would be extinguished=the
Magistrate would be at liberty to take cognizance of the case or grant further time for
completion of the investigation, as the case may be, though the accused may still be released
on bail under other provisions of the Cr.PC. (Paras 18.2 and 18.3)
(2001)5 SCC 453 : 2001(2) PLJR (SC)182 : 2001(1) JLJR (SC)890; (2015)8 SCC 340 :
2015(2) PLJR (SC)318 : 2015(2) JLJR (SC)82; (1996)1 SCC 718; (1996)1 SCC 722;
(2017)15 SCC 67 : 2017(4) PLJR (SC)53 : 2017(4) JLJR (SC)37; (2012)12 SCC 1; 2020
SCC OnLine SC 824 : 2020(4) PLJR (SC) ??? : 2020 (4) JLJR (SC) ???=Relied upon.

(2014)9 SCC 457 : 2014(4) PLJR (SC)131 : 2014(3) JLJR (SC)517=Affirmed.

(1994)4 SCC 602; (1994)5 SCC 410 : 1994(2) PLJR (SC)63=Explained.

(2011)10 SCC 445=Per incurriam.

(1996)1 SCC 432; (2005)7 SCC 29; (2009)7 SCC 480=Referred to.

STATE OF U.P. vs SUDHIR KUMAR SINGH (Supreme Court)

Government Contract=Cancellation=maintainability of writ petition=every case in which a

citizen/person knocks at the doors of the writ court for breach of his or its fundamental rights
is a matter which contains a “public law element”, as opposed to a case which is concerned
only with breach of contract and damages flowing therefrom=whenever a plea of breach of
natural justice is made against the State, the said plea, if found sustainable, sounds as
arbitrary State action, which attracts the provisions of Article 14=in present case public law
elements involved in that petitioner/respondent no. 1 filed writ petition alleging breach of
audi alteram partem rule as entire proceedings leading to cancellation of the tender, together
with cancellation itself, were done on an ex parte appraisal of facts behind his back=he was
completely in the dark so far as cancellation of award of tender in his favour is concerned, the
audi alteram partem rule breached in its entirety=prejudice caused to him not only from the
fact that one year of the contract period was taken away, but also that, if the impugned High
Court judgment is to be set aside he will be debarred from bidding for any of the
Corporation’s tenders for a period of three years=impugned judgment upheld on the ground
that natural justice was breached, not being a case of admitted facts leading to the grant of a
futile writ and prejudice has indeed been caused to respondent no. 1=earnest money deposit
and security deposit ordered to be returned by the Corporation. (Paras 23 and 40 to 42)

(1974)2 SCC 121=Relied upon.

Administrative Law=Principles of Natural Justice=audi alteram partem=natural justice is a

flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice=the
breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion
that prejudice is thereby caused. (Para 39)

Administrative Law=Principles of Natural Justice=where procedural and/or substantive

provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not
lead to invalidity of the orders passed=prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the
case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but
also in public interest=no prejudice is caused to the person complaining breach of natural
justice where such person does not dispute the case against him or it=this can happen by
reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or
admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that no real prejudice can,
therefore, be said to have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural
justice=in cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or indisputable, and only one
conclusion is possible, the Court does not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when
there is, in fact, no prejudice caused=this conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an
appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person
=the “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable
suspicion of a litigant=it should exist as a matter of fact or be based upon a definite inference
of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice. (Para 39)

(1980)4 SCC 379; (2004)3 SCC 553; (2006)10 SCC 236; (2008)3 SCC 440 : 2008(2) PLJR
(SC)108 : 2008(2) JLJR (SC)141; (2010)11 SCC 186; (2019)16 SCC 794; (2001)8 SCC 344;
(2015)13 SCC 233; (2015)7 SCC 728; (2006)8 SCC 776; (1984)1 SCC 43; (2006)1 SCC
667; (1993)4 SCC 727; (2008)9 SCC 31; (2015)8 SCC 519; (1996)3 SCC 364; (1999)6 SCC
237; (2000)7 SCC 529; (2010)5 SCC 349; (2001) 1 SCC 214; (2005)3 SCC 409; (2005)5
SCC 337; (2006)2 SCC 315; (2006)8 SCC 647; (2007)4 SCC 54; (2007)5 SCC 65; (2007)13
SCC 352; (2009)11 SCC 308; (2010)13 SCC 216; (2018)15 SCC 463=Relied upon.

(1999)1 SCC 492; (2007)14 SCC 517; (1977)3 SCC 457; (2012)8 SCC 216; (1994)6 SCC
651; (2007)1 SCC 477=Distinguished.

BIKRAMJIT SINGH (Supreme Court)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973=Section 167=National Investigation Agency Act,

2008=Sections 13 and 22=default bail=denial=arrest of appellant for offences under IPC,
Arms Act, Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
on 22.11.2018, and on said date he was remanded to custody by Sub-Divisional
Magistrate=after 90 days in custody expired on 21.2.2019, an application for default bail was
made to SDJM which was dismissed on 25.2.2019 on the ground that he had already
extended time from 90 days to 180 days u/s 167 as amended by Section 43-D(2), UAP Act,
1967=charge-sheet was filed on 26.3.2019=the fact that first application was wrongly
dismissed on 25.2.2019 would make no difference and ought to have been corrected in
revision=under the UAP Act r/w NIA Act, the Special Court alone had jurisdiction to extend
time to 180 days under first proviso in Section 43-D(2)(b)=the fact that appellant filed
another application for default bail later, would not mean that this application would wipe out
the effect of the earlier application that was wrongly decided=right to default bail are not
mere statutory rights, but is part of the procedure established by law under Article 21 of the
Constitution , therefore, is a fundamental right granted to an accused person to be released on
bail once the conditions of the first proviso to Section 167(2) are fulfilled=appellant held
entitled to be released on “default bail”, as amended by Section 43-D=direction
issued=impugned judgment set aside. (Paras 3 to 5 and 29)

National Investigation Agency Act, 2008=Sections 13 and 22=u/s 22(2)(ii), reference to the
Central Agency in Section 13(1) is to be construed as a reference to the investigation agency
of the State Government, the State police in present case=until a Special Court is designated
by the State Government, the jurisdiction conferred on a Special Court shall be exercised
only by the Court of Sessions of the Division in which such offence has been committed.
(Para 18)

National Investigation Agency Act, 2008=Sections 13, 16 and 22=Unlawful Activities

(Prevention) Act, 196=Sections 13/43-D=Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973=Section
167=offences under the UAPA=for all offences under the UAPA, the Magistrate’s
jurisdiction to extend time under the first proviso in Section 43-D(2)(b) is non-existent, “the
Court” being either a Sessions Court, in the absence of a notification specifying a Special
Court, or the Special Court itself=under the first proviso in Section 43-D(2)(b), the 90 day
period indicated by the first proviso to Section 167(2), Cr.PC can be extended up to a
maximum period of 180 days if “the Court” is satisfied with the report of the public
prosecutor indicating progress of investigation and specific reasons for detention of the
accused beyond the period of 90 days=in view of Section 16(2), NIA Act, even though
offences may be punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years, the Special
Court alone is to try such offence, albeit in a summary way if it thinks it fit to do so. (Paras
20 and 21)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973=Section 167(2), first proviso (a)=default bail=principles

reiterated=so long as an application for grant of default bail is made on expiry of the period
of 90 days (which application need not even be in writing) before a charge-sheet is filed, the
right to default bail becomes complete=it is of no moment that the Criminal Court either does
not dispose of such application before charge-sheet is filed or disposes of such application
wrongly before such charge-sheet is filed=so long as an application was made for default bail
on expiry of the stated period before time is further extended, default bail, being an
indefeasible right of the accused under the first proviso to Section 167(2), kicks in and must
be granted. (Para 28)

(1994)4 SCC 602; (1994)5 SCC 410; (2001)5 SCC 453; (2014)9 SCC 457; (2012)12 SCC 1;
(2017)15 SCC 67=Relied upon.

(2011)10 SCC 445=Referred to.

SHANTI DEVI ALIAS SHANTI MISHRA (Supreme Court)

Constitution of India=Article 226= territorial jurisdiction=service matter (pensionary

benefits)=husband of appellant , employed in Coal India Limited in West Bengal, after
retirement settled in Darbhanga=writ petition filed before Patna High Court for refund of
amount wrongly withheld/illegally deducted from him which was dismissed on the ground of
lack of territorial jurisdiction=later his pension was stopped and order for recovery of amount
paid towards pension issued=instant, writ petition filed also dismissed on same ground=cause
of action for filing present writ petition was entirely different=dismissal of writ petition does
not preclude him to file subsequent writ petition in the same High Court=part of cause of
action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Patna High Court=the employer requires
a retiring employee to indicate the place where he shall receive pension after his retirement=
deceased petitioner opted for receiving his pension in Darbhabga and was continuously
receiving pension for last 8 years in his saving bank account in SBI, Darbhanga=stoppage of
his pension affected him at his native place, he being deprived of the benefit of pension
which he was receiving from his employer=stoppage of pension gave a cause of action,
which arose at the place where petitioner was continuously receiving the pension=view of
Single Judge and Division Bench holding the writ petition not maintainable on ground of lack
of territorial jurisdiction erroneous and caused immense hardship to petitioner=impugned
judgment set aside=direction to respondents to ensure payment of provisional pension to
appellant from December, 2020. (Paras 11 to 13, 15, 17, 29 and 34)

LPA 1265/2017; CWJC 5999/2014=Set aside.

Constitution of India=Article 226=territorial jurisdiction/forum non conveniens=service

matter (pensionary benefits)=husband of appellant, employed in West Bengal, after
retirement settled in Darbhanga=writ petition before Patna High Court for refund of amount
wrongly withheld was dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction=thereafter he
filed writ petition before Jharkhand High Court=later he filed present writ petition after
stoppage of his pension ,which was also dismissed on same ground=single Judge held that
petitioner ought to have filed writ petition in Jharkhand High Court where his earlier writ
petition was pending=respondents’ plea that writ petition was rightly dismissed on principle
of forum non conveniens=cause of action for filing earlier writ petition was entirely
different=stoppage of pension and asking for refund of more than Rs. 8 lakhs amount had
serious adverse effect on petitioner, who was staying at his native place Darbhanga=a retired
employee, who is receiving pension, cannot be asked to go to another court to file writ
petition, when he has a cause of action for filing a writ petition in Patna High Court= for a
retiree, who is settled in Darbhanga and receiving pension at District Darbhhanga, it was not
necessary for him to file his petition in Jharkhand High Court where his earlier writ petition
was pending=for a retired employee convenience is to prosecute his case at the place where
he belonged to and was getting pension=submission of respondents has no substance. (Paras
16, 30 and 33)

(1994)4 SCC 711; (2000)7 SCC 640; (2004)3 SCC 277; (2004)6 SCC 254; (2014)9 SCC 329
=Relied upon.

2015(2) PLJR 256=Referred to. ???

DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, RLY. PROTECTION FORCE (Supreme

Court)

Service Law=Punishment=judicial review=High Court must not act as an appellate authority

and re-appreciate the evidence led before the enquiry officer=principles reiterated. (Para
12.1)

AIR 1963 SC 1723; (1975)2 SCC 557; (1997)7 SCC 463; (2003)4 SCC 331; (2014)4 SCC
108; (2011)11 SCC 535; CA 3340/2020; (2015)2 SCC 610; (1995)6 SCC 749; (1997)7 SCC
463; (2001)2 SCC 386; (2007)4 SCC 669; (2009)15 SCC 620; (2014)4 SCC 108=Relied
upon.
Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987=Rules 146.2, 153 and 229=compulsory retirement=
charges of gross neglect of duty and abuse of authority=High Court set aside order of
compulsory retirement and directed Railways Department to reinstate respondent with
consequential benefits and payment of 50% back wages=no allegation of malafides against
disciplinary authority or lack of his competence in passing the order of compulsory
retirement or of a breach of the principles of natural justice, or that findings were based on no
evidence=findings of gross neglect of duty based on materials on record and concurrently
upheld=High Court was not justified in re-appraising the entire evidence threadbare as a court
of first appeal and substituting the order of punishment, by a lesser punishment, without
justifiable reason=a police officer in the RPF is required to maintain a high standard of
integrity in the discharge of his official functions=charges proved against respondent “were
of neglect of duty” which resulted in pecuniary loss to Railways=respondent was a Sub-
Inspector in Railway Police discharging an office of trust and confidence which required
absolute integrity=respondent was convicted by the Special Judge, for offences punishable
under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and sentenced=impugned Judgment set aside=
order of compulsory retirement restored=however, gratuity payable to him, not released by
the Department so far=direction issued to release gratuity. (Paras 12.2, 12.5 and 13)

Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank (Supreme Court)

Service Law=Appointment=Peon in Bank=denial=on the ground that respondent possessed

higher qualification=as per the eligibility criteria, a candidate should have passed 12th class
or its equivalent with basic reading/writing knowledge of English and should not be a
graduate=respondent applied for the post without disclosing that he was a graduate and was
selected on the basis of the marks obtained in 10th and 12th class=before he was permitted to
resume his duty, the bank came to know that he was a Graduate, thus found not eligible =
respondent never challenged the eligibility criteria/educational qualification mentioned in the
advertisement and participated in the recruitment process=once having participated in the
recruitment process as per the advertisement, it is not open for him to contend that acquisition
of higher qualification cannot be a disqualification, that too when he never challenged the
eligibility criteria/educational qualification mentioned in the advertisement=prescribing the
eligibility criteria that a graduate shall not be eligible to apply was a conscious decision taken
by the Bank=it is not for the court to consider the relevance of qualifications prescribed for
various posts=it is for the employer to determine and decide the relevancy and suitability of
qualifications for any post=a greater latitude is permitted by the Courts for the employer to
prescribe qualifications for any post=however, the employer cannot act arbitrarily or
fancifully in prescribing qualifications for posts=impugned orders directing the Bank to allow
respondent to discharge his duties, quashed and set aside. (Paras 5, 5.2, 6, 7, 7.3 and 8 to 10)

(1990)1 SCC 288; (2003)3 SCC 548; (2019)2 SCC 404=Relied upon.

CWP 69034/2019(All.); CA 1010/2000; (2017)8 SCC 608; (2010)15 SCC 596; (2015)2 SCC
170=Referred to.

Service Law=Appointment=Over-qualification=advertisement prescribing eligibility criteria

of having passed 12th class or its equivalent and should not be a Graduate=respondent
deliberately, wilfully and intentionally suppressed the fact that he was a graduate=an
employee is expected to give a correct information as to his qualification=respondent failed
to do so=he was overqualified and therefore, ineligible to apply for the job=suppression of
material information and making a false statement has a clear bearing on the character and
antecedents of the employee in relation to his continuance in service=a candidate having
suppressed the material information and/or giving false information cannot claim right to
continuance in service=candidature rightly cancelled and not permitted to resume his duty.
(Para 8)

(2003)3 SCC 437=Relied upon.

UMC TECHNOLOGIES PRIVATE LIMITED (Supreme Court)

Administrative Law=Notice=a person against whom any action is sought to be taken or

whose right or interests are being affected should be given a reasonable opportunity to defend
himself=basic principle of natural justice is that before adjudication starts, the authority
concerned should give to the affected party a notice of the case against him so that he can
defend himself=such notice should be adequate and grounds necessitating action and the
penalty/action proposed should be mentioned specifically and unambiguously=an order
travelling beyond the bounds of notice is impermissible and without jurisdiction to that
extent. (Para 13)

Government Contract=Blacklisting=in the context of blacklisting of a person or an entity by

the State or State Corporation, the requirement of a valid, particularized and unambiguous
show cause notice is crucial due to severe consequences of blacklisting and stigmatization
that accrues to the person/entity being blacklisted=blacklisting has the effect of denying a
person or an entity the privileged opportunity of entering into government contracts=
blacklisting tarnishes blacklisted person’s reputation and brings the person’s character into
question=blacklisting also has long-lasting civil consequences for future business prospects
of blacklisted person=consequences of blacklisting travel far beyond the dealings of the
blacklisted person with one particular government Ccorporation=a prior show cause notice
granting a reasonable opportunity of being heard is an essential element of all administrative
decision-making and particularly so in decisions pertaining to blacklisting which entail grave
consequences for the entity being blacklisted=in these cases, furnishing of a valid show cause
notice is critical and a failure to do so would be fatal to any order of blacklisting pursuant
thereto. (Paras 14, 15 and 19)

(1980)3 SCC 1; (1975)1 SCC 70; (1989)1 SCC 229; (2014)9 SCC 105=Relied upon.

Government Contract=Blacklisting=for a show cause notice to constitute the valid basis of a

blacklisting order, must spell out clearly or its contents be such that it can be clearly inferred
therefrom, that there is intention on the part of the issuer of notice to blacklist the noticee=
such a clear notice is essential for ensuring that the person against whom penalty of
blacklisting is intended to be imposed, has an adequate, informed and meaningful opportunity
to show cause against his possible blacklisting=in present case, action of blacklisting was
neither expressly proposed nor could be inferred from the language employed by the
Corporation in its show cause notice=mere existence of a clause in the Bid Document, which
mentions blacklisting as a bar against eligibility, cannot satisfy the mandatory requirement of
a clear mention of proposed action in the show cause notice=instantly, show cause notice
does not fulfil the requirements of a valid show cause notice for blacklisting=order of
blacklisting appellant clearly traversed beyond the bounds of show cause notice which is
impermissible in law=impugned order set aside= Corporation’s order quashed so far as it
blacklists the appellant from participating in future tenders. (Paras 21 and 24 to 27)

HITESH VERMA (Supreme Court)

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989=Section 3(1)(x)
(e)=Indian Penal Code, 1860=Sections 452, 504 and 506=Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
=Section 482=quashing=FIR lodged under IPC and SC/ST Act=property disputes between
parties=charge-sheet filed u/s 3(1)(x) which was substituted in 2016 as S. 3(1)(r) =basic
ingredients of S. 3(1)(r) is intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a
member of SC or ST in any place within public view=assertion of title over land by either of
the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment=parties invoked
jurisdiction of the civil court, availing their remedies in accordance with procedure
established by law=such action is not for the reason that respondent No. 2 is member of
Scheduled Caste=further, allegations of abusing the informant were within four walls of her
building and not the case that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or
friends) at the time of incident in the house=therefore, basic ingredient that words were
uttered “in any place within public view” not made out=due to dispute about possession of
land, appellant and others were not permitting respondent No. 2 to cultivate the land=matter
regarding possession of property pending before the civil court, any dispute arising on
account of possession of said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless
victim is abused, intimated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled
Caste or Scheduled Tribe=allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title
over the property=if such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence not made
out=finding that appellant was aware of the caste of informant is wholly inconsequential as
the knowledge does not bar, any person to protect his rights by way of a procedure
established by law=charges against appellant not made out=charge-sheet to that extent
quashed. (Paras 12 to 16, 18, 22 and 24)

(2008)8 SCC 435; 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1104; (2018)6 SCC 454; (2020)4 SCC 761; (2020)
4 SCC 727; (2018)13 SCC 612=Relied upon.

(2008)12 SCC 531; (2009)3 SCC 789=Referred to.

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989=Section 3(1)=
an offence under 1989 Act would be made out when a member of vulnerable section of the
society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment=offence under the Act is not
established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there
is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason
that the victim belongs to such caste=property disputes between a vulnerable section of the
society and a person of upper caste will not disclose any offence under the Act unless, the
allegations are on account of the victim being a Scheduled Caste. (Paras 18 and 22)