Case law lecture notes

UNION OF INDIA V. K.A. NAJEEB (1 FEBRUARY, 2021)

Issue:-

The main issue before the court was that whether bail can be granted to an accused on
the ground of inordinate delay in trial even when a strict law such as the The Unlawful
Activites (Prevention) Act, 1967 makes restriction on the grant of bail.

Relevant Provision:-

Section 43-D (5): Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused
of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be
released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity of being heard on the application for such release: Provided that such accused
person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case
diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.

Ratio:-

The right to speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused under Article 21 of the
Constitution and when a timely trial is not possible and the accused has suffered
incarceration for a significant period of time, the courts would be obliged to grant bail to
the accused even if the law puts restrictions on such grant of bail.

Observations:-

1. The Constitutional courts can do away with statutory restrictions if the fundamental
rights of a person are affected and there is no scope of timely trial available.

2. Once the High Court has granted bail to a person after examining the grounds and
circumstances of the case, there is limited scope of interference by the Supreme Court.

Cases Referred:

1. Paramjeet Singh v. State of Delhi (1999): Accused under serious laws such as TADA,
NDPS etc. can also be released on bail if their fundamental right to speedy trial is violated.

2. Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admin.) (1978): The SC has to be cautious while
entertaining a plea against bail order passed by a lower court.
 VIKASH KUMAR V. UPSC (11 FEBRUARY, 2021)

Issue:-

The main issue in this case was that the appellant was denied a scribe by the UPSC
during the Civil Services Exam, 2018 due to a rule that scribe could only be availed by
candidates who are blind or who suffer a benchmark disability (40% or more). The
appellant had challenged the CSE Rules, 2018. Important Provisions: [Rights of Persons
With Disabilities Act, 2016] Section 2(y):

“reasonable accommodation” means necessary and appropriate modification and

adjustments, without imposing a disproportionate or undue burden in a particular case, to
ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise of rights equally with others.
Section 3: Equality and non-discrimination

(1) The appropriate Government shall ensure that the persons with disabilities enjoy the
right to equality, life with dignity and respect for his or her integrity equally with others.

(2) The appropriate Government shall take steps to utilise the capacity of persons with
disabilities by providing appropriate environment.

(3) No person with disability shall be discriminated on the ground of disability, unless it is
shown that the impugned act or omission is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate
aim.

(4) No person shall be deprived of his or her personal liberty only on the ground of
disability.

(5) The appropriate Government shall take necessary steps to ensure reasonable
accommodation for persons with disabilities.

Ratio:-

The SC held that having a benchmark disability is not a pre-condition for obtaining a
scribe in any examination. The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 was enacted
by the Parliament to give more opportunities to disabled people and therefore its provisions
should be given liberal interpretation. The court while doing so, also overruled the
judgment of V. Surendra Mohan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2019) which held that a candidate
could not be selected for judicial services if he suffered from more than 50% disability
(blindness).

Observations:-

1. The V. Surendra Mohan judgment shall cease to be a binding precedent.

2. The principle of reasonable accommodation is the basis of the RPwD Act, 2016 and it
is the duty of the State to ensure equal opportunities for the disabled persons.

Cases Overruled:

V. Surendra Mohan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2019): The SC held that this judgment was
delivered in the context of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995. The Parliament has
enacted a new law in 2016 in which new principles have been incorporated and greater
protection has been afforded to the disabled persons. Therefore, these rights are to be
understood with respect to the RPwD Act, 2016.

KANIZ FATIMA V. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (9 FEBRUARY, 2021)

Issue:-

The petitioners had sought for the review of the Shaheen Bagh Judgment [Amit Sahni v.
Commissioner of Police (2020)] which had put certain restrictions on the right to protest.

Relevant Provision:-

Article 137 (Constitution). Review of orders or judgments by the Supreme Court:

Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under article
145, the Supreme Court shall have power to review any judgment pronounced or order
made by it.

Ratio:-

The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition against the said judgment on the
ground that the right to express dissent is an essential part of the right to freedom of speech
and expression but it is not an absolute right and is subject to reasonable restrictions.

Observations:-

1. The right to protest and express dissent comes with certain duties. It cannot be
exercised anywhere.
2. The protestors cannot occupy public property in the name of protest and cause trouble
to other citizens.

Cases Referred:-

1. Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police (2020): The judgment was upheld by the
Supreme Court and the review petition was dismissed.
 ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE V. KAPIL WADHAWAN (23 FEBRUARY,
2021)

Issue:-

The main issue in this case before the court was that whether the day of remanding an
accused to the police or judicial custody is to be considered while computing the
mandatory period of 60/90 days in the grant of default bail under Section 167 CrPC, 1973.

Relevant Provision:-

Section 167 (CrPC): Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty

four hours:

(1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the
investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by section
57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded,
the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if
he is not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial
Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and
shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate.

(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may,
whether he has or has no jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorize the
detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not
exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit
it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be
forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction:

Provided that:

(a) The Magistrate may authorize the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in
custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate
grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorize the detention of the
accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding-

(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with
death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years;
(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the
expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused
person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every
person released on bail under this Sub-Section shall be deemed to be so released under
the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;……….

Ratio:-

The SC observed that there are many conflicting opinions of the Supreme Court in
different cases regarding this issue. Therefore, this question must be settled by a higher
bench of the Supreme Court. The matter was then referred to a higher bench.

Observations:-

1. In certain cases the Supreme Court has held that the day of remand is not to be included
in computing the time period for default bail:
a. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rustom (1995)
b. Ravi Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar (2015)
c. M. Ravindran v. Intelligence Officer, Director of Revenue Intelligence (2020)

2. In other cases, the Supreme Court has held that the day of remand is to be included in
computing the time period for default bail:
a. Chaganti Satyanarayan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1986)
 FAKHREY ALAM V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (15 March, 2021)

Issue:-

The issue in this question was that can the State extend the time period mentioned in
Section 167 CrPC, 1973 (60/90 days respectively) by filing supplementary charge-sheets
before the court.

Ratio:-

The SC held that no extension in time period under Section 167 CrPC is permissible.
 Observations:-

1. The right of default bail under Proviso I to Section 167(2) CrPC is a fundamental right
of the accused person.

2. If the investigation is not completed within the specified period of 60/90 days, then the
accused becomes entitled to default bail and the State cannot take the excuse of filing
further charge-sheets against the accused.

3. The accused is even entitled to this right under stricter laws such as the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

Cases Referred:-

1. Bikramjeet Singh v. State of Punjab (2020): The right to default bail under Section
167(2) CrPC is a fundamental right of the accused person.

APARNA BHAT V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH (18 March, 2021)

Issue:-

The main issue before the court was that whether it is permissible under law to issue
directions such as ‘tying of rakhi by the victim to the accused’ while granting bail orders
especially in cases of crimes against women.
 Relevant Provision:-

Section 437(3) CrPC, 1973: When a person accused or suspected of the commission of
an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or more or of
an offence under Chapter VI, Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or
abetment of, or conspiracy or attempt to commit, any such offence, is released on bail
under sub- section (1), the Court may impose any condition which the Court considers
necessary-
(a) in order to ensure that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the
bond executed under this Chapter, or
(b) in order to ensure that such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of
which he is accused or of the commission of which he is suspected, or
(c) otherwise in the interests of justice.

Ratio:-

The Supreme Court strongly condemned this order of the MP High Court holding that
such orders are not permissible under law. The court also issued a larger set of guidelines to
be followed by the courts while granting bail to an accused.

Observations:-

1. The law criminalizes outraging the modesty of a woman and using rakhi tying as a
condition for bail transforms a molester into a brother. This is wholly unacceptable and has
the effect of diluting and eroding the offence of sexual harassment.

2. Any reasoning or language that diminishes an offence and tends to trivialize the
survivor is to be avoided under all circumstances.

3. The court also observed that there must be special training programmes organized for
the judges for the purpose of gender sensitization.

4. The court also urged the Bar Council of India to take measure in order to introduce
courses and gender sensitization programmes in LLB courses and the AIBE. Guidelines
issued by the court:

1. Bail conditions should not mandate, require or permit contact between the accused and
the victim. Such conditions should seek to protect the complainant from any further
harassment by the accused.

2. Where circumstances exist for the court to believe that there might be a potential threat
of harassment of the victim, or upon apprehension expressed, after calling for reports from
the police, the nature of protection shall be separately considered and appropriate order
made, in addition to a direction to the accused not to make any contact with the victim.
3. In all cases where bail is granted, the complainant should immediately be informed that
the accused has been granted bail and a copy of the bail order made over to him/her within
two days.

4. Bail conditions and orders should avoid reflecting stereotypical or patriarchal notions
about women and their place in society, and must strictly be in accordance with the
requirements of the CrPC. In other words, discussion about the dress, behavior, or past
"conduct" or "morals" of the prosecutrix, should not enter the verdict granting bail.

5. The courts while adjudicating cases involving gender related crimes, should not suggest
or entertain any notions (or encourage any steps) towards compromises between the
prosecutrix and the accused to get married, suggest or
mandate mediation between the accused and the survivor, or any form of compromise as it
is beyond their powers and jurisdiction.

6. Sensitivity should be displayed at all times by judges, who should ensure that there is
no traumatization of the prosecutrix, during the proceedings, or anything said during the
arguments.

7. Judges especially should not use any words, spoken or written, that would undermine or
shake the confidence of the survivor in the fairness or impartiality of the court.

Cases Referred:-

1. Kunal Kumar Tiwari v. State of Bihar (2017): The words ‘interest of justice’ used in
Section 437(3)(c) means ‘good administration of justice’ or ‘advancing the trial process’
and no further broad meaning should be given to these words by the court.

2. State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996): The courts must restrain themselves from
using stereotypes against women. It is the duty of the courts to be sensitive towards women
who are victims of offences and should not add to their trauma.
GOVERNMENT OF MAHARASHTRA V. BORSE BROTHERS ENGINEERS AND
CONTRACTORS PVT. LTD.(19 March, 2021)

Issue:-

The main issue before the court in this case was whether a delay of more than 120 days
can be condoned in case of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996.

Relevant Provisions:-

Section 37 (Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996). Appealable orders:-

(1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court
authorized by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order,
namely:
(a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under section 8;
(b) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9;
(c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34.

(2) Appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral tribunal
(a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 16; or
(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section 17.

(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but
nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Section 5 (Limitation Act, 1963) Extension of prescribed period in certain cases: Any
appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order
XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed
period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not
preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Ratio:-

A delay of more than 120 days for filing an appeal under Section 37 Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 can be condoned by a court only under exceptional circumstances.
The party claiming condonation of delay must act in a bona-fide manner and not
negligently in such cases.

Observations:-

1. No specific time period is provided under Section 37 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 because it deals with appeals against various orders.

2. If the value of subject matter is above Rs. 3 lakhs, then the limitation period of filing
appeal is to be computed as per Section 13(1) Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
3. If the value of subject matter is less than Rs. 3 lakhs, then the limitation period is to be
computed as per Section 116 & 117 Limitation Act, 1963 depending upon the authority
before which the appeal is made.

Cases Overruled:-

1. M/s N.V. International v. State of Assam (2019): The Supreme Court had held in this
case that delay of more than 120 days for filing appeal under Section 37 Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot be condoned by the courts.

LT. COL. NITISHA AND ORS. V. UNION OF INDIA.(25 March, 2021)

Issue:-

The petitioners in the present case had challenged the evaluation criteria adopted by the
Indian Army for granting permanent commission to women officers serving in the Short
Service Commission.

Ratio:-

The Supreme Court held that the criteria adopted by the Indian Army was arbitrary and
irrational and violative of fundamental right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.
The Court also directed the Indian Army to reconsider the plea of the SSC women officers
for the grant of permanent commission in line with the directions issued by the Supreme
Court in this case.

Observations:-

1. The practice adopted by the Indian army to benchmark the evaluation of the women
officers with the lowest credential of their male counterparts is arbitrary.

2. The ACR evaluation of the women officers was also freezed at the 5th or 10th year of
their service. This practice is also arbitrary and irrational.

3. This ultimately resulted in that the army did not consider the merits of the women
officers beyond the 5th or 10th year of service (which included service in the United
Nations, awarding of Vishishtha Sena Medal etc.) in order to grant permanent commission
and led to exclusion of some of the finest women officers.

4. The actions of the Army to adopt such irrational criterias have led to systematic
discrimination of the women in Indian Army from a long period of time.

Directions issued by the Court:-

1. The administrative requirements adopted by the Army Authorities is 'arbitrary and
irrational" and shall not be enforced.

2. All women officers who have satisfied the 60% cut-off are entitled to PC subject to
satisfaction of medical criteria as given below and satisfaction of vigilance and disciplinary
clearance.

3. The medical criteria adopted by the Army in August 2020 shall be applied at the 5th or
10th year of their service as the case may be.

4. All officers other than non-optees officers to be considered for grant of permanent
commission as per terms, within 2 months.

5. The decision already taken to grant permanent commission to some of the women
officers in terms of the Babita Puniya judgment shall not be disturbed.

Cases Referred:-

1. Babita Puniya v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence (2021): The Supreme Court in this
case had cleared the way for women to have permanent commission in the Indian Army in
many departments which was earlier restricted to only medical and educational fields.

MOHAMMED SALIMULLAH V. UNION OF INDIA. (8 April, 2021)

Issue:-

The petitioner in this case was a Rohingya Muslim who had challenged the order of the
Central Government to deport the Rohingya Muslim community to Myanmar (their
homeland).

Ratio:-

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition of the Rohingya Muslims and held that the
matter of deportation is a policy matter of the Government and the courts have very limited
powers regarding this issue. The court upheld the decision of the Central Government to
deport the Rohingyas.

Observations:-

1. The right not to be deported is a right ancillary to the fundamental right to reside or
settle in any part of India under Article 19(1)(e) of the Constitution. This right is available
only to the citizens of India and not refugees or foreign nationals.

2. India is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention, 1951 and therefore, the courts
cannot give a ruling in conflict of the municipal law by relying on international treaties and
conventions.
3. The court also observed that it cannot comment upon anything happening in another
country. (On the contention that the government in Myanmar was a military regime that
persecuted the Rohingya community)

Cases Referred:-

1. The Gambia v. Myanmar (International Court of Justice) (2020):- The petitioners

had used this case to highlight that the ICJ had recognized that the Rohingyas were facing
persecution in Myanmar. However, the SC refused to go into this issue.

INDIAN SCHOOL, JODHPUR V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN. (3 MAY 2021)

Issue:-

The main issue before the court in this case was regarding the constitutional validity of
the Rajasthan Schools (Regulation of Fee) Act, 2016 which was challenged on the ground
that the provision regarding regulation of fees of private schools by the State amounted to
violation of fundamental right to freedom of trade and profession.

Ratio:-
 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the said Act and held that the
state regulation of fees by private schools does not amount to breach of the fundamental
right under Article 19(1)(g).

Observations:-

1. The recovery of excess amounts beyond the permissible limit would result in
profiteering and commercialization.

2. Government has power to provide for an external regulatory mechanism for

determination of school fees or so to say fixation of "just" and "permissible" school fees at
the initial stage itself.

3. The fees charged by the educational institutions must be commensurate with their
services and they cannot indulge in 'profiteering' or 'commercialization.

4. A private institution has the autonomy to fix its own fees so long as it does not result in
'profiteering' and 'commercialization'.

5. Private schools demanding fees from students for the activities and facilities not availed
by them due to the lockdown amounts to 'profiteering' and 'commercialization'.

6. The State cannot infringe the autonomy of the schools in the name of stopping
profiteering. Independent authorities can be set up to determine the fees of schools.

Cases Referred:-

1. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2003):- The State has the authority to
regulate the minor issues relating to private unaided institutions. The government can
impose reasonable restrictions on private unaided institutions.

DR. JAISHREE LAXMANRAO PATIL V. CHIEF MINISTER (5 MAY, 2021)

Issue:-
 The main issue in this case was regarding the validity of the 16% Maratha Quota
granted by the State of Maharashtra to the Maratha community (OBC) which resulted in
the total reservation amounting to 68%.

Ratio:-

The Supreme Court struck down the Maratha reservation as unconstitutional and
violative of the fundamental right to equality under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
The court also rejected a review of the Indra Sawney judgment on the ground that the
ceiling limit of 50% needs to be revised.

Observations:

1. There are no exceptional circumstances to justify the reservation over and above the
ceiling limit of 50%. [In Indra Sahney v. Union of India (1992) the SC had held that the
ceiling limit of 50% may be breached in case of exceptional circumstances.]

2. The Maratha community is not a socially or educationally backward class in the state of
Maharashtra.

3. The Marathas are adequately represented in the State services in Maharashtra and hence
there is no need for further reservation for them.

4. Reservation under Article 16 is based on the principle of ‘adequate representation’ and

not ‘proportional representation’.

5. The court also held that after the 102nd Constitutional Amendment, 2018 the President
is the competent authority to declare OBCs in relation to the States and the States have no
power to name the lists of OBCs.

Cases Referred:-

1. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992): The reservation cannot exceed a maximum of
50% of the total unless there are exceptional circumstances that warrant such excessive
reservation.
 GURMEET SINGH V. STATE OF PUNJAB. ( 28 MAY, 2021)

Issue:-

The main issue before the court was regarding the interpretation of the term ‘soon
before her death’ as provided under Section 304-B IPC, 1860 (dowry death).

Relevant Provisions:-

Section 304B (IPC, 1860) Dowry death:-

(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs
otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is
shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her
husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry,
such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to
have caused her death. Explanation.—For the purposes of this Sub-Section, “dowry” shall
have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. Section
113B (Indian Evidence Act, 1872) Presumption as to dowry death: When the question is
whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon
before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment
for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person
had caused the dowry death.

Ratio:-

The SC held that the term ‘soon before her death’ does not mean immediately before
the death of the woman. The court also issued guidelines for trial in dowry death cases.

Observations:-

1. The prosecution must establish the existence of "proximate and live link" between the
dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.
2. Section 304¬B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as
homicidal or suicidal or accidental.

3. It is true that in criminal statutes strict interpretation is to be adopted, but the courts
have the power to use purposive interpretation in order to avoid ambiguity.

4. The courts have the discretion to ascertain that whether the time between the
harassment and the death would be included in ‘soon before’.

5. Conviction under a charge of Section 304-B (dowry death) is permissible in absence of

charge under Section 498-A (cruelty).

Guidelines issued by the Court:-

1. Section 304¬B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb
the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand.

2. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for
constituting an offence under Section 304¬B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the
rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113¬B, Evidence Act operates
against the accused.

3. The phrase "soon before" as appearing in Section 304¬B, IPC cannot be construed to
mean 'immediately before'. The prosecution must establish the existence of "proximate and
live link" between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the
husband or his relatives.
 VINOD DUA V. UNION OF INDIA. (3 JUNE, 2021)

Issue:-

The petitioner in this case had pleaded for quashing an FIR lodged against him by a
BJP worker of Himachal Pradesh on the ground that the petitioner had committed the
offence of sedition, public nuisance and printing defamatory materials by making
controversial remarks against the Prime Minister on his YouTube show.

Relevant Provision:-

Section 124A (IPC, 1860). Sedition:

Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation,

or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to
excite disaffection towards, the Government established by law in India, shall be punished
with imprisonment for life, to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment which may
extend to three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine.

Explanation 1:- The expression “disaffection” includes disloyalty and all feelings of
enmity.

Explanation 2:- Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of the

Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, without exciting or
attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under
this section.

Explanation 3:- Comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative or other

action of the Government without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or
disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section.

Section 268 (IPC, 1860). Public Nuisance:- A person is guilty of a public nuisance
who does any act or is guilty of an illegal omission which causes any common injury,
danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in general who dwell or occupy property
in the vicinity, or which must necessarily cause injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to
persons who may have occasion to use any public right.

Section 501 (IPC, 1860). Printing or engraving matter known to be defamatory:-

Whoever prints or engraves any matter, knowing or having good reason to believe that
such matter is defamatory of any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a
term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

Ratio:-

The SC quashed the FIR against Vinod Dua on the grounds that journalists are entitled
to free journalism and a controversial statement does not amount to sedition if there is no
intention/tendency to incite enmity towards the government.

Observations:-

1. Every journalist is entitled to the protections mentioned in the case of Kedar Nath
Singh v. State of Bihar (1962).

2. On facts, it has been established that the statements attributed to the petitioner that the
Prime Minister had used deaths and terror attacks to garner votes or that the Prime Minister
had garnered votes through acts of terrorism, were not made in the Talk Show.

Cases Referred:-
1. Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962): The scope of offence under Section 124A
IPC is limited to the acts involving intention or tendency to create disorder, disturbance of
law and order or incitement to violence.
 STATE OF KERALA V. LEESAMA JOSEPH. (28 JUNE, 2021)

Issue:-

The main issue before the court in this case was that whether the persons with
disabilities (PWD) were entitled to reservation in promotions in the services under the state.

Ratio:-

The court held that the persons with disabilities are entitled to reservation in promotion.

Observations:-

1. Reservation in promotion cannot be denied to persons with disabilities.

2. There is a legislative mandate [Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016] of equal
opportunity for career progression. (The Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 was replaced
by the RPwD Act, 2016)

3. A person cannot be denied the benefit of promotion if he was inducted into the service
via compassionate appointment and not through direct recruitment.

4. Absence of rules for reservation in promotion in favour of disabled persons cannot deny
the benefit of such reservation to the disabled persons.

Cases Referred:-

1. Rajeev Kumar Gupta v. Union of India (2016): The principle of no reservation in

promotions held in the judgment of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) is not
applicable to persons with disabilities. [This point regarding no reservation in promotion
was set aside by the Parliament through 77th Amendment. 1995 by introducing Article
16(4A) in the Constitution that provides for reservation in promotions. However, this
provision only relates to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. The judgments
herein mentioned analyse the scope of reservation in promotion for the persons with
disabilities.]

2. Siddaraju v. State of Karnataka (2020):- Persons with disabilities have a right to

reservation in promotion.