MOHD SHAKIR VS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Bench:
Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Sudhanshu Dhulia

Facts:
In this case, there was a dispute regarding the possession of a property in which civil suits were pending before
different courts. The Executive Magistrate dropped proceedings under Section 145 CrPC, 1973 on the ground that
the matter was to be decided by the civil courts. However, the EM issued order to the parties to maintain status quo
till the decision of the suits.

Issue:
The issue was that whether the EM could make any observation regarding the rights of the parties and issue status
quo order when the proceedings under Section 145 were being dropped.

Relevant Provision:
Section 145(1) CrPC, 1973:

Whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute
likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within his local
jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties
concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in
written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute.

Ratio:
The SC held that the Magistrate cannot make observations as to rights of parties when proceedings under Section
145 were being dropped.

Observations:
1. The learned Magistrate had proceeded to record the findings, as if the possession of the respondent on the questioned
property was proved from the documentary evidence from the date of issuing notice and two months prior to the same
and then, had also proceeded to order that the second party would not interfere in the peaceful possession of the first
party until the competent Civil Court passes final judgment in the matter, and that status quo shall be maintained.

2. The Magistrate ought to have left all the relevant aspects for consideration of the competent civil court and without
recording any finding in the matter.

Morgan Securities And Credits Pvt. Ltd. vs Videocon Industries Ltd.

Bench:
Justices DY Chandrachud and AS Bopanna

Facts:
In this case, the Arbitrator decreed the claim and awarded amount of Rs. 5,00,32,656 along with Interest at the rate
of:
(i) twenty one percent per annum has been granted from the date of default to the date of the demand notice;
(ii) thirty six percent per annum with monthly rests from the date of the demand notice to the date of award ("pre-
award interest"); and
(iii) eighteen percent per annum on the principal amount of Rs. 5,00,32,656 from the date of award to the date of
payment ("post-award interest").

The Delhi High Court rejected the challenge raised against this award observing that the Arbitrator had in his discretion
restricted the post award interest to the principal amount.
 Issue:
The main issue before the court in this case was that whether the arbitrator had any discretion as to the award of ‘pre-
award’ and ‘post-award’ interest and if so, as to what amount.

Relevant Provision:
Section 31(7). Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:

(a) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where and in so far as an arbitral award is for the payment of money, the
arbitral tribunal may include in the sum for which the award is made interest, at such rate as it deems reasonable,
on the whole or any part of the money, for the whole or any part of the period between the date on which the
cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made.
(b) A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall, unless the award otherwise directs, carry interest at the rate
of two per cent. higher than the current rate of interest prevalent on the date of award, from the date of award to
the date of payment.

Ratio:

The SC held that the arbitrator has a wide discretion to award interest as to an arbitral award. This includes the
discretion to award post-award interest on only a part of the sum of the total award.

Observations:
1. The arbitrator has the discretion to determine:
a. the rate of reasonable interest
b. the sum on which the interest is to be paid, that is whether on the whole or any part of the principal amount
c. the period for which payment of interest is to be made - whether it should be for the whole or any part of the period
between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date of the award.

2. When a discretion has been conferred on the arbitrator in regard to the grant of pre-award interest, it would be against
the grain of statutory interpretation to presuppose that the legislative intent was to reduce the discretionary power of
the arbitrator for the grant of post-award interest under Section 31(7)(b).

3. Clause (b) does not fetter the discretion of the arbitrator to grant post-award interest. It only contemplates a situation
in which the discretion is not exercised by the arbitrator.

4. The purpose of granting post-award interest is to ensure that the award debtor does not delay the payment of the
award.

Cases Distinguished:
1. Hyder Consulting (UK) Limited v. Governor, State of Orissa [(2015) 2 SCC 189]: In this case, Justice Bobade had
opined that the arbitrator may grant post-award interest on the aggregate of the principal sum and the pre-award
interest. However, in this case, the arbitrator had not exercised any discretion in the first instance regarding the
interest. Therefore, there was no opinion of the court on the issue of the scope of the arbitrator’s discretion.

LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION VS SANJEEV BUILDERS PRIVATE LIMITED

Bench:
Justices Aniruddha Bose and JB Pardiwala

Facts:
This appeal arises from a suit filed in 1986 by plaintiffs for the specific performance of contract based on an agreement
dated 08.06.1979. The Bombay High Court allowing the application filed by plaintiffs permitted them to amend the
plaint. The suit originally claimed the damages to the tune of Rs. 1,01,00,000/- [Rs. One Crore & One Lakh only] in
the alternative was prayed for. By way of amendment the damages prayed for is to the tune of Rs. 4,00,01,00,000/-
[Rs. Four Hundred Crore & One Lakh only]. One of the contentions raised in the appeal filed by LIC (defendant) was
that the amendment was hit by the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. It was also
contended that the amendment could be said to be even hit by the principle of constructive res judicata. In this regard,
the plaintiffs contended that the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the CPC cannot be made applicable to an application
seeking amendment of plaint.
 Issue:
The main issue before the court was that whether the bar of Order II Rule 2 CPC, 1908 was applicable to amendment
of pleadings.
Relevant Provision:
Order II Rule 2 CPC, 1908. Suit to include the whole claim:
(1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of
action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any
Court.
(2) Relinquishment of part of claim- Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any
portion of his claim he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished.
(3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs- A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same
cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for
all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted.

Order VI Rule 17 CPC, 1908. Amendment of Pleadings

Ratio:
The SC held that the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC, 1908 does not apply to an amendment to the pleadings in the
existing suit. Such bar is only applicable to the subsequent suits. The SC also laid down guidelines related to
amendment of pleadings under Order VI Rule 17.

Observations:
1. The principle of constructive res judicata has no application when there was no formal adjudication between the
parties after full hearing.

Guidelines issued by Court:

1. All amendments are to be allowed which are necessary for determining the real question in controversy provided it
does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. This is mandatory, as is apparent from the use of the word
"shall", in the latter part of Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC.

2. The prayer for amendment is to be allowed:

a. if the amendment is required for effective and proper adjudication of the controversy between the parties, and
b. to avoid multiplicity of proceedings,
Provided:
(a) the amendment does not result in injustice to the other side,
(b) by the amendment, the parties seeking amendment does not seek to withdraw any clear admission made by the
party which confers a right on the other side and
(c) the amendment does not raise a time barred claim, resulting in divesting of the other side of a valuable accrued
right (in certain situations).

3. A prayer for amendment is generally required to be allowed unless:

a. by the amendment, a time barred claim is sought to be introduced, in which case the fact that the claim would be
time barred becomes a relevant factor for consideration,
b. the amendment changes the nature of the suit,
c. the prayer for amendment is malafide, or
d. by the amendment, the other side loses a valid defence.
e. In dealing with a prayer for amendment of pleadings, the court should avoid a hyper technical approach, and is
ordinarily required to be liberal especially where the opposite party can be compensated by costs.

4. Where the amendment would enable the court to pin-pointedly consider the dispute and would aid in rendering a
more satisfactory decision, the prayer for amendment should be allowed.

5. Where the amendment merely sought to introduce an additional or a new approach without introducing a time barred
cause of action, the amendment is liable to be allowed even after expiry of limitation.

6. Amendment may be justifiably allowed where it is intended to rectify the absence of material particulars in the plaint.

7. Delay in applying for amendment alone is not a ground to disallow the prayer. Where the aspect of delay is arguable,
the prayer for amendment could be allowed and the issue of limitation framed separately for decision.
8. Where the amendment changes the nature of the suit or the cause of action, so as to set up an entirely new case,
foreign to the case set up in the plaint, the amendment must be disallowed. Where, however, the amendment sought
is only with respect to the relief in the plaint, and is predicated on facts which are already pleaded in the plaint,
ordinarily the amendment is required to be allowed.

9. Where the amendment is sought before commencement of trial, the court is required to be liberal in its approach. The
court is required to bear in mind the fact that the opposite party would have a chance to meet the case set up in
amendment. As such, where the amendment does not result in irreparable prejudice to the opposite party, or divest
the opposite party of an advantage which it had secured as a result of an admission by the party seeking amendment,
the amendment is required to be allowed. Equally, where the amendment is necessary for the court to effectively
adjudicate on the main issues in controversy between the parties, the amendment should be allowed.

Cases Referred:
1. Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal [AIR 1964 SC 1810]: Order II Rule 2 is applicable to subsequent suits.

TARAK DASH MUKHARJEE VS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Bench:
Justices Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka

Facts:
In this case, the accused had approached the Allahabad High Court seeking quashing of the second FIR contending
that both the first and second FIRs are based on the same set of facts and the same cause of action. It was contended
that the registration of second FIR is a gross abuse of process of law. The High Court dismissed the petition.

Issue:
The main issue in this case was that the whether successive FIRs could be filed against the same person on same
allegations.

Important Provisions:
CrPC, 1973: Sections 154, 155
Constitution of India, 1950: Article 21, 22.

Ratio:
The SC held that successive FIRs against the same accused on the same allegations cannot be lodged.

Observations:
1. Such successive FIRs will result in the accused getting entangled in multiple criminal proceedings for the same
alleged offence.\
2. It is nothing but abuse of the process of law.
3. Such act would also be violative Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution.

Cases Referred:
1. T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala [(2001) 6 SCC 181]: Two FIRs cannot be filed against the same accused on the
same facts

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH VS NANDU @ NANDUA

Bench:
Justices MR Shah and Krishna Murari

Facts:
In this case, the trial Court (in the year 1995) convicted Nandu @ Nandua and other accused for the offences
punishable under Sections 147, 148, 323 and 302/34 of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment.
The Madhya Pradesh High Court (in the year 2019) confirmed the conviction of the accused, but partly allowed the
appeal by reducing the sentence imposed on Nandu to that already undergone by him.
 Issue:
Whether an accused can be sentenced to less than life imprisonment when he has been convicted of the offence of
murder u/s 302 IPC, 1860.

Relevant Provision:
Section 302 IPC: Punishment for murder:
Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
Section 386 CrPC, 1973. Powers of appellate court.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that a murder convict cannot be sentenced to a punishment less than imprisonment for
life.

Observations:
1. The minimum sentence provided for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC would be imprisonment for life
and fine.
2. Any punishment less than the imprisonment for life for the offence punishable under Section 302 would be contrary
to Section 302 IPC, 1860.

AHMEDNAGAR MAHANAGAR PALIKA VS AHMEDNAGAR MAHANAGAR

PALIKA KAMGAR UNION
Bench:
Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna

Facts:
In this case, an Industrial Court directed the Ahmednagar Mahanagar Palika to give appointment to the heirs of the
employees on their retirement and/or superannuation. The direction was based on a settlement award between the
Employees Union and the Mahanagar Palika in which one of the demand by the Union was that legal heirs of the
employees must be employed on retirement. The Gujarat High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by Mahanagar
Palika challenging this order.

Issue:
The issue in this case was that whether the heirs of the employees could be appointed on their
retirement/superannuation.
Relevant Provision:
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 15 and 16.

Ratio:
The SC observed that the appointment of the heirs of the employees on their retirement/superannuation is violative
of the Right to Equality under the Indian Constitution.

Observations:
1. If such an appointment is permitted, in that case, outsiders shall never get an appointment and only the heirs of the
employees on their superannuation and/or retirement shall get an appointment.

2. Appointment on compassionate grounds cannot be extended to the heirs of the employees on their superannuation
and/or retirement.

3. The appointment on compassionate grounds is provided upon the death of an employee in harness without any kind
of security whatsoever. The appointment on compassionate grounds is not automatic and shall be subject to the strict
scrutiny of various parameters including the financial position of the family, the economic dependence of the family
upon the deceased employee and the avocation of the other members of the family. No one can claim to have a
vested right for appointment on compassionate grounds.
 STATE VS R. SOUNDIRARASU
Bench:
Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and JB Pardiwala

Facts:
The Supreme Court was considering an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Madras that allowed criminal
revision applications preferred by the accused discharging them from the prosecution under Section 13(2) read with
13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Issue:
The issue before the court was regarding the scope of ‘discharge’ under Section 239 CrPC, 1973.

Relevant Provisions:
Section 239 (CrPC): When accused shall be discharged (Case instituted on police report):
If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under section 173 and making such examination,
if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an
opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall
discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing.
Section 227 (CrPC): Discharge (Court of Session)
Section 245 (CrPC): When accused shall be discharged (Case instituted otherwise than on police report)

Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that the only consideration at the stage of Section 239/240 is as to whether the
allegation/charge is groundless.

Observations:
1. The test which may be applied for determining whether the charge should be considered groundless is that where the
materials are such that even if unrebutted, would make out no case whatsoever.

2. Sections 227 and 239 resply provide for discharge being made before the recording of evidence and the consideration
as to whether the charge has to be framed or not is required to be made on the basis of the record of the case,
including the documents and oral hearing of the accused and the prosecution or the police report, the documents sent
along with it and examination of the accused and after affording an opportunity to the parties to be heard. On the
other hand, the stage for discharge under Section 245 is reached only after the evidence referred to in Section 244
has been taken. Despite the slight variation in the provisions with regard to discharge under the three pairs of Sections
referred to above, the settled legal position is that the stage of framing of charge under either of these three situations,
is a preliminary one and the test of "prima facie" case has to be applied — if the trial court is satisfied that a prima
facie case is made out, charge has to be framed.

3. As per the provisions under Section 239 what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that
the offence has been committed and not that a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage,
even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence
of the factual ingredients constituting the offences alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in
respect of that offence, and it is only in a case where the Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless, he is to
discharge the accused after recording his reasons for doing so.

Cases Referred:
1. K. Ramakrishna & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr. [(2000) 8 SCC 547]: The questions regarding the sufficiency or
reliability of the evidence to proceed further are not required to be considered by the trial court under Section 239
CrPC.
 K PARAMASIVAM VS KARUR VYSYA BANK LTD
Bench:
Justices Indira Banerjee and JK Maheshwari

Facts:
In this case, a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process [CIRP] was initiated against Maharaja Theme Parks and
Resorts who were guarantors for the corporate debtor, without initiating any action against the principal borrower
first. The NCLT admitted the petition under Section 7 IBC, 2016 which was upheld by the NCLAT.

Issue:
The issue in this matter was that whether CIRP could be initiated against corporate guarantor without proceeding
against the principal debtor.

Relevant Provision:
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016: Sections 3(8), 5(5A) and 7.

Ratio:
The SC held that it is legal to proceed directly against corporate guarantors and initiate CIRP under Section 7.

Observations:
1. The liability of the guarantor is co-extensive with that of the principal borrower.

2. CIRP can be initiated against a Corporate entity who has given a guarantee to secure the dues of a non-corporate
entity as a financial debt accrues to the corporate person, in respect of the guarantee given by it, once the borrower
commits default and the guarantor is then, the Corporate Debtor.

Cases Referred:
1. Laxmi Pat Surana v. Union Bank of India [(2021) 8 SCC 481]: Insolvency Process is maintainable against corporate
guarantor even if principal borrower is not a corporate person.
 INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. VS SUDERA REALTY PRIVATE LIMITED
Bench:
Justices KM Joseph and PS Narasimha

Facts:
The respondent had filed a civil suit against the appellant seeking mesne profits on the ground that the appellant is a
‘tenant at sufferance’. The decree was granted by the trial court and later on confirmed by the High Court.

Issue:
The main issue before the court was that whether a ‘tenant at sufferance’ is liable to pay mesne profits to the landlord.

Relevant Provision:
Section 2(12) CPC, 1908: Mesne Profits:
"mesne profits" of property means those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property actually
received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom, together with interest on such profits, but shall not
include profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession.
Section 111(a) Transfer of Property Act, 1882: Determination of lease by efflux of time.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that a ‘tenant at sufferance’ who continues in possession after the expiry of lease is liable
to pay mesne profits.

Observations:
1. While a tenant at sufferance cannot be forcibly dispossessed, that does not detract from the possession of the
erstwhile tenant turning unlawful on the expiry of the lease.
2. A tenant continuing in possession after the expiry of the lease may be treated as a tenant at sufferance, which status
is a shade higher than that of a mere trespasser, as in the case of a tenant continuing after the expiry of the lease,
his original entry was lawful. But a tenant at sufferance is not a tenant by holding over.

Cases Referred:
1. Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd. [(2005) 1 SCC 705]: The possession of ‘tenant at sufferance’
is unlawful and he is liable to pay mesne profits.

SHIV KUMAR VS STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Bench:
Justices KM Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy

Facts:
The prosecution case against Shiv Kumar and co-accused Shatrughan Prasad was that they had received the articles
looted from the truck knowing fully well that those are stolen property. The Trial Court convicted the accused and the
High Court confirmed the conviction.

Issue:
The main issue before the court in this case was that whether for conviction under Section 411 IPC, 1860 the
knowledge of the accused that the property was a stolen property needs to be proved.

Relevant Provisions:
Section 411 (IPC). Dishonestly receiving stolen property:
Whoever dishonestly receives or retains any stolen property, knowing or having reason to believe the same to be
stolen property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years,
or with fine, or with both.

Ratio:
For a conviction under Section 411 IPC, the prosecution must establish the knowledge of the accused that the property
was stolen property.
 Cases Referred:
1. Trimbak v. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR 1954 SC 39]: The following ingredients need to be proved in order to
establish an offence under Section 411 IPC:
a. that the stolen property was in the possession of the accused
b. that some person other than the accused had possession of the property before the accused got possession of it
c. that the accused had knowledge that the property was stolen property

VISHWANATH PRATAP SINGH VS ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA

Bench:
Justices Hemant Gupta and Sudhanshu Dhulia

Facts:
Vishwanath Pratap Singh had first approached the Delhi High Court challenging a notification issued by Election
Commission of India for election to Rajya Sabha after he was not allowed to file his nomination without a proper
proposer proposing his name. The High Court rejected his contention that his fundamental right of free speech and
expression and right to personal liberty has been infringed.

Relevant Provision:
Article 19(1)(a). Constitution of India: Right to freedom of speech and expression

Issue:
The main issue before the court was that whether the right to contest an election was a fundamental right of a citizen.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that the right to contest an election is not a fundamental right but only a statutory right of a
citizen.

Observations:
1. There is nothing wrong in the same statute which confers the right to contest an election also to provide for the
necessary qualifications without which a person cannot offer his candidature for an elective office and also to provide
for disqualifications which would disable a person from contesting for, or holding, an elective statutory office.

2. The Representation of People Act, 1950 read with the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 has contemplated the name
of a candidate to be proposed while filling the nomination form. Therefore, an individual cannot claim that he has a
right to contest election and the said stipulation violates his fundamental right, so as to file his nomination without any
proposer as is required under the Act.

Cases Referred:
1. Javed v. State of Haryana [(2003) 8 SCC 369]: Right to contest an election is neither a fundamental right nor a
common law right.

2. Rajbala v. State of Haryana [(2016) 2 SCC 445]: The right to contest election to Rajya Sabha and Legislative Councils
is subject to certain constitutional limitations and any law made by the Parliament.