Lingeswaran v.

Thirunagalingam
SLP 2054-2055/2022

Bench: Justice MR Shah and Justice BV Nagarathna

Issues: Madras High Court set aside trial court’s order condoning the huge delay of 467 days in
preferring the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree.
Ratio: In complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court, Special Leave Petitions
stand dismissed, and pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
Orbiter: Having gone through the order passed by the learned trial Court, even the learned trial
Court also specifically observed that, in the absence of material evidence, it cannot be said that
the delay has been explained.
Cases referred: Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 10 SCC 765
Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157
Provisions List: Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5
Delay Condonation - When it is found that the delay is not properly explained, the application to
condone delay is required to be dismissed - the Court has no power to extend the period of limitation
on equitable grounds - Still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails
to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. (Para 5)

Judgment:
Feeling aggrieved with the order of the Madras High Court setting aside the trial Court’s order,
the defendants have preferred the present SLP.
We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. The approach adopted by
the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot
be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to
condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who
is guilty of delay and laches.
In Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 it
was held by this court that the statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a
particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.
In Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157,
paragraph 14, it is observed and held as under: “The law of limitation is founded on public policy.
The limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the
parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without
unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should
remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature.”
The Special 4 Leave Petitions and pending application, if any stand dismissed.

Tulesh Kumar Sahu v. State of Chattisgarh [Criminal Appeal No(s). 753/2021]

Bench: Justices UU Lalit, S Ravindra Bhat and PS Narasimha

Issues: Can the conviction of a person for murder be based solely on the alleged recovery of
stolen articles?
Ratio: Here, there is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the robbery and murder formed
parts of one transaction. It is not even known at what time of the night these events took place.
In our Judgment, Beaumonth, C.J., and Sen J. in - Bhikha Gobar v. Emperor, AIR 1943 Bom. 458 (B)
rightly held that the mere fact that an accused produced shortly after the murder ornaments
which were on the murdered person is not enough to justify the inference that the accused must
have committed the murder.
Orbiter: In our judgment, no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what inference should be
drawn from a certain circumstance. Where, however, the only evidence against an accused
person is the recovery of stolen property and although the circumstances may indicate that the
theft and the murder must have been committed at the same time, it is not safe to draw the
inference that the person in possession of the stolen property was the murdered. Suspicion
cannot take the place of proof.

Cases referred:
1. Ashish Jain v. Makrand Singh and Others, (2019) 3 SCC 770- when a register was produced
on record, in absence of conclusive evidence that it was maintained by deceased, benefit of
doubt was given to accused.
1. Sonu alias Sunil v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2020 SCC Online SC 473- the observations in
Ashish Jain were relied upon in this case.
2. Sunder Lal alia Sundera vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 28- the ornaments were
worn by the deceased. No explanation was forthcoming how the accused came to be in
possession on the very same day of murder. Based on the circumstances, the Court upheld
conviction under Section 302 of the IPC.
3. Sanwant Khan vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1956 SC 54- in absence of any direct or
circumstantial evidence whatsoever, from the solitary circumstance of the unexplained
recovery of the two articles from the houses of the two appellants it does not necessarily
indicate that the theft and the murders took place at one and the same time.
4. Baiju v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 588- In the case of recovery of an article from
a person accused of other than theft, chance to explain its possession should be given.

Provisions: IPC - 396, 460, 302, 392 r/w 34 | Evidence Act - 114, 27 | Arms Act - 25
Judgment: The only material which may possibly be taken against the appellant is, thus
extremely weak. There is no other material on record which could even remotely be taken against
the appellant. On the strength of the law declared by this Court, the appellant is, therefore,
entitled to benefit of doubt.

Nandu Singh v. State of M.P (now Chattisgarh) [Criminal Appeal No.285 of 2022]
Bench: Justices U.U. Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and P.S. Narasimha
Issues: can a conviction for murder be made in absence of motive in a case depending upon
circumstantial evidence?
Ratio: In a case based on substantial evidence, motive assumes great significance. It is not as if
motive alone becomes the crucial link in the case to be established by the prosecution and in its
absence the case of Prosecution must be discarded. But, at the same time, complete absence of
motive assumes a different complexion and such absence definitely weighs in favour of the
accused.
Orbiter: In the instant case even on the issue of “last seen”, the evidence of PW-8- Ullekh Prasad
did not give any particulars nor did it establish any proximity in terms of time. Further, even after
the deceased had gone missing, no suspicion was entertained at any juncture against the
appellant and his name came to the surface only after the crime was converted to one under
Section 302 of the IPC.

Cases referred:
1. Anwar Ali vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2020) 10 SCC 166- if motive is proved that would
supply a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence but the absence thereof cannot be a
ground to reject the prosecution case.
2. Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189- absence of motive in a case depending on
circumstantial evidence is a factor that weighs in favour of the accused.
3. State of U.P. v. Kishanpal, (2008) 16 SCC 73- if the evidence is clear and unambiguous and the
circumstances prove the guilt of the accused, the same is not weakened even if the motive is
not a very strong one.
4. Shivaji Chintappa Patil vs. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 5 SCC 626- Anwar Ali ruling was
reiterated.

Provisions: IPC – 302, 201 | Evidence Act - 114, 27 | Arms Act - 25

Judgment: The circumstances on record do not make a complete chain to dispel any hypothesis
of innocence of the appellant. The prosecution having failed to establish through clear, cogent
and consistent evidence, the chain of events, on the basis of which the guilt of the appellant could
be established, the courts below were not right in accepting the case of prosecution and
convicting the appellant. We, therefore, acquit the appellant of the charges levelled against him.

Luckose Zachariah @ Zak Nedurnchira Luke & Ors. v. Joseph Joseph & Ors. [Criminal Appeal
No 256 of 2022]
Bench: Justices DY Chandrachud and Surya Kant
Issues: Is it necessary for Magistrate to consider charge sheet submitted u/s 173(2) of CrPC as
well as supplementary charge sheet u/s 173(8) of CrPC while deciding whether accused has
committed an offense?
Ratio: In view of the clear position of law which has been enunciated in the judgments of this
Court, both in Vinay Tyagi (supra) and Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya (supra), it is necessary for the
Magistrate, to have due regard to both the reports, the initial report which was submitted under
Section 173(2) as well as the supplementary report which was submitted after further
investigation in terms of Section 173(8). It is thereafter that the Magistrate would have to take a
considered view in accordance with law as to whether there is ground for presuming that the
persons named as accused have committed an offence.
Orbiter: While the High Court has relied upon the decision in Vinay Tyagi (supra), it becomes
necessary for this Court to set the matter beyond any controversy having due regard to the fact
that the Sessions Judge in the present case had while remitting the proceedings back to the
Magistrate relied on the judgment of the Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Joseph (supra)
which is contrary to the position set out in Vinay Tyagi.

Cases referred:
1. Vinay Tyagi v Irshad Alia alias Deepak (2013) 5 SCC 762- the supplementary report would
have to be dealt with “as part of the primary report” in view of the provisions of sub-Sections
3 to 6 of Section 173.
2. Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat (2019) 17 SCC 1- the police retain the power,
subject, of course, to the Magistrate's nod under Section 173(8) to further investigate an
offense till charges are framed.
3. Joseph v. Antony Joseph, 2018 (3) KHC 23- When a positive report under Section 173(2) of
Cr.P.C. is followed by a negative report under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. and cognizance has been
taken upon the former report, the magistrate shall proceed with the case ignoring the latter
report. But the supplementary report shall form part of the record of the case.

Provisions: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973- Section 173, Section 173(2), Section 173(8).
Judgment: The initial report under Section 173(2) CrPC which was submitted before the
competent court after investigation found that prima facie the appellants were involved in the
commission of the offences alleged. The subsequent report under Section 173(8) however has
come to the conclusion that the proceedings were liable to be dropped since prima facie no case
involving the commission of the offences has been established. In terms of sub-Section 8 of
Section 173, in the event of a further investigation, the report has to be forwarded to the
Magistrate upon which, the provisions of subSections (2) to (6) shall (as far as may be) apply in
relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded in sub-section
(2).
 Binay Kumar Dalei v. State of Odisha
Civil Appeal Nos.1627-1628 of 2022

Bench: Justices L. Nageswara Rao and BR Gavai

Issues: Can mining activity be permitted in the area which does not fall within the eco-sensitive
zone without implementing the Comprehensive Wildlife Management Plan and without
complying with Section 36A of the Act?
Ratio: The State of Odisha is directed to implement the Comprehensive Wildlife Management
Plan as suggested by the Standing Committee of NBWL before permitting any mining activity in
the eco-sensitive zone. The State is also directed to complete the process of declaration of the
traditional elephant corridor as a conservation reserve as per Section 36A of the Act
expeditiously. The mining operations of 97 quarries shall be permitted only thereafter.
Orbiter: The dispute can be resolved by giving a direction to the State Government to implement
the Comprehensive Wildlife Management Plan and complete the process of declaration of the
traditional elephant corridor as a conservation reserve as provided in Section 36A of the Act.

Cases referred:
1. Hospitality Association of Mudumalai v. In Defence of Environment and Animals & Ors;
(2020) 10 SCC 589- dealt with the importance of preserving elephant corridors and wildlife
sanctuaries.
2. Goa Foundation v. Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 590- Similar was reiterated.

Provisions: Wildlife (Protection) Act 1972- Section 36 | Rule 5 of the Environment (Protection)
Rules, 1986.
Judgment: The point that arises for consideration of this Court in this appeal is in a narrow
compass. According to the Appellants and the State Government there is no justification for
stopping mining activity in the area which does not fall within the eco-sensitive zone. Whereas
the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent No.8 contended that no mining activity can be
permitted even in the vicinity of an eco-sensitive zone unless the Comprehensive Wildlife
Management Plan has been implemented and Section 36A of the Act has been complied with.
Therefore, the State of Odisha is directed to implement the Comprehensive Wildlife Management
Plan as suggested by the Standing Committee of NBWL before permitting any mining activity in
the eco-sensitive zone.

Karan Singh v. State of U.P.

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. ………….. OF 2022
SLP (Crl.) No.717 of 2020

Bench: Justices Indira Banerjee and V. Ramasubramanian

Issue: whether the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and not
beyond all iota of doubt.
Ratio: The prosecution is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and not beyond all
iota of doubt. Appeal against High Court judgment upholding the conviction of accused in a
murder case - dismissed - The prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt - The fact
that the trial/appeal should have taken years and that other accused should have died during the
appeal cannot be a ground for acquittal. The prosecution was required to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt, which it has done, and not beyond all iota of doubt.
Orbiter: The fact that one of the injured witnesses may not have mentioned the name of
Appellant Karan Singh does not demolish the evidence of the other witnesses.
Cases referred:
1. Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana (2013) 14 SCC 434- The court is not supposed to give
undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the
heart of the matter, and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.
Provisions: Section 302 read with Section 149, Section 307 read with Section 149 and Section
148 of the Indian Penal Code.
Judgment: This Court, in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434 held: the court
is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which
do not go to the heart of the matter, and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness...” The
Appellant’s presence has been proved by two eye witnesses. It has been proved by the eye
witnesses, that the Appellant carried a rifle. But PW2 and PW3 deposed that all the accused had
opened fire. The prosecution was required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, which it
has done, and not beyond all iota of doubt. The fact that one of the injured witnesses may not
have mentioned the name of Appellant Karan Singh does not demolish the evidence of the other
witnesses.

Loop Telecom & Trading Ltd v. Union of India

CA 1447-1467 of 2016 | 3 March 2022

Bench: Justices DY Chandrachud, Surya Kant and Vikram Nath

Issue: Will the principle of Restitution under Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act apply when
the party claiming restitution was equally or more responsible for the illegality of the Contract.
Ratio: In adjudicating a claim of restitution, the court must determine the illegality which caused
the contract to become void and the role the party claiming restitution has played in it. If the
party claiming restitution was equally or more responsible for the illegality (in comparison to the
defendant), there shall be no cause for restitution.
Orbiter: In the Principles of Law of Restitution3 it has been noted that all claims for restitution
are subject to a defense of illegality. A court will not assist those who aim to perpetrate illegality.

Cases referred:
1. R K Garg v. Union of India- a greater free play in the joints must be accorded to decisions of
economic policy where the legislature or the executive is called upon to make complex
choices which cannot always conform to a straitjacket or doctrinaire solution.
2. Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India- the 2G licences which were granted by
the Union of India, including to the appellant, were quashed. The appellant claims to be
entitled to the refund of its Entry Fee on, as it contends, “well settled principles of civil,
contractual and constitutional law”.

Provisions: Indian Contract Act, 1872 - Section 65, Section 56.

Judgment: The applicability of Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act is not limited to cases of
physical impossibility. The Court also noted that in deciding cases in India, the only test which
must apply “is that of supervening impossibility or illegality of the act agreed to be contractually
done”. Thus, in determining a claim of restitution, the claiming party’s legal footing in relation to
the illegal act (and in comparison to the defendant) must be understood. Unless the party
claiming restitution participated in the illegal act involuntarily or the rule of law offers them
protection against the defendant, they would be held to be in pari delicto and therefore, their
claim for restitution will fail. In adjudicating a claim of restitution under Section 65 of the Indian
Contract Act, the court must determine the illegality which caused the contract to become void
and the role the party claiming restitution has played in it. In the present case, the appellant has
been held to be in pari delicto. The Principles of Law of Restitution subsequently notes that in
pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis is a way of qualifying the ex turpi causa defence.
 Union of India v. Managobinda Samantaray
CA 1622-1623 OF 2022 | 24 Feb 2022

Bench: Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Bela M. Trivedi

Issue: Can High Court interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by the Appellate
Authority?
Ratio: High Court cannot interfere with quantum of punishment imposed by the Appellate
Authority unless the exercise of discretion in awarding punishment is perverse in the sense the
punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate.
Orbiter: Writ jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law, procedural error
leading to manifest injustice, or violation of principles of natural justice. The decision is also
disturbed when it is found to be ailing with perversity.
Provisions:
Constitution of India, 1950 Article 226 - Judicial Review Of Disciplinary Proceedings.
CISF Rules, 2001 Rule 52
Judgment: Quantum of punishment is within the discretionary domain and the sole power of the
decision-making authority once the charge of misconduct stands proved. Such discretionary
power is exposed to judicial interference if exercised in a manner which is grossly
disproportionate to the fault, as the constitutional courts while exercising the power of judicial
review do not assume the role of the appellate authority. Writ jurisdiction is circumscribed by
limits of correcting errors of law, procedural error leading to manifest injustice or violation of
principles of natural justice. The decision are also disturbed when it is found to be ailing with
perversity. On the question of quantum of punishment, the court exercising the power of judicial
review can examine whether the authority has been a reasonable employer and has taken into
consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant
circumstances and excluded irrelevant matters. In the context of quantum of punishment these
aspects are examined to consider whether there is any error in decision making process. On
merits of the quantum of punishment imposed, the courts would not interfere unless the exercise
of discretion in awarding punishment is perverse in the sense the punishment imposed is grossly
disproportionate.

Sukhdev Singh vs State of Punjab

CrA 1004 of 2016 | 22 Feb 2022

Bench: CJI NV Ramana, Justices AS Bopanna and Hima Kohli

Issue: whether physical analysis prescribed under NDPS act for testing opium?
Ratio: The physical nature of the material is not relevant for determining whether the contents
of the sample analyzed were actually opium or not and physical analysis is not prescribed under
the provisions of the NDPS Act for testing the opium.
Orbiter: No doubt, the report of the Chemical Examiner indicates that some powder
material/chura was undertaken for analysis which was found to contain morphine and meconic
acid.
Provisions: Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 50
Judgment: It is only on the basis of the contents of the particular sample that a conclusion is to be
arrived at regarding the same being opium. The physical nature of the material is not relevant for
determining whether the contents of the sample analyzed were actually opium or not, and
physical analysis is not prescribed under the provisions of the NDPS Act for testing the opium.
 Narendra Singh @ Mukesh @ Bhura v. State of Rajasthan
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 7830/2021

Issue: Whether life imprisonment for the entire life span for an offence punishable under Section
302 of the IPC is beyond jurisdiction of the Trial Judge?
Ratio: The sentence of life imprisonment which shall be extended to the remainder of life passed
by the learned trial court and confirmed by the High Court on dismissal of appeal stands modified
with the sentence for imprisonment for life.
Orbiter: Learned Counsel for the petitioner has made a limited submission before this Court.
Cases referred: Union of India v. V. Sriharan
Provisions: Section 302 of the IPC
Judgment: “ Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that while
convicting the petitioner for offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, the Ld.Trial Judge
has punished him with life imprisonment for the entire life span which according to the learned
senior counsel is beyond jurisdiction of the Ld.Trial Judge and placed reliance on the judgment of
this Court reported in 2016 (7) SCC 1. Issue notice, for this limited purpose.” After we have heard
the learned Counsel for the parties and taking note of the Constitution Bench judgment of this
Court reported in 2016 (7) SCC 1, the sentence of life imprisonment which shall be extended to
remainder of life passed by the learned trial court by judgment dated 19.12.2013 and confirmed
by the High Court on dismissal of appeal stands modified with the sentence for imprisonment for
life.

Amritlal v. Shantilal Soni

SLP (Crl. No.) 5122 of 2019

Bench: Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Vikram Nath

Issue: Whether the relevant date for computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC
is the date of filing of the complaint, the date of institution of prosecution, or date on which
Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence.
Ratio: The relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of
prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence.
Orbiter: In rather over-zealous, if not over-adventurous, attempt to support the order of the High
Court, learned counsel for the contesting respondents has attempted to submit that Sarah
Mathew’s case requires reconsideration on the ground that some of the factors related with
Chapter XXXVI CrPC have not been considered by this Court. Such an attempt has only been noted
to be rejected.

Cases referred:
1. Somawanti & Ors. v. The State of Punjab & Ors.: AIR 1963 SC 151- A decision of the
Constitution Bench of this Court cannot be questioned on certain suggestions about different
interpretation of the provisions under consideration. It remains trite that the binding effect
of a decision of this Court does not depend upon whether a particular argument was
considered or not, provided the point with reference to which the argument is advanced, was
actually decided therein.
2. Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases by its director Dr. K.M. Cherian-
Therefore, the enunciations and declaration of law by the Constitution Bench do not admit of
any doubt that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC,
the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution
and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence. The High Court has
made a fundamental error in assuming that the date of taking cognizance i.e., 04.12.2012 is
decisive of the matter, while ignoring the fact that the written complaint was indeed filed by
the appellant on 10.07.2012, well within the period of limitation of 3 years with reference to
the date of commission of offence i.e., 04.10.2009.
Provisions:
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973- Section 468, Chapter XXXVI CrPC.
Judgement: Appeal against High Court order setting aside criminal proceedings on the ground
that taking cognizance by magistrate was barred by limitation. The High Court made a
fundamental error in assuming that the date of taking cognizance i.e., 04.12.2012 is decisive of
the matter, while ignoring the fact that the written complaint was indeed filed by the appellant
on 10.07.2012, well within the period of limitation of 3 years with reference to the date of
commission of offence i.e., 04.10.2009. Rejected the contention that Sarah Mathew's case requires
reconsideration on the ground that some of the factors related with Chapter XXXVI CrPC have not
been considered.

M. Nageshwara Reddy v. State of A.P.

2022 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Bench: Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna

Issues: Can evidence of eye witnesses be discarded merely because they were the relatives of the
deceased victim?
Ratio: Evidence of eye witnesses cannot be discarded merely because they were the relatives of
the deceased victim.
Orbiter: The contradictions, if any, are not material contradictions which can affect the case of
the prosecution as a whole.
Judgment: Merely because the witnesses were the relatives of the deceased, their evidence
cannot be discarded solely on the aforesaid ground. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of
the case, the High Court has materially erred in discarding the deposition/evidence. Delay of
seven hours in lodging FIR cannot be said to be fatal to the prosecution case - Conviction recorded
by Trial Court restored. Unnecessarily weightage shall not be given to some minor contradictions.
Deposition of injured eyewitness has a greater reliability and credibility.

Yeruva Sayireddy v. State of A.P.

Criminal Appeal No.233 Of 2016

Bench: Justice Vineet Saran and Justice Aniruddha Bose

Issues: Can amicus curiae who appearing for the deceased appellant be treated as 'near relative'
under Section 394 CrPC for the purpose of continuance of appeal?
Ratio: The counsel, as an Amicus, cannot be treated as a near relative of the deceased
appellant/convict.
Orbiter: The appeal is governed by the substantive provision of law.
Provisions: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973- Section 394.
Judgment: Admittedly, the appellant has died after being in jail for about 12 years. As per Section
394 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) on the death of the appellant/convict the
appeal is to abate. The proviso thereof carries an exception to the effect that a near relative may,
within thirty days of the death of the appellant/convict, apply to the Appellate Court for leave to
continue the appeal. The explanation to the said proviso defines ‘near relative’ to mean a parent,
spouse, lineal descendant, brother or sister. In the present case, there is no application for leave
to continue the appeal after the death of the appellant/convict. The counsel, as an Amicus, cannot
be treated as a near relative of the deceased appellant/convict. The application for continuance
of the appeal having not been made within 30 days or even thereafter by any near relative, in our
opinion, as per the provision of Section 394 of the Cr.P.C.,
 State of M.P v. Ramji Lal Sharma
Criminal Appeal No. 293 Of 2022

Bench: Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna

Issue: Is it material whether accused used weapon or caused injury if 'common intention' to kill
deceased is established?
Ratio: Once it has been established and proved by the prosecution that all the accused came at
the place of incident with a common intention to kill the deceased and as such, they shared the
common intention, in that case it is immaterial whether any of the accused who shared the
common intention had used any weapon or not and/or any of them caused any injury on the
deceased or not.
Orbiter: NA
Provisions: Indian Penal Code, 1860- Section 34.
Judgment: Even otherwise once it has been established and proved by the prosecution that all
the accused came to the place of the incident with a common intention to kill the deceased and
as such, they shared the common intention, in that case, it is immaterial whether any of the
accused who shared the common intention had used any weapon or not and/or any of them
caused any injury on the deceased or not. There are no material contradictions between the
ocular and medical evidence. The presence of all the accused has been established and proved
and the prosecution has also been successful in proving that all the accused shared a common
intention. Trial Court judgment restored.

Amit Katyal v. Meera Ahuja

Civil Appeal No. 3778 Of 2020

Bench: Whether the object and purpose of 14 the IBC is to kill the company and stop/stall the
project, or to ensure that the business of the company runs as a going concern.
Ratio: The object and purpose of 14 the IBC are not to kill the company and stop/stall the project,
but to ensure that the business of the company runs as a going concern.
Orbiter: Being alive to the problem of a single home buyer derailing the entire project by filing an
insolvency application under Section 7 of the IBC, the legislature has introduced the threshold of
at least 100 home buyers or 10% of the total home buyers of the same project to jointly file an
application under Section 7 of the IBC for commencement of CIRP against the builder company.
Cases referred:
1. Brilliant Alloys Pvt. Ltd. v. S. Rajagopal 2018 SCC Online SC 3154- Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code, 2016; Section 12A - Regulation 30A of the CIRP Regulations, 2016 - This provision is
held to be directory depending on fact of case.
2. Swiss Ribbons Private Limited and Another v. Union of India and others, reported in (2019)
4 SCC 17- Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 12A - At any stage before a COC is
constituted, a party can approach NCLT/Adjudicating Authority directly and the Tribunal
may in exercise of its powers under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, allow or disallow an
application for withdrawal or settlement - In an appropriate case and where the case is being
made out and the NCLT is satisfied about the settlement, may permit/allow an application for
withdrawal or settlement.

Provisions: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 12A.

Judgment: The Court allowed withdrawal of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against
a builder in an application filed by three homebuyers in view of a settlement plan agreed upon
by the majority of them. In the larger interest of the homebuyers, the Apex Court exercised power
under Article 142 to permit withdrawal of the CIRP proceedings and set aside all matters pending
between the parties. Therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, where out of
128 home buyers, 82 home buyers will get the possession within a period of one year, as
undertaken by the appellant and respondent No.4 – Corporate Debtor, coupled with the fact that
original applicants have also settled the dispute with the appellant/Corporate Debtor, we are of
the opinion that this is a fit case to exercise the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of
India read with Rule 11 of the NCLT rules, 2016 and to permit the original applicants to withdraw
the CIRP proceedings. We are of the opinion that the same shall be in the larger interest of the
home buyers who are waiting for the possession for more than eight years. If the original
applicants and the majority of the home buyers are not permitted to close the CIRP proceedings,
it would have a drastic consequence on the home buyers of the real estate project. If the CIRP
proceedings are continued, there would be a moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC and there
would be a stay of all pending proceedings and which would bar the institution of fresh
proceedings against the builder, including proceedings by homebuyers for compensation due to
delayed possession or refund. On the other hand, if the CIRP fails, then the builder-company has
to go into liquidation as per Section 33 of the IBC. The homebuyers being unsecured creditors of
the builder company stand to lose all the monies that are either hard-earned and saved or
borrowed at high rate of interest, for no fault of theirs.

State of Rajsthan v. Ashok Khetoliya

CA 1814 OF 2022 | 10 March 2022

Bench: Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian

Issue: Whether 74th constitutional amendment take away states' power to legislate in the matter
of 'local bodies'.
Ratio: The scheme of the Constitutional Amendment is not to take away legislative competence
of the State Legislatures to legislate on the subject of local Government, but it is more to ensure
that the three tiers of governance are strengthened as part of democratic set up.
Orbiter: In fact, the High Court has struck down the notification only for the reason that the
notification under Article 243Q(2) was not published. Such reasoning is not tenable.
Provisions: Constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992, Part IXA - Rajasthan
Municipalities Act, 2009.
Cases referred:
1. Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija- The High Court found that the decision to exclude Ulhasnagar
was taken by the Government abruptly and in an irrational manner.
2. Champa Lal- this Court had struck down a notification issued by the Governor of the State of
Rajasthan holding that in the absence of notification which meets the requirement of Article
243Q(2).
3. Parmar Samantsinh Umedsinh v. State of Gujarat & Ors; 2021 SCC OnLine SC 138- The power
of competent Legislature, i.e., State Legislature in the light of enabling provisions provided in
the Constitution with regard to framing of laws concerning Legislature cannot be whittled
down by way of restrictive interpretation as contended by the appellants.
4. State of U.P. & Ors. v. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti & Ors; 1995 Supp (2) SCC 305- this Court
was considering the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992.

Judgement: It is the State Legislature alone which is competent to legislate in respect of the
municipalities with only one limitation that the provisions of the State Act cannot be inconsistent
with the mandate of the Scheme of Part IXA of the Constitution. The scheme of the Constitutional
Amendment is not to take away legislative competence of the State Legislatures to legislate on
the subject of local Government but it is more to ensure that the three tiers of governance are
strengthened as part of democratic set up....Since the local Government falls in entry 5 of List II
of the Seventh Schedule, therefore, it is the State Legislature alone which is competent to legislate
in respect of the municipalities with only one limitation that the provisions of the State Act cannot
be inconsistent with the mandate of the Scheme of Part IXA of the Constitution. As Section 5 of
the Municipalities Act is not inconsistent with any provisions of Article 243Q of the Constitution,
therefore, two notifications are not contemplated or warranted under the Scheme of Part IXA or
the Municipalities Act...The State Government is competent to divide the Municipalities in the
State into classes according to their income or other factors like population or importance of the
local area and other circumstances as provided under Section 329 of the Municipalities Act.
 OLX India BV v. State of Haryana
CrA 378 OF 2022 | 8 March 2022

Coram: Justices UU Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and PS Narasimha

Issue: Can HC pass the directions to adopt a screening mechanism with respect to the sellers who
could post an advertisement on the Platform?
Ratio: There was no occasion for the High Court to pass these directions; and more particularly,
without hearing the appellant.
Orbiter: Since the matter is pending consideration before the High Court, we do not enter into
and deal with the submissions advanced by the appellant but leave the appellant to agitate all
these issues before the High Court.
Judgement: Appeal against Punjab and Haryana HC interim directions issued against OLX is
Allowed. There was no occasion for the High Court to pass these directions; and more
particularly, without hearing the appellant.

Kamla Devi v. State of Rajasthan

CrA 342 OF 2022 | 11 March 2022

Coram: Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna

Issues: Can court deciding bail application completely divorce its decision from material aspects
of the case?
Ratio: The Court deciding a bail application cannot completely divorce its decision from material
aspects of the case such as the allegations made against the accused. It is not necessary for a Court
to give elaborate reasons while granting bail, particularly when the case is at the initial stage and
the allegations of the offences by the accused would not have been crystalised as such. There
cannot be elaborate details recorded to give an impression that the case is one that would result
in a conviction or, by contrast, in an acquittal while passing an order on an application for grant
of bail.
Provisions: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 : Section 439.
Judgement: While we are conscious of the fact that a Court considering the grant of bail must not
engage in an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, we are of the view that the High Court
while passing the impugned orders has not taken into account even a single material aspect of
the case ..
...The primary considerations which must be placed at balance while deciding the grant of bail
are: (i) the seriousness of the offence; (ii) the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice; (iii)
the impact of release of the accused on the prosecution witnesses; (iv) likelihood of the accused
tampering with evidence. While such list is not exhaustive, it may be stated that if a Court takes
into account such factors in deciding a bail application, it could be concluded that the decision
has resulted from a judicious exercise of its discretion.

M/s Puri Investments v. M/s Young Friends & Co. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1609 OF 2022

Bench: VINEET SARAN; ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ

Issues: what is the scope of interference by the supervisory Court on decisions of the fact-finding
forum.
Ratio: Scope of interference by the supervisory Court on decisions of the fact-finding forum -
Situations when a finding on facts or questions of law would be perverse: (i) Erroneous on
account of non-consideration of material evidence, or (ii) Being conclusions which are contrary
to the evidence, or (iii) Based on inferences that are impermissible in law.
Provisions: Constitution of India, 1950; Article 227
Judgement: Appeal against High Court order which set aside the eviction order of Appellate
Tribunal High Court is Allowed - The High Court tested the legality of the order of the Tribunal
through the lens of an appellate body and not as a supervisory Court in adjudicating the
application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This is impermissible - There was no
perversity in the order of the Appellate Tribunal on the basis of which the High Court could have
interfered.

Gadadhar Chandra vs State of West Bengal | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 287

Coram: Justices Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka

Issue: Whether prior concert & pre-arranged plan has to be established for conviction invoking
'common intention' us 34.
Ratio: Common intention presupposes prior concert. It requires meeting of minds, a prearranged
plan before a man can be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another. The criminal act
must have been done in furtherance of the common intention of all the accused. In a given case,
the plan can be formed suddenly.
Provisions: Indian Penal Code, 1860 -Section 34
Judgement: Appeal against concurrent conviction of appellant by invoking Section 34 IPC -
Allowed - The prosecution has failed to prove ingredients of Section 34 of IPC in this case - non
examination of two crucial eye witnesses makes the prosecution case about the existence of a
prior concert and prearranged plan extremely doubtful.

State of M.P. v. Sadique REVIEW PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. OF 2022 (Arising out of Diary
No. 1930 of 2022) IN CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 963 OF 2021

UDAY UMESH LALIT; J, S. RAVINDRA BHAT; J, BELA M. TRIVEDI; J

Issues: Is Magistrate competent to consider the request for extension of time to complete
investigation?
Ratio: Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; Section 43D(2)(b) - Magistrate would not be
competent to consider the request for extension of time to complete investigation - The only
competent authority to consider such request would be "the Court" as specified in the proviso in
Section 43-D (2)(b) of the UAPA - Review petition filed by the State dismissed
Provisions: Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; Section 43D(2)(b).
Judgement: Relying upon the decision in Bikramjit Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 616
it was observed by this Court:- “Consequently, insofar as “Extension of time to complete
investigation” is concerned, the Magistrate would not be competent to consider the request and
the only competent authority to consider such request would be “the Court” as specified in the
proviso in Section 43-D(b) of the UAPA. In view of the law laid down by this Court, we accept the
plea raised by the appellants and hold them entitled to the relief of default bail as prayed for.”

Nahar Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh CrA 443 OF 2022 | 16 March 2022

Coram: Justices Vineet Saran and Aniruddha Bose

Issues: Can magistrate summon person not named in police report or fir if materials reveal prima
facie his involvement.
Ratio: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 190 (1)(b) - Jurisdiction to issue summons can
be exercised even in respect of a person whose name may not feature at all in the police report,
whether as accused or in column (2) thereof if the Magistrate is satisfied that there are materials
on record which would reveal prima facie his involvement in the offence.
Provisions: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 190 (1)(b).
Cases referred: Raghubans Dubey v. State of Bihar (1967) 2 SCR 423 : AIR 1967 SC 1167 and
Dharam Pal and Others vs. State of Haryana (2014) 3 SCC 306 and Hardeep Singh vs. State of
Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92, - Inclusion in column (2) was not held to be the determinant factor for
summoning persons other than those named as accused in the police report or chargesheet. The
principle of law enunciated in Raghubans Dubey (supra), Dharam Pal (supra) and Hardeep Singh
(supra) does not constrict exercise of such power of the Court taking cognizance in respect of this
category of persons (i.e., whose names feature in column (2) of the chargesheet)..
Judgement: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 190 (1)(b) - For summoning persons upon
taking cognizance of an offence, the Magistrate has to examine the materials available before him
for coming to the conclusion that apart from those sent up by the police some other persons are
involved in the offence. These materials need not remain confined to the police report, charge
sheet or the F.I.R. A statement made under Section 164 of the Code could also be considered for
such purpose. Appeal against High Court judgment which upheld the order passed by Magistrate
summoning the appellant who was not named in police report is Dismissed - The name of the
accused/appellant had transpired from the statement made by the victim under Section 164 CrPC
- No error in the order of the Magistrate

Mohinder Singh (D) The. Lrs. And Ors. v. Mal Singh (D) Through. Lrs. And Ors. C.A. No.
1731 of 2009

Coram: SANJAY KISHAN KAUL; M.M. SUNDRESH, JJ

Issue: whether courts Should Pass 'Value Judgment' On Relationship Between Donor & Donee If
There Is Valid Execution?
Ratio: Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 122 - Gift - If the donor is making a gift out of his
own free will and volition and is the exclusive owner of the properties, it is nobody’s concern as
to whom he gives the properties to - It is time that the Courts get out of this mindset, or possibly
may have got out of this mindset by now on passing value judgments on relationships between
parties in determining either a testamentary or non-testamentary disposition so long as the
document executed is found to be validly executed.
Provisions: Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 122.
Judgement:
Even the belief of the original plaintiff and appellants before us is predicated on this prejudice
that they have some inherent right to get the benefit of the property, as the brothers of the
deceased and the lady who stayed with him, wife or not, should not be entitled the same. In these
circumstances, one of the issues framed originally was whether Pritam Kaur enjoyed the status
of a wife or not. In our view, if the donor is making a gift out of his own free will and volition and
is the exclusive owner of the property, it is nobody's concern as to who he gives the property to.
Determination of testamentary or non-testamentary disposition - the documents executed are
validly executed - Courts should refrain from passing value judgments on relationships between
parties - in their determination, Courts below have taken a male chauvinistic approach - their
reasoning is based only on a social belief that the man staying with a woman, who is not his wife
and giving his property to her is something immoral and improper and she should not be the
beneficiary of gift deed even if the donor stands by the gift deed.