IN RE: T.N. GODAVARMAN THIRUMULPAD V.

UNION OF INDIA

Bench: Justices L. Nageshwar Rao, B.R. Gavai and Aniruddha Bose

Facts: The Supreme Court has issued various directions in relation to conservation of forests in the already
existing matter abovementioned. A report was submitted by a Central Empowered Committee in 2003 in
relation to Jamua Ramgarh Wildlife Sanctuary in which there were gross violations relating to protected
forests, especially by the local miners. Applications were filed in relation to this before the Apex Court for
stringent action against such illegal activities.

Directions issued by the Supreme Court:

1. Each protected forest, that is national park or wildlife sanctuary must have an Eco Sensitive Zone (ESZ) of minimum
one kilometre measured from the demarcated boundary of such protected forest in which the activities proscribed and
prescribed in the Guidelines of 9th February 2011 shall be strictly adhered to. For Jamua Ramgarh wildlife sanctuary,
it shall be 500 metres so far as subsisting activities are concerned.

2. In the event, however, the ESZ is already prescribed as per law that goes beyond one kilometre buffer zone, the wider
margin as ESZ shall prevail. If such wider buffer zone beyond one kilometre is proposed under any statutory
instrument for a particular national park or wildlife sanctuary awaiting final decision in that regard, then till such final
decision is taken, the ESZ covering the area beyond one kilometre as proposed shall be maintained.

3. The Principal Chief Conservator of Forests as also the Home Secretary of each State and Union Territory shall remain
responsible for proper compliance of the said Guidelines as regards nature of use within the ESZ of all national parks
and sanctuaries within a particular State or Union Territory. The Principal Chief Conservator of Forests for each State
and Union Territory shall also arrange to make a list of subsisting structures and other relevant details within the
respective ESZs forthwith and a report shall be furnished before this Court by the Principal Chief Conservator of
Forests of each State and Union Territory within a period of three months. For this purpose, such authority shall be
entitled to take assistance of any governmental agency for satellite imaging or photography using drones.

4. Mining within the national parks and wildlife sanctuaries shall not be permitted.

5. In the event any activity is already being undertaken within the one kilometre or extended buffer zone (ESZ), as the
case may be, of any wildlife sanctuary or national park which does not come within the ambit of prohibited activities
as per the 9th February 2011 Guidelines, such activities may continue with permission of the Principal Chief
Conservator of Forests of each State or Union Territory and the person responsible for such activities in such a
situation shall obtain necessary permission within a period of six months. Such permission shall be given once the
Principal Chief Conservator of Forests is satisfied that the activities concerned do not come within the prohibited list
and were continuing prior to passing of this order in a legitimate manner. No new permanent structure shall be
permitted to come up for whatsoever purpose within the ESZ.

6. The minimum width of the ESZ may be diluted in overwhelming public interest but for that purpose the State or Union
Territory concerned shall approach the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) and Ministry of
Environment, Forests and Climate Change (MoEF&CC) and both these bodies shall give their respective
opinions/recommendations before this Court. On that basis, this Court shall pass appropriate order.

7. In the event the CEC, MoEF&CC, the Standing Committee of National Board of Wildlife or any other body of persons
or individual having special interest in environmental issues consider it necessary for maintaining a wider or larger
ESZ in respect of any national park or wildlife sanctuary, such body or individual shall approach the CEC. In such a
situation the CEC shall be at liberty to examine the need of a wider ESZ in respect of any national park or wildlife
sanctuary in consultation with all the stakeholders including the State or Union Territory concerned, MoEF&CC as
also the Standing Committee of National Board of Wildlife and then approach this Court with its recommendations.

8. In respect of sanctuaries or national parks for which the proposal of a State or Union Territory has not been given,
the 10 kilometres buffer zone as ESZ, as indicated in the order passed by this Court on 4th December 2006 in the
case of Goa Foundation (supra) and also contained in the Guidelines of 9th February 2011 shall be implemented.
Within that area, the entire set of restrictions concerning an ESZ shall operate till a final decision in that regard is
arrived at.
 VALLAL RCK V. M/S. SIVA INDUSTRIES AND HOLDINGS LIMITED AND ORS.
Bench:
Justices B.R. Gavai and Hima Kohli
Facts:
The Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) was initiated against a corporate debtor after the application
for initiation of proceedings was admitted by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). A resolution plan was
presented to the Committee of Creditors (CoC) by the Resolution Professional (RP) which was not approved by the
CoC. Consequently, one of the promoters of the corporate debtor proposed a settlement plan which was approved
by the CoC. Therefore, the RP applied for withdrawal of CIRP which was denied by both NCLT and National Company
Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT).

Issue:
The main issue before the court in this case was that whether the NCLT/NCLAT were entitled to disallow the
withdrawal of the CIRP when 90% or more creditors decide that it is in in the interest of the parties to permit the
settlement plan.
Relevant Provision:
Section 12A (Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016). Withdrawal of application admitted under Section 7, 9 or 10:
The Adjudicating Authority may allow the withdrawal of application admitted under section 7 or section 9 or section
10, on an application made by the applicant with the approval of ninety per cent. voting share of the committee of
creditors, in such manner as may be prescribed.
Section 7 (IBC, 2016). Initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process by financial creditor

Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that when 90% or more creditors decide that it will be in the interest of all the stakeholders
to permit Settlement Plan filed by promoter of the Corporate Debtor and withdraw Corporate Insolvency Resolution
Process as per Section 12A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the adjudicating authority (NCLT) or the
appellate authority (NCLAT) cannot sit in appeal over such commercial wisdom of Committee of Creditors (CoC).

Observations:

1. As per the framework of the IBC, 2016 there must be minimum interference by the NCLT/NCLAT.

2. Section 12A has been inserted on the recommendations of the Insolvency Law Committee vide the IBC (Second
Amendment) Act, 2018. The committee has proposed that the intent of the IBC is to discourage individual actions for
enforcement and settlement.

3. The interference would be warranted only when the adjudicating authority or the appellate authority finds the decision
of the CoC to be wholly capricious, arbitrary, irrational and de hors the provisions of the statute or the Rules.

Cases Referred:

1. Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [(2019) 4 SCC 17]: The Supreme Court upheld the validity of
Section 12A IBC, 2016.

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH VS RAGHU RAMA KRISHNA RAJU KANUMURU

Bench:
Justices B R Gavai and Hima Kohli
Facts:
The state of Andhra Pradesh was running a resort near Vishakhapatnam. It was demolished for reconstruction. A writ
petition was filed before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the said construction in which the HC had
granted an interim order permitting the construction. The Member of Parliament Raghu Rama sent a letter to the
National Green Tribunal in relation to the construction and the NGT prohibited the State from constructing the resort.

Issue:
The main issue before the court was that whether a tribunal like NGT could entertain a matter and pass orders in
such matter when the HC had already taken cognizance of the matter.

Relevant Provision:
 Article 227(1) of the Constitution of India:
Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories interrelation to
which it exercises jurisdiction.
Article 323B of the Constitution of India: Tribunals for other matters
Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that tribunals like NGT are subordinate to the High Courts. Therefore, the orders passed by
the constitutional courts shall prevail over any order of such tribunals.
Observations:

1. It was not appropriate on the part of the learned NGT to have continued with the proceedings before it, specifically,
when it was pointed that the High Court was also in seisin of the matter and had passed an interim order permitting
the construction.

2. The conflicting orders passed by the learned NGT and the High Court would lead to an anomalous situation, where
the authorities would be faced with a difficulty as to which order they are required to follow.

3. Though development is necessary for economic progress of the nation, it is equally necessary to safeguard the
environment so as to preserve pollution free environment and ecology for the future generations to come.

Cases Referred:

1. L Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [AIR 1995 SC 1151]: The tribunals are not outside the scope of jurisdiction of the
High Courts and the Supreme Court.

JAGMOHAN SINGH v. VIMLESH KUMAR & ORS.

Bench:
Justices Indira Banerjee and AS Bopanna
Facts:
The Allahabad HC had quashed an FIR vide its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, 1973. This order was
appealed before the SC.
Issue:
The main issue revolved around the fact that whether under the inherent jurisdiction, the High Court is entitled to look
into the evidence on record.
Important Provisions:
Section 482 CrPC, 1973. Saving of inherent powers of the High Court:
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as
may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
Ratio:
The SC re-iterated that the powers under Section 482 CrPC are very limited and the High Courts shall not enquire on
the reliability of evidence on record in such cases.
Observations:

1. The HC are to interfere by the use of inherent powers sparingly and in exceptional circumstances.

2. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the High Court should not ordinarily embark upon an
enquiry into whether there is reliable evidence or not.

3. The criminal proceedings can be said to be in abuse of the process of Court, to warrant intervention under Section
482 Cr.P.C., when the allegations in the FIR do not at all disclose any offence or there are materials on record from
which the Court can reasonably arrive at a finding that the proceedings are in abuse of the process of the Court.

KATTUKANDI EDATHIL KRISHNAN VS KATTUKANDI EDATHIL VALSAN

Bench:
Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and Vikram Nath
Facts:
In a suit for partition, the trial court had passed a preliminary decree and adjourned the suit sine die with liberty to the
parties for applying for final decree. The matter went in appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
 Whether the parties need to institute separate proceedings for a final decree after the court has passed a preliminary
decree.
Relevant Provision:
Order 20 Rule 18(2) CPC, 1908.
Where the Court passes a decree for the partition of property or for the separate possession of a share therein, then-
if and in so far as such decree relates to any other immovable property or to movable property, the Court may, if the
partition or separation cannot be conveniently made without further inquiry, pass a preliminary decree declaring the
rights of the several parties interested in the property and giving such further directions as may be required.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court directed the trial courts to proceed suo moto after passing preliminary decree in a suit. There is
no need for separate proceedings to be instituted by the parties for the final decree.

Observations:

1. This practice is to be discouraged as there is no point in declaring the rights of the parties in one proceeding and
requiring initiation of separate proceedings for quantification and ascertainment of the relief. This will only delay the
realization of the fruits of the decree.

2. the final decree proceedings can be initiated at any point of time as there is no limitation for initiating final decree
proceedings.

Cases Referred:

1. Shub Karan Bubna v. Sita Ram Bubna [(2009) 9 SCC 689]: There is defect in the practice adopted in relation to the
final decree proceedings and proper amendments must be made to address the same.

EX. CT. M AHADEV VS DIRECTOR GENERAL, BORDER SECURITY FORCE

Bench:
Justices BR Gavai and Hima Kohli
Facts:
The accused was serving in the BSF and had allegedly caused the death of a person. The accused had taken the
plea of private defence which was rejected by the General Security Force Court and the Delhi High Court and the
accused was convicted for murder under Section 302 IPC, 1860.
Issue:
The main issue in this case before the court was that whether the accused person was entitled to claim the plea of
self defence in the present case.
Relevant Provision:
Section 96-106 IPC, 1860 (Private Defence)
Section 105 Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Burden of proving that the case of the accused comes within exceptions:
When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case
within any of the General Exceptions in the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860), or within any special exception or proviso
contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the Court shall
presume the absence of such circumstances.
Ratio:
The SC observed that right of private defence would be available to the accused person as he had proved the
existence of the circumstances for exercising this right upto preponderance of probabilities. The accused need not
prove his self defence beyond reasonable doubt.

Observations:

1. The doctrine of the right to private defence is founded on the very same instinct of self-preservation that has been
duly enshrined in the criminal law.

2. Whether a person has legitimately acted in exercise of the right of defence given a particular set of facts and
circumstances, would depend on the nuance of each case. For arriving at any conclusion, the Court would be required
to examine all the surrounding circumstances.

3. The courts must keep in mind that the extent of the violence used by the accused for defending himself or his property
should be in proportion to the injury apprehended. This is not to say that a step to step analysis of the injury that was
 apprehended and the violence used is required to be undertaken by the Court; nor is it feasible to prescribe specific
parameters for determining whether the steps taken by the accused to invoke private self-defence and the extent of
force used by him was proper or not.

Cases Referred:

1. Rizan & Anr. v. State of Chattisgarh [(2003) 2 SCC 661]: The accused must prove his self defence upto
preponderance of probability and not beyond reasonable doubt.

MS. P XXX V. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR.

Bench:
Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Vikram Nath
Facts:
The appellant and respondent no. 2 were engaged and were to marry each other. During this time, the appellant
visited her fiancée i.e. respondent no.2 and allegedly had coercive sexual intercourse with him. The appellant claimed
that the respondent demanded a sum of Rs. 25 lakhs for marriage and then a complaint was filed against him. The
respondent also threatened to kill the appellant. Chargesheet was filed under Sections 376, 504 and 506 IPC, 1860.
At the time of framing of charges, the Sessions Court held that Section 376 offence did not form part of same
transaction and discharged the accused on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. This was challenged before
the High Court and later before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
The issue before the court was that whether the offences under Section 376, 504 and 506 formed a part of the same
transaction.
Relevant Provisions:
Section 220(1) CrPC, 1973:
If, in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, more offences than one are committed
by the same person, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such offence.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that in the given set of circumstances, the offense under Section 376, 504 and 506 cannot
be tried together as they do not form the part of the same transaction.

Observations:

1. Whether two or more acts constitute the same transaction for the purpose of being tried together under Section 220
of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), is purely a question of fact. The reasonable determination of the same
would however depend on elements like proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action and
community of purpose or design.

2. In the facts of the present case, the complaint raised allegations of different offences, of different nature and at
different places of occurrence, but committed by the same person and against the same person.

Cases Referred:
1. Mohan Baitha & Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr. [AIR 2001 SC 1490]: Whether two or more offences have been
committed as a part of the same transaction is a question of fact.

SAUD FAISAL V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.

Bench:
Justices C.T. Ravikumar and Sudhanshu Dhulia
Facts:
The petitioner is facing trial in a murder case. In 2014, during the trial, one prosecution witness named Naushad gave
a statement that he had identified the petitioner as one of the assailants carrying rifle. Relating to the crime, the
petitioner was facing another trial under the Gangsters Act. In the proceedings under the Gangsters Act, the same
witness Naushad gave a statement in 2021 that he could not identify the petitioner as one of the assailants as he was
wearing a cloth over his face. Relying on the second statement given by the witness in 2021, the petitioner sought to
recall him as a witness in the first trial. The trial court rejected this application and the High Court affirmed the rejection.
In this backdrop, he approached the Supreme Court.
Issue:
The issue in this matter was that whether a witness could be recalled on the ground that he gave a different statement
in another proceeding.
Relevant Provision:
 Section 311 CrPC, 1973. Power to summon material witness, or examine person present:
Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a
witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or. recall and re- examine any
person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re- examine any such person if his
evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case.

Ratio:
The SC held that a witness cannot be recalled merely on the ground that he gave a different statement in another
proceeding, especially after a gap of 7 years.

Observations:

1. It is not a case where a contradictory statement was given by some other witnesses in the present trial.

SHAIK NAZNEEN V. THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS.

Bench:
Justices C.T. Ravikumar and Sudhanshu Dhulia
Facts:
The accused person was under preventive detention on the ground that he had been involved in various chain
snatching offences.
Issue:
The main issue before the court was that whether preventive detention could be invoked for an ordinary law and order
situation.
Relevant Provision:
Article 22 of Constitution.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that the preventive detention law cannot be invoked in ordinary law and order situations.

Observations:

1. The powers under preventive detention laws are to be exercised under exceptional circumstances.

2. While a law and order situation can be dealt with under the ordinary law of land, it is only when there is a public order
situation that the invocation of the powers under the law of Preventive Detention is justified, absent which the
preventive detention would be bad and would be in violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution as it encroaches
upon the liberty and freedom of an individual.

Cases Referred:

1. Mallada K Sriram v. State of Telangana [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 358]: The preventive detention law is not to be used by
the state in a routine manner.

2. Bitan Sengupta v. State of West Bengal [(2018) 18 SCC 366]: If the parties have reached a genuine settlement, the
courts must accept it and compound the offences.