Rishipal@Rishipal Singh Solanki v. Raju & Anr.

Criminal Appeal No 541 of 2022 (Arising out of SLP (Crl) No 1743 of 2022)
Bench: Justices DY. Chandrachud and Surya Kant

Issues: Whether the reasons which weigh Court in cancelling the bail to co accused would also apply in case of
bail preferred by another accused in relation to the same FIR and incident.

Ratio: Reasons which have weighed with this Court in cancelling the bail which was granted to the co-accused
would equally apply to the case of the first respondent which also arises out of the same first information report
and incident.

Provisions List: Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 307, 302 read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

Judgment: As a matter of fact, the reasons which have weighed with this Court in cancelling the bail which was
granted to the co-accused would equally apply to the case of the first respondent which also arises out of the same
first information report and incident. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and
order of the High Court dated 9 November 2021 granting bail to the first respondent. The application for bail shall
accordingly stand dismissed and the first respondent shall surrender no later than within a week from the date of
this order.

M/S Shree Vishnu Construction v. The Engineer in Chief Military Engineering Services
Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 5306/2022; 01-04-2022
Bench: Justices M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna
Issues: Delay in the appointment of an Arbitrator will frustrate the object and purpose of the Arbitration Act?
Ratio: As per the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11 - The arbitration applications for the
appointment of an Arbitrator are required to be decided and disposed of at the earliest, otherwise the object and
purpose of the Arbitration Act shall be frustrated.
Orbiter: It is a very sorry state of affairs that the arbitration application under Section 11 has been decided and
disposed of after a period of four years.
Provisions List: Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11
Judgment: The arbitration applications for the appointment of an Arbitrator are required to be decided and
disposed of at the earliest, otherwise the object and purpose of the Arbitration Act shall be frustrated. Even as per
the amended Arbitration Act, the arbitration proceedings are required to be disposed of within one year. If the
Section 11 application itself is not decided within one year, even the purpose and object of the amended Arbitration
Act shall also be frustrated. Under the circumstances, we direct the Registrar General of the High Court for the
State of Telangana at Hyderabad to submit a detailed report/statement before this Court on or before the next date
of hearing pointing out how many Section 11 applications are pending before the High Court and from which
year. Such report to be submitted on or before 19.04.2022.

Principal Commissioner of IT(Central) v. M/S Mahagun Realtors (P) Ltd.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2716 OF 2022; April 05, 2022 (ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION
(C) NO. 4063 OF 2020)
Bench: Corum: Justices U.U. Lalit and S. Ravindra Bhat
Issues: Whether amalgamation wind up a company?
Whether income tax notice invalid merely because it was sent to amalgamating company?
Ratio: As per Income Tax Act, 1961; Section 2 (1A) - Companies Act, 1956; Section 394 (2), 481 - Despite
amalgamation, the business, enterprise, and undertaking of the transferee or amalgamated company which ceases
to exist, after amalgamation, is treated as a continuing one, and any benefits, by way of carry forward of losses
(of the transferor company), depreciation, etc., are allowed to the transferee. Whether corporate death of an entity
upon amalgamation per se invalidates an assessment order ordinarily cannot be determined on a bare application
of Section 481 of the Companies Act, 1956 (and its equivalent in the 2013 Act), but would depend on the terms
of the amalgamation and the facts of each case.
Provisions List: Income Tax Act, 1961; Section 2 (1A), - Companies Act, 1956; Section 394 (2), 481.
Cases Referred:
1. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hukamchand Mohanlal 1972 (1) SCR 786- Section 159 of the Act
related to a legal representative’s tax liability. It casts liability upon a legal representative in the event of
death of her or his predecessor, to pay tax.
2. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Amarchand Shroff 1963 Supp (1) SCR 699 - The assessee ordinarily
had to be a living person and could not be a dead person. By Section 24B the legal personality of the
deceased assessee was extended for the duration of the entire previous year in the course of which he
died.
3. Commissioner of Income Tax v. James Anderson- the expression "any tax which would have been
payable by him under this Act if he had not died" cannot be deemed to have supplied the machinery for
taxation of income received by a legal representative.
4. Dalmia Power Limited & Ors v. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 1, Trichy 15 (2020)
14 SCC 736 and McDowell and Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Karnataka Central 16
(2017) 13 SCC 799- The assessee had taken over a sick company-HPL – by amalgamation; HPL ceased
to have any identity after amalgamation. The relative rights, however, were determined in terms of the
scheme of amalgamation.
5. Bhagwan Dass Chopra v. United Bank of India (1998) 1 SCR 1088 and Singer India Ltd. v. Chander
Mohan Chadha (2004) Supp (3) SCR 535- .there can be no doubt that when two companies amalgamate
and merge into one, the transferor company loses its identity as it ceases to have its business. However,
their respective rights and liabilities are determined under the scheme of amalgamation, but the corporate
identity of transferor company ceases to exist with effect from the date the amalgamation is made
effective."

Judgment: Companies Act, 2013; Section 170 - Companies Act, 1956; Section 394 (1)(a) - Amalgamation is
unlike the winding up of a corporate entity. In the case of amalgamation, the outer shell of the corporate entity is
undoubtedly destroyed; it ceases to exist. Yet, in every other sense of the term, the corporate venture continues –
enfolded within the new or the existing transferee entity. In other words, the business and the adventure lives on
but within a new corporate residence, i.e., the transferee company. It is, therefore, essential to look beyond the
mere concept of destruction of corporate entity which brings to an end or terminates any assessment proceedings
- Upon amalgamation, the cause of action or the complaint does not per se cease depending of course, upon the
structure and objective of enactment. The quest of legal systems and courts has been to locate if a successor or
representative exists in relation to the particular cause or action, upon whom the assets might have devolved or
upon whom the liability in the event it is adjudicated, would fall.

Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of Himachal Pradesh

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2273 OF 2022 (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) DIARY NO. 13202 OF 2020)

Coram: Justices S. Ravindra Bhat and PS Narasimha

Issue: Validity of forcible dispossession of private property of a person without following due process of law.
Ratio: Under the Constitution of India, 1950; Article 300A - Forcible dispossession of a person of their private
property without following due process of law, was violative of both their human right and constitutional right
under Article 300-A.
Orbiter: High threshold of legality that must be met, to dispossess an individual of their property, and even more
so when done by the State.
Provisions: Constitution of India, 1950; Article 300A.
Cases Referred:
 1. Entick v. Carrington and by this court in Wazir Chand v. The State of Himachal Pradesh- It is the cardinal
principle of the rule of law, that nobody can be deprived of liberty or property without due process, or
authorization of law.
2. Bishandas v. State of Punjab- rejected the contention that the petitioners in the case were trespassers and
could be removed by an executive order.
3. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors.- Under law, the possession of a
lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is
prohibited.
4. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service- doctrine of laches in
Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine.
5. P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22- In a case where the
demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to
promote justice, and not defeat it.
6. Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh- This court, in Vidya Devi (supra) facing an almost identical
set of facts and circumstances – rejected the contention of ‘oral’ consent to be baseless and outlined the
responsibility of the State.
7. State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar- (2011) 10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769- the right to property
is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right.
8. Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC- The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot
arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.

Judgment: It is a rule of law that nobody can be deprived of liberty or property without due process or
authorization of law - Rather than enjoying a wider bandwidth of lenience, the State often has a higher
responsibility in demonstrating that it has acted within the confines of legality, and therefore, not tarnished the
basic principle of the rule of law. There is a need for written consent in matters of land acquisition proceedings -
contention of 'oral' consent is baseless. Appeal against Himachal Pradesh HC judgment which disposed of a writ
petition challenging dispossession and seeking compensation - Allowed - In the absence of written consent to
voluntarily give up their land, the appellants were entitled to compensation in terms of law - State directed to treat
the subject lands as a deemed acquisition and appropriately disburse compensation to the appellants.

Haryana Urban Development, Karnal v. M/s Mehta Construction Co. & Anr.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2693 OF 2022 (SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 6137 OF 2022)
(DIARY NO. 23287 OF 2020)
Corum: Justices Ajay Rastogi and Sanjiv Khanna
Issue: Can an arbitral award be set aside merely on an erroneous application of law or misappreciation of
evidence?
Ratio: Under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 34 - Arbitral award can be set aside by the court if
the court finds the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. The award shall not be
set aside merely on the ground of erroneous application of law or by misappreciation of evidence.
Provisions: Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 34, Section 43 Section 21,
Orbiter: No plausible explanation could be given by the objector, for filing the objections at a belated stage.
Judgment: As per sub-section (3) to Section 34 of the Act, an application for setting aside an award is to be made
within three months from the date on which a party filing objections under sub-section (1) to Section 34 has
received the arbitral award; or, if a request has been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request
has been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal. However, the proviso states that the court may condone the delay of
a period of up to thirty days in filing of the objections if it is satisfied that the applicant is prevented by sufficient
cause from making an application under Section 34(1) of the Act.
 Neetu Tripathi v State of UP & Anr
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.3997/2021

Bench: Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and M.M. Sundresh

Issue: Delay in Cross-Examination Of Witness.
Ratio: Criminal Trial - Once the witness is in the witness box and is being cross-examined every endeavor must
be made to ensure that the cross-examination is completed on that day.
Provisions: Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 406 506, 392, 120-B IPC.
Judgment: We are informed by the complainant that there are four private witnesses. The grievance made is that
whenever the first witness is under cross-examination and after a couple of questions the matter is deferred. If it
is so, we cannot appreciate it. Once the witness is in the witness box and is being cross-examined every endeavor
must be made to ensure that the cross-examination is completed on that day. This is more so looking into the
nature of the case before the Court which is not a complex criminal trial.

Chairman cum Managing Director Fertilizer Corp of India Ltd. v. Rajesh Chandra Srivastava
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2260 OF 2022 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition(C) NO. 26844 OF 2016)

Bench: Justice Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian

Issue: Whether an ad hoc payment made to the workers pursuant to the interim orders passed by this Court form
part of “wages”.
Ratio: An ad hoc payment made to the workers pursuant to the interim orders passed by this Court in a previous
round of litigation does not form part of “wages” within the meaning of the expression under Section 2(s) of the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, for the purpose of calculating gratuity.
Orbiter: Keeping in mind the above definition, if we go back to historical facts, it would be clear that the
employees initiated the first round of litigation before various High Courts, for the grant of the benefit of revision
of pay scales, way back in the year 1996, on the ground that the employees of other PSUs have been granted
revision on par with the Government servants. It will thus be clear that what was claimed in the first round of
litigation was not what was payable in accordance with the terms and conditions of employment.
Provisions: Under Section 2(s) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972
Cases List: Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, (1977) 2 SCC 329- “We clarify that wages
will mean and included basic wages and Dearness Allowance and nothing else”.
Judgment: It is a fundamental principle of law that a party who is in the enjoyment of an interim order, is bound
to lose the benefit of such interim order when the ultimate outcome of the case goes against him. Merely because
of the fortuitous circumstance of the Voluntary Separation Scheme coming into effect before the transferred cases
were finally dismissed by this Court by an order dated 25.04.2003, creating an illusion as though the last drawn
pay included this ad hoc payment, it is not possible to go against the fundamental rule that the benefits of an
interim order would automatically go when the party who secured it, failed in the final stage.

Noel Harper & Ors. v. Union of India

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 566 OF 2021

Coram: Justices AM Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheshwari, and CT Ravikumar

Issue: Whether a mere plea of 'inconvenience' grounds to challenge the constitutional validity of legislation.
Ratio: Mere plea of inconvenience is not enough to assail the constitutional validity of legislation.
Orbiter: As a matter of law, the validity of the amendments must be tested on the touchstone of tenets underlying
Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution.
Provisions: Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution, 2020 amendments made to the Foreign Contribution
(Regulation) Act 2010.
Cases Referred:
1. Ombalika Das vs. Hulisa Shaw- The legislature enjoys considerable latitude while exercising its wisdom
on the basis of inputs collated from a different quarter.
2. Shreya Singhal and K.S. Puttaswami- it is open to the Court to test the amendment on the touchstone of
manifestly arbitrary.
3. Anuradha Bhasin vs. Union of India & Ors. - the underlying consideration of appropriateness, necessity,
and the least restrictive measure compliant law, will also be of no avail.

Judgment: Mere plea of inconvenience is not enough to attract the constitutional inhibition. The Courts ought
not to adopt a doctrinaire approach in construing the amended provisions and undermine the legislative intent of
strengthening the regulatory mechanism concerning foreign contribution. There is intrinsic evidence to indicate
that the change effected by the amendments is to serve the legitimate Government purpose and has a rational
nexus to the object of the Principal Act and the amendments and that the preamendment dispensation (unamended
Section 7) was not sufficient to effectively regulate the acceptance and utilization of foreign contribution as
predicated by the Principal Act. Assuming that some inconvenience is likely to be caused to few applicants, the
constitutionality of a statute cannot be assailed on the basis of fortuitous circumstances and more so when it being
only a one-time exercise to ensure the inflow of foreign contribution through one channel only, being a
precondition for grant of permission.

State of Rajasthan v. Banwarilal

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) Diary No. 21596/2020; APRIL 08, 2022

Coram: Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna

Issue: Can an inadequate sentence be imposed merely because long period has lapsed by the time criminal appeal
is decided?
Ratio: Merely because a long period has lapsed by the time the appeal is decided cannot be a ground to award the
punishment which is disproportionate and inadequate- the trial Court had already taken a very lenient view while
imposing the sentence of only three years' rigorous imprisonment. Therefore, the High Court ought not to have
interfered with the same.
Orbiter: Criminal appeals are being disposed of in a cursory manner and by adopting truncated methods. The
practice of disposing of criminal appeals by adopting shortcuts is deprecated.
Provisions: Section 307 IPC.

Cases Referred:
1. Soman v. State of Kerala, (2013) 11 SCC 382- Courts ought to base sentencing decisions on various
different rationales — most prominent amongst which would be proportionality and deterrence.
2. Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648- One of the prime objectives of the
criminal law is imposition of appropriate, adequate, just and proportionate sentence commensurate with
the nature and gravity of crime and the manner in which the crime is done.
3. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Udham, reported in (2019) 10 SCC 300- Sentencing for crimes has to be
analysed on the touchstone of three tests viz. crime test, criminal test and comparative proportionality
test.
4. Satish Kumar Jayanti Lal Dabgar v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 359-

Judgment: Merely because a long period has lapsed by the time the appeal is decided cannot be a ground to award
the punishment which is disproportionate and inadequate. The High Court has not at all adverted to the relevant
factors which were required to be while imposing appropriate/suitable punishment/sentence. As observed
hereinabove, the High Court has dealt with and disposed of the appeal in a most cavalier manner. The High Court
has disposed of the appeal by adopting shortcuts. The manner in which the High Court has dealt with and disposed
of the appeal is highly deprecated. In cases, like the present one, the accused did not press any challenge to the
conviction and prayed for reduction in sentence and the same is considered and an inadequate and inappropriate
sentence has been imposed without assigning any further reasons and without adverting to the relevant factors
which are required to be considered while imposing appropriate punishment/sentence. We deprecate such practice
of 15 disposing of criminal appeals by adopting shortcuts.

Mallada K Sri Ram v. State of Telangana

Criminal Appeal No 561 of 2022 (Arising out of SLP(Crl) No 1788 of 2022)

Coram: Justices DY Chandrachud and Surya Kant

Issue: Whether preventive detention be ordered merely because a person is implicated in a criminal proceeding?
Ratio: The personal liberty of an accused cannot be sacrificed on the altar of preventive detention merely because
a person is implicated in a criminal proceeding.
Orbiter: The powers of preventive detention are exceptional and even draconian.
Provisions: Article 226 of the Constitution.

Cases Referred:
1. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740- every disorder does not meet the threshold of
a disturbance to public order, unless it affects the community at large.
2. Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana, (2021) 9 SCC 415 - while such an apprehension may be a
ground for considering the cancellation of bail to an accused, it cannot meet the standards prescribed for
preventive detention unless there is a demonstrable threat to the maintenance of public order.
3. Sama Aruna v. State of Telangana, (2018) 12 SCC 150- a preventive detention order that is passed
without examining a live and proximate link between the event and the detention is tantamount to
punishment without trial.
4. Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 2 SCC 427- while the ordinary procedural
hierarchy among courts must be respected, the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226 extends
to protecting the personal liberty of persons who have demonstrated that the instrumentality of the State
is being weaponised for using the force of criminal law.

Judgment: A mere apprehension of a breach of law and order is not sufficient to meet the standard of adversely
affecting the “maintenance of public order”. Callous exercise of the exceptional power of preventive detention by
the detaining authorities and the state - Respondents directed to take stock of challenges to detention orders
pending before the Advisory Board, High Court and Supreme Court and evaluate the fairness of the detention
order against lawful standards. In this case, the apprehension of a disturbance to public order owing to a crime
that was reported over seven months prior to the detention order has no basis in fact. The apprehension of an
adverse impact to public order is a mere surmise of the detaining authority, especially when there have been no
reports of unrest since the detenu was released on bail on 8 January 2021 and detained with effect from 26 June
2021. The nature of the allegations against the detenu are grave.

Chandra Prakash Mishra v. Flipkart India Pvt. Ltd.

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2859-2861 OF 2022 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) Nos. 3384-3386 OF 2017)

Coram: Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Aniruddha Bose

Issue: Can order be termed "mala fide" just because it is illegal, erroneous or perverse?
Ratio: Under Administrative Law, every erroneous, illegal or even perverse order/action by a Statutory authority,
by itself, cannot be termed as wanting in good faith or suffering from malafide.
Orbiter: For imputing motives and drawing inference about want of good faith in any person, particularly a
statutory authority, something more than mere error or fault ought to exist.
Judgment: Appeal challenging adverse Remarks made in the Allahabad HC judgment regarding a Statutory
authority is allowed. Even if the High Court found that the impugned actions of the authorities concerned,
particularly of the appellant, had not been strictly in conformity with law or were irregular or were illegal or even
perverse, such findings, by themselves, were not leading to an inference as a corollary that there had been any
deliberate action or omission on the part of the Assessing Authority or the Registering Authority; or that any
'tactics' were adopted. Nothing concrete is available on record to impute motives in the appellant, even if his
actions/omissions while functioning as Assessing Authority otherwise called for disapproval.

Mafat Lal v. State of Rajasthan

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s).592 OF 2022 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) No(s). 1806 of 2021)

Coram: Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and Vikram Nath

Issue: Whether Section 366 IPC would be attracted only when there is a forceful compulsion of marriage?
Ratio: Section 366 IPC would come into play only where there is a forceful compulsion of marriage, by
kidnapping or by inducing a woman. This offense also would not be made out once the abductee has clearly stated
that she was in love with the accused and that she left her home on account of the disturbing circumstances at her
parental home as the said relationship was not acceptable to her father and that she married the accused on her
own free will without any influence being exercised by the accused.
Provisions: Section 366 IPC
Judgment: Kidnapping would necessarily involve enticing or taking away any minor under eighteen years of age
if a female for the offence under Section 363 IPC. In the present case, the abductee had clearly stated that she was
neither taken away nor induced and that she had left her home of her own free will. Section 366 IPC would come
into play only where there is a forceful compulsion of marriage, by kidnapping or by inducing a woman. This
offence also would not be made out once the appellant no. 2 the abductee has clearly stated that she was in love
with the appellant no.1 and that she left her home on account of the disturbing circumstances at her parental home
as the said relationship was not acceptable to her father and that she married appellant no.1 on her own free will
without any influence being exercised by appellant no.1.

Sanjay Gupta & Ors. v. State of U.P. through its Secretary

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 338 OF 2006; APRIL 12, 2022

Bench: Justice Hemant Gupta and v. Ramasubramanian

Issue: Liability on state & organizers to compensate victims in Meerut fire tragedy.
Ratio: Allahabad High Court Chief Justice to nominate within two weeks a District Judge or Additional District
Judge to work on a day-to-day basis for determining the compensation payable to the families of the victims of
the fire that broke out during a consumer fair in Meerut in 2006. Computation of compensation in accordance
with the principles of just compensation as in the case of an accident under the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 by the
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal.
Orbiter: The mere fact that the cause of the accident is unknown does not prevent the plaintiff from recovering
the damages, if proper inference to be drawn from the circumstances which are known is that it was caused by the
negligence of the defendant.
Provisions: Constitution of India, 1950; Article 21, 32, 226, Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952.
Cases referred:
1. Sanjay Gupta & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
2. Nilabati Behera (Smt.) alias Lalita Behera v. State of Orissa & Ors.
3. Sube Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.,
4. Shri Sohan Lal v. Union of India & Anr.,
5. Radhey Shyam & Anr. v. Chhabi Nath & Ors.,
6. Radhey Shyam & Anr. v. Chhabi Nath & Ors.,
7. Praga Tools Corporation v. Shri C.A. Imanual & Ors.
8. Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil
9. Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy v. Union of India & Ors.
10. Green Park Theatres Associated (P) Ltd. v. Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy & Ors.
Judgment: Infringement of Article 21 may be an individual case such as by the State or its functionaries; or by
the Organizers and the State; or by the Organizers themselves have been the subject matter of consideration before
this Court in a writ petition under Article 32 or before the High Court under Article 226. Article 21 of the
Constitution of India has to be read into all public safety statutes since the prime object of public safety legislation
is to protect the individual and to compensate him for the loss suffered. Duty of care expected from State or its
officials functioning under the public safety legislation is, therefore, very high. The Commission under the Act
shall be appointed either by the Executive or by the Legislature but not by the Judiciary in terms of the provisions
of Inquiry Act. - In respect of criminal charges, an accused can be tried by a Court of law and not merely on the
basis of the report of the Commissioner under the Inquiry Act. Res ipsa loquitor - Res ipsa loquitor is resorted to
when an accident is shown to have occurred and the cause of the accident is primarily within the knowledge of
the defendant.
Sanjay Patel v. State of U.P.
M.A.No.1997 OF 2021 IN SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) No.5604 of 2009

Coram: Justices AM Khanwilkar and Abhay S. Oka

Issue: Plea of juvenility, of Applicant who has undergone the sentence for 17 years.
Ratio: Juvenility Plea of an applicant whose murder conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court by dismissing
SLP in 2009. Juvenile Justice Board passed an order holding that, on the date of commission of the offense, his
age was 17 years 07 months and 23 days. The applicant has undergone a sentence of 17 years and 03 days. It will
be unjust to send the applicant to the Juvenile Justice Board. He shall be forthwith set at liberty provided he is not
required to be detained under any other order of the competent Court.
Provisions: Section 7A of the JJ 2000 Act.
Judgment: As per the 2000 Act, only the Juvenile Justice Board constituted under Section 4 thereof had
jurisdiction to try a juvenile in conflict with the law. Under Section 7A of the 2000 Act, an accused was entitled
to raise a claim of juvenility before any Court, even after the final disposal of the case. Such a claim was required
to be determined in accordance with the provisions of the 2000 Act. Subsection (2) of Section 7A provided that
if after holding an inquiry, the Court found the accused to be juvenile on the date of commission of the offence,
the Court was under a mandate to forward the juvenile to the Juvenile Justice Board for passing appropriate orders.
Subsection (2) of Section 7A further provided that in such a case, the sentence passed by Criminal Court shall be
deemed to have no effect in such a case. In view of the categorical finding recorded in this case by the competent
Juvenile Justice Board, which is based on documentary evidence, in view of subsection (2) of Section 7A, the
applicant is required to be forwarded to the Juvenile Justice Board. Under Section 15 of the 2000 Act, the most
stringent action which could have been 3 taken against the applicant, was of sending the applicant to a special
home for a period of three years.
Jahir Hak v. State of Rajasthan
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 605 OF 2022 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 7003 of 2021)

Bench: Justices KM Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy

Issue: Can the long period of incarceration already undergone be relevant in deciding a plea of bail?
Ratio: - In the nature of the case against the appellant, the evidence which has already unfolded and above all, the
long period of incarceration that the appellant has already undergone, time has arrived when the appellant be
enlarged on bail.
Orbiter: We bear in mind the fact that the prosecution seeks to examine as many as 109 witnesses of which only
6 witnesses have been fully examined so far.
Provisions: Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; Section 43D(5).
Cases Referred: Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb (2021) (3) SCC 713- delay in trial can be a ground for bail under
UAPA.
Judgment: The condition in Section 43D (5) of the Act of 1967 has been understood to be less stringent than the
provisions contained in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, as already noticed by us. We
would think that in the nature of the case against the appellant, the evidence which has already unfolded and above
all, the long period of incarceration that the appellant has already undergone, time has arrived when the appellant
be enlarged on bail.
Case Title: Jagjeet Singh And Ors. v. Ashish Mishra @ Monu And Anr. Criminal Appeal No. 632 of 2022]
Bench: N.V. Ramana; CJI., Surya Kant; J., Hima Kohli; J
Issue: Can an Accused be subjected to unending detention pending trial?
Ratio: According to Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 439, No accused can be subjected to unending
detention pending trial, especially when the law presumes him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even where
statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail, such as in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967, this Court has expressly ruled that after a reasonably long period of incarceration, or for any other valid
reason, such stringent provisions will melt down, and cannot be measured over and above the right of liberty
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Orbiter: The rights of victims, and indeed victimology, is an evolving jurisprudence and it is more than
appropriate to move forward in a positive direction, rather than stand still or worse, take a step backward. A voice
has been given to victims of crime by Parliament and the judiciary and that voice needs to be heard, and if not
already heard, it needs to be raised to a higher decibel so that it is clearly heard.
Provisions: Article 21 of the Constitution, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 439, Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973; Section 2 (wa), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 154.
Cases Referred:
1. Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) v. State of Karnataka & Ors.- there was need to give adequate
representation to victims in criminal proceedings.
2. Kanwar Singh Meena v. State of Rajasthan- The High Court or the Sessions Court can cancel the bail
even in cases where the order granting bail suffers from serious infirmities resulting in miscarriage of
justice.
3. Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee & Anr.- It is well settled that, among other circumstances,
the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are discussed in this case.
4. The aforestated principles have been affirmed and restated in a number of subsequent decisions,
including in the recent judgments of Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. & Anr.10, Anil Kumar Yadav v. State
(NCT of Delhi) & Anr.,11 and Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar & Anr.
5. Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, ¶ 15 & 17- Even where statutory provisions expressly
bar the grant of bail, such as in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, this Court
has expressly ruled that after a reasonably long period of incarceration, or for any other valid reason,
such stringent provisions will melt down, and cannot be measured over and above the right of liberty
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Judgment: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 2 (wa) - Victim’s right to be heard - A ‘victim’ within the
meaning of Cr.P.C. cannot be asked to await the commencement of trial for asserting his/her right to participate
in the proceedings. He / She has a legally vested right to be heard at every step post the occurrence of an offence.
Such a ‘victim’ has unbridled participatory rights from the stage of investigation till the culmination of the
proceedings in an appeal or revision - Where the victims themselves have come forward to participate in a criminal
proceeding, they must be accorded with an opportunity of a fair and effective hearing. According to Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 439, Principles that a Court must bear in mind while deciding an application
for grant of bail discussed- A court should refrain from evaluating or undertaking a detailed assessment of
evidence, as the same is not a relevant consideration at the threshold stage. Therefore, Appeal against bail granted
by Allahabad HC to murder accused is Allowed on account of the factors like (i) irrelevant considerations having
impacted the impugned order granting bail; (ii) the High Court exceeding its jurisdiction by touching upon the
merits of the case; (iii) denial of victims’ right to participate in the proceedings; and (iv) the tearing hurry shown
by the High Court in entertaining or granting bail to the respondent/accused; can rightfully cancel the bail, without
depriving the Accused of his legitimate right to seek enlargement on bail on relevant considerations.
State of U.P. v. Prem Chopra CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2417 OF 2022 (Arising out of S.L.P. (CIVIL) NO.15330
OF 2019)
Coram: Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and Vikram Nath
Issue: Does the interim order comes to an end with the dismissal of proceedings?
Ratio: Interim orders- A stayed order is not wiped out from the existence, unless it is quashed. Once the
proceedings, wherein a stay was granted, are dismissed, any interim order granted earlier merges with the final
order. In other words, the interim order comes to an end with the dismissal of the proceedings.
Provisions: Section 36 of the U.P. Excise Act, 1910, Section 38A of the Act, Order 39 of the Civil Procedure
Code, 1908, Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Cases Referred:
1. Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. V. Church of South India Trust Association CSI CINOD Secretariat,
Madras, (1992) 3 SCC 1- the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of the
passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence.
2. Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. and Others v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Others, (1997) 5
SCC 772- an order of stay granted during the pendency of a writ petition/suit or other proceeding comes
to an end with the dismissal of the substantive proceedings.
3. Rajasthan Housing Board and Others v. Krishna Kumari, (2005) 13 SCC 151- Order 39 of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908 provides for grant of temporary injunction at the risk and responsibility of the
person who obtains it.
4. South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. V. State of M.P. and Others, (2003) 8 SCC 648- The principle of restitution
has been statutorily recognized in Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 144 CPC
speaks not only of a decree being varied, reversed, set aside or modified but also includes an order on a
par with a decree.
5. Nava Bharat Ferro Alloys Limited v. Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited and Another,
(2011) 1 SCC 216- The High Court subsequently upheld upward revision of tariff.
6. State of Rajasthan and Another v. J.K. Synthetics Limited and Another, (2011) 12 SCC 518- whenever
there is an interim order of stay in regard to any revision in rate or tariff.

Judgment: It is the duty of the Court to put the parties in the same position they would have been but
for the interim order of the court, unless the order granting interim stay or final order dismissing the
proceedings specifies otherwise. On the dismissal of the proceedings or vacation of the interim order, the
beneficiary of the interim order shall have to pay interest on the amount withheld or not paid by virtue
of the interim order.

Saroja Ammal vs M Deenadayalan CA 2828 OF 2022

Coram: Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian
Issue: Can owner bequeath properties even to strangers by will?
Ratio: The absolute owner of a property is entitled even to bequeath his properties in favour of strangers.
Orbiter: Truth and validity of the Will did not depend upon whether the plaintiff was a legally wedded wife or
mistress of the testator or whether she was in an unacceptable relationship with the plaintiff.
Cases Referred: Pentakota Satyanarayana and Others vs. Pentakota Seetharatnam and Others, (2005) 8 SCC 67-
While over turning the verdict of the High Court, this Court indicated the circumstances which falsified the claim
of suspicious circumstances.
Judgment: Appeal against Madras HC judgment which allowed second appeal and dismissed the suit filed by
plaintiff who sought a declaration of title and for permanent injunction in respect of certain properties based upon
the last Will and Testament by one Munisamy Chettiar, whom she claimed to be her husband is allowed. The trial
Court and the first appellate Court had come to the conclusion that the Will was true and valid and that there were
no suspicious circumstances. High Court re-appreciated the very same evidence to come to a different conclusion
in a second appeal.
K.C. Laxmana v. K.C. Chandrappa CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2582 OF 2010; April 19, 2022
Coram: Justice S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari
Issue: Can the gift of ancestral property of HUF be for 'pious purpose' only?
Ratio: A Hindu father or any other managing member of a HUF has power to make a gift of the ancestral property
only for a 'pious purpose' - Term 'pious purpose' is a gift for charitable and/or religious purpose. A deed of gift in
regard to the ancestral property executed 'out of love and affection does not come within the scope of the term
'pious purpose'.
Provisions: Limitation Act, 1963; Article 109, Article 58 of the Second Schedule to the Limitation Act.
Cases referred:
1. Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh and Ors. vs. Mallappa Chanbasappa and Anr AIR 1964 SC
510- A deed of gift in regard to the ancestral property executed 'out of love and affection' does not come
within the scope of the term 'pious purpose'.
 2. Thimmaiah and Ors. Vs. Ningamma and Anr (2000) 7 SCC 409- Joint Family Property- Power to alienate
only in three situations, namely, (i) legal necessity (ii) for the benefit of the estate and (iii) with the
consent of all the coparceners of the family - Where an alienation is not made with the consent of all the
coparceners, it is voidable at the instance of the coparceners whose consent has not been obtained.
Judgment: Limitation Act, 1963; Article 109 - Article 109 is the special Article to apply where the alienation of
the father is challenged by the son and the property is ancestral and the parties are governed by Mitakshara law -
The word 'alienation' in this article includes 'gift' - In order to attract Article 109, the following conditions have
to be fulfilled: 1) The parties must be Hindus governed by Mitakshara; (2) the suit is for setting aside the alienation
by the father at the instance of the son; (3) the property relates to ancestral property; and (4) the alienee has taken
over possession of the property alienated by the father. Interpretation of Statutes -Where a statute contains both
general provision as well as specific provision, the later must prevail.
Mr. Y. v. State of Rajasthan (CrA 649 of 2022)
Coram: CJI NV Ramana and Krishna Murari
Issue: Validity of the recent trend of courts deciding bail pleas without giving specific reasons?
Ratio: According to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 439 that deals with Bail, A recent trend of
passing such orders granting or refusing to grant bail, where the Courts make a general observation that "the facts
and the circumstances" have been considered. Such a situation continues despite various judgments of this Court
wherein this Court has disapproved of such a practice.
Orbiter: - Reasoning is the life blood of the judicial system. That every order must be reasoned is one of the
fundamental tenets of our system. An unreasoned order suffers the vice of arbitrariness.
Provisions: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 439.
Cases Referred:
1. Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118- Where a court considering an application for bail fails to
consider relevant factors, an appellate court may justifiably set aside the order granting bail.
2. Jagjeet Singh & Ors. V. Ashish Mishra @ Monu & Anr.- in Criminal Appeal No. 632 of 2022, has
reiterated the factors that the Court must consider at the time of granting bail under Section 439 CrPC.
3. Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508- It is well settled in law that cancellation of bail after
it is granted because the accused has misconducted himself or of some supervening circumstances
warranting such cancellation have occurred is in a different compartment altogether than an order
granting bail which is unjustified, illegal and perverse.
4. Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338- Giving reasons is different from discussing merits or demerits.
5. Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528- Any order devoid of such reasons would
suffer from non-application of mind…
6. Brij Nandan Jaiswal v. Munna, (2009) 1 SCC 678- While granting bail, particularly in serious cases like
murder some reasons justifying the grant are necessary.
7. Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496- It is trite that this Court does not,
normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused.
8. Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice of India, (1986) 4 SCC 767- We reiterate this policy
principle laid down by the bench of this Court and hold that this Court should not ordinarily, save in
exceptional cases, interfere with orders granting or refusing bail or anticipatory bail, because these are
matters in which the High Court should normally be the final arbiter.
9. State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21- involvement of the accused, nature and gravity of
the charge, severity of the punishment, and the character, position and standing of the accused.
10. Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), (1978) 1 SCC 118- various parameters which must be
considered while granting bail.
Judgment: Parameters which must be considered while granting bail discussed - certain important factors that
are always considered, inter-alia, relate to prima facie involvement of the accused, nature and gravity of the charge,
severity of the punishment, and the character, position and standing of the accused - At the stage of granting bail
the Court is not required to enter into a detailed analysis of the evidence in the case. Appellate Court is required
to analyze whether the order granting bail was illegal, perverse, unjustified or arbitrary. On the other hand, an
application for cancellation of bail looks at whether supervening circumstances have occurred warranting
cancellation. The impugned order passed by the Rajasthan HC is cryptic and does not suggest any application of
mind.
Indrajeet Yadav vs Santosh Singh | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 386 | CrA 577 OF 2022
Coram: Justice MR Shah and BV Nagarathna
Issue: Validity of practice of pronouncing final orders without a reasoned judgment?
Ratio: The practice of pronouncing the final orders without a reasoned judgment has to be stopped and
discouraged.
Cases Referred:
1. Balaji Baliram Mupade & Anr. versus The State of Maharashtra and State of Punjab & Ors. versus Jagdev
Singh Talwandi- Judicial discipline requires promptness in delivery of judgments – an aspect repeatedly
emphasized by this Court.
Judgment: Appeal against Allahabad HC judgment which set aside conviction in a murder case is Allowed and
remanded. Despite the strong observations made by this Court as far as back in the year 1984 and thereafter
repeatedly reiterated, still the practice of pronouncing only the operative portion of the judgment without a
reasoned judgment and to pass a reasoned judgment subsequently has been continued.
Venkatesh@ Chandra v. State of Karnataka CrA 1476-1477 OF 2018
Coram: Justices U U Lalit and P S Narasimha
Issue: Which part of statement of accused under section 27 recovery should be recorded?
Ratio: Only that part of the statement which leads to the discovery of certain facts alone could be marked in
evidence and not the entirely of the statement. In the process, a confession of an accused which is otherwise hit
by the principles of Evidence Act finds its place on record. Such kind of statements may have a direct tendency
to influence and prejudice the mind of the Court. This practice must immediately be stopped.
Provisions: Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27.
Cases referred:
1. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1984 SC 1622, Musheer Khan @ Badshah Khan
& Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 748- Circumstances on the basis of which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn, must be fully established.
2. Pulukuri Kotayya and Ors. v. King-Emperor- Section 27, which is not artistically worded, provides an
exception to the prohibition imposed by the preceding section, and enables certain statements made by a
person in police custody to be proved..
3.
Judgement: Accused's statement recorded on a DVD and played in Court, Such a statement is in the nature of a
confession to a Police Officer and is completely hit by the principles of Evidence Act. If at all the accused were
desirous of making confessions, the Investigating Machinery could have facilitated recording of confession by
producing them before a Magistrate for appropriate action in terms of Section 164 of the Code. Any departure
from that course is not acceptable and cannot be recognized and taken on record as evidence. All matters relating
to the crime and whether a particular thing happens to be a conclusive piece of evidence must be dealt with by a
Court of Law and not through a TV channel. A mere chart giving description of offences, numbers and the sections
of the offences and about the nature of offences cannot be taken into account at the stage of conviction. Accused's
involvement in other crimes may be a relevant factor provided the concerned material in the form of concluded
judgments in the other matters are brought on record in a manner known to law. Circumstances on the basis of
which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn, must be fully established.
State of Uttarakhand v. Magan Pal Singh CA 2905 OF 2022
Coram: Justices M R Shah and B V Nagarathna
Issue: Validity of practice of disposal of writ petitions without deciding it on merits?
Ratio: Constitution of India, 1950; Article 226 - When a number of issues/grounds were raised in the writ petition,
there is a duty cast upon the High Court to deal with the same and thereafter, to pass a reasoned order.
Provisions: Constitution of India, 1950; Article 226
Cases Referred:
1. Vishal Ashwin Patel Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 25(3) & Ors. (Civil Appeal No.
2200/2022)- the High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was
 required to have independently considered the legality and validity of the order passed by the Tribunal
which was under challenge before it.
2. Central Board of Trustees Vs. Indore Composite Private Limited, (2018) 8 SCC 443- the courts need to
pass a reasoned order in every case.
3. Union Public Service Commission Vs. Bibhu Prasad Sarangi and Ors., (2021) 4 SCC 516- the reasons
constitute the soul of judicial decision and how Judges communicate in their judgment is a defining
characteristic of judicial process since quality of justice brings legitimacy to the judiciary.
Judgment: The manner in which the High Court has dealt with and disposed of the writ petition without deciding
the writ petition on merits cannot be appreciated at all. When a number of issues/grounds were raised in the writ
petition, there was the duty cast upon the High Court to deal with the same and thereafter, to pass a reasoned
order.
Evergreen Landmark Pvt. Ltd. v. John Tinson & Co. Pvt. Ltd. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2783 OF 2022; April
19, 2022
Corum: Justices M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna
Issue: Can Arbitral Tribunal direct interim deposit of amount in dispute when liability to pay is seriously disputed?
Ratio: No order could have been passed by the Tribunal by way of interim measure on the applications filed under
Section 17 of the Arbitration Act in a case where there is a serious dispute with respect to the liability of the rental
amounts to be paid, which is yet to be adjudicated upon and/or considered by the Arbitral Tribunal.
Provisions: Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 17
Judgment: Appeal against Delhi HC order which confirmed the interim order passed by Arbitral Tribunal
directing the appellant to deposit the rental amount from March, 2020 onwards and up to December, 2021 is Partly
allowed. Under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 17, No order could have been passed by the
Tribunal by way of interim measure on the applications filed under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act in a case
where there is a serious dispute with respect to the liability of the rental amounts to be paid, which is yet to be
adjudicated upon and/or considered by the Arbitral Tribunal - The appellant will therefore have to deposit the
entire rental amount except the period for which there was complete closure due to lockdown.
Md. Firoz v. State of M.P. CrA 612 OF 2019
Coram: Justices UU Lalit , S. Ravindra Bhat and Bela M. Trivedi
Issue: Does the maximum punishment prescribed always be the determinative factor for repairing the crippled
psyche of the offender?
Ratio: Restorative justice - To give opportunity to the offender to repair the damage caused, and to become a
socially useful individual, when he is released from the jail - The maximum punishment prescribed may not always
be the determinative factor for repairing the crippled psyche of the offender.
Orbiter: The only difference between the saint and the sinner is that every saint has a past and every sinner has a
future”. One of the basic principles of restorative justice as developed by this Court over the years, also is to give
an opportunity to the offender to repair the damage caused, and to become a socially useful individual, when he
is released from the jail.
Provisions: Constitution of India, 1950; Article 21, 39A - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 304, Indian
Evidence Act, 1882; Section 106Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 313.
Cases referred:
1. Bachan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684- imposition of death penalty is required to be
guided by the paramount beacons of the legislative policy discernible from sections 354 (3) and 235 (2)
of the Cr.P.C.
2. Machhi Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 47- “rarest of rare cases” to be followed for imposing
the death sentence.
3. Shatrughna Baban Meshram Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 1 SCC 596- “rarest of rare cases” to be
followed for imposing the death sentence.
4. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra 1984 (4) SCC 116- circumstantial evidence is
discussed.
Judgment: The court conducting the trial/appeal is not only obliged to protect the rights of the accused but also
the rights of the victim, and the interest of the society at large. The Judge presiding over the criminal trial has not
only to see that innocent man is not punished but has also to see that guilty man does not escape. Both are his
public duties required to be discharged very diligently to maintain the public confidence and uphold the majesty
of the law. Right to fair and speedy trial applies as much to the victim as the accused. Section 106 of the Evidence
Act does not shift the burden of the prosecution on the accused, nor requires the accused to furnish an explanation
with regard to the facts which are especially within his knowledge, nonetheless furnishing or non-furnishing of
the explanation by the accused would be a very crucial fact, when the theory of "last seen together" as propounded
by the prosecution is proved against him, to know as to how and when the accused parted the company of the
victim. No conviction could be based on the statement of the accused recorded under section 313 of the Cr.P.C.
and the prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused by leading independent and cogent evidence.
Mahesh Kumar Kejriwal v. Bhanuj Jindal SLP (Crl) 3382/2022
Coram: Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Aniruddha Bose
Issue: Can the accused claim blanket exemption from personal appearance in cases under Section 138 NI Act?
Provisions: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 205 (2), 251 and 317 - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1882
; Section 138
Cases referred: M/s Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. M/s Bhiwani Denim Apparels Ltd.: (2001) 7 SCC 401- Having
gone through the said decision, we are satisfied that the observations therein essentially co-relate with the facts of
the said case.
Ratio: An accused cannot claim a blanket exemption from appearance in a case pertaining to the offense under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Judgment: The judgment in M/s Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. M/s Bhiwani Denim Apparels Ltd.: (2001) 7 SCC
401 does not deal with a claim for blanket exemption from personal appearance. Observations therein essentially
co-relate with the facts of the said case. In appropriate cases the Magistrate can allow an accused to make even
the first appearance through a counsel. Such discretion needs to be exercised only in rare instances and there ought
to be good reasons for dispensing with the presence. SLP against Punjab & Haryana HC judgment which refused
petitioner's claim of blanket exemption from personal experience in case under Section 138 NI Act is Dismissed.
It is difficult to appreciate that in the case of the present nature, the petitioners seek to avoid appearance even once
in terms of the order of the learned Sessions Judge.
Ranveer Upadhayay v. State of U.P. SLP(Crl) 2953 OF 2022
Coram: Justices Indira Banerjee and AS Bopanna
Issue: Can Criminal Proceedings Be Quashed Merely Because Complaint Was Lodged By Political Rival?
Ratio: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 - Criminal proceedings cannot be quashed only because
the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at
the behest of a political opponent. However, such possibility would not justify interference under Section 482
Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings.
Orbiter: The fact that the complaint may have been initiated by reason of political vendetta is not in itself ground
for quashing the criminal proceedings.
Provisions: Section 482 of Cr.P.C, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989
Cases Referred:
1. Shantaben Bhurabhai Bhuriya vs Anand Athabhai Chaudhari 2021 SCC Online SC 974
Saving of inherent powers of High Court- Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly.
2. Monica Kumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P
3. Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar
4. Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Others
5. State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh
6. Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Ors.
7. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gourieshetty Mahesh
8. Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttrakhand
9. Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre
10. Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal
11. Kapil Agarwal & Ors. V. Sanjay Sharma & Others
12. State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors.
13. Hamida v. Rashid @ Rasheed and Others
Judgment: Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C is not to be exercised for the asking - In exercise of power
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint
except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any
offence - Ends of justice would be better served if valuable time of the Court is spent on hearing appeals rather
than entertaining petitions under Section 482 at an interlocutory stage which might ultimately result in miscarriage
of justice. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989 - Contention that only
Special Court could take cognizance of offences under the Atrocities Act rejected. The allegations in the complaint
constitute offence under the Attrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue, would have to be decided
in the trial.
Anuj Singh @ Ramanuj Singh @ Seth Singh vs State of Bihar CrA 150 OF 2020
Coram: CJI NV Ramana, Justices Krishna Murari and Hima Kohli
Issue: Whether testimony of a witness in a criminal trial be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or
omissions?
Ratio: The testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions
or omissions.
Provisions: Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 324, Arms Act, 1950 ; Section 27
Cases referred:
Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra (2000) 8 SCC 457- Only contradictions in
material particulars and not minor contradictions can be a ground to discredit the testimony of the witnesses.
Judgment: In a criminal trial, medical evidence adduced by the prosecution has great corroborative value as it
proves that the injuries could have been caused in the manner alleged - It is not merely a check upon testimony of
eyewitnesses, it is also independent testimony, because it may establish certain facts, quite apart from the other
oral evidence. As per Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 324, The presence of following ingredients is a must
which are as follows:
1. Voluntary hurt caused to another person by the accused, and
2. Such hurt was caused.
Once the charge against the appellants under Section 324 IPC of voluntarily causing injuries by firearm, which is
a dangerous weapon stands established, they cannot escape the punishment for using arms prescribed by Section
27 of the Arms Act. Supreme Court Patna High Court judgment which modified the judgment passed by the Trial
Court convicting the appellants- accused under Section 307 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code to Section
324 IPC and confirming their conviction under Section 27 of the Arms Act.

Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala Criminal Appeal No 430 of 2015

Coram: Justices SK Kaul and MM Sundresh
Issue: Whether Section 27 recovery must satisfy court's conscience?
Ratio: Any recovery under Section 27 will have to satisfy the Court's conscience.
Provisions: Section 27, 25, 26 of the Evidence Act, Section 378 of Cr.PC, Section 161, Section 159 CrPC.

Cases Referred:
Scope of Appeal filed against the Acquittal
1. Mohan @Srinivas @Seena @Tailor Seena v. State of Karnataka, [2021 SCC OnLine SC 1233], N.
Vijayakumar v. State of T.N., [(2021) 3 SCC 687]- While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking
Section 378 of the Cr.PC, the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court's view can be termed
as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed.
Delay in sending the (FIR) First Information Report to the Magistrate
2. Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh, Rajeevan v. State of Kerala, State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash, The
Magistrate has a role to play under Section 159 of Cr.PC.
Delay in Recording the Statement under Section 161 Cr.PC
3. Shahid Khan v. State of Rajasthan, Ganesh Bhavan Patel v. State of Maharashtra, A long, unexplained delay
in Recording the Statement under Section 161 Cr.PC, would give room for suspicion.
Recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act
 4. Kusal Toppo v. State of Jharkhand, Navaneethakrishnan v. State, Navaneethakrishnan v. State, Aghnoo
Nagesia v. State of Bihar, K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P, Section 27 is an exception to Sections
24 to 26 meant for a specific purpose and thus be construed as a proviso.
Judgment: Section 27 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Sections 24 to 26. Admissibility under Section 27
is relatable to the information pertaining to a fact discovered. Therefore, Section 27 is an exception to Sections 24
to 26 meant for a specific purpose and thus be construed as a proviso. The onus is on the prosecution to prove the
fact discovered from the information obtained from the accused. The Court will have to be conscious of the
witness's credibility and the other evidence produced when dealing with a recovery under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC, the Appellate
Court has to consider whether the Trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence
on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in
favour of the accused. As per Code of Criminal Procedure 1973; Section 159 - Mere delay to send FIR to
jurisdictional magistrate cannot be sole factor to reject prosecution's case. An inordinate and unexplained delay
in recording Statement under Section 161 CrPC may be fatal to the prosecution's case but only to be considered
by the Court, on the facts of each case. However, nonexamination of the witness despite being available may call
for an explanation from the Investigating Officer.

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. UB Engineering Ltd. SLP(C) Nos. 24912-24913 of 2013
Bench: M.R. SHAH; B.V. NAGARATHNA, JJ
Issue: Can Arbitral Tribunal grant post award interest on interest component included in the sum of the award?
Ratio: Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 31(7) - Arbitral tribunal can grant post-award interest on
the sum of the award which also includes the interest component. The word sum used under Section 31(7) includes
the interest awarded on the substantive claims, therefore, the post award interest would be on both the amount
awarded in respect of the substantive claims and the interest awarded on such claims.
Provisions: Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 31(7)
Cases Referred:
1. Hyder Consulting (UK) Limited vs. Governor, State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 189- the amount awarded
under Section 31(7)(a) of the Act, whether with interest or without interest, constitutes a "sum" for which
the award is made.
2. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited vs. Globe Hi-fabs Limited (2015) 5 SCC 718- Judges cannot legislate
or amend the law by judicial decisions. They have to maintain judicial discipline and give their decisions
in accordance with law. Hence the lesser rate of interest cannot be awarded because that would be
amending the law which is not within the powers of the judiciary.
Judgment: In that view of the matter even the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court reducing
the interest @ 9% from that of 18% p.a. from the date of award till the actual payment is also unsustainable and
the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. The award passed by the learned Arbitrator is hereby restored.
ONGC v. Discovery Enterprize CA 2042 of 2022
Coram: Justices DY Chandrachud, Surya Kant and Vikram Nath
Issue: Whether group of companies doctrine can be applied to bind non signatory to an arbitration agreement?
Ratio: According to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 2(h), 7, 8, 16 that deals with group of
companies doctrine, an arbitration agreement entered into by a company within a group of companies, can bind
its non-signatory affiliates or sister concerns if the circumstances demonstrate a mutual intention of the parties to
bind both the signatory and affiliated, non-signatory parties.
Orbiter: In the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction, the court must have due deference to the grounds which have
weighed with the tribunal in holding that it lacks jurisdiction having regard to the object and spirit underlying the
statute which entrusts the arbitral tribunal with the power to rule on its own jurisdiction
Provisions: Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 2(h), 7, 8, 16, 34, 37
Cases Referred:
Group of Companies Doctrine- an arbitration agreement entered into by a company, being one within a group
of companies, can bind its nonsignatory affiliates or sister or parent concerns, if the circumstances demonstrate
that the mutual intention of all the parties was to bind both the signatories and the non-signatory affiliates.
1. Indowind Energy Ltd. v. Wescare (I) Ltd. & Anr.
 2. Chloro Controls India Pvt. Ltd. v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc. & Ors.
3. Ameet Lalchand Shah & Ors. v. Rishabh Enterprises & Anr.
4. Cheran Properties Ltd. v. Kasturi & Sons Ltd. & Ors.
5. Duro Felguera v. Gangavaram Port Limited.
6. Reckitt Benckiser (India) P Ltd. v. Reynders Label Printing
7. MTNL v. Canara Bank & Ors.

Judgment: A non-signatory may be bound by the arbitration agreement where: (i) There exists a group of
companies; and (ii) Parties have engaged in conduct or made statements indicating an intention to bind a non-
signatory. In deciding whether a company within a group of companies which is not a signatory to arbitration
agreement would nonetheless be bound by it, the law considers the following factors: (i) The mutual intent of the
parties; (ii) The relationship of a non-signatory to a party which is a signatory to the agreement; (iii) The
commonality of the subject matter; (iv) The composite nature of the transaction; and (v) The performance of the
contract. An appeal lies to the Court from the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal that it lacks jurisdiction - Parliament
has not specifically constricted the powers of the court while considering an appeal under clause (a) of sub-section
(2) of Section 37 by the grounds on which an award can be challenged under Section 34. As per Section 16, Party
taking the plea of absence of jurisdiction is required to establish the grounds on which it set about to establish its
plea.

Harminder SIngh v. Surjit Kaur CA 89 OF 2012

Coram: Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian
Issue: Whether mortgagor has right to redeem usufructuary mortgage at any point of time?
Ratio: Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 62 deals with usufructuary oortgage. Once a usufructuary mortgage
is created, the mortgagor has a right to redeem the mortgage at any point of time on the principle that once a
mortgage always a mortgage.
Provision: Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 62

Cases Referred:
1. Sampuran Singh Vs. Niranjan Kaur- The suit was decreed by the trial Court. Such decree was affirmed
by the First Appellate Court as well but in Second Appeal, the suit was dismissed relying upon the
judgment.
2. Ram Kishan & Ors. Vs. Sheo Ram & Ors.- once a usufructuary mortgage is created, the mortgagor has
a right to redeem the mortgage at any point of time on the principle that once a mortgage always a
mortgage.
3. Singh Ram (Dead) Through Legal Representatives Vs. Sheo Ram & Ors.- once a usufructuary mortgage
is created, the mortgagor has a right to redeem the mortgage at any point of time on the principle that
once a mortgage always a mortgage.
Judgement: After the judgment was rendered by the Single Judge Bench, the Full Bench of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in ‘Ram Kishan & Ors. Vs. Sheo Ram & Ors.’ reported in AIR 2008 P&H 77 held that once
a usufructuary mortgage is created, the mortgagor has a right to redeem the mortgage at any point of time on the
principle that once a mortgage always a mortgage. Such judgment was affirmed by this Court in ‘Singh Ram
(Dead) Through Legal Representatives Vs. Sheo Ram & Ors.’ reported in (2014) 9 SCC 185.
Invest Asset Securitization & Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd. v. Girnar Fibers Ltd. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3033
OF 2022; April 25, 2022
Bench: Dinesh Maheshwari and Aniruddha Bose; JJ.
Issue: Whether Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code is for money recovery proceedings?
Ratio: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - The provisions of the Code are essentially intended to bring the
corporate debtor to its feet and are not of money recovery proceedings as such.
Orbiter: However, in the interest of justice, it does appear appropriate and hence observed that if any other
proceedings have been or are taken up by the appellant, the same shall be dealt with and proceeded on their own
merits and in accordance with law.
Provision: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, Section 7
Judgment: Time and again, it has been expressed and explained by this Court that the provisions of the Code are
essentially intended to bring the corporate debtor to its feet and are not of money recovery proceedings as such.
The intent of the appellant had only been to invoke the provisions of the Code so as to enforce recovery against
the corporate debtor. We find no fault in the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal having declined the prayer of
the appellant. However, in the interest of justice, it does appear appropriate and hence observed that if any other
proceedings have been or are taken up by the appellant, the same shall be dealt with and proceeded on their own
merits and in accordance with law.
Waqf Board Rajasthan v. Jindal Saw Ltd. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2788 & 2789 OF 2022 (ARISING OUT
OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 16196 & 17334 OF 2021)
Corum: Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian
Issue: Under the Waqf Act, whether dilapidated structure be recognised as a religious place for offering Namaaz
without proof of dedication?
Ratio: Under Waqf Act, 1995; Section 3(r) which deals with the definition of waqf, there ought to be proof of
dedication or user or grant to qualify as waqf - in the absence of any proof of dedication or user, a dilapidated wall
or a platform cannot be conferred a status of a religious place for the purpose of offering prayers / Namaaz.
Provision: Waqf Act, 1995; Section 3(r)
Judgement: Still further, there is no evidence at any given point of time that the structure was being used as a
mosque. There is no allegation or proof of either of dedication or user or grant which can be termed as a waqf
within the meaning of the Act. In the absence of any proof of dedication or user, a dilapidated wall or a platform
cannot be conferred a status of a religious place for the purpose of offering prayers/Namaaz.
Atbir v. State of NCT of Delhi CrA 714 OF 2022
Coram: Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Aniruddha Bose
Issue: Whether prisoner has right to seek furlough even if he is not eligible for sentence remission?
Ratio: Under Delhi Prison Act, 2000; Section 2(h) that deals with Delhi Prison Rules, 2018. Rule 1222-1223
states that getting remission is not a pre-requisite for obtaining furlough.
Orbiter: Furlough means release of a prisoner for a short period of time after a gap of certain qualified numbers
of years of incarceration by way of motivation for maintaining good conduct and to remain disciplined in the
prison. This is purely an incentive for good conduct in the prison.
Provisions: Delhi Prison Act, 2000; Section 2(h) - Delhi Prison Rules, 2018; Rule 1222-1223

Cases referred:
1. Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.: (2017) 15 SCC 55- There is a subtle distinction between parole and
furlough. A parole can be defined as conditional release of prisoners i.e. an early release of a prisoner,
conditional on good behaviour and regular reporting to the authorities for a set period of time.
2. State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Narayan: (2021) SCCOnLine SC 949- Although furlough can be claimed
without a reason, the prisoner does not have an absolute legal right to claim furlough.
3. W.P. (Crl.) No. 682 of 2019: Chandra Kant Jha v. State of NCT of Delhi- Unless the sentencing Court
while stipulating the condition of no remission specifies debarment of any particular kind of remission,
all kinds of remissions shall be barred to a prisoner.
4. Union of India v. V. Sriharan & Ors.: (2016) 7 SCC 1- “when a remission of the substantive sentence is
granted under Section 432, then and then only giving credit to the earned remission can take place and
not otherwise” cannot mean that furlough could be availed by the appellant only if his case is considered
for premature release.
Judgement: Even if a prisoner is not to get any remission in his sentence and has to serve the sentence of
imprisonment throughout his natural life, neither the requirements of his maintaining good conduct are whittled
down nor the reformative approach and incentive for good conduct cease to exist in his relation. Thus, if he
maintains good conduct, furlough cannot be denied as a matter of course. Depriving of even the concession of
furlough and thereby taking away an incentive/motivation for good conduct would not only be counter-productive
but would be an antithesis to the reformative approach otherwise running through the scheme of Rules of 2018.
The eligibility requirement to obtain furlough is of '3 Annual good conduct reports' and not '3 Annual good conduct
remissions'. The expressions employed in Clause (I) of Rule 1223 of the Rules of 2018 are that the prisoner ought
to maintain 'Good conduct in the prison and should have earned rewards in last 3 Annual good conduct report' and
further that he should continue 'to maintain good conduct'. Even these expressions cannot be read to mean that the
prisoner ought to earn 'good conduct remissions' - It cannot be said that earning rewards is equivalent to earning
remissions.