Administrative Law Review
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Administrative Law = that branch of public law
dealing with the doctrines and principles governing
Constitutional Law
Prescribes the permanent framework of the system of
government; supplies the general plan of governmental
organization
Prescribes the limitations on the exercise of governmental
power so as to protect the rights of individuals against
abuse in their exercise
Stresses on the right of citizens
Administrative body
Composed of persons or individuals who are considered as
experts in their particular fields
Have a variety of functions
Given a wider discretion in the exercise of its power since it
is not bound by the rigid technicalities as prescribed upon
the court
 Purpose of administrative law is the protection of
private rights.
 Subject matter of administrative law is the
nature and mode of powers exercised by
administrative bodies and officers.
 It has for its basic functions the effective and
efficient operation of the government
machinery.
 Origin of administrative law:
o Statutes
o Increase of government functions and
concerns
o Necessity of government control and
regulation
 Sources of Administrative Law:
o The Constitution
o Statutes creating administrative bodies
o Court decisions
o Body of rules, regulations and orders issued
by administrative agencies
Reason why it is called fourth branch of the
government:
Because of the multiplication of the activities of
man, the State through legislature and courts found it
necessary to create agencies in order to de-clog
court dockets. The State found it unable to keep up
Government of the Republic Of The Philippines
corporate governmental entity through which the
functions of government are exercised throughout the
Philippine Islands, including, the various arms through
which political authority is made effective in said Islands,
whether pertaining to the central Government or to the
provincial or municipal branches or other form of local
government. (Section 2, Administrative Code)
BACANI vs. NACOCO (100P468)
F: Court stenographers were asked to return the
money paid to them by Nat’l Coconut Corp
(NACOCO). COA disallowed the payment saying that
since NACOCO is exempted being part of GRP.
H: NACOCO has a corporate personality separate
and distinct from the GRP. It is not within the scope
of GRP. Thus, it is not exempt under Rule 131.
The term “Government of the Republic of the
Philippines" used in Section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code refers only to that government
entity through which the functions of government are
exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this
are included those arms through which such political
authority is made effective whether they be
provincial, municipal or other form of local government.
These are what we call municipal corporations.
They do not include government entities which are
given a corporate personality and distinct from the
government and which are governed by the Corporation
1
the powers and procedures of administrative
agencies including especially judicial review of
administrative action.
Administrative Law
Carries into effect the plan of governmental organization,
executes what has been prescribed by constitutional law
Provides for the relief to the individuals should there be
violations of their rights by official government action
Gives stress on their duties to the government
Court
A tribunal manned by persons who are learned in the field
of law, imparted and removed from the passing pressure
of politics
Has only judicial function
Has to observe the principles and rules embodied in the
Rules of Court
with the various activities of individuals. Thus, the so-
called venture into the 4th branch of the
government which is actually a delegation of
legislative power to the administrative bodies.
BQ: What are the types of administrative bodies or
agencies?
1) Administrative agencies created to carry on
governmental functions(BIR, BoC, CSC, LRA)
2) Administrative agencies created to perform
business services for the public (Philippine
Postal Authority; PNR, NFA, NHA)
3) Administrative agencies created to regulate
businesses affected with public interest (NTC,
LTFRB, Insurance Commission, ERB, HLURB,
Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences)
4) Administrative agencies created to regulate
private businesses and individuals under
police power (SEC, Dangerous Drug Board,
CID, PRC)
5) Administrative agencies that adjudicate and
decide industrial controversies (NLRC, POEA)
6) Administrative agencies that grant privileges
(GSIS, SSS, PAO, Phil Veterans Adm.)
7) Administrative agencies making the
government a private party (COA, Social
Security System Adjudication Office)
National Government
Entire machinery of the central government, composed of
executive, legislative, and judicial departments, as
distinguished from the different forms of local governments
law. Their powers, duties and liabilities have to be
determined by in the light of that law and of their
corporate charters. They, like NACOCO, do not
therefore come within the exemption clause
prescribed in Section 16 of our Rules of Court
CENTRAL BANK vs. CA (63 S 431)
F: Court sided with contractor Ablaza and ordered
CB to pay. Under the old Administrative Code,
National Government cannot dispense fund without
the requisite certification of availability of funds.
In this case, there was none aside from the fact
that no formal contract was entered into.
H: CB is not part of the National Government
To be sure, the CB is a government instrumentality.
But it was created as an autonomous body under RA
265, "to administer the monetary und banking system
of the republic.”
It does not depend on the National Government for
the financing of its operations, it is the national
Government that occasionally resorts to it for the
Administrative Law Review
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needed budgetary accommodations. Under Section 14
of the Bank's Charter, the Monetary Board may
authorize such expenditures by the CB as are in the
interest of the effective administration and operation
of the bank. Its prerogative to incur such liabilities
and expenditures is not subject to any prerequisite
found in any statute or regulation not expressly
applicable to it. Relevant to the issue in this case, it is
not subject, like the Social Security Commission, to
section 1901 and related provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code, which require national
government construction to be done by or under the
supervision of the Bureau of Public Works. For these
reasons, the provisions of the RAC invoked by the bank
do not apply to it. To our knowledge, in no other
instance has the Bank considered itself subject
thereto.
 10/9/1989 Minute Resolution = UP does not fall
within GRP
Incorporated and Non-Incorporated Government
Authorities
IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY vs. CA (249
SCRA 539)
F: ISA was created for a term of 5 years. It
instituted expropriation proceedings, but while the
case was pending, its term expired, so GRP
substituted it.
H: ISA is a non-incorporated authority, thus GRP
could substitute
The Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) is a non-
incorporated agency or instrumentality of the
Republic of the Philippines, or more precisely of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated
agency expires, the powers duties and functions as
well as the assets and liabilities of that agency
revert back to, and are reassumed by, the Republic
of the Philippines, in the absence of special
provisions of law specifying some other disposition
thereof.
 For incorporated agencies, GRP will not be
able to substitute because they have an
independent personality.

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 Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
o courts cannot and will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal,
o especially where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion
o requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact and
o where a uniformity of ruling is essential to
comply with the purposes of the regulatory
statute administered.
 The doctrine applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in courts, and comes into play
whenever enforcement of a claim requires
the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within
the special competence of an administrative
body; in such case, the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to
the administrative body for its view.
 The purpose of the doctrine is not only
o to give the administrative agency the
opportunity to decide the controversy by
itself correctly, but also
o to prevent unnecessary and premature
resort to courts.
2
BOC vs. DELA ROSA (May 31, 1991)
F: BoC ruled that William’s grandfather is a Filipino.
This is reversed by the new BoC, thus William appealed
before Judge Dela Rosa. BoC contended that the court
has no jurisdiction
H: The court is not empowered to look into this
question: whether or not a person is an alleged alien.
This is within the competence of the BOI.
The Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive
authority to hear and try cases involving alleged aliens,
and in the process, determine also their citizenship.
The Primary Jurisdiction of the Bureau of
immigration over deportation proceedings admits of an
exception, i.e. judicial intervention may be resorted to
in cases where the claim of citizenship is so substantial
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
claim is Correct. The Bureau of Immigration is not of
equal rank as the RTC, hence its decisions may be
appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special
civil action for certiorari by the RTC.
Qualitrans Limousine Service Inc. v. Royal Class
Limousine Service (179 S 569)
F: Land Transportation Commission (LTC) granted a
certificate of public convenience (CPC) to Royal
Class. The same CPC was also granted to Qualitrans.
Thus, Qualitrans filed a petition for declaratory
relief before the LTC which action is ordinarily
cognizable by the regular courts.
H: LTC has jurisdiction
Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
the LTC has the power to look into the controversy
notwithstanding the fact that it is a petition for
declaratory relief. What is important is not the
nomenclature or the name attached by the parties
to their pleadings, but what the petition alleges.
Actually, the petition although named as
“petition for declaratory relief,” is a petition to
declare the rights given by the LTC to the Royal
Class. The LTC has the power to modify, revise or
set aside the CPC by applying the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.
Moreover, the LTC as well as most of the
administrative bodies are now empowered to award
damages pursuant to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.
How do you determine whether or not an agency or
body is judicial or administrative?
If the principal function of the body is regulatory
in nature although in the process of this principal
regulatory function it is allowed by law to adjudicate
controversy and this latter function is merely an
incident to its primary function, it is an administrative
body.
Otherwise, if the principal purpose in creating
such body is to adjudicate and decide given rights,
then it is a matter within the ambit of the court.
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Statutes conferring powers on administrative
agencies must be liberally construed to enable them
to discharge their assigned duties in accordance
with the legislative purpose.
SOLID HOMES vs. PAYAWAL (177 SCRA 73
[1989])
F: Payawal bought a house from Solid Homes. Although
she already paid the price, Solid Homes failed to
deliver the Certificate of Title. Thus, Payawal filed a
case before the court. Solid Homes argued that NHA
has jurisdiction instead.
H: RTC has no jurisdiction over the case
The Supreme Court sustained the competence of
the National Housing Authority (NHA) in the exercise
of its exclusive jurisdiction vested in its by PD 957 and
PD 1344 to determine the rights of the parties under a
contract to sell a subdivision lot.
Under PD 1344, the NHA shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
1) Unsound real estate business practices;
2) Claims involving refund and any other claims
filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman; and
3) Cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed
by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium
unit against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman.
CT TORRES, INC. vs. HIBIONADA (191 SCRA 268)
F: After Diongon fully paid the land he bought from
Pleasantiville Dev’t Corp., it still refused to deliver
the Certificate of Title
H: RTC has no jurisdiction over the case
Under PD 1344, the complaint for specific
performance with damages filed with the Regional Trial
Court comes under the jurisdiction of the Housing and
Land use Regulatory Board (HLURB), e.g. where the
buyer of a subdivision lot seeks specific performance
of the seller's obligation to deliver to him the
corresponding certificate of title
The HLURB is competent to award damages
although this is essentially a judicial power
exercisable ordinarily only by the courts, in the
exercise of its powers, the HLURB must interpret and
apply contracts, and award damages whenever
appropriate
Note: On 2/7/1981, by virtue of EO 648, the
regulatory functions of NHA were transferred to the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC).
But pursuant to EO 90 dated 12/17/1986, the
functions of the HSRC were transferred to the HLURB.
Marina Properties Corp. vs. CA, (294 SCRA 273)
F: Marina constructed a condo and hired Carlos as a
principal contractor. As an incentive, it allowed Carlos
to buy one unit. Now, Marina refused to accept Carlos
Construction’s payment for its balance for the condo
unit it bought. Carlos filed damages before the RTC
and an action for specific performance before the
HLURB.
H: Carlos is not guilty of forum shopping since the
cause of action is different
There is no forum shopping where a party sues
another before the HLURB to enforce their Contract
to Purchase and to Sell and files another suit in court
to collect sum of money corresponding to unpaid
billings from their Construction Contract.
3
Arranza vs. BF Homes. Inc. (333 SCRA 300)
The HLURB and not the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has jurisdiction over a complaint
filed by subdivision homeowners against a subdivision
developer (under receivership) for specific
performance regarding basic homeowners' needs such
as water, security and open spaces.
The fact that respondent is under receivership
does not divest the HLURB of that jurisdiction. No
violation of the SEC order suspending payments to
creditors would result as far as petitioners' complaint
before the HLURB is concerned. Such claims are
basically not pecuniary in nature although it could
incidentally involve monetary considerations. All that
petitioners' claims entail is the exercise of proper
subdivision management by the SEC-appointed Board
of Receivers so that homeowners shall enjoy the ideal
community living.
Neither may petitioners be considered as having
"claims" against respondent within the context of PD
902-A to warrant the suspension of the HLURB
proceedings. Petitioners do not aim to enforce a
pecuniary demand. Their claim for reimbursement
should be viewed in the light of respondent's failure to
observe its statutory and contractual obligations or
provide petitioners a "decent human settlement" and
“ample opportunities for improving their quality of
life."
Thus, the proceedings at the HLURB should not be
suspended and should continue until such time that the
HLURB shall have resolved the controversy. Any and all
monetary claims duly established before the HLURB
shall be referred to the Board of Receivers.
Fabia vs. CA. 363 SCRA 433
Although the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
exhorts the referral of the instant case to the SEC
for its resolution, however, RA 8799 (30 May 2000),
The Securities Regulation Code, has amended PD 902-
A, and transferred the jurisdiction of the SEC over
intra-corporate cases (all those enumerated under Sec.
5 of PD 902-A) to the courts of general jurisdiction or
the appropriate Regional Trial Courts.
PAL vs. Kurangking, 389 SCRA 588
Note that on 15 December 2000, the Court, in A.M.
No 00-8-10-SC, adopted the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation and directed
the transfer from the SEC to RTCs, all petitions for
rehabilitation filed by corporations, partnerships and
associations under PD 902-A in accordance with the
amendatory provisions of RA 8799.
Padua vs. Ranada (390 SCRA 664)
The laws and the TRB Rules of Procedure have
provided the remedies of an interested Expressway
user, that is, to file a petition for review of the
adjusted toll rates with the Toll Regulatory
Board(TRB). The TRB is the agency assigned to
supervise the collection of toll fees and the operation
of toll facilities. Petitioner Zialcita's argument that
the provisional toll rate adjustments are exorbitant,
oppressive, onerous and unconscionable is a question of
fact requiring knowledge of the formula used and the
factors considered in determining the assailed rates.
This task is within the province of the TRB. Further,
PD 1112 explicitly provides that "the decisions of the
Toll Regulatory Board on petitions for the increase of
toll rate shall be appeasable to the Office of the
President within 10 days from the promulgation
thereof.”
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Republic v. Migrino (189 S 300)
F: PCGG chair Jovito Salonga created an Anti-Graft
Board to investigate the unexplained wealth of AFP
personnel. He ordered an investigation on Lt. Col.
Tecson who argued that PCGG has no jurisdiction over
him since there was no allegation of his association
with Marcos.
H: PCGG has no jurisdiction since its authority is only
limited to investigating the Marcoses’ wealth
The issuance of the order creating the Anti-
Graft Board as applied to the members of the AFP
no longer has relation to the law because the law
intends only the PCGG to look into the alleged ill-
gotten wealth involving the Marcoses and their
cronies.
And if the respondent before the PCGG is
facing a charge which has nothing to do with alleged
association with the Marcoses, then it does not fall
within the ambit of the law creating the PCGG.
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Generally, administrative bodies can only
exercise those powers which are either conferred by
the Constitution or statute or those which are
necessarily implied from their exercise.
Administrative bodies commonly exercise two (2)
basic powers:
1. quasi legislative or rule-making = enables
them to promulgate implementing rules
and regulations
2. quasi judicial or adjudicatory= enables
them to interpret and apply such
regulations
ON RATE FIXING Legislative Quasi-Judicial
Extent of Rate applies to Rate directed
applicability all only at 1 entity
Notice & May be Absolutely
hearing dispensed with necessary
unless the law
provides
otherwise
To be able to
present
evidence and
prove the
possible
adverse
effects on its
financial
viability

 This is the power of administrative agencies
o to resolve questions of fact and questions of
law involved in a case brought to their
determination and adjudication,
o provided, that its determination on question
of law is subject to judicial review.
 The exercise of this power is incidental to their
main function. Their main function is to enforce
the law entrusted to them for implementation
 Procedural due process should be complied
with
 For an administrative body to be considered
and to act as quasi-judicial,
o there must be an express empowerment by
law.
o Absent express empowerment, jurisdiction
should be construed to mean mere
regulatory and supervisory, not judicial
powers.
 Adjudicative power must always be read and
exercised as being in aid of the principal
function of an administrative body.
o In other words, the grant of quasi-judicial
power should not be the only power
conferred but should instead be only
incidental to the administrative agency's
4
main task of implementing the law in the
specific fields of its expertise.
o Otherwise, the agency becomes a
specialized court of justice under the
judicial branch.
PCGG vs. Judge Pena 2/7/1989
F: PCGG issued freeze order to two export garment
firms who filed an injunction before RTC to restrain
PCGG.
H: RTC cannot restrain PCGG
Under its charter, PCGG exercises quasi-judicial
power thus it is deemed a co-equal body of RTC.
Quasi-Judicial is the term applied the action,
discretion etc. of public administrative officers who
are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts and draw conclusions from them as
a basis for their official action, and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature.
A quasi-judicial proceeding involves:
(a) taking and evaluation of evidence,
(b) determining facts based upon the
evidence presented; and
(c) rendering an order or decision supported
by the facts proved
Sanado vs. CA, 356 SCRA 546
The action of an administrative agency in granting
or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a license,
permit, franchise, or certificate or public convenience
and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial.
Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA,
on its own initiative, may conduct the necessary
proceeding for the suspension or cancellation of the
license of any private placement agency on any of the
grounds mentioned therein.
University of the Phil. Board of Regents vs. CA
(313 SCRA 404)
F: UP awarded a doctorate degree in Anthropology to
an Indian national. It was later found that she has
plagiarized her thesis thus the Board of Regents
withdrew the degree. She contended that the Board
was already estopped.
H: the degree can be withdrawn; power to infer
includes the power to withdraw; there was due process
because she was given the right to be heard – a formal
hearing is not required
If the conferment of a degree is founded on error
or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered,
subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw
what it has granted without violating a student's
rights.
The pursuit of academic excellence is the
university's concern -- it should be empowered, as an
act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself
from serious threats to its integrity.
If an institution of higher learning can decide who
can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also
determine on whom it can confer the honor or
distinction of being its graduates.
Carino vs. CHR, 204 SCRA 483
F: Teachers who participated in the mass action were
either dismissed or suspended. While the appeal was
pending before the SC, the teachers also filed a case
before the CHR – who issued subpoena to DECS Sec
Cariño.
H: CHR has no power to adjudicate; decision of DECS
Sec is appealed to Pres
While the Constitution grants the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) the power to “investigate ... all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights" its power to investigate does not
include the power to adjudicate.
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Fact-finding is not adjudication and cannot be
likened to a judicial or quasi-judicial function. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining there
from the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accomplished by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end
that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such
appeals, or modes of review as may be provided by law,
which the Constitution has withheld from the CHR.
BQ: Can the CHR exercise QJ function?
No! Since this power was not conferred to the
CHR. Authority to conduct investigation does not
mean that you also have quasi-judicial powers.
Federacion Español Profesores vs. QUISUMBING
(1/26/1988)
F: Educ Sec Quisumbing issued an order abolishing
Spanish subject as part of the curriculum and
imposing the Arabic subject in an optional basis. The
Federacion questioned the order as arbitrary and
violative of due process.
H: The issuance of the order is a valid exercise of
quasi-legislative power, so there can be no violation
of due process here. Notice and hearing is not
necessary
The rule against forum shopping applies to quasi-
judicial proceedings.
 Forum shopping is the act of a party against
whom an adverse judgment has been rendered
in one forum, of seeking another (other than by
appeal or the special civil action of certiorari), or
of instituting two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition
that one or the other would make a favorable
disposition.
 In this jurisdiction, a party is not permitted to
pursue simultaneous remedies in two different
form.
 Where forum-shopping is deemed to exist, the
summary dismissal of both actions is warranted.
 The test to determine whether a party has
violated the rule against forum shopping is
where the elements of Iitis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in the other.
 The requisites of res judicata are:
a) identity of parties,
b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same
facts, and
c) the identity of the two preceding particulars
is such that any judgment rendered in the
other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration
Cabarrus vs. Bemas, 279 SCRA 388
The prohibition against forum shopping does not
apply to an agency which does not exercise judicial or
quasi-judicial power Thus, the filing in court of a civil
case for damages arising from a crime does nor
preclude the plaintiff from instituting a criminal
complaint with the prosecutor's office or other
investigating agency, such as the National Bureau of
Investigation, they being not quasi-judicial office or
agencies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers.
The law allows the filing of a civil action independently
with the criminal case without violating the circular on
forum shopping.
5
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Congress may validly delegate to administrative
agencies the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations in order to implement a given legislation
and effectuate its policies. In order to be valid:
1) the rules and regulation must be germane
to the objects and purpose of the statute;
2) it must conform to the standards of the
statute; and
3) it must relate solely to carrying out into
effect the general provisions of the law.
If the implementing rules and regulations are
issued in excess of the rule making authority of the
agency, it is without binding effect upon the courts.
At best, the same may be treated as administrative
interpretations of the law and as such, they may be
set aside by the Supreme Court in the final
determination of what the law means
Legislative Power Quasi-legislative Power
Power to make laws and Power of adm agencies
the power to fix a to issue adm rules and
legislative policy regulations in order to
implement the law and
the legislative policy fixed
by the legislature
Cannot be delegated Power of subordinate
by legislature to the legislation
adm agencies
Requisites for a valid delegation (Pelaez v. Auditor
General)
a) the law must be complete in itself; must set forth
a policy to be executed (Completeness Test)
b) must fix a standard, the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable, to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. (Sufficient Standard Test)
Phil. Bank of Communications vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (302 SCRA 241)
F: PBCom filed a refund for its tax credit 3 years
after it was incurred. It invoked Rev. Memo. Circ. 7-85
which states that its prescriptive period is 10 years
H: circular is invalid; no vested right on erroneous
interpretation of the law
Revenue Memorandum Circular 7-85, changing the
prescriptive period of two years to ten years on claims
of excess quarterly income tax payments, created a
clear inconsistency with the provision of Section 230
of 1997 National Internal Revenue Code.
The rule issued by the BIR Commissioner
violates the law. It arrogates unto itself the power
to legislate. One requirement for a valid issuance of
rules and regulations by administrative agencies is
that, the rule must be germane to the object and
purposes of the law and must at all times be in
conformity and within the scope and powers as
provided by the statute to the administrative
agency.
So in this case, there can be no estoppel on the
part of the State where the administrative agency
acting on behalf of the State has made an error.
Ople vs. Torres (293 SCRA 141)
Administrative Order No 308 which provided for
the adoption of a national computerized identification
reference system is unconstitutional.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by
the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It cannot be
argued that AO 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. The establishment of a
national computerized identification reference system
requires a delicate adjustment of various contending
state policies, the primacy of national security, the
extent of privacy against dossier-gathering by the
Administrative Law Review
emily zen chua
government, and choices of policies. It deals with a
subject that should be covered by a law. (what was
required was a law itself)
 law authorizing Pres to suspend the operation
of a law upon the happening of an act and
such ascertainment is also given to the pres =
no undue delegation of legislative power
 to avoid undue delegation, it is essential that
the law must be complete OR, in the absence
of completeness of the law, there must be
sufficient guidelines or policies
Kinds of Administrative Rules and Regulations:
1. Supplementary or detailed legislation — They
are rules and regulations "to fix the details" in the
execution and enforcement of a policy set out
in the law
a. ex: Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code.
2. Interpretative legislation — They are rules and
regulations construing or interpreting the
provisions of a statute to be enforced and they
are binding on all concerned until they are
changed
a. Ex: BIR Circulars, CB Circulars
b. They have the effect of law and are
entitled to great respect; they have in their
favor the presumption of legality.
c. The erroneous application of the law by
public officers does not bar a subsequent
correct application of the law.
3. Contingent legislation — They are rules and
regulations made by an administrative authority
on the existence of certain facts or things upon
which the enforcement of the law depends.
Legislative Regulations Interpretative Regulations
(#1&2)
Rules they adopt to Rules arising from their
implement the law interpretation of the law
What is employed in They constitute the
promulgating this administrator’s
regulation is not the construction of a statute
discretion to determine and they are valid if they
what the law shall be, as construe the statute
this is exclusively vested correctly. If not, they are
in the legislature, but the subject to judicial review
discretion on how the
law shall be enforced
Requisites for its validity:
1. issued under the authority of law
2. within the scope and purview of the law
SANZ vs. ABAD SANTOS
F: The board of examiners for nursing issued an
order requiring a periodic inspection of nursing
schools
H: order is valid; it is an exercise of quasi-
legislative power thus prior hearing not needed
RA 877, as amended by RA 4704 (The Phil Nursing
Act), empowers the Board of Examiners to promulgate
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provision of this Act. It is also empowered to
inspect nursing colleges and schools and vests it with
authority “to issue, suspend, revoke or reissue
certificates of registration for practice of nursing.”
Thus, statutory authority plainly exists for petitioner
board to conduct periodic inspections of nursing
schools in order to discharge its supervisory and
regulatory functions vested in it under the Phil Nursing
Act.
LUPANGCO vs. CA (160 S 848)
F: PRC issued an order requiring that the candidates
for CPA board exams are not allowed to participate
in any review classes or receive materials within 3-
day period prior to the examination day. The order
was questioned by the students.
6
H: this should have been valid but invalidated because it
was capricious
Basically, the PRC performed quasi-legislative
power. But the issuance of a quasi-legislative rule
must be reasonable. It must not be arbitrary. But in
this case, the issuance of order by the PRC violated
the rights not only of the students but also the
right to academic freedom of the school – how to
prepare their students to pass the CPA exam is
within the ambit of this right to academic freedom.
In the same manner, it is the right of liberty of
the students to take whatever measures they
deemed proper in order that they successfully
hurdle the CPA board exams.
In other words, the rule issued by the
administrative agency must not be arbitrary. It must
be reasonable and consistent with the objective of
the law. It is precisely to carry out the object and
purpose of the statute creating the administrative
agency.
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION vs.
DECS (8/31/1987)
F: petitioner questioned DECS order authorizing
TFI of 15% to 20%. DECS reconsidered and
decreased it to 10%-15%. Petitioner was not
contended and filed a petition for prohibition
before the courts saying DECS has no power to
increase school fees and the order constitutes a
denial of substantive and procedural due process
H: the order was valid exercise of quasi-legislative
power because it applies to all thus prior hearing not
needed
Section 57 (3) of BP Blg 232, otherwise known as
The Education Act of 1982, vests the DECS with the
power to regulate the educational system in the
country. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise,
this power includes the power to prescribe school fees
and us such, the power should be considered lodged
with the DECS, if it is to properly and effectively
discharge its functions and duties under the law.
The function of prescribing rates by an
administrative agency may be either a legislative or an
adjudicative function.
If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior
notice and hearing to affected parties is not a
requirement of due process. In the exercise of its
quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are
essential to the validity of such rates.
When the rules laid down by an administrative
agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given
kind throughout the country, they may partake of a
legislative character. If it applies exclusively to a
particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then it
is quasi-judicial function in character.
Dadole vs. CGA (393 SCRA 272)
F: Mandaue judges received monthly allowances of
1,250. This was increased to 1,500 on the pending
budget. COA though disapproved it citing DBM circular
limiting the allowances to 1,000
H: circular is void
Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55 dated
03/15/94) issued by the DBM which provides that the
additional monthly allowances to be given by a LGU to
national government officials assigned in their locality
(like Judges) should not exceed P1,000 in
provinces/cities and P700 in municipalities is invalid
because it goes beyond the law it seeks to implement.
Section 458 of PA 7160, the law that supposedly
serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of
additional allowances to judges “when the finances of
the city government allow." The said provision does not
authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the
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additional allowances granted to judges. The DBM
over-stepped its power of supervision over LGUs by
imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the
law it sought to implement. Further, LBC 55 is void on
account of its lack of publication
CONTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS (264 SCRA 20)
F: Petitioners are SSS ee’s. Upon their retirement,
they availed of RA 660 and SSS Resolution No. 56.
COA disallowed all the claims, saying it violated RA
4968 (Teves Retirement Law) which specifically bars
the creation of insurance or retirement plan other
than the GSIS government law for GSIS
government employees.
H: Resolution 56 contravenes the Teves Retirement
Law. This is an act arrogating unto itself power
solely belonging to Congress.
The rule-making power of a public administrative
body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not
use either to abridge the authority given it by the
Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power
beyond the scope intended. The SSS, in promulgating
Res. 56 which provides a supplementary
pension/retirement plan in contravention of the Teves
Retirement Law (Sec 28 of CA 186 as amended by RA
4968), cannot, in the guise of rule-making, legislate or
amend laws or worse, render them nugatory.
NASIPIT LUMBER vs. NWPC (289 SCRA 670)
The Labor Code, as amended by RA 6727 (Wages
Rationalization Act), grants the National Wages and
Productivity Commission (NWPC) the power to
prescribe rules and guidelines for the determination of
appropriate wages in the country. Hence, guidelines
issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and
Productivity Board (RTWPB) without the approval of or
worse, contrary to those promulgated by the NWPC
are ineffectual, void and cannot be the source of
rights and privileges.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura & De Los Angeles
vs. HDMF (333 SCRA 777)
F: petitioner is a law firm exempted from Pag-ibig
Fund coverage because of its superior retirement plan.
A board resolution was passed though saying that in
order to be exempted, er needs to have both
retirement and housing benefit
H: board resolution is invalid
Where the Board of Trustees of the Home
Development Mutual Fund HDMF) required in Section 1,
Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and
Regulations Implementing PD 1752, as amended by RA
7742, that employers should have both
provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its
employees in order to qualify for exemption from the
Pag-ibig Fund Coverage, it effectively amended Section
19 of PD 1752 which merely requires as a pre-condition
for exemption from coverage the existence of either a
superior provident/retirement plan or a superior
housing plan, and not the concurrence of both plans.
And when the HDMF Board subsequently abolished
that exemption through its 1996 Amendments, it
repealed Section 19 of PD 1752. Such amendment and
subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as
they are not within the delegated power of the Board.
7



Do all agencies with quasi-judicial functions have the
power to issue subpoena?
 Yes. As long as in exercise of quasi- judicial –
even if charter is silent. Power is vested in the AA
in the Admin Code (see Sec 13 Bk VII)
 Test for valid enforcement of subpoena:
1. w/in authority of the agency ( expressly
authorized by law )
2. demand is not too indefinite – subpoena duces
tecum
3. info is reasonably relevant (Evangelista v.
Jarencio)
 rationale: power to adjudicate will be rendered
inutile if can’t subpoena

 Administrative agencies have no inherent power
to require the attendance of witnesses.
However, the power to issue subpoenas ad
testificandum or duces tecum may be given to
them by law; and the disobedience to the
subpoena or refusal to be sworn in to answer
questions, or to comply with agency orders or
decisions may be punished as contempt.
 Under the Administrative Code of 1987 (Sec. 13,
Chapters, Book Vll, EO 292), administrative and
quasi-judicial bodies shall have the power in any
contested case to require the attendance of
witnesses or the production of books, papers,
documents and other pertinent data, upon
request of any party before or during the
hearing upon showing of general relevance.
 Further when authority to take testimony or
receive evidence is conferred upon any
administrative officer or any non-judicial person,
committee, or other body, such authority shall
include the power to administer oaths, summon
witnesses, and require the production of
documents by a subpoena duces tecum (Sec-
37).
 Administrative subpoena differs from a judicial
subpoena. The purpose of an administrative
subpoena is not to prove a pending charge but
to discover evidence on the basis of which a
charge may be filed if the evidence discovered
so justifies. A subpoena may be enforced if the
inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the
demand is not too indefinite and the information
is reasonably relevant (Evangelista vs. Jarencio.
68 SCRA 99).

Do all agencies with quasi-judicial functions have the
power to cite for contempt?
 No. Power must be expressly granted in the
agency’s charter (ex. PD 902-A creating the
SEC)
 If no law, must invoke the aid of RTC
 Rationale: power to punish for contempt
inherently judicial
 The power to cite for contempt can only be
used in connection with judicial and quasi-
judicial functions and with ministerial functions.
(Guevara v. COMELEC)

 The power to punish contempt should be clearly
defined and granted by law and its penalty
determined. In the absence of provision of law,
administrative bodies do not possess inherent
power of contempt.
 EO 292 states that unless otherwise provided by
law, the agency may, in case of disobedience,
invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within
whose jurisdiction the contested case being
heard falls. The Court may punish contumacy or
refusal as contempt (Sec 13, Chapter 3. Bk. VII).
 Where the administrative agency is given the
Administrative Law Review
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power to punish for contempt, its exercise of the
power is limited to making effective the power
to elicit testimony (in the exercise of QJ)and it
cannot be exercised in furtherance of
administrative functions (Guevara vs. Comelec,
104 Phil 268). This limitation derives from the
nature to punish for contempt as inherently
judicial and from the existence of the power to
punish for contempt as being essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and
consequently, in the administration of justice.
Note: Subpoena and Contempt powers are inherent
in courts. But for Adm bodies, a law expressly
conferring such powers is needed.

1. Discretionary power — This is the power of
administrative agencies to act officially on certain
cases referred to them according to the dictates of
their own judgment and conscience and not
controlled by the judgment or conscience of others.
2. Ministerial power — It is a power exercised in
response to a duty as imposed by law and its
performance does not depend upon the discretion
of the administrative agency involved or of the
executive officers performing said power.


Administrative bodies, corollary to their obligation
to enforce the law must perforce have the
competence to interpret, at first instance, the
meaning of the laws that they are to execute.
Such interpretations are however not binding
upon the courts but carry persuasive weight. When
an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues
a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-
existing law and the administrative interpretation is at
best advisory for it is the courts that finally determine
what the law means (Melendres. Jr. vs. Comelec, 319
SCRA 262).

:
(ASAR-P)
1. AUTHORIZED = Its promulgation must be
authorized by the legislature
2. SCOPE OF AUTHORITY = It must be within the
scope of the authority given by the legislature
3. ACCORDING TO THE PRESCRIBED PROCEDURE =
It must be promulgated in accordance with the
prescribed procedure
4. REASONABLE = It must be reasonable, and
5. must be published = publication must be in full,
or it is no publication at all
Publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine
qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take
effect. This is explicit from EO No. 200, which
repealed Article 2 of the Civil Code, and which
states that: “Laws shall take effect after 15 days
following the completion of their publication either in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided."
Need not be published:
1. interpretative rules and regulations
2. merely internal in nature = regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency
and not the public
3. letter of instruction issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules and
guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their
duties
Caltex, Inc. vs. CA (292 SCRA 273)
Issuances by an administrative agency have the
force and effect of law, and when the issuances are of
"general applicability", publication is necessary as a
8
requirement of due process.
Phil International Trading Corp. vs. COA (309 SCRA
177)
DBM-CCC No. 10 which was issued by the DBM
pursuant to Sec. 23 of RA 6758 and which completely
disallows payment of allowances and other
compensation to government officials and employees is
of no force and effect due to the absence of
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. The fact that it was reissued and
then submitted for publication in the O.G. does not
cure the defect and retroact to the time that above-
mentioned items were disallowed in audit because
publication is required as a condition precedent to the
effectivity of a law to inform the public of the
contents of the law or rules and regulations before
their rights and interests are affected by the same.
De Jesus vs. COA (294 SCRA 152).
The circular issued by the DBM to implement the
Salary Standardization Law, which discontinued the
payment of allowances and fringe benefits previously
granted on top of basic salary, was ineffective for lack
of publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation as required by law.
Philsa International Placement and Services Corp.
vs. Secretary of Labor (356 SCRA 174)
An Administrative Circular that was never filed
without the National Administrative Register cannot
be used as basis for the imposition or administrative
sanctions.
Under Sees. 3 & 4, Book VII, E.O 292, rules and
regulations imposing a penalty as authorized by the
law itself must be filed and registered with the UP Law
Center.
Republic vs. Express Telecommunication Co.. Inc.
(373 SCRA 317)
F: Nat’l Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued
a provisional authority to Bayantel to operate a digital
Cellular Mobile telephone. Extelcom objects saying
such was issued under the 1978 rules of procedure
when Bayantel’s application was filed on 1/22/1993
H: The 1993 Revised Rules of the NTC should be
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation before it can take effect. In the
absence of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978
Rules that governs.
The absence of publication, coupled with the
certification by the NTC Commissioner stating that
the NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly
indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken
effect at the time of the grant of the provisional
authority to Bayantel.
The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed
with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no
moment. Nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987
implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law
Center is the operative act that gives the rules force
and effect. The National Administrative Register is
merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished
only to the Office of the President, Congress, all
appellate courts, the National Library, other public
offices or agencies as the Congress may select, and to
other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication
and mailing or distribution costs.
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Additional requisites for Adm rules with penal
sanctions:
1. the law must itself declare as punishable
the violation of the administrative rule or
regulation
2. the law should define or fix the penalty for
the violation of the administrative rule or
regulation


1. impartial tribunal
2. due notice and hearing or opportunity to
be heard
3. procedure consistent with essentials of a fair
trial
4. proceedings should be conducted to give
opportunity for a court to determine
whether the applicable rule of law and
procedure were observed
REQ #1
Sec 9 of RA 4760 (Magna Carta of Public School
Teachers): The committee to hear public school
teachers’ administrative cases is composed of:
1. the School Superintended of the division as
chair
2. A representative of the local or any existing
provincial or national teachers’
organization and
3. a supervisor of the division
Fabella vs. CA (282 SCRA 256)
The right of public school teachers who allegedly
staged a strike to due process was violated as to
render the disciplinary sanction against them invalid,
when the committee that conducted the investigation
did not include as member a representative of their
organization specifically required by the Magna Carta
for Public School Teachers (RA4670) to be so
represented.
In this case, the inclusion of a representative of a
teachers’ organization in the committees was
indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal.
Emin vs. De Leon (378 SCRA 143)
Although under the Civil Service Law, the civil
service embraces every branch, agency and
instrumentality of government, including GOCC’s
whether performing governmental or proprietary
function, the CSC does not have original jurisdiction
over an administrative case against a public school
teacher. Jurisdiction over administrative cases of
public school teachers is lodged with the Investigating
Committee created under Section 2 of the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers (RA 4670), now
implemented under the DECS Rules of Procedure.
Nonetheless, the Court affirmed the dismissal
from the service of the petitioner who was found
guilty of dishonesty (for faking civil service eligibilities
of certain teachers for a fee) as he was sufficiently
afforded due process by the CSC. Not only did he
answer the charges before the CSC Regional Office
but he participated in the hearings. Under the principle
of estoppel by laches, petitioner is now barred from
impugning the CSC's jurisdiction over his case.
Alcafa et al. vs Villar (GR No. 156063. November
18, 2003)
Respondent School Principal Villar is barred under
the principle of estoppel by laches from assailing the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman since his right to
procedural due process was properly observed. Not
only did he file a counter-affidavit and a motion for
reconsideration from the decision dismissing for
dishonesty, he also participated in the hearings
conducted by OMB-VIS and was given the opportunity
9
to cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Cruz vs. CSC (370 SCRA 650)
F: Paitim took the CSC exam in behalf of Cruz. They
were found guilty by the CSC. They argued that their
right to due process was violated since CSC acted as
investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge
H: Petitioners were not denied due process of law by
the fact that the CSC acted as investigator,
complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time
against the petitioners.
The CSC is mandated to hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by it or instituted
before it directly or on appeal, including actions of its
officers and the agencies attached to it. In this case,
the fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself
does not mean that it could not be an impartial judge.
As an administrative body, its decision was based on
substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative
bodies, being considered experts in their field, are
binding on the Supreme Court.
REQ #2:
Where the order refers to a simple revival of the
archived application of Bayantel in NTC Case No. 92-
426, it cannot be said that oppositor Extelcom's right
to procedural due process was prejudiced if it was
not given an opportunity to question the motion for
revival. There is no denial of due process where it will
still have the opportunity to be heard during the full-
blown adversarial hearings that will follow (Republic
vs. Express Telecommunication, 373 SCRA 319).
A party may be declared in default in
administrative proceeding. So if there is a directive
but the party respondent did not file the answer
within the prescribed period, the administrative
officer may consider such party in default. And thus,
the complainant may then proceed with the
presentation of his evidence ex parte, unless there is
waiver likewise of such presentation and that
pleading be made clearly on the basis on such
submission of a position paper.
Note:
A violation of any of the cardinal requirements of
due process in administrative proceedings renders
any judgment or order issued therein null and void
and can be attacked in any appropriate
proceeding.
procedural due process substantive due process
refers to the method of requires that the law
manner by which the itself, not merely the
law is enforced procedures by which the
law would be enforced,
is fair, reasonable and
just
CSC vs. Lucas (301 SCRA 560)
F: he was charged with simple misconduct and was
suspended by DA Sec. Upon appeal, CSC charged him
with grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal
H: no due process since he was not informed of the
charge of grave misconduct
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from
fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to
due process in investigations and hearings. A basic
requirement of due process is that a person must be
duly informed of the charges against him and that he
cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not
charged. Thus, respondent was denied due process
when the CSC, on appeal to it from the decision of the
DA Secretary imposing the penalty of suspension for 1
month and 1 day on a charge of simple misconduct,
found him guilty of grave misconduct and meted him
the penalty of dismissal.
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Audion Electric Co. vs. NLRC (308 SCRA 340)
The essence of due process is an opportunity to
be heard or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.
Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez (240
SCRA 502)
F: MWSS was ordered by Ombudsman to set aside the
recommendation of its PBAC and award the contract to
a complying and responsive bidder
H: there was still due process
One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even many times
more creditably and practicable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In administrative proceedings,
moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied; administrative due process
cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict
judicial sense.
Univ. of the Phil. Board of Regents vs. CA (313
SCRA 4044)
Due process in an administrative context does not
require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the
courts of justice. Disciplinary cases involving students
need not necessarily include the right to cross-
examination.
 The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a
part of due process; it's merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with provisions of
the law.
 As a statutory right, it may therefore be
withdrawn by law and there can here be no
denial of due process.
 Due process in administrative adjudication does
not mean that there must be a formal trial type
investigation as that conducted in the courts of
justice. In fact, the administrative agencies are
not strictly bound to observe the rigid
technicalities as applied in courts following the
Rules of Court.
Lumiqued vs. Exevea (282 SCRA 125)
F: DAR Reg’l Director Lumiqued was found guilty of
Malversation through Falsification of Official
Documents. On his 2nd MFR, he argued he was denied
due process since he was not represented by counsel
during the hearing. He died while the case was pending
and his heirs has substituted him
H: the was no denial of due process
The due process clause does not encompass the
right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative investigation.
A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not
be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of
the charges and of the respondent’s capacity to
represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to
furnish the person investigated with counsel. In an
administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option
of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear
from Section 39(2), Rule XIV (on Discipline) of the
Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292. Administrative
investigations are conducted merely to determine
whether there are facts that merit disciplinary
measures against erring public officers and employees,
with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of the
government service.
The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless
the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel,
is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during
custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and
10
may thus be rejected in a criminal at case and, with
more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In this case,
DAR Regional Director Lumiqued, however, was not
accused of any crime in the proceedings. The
investigation conducted by the committee was for the
purpose of determining if he could be held
administratively liable under the law for the complaints
filed against him.
LINCOLN GERALD vs. NLRC (July 23, 1990)
F: Lincoln Gerald complained that he was deprived of
due process because the notice adverse to him was
furnished to his former counsel who failed to inform
him and failed to file the necessary pleadings.
H: there was no denial of due process; notices are
sent to counsel of record, not to the client
Records show that petitioner’s former counsel
did not withdraw its appearance. Hence, service of a
copy of the decision of the law was valid.
In other words, there must be notice and
application filed before the administrative agency of
such withdrawal as counsel. In the absence of such
application and the approval by the administrative
agency, the counsel continues to be the counsel of
record. Thus, any notice given to the counsel is
binding and is a notice on the client.
NAPOCOR vs. NLRC (90933-61; MAY 29, 1997)
F: SolGen was Napocor’s lawyer. NLRC’s decision was
sent to the special attorney temporarily designated by
the OSG. Thus, when Napocor filed an appeal, NLRC
contends that it was filed beyond the reglementary
period.
H: The period will only commence to run from OSG’s
receipt of the decision.
The fact that the OSG is petitioner's counsel is
unchallenged, the former having entered its
appearance on September 15, 1986. 24 The lawyer
deputized and designated as "special attorney-OSG" is
a mere representative of the OSG and the latter
retains supervision and control over the deputized
lawyer. The OSG continues to be the principal counsel
for the National Power Corporation, and as such, the
Solicitor General is the party entitled to be furnished
copies of orders, notices and decisions. The deputized
special attorney has no legal authority to decide
whether or not an appeal should be made.
As a consequence, copies of orders and decisions
served on the deputized counsel, acting as agent or
representative of the Solicitor General, are not
binding until they are actually received by the latter.
We have likewise consistently held that the proper
basis for computing the reglementary period to file an
appeal and for determining whether a decision had
attained finality is service on the OSG. In the present
controversy, only the special attorney was served with
a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Since
service of said decision was never made on the OSG,
the period to appeal the decision to the NLRC did not
commence to run. Hence, the appeal memorandum filed
by the OSG on July 17, 1989 was not filed belatedly.
ZAMBALES CHROMITE Mining vs. CA (94 S 261)
F: Gozon rendered a decision adverse to Zambales
Chromite while he was still director of Bureau of
Mines. Pending appeal, Gozon was promoted to DENR
Sec, thus he is not reviewing his decision.
H: There was a violation of due process because the
Chromite Mining cannot expect fair play in the
appealed case.
The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of
DENR reviewing his own decision, as Director of Mines,
is a mockery of administrative justice. The decision of
the reviewing officer would be biased, inevitably, it
Administrative Law Review
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would be the same view since being human, he would
not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the
case.
A sense of proportion and consideration for the
fitness of things should have deterred Secretary
Gozon from reviewing his own decision as Director of
Mines. He should have asked his Undersecretary to
undertake the review.
SINGSON vs. NLRC
F: Labor Arbiter Aquino rendered a decision adverse
to Singson. Aquino was later promoted to NLRC
Commissioner. The decision was appealed to his
division. He participated in the decision, but he did
not participate in the deliberation of the MFR
H: There was violation of due process
Petitioner was denied due process when
Commissioner Aquino participated, as, presiding
commissioner of the 2n'l division of the NLRC, in
reviewing private respondent PAL’s appeal. He was
reviewing his own decision as a former Labor Arbiter.
Litigants are entitled to a review of 3
commissioners who are impartial right from the start
of the process of review. Commissioner Aquino can
hardly be considered impartial since he was the arbiter
who decided the case under review. He should have
inhibited himself from any participation in the case.
PNCC vs. REPUBLIC (89557; 8/20/1990)
F: Republic filed a quo warranto with preliminary
injunction and restraining order saying that some
portion of the Expressway be withdrawn from
PNCC’s franchise because PNCC had long fully
recovered its investments. RTC dismissed the case
but ordered that the toll fees collected be placed in
an escrow account. PNCC and Republic later
compromised and decided that the amount in escrow
be used to put up emergency boxes, etc. Gaite (of
Federation of Parañaque Homeowners) opposed the
compromise.
H: elman said that in this case, there was no due
process since the cancellation of the certificate of
public convenience was done motu propio; this issue
was not discussed in the case since the parties
compromised
A public hearing is mandatory only in cases of
petitions for increases in toll rates the purpose of
which is to give users of the expressway who will be
adversely affected an opportunity to contest the
validity of such an increase. Indeed, no affected toll
payer shall be prejudiced where the collectible rates
were reduced as in this case.
CODINIELO vs. EXEC. SEC. (August 4, 1997)
F: A party complained of denial of due process on
non-observance of this requirement because there
was no participation in the formal hearing or
investigation but nonetheless this party was given
the opportunity to file and in fact did file a motion
for reconsideration.
H: So there was here a cure of whatever infirmity
because there was opportunity given to the adverse
party to be heard. So whatever defect in due
process was cured by the subsequent act of the
party in filing a motion for reconsideration wherein
he argued his position where he presented his
evidence.
PEPSI COLA vs. NLRC
H: There is no denial of due process where the
affected party is heard through his memorandum of
appeal. In the formal hearing, there was
nonparticipation but he did participate because he
filed his memorandum of appeal. Thus, whatever
11
infirmity made in the course of proceedings by lower
body was cured.
But where in the motion for reconsideration, only
the entry of appearance by counsel and there was
only a broad motion to reconsider, the infirmity is not
cured because even when he filed his motion for
reconsideration but nonetheless there was no
opportunity for him to present his evidence. In fact,
what was made what was mentioned in the motion
for reconsideration was only an entry of appearance
by counsel. Thus, this does not comply with the
requirement of due process. (Villarosa vs. Comelec,
November 29, 1999)
Where an order cancels a certificate of public
convenience of a franchise holder (a permittee) was
entered ex-parte on the basis merely on a petition
filed by the oppositor, there is here denial of due
process because there was no opportunity given to
the franchise holder to oppose this petition of
opposition.


1. The right to a hearing;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence
presented;
3. The decision must have something to
support itself;
4. The evidence on which the decision is
based must be substantial;
5. The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record disclosed to
the parties affected;
6. The board or its judges must act on its or
their own independent consideration of the
law and the facts of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of the
subordinate in arriving at decision; and
7. The decision must be rendered in such a
manner that the parties can know the
various issues involved the reason for the
decision rendered. (Ang Tibay case)
REQ #1
 The right to a hearing simply means the right to
present evidence on his behalf and also the
right to know the allegations of the other party
and the opportunity to controvert these findings;
Padua vs. Ranada (390 SCRA 666)
An administrative agency may be empowered to
approve provisionally. when demanded by urgent public
need. rates of public utilities without a hearing, the
reason being that provisional 'rates are by their nature
temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity
with the definitive rates approved after final hearing.
REQ #4
Substantial evident = such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion; more than a mere scintilla
Preponderance of Evidence
Proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
REQ #6
Padua vs. Ranada (390 SCRA 679)
There is nothing irregular that the TRB Resolution
No. 2001-89 authorizing provisional toll rate
adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway effective
January 1. 2002 was signed by the TRB Executive
Directors and four TRB Directors, none of whom
personally attended the hearing. An administrative
agency may employ other persons, such as a hearing
officer, examiner or investigator, to receive evidence,
conduct hearing and make reports, on the basis of
which the agency shall render its decision
Administrative Law Review
emily zen chua
 There is no violation of due process where the
investigation is conducted not by the officer
duly authorized to render a decision but one
who is a subordinate of that duly authorized
officer, because the matter of conducting
investigations may be delegated by the superior
to a subordinate.
 But there is a violation of due process where on
the basis of a complaint, an ocular inspection is
conducted in the premises of the company
which is subject of the complaint and on the
basis of the ocular inspection and interrogation
of the witnesses -- the laborers, the
administrative agency makes a decision.
o A decision based simply on ocular
inspection and interrogation of laborers is
not the decision contemplated by law as to
fall under the concept of observance of
due process, because ocular inspection is
not the main trial. There is the requirement
for the conduct of a formal investigation.
 There is also a violation of due process where
the public officer respondent is adjudged guilty
of an offense of which he was not charged.
REQ #7
MALINAO vs. REYES (255 SCRA 616)
F: Malinao filed an administrative case against the
Mayor. SP held the mayor guilty but the SP decision
was only signed by the Presiding Chair
H: decision is invalid
Thus, to render a decision in administrative cases
involving elective local officials, the decision of the*
Sanggunian must be "in writing stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision.”
The so-called "Decision prepared by a Sanggunian
member” cannot be regarded as the Sanggunian for
lack of the signatures of the requisite majority. The
voting following the deliberation of the members of
the Sanggunian did not necessarily constitute their
Decision unless this was embodied in an opinion
Doctrine of exhaustion of adm remedies
The administrative agency has authority to pass on every
question raised by a person resorting to judicial relief and
enable the court to withhold its aid entirely until the
administrative remedies had been exhausted
The claim or matter is cognizable in the first instance by an The claim or matter is cognizable by both the court and
administrative agency alone
The purpose of the rule is to control the timing of judicial
relief from adjudicative action of an agency
Both principles do not apply where the issue involved is a pure question of law.
Whenever there is an available administrative
remedy provided by law, no judicial recourse can be
made until all such remedies have been availed of
and exhausted.
The reasons for this doctrine are:
1. If relief is first sought from a superior
administrative agency, resort to the courts
may be unnecessary
2. The administrative agency should be given a
chance to correct its error.
3. Principle of comity and convenience requires
the courts to stay their hand until the
administrative processes are completed.
4. Since judicial review of administrative
decisions is usually made through special civil
actions, such proceedings will not normally
prosper if there is another plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law
 Before a party can be allowed to seek judicial
intervention, he is to exhaust all means of
administrative redress available under the law.
o The court for reasons of law, comity and
convenience will not entertain a case
unless all available remedies have been
12
prepared by one of them.
Requirement of prior notice and hearing can be
dispensed with:
1) summary proceedings of distraint and levy upon
the property of a delinquent taxpayer;
2) in the case of a preventive suspension of a
public officer because of the nature of
preventive suspension which is not a legal
sanction but merely a preliminary measure;
3) cancellation of passport where no abuse of
discretion is committed by the Sec of Foreign
Affairs (since this is a mere privilege)
4) grant of provisional authority for increased rates,
or to engage in a particular line of business
5) summary abatement of nuisance per se which
affects the immediate safety of persons or
property

The right against self-incrimination is available in
all kinds of proceedings, whether civil, criminal or
administrative (Galman vs Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294)
But such right is available only to natural persons
and not to a judicial person (Valmonte vs. Belmonte,
170 SCRA 256).
Thus, an administrative agency may require an
organization (corporation, partnership or association)
to furnish it with records of books although these may
incriminate such an organization. The reason for the
exclusion of judicial persons from the no self-
incrimination rule is the need for administrative
bodies tasked by legislature to see to the
compliance with law and public policy. Generally,
when the law requires that certain records be kept,
these records are withdrawn from the protective
mantle of the no self-incrimination clause (Shapiro
doctrine).


Doctrine of primary jurisdiction
Both the court and adm agency have jurisdiction to pass
on a question when a particular case is presented to court
as an original matter, rather than a matter of review
administrative agency
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not concerned with
judicial review but determines in some instances whether
initial action should be taken by a court or administrative
agency.
exhausted in order to give the
administrative agency concerned the
chance to act and correct the errors, if any,
that it might have committed in the
administrative forum and prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to courts
o One of the reasons for the doctrine is the
separation of powers which enjoins upon
the judiciary a becoming policy of non-
interference with matters coming primarily
within the competence of other
department (Lopez vs. City of Manila, 303
SCRA 448).
 Accordingly, a motion for reconsideration must
first be filed, conformably with Section 14, Rule
VII of the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC -
before the special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be availed of
(Sunshine Transportation vs. NLRC, 254 SCRA 51).
 The party with an administrative remedy must
not merely initiate the prescribed administrative
procedure to obtain relief but also pursue to its
appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial
intervention in order to give that administrative
agency an opportunity to decide the matter by
itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to court (Carale vs. Abarintos,
Administrative Law Review
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269 SCRA 133; Jariol vs. COMELEC. 270 SCRA
255)
DELTAVENTURES vs. CABATO (327 SCRA 522)
F: Labor Arbiter filed an alias writ of execution
against Ongpin. Now, there is a case filed before the
RTC for damages, prohibition and injunction against
the same party who is the complainant in the labor
case.
H: The action before the court was really in the
nature of a labor case incident which should warrant
the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ostensibly, the third party claim before the trial
court was for the recovery of possession and
injunction, but in essence it was an action challenging
the validity or propriety of the levy vis-a-vis the alias
writ of execution, including the acts performed by the
Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Sheriff implementing
the writ in the labor case.
The subject matter of the claim is but an incident
of the labor case, a matter beyond the jurisdiction of
the regional court.
In denying Deltaventure's petition, the court a quo
is merely upholding the time-honored principle that a
RTC, being a co-equal body of the NLRC, has no
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or injunction
to enjoin the execution of any decision of the latter.
Jalandoni vs. Drilon (327 SCRA 108)
The review as an act of supervision and control by
the justice secretary over fiscals and prosecutors
finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies which holds that mistakes,
abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of
an administrative activity or by an administrative
agency should be corrected by higher administrative
authorities, and not directly by courts.
Aurido vs. Rabi (392 SCRA 604)
When Regional State Prosecutor (RSP) Aurillo motu
proprio took over the preliminary investigation of IS
No 95-043 after the same had already been dismissed
by the city prosecutor and ordered the assistant
regional state prosecutor to conduct a preliminary
investigation of the case, he exercised not only
administrative supervision but control over the city
prosecutor. By doing so, Aurillo nullified the resolution
of the inquest prosecutor as approved by the city
prosecutor and deprived Rabi as the aggrieved party in
IS 95-043 of his right to file a motion for
reconsideration and if said motion were denied to
appeal to the Secretary of Justice. The office of the
RSP does not conduct any preliminary investigation or
prosecute any criminal case in court at all The bulk of
his work consists of administrative supervision over
city and provincial fiscals and their assistants.
This doctrine applies only where there is a
provision of law describing the exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Supposing the law does not
describe the filing of a motion for reconsideration,
this method may be dispensed with by the
aggrieved party because there is no provision in the
law providing for the exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
A direct action in court without prior exhaustion
of administrative remedies, when required, is
premature, warranting its dismissal on a motion to
dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action. The
failure to observe the doctrine does not affect the
jurisdiction of the Court. The only effect of non-
compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the
complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground
for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper
time, this ground is deemed waived and the court
can take cognizance of the case and try it.
13
Exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time
possible, even before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion
to dismiss, otherwise such ground would be deemed
waived (Calub vs. CA, 331 SCRA 55).
Absent a showing that petitioner had availed
itself of and exhausted the appropriate
administrative remedies, a premature resort to the
courts would result in the dismissal of the petition
(Social Security System Employees Association vs.
Bathan-Velasco, 313 SCRA 250)
The complaint of private respondent NIA Senior
Engr. Ortizo for prohibition and injunction questioning
Regional Office Memo No. 52 reassigning him to a
station different from that specified in his
appointment papers should have been dismissed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. He should
have first complained to the NIA Administrator, and if
necessary, then appeal to the CSC. Cases involving
personnel actions, reassignment included, affecting
civil service employees, are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the CSC (Corsiga vs. Defenses 391
SCRA 274).
It is well-settled that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing of a
special civil action for certiorari. Extelcom violated
the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
when it went directly to the Court of Appeals on a
petition for certiorari and prohibition from the NTC
Order without first filing a motion for reconsideration
within 15 days pursuant to NTC Rules (Republic vs.
Express Telecommunication Co., 373 SCRA 321).
Under Art. 128 of the Labor Code as amended,
an order issued by the duly authorized representative
of the Secretary of Labor (involving a monetary
award in the exercise of his visitorial and
enforcement powers) may be appealed to the
latter. Thus petitioner Laguna CATV should have first
appealed the order of DOLE Regional Director
Maraan denying its motion to quash the writ of
execution to the Secretary of Labor instead of filing
with the Court of Appeals a motion for extension of
time to file a petition for review. The CA was correct
in holding that petitioner failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies (Laguna CATV Network vs.
Maraan, 392 SCRA 226)


1.) The principle requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not applicable where
the question is purely a legal one
a. The question whether respondent's transfer to
the position of Regional Director of the Public
Attorney's Office, which was made without
her consent, amounts to a removal without
cause is a legal issue (Demaisip vs. Bacal GR
139382, 6 December 2000);
b. The issues of whether or not the decision of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod in disciplinary
cases is appealable to the Office of the
President, as well as the propriety of taking
an oath of office anew by respondent
Barangay Captain Laxina, are questions of
law (Mendoza vs. Laxina, Sr, 406 SCRA 156)];
2.) where the controverted act is patently illegal or
was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction (Brett vs. IAC 191 SCRA 687);
a. In conducting administrative investigation,
service of summons is necessary. If the
decision was rendered without the service of
summons, then no need to comply with
exhaustion of adm remedies
3.) where the respondent Is a department
secretary, who acts as an alter ego of the
President, bear the implied or assumed approval
of the latter (AImine vs. CA. 177 SCRA 97;
Quisumbing vs. Gumban, 193 SCRA 523);
4.) when there is estoppel on the part of the party
invoking it (Sunga vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 338);
a. in the administrative proceeding, AA made
representation that only the court can
Administrative Law Review
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resolve and such court action was taken
5.) when there is unreasonable delay of official
action that will irreparably prejudice the
complainant;
a. An example is a quo warranto case which
must be filed within one year
6.) where the amount is too small so as to make the
rule impractical;
7.) where the doctrine of qualified political agency
applies (Binamira vs. Garucho, 190 SCRA 154);
8.) where there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention (Abate vs.
Aldana, 29 February 1960);
a. The matter involves a boundary dispute
between timber concessionaires. While the
case is pending, the other party continued
to use petitioner’s road and no action was
taken by DENR. Judicial intervention is
needed to prevent irreparable damage or
injury to the parties.
9.) where there is no plain, adequate and speedy
remedy except court action (Tiangco vs.
Lauchang, 9 SCRA 126; Pagara vs. CA, 254 SCRA
619; NFA vs. CA, 253 SCRA 470);
10.) in land cases, where the land in question is
private (Baladjay vs. Castillo, 1 SCRA 1064);
11.) where insistence on its observance would result
in nullification of the claim being asserted
(Gravador vs. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742);
12.) where there is nothing left to be done except to
seek court action (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA
639);
13.) when the controverted acts violate due process;
14.) there is failure of a high government official from
whom relief is sought to act on the matter; and
15.) when the issue of non-exhaustion has been
rendered moot and academic (Carale vs.
Abarintos, 269 SCRA 133; Land Bank of the Phil
vs. CA, 318 SCRA 144)
In Castro vs. Gloria (363 SCRA 423), the Court
ruled that the issue of whether or not petitioner's
dismissal from the service is the proper penalty for the
first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is a
pure question of law Hence, the doctrine may be
dispensed with and judicial action may be
immediately resorted to by petitioner.
(#1) NAPOCOR vs. MISAMIS PROVINCE
(72477; 10/16/1990)
F: An action was filed by the province against
NAPOCOR for the collection of delinquent real
property taxes pursuant to PD 464 or Real Property
Tax Code. NAPOCOR filed a motion to dismiss
alleging that PD 242 should apply – prescribes
administrative settlement instead
H: Here, the issue is clearly a legal one i.e. which law
applies. Thus, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply in the case.
(#3) DIMAISIP vs. CA
F: Director awarded fishpond to Dimaisip. Dept Sec
reversed Director. Instead of filing an appeal
before the Office of the Pres., Dimaisip filed an
action before the court.
H: This is an exception to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies because the decision was
one made by the Department Secretary who is an
alter ego of the President.
(#3) CALO vs. FUENTES. (The SC made a reversal
of its earlier decision in DIMAISIP)
F: Director of Lands and Dept Sec awarded
homestead application to Fuentes. Calo initially filed
an appeal before the Office of the President. But
even before the Office the President could act on
the matter, he withdrew such appeal.
H: The withdrawal of such an appeal before the
Office of the President was fatal because it was the
last act required of him in compliance with the
14
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
But in many other cases decided by the court, it
went back to its earlier ruling. Thus, you have the
case of
(#3)QUISUMBING vs. GUMBAN (193 SCRA 523)
F: DECS Secretary Quisumbing transferred Mrs.
Yap to South Cotabato. The order was contested not
before the Office of the Secretary but before the
sala of Judge Gumban. Department Secretary filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that there should
be exhaustion.
H: The Court ruled that there was no need for
exhaustion of administrative remedies because the
act complained of was one made by the Department
Secretary as the alter ego of the President
How to reconcile these contradictory rulings:
A: The first basis is to look into the provisions of
the law i.e., where the law itself prescribes remedy,
then there must be compliance with this doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. But if the law is
silent – there is no such provision requiring exhaustion
– there is no need to exhaust administrative
remedies.
Example: Under PD 1281, the matter of the
conflicting mining claims is now within the
competence of the Bureau of Mines. The matter of
resolving conflicting mining claims is now purely
administrative. Thus under PD1281, the authority
which has the say on the matter is the Director of the
Bureau of Mines. But his decision is appealable to the
Department Secretary of Natural Resources and from
the decision of the DENR Secretary, if the party is still
aggrieved, the same may be elevated to the Office
of the President.
So, there is here in this case the need to comply
with the doctrine of exhaustion administrative
remedies. The doctrine of qualified political agency
does not apply here because there is a provision in
the law requiring that an appeal be taken from the
decision of the Department Secretary to the
President within a period of 5 days. The law itself
even provides that the decision of the President on
the matter of conflicting claims is final and
executory.
Of course, it does not mean that the party has
no remedy. Even if the provision of the law makes the
decision of the Office of the President final and
executory but the same has been made in abuse of
authority, then it can be the subject of judicial
review.
LLORENA vs. LACSON
F: A laborer was dismissed by the mayor because of
the loss of a personal property – a piano. The law
requires that the action must be taken before the
Office of the President. Laborer did not comply with
this requirement, saying that since he is uneducated
(barely reached the 4th grade), he is exempted
H: Lack of education is not a defense. There must
still be compliance with the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
(BQ) SABELLO vs. DECS (12/26/1989)
F: School Principal Sabello was found guilty in a
criminal case. He was reinstated because there was
an absolute pardon given to him. But he was
reinstated as a mere classroom teacher. He did not
file his appeal in the DECS but went directly to the
court saying poverty denied him the services of the
lawyer.
H: case was allowed to continue
The rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the application of the exceptions is
Administrative Law Review 15
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not a fast and rigid rule. 

In the case of Sabello, the Court granted the Where provided by law, appeal from an
petition of the petitioner here. Sabello claimed that administrative determination may be made to a
higher or superior administrative officer or body.
poverty denied him the services of a lawyer. On that
(Basis: Power of Control)
basis, the Court set aside this requirement of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and looked Power of Control Power of Supervision
into the merits of the case and so, he was reinstated power of the President The power of the
to the position of school principal. over the executive President over
In this situation, where the interest of justice branch of government, administrative disciplinary
requires, the Court ruled that there was no need to including all executive cases against elective
exhaust administrative remedies because poverty officers from Cabinet local officials is derived
Secretary to the lowliest from his power of general
deprived the petitioner access to lawyers.
clerk supervision over local
governments
It is the power of the the power of ensuring

President to alter or that laws are faithfully

modify or nullify or set executed, or that the
In the absence of a constitutional provision or a
aside what a subordinate officers act
statute to the contrary, the official acts of a
subordinate officer had within the law
department secretary are deemed acts of the
done in the
President himself unless disapproved or reprobated
performance of his
by the latter (Binamira vs. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154;
duties and to substitute
Villena vs. Secretary of Interior. 67 Phil. 451).
the judgment of the
former with that of the
 The power of the DILG to investigate
latter
administrative complaints is based on the alter-
includes the power of
ego principle or the doctrine of qualified
supervision
political agency (Joson vs. Torres, 290 SCRA 281).
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, “all  Supervision is not incompatible with discipline
executive and administrative organizations are which must be construed to authorize the
adjuncts of the Executive Department and the President to order an investigation of the act or
heads of the various executive departments are conduct local officials (Joson vs. Torres, 290
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive.” SCRA 281)
 Except in cases where the Chief Executive is  The power to discipline evidently includes the
required by the Constitution or law to act in power to investigate. As the Disciplining
person, or the exigencies of the situation Authority, the President has the power derived
demand that he act personally, the multifarious from the Constitution itself to investigate
executive and administrative functions of the complaints against local elective officials.
Chief Executive are performed by and through  AO 23, however, delegates the power to
the executive departments, and the acts of the investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating
Secretaries of such departments, performed and Committee as may be constituted by the
promulgated in the regular course of business, Disciplining Authority. This is not undue
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the delegation as what is delegated by the
Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the President is the power to investigate, not the
Chief Executive' (Fortich vs. Corona. 298 SCRA power to discipline.
705)  Hence, jurisdiction over administrative
disciplinary cases against elective local officials
is lodged in two authorities:
Province of Camarines Norte vs. Province of
o the Disciplining Authority (the President)
Quezon, (367 SCRA 91)
and
The claim of respondents (Quezon Prov. Gov o the Investigating Authority (the DILG
Rodriguez and Calauag Mayor Lim) that the DENR Secretary, who may act by himself or
technical team conducted the survey (to make a constitute an Investigating Committee).
delineation of the boundary separating the Provinces o In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the Disciplining
of Camarines Norte and Quezon) without prior Authority may designate a Special
authority from the Office of the President is baseless. Investigating Committee.
The authority of the team emanated from the Special
The Executive Secretary, acting by authority of
Order No. 1179 duly issued by the DENR Secretary, the President, may reverse a Decision of the Director
the alter ego of the President. Being an alter ego, the that had been affirmed by the Department
acts of the DENR Secretary are presumed to be the Secretary.
acts of the President unless expressly repudiated by  The argument that the Executive Secretary is
the latter. The DENR team was precisely created to equal in rank with other department heads is
comply with the SC Decision to conduct the survey. incorrect for he acts by "authority of the
President."
 His decision should thus be given full faith and
credit by the courts. His assumed authority
should be accepted for only the President can
rightfully say that he is not authorized to do so.
Administrative Law Review 16
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 officers that a certain person is a tenant are merely

 provisional and not conclusive on courts.

Review by Administrative Review by the Courts

Bautista vs. Araneta (326 SCRA 234)
Agencies
F: Bautista claimed he is a tenant, but the owner of
the superior Since the authority of the
administrative official is court is simply to find out the land – Araneta, denies it. DARAB ruled that he is
authorized, in the whether there is a tenant. This was reversed by the CA.
exercise of his discretion, substantial evidence in H: CA can reverse DARAB’s finding that he is a tenant
to receive additional support of the The Supreme Court rejected petitioner's claim
evidence conclusion reached by that he is a tenant by virtue of the factual finding of
the administrative the DARAB considering that DARAB mainly relied on
officer, its power of
the certifications issued in favor of petitioner in
review is limited only to
all the evidence already holding that he is a tenant of the disputed
submitted by the parties. landholding.
It CANNOT be Certifications issued by administrative agencies or
compelled by the parties officers that a certain person is a tenant are merely
for them to submit new provisional and not conclusive on courts. This Court is
evidence precisely not necessarily bound by these findings especially if
because its role is not to they are mere conclusions that are not supported by
determine conflicting
substantial evidence.
claims which is a power
given to the [Note: Tenancy is not purely a factual relationship
administrative body dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the
it is within the The role of the court is land. It is also a legal relationship that can only be
prerogative of the simply to find out created with the consent of the true and lawful
superior adm officer to whether the evidence landholder.]
order the conduct of a supports the decision –
new hearing or trial de whether or not there is
Questions which may be subject of judicial review:
novo, in the exercise of substantial evidence to
1. Questions of Law
his discretion, and even support the finding
a. involves the constitutionality of law, treaty,
the admission of new made by the
ordinance or administrative order
evidence administrative officer.
b. jurisdiction of the adm agency
c. there is an error of law committed by the adm
officer
Findings of facts of administrative bodies are as a
rule not subject to judicial review and must be
2. Question of Fact
accorded not only utmost respect but even finality
GR: Factual findings of administrative bodies are
as long as such decisions are confined to matters
accorded respect, if not finality.
within their respective jurisdiction and are supported
Exceptions:
by substantial evidence (San Sebastian College vs.
a. The decision is not supported by substantial
CA. 197 SCRA 139; Labor Congress of the Philippines
evidence;
vs. NLRC, 292 SCRA 469).
b. The findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or
collusion.
c. The procedure is irregular.
Philsa International Placement & Services Corp. vs. d. Palpable or serious errors have been committed.
Labor Secretary (356 SCRA 174) e. When grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness or
Findings of the POEA regarding alleged contract capriciousness is manifest.
substitution constitute question of fact which may f. The law explicitly authorizes review of factual
not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. matters (Sibayan vs. Pena, 187 SCRA 22;
Purefoods Corporation vs NLRC, 171 SCRA 415).
g. There is conflict in the factual findings not only at
Cosep vs. NLRC (290 SCRA 705)
the Ombudsman level, but even at the
But if there is a misappreciation of facts by the
appellate court (Teresita Fabian vs. Agustin, GR
quasi-judicial agency like the NLRC, thereby impairing No. 143092, 14 February 2003)
petitioners’ right to security of tenure, or where the
factual findings lack support, the Court is compelled 3. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact (Brandeis
to deviate from this well established rule. Even Doctrine of Assimilation of Facts)
decisions of administrative agencies which are This doctrine lays down the rule that when a
declared "final" by law are not exempt from the finding of fact is so intimately involved and
dependent upon the question of law, the court will,
judicial review when so warranted.
in order to resolve the question of law, examine the
factual setting including the evidence adduced
Malonzo vs. COMELEC (269 SCRA 381) thereto. (findings of facts are necessary in order to
In cases filed before administrative and quasi- determine the findings of law)
judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it
is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount Fabian v. Agustin
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might The Ombudsman Investigation Officer found
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. DPWH District Engineer Agustin guilty of grave
misconduct as well as irregular or immoral conduct and
Neugene Marketing vs. CA (303 SCRA 295) recommended his dismissal from the service, which
The rule that the appellate court will not generally finding was approved by Ombudsman Desierto with
disturb the factual findings by the trial court does modification that the offense is only misconduct and
not apply where the Securities and Exchange that the penalty Is suspension from office for one
Commission overlooked certain facts of substance and year without pay.
value which if considered would affect the result of Eventually, Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero dismissed
the case. the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. However,
the Court of Appeals in its original Decision reinstated
Oarde vs. CA (280 SCRA 235) Ombudsman Desierto's order imposing the one-year
Certifications issued by administrative agencies or suspension. Later, the CA rendered an amended
Administrative Law Review 17
emily zen chua

Decision, this time affirming the Guerrero dismissal of Matuguina Integrated Wood Products (MIWP) vs.
the case. CA (263 SCRA 508)
Such conflict in the factual findings compels the The issue of whether or not petitioner MIWP is an
Supreme Court to deviate from the general rule and alter ego of Milagros Matuguina, the losing party-
review the evidence. In this case, the Court reversed respondent in the MNR case, Is one of fact, and which
the CA amended Decision and ordered respondent’s should have been threshed out in said administrative
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of proceedings, and not in the prohibition proceedings in
retirement benefits and with prejudice to his re- the trial court, where it is precisely the failure of the
employment in the government. respondent Minister of Natural Resources to proceed
as mandated by law in the execution of its order which
All errors or decisions of administrative bodies is under scrutiny.
involving questions of law are subject to judicial
review consistent with Sec. 5 (2-e), Art. VIII, 1987
Republic vs. Imperial (303 SCRA 127)
Constitution which provides: "All cases in which only
an error or question of law is involved." The classification of public lands is a function of
the executive branch, specifically the Director of
Appeal by Certiorari Special Civil Action for Lands (now the Director of the Lands Management
(Rule 45) Certiorari (Rule 65) Bureau), and the decision of the director of lands when
Only questions of law The only question that approved by the DENR Secretary as to questions of
may be raised (Sec 1, may be raised is whether fact is conclusive and not subject to review by the
Rule 43) or not the respondent court in the absence of any showing that such decision
(tribunal or officer
or finding is tainted with fraud or mistake (In Re:
exercising judicial
function) has acted Petition Seeking for Clarification as to the Validity and
without or in excess of Forceful Effect of Two Final and Executory but
jurisdiction or with grave Conflicting Decisions of the SC, 321 SCRA 62).
abuse of discretion
The parties are: the The petitioner is the  Bureau of Patents: where there is a question as
appellant as petitioner aggrieved party and the to whether or not such a trade name causes
and the appellee as respondent is the tribunal confusion, or similar to a prior registered trade
respondent or officer exercising name or trademark, such issue is one belonging
judicial function who is to the courts.
alleged to have acted  Bureau of Immigration: within its jurisdiction:
without or in excess of o excluding an alien on the ground that he is
jurisdiction or with grave not a Filipino citizen
abuse of discretion o whether or not a person is authorized to
Filed before CA; w/in 15 The party benefited by reside or is an immigrant or an alien
days the act complained of is  If the issue of citizenship is put into issue, then it is
also included as within the power of the court to order the
respondent administrative agency to defer action on the
matter in order for the court to look into the issue
Questions of Law Questions of Facts of citizenship. The issue of citizenship is one within
If the facts are A question of fact arises the exclusive authority of the court and not of
established or admitted, when there is a conflict the administrative agency.
their legal effect is a in testimony. The  COA: (PD 1445) the findings made by the
question of law for the question must be auditor on the matter of claims or settlement of
court to determine resolved by the court. No accounts may be the subject of an appeal to
question of fact exists if the COA within a period of six (6) months from
only one conclusion is the findings made by the auditor. And from the
possible from the facts decision of the COA, the same may be the
established subject of judicial review within a period of 30
There is a questions of There is a question of days as mandated by PD 1445.
law in a given case fact when the doubt or
when the doubt or difference arises as to 
difference arises as to the truth or the
what the law is on a falsehood of alleged GR: Administrative bodies are not allowed to grant
certain state of facts facts. criminal and civil immunities to persons.
Exception: where the law itself authorizes the grant of
such immunity to the individual.
Tuazon vs. CA (118 SCRA464)
In Brandeis Doctrine of Assimilation of Facts, the 1) Presidential Commission on Good
more important issue, which is law, assimilates the Government (PCGG) pursuant to Sec 5, E.O.
facts. Thus, questions of facts and of law are subject 14 as amended by E.O. 14-A. The PCGG has
to judicial review. For instance the issue or tenancy the power to grant criminal, civil and
involves legal questions as tenancy is not a purely administrative immunity to persons who testify
factual relationship dependent on what the alleged on the matter of alleged acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth by associates of the Marcoses;
tenants do upon the land but it is also a legal
and the
relationship.
2) Office of the Ombudsman, pursuant to
Section 17 of RA 6770, may grant immunity
Sanado vs. CA (356 SCRA 546) from criminal prosecution to any person
If a party disagrees with the decisions of the whose testimony or possession and production
Office of the President, he should elevate the matter of documents and evidence may be
by petition for review before the Court of Appeals for necessary in any proceeding or hearing being
the latter's exercise of the power of judicial review. conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.
(Rule 43)
Administrative Law Review
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

A basic principle of the law on public officers is
that a public official or employee is under a three-
fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a
wrongful act or omission - a public officer may be
held civilly criminally and administratively liable for a
wrongful doing (Tecson vs. Sandiganbayan. 318
SCRA 80).
A criminal prosecution will not constitute a
prejudicial question even if the same facts and
circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings. A finding of guilt in the criminal case
will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
administrative case. Neither would the results in one
conclude the other. (Gatahalian Promotions Talents
Pool vs. Naldoza. 315 SCRA 406)
Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not
a bar to an administrative prosecution or vice versa.
The court, in dismissing the criminal complaint was
simply saying that the prosecution was unable to
prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt. The absence of proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence
whatsoever for there is another class of evidence
which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, is adequate in administrative
cases; the substantial evidence rule in administrative
proceedings merely requires such relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion (Ocampo vs. Ombudsman,
322 SCRA 22).
Administrative offenses do not prescribe (Floria vs.
Sunga, 368 SCRA 551). (Prescriptive period for
criminal case is 15 years, while administrative case is
imprescriptible; Sec 20 of the Ombudsman Act
provides that no investigated is needed – this is
merely directive)
The withdrawal of a complaint or the desistance
of a complainant does not necessarily warrant the
dismissal of an administrative complaint (Guro vs.
Duronio, 397 SCRA 1)
In instances, however, where an administrative
case cannot proceed without the active
cooperation of the complainant, the Supreme Court
may find itself with hardly any alternatives but to
dismiss the complaint (Dagsa-an vs. Conag, 290
SCRA 12).
An administrative complaint against public
officers cannot just be withdrawn at any time by the
simple expediency of the complainant suddenly
claiming a change of mind (Nones vs. Orrnita, 390
SCRA 520).
An affidavit of desistance will not automatically
result to the dismissal of an administrative case or to
the exoneration of respondent. This is because the
complainant is merely a witness in an administrative
case. He cannot, by his own desistance, divest the
court of its jurisdiction, for the court has an interest
apart from complainant's own in determining the
truth and, when necessary, imposing sanctions
against erring court employees (Jacob vs. Tambo,
369 SCRA 148).
While a reelected official may no longer be held
administratively liable for signing a questionable
contract before his reelection, this will not prejudice
the filing of any case other than administrative case
against him (Garcia vs. Mojica. 314 SCRA 207).
LOYAO, JR., vs. CAUBE (A.M. No. P-02-1599.
April 30, 2003)
F: Clerk of Court Caube issued summons to plaintiffs
although there was no case pending against them.
Caube called them so that they could forge an amicable
settlement with their creditors. Caube was dismissed.
Pending appeal, he died.
H: The death or retirement of any judicial officer
from the service does not preclude the finding of any
18
administrative liability to which he shall still be
answerable.
This jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the
filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by
the mere fact that the respondent public official had
ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The
Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the
respondent public official innocent of the charges or
declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be
fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and
dangerous implications . . . If innocent, respondent
public official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he has
served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to
receive the corresponding censure and a penalty
proper and imposable under the situation.
To be sure, respondent Caube’s death has
permanently foreclosed the prosecution of any other
actions, be it criminal or civil, against him for his
malfeasance in office. We are, however, not precluded
from imposing the appropriate administrative sanctions
against him

Under this doctrine, public officials cannot be
subject to disciplinary action for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term.
The doctrine is not only founded on the theory
that an official’s re-election expresses the sovereign
will of the electorate to forgive, or condone any act
or omission constituting a ground for administrative
discipline which was committed during his previous
term, but also dictated by public policy, otherwise,
his second term may just be devoted to defending
himself in the said cases to the detriment of public
service. The doctrine cannot however apply to
criminal acts which the reelected official may have
committed during his previous term
(BQ) AGUINALDO vs. SANTOS (212 SCRA 768)
F: DILG Secretary Santos filed an administrative
case against Governor Aguinaldo for disloyalty to
the Republic. The penalty of such is of dismissal.
Pending the administrative case, he ran for the
same elective position and got elected as the
governor.
H: Applying the doctrine of forgiveness and
condonation, Gov. Aguinaldo could not be held
administratively liable for a prior act committed.
Why? The previous term is distinct from the
succeeding term.
So where no sanction was meted for an act
during a previous term, definitely no sanction should
be allowed for such act committed during a previous
term in a subsequent term of office.
Paredes vs. CSC (192 SCRA 84)
Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a review
of decisions exonerating officers or employees from
administrative charges"
Section 39(a), in relation to Section 37(a), of PD
807 which provides that 'Appeals, where allowable,
shall be made by the party adversely affected by
the decision x x x" was interpreted by the Court: "The
phrase 'party adversely affected by the decision'
refers to the government employee against whom
the administrative case is filed for the purpose of
disciplinary action which may take the form of
suspension (of more than 30 days), demotion in rank
or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office.
Parenthetically, the Philippine Civil Service Law does
not allow the complainant to appeal a decision
exonerating or absolving a civil service employee.
 Sec 39 & 37 of CSL: penalty of suspension for less
than 30 days; or a fine of less than 1 month
salary; or reprimand – is final and executory
Administrative Law Review
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
Decisions and orders of administrative agencies
have, upon their finality, the force and binding
effect of a final judgment within the purview of the
res judicata doctrine. The rule of res judicata thus
forbids the reopening of a matter once determined
by competent authority acting within their exclusive
jurisdiction.
Once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid
final judgment of a competent court, it can no
longer be controverted anew and should be finally
laid to rest
Exceptions lo the doctrine of res judicata:
1. Where there are supervening events which
make it imperative, in the higher interest of
justice, to modify a final judgment to harmonize
it with the prevailing circumstances (Teodoro vs.
Carague. 206 SCRA 429);
2. Where the applicability of the doctrine would
involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality (De
Leon vs. CA), as when it would amount to a
denial of justice or a bar to a vindication of a
legitimate grievance (Suarez vs. CA, 193 SCRA
183);
3. Where the parties involved have waived it or do
not timely raise it as a defense (Teodoro vs.
Carague).
4. The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to
questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Comelec).
BID vs. dela Rosa (197 SCRA 855)
Every time the citizenship of a person is material
or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the court or administrative authority decides
as to such citizenship is generally not considered as
res judicata, hence, it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand.
The doctrine of res judicata applies only to
judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the
exercise of administrative powers. The doctrine
embraces two concepts:
1. bar by prior judgment under par. (b) of Rule
39, Section 47; and
2. conclusiveness of judgment under par. (c)
thereof
Ocho vs. Calos (345 SCRA 488)
F: Calos’ land was subjected to CARP. His property was
distributed through Operation Land Transfer (OLT).
Calos questioned the qualifications of beneficiaries.
PARAD ruled that land be returned to Calos since the
beneficiaries are already landowners. DARAB reversed
PARAD. CA held that Polinar (one of the beneficiaries)
is disqualified since he already owns land
H: res judicata applies thus DARAB’s decision that
Polinar does not own land is final and conclusive on the
Courts
Conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation
of particular facts or issues in another litigation
between the same parties on a different claim or
causes of action.
Thus, the decision of the DAR hearing Officer in
Adm. Case 006-90, which had long attained finality,
that petitioner Ocho is not the owner of other
agricultural lands, foreclosed any inquiry on the same
issue involving the same parties and property.
Although the action instituted by the Calos in Adm.
Case 006-90 (Anomalies in OLT Transfer Action) is
different from the action in Adm. Case X-014
(Annulment of Deeds of Assignment, Emancipation
Patents and TCTs, Retention and Recovery of
Possession and Ownership), the concept of
19
conclusiveness of judgment still applies because the
identity of causes of action is not required but merely
identity of issues.
 In other words, it does not matter that the
issues are different. The issue here (DAR) is
one of cancellation of title and recovery of
possession and ownership, whereas, the
issue in the CA pertains to whether or not this
person is the owner of another agricultural
land. But nonetheless, since the facts are the
same, the issues are related, even if the
causes of action are different, the doctrine
of res adjudicata still applies.
Montemayor vs. Bundalian (405 SCRA 265)
The decision of the Ombudsman does not operate
as res judicata in the case before the Presidential
Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC)
subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata
applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings,
not to the exercise of administrative powers.
Petitioner DPWH Regional Director Montemayor
was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible
criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank
property in violation of RA 3019. For the same alleged
misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee was
investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the
administrative power and control of the President over
him. As the PCAGC investigation of petitioner was
administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata
finds no application in this case.

Section 6, Art- XVI of the 1987 Constitution
provides: The State shall establish and maintain one
police force, which shall be national in scope and
civilian in character to be administered and
controlled by a national police commission
(NAPOLCOM). The authority of local executives shall
be provided by law.
 The authority of local executives over the
elements of the PNP shall be provided by law.
Thus, you have RA 6975 as amended by RA 8851
MANALO vs. SISTOZA [G.R. No. 107369. August
11, 1999]
F: Pres Aquino appointed respondents to PNP
Superintendents and Directors without the approval of
CA. RA 6975 mandates that CA confirmation is needed.
Manalo argued that PNP is akin to AFP where
appointment to colonel and naval captain requires
confirmation
H: CA confirmation is not needed
The Philippine National Police is separate and
distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction.
Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution,
“The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be
composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo
military training and service, as may be provided by
law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the
security of the State.”
On the other hand, Section 6 of the same
Article of the Constitution ordains that:
“The State shall establish and maintain one police
force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in
character to be administered and controlled by a
national police commission. The authority of local
executives over the police units in their jurisdiction
shall be provided by law.”
To so distinguish the police force from the
armed forces, Congress enacted Republic Act 6975
which states in part:
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Section 2. Declaration of policy - It is hereby
declared to be the policy of the State to promote
peace and order, ensure public safety and further
strengthen local government capability aimed towards
the effective delivery of the basic services to the
citizenry through the establishment of a highly
efficient and competent police force that is national in
scope and civilian in character. xxx
The police force shall be organized, trained and
equipped primarily for the performance of police
functions. Its national scope and civilian character
shall be paramount. No element of the police force
shall be military nor shall any position thereof be
occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.
Thereunder, the police force is different from
and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in
the military are not similar to those in the Philippine
National Police. Thus, directors and chief
superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein
respondent police officers, do not fall under the first
category of presidential appointees requiring the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Important Provisions of RA 6975(DILG Act of 1990):
[1] Section 8
No retired or resigned military officer or police
official shall be appointed within one (1) year from
the time of his resignation or retirement. In other
words, the prohibition is only for a period of 1 year
from his separation from the military or police service.
Thereafter, the President is empowered to appoint
such retired or resigned military officer or police
official.
[2] Section 12 = defines the relationship between the
DILG and the Department of National Defense.
The primary role of the Department of National
Defense through the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) is to secure and preserve the external security
of the State. In other words, the AFP has the primary,
the principal role of preserving external security.
 Under the DILG are several offices, bureaus, i.e.,
PNP, the National Police Commission (which
exercises administrative control and supervision
over the PNP), Bureau of Jail and Management.
What is the role of DILG through the PNP?
o It has the primary role of preserving the
internal security of the State.
o But where there are serious threats, through
the national security of the State and in the
interest of public order, the President may
upon the recommendation of the Peace
and Order Council, may call upon the
Armed Forces to reassume the primary
responsibility of preserving not only the
external but also the internal security of the
State.
[3] Section 39 = compulsory retirement of officers and
non-officers upon reaching the age of 56 years
In case an officer with the rank of Chief
Superintendent, Director or the Deputy Director
General, the National Police Commission may allow
his retention in the service for an unextendible period
of one (1) year.
Positions Covered: Director General, the Deputy
Director General, the Chief of the PNP, the Director,
and down the line is the Chief Superintendent.
[4] Section 45 = citizens’ complaints.
Authorizes the filing by the private individual of a
complaint against a member of the PNP:
1. offense calls for a penalty punishable by a
20
fine of 15-day salary or suspension, the
citizen’s complaint shall be filed before the
Chief of Police.
2. where the penalty is not more than 30 days
suspension, the complaint may be filed before
the mayor,
3. where the penalty is more than that period of
suspension -- more than a one month of
suspension as penalty or even dismissal from
the service, a citizen may file such
administrative complaint before the People’s
Law Enforcement Board (PLEB).
There is created a PLEB in every municipality,
city or legislative district – composed of:
1. a member of the Sanggunian
2. Barangay Captain; and
3. Impeccable citizens of the place (known
for probity and independence)
The membership in the PLEB is a civic duty. This is
one instance where an officer aware of a private
individual may be called upon to render public
service, to membership in the People’s Law
Enforcement Board.
[5] Section 45 = disciplinary action imposed by the
PNP Regional Director or the PLEB involving demotion
or dismissal from the service, may be appealable to
the Regional Appellate Board. (RAB)
Decision of the PLEB is final unless the penalty is
demotion or dismissal from service. It will be
appealed within 10 days from receipt of decision to:
a. Regional Appellate Board (RAB) = cases
taken cognizance of by the Regional
Director or the PLEB;
b. National Appellate Board (NAB) = cases
taken cognizance of by the Chief of the
PNP
 RAB is given a period of 60 days to decide on
such an appeal.
 If no such decision is made on such appeal by
the RAB, then it means that the decision
appealed from has become final and executory
but subject to the right by the aggrieved
individual to appeal to the DILG Secretary.
 So notwithstanding the lapse of the 60 day
period and no action was taken on such
appealed case by the RAB, the matter can still
be the subject of an appeal to the DILG
Secretary.
It is erroneous to state that the appeal may be
taken to the NAPOLCOM because the NAPOLCOM
takes cognizance of appealed cases only through its
recognized disciplinary machineries -- RAB and NAB.
CABADA vs. ALUNAN (260 SCRA 839)
F: The aggrieved individual filed the appeal
addressed to the DILG Secretary in his capacity as
ex-officio Chairman of the NAPOLCOM.
H: his appeal is not deemed an appeal to the
Napolcom
Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 (RA 6975)
dearly shows that the NAPOLCOM exercises appellate
Jurisdiction only on the following cases and THROUGH
(a) the National Appellate Board (NAB) in
personnel disciplinary actions involving
demotion or dismissal from the service
imposed by the PNP Chief, and
(b) the RAB in administrative cases against
policemen and over decisions on claims for
police benefits.
The NAPOLCOM has no appellate jurisdiction over
decisions rendered by the NAB and the RAB.
Consequently, the NAPOLCOM did not have authority
over the appeal and the petition for review, and just
because both mentioned the DILG Secretary as
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Chairman of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them within
the jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM.
[6] Section 46 = members of the PNP are no longer
subject to the provisions of court martial proceedings
nor under the provisions of the CA 408 known as the
Articles of War.
 The PNP shall be national in scope and civilian in
character. Meaning, all members of the PNP are
now subject to the authority of civilian courts. So,
if cases are to be filed against the members of
the PNP, the cases, if evidence warrants, should
be filed before the regular courts and not
before courts martial pursuant to the provision of
PD 1850 and the matters be tried under the
civilian laws.
 Courts martial are not judicial bodies but are
implementing arms of the executive branch. It is
an administrative body under the executive
branch and not a judicial body.
 The Sandiganbayan is a regular court. The ranks
in the PNP service that belongs to the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan are
o from the rank of Provincial Director up --
salary grade 27 and up (high-ranking
officer)
o Below salary grade 27, superintendent is a
low ranking officer of the PNP.
[7] Section 47, = preventive suspension
GR: Preventive suspension of a public officer must be
for a fixed period – 90 days, 60 days, etc.
Exception:
1. the preventive suspension from office of a PNP
member criminally charged with grave offense
where the penalty is six years and one day or
more shall last until the termination of the case,
and the suspension cannot be lifted before that
time
2. where there may be indefinite preventive
suspension -- such as under RA 3019 in relation to
RA 1379 (Ill-gotten Wealth.)
The reason why PNP members are treated
differently is that they carry weapons and the badge
of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate
witnesses against them. (Himagan vs. People, 237
SCRA 538-541)
[8] Section 51 defines the powers of local
government executives over PNP units.
The Regional Police Director has the prerogative
to name the five (5) eligibles for the position of chief
of police from a pool of eligible officers screened by
the Senior Officer Promotion and Selection Board,
PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon City, without
interference from local executives.
As deputy of the National Police Commission, the
authority of the mayor is very limited -- in reality, he
has no power of appointment and has only the
limited power of selecting one from among the list of
five eligibles to be named the chief of police.
The mayor cannot require the Regional Police
Director to include the name of any officer, no
matter how qualified, in the list of five to be
submitted to the mayor (Andaya vs. Regional Trial
Court. Cebu City, Br. 20. 319 SCRA 696).
In the provincial level, the Provincial Governor is
limited to the list the names of 5 eligible police
officers as screened by the Senior Police Officer’s
Promotion and Selection Board of the PNP Camp
Crame, Quezon City.
GR: The power of local executives is one of
operational supervision and control. Meaning, the
Local Chief Executive shall exercise operational
supervision and control over PNP units within his
territorial jurisdiction.
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Exception :
Within a period of 30 days immediately before a
national, local or barangay elections and 30 days
thereafter, the local chief executives do not have
operational control and supervision. It is the
COMELEC which has the operational control over
PNP units within 30 days before and 30 days after the
elections pursuant to Section 51 of the PNP Law.
Operational supervision and control exercised by the
local chief executive over PNP units
 the power to direct, oversee and even
inspect police units, police forces, and the
power to employ and deploy PNP units
through the Station Commander to ensure
public safety and the maintenance of
peace and order within the territorial
jurisdiction of the local chief executive
 the power to employ and deploy units and
elements of the PNP through the police
station commander to ensure the
maintenance of peace and order within
the territorial jurisdiction.
[9] Section 52 withdrawal of operational power
The President may upon consultation with the
Provincial Governor and the Congressman suspend
the power of operational supervision and control of
any Local Chief Executive over police units on any of
the following grounds:
a) abuse of authority by the local chief
executive;
b) frequent unauthorized absences; (Note that
this is also one of the grounds for the institution
of disciplinary action against a local
executive official under Section 60 of RA
7160;)
c) providing material support to criminal
elements if the local chief executive is in
cahoots, or maintains an army of goons who
are members of the PNP;
d) engaging in acts inimical to national security.
ALUNAN vs. ASUNCION (323 SCRA 623)
F: DILG Sec Alunan issued Resolution 93-032
stopping the members of the Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS) from exercising certain police powers
– power to arrest, investigate commission of
offenses as well as the power to effect seizures.
The resolution classifies them as merely civilian
components of the PNP. The resolution was
questioned as violative of the DILG law (RA 6975).
H: the questioned resolution implements RA 6975.
Resolution No. 93-032 issued by the NAPOLCOM
which strips members of the Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS) with police powers (such as effecting
arrest, search and seizures and the investigation of
the commission of crimes), and instead classifies
them as civilian personnel of the PNP does not
violate RA 6975 but actually implements it.
RA 6975 had the effect of revising the whole
police force system and substituting a new unified
one in its place. The new police force absorbed the
members of the former NAPOLCOM, Philippine
Constabulary (PC) and Integrated National Police, all
three of which were accordingly abolished.
With the abolition of the PC, including
necessarily the CIS, RA 5750, which provides for
the qualifications, selection and appointment of
civilian investigation agents of the CIS as well as
their powers as peace officers, has been rendered
inutile. RA 5750 has been superseded by RA 6975.
Accordingly, police powers have been reserved
for such uniformed PNP personnel. Hence, those
former CIS agents who opted not to join the
uniformed personnel of the PNP are effectively
denied police powers.
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
The Solicitor General is the lawyer of the
government, any of its agencies and officials in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer. This is so provided
under Sec. 11 of PD No.478. The exception is when
such officials or agents
1. are being charged criminally or
2. are being civilly sued for damages arising
from a felony
 the reason here is that, the government as the
principal, cannot commit a wrong. The illegal
acts or omissions committed by the agent
cannot be imputed on the principal
Orbos vs. Civil Service Commission, 12 Sept. 1990
F: DOTC Secretary Orbos made a reorganization in
the DOTC. Madarang questioned the appointment of
Ayug and Maglayon. He subsequently filed an appeal
before the CSC – which ruled that Madarang should
be appointed instead. Orbos refused to heed CSC
since the matter of appointment is one solely
belonging to the sound discretion of the appointing
authority. OSG represented DOTC. CSC questioned
this.
HELD: OSG can validly represent DOTC.
When confronted with a situation where one
government office takes an adverse position against
another government agency, the Solicitor General
should not refrain from performing his duty as the
lawyer of the government. It is incumbent upon him to
present to the court what he considers would legally
uphold the best interest of the government although it
may run counter to a client's position. In such an
instance, the government office adversely affected by
the position taken by the Solicitor General, if it still
believes in the merit of its case, may appear in its own
behalf through its legal personnel or representative.
In situations where the other agency has already
filed a pleading which is inconsistent with the stand
taken by the Solicitor General, the Solicitor General
may seek permission from the courts not to represent
such agency and for that agency to represent itself
through its own in-house counsel.
Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, (272 SCRA 663)
Sec. 35 Chapter 123, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292), which
reproduces the powers of the OSG enumerated in PD
478, provides that the OSG shall "deputize legal
officers of government bureaus, agencies and offices
to assist the Solicitor General and represent the
Government in cases involving their respective offices,
and call on any office or instrumentality of the
Government for such service assistance.
NPC vs. NLRC (272 SCRA 706)
When authorized by the President or head of
office, the OSG also represents GOCCs. The OSG is
the principal counsel of the National Power Corporation
(NPC). As such, copies of orders and decisions served
on the deputized special attorney, acting as agent or
representative of the Solicitor General, are not
binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor
General. The proper basis for computing the
reglementary period to file an appeal and for
determining whether a decision has attained finality is
service on the OSG and not on the special attorney.
Urbano vs. Chavez & Co vs. Chavez (183 SCRA 347)
F: DILG Secretary Luis Santos was charged before
the Ombudsman. He was represented by OSG
H: OSG cannot represent Santos
The Office of the Solicitor General is not
22
authorized to represent a public official at any stage
of a criminal case or in a civil suit for damages arising
from a felony. This applies to all public officials and
employees in the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of the government.
A public official who is sued in a criminal case is
actually sued in his personal capacity inasmuch as his
principal, the State, can never be the author of a
wrongful act. In the same light, any pecuniary liability a
public official may be held to account on the occasion
of a civil suit for damages arising from a felony
allegedly committed by him is for his own account. The
State is not liable for the same.
GO vs. CHAVEZ (183 SCRA 347)
F: Solicitor General Frank Chavez was interviewed
by Business World and he uttered defamatory
remarks. Go filed a civil action for damages arising
from these utterances of malicious remarks.
Chavez was represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General.
H: Chavez should not be represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General because the case
for damages cannot be attributable to the State.
If ever there is a judgment for the payment of
damages, the government cannot be made
answerable therefore.
Of course, it does not mean that the Solicitor
General should not represent a government official
sued in his official capacity where such
representation would be adverse to a position taken
by another government office.
Republic vs. Desierto (389 SCRA 452)
The Court allowed the petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 filed by the Republic of the Philippines through
the PCGG (not the OSG) assailing the dismissal by the
Ombudsman of the graft complaint against private
respondents Cojuangco et al. (involving the acquisition
by the United Coconut Oil Mils of 16 oil mills using coco
levy funds).
Although the OSG should have filed the petition in
behalf of the Republic, however, if the ends of
substantial justice would be better served, and the
issues in the action could be determined in a more just
speedy and inexpensive manner, then the petition
should be entertained.
Assuming the PCGG has no authority to file the
petition, its unauthorized filing was ratified, and the
defect was cured, when the OSG signed as co-counsel
for the Republic in its Consolidated Reply.
PEOPLE vs. DELGADO (September 18, 1990)
F: This was an action filed by the Commission on
Elections in the name of the People of the
Philippines a petition questioning the authority of
the RTC to review the actions taken by the
COMELEC in the conduct of investigation and
prosecution of election offenses brought before
the RTC.
HELD: The petition has to be dismissed on the
ground that the petition was not filed by the proper
counsel for the government which in this case is the
Office of the Solicitor General.
Only the Office of the Solicitor General can
represent the People of the Philippines. In the least,
the consent of the Office of the Solicitor General
should have been secured by the COMELEC before
the filing of the petition.
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The Ombudsman has the power, function and
duty to act promptly on any complaint filed in any
manner or form against any public officer or
employee and to investigate any act or omission of
any public official when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
The incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special
Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution) effective 02
February 1987 is without authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of
criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan except upon
orders of the Ombudsman (Zaidivar vs. Sandiganbayan,
160 SCRA 843, 27 April 1998).
Before the creation of the Office of the
Ombudsman, what we had was the Tanodbayan.
Subsequently, the Tanodbayan remained as the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP). Under the
Constitution, the OSP became a component unit of
the Office of the Ombudsman. The OSP can only
proceed upon the permission of the Ombudsman in
the matter of conducting preliminary investigation
and the filing of cases before the Sandiganbayan.
The authority of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Military Affairs is not confined to the military. The
Ombudsman, under Sections 11 and 31 of R.A. 6770,
may refer cases involving non-military personnel, like
the officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) who
are civilian personnel of the government, for
investigation by the Deputy for Military Affairs.
(Lacson et al vs. Casaclang et al, 248 SCRA 568).
Jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman:
DELOSO vs. DOMINGO (191 SCRA 545)
F: Gov. Deloso claimed that he was ambushed while
on their way to a pre-wedding celebration. All the
casualties were the ambushers, not one of the
convoy of Gov. Deloso was injured or killed. But in
the investigation conducted by the PNP, it is found
out that Deloso and his men were actually the
ambushers. Before cases were filed, Deloso claimed
that the Ombudsman has no authority to conduct
the preliminary investigation because the crime is
not office-related.
HELD: The authority of the Ombudsman covers all
kinds of offenses, all misfeasances, malfeasances
and non-feasances committed by public officers and
employees.
As protector of the people, the Office of the
Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials and to investigate any act or
omission of any public official when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and
nonfeasance committed by any officer or employee
during his tenure of office.
George Uy vs. Ombudsman (20 March 2001)
F: SC made an earlier ruling that the power of the
Ombudsman to prosecute cases extends only to those
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The
Ombudsman filed an MFR
H: SC went back to the earlier ruling in Deloso case on
the matter of broad jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to
conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all
criminal cases involving public officers and employees,
not only those within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the
23
regular courts as well. His authority to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed by public officers and
employees is founded in Section 15 and Section 11 of
RA 6770.
Section 15 vests the Ombudsman with the plenary
and unqualified power to investigate and prosecute any
act or omission when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does
not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts.
Section 11 grants the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, an organic component of the office of the
Ombudsman under the latter's supervision and control,
the power to conduct preliminary investigation and
prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, the powers granted by the legislature to
the Ombudsman are very broad. He is mandated by law
to act on all complaints against officers and employees
of the government and to enforce their administrative,
civil and criminal liability where the evidence warrants.
Recognizing the importance of this power, the Court
cannot derogate the same by limiting it only to cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Finally, the authority of the Ombudsman to
prosecute cases involving public officers and employees
before the regular courts does not conflict with the
power of the regular prosecutors under the DOJ to
control and direct the prosecution of all criminal
actions under Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.The power of the Ombudsman is a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged. Thus, Administrative Order No. 8 of the
Office of the Ombudsman provides that in cases
cognizable by regular courts, the control and
supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman is only in
Ombudsman cases and that the law recognizes a
concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the
Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of
government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by
regular courts. (Ombudsman’s jurisdiction is primary
and can take over anytime)
SANCHEZ vs. DEMETRIOU (227 SCRA 637)
F: DOJ conducted the preliminary investigation of
Sanchez with regard to Rape and homicide cases
filed against him. Sanchez argued that only the
Ombudsman which has the power to conduct
preliminary investigation against a public officer.
H: The authority of the Ombudsman is one of
shared and concurrent jurisdiction with other
investigating body of the government such as the
DOJ.
Kinds of Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman:
1. Primary = The Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction over offenses cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan. If other agencies
have in the meantime investigated the
case, at any time of the proceeding, the
Ombudsman can take over the
investigation
2. Shared/ Concurrent = cases falling under
the jurisdiction of other courts – MTC, RTC
Administrative Law Review
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Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
1. Office related offenses
2. Regardless of penalty
3. High Ranking Officer (Salary grade 27 and
up) – the ff officers, although with salary
under grade 27, are still within the
jurisdiction of Sandigan:
a. Prosecutors
b. Regional Director and above
c. Municipal Mayor
d. Senior Supreintendent
e. Heads of offices of the LGU’s
NATIVIDAD vs. FELIX (229 SCRA 682)
F: The provincial prosecutor of Tarlac conducted a
preliminary investigation of a murder of an NPA
suspect Ceverino Aquino. The crime was allegedly
committed by Tarlac Mayor Natividad Ramos.
Ramos claimed that it is only the Ombudsman which
has the power to investigate because he is a high-
ranking official.
HELD: The authority of the Ombudsman is a shared
and concurrent authority with the other
investigative bodies of the government.
Although it was argued by Mayor Natividad that
the murder was committed in relation to his office
which is to maintain peace and order in the society
since the victim is an NPA, however, nowhere in
Section 444 of the LGC is the commission of murder
among the duties and responsibilities of a municipal
mayor.
ORCULLO vs. GERVACIO, JR. (314 SCRA 452)
F: Virgilia Yap Morales was hired as a coordinator in
a study for the codification of the Women Code of
Davao. The project was terminated because of lack
of funds. She is now claiming that there was non-
payment of wages due her in the amount of
P70,800.00. The Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao was not satisfied with the comment
submitted by Councilor Orcullo thus it directed the
payment of the wages.
H: The Ombudsman has no power to direct the
payment of a supposed money claim due an employee.
A money claim against a councilor is within the
jurisdiction of a court of proper jurisdiction, not the
Ombudsman, and if the money claim is against the City
Government, the claim is within the jurisdiction of the
City Council (Sangguniang Panlungsod), or other proper
government agency, but not the Office of the
Ombudsman.
MACEDA vs. VASQUEZ (221 SCRA 464)
F: Ombudsman filed a criminal case against Judge
Maceda for falsification of his certificate of
service – that he had completed the number of
resolutions within the period mandated.
H: The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively
vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from
the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and
court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take
the proper administrative action against them if
they commit any violation thereof.
Thus, where a criminal complaint against a judge
or other court employees arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer
action on said complaint and refer the same to the
Supreme Court for determination whether said
judge or court employee had acted within the scope
of their administrative duties
Where administrative questions relevant to the
inquiry have yet to be resolved by the Supreme Court
24
before a prima fade finding of criminal responsibility
may be made, such as where the complaint alleges
falsification by the judge of a certificate of service
and the Court still has to ascertain if the judge has
been granted an extension of time, the Office of the
Ombudsman should defer action on the case pending
such resolution. This is dictated by practical
considerations only.
DOLALAS vs. OMBUDSMAN (265 SCRA 819)
F: A criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-
Graft Law was filed before the Ombudsman against
MTC Judge Dolalas of Zamboanga City for
unreasonable delay in deciding a case for alarms and
scandals filed before her sala.
H: this is clearly administrative in nature over which
the SC has administrative control and supervision
The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to initiate an
investigation into the alleged “undue delay by the judge
in the disposition of the criminal case” which involves
the determination of whether, in resolving the alarms
and scandals case, petitioner-judge acted in
accordance with the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Such is dearly administrative in nature over which
the Supreme Court has administrative control and
supervision
FUENTES vs. OMBUDSMAN (October 23, 2001)
F: Owners of expropriated land to construct the
fly-over in Buhangin were not yet paid. Judge
Fuentes ordered the attachment of several
properties considered as junks found in the
compound of DPWH in Panacan. The order was
questioned before the Ombudsman. The fact-
finding committee recommended the filing of a
criminal case against Judge Fuentes.
H: Omb. has no jurisdiction; only the SC
Petitioner judge's questioned order directing the
attachment of government property and issuing a writ
of execution were done in relation to his office, well
within his official functions. However, whether or not
such order of execution was valid must be inquired into
in the course of judicial action only by the Supreme
Court that is tasked to supervise the courts.
Thus the Ombudsman may not initiate or
investigate a criminal or administrative complaint
before his office against petitioner judge, but indorse
the case to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Fuentes' questioned order directing the
attachment of government property and issuing a writ
of execution were done in relation to his office, well
within his official functions. The order may be
erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, whether or not such order of execution was
valid must be inquired into in the course of the judicial
action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to
supervise the courts.
Before a civil or a criminal case is filed against a
judge for violation of Articles 204 and 205 of the
Revised Penal Code on rendering an unjust
judgment or interlocutory order, there MUST be a final
and authoritative judicial declaration that the
decision or order of the judge is indeed unjust. In the
absence of such declaration, the filing of civil or
criminal case against the judge on such matter is
premature and cannot prosper.
The pronouncement that the judgment is unjust
may result either from:
(1) an action for certiorari or prohibition against
such action of the judge, or,
(2) pursuant to the filing of an administrative
case before the higher court impugning the
validity of such judgment or order rendered
by the respondent judge
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Investigatory and Prosecutory powers:
Ocampo vs. Ombudsman (225 3CRA725)
F: OSP moved to dismiss to the graft case against
Gov. Ocampo. Ombudsman reversed OSP. Ocampo then
filed a case to move to dismiss Ombudsman’s finding
based on OSP’s recommendation.
H: Courts cannot review the exercise of discretion of
Ombudsman
The Court, recognizing the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman and for reasons of
practicably, will not interfere nor pass upon findings of
the Ombudsman to avoid its being hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before
it, and the Court will not review the exercise of
discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an information
in court or dismiss a complaint.
If the Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a
complaint outright without going through a
preliminary investigation, it necessarily follows that it is
also within his discretion to determine whether the
evidence before him is sufficient to establish
probable cause.
Thus, petitioners may not compel the
Ombudsman to order the production of certain
documents if in his judgment, such documents are
not necessary in order to establish the guilt, or
innocence, of the accused (Mamburao vs.
Ombudsman. 344 SCRA 818).
Despite the Ombudsman's non-compliance with
the affidavit requirement, petitioner filed his counter-
affidavit and answered the charges against him.
Hence, having submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman and having allowed the
proceedings to go on until the preliminary
investigation was terminated and the information
filed with the Sandiganbayan, petitioner Is deemed
to have waived whatever right he may otherwise
have to assail the manner in which the preliminary
investigation was conducted (Bautista vs.
Sandiganbayan, 12 May 2000).
Duterte vs. Sandiganbayan (130191; 4/27/1998)
F: To substantiate an unverified complaint filed
against Duterte for the purchase of computers, OMB-
Mindanao requested COA’s Special Audit Team to
submit affidavits. Duterte et. al., were not given copies
of these affidavits. They were only asked to file a
comment on the civil case and COA Report. The civil
case was dismissed for being moot since the said
contract was rescinded.
H: no due process
A COA special audit report is not equivalent to the
affidavits required under Administrative Order No. 07
(Rules or Procedure) of the Ombudsman for the
conduct of preliminary investigation. When Duterte et.
al., were asked to file a comment on a COA Audit
Report, they were already being subjected to
preliminary investigation without being so informed.
Also, they were not furnished a single affidavit of any
person charging them of any offense.
Garcia vs. Primo (148944; 2/5/2003)
F: Cebu Mayor was charged with graft with regard to
a contract he entered with FE Zuelling – an asphalt
distributor
H: due process was complied with
The Duterte ruling does not apply where the
Ombudsman's order requiring petitioner to submit his
counter-affidavit was accompanied by the COA Special
25
Audit Report and the joint affidavit and supplemental
joint affidavit of the auditors.
The fact that the Prosecutor who conducted the
fact-finding investigation already resigned and that his
name was withdrawn as complainant from the case is of
no fatal consequence.
First, Tagaan's report and affidavit still form part
of the records of the case. He could still be called by
subpoena if necessary.
Second, Tagaan was a nominal party, whose duty as
special prosecutor was to investigate the commission
of crimes and file the corresponding information.
Since the illegal acts imputed are public offenses.
The real complainant is the State, which is
represented by the remaining complainants - the COA
and the Ombudsman.
Baluyut vs. Holganza (9 February 2000)
The Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the controversy since the Philippine
National Red Cross is a government owned and
controlled corporation, with an original charter under
RA 95 as amended.

Garcia vs. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207
F: Mayor Garcia signed the anomalous purchase of
asphalt 4)days before the local elections. Garcia was
re-elected. Ombudsman then preventively
suspended him. Garcia claims that he could no longer
be placed under preventive suspension because of
his re-election citing the case of AGUINALDO.
H: The Ombudsman can still issue preventive
suspension order even if the act in question
happened during a previous term.
The power of the Ombudsman to issue
preventive suspension order is provided for under
Section 24 of R.A. 6670. The power to investigate
is separate and distinct from the power to impose
administrative sanctions. The power to investigate
is also separate and distinct from the power to
preventively suspend a local elective official.
But because of Garcia’s re-election, he cannot
be sanctioned administratively because the subject
of the administrative complaint was committed
during a previous term despite the fact that the act
complained of happened 4 days before the elections.
What is determinative is the time of
commission, i.e., during a previous term. It does not
matter that it took place a few days before the
elections. There was here a presumed knowledge on
the part of the people re-electing him to the same
office. Thus, there was condonation as in the
AGUINALDO case.
The power of the Ombudsman to preventively
suspend any officer or employee "under his authority"
means that he can preventively suspend all officials
under investigation by his office, regardless of the
branch of government in which they are employed,
excepting those removable by impeachment, members
of Congress and the Judiciary.
 To initiate impeachment, the Ombudsman can
investigate
YABUT vs. OMBUDSMAN (233 SCRA 311)
F: While Vice Mayor Yabut was direct a traffic, a
fistfight ensued between him and an American.
While investigation for simple misconduct and
oppression was on-going, he was preventively
suspended for 90-days. His penalty was 90-day
suspension. Yabut now asks that the period of
preventive suspension must be credited to whatever
penalty of suspension that may be imposed by the
Administrative Law Review 26
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Ombudsman.
H: the period of preventive suspension cannot be Appeal:
credited
ALBA vs. NITORREDA (254 SCRA 753)
A preventive suspension decreed by the
F: DECS Asst. Regional Director Alba was charged
Ombudsman by virtue of his authority under Section
of being partial to the owner of a school in Tagum.
21 of RA 6770. In relation to Section 9 of
Administrative Order No. 07, is not meant to be a He was found guilty but cannot appeal because of
penalty but a means taken to insure the proper and Sec 27 of RA 6770
impartial conduct of an investigation. H: no violation of right to appeal
The period of preventive suspension cannot be Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section 7, Rule 111 of
credited to whatever penalty that may be meted Administrative Order No. 7 (known as the Rules of
Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman), denying
out.
the right of appeal and providing for the finality of the
decision where the penalty imposed is public censure or
(BQ) BUENASEDA vs. FLAVIER (226 SCRA 646)
reprimand, suspension of not more than 1 month or a
F: DOH Sec Flavier filed graft cases against several
fine equivalent to 1 month salary, is constitutional and
employees including the Chief (Dr. Buenaseda) of
the Hospital of the National Center for Mental not tantamount to a deprivation of property without
Health. After filing their answers, the Ombudsman due process of law.
issued preventive suspension order. The The right to appeal is not a natural right nor part
respondents contended that there was yet no of due process.
formal hearing conducted on the matter and so, the All other decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not
issuance of the preventive suspension order violated
enumerated in Section 27 are not final, unappealable
due process.
and immediately executory. In these other cases, the
H: they can be preventively suspended
respondent therein has the right to appeal to the
Being a mere order for preventive suspension
Court of Appeals within ten days from receipt of the
the questioned order of the Ombudsman was validly
issued even without a full-blown hearing and the written notice of the order, directive or decision. An
formal presentation of evidence by the parties. appeal timely filed will stay the immediate
The moment a criminal or administrative implementation of the decision. In all these other
complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the cases therefore, the judgment imposed therein will
respondent is deemed to be "in his authority" and he become final after the lapse of the reglementary
can proceed to determine whether said respondent period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or, an appeal
therefrom having been taken, the judgment in the
should be placed under preventive suspension.
appellate tribunal becomes final.
CASTILLO-Co vs. BARBERS (290 SCRA 719)
Lapid vs. CA. 334 SCRA 741
F: Gov. Castillo was charged with graft practices
F: Lapid was suspended for 1 year. Pending appeal, the
because she purchased reconditioned heavy
NB, DILG and Ombudsman wants the penalty
equipment when the requirement is for brand new
immediately executed.
ones. Castillo contends that she can only be
H: penalty cannot be immediately executed since no
preventively suspended for 60 days since that was
law allows it; this case was decided before AO-14-A
what is provided under LGC.
A decision of the Ombudsman finding him liable for
H: she can be suspended for 6 months
misconduct and imposing the penalty of one year
The provisions under the LGC are different from
suspension without pay, is not among those listed in the
that under the Ombudsman Act. So, administrative
Ombudsman Act of 1989 as final and unappealable.
proceedings taken by the Ombudsman pursuant to
There is no general legal principle that mandates
its provisions under the Ombudsman Law ought to be
that all decisions of quasi-judicial and administrative
followed. In other words, the Ombudsman can mete
agencies are immediately executory. Decisions
out the maximum preventive suspension of six (6)
rendered by the SEC and the Civil Aeronautics Board,
months.
for example, are not immediately executory and are
A preventive suspension can be decreed on an
stayed when an appeal is filed before the Court of
official under investigation after charges are brought
Appeals.
and even before the charges are heard since the same
On the other hand, the decisions of the Civil
is not in the nature of a penalty. The length of the
Service Commission, under the Administrative Code,
period of suspension within the six-month limit
and the Office of the President under the Local
prescribed by Sec. 24 of RA 6770, like the evaluation
Government Code are immediately executory even
of the strength of the evidence, lies in the discretion
pending appeal because the pertinent laws under which
of the Ombudsman.
the decision were rendered mandate them to be so.
The provisions of the last two cited laws expressly
YASAY vs. DESIERTO (300 SCRA 494)
provide for the execution pending appeal of their final
The matter of imposing the period of preventive
orders or decisions. Section 68 of the Local
suspension up to six months lies within the
Government Code only applies to administrative
discretion of the Ombudsman.
decisions rendered by the Office of the President or
The Supreme Court cannot substitute its own
the appropriate Sanggunian against elective local
judgment for that of the Ombudsman on this
government officials. Similarly, the provisions in the
matter, absent clear showing of grave abuse of
Administrative Code of 1987 mandating the execution
discretion
pending review applies specifically to administrative
decisions of the Civil Service Commission involving
Generally, the SC will not interfere into the
exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman. members of the Civil Service. There is no basis in law
Although in the case of GARCIA vs. MOJICA, the for the proposition that the provisions of the
SC ruled that the imposition of six (6) months Administrative Code and the Local Government Code on
preventive suspension on Mayor Garcia was execution pending review should be applied suppletorily
unreasonable and so the SC reduced the period. to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is
As a general rule however, the matter is within the nothing in the Ombudsman Act which provides for such
sound discretion of the Office of the Ombudsman.
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suppletorily application.
Lopez vs. CA and Romeo Liggayu (389 SCRA 570)
F: Liggayu, Manager of the Legal Department of the
PCSO, was found guilty by the Ombudsman of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for
issuing a subpoena in excess of his authority as
Resident Ombudsman of PCSO and was meted the
penalty of six months and one day suspension without
pay.
H: suspension cannot be executed pending appeal
The legislature has seen fit to grant a stay of
execution pending appeal from disciplinary cases where
the penalty imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman
is not public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one
month salary.
The Court of Appeals, committed no grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
enjoining the execution of private respondent
Liggayu's suspension pending appeal. Considering that
Liggayu appealed from the decision of the Office of
the Ombudsman, the stay of execution of the penalty
of suspension should therefore issue as a matter of
right. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties
the right to appeal from its decisions should generally
carry with it the stay of these decisions pending
appeal.
GR: The filing of an appeal will stay the immediate
execution of the penalty
Exception: when the law itself allows the execution
(this may have been repealed by AO-14-A dated
8/17/2000 issued by the Ombudsman which states
that an appeal shall not stop the decision of the
Ombudsman from being executory; he is entitled to
back wages though)
Fabian vs. Desierto (295 SCRA 470)
Appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should
be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In so holding, the Court
declared unconstitutional Section 27 of RA 6770 which
provided that decisions of the office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
way of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. Such provision was violative of
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution, as it
expanded the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
without its advice and consent.
Villavert vs. Desierto (23 February 2000)
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the
Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court.
Consequently, such appeals in administrative cases
should be taken to the Court of Appeals.
Namuhe vs. Ombudsman (298 SCRA 299)
A transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise
of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving
review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of
Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive
appellate jurisdiction there over, relates to procedure
only and does not impair any substantive right. It is not
the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is
affected by law; that right has been preserved. Only
the procedure by which the appeal is to be made has
been changed.
Morong Water District vs. Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman (17 March 2000)
Any appeal or application for remedy against a
27
decision or finding of the Office of the Ombudsman
may only be entertained by the Supreme Court on a
pure question of law. Findings of fact of the
Ombudsman, when supported by substantial evidence,
are conclusive.
Remedy where the penalty imposed is more than 30-
day suspension or up to one year (the period of
suspension as a penalty should not exceed one year
or dismissal from the service):
1. Adm case decided by Ombudsman =
Petition for review on certiorari applying
Rule 43 -- brought before the CA within 10
days.
2. Criminal cases decided by the
Ombudsman = file MFR within 5 days, then
appeal should be taken to SC.
3. Under Rule 65 but only as an exception, i.e.,
where there is grave abuse of discretion,
error of law and such other instances.
MARQUEZ vs. DESIERTO (G.R. 135882, June 23,
2001)
F: Ombudsman ordered bank manager of Unionbank
to produce the bank records of Lagdameo – who is
subject to a fact-finding investigation. No formal
investigation yet, only a verification whether there
is enough evidence to support the complaint.
H: the fact-finding investigation is a fishing
expedition which does not warrant an exception
from the Bank Secrecy Act (RA 1405)
The order of the Ombudsman to produce several
bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera
relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank,
Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch
manager, is an invasion of privacy which is violative of
the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act (RA 1405).
Before an in camera inspection may be allowed:
1. there must be a pending case before a court of
competent jurisdiction
2. the account must be clearly identified,
3. the inspection limited to the subject matter of
the pending case before the court of competent
jurisdiction
4. The bank personnel and the account holder must
be notified to be present during the inspection,
and
5. such inspection may cover only the account
identified in the pending case.
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending
litigation before any court of competent authority.
What is existing is an investigation by the Office of
the Ombudsman through its Fact-Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FFIB). In short, what the
Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional
evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al.,
with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending
case in court which would warrant the opening of the
bank account for inspection.
Exceptions to Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act:
(1) in the course of an examination by the bank
pursuant to an authority given by the Central
Bank;
(2) an authority given to the auditor for the
conduct of an audit;
(3) upon written permission of the depositor;
(4) in cases of impeachment proceedings;
(5) where the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the controversy; and
(6) upon order of competent courts in cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty on the part of the
public officers
(7) Sec 8 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) = during his incumbency, public
official has acquired property manifestly out of
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proportion to his salary and other lawful
income
(PD 1445: Gov’t Auditing
Code)
Article IX-D, Section 2 – COA has the authority
and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue end receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or
held in trust by the Government and the power to
promulgate rules for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses
of government funds and property.
The Constitution and existing laws mandate the
COA to audit all government agencies, including
GOCCs with original charters like the water districts
created under PD 198 (De Jesus vs. COA, 403 SCRA
666).
DBP vs. COA (3 73 SCRA 356)
The COA's jurisdiction covers all government
agencies, offices, bureaus and units, including GOCCs,
and even non-government entities enjoying subsidy
from the government. However, nothing in Sec. 26 of
PD 1445 states that the COA's power to examine and
audit government banks is exclusive, thereby
preventing private audit of government agencies
concurrently with the COA audit. Even with a private
audit, the COA will still conduct its usual examination
and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still bind
government agencies and their officials.
The COA does not have the sole and exclusive
power to examine and audit government banks. The
Central Bank has concurrent jurisdiction to examine
and audit, or cause the examination and audit, of
government banks. Still, the COA's audit prevails over
that of the Central Bank since the COA is the
constitutionally mandated auditor of government bank.
And in matters under second paragraph of Section 2,
Article IX-D of the Constitution, the Central Bank is
devoid of authority to allow or disallow expenditures of
government banks since this function belongs
exclusively to the COA.
Commissioner or Internal Revenue vs. COA (218
SCRA 204)
H: Dept of Finance, which has supervision and control
over the BIR, may grant the informer’s award. COA
may disallow such grant and this disallowance can be
set aside by the court.
The final determination by the Department of
Finance, thru the recommendation of BIR of the
entitlement to the informer's reward under NIRC, is
under Sec 90 of PD 1445, conclusive only upon the
executive agencies concerned and cannot bind COA in
the exercise of its constitutional function. But the
disallowance in audit by COA may be set aside and
nullified by the Supreme Court if done with grave
abuse of discretion.
In its exercise of its power to audit, the COA
cannot disallow the payment of back wages to
employees, which had been decreed pursuant to a
final decision of the Civil Service Commission
(Cagatin, et al vs. COA, 21 March 2000).
NHA vs. COA (226 SCRA 65)
F: The Republic, through NHA, entered into a loan
agreement with KFW. To fulfill one of the conditions
for loan extension, NHA extended the services of a
foreign consultant. COA disallowed the extension
H: COA’s disallowance was valid
The claim that renewal of NHA's foreign loan with
German entity KFW for the Urban Housing Project
28
would have been jeopardized if NHA did not agree to
the extension of a foreign consultant's services is no
justification for not complying with the Constitutional
mandate prohibiting unnecessary expenses of public
funds which is beyond compromise.
Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan (303 SCRA 309)
F: The transaction post-audited by COA has been
found in order by COA. Despite such findings, the
Ombudsman still inquired into the criminal liability of
Public Officers who were responsible for such contract
H: the Ombudsman has discretion whether to adopt
the COA report or not
The exoneration of respondents in the audit
investigation does not mean the automatic dismissal
of the complaint against them - the preliminary
investigation, after all, is independent from the
investigation conducted by the COA, their purposes
distinct from each other.
Cruz vs. COA (368 SCRA 85)
The classification of COA as to who were entitled
to the social amelioration benefits (SAB) and
excluding there from those employees of the Sugar
Regulatory Administration (SRA) hired after October
31, 1989, has no legal basis. The date of hiring of an
employee can not be considered as a substantial
distinction and is not among those factors that shall
be taken into account in fixing compensation or
granting benefits. RA 6758 (Salary Standardization
Law) and Corporate Compensation Circular 10 (the
Implementing Rules) do not make any distinction
between those hired before and after October 31,
1989.

PCGG
The laws creating PCGG:
E.O. 1 (February 28, 1986)
 mandates the PCGG to recover ill-gotten
wealth accumulated by the Marcoses, their
immediate families, relatives, subordinates,
associates and cronies, whether such properties
found in the Philippines or abroad.
 includes the power to take over or sequester all
business enterprises or entities controlled or
owned by them
 PCGG has the power to take over or place
under its control any property or office within its
authority
 no civil action shall prosper against the PCGG or
any member thereof for the discharge of their
functions and duties
E.O. 2
 empowers the PCGG to freeze all assets and
properties in the Philippines and
 likewise prohibit any person from transferring or
concealing such property alleged to be ill-
gotten
E.O. 14 and E.O. 14-A
 mandate the PCGG to file and prosecute all
cases before the Sandiganbayan which has the
exclusive jurisdiction to try and hear cases of the
PCGG.
 Section 5 of E.O. 14 as amended, empowers the
PCGG to grant immunity from criminal
prosecution of any person who testifies
Baseco vs. PCGG (150 SCRA 181)
The PCGG cannot perform acts of ownership or
dominion over sequestered properties.
The essence of the sequestration order is not an
act of ownership. It is simply an act to conserve
properties to prevent further dissipation of assets
alleged to be ill-gotten.
Administrative Law Review
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Since the PCGG is not the owner of the
sequestered assets, it is not allowed to vote
sequestered shares of stocks or even elect members
of the board of directors concerned (Cojuangco vs.
Azcuna, [April 16, 1991]). The reason here is that,
PCGG is a mere conservator and not an owner of
the sequestered property.
The exception to this rule is in case of a take over
of a business belonging to the government or whose
capitalization comes from government funds, but
now in the hands of the private business. In such
situation, the PCGG may vote on the sequestered
shares not as an act of ownership but to conserve
properties already in the hands of private businesses
but which used to be owned by the government, or
the capitalization comes from the government.
And under the rules promulgated by the PCGG,
there was a question on whether or not the power to
issue a writ of sequestration may be delegated to an
agent or representative of the PCGG. In the case of
Two clear "public character" exceptions under
which the government is granted the authority to
vote the shares:
(1) Where government shares are taken over
by private persons or entities who/which
registered them in their own lames, and
(2) Where the capitalization or shares that were
acquired with public funds somehow
landed in private hands (Republic vs.
COCOFED, 372 SCRA 463; Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan, 402 SCRA 85)
Republic vs. COCOFED (372 SCRA 463)
The sequestered UCPB shares having been
conclusively shown to have been purchased with
coconut levies, the Court holds that these funds and
shares are, at the very least, affected with public
interest; thus, private respondents even if they are
the registered shareholders cannot be accorded the
right to vote them.
The coconut levy funds are not only affected with
public interest they are in fact prima facie public
funds They also partake of the nature of taxes which
are enforced proportional contributions from persons
and properties, exacted by the State by virtue of its
sovereignty for the support of government and for all
public needs.
The PCGG has no authority to sell sequestered
property as it is not the owner of the property it
sequesters. It is only an overseer, c protector and a
preserver (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 26
December 1990).
Under Sector 5 of Executive Order No 14, the
PCGG is authorized to grant immunity from criminal
prosecution to any person who testifies. As ruled by
the Supreme Court in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan
(173 SCRA 72), the PCGG, pursuant to E 0. No. 14, in
relation with Section 3 of the same Executive Order,
may grant criminal and civil immunities. The
Sandiganbayan though has the jurisdiction to look
into the validity of the immunity granted by the
PCGG.
REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (173 SCRA 72)
F: There was a grant of civil immunity to Jose
Campos. Such immunity was extended to his son,
Jose Campos, Jr. Whether or not the PCGG is
empowered to grant civil immunity. Note that
Section 5 of E.O. 14 talks only of immunity given by
PCGG in criminal cases.
H: Section 5 must be related to Section 3 of E.O. 14
as amended which provides for the procedure and
the applicable laws in the prosecution of civil cases,
and applying the provision of the New Civil Code,
Article 2028 – the mandate is to conciliate civil
cases.
Therefore the grant of civil immunity in civil
29
case to the son (Jose Campos, Jr.) was within the
powers of the PCGG.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (258 SCRA 686)
F: A representative of the PCGG, Atty. Ramirez
issued a sequestration order over the assets and
properties of Dio Island Resort in Leyte allegedly
owned by the Romualdezes.
H: to be valid, a sequestration order must be issued
with the authority of 2 Commissioners
Under the rules promulgated, the PCGG may issue
writ of sequestration upon the authority of at least
two Commissioners "when the commission has
reasonable grounds to believe that the issuance
thereof is warranted." But the PCGG may not delegate
its authority to sequester to its representatives and
subordinates and any such delegation is invalid and
ineffective
The power to sequester, therefore, carries with it
the corollary duty to make a preliminary determination
of whether there is a reasonable basis for
sequestering a properly alleged to be ill-gotten. The
absence of such prior determination by PCGG is fatal
defect which renders the sequestration void ab initio,
and thus not subject to ratification by the PCGG.
H: order was invalid event though it was ratified by
the Commission
The writ of sequestration is null and void since
the issuance made by the representative of the
PCGG did not conform to the rules implementing the
law. No ratification by the PCGG can cure the
defect. Such non-compliance is a fatal defect.
Republic vs. Migrino (30 August 1990)
F: PCGG initiated an investigation on the alleged ill-
gotten wealth of Col. Tecson, yet there were no
allegations that Tecson is related to the Marcoses
H: PCGG has no jurisdiction; Ombudsman has
The PCGG is the agency empowered to bring
proceedings for forfeiture of property alleged
acquired unlawfully before February 25, 1986, while
the power to investigate cases of ill-gotten or
unexplained wealth acquired after that date is vested
in the Ombudsman (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan. 237
SCRA 242), and if warranted, the Solicitor General
may file the forfeiture petition with the
Sandiganbayan.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (407 SCRA 13)
Where there is no jurisdiction to waive, as the
PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial
powers never granted to it, then respondent Major
General Ramas could not be deemed to have waived any
defect in the filing by the PCGG of the forfeiture
petition by filing an answer with counterclaim. Parties
may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the
proceeding. Ramas’ position atone as Commanding
General of the Philippine Army does not suffice to
make him a “subordinate” of former President Marcos
for purposes of EO 1 and its amendments. It is
precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten
wealth was accumulated by a "subordinate” of Marcos
that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. Failing in this, the
PCGG should have recommended the instant case to
the Ombudsman.
PCGG vs. PEÑA (April 12, 1988)
F: There was a freeze order issued by the PCGG
over the assets and records of two government
firms. This freeze order was contested before the
RTC. Based on a complaint, the RTC issued a
restraining order.
H: The RTC has no jurisdiction over PCGG. The SC
applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and
Administrative Law Review 30
emily zen chua

exhaustion of administrative remedies. The PCGG DAR, namely:

is a co-equal body with the RTC and co-equal 1) DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform
bodies have no power to control the other. Adjudication Board);
It is only the Sandiganbayan which has the 2) RARAD (Regional Agrarian Reform
exclusive jurisdiction over the PCGG. Adjudicator); and
3) PARAD (Provincial Agrarian Reform
 Adjudicator)

The actions of the Monetary Board in  All cases under the exclusive original
proceedings on insolvency are explicitly declared jurisdiction of the DAR must commence in the
under Section 29 of the Central Bank Act (RA 265, as PARAD of the province where the property is
amended by EO 289) to be "final and executory." situated.
They may not be set aside, except upon "convincing  The DARAB only has appellate jurisdiction to
proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in review the orders and findings of the PARAD.
bad faith." (Central Bank vs. Judge dela Cruz 12
November 1990). ROXAS & CO. vs. CA (321 SCRA 106)
The Central Bank can close down a bank for F: DAR determined that the property in Nasugbu,
insolvency without prior notice and hearing. The Batangas should be brought under CARP.
"close now and hear later” policy that empowers the
Presidential Proclamation 15-20 declared the same
Central Bank to take over a bank before it could
even disprove the CB's findings of insolvency is area as tourist zone.
intended to prevent the unwarranted dissipation of HELD: DAR authorities must not simply disregard
the bank assets and protect its depositors, creditors, the Proclamation because it has the effect of a law
stockholders and the public. unless the same is repealed
The character of a parcel of land is not
Central Bank vs. Triumph Savings Bank (220 SCRA determined merely by a process of elimination — the
536) actual use which the land is capable should be the
Section 29 of the Central Bank Act does not primordial factor. Presidential Proclamation No. 1520,
require prior notice and hearing before a bank may be which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourist zone,
directed to stop operations and placed under has the force and effect of law unless repealed -- it
receivership because they would not only cause delay cannot be disregarded by DAR or any other
but also give bank insiders the chance to further department of Government.
dissipate the bank's assets, create more liabilities and Since it governs the extraordinary method of
destroy evidence of fraud. expropriating private property, The Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) should be strictly
Requisites before the Central Bank can close down a
construed.
bank for insolvency without prior notice and hearing:
1) There must be an examination pursuant to the
Section 50 Section 57
authority of the Central Bank. In other words,
the examining department of the Central Refers to administrative Refers to judicial
Bank is given the power by the Central Bank proceedings which may proceedings in
to look into the accounts and records of the be subject to judicial determining just
bank in question; inquiry compensation
2) On the basis of such examination, a report has confers to the DAR the confers the exclusive
to be submitted to the Monetary Board; and primary jurisdiction to original jurisdiction to the
3) The Monetary Board on the basis of such determine agrarian RTC to hear and decide
report finding that further operation would reform matters and the petitions for the
only cause danger to the bank and to the exclusive authority over determination of just
public, then it can order the immediate all matters pertaining to compensation
closure of the bank. the implementation of
agrarian reforms which
Of course under the law, the aggrieved bank is necessarily includes the
given the opportunity to sue the Central Bank within determination of just
a period of ten (10) days from the date of closure. compensation to be paid
to the landowner
(RA 6657) preliminary determination RTC is not exercising
made by the DAR in the appellate jurisdiction;
Republic Act No. 6657 explicitly recognizes the matter of the value of the
effectivity and applicability of PD 229, investing the land placed under the
Department of Agrarian Reform with original CARP and the just
jurisdiction, generally, over all cases involving compensation
agrarian laws, although under Section 57 of said act,
it restores to the Regional Trial Court original and Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the DARAB Rules,
exclusive jurisdiction over: the decision of the adjudicator in the summary
1) all petitions for the determination of just administrative proceeding on land-valuation and
compensation; and preliminary determination and payment of just
2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under compensation shall not be appealable to the DARAB
the Act (Tangub vs. Court of Appeals, 03 but shall be filed directly with the RTC which shall be
December 1990). constituted as a Special Agrarian Reform Court. So
this still is an exercise of original exclusive jurisdiction
Under Sec. 50 of RA 6657, it is the DAR which is of the RTC.
vested with This is consistent with the doctrine of primary
1. primary jurisdiction to determine and jurisdiction and the doctrine of exhaustion of
adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and administrative remedies. It only means that primary
2. the exclusive original jurisdiction overall jurisdiction is lodged in the DAR as an administrative
matters involving the implementation of agency to determine in a preliminary manner the just
agrarian reform (includes determination of just compensation.
compensation), except those falling under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the The STAGES required under Section 50 under this
Department of Agriculture and the DENR. agrarian (administrative) proceeding:
1. The Landbank determines a preliminary
DAR’s exclusive original jurisdiction is exercised determination as to the value of land placed
through hierarchically-arranged agencies of the under the CARP and the compensation to be
Administrative Law Review
emily zen chua
paid to the landowner;
2. The DAR initiates the acquisition of agricultural
land by notifying the owner of the property of
the desire of the government to place the
property under the coverage of the CARP
together with the notice and the valuation as
initially determined by the Landbank;
3. Within 30 days from notice given by the DAR,
the landowner must decide whether to accept
or reject the offer made by the DAR;
4. If there is rejection by the landowner, there will
be a summary administrative proceeding held
by the PARAD or RARAD, as the case may be,
depending on the value of the land, for
purposes of determining just compensation;
5. Parties interested in the transaction are
required to submit their respective evidence;
6. The DAR adjudicator must decide the matter
within 30 days from submission of the case;
7. If the landowner still finds the price
unsatisfactory, the landowner can bring the
case immediately and directly to the RTC
WITHIN 15 DAYS from receipt of notice of such
decision. There is no need to bring it to the
DARAB.
PHIL. VETERANS BANK vs. CA (322 SCRA 140)
F: PVB’s properties were placed under CARP. PVB
filed its appeal before the RTC beyond the 15-day
period as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of the
DARAB Rules. The RTC dismissed the petition.
H: The 15-day period to file the petition for just
compensation is mandatory.
The jurisdiction of the courts is not any less
"original and exclusive" because the question is first
passed upon") by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings
are not a continuation of the administrative
determination. Hence, as the petition of the landowner
PVB was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in
Rule XIII, Sec. 11 of the DARAB Rules, the trial court
correctly dismissed the case (for judicial
determination of the just compensation) and the Court
of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal.
LAGUNA ESTATE DEV’T CORP. vs. CA, (335
SCRA 38)
F: CARP beneficiaries filed a case before the DAR
to compel LEDC to grant them an easement of right
of way
H: DARAB has NO power to grant to the
beneficiaries a right of way (easement) since there
is not tenancy relationship between the parties
For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over the
case, there must be TENANCY relationship between
the parties. In the instant case, there exist no
tenancy relationship between the petitioner estates
and the beneficiaries.
The following indispensable elements must be
established:
1. the parties are the land-owner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee;
2. the subject matter of the relationship is
agricultural land
3. there must be consent between the
parties to the tenancy relationship;
4. the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production;
5. there is personal cultivation on the part of
the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
6. the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee
Obviously , in this case, the issue of a right of way
or easement over private property without tenancy
relations is outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
This is not an agrarian issue. Jurisdiction is vested in a
31
court of general jurisdiction.
BAUTISTA vs. ARANETA (326 SCRA 235)
F: PARAD and DARAB held that Bautista is a tenant
-- based on the certification issued by the agrarian
reform technician and the MARO (Mun. Agrarian
Reform Officer). The certification was based on
interviews with persons in occupation of the
property.
H: possession and cultivation is not sufficient to
make a conclusion that tenancy exists
There must be a consent by the landowner for
the relationship to exist. The certifications do not
show such consent. The certifications show only
that Bautista is the possessor and the cultivator of
the land. These certifications are not sufficient to
show that Bautista is a tenant of Araneta.


The Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of PD
1067, as amended by PD 1839, to regulate and
centralize all games of chance authorized by existing
franchise or permitted by law. It is allowed to
establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on
land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines.
PAGCOR is a reliable source of much needed
revenue for the cash strapped Government. It
provided funds for social impact projects and
subjected gambling to close scrutiny, regulation,
supervision and control of the Government. Public
Welfare lies at the bottom of the enactment of the
PD 1869
BASCO vs PAGCOR (197 S 53)
PAGCOR has two-fold character: (1) governmental
and (2) proprietary functions.
In its governmental character, the PAGCOR is
mandated to regulate and centralize all forms of games
of chance in one centralized agency known as the
PAGCOR. The basis here is public welfare – the need to
regulate gambling and all the consequent evils
attendant to operations of gambling joints and casinos.
In its exercise of its proprietary function,
PAGCOR is therefore authorized to operate as a
business.
PAGCOR has a dual role to operate and to regulate
gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental,
which places it in the category of an agency or
instrumentality of government. Being an
instrumentality of the government, PAGCOR should be
and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise its
operation might be burdened, embedded or subjected
to control by a mere local government
MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES (253 SCRA
255)
The LGU has no power to impose a tax on the
PAGCOR.
Clearly, under the charter of PAGCOR, it is
exempt from local taxes. And under the Constitution,
the power of the LGUs to tax is subject to such
guidelines and limitations that Congress may impose.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.
Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is considered
inimical to the interests of the people, in the
Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing
gambling, it is left to Congress to deal with the activity
as it sees fit.
CSC and PAGCOR vs. Salas (274 SCRA 414)
Administrative Law Review
emily zen chua
Section 16 of PD 1869 insofar as it exempts
PAGCOR positions from the provisions of Civil Service
Law and Rules has been amended, modified or deemed
repeated by the 1987 Constitution and Executive
Order 292.
Re: Jai-Alai
Del Mar vs. PAGCOR (346 SCRA 485)
F: PAGCOR entered into a contract with
Grand Jai-alai Corp wherein PAGCOR will
mange and operate the operation – no
financial cash out by PAGCOR. Rep. Del Mar
questioned the agreement on the ground
that PAGCOR has no such power
H: The charter of PAGCOR does not give it
any franchise to operate and manage jai alai.
Firstly, a franchise is a special privilege
of public concern which cannot be exercised
at will.
Thus, the manner of granting the
franchise, to whom it may be granted, the
mode of conducting the business, etc., are
defined in clear language. Such express
grant and its conditionalities protective of
the public interest are evidently wanting in
PD 1869, the present Charter of PAGCOR.
Second, a historical study of the
creation, growth and development of
PAGCOR will show that it was never given a
legislative franchise to operate a jai alai.
It cannot be the intent of President
Marcos in the exercise of his martial law
powers to grant PAGCOR in 1977 a franchise
to operate jai alai because a year and a half
before it was chartered under PD 1067, he
issued PD 810 on 16 October 1975 granting
Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement
Corporation controlled by the Romualdezes a
25-year franchise to operate Jai-alai in
Manila.
The amendatory laws to PD 1067,
namely: PD 1399, PD 1632 and PD 1869, did
not change the nature and scope of
PAGCOR's franchise to maintain gambling
casinos (not a franchise to operate jai alai).
When President Aquino issued EO 169 on 08
May 1987 repealing PD 310, PAGCOR's
franchise to operate gambling casinos was
not revoked. Neither was it given a
franchise to operate jai alai.
Third, PAGCOR is engaged in business
affected with public interest.
Perforce, a legislative franchise to
operate jai alai is imbued with public
interest and involves an exercise of police
power. The rule is that laws which grant the
right to exercise a part of the police power
of the state are to be construed strictly
and any doubt must be resolved against the
grant.
LTO

LTFRB
 The LTO and the LTRRB are under the supervision
of the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC).
 The DOTC, through the LTO and LTFRB, is
mandated to implement laws pertaining to land
transportation under RA 4136, otherwise known
as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
 The LTO has the duty to register vehicles and
32
licensing of drivers.
 The LTFRB under E.O. 202, is tasked for the
regulation of public utility or “for-hire” vehicles
and the grant of franchises or certificates of
public convenience.
o Take note that Section 458 of the Local
Government Code confers to the LGUs the
regulation of operation of tricycles-for-hire
and grant of franchises for the operation
thereof, subject to the guidelines issued by
the DOTC.
o The duty of LTO is not affected by Section
458 of the LGC. Still, the LTO is mandated to
require the registration of these tricycles-for-
hire. R.A. 4136 mandates the registration of
all kinds of motor vehicles “used or
operated on or upon any public highway”
in the Philippines.
Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited vs. SBMA (339
SCRA 434)
F: SBMA conducted a bidding for the operation of
container terminal in Subic Bay. Of the 3 bidders,
only 2 qualified -- ICTSI and HPPL. Before the
opening of the sealed bidding, HPPL wanted to
disqualify ICTSI since it is the operator of the
Manila International Container Port (MICP). Under
E.O. 212, there is prohibition as to the operation of
the same operator of another similar facility.
ICTSI appealed such protest to the Office of
the Pres. Pending appeal, SBMA awarded the bid
to HPPL. Exec Sec Torres recommended the re-
bidding of the project. The HPPL argued that there
was already a perfected contract because the
SBMA Board of Directors already awarded the
contract to it.
HELD: Petitioner HPPL has not shown that it has a
clear right to be declared as the winning bidder
with finality. The award given by the SBMA was not
yet final and thus still can be assailed.
Petitioner HPPL has not sufficiently shown that it
has a clear and unmistakable right to be declared
the winning bidder with finality, such that SBMA
can be compelled to negotiate a Concession
Contract. As chartered institution, the SBMA is
always under the direct control of the Office of
the President, particularly when contracts and/or
projects undertaken by the SBMA entail substantial
amounts of money.
Specifically, LOI 620 dated October 27, 1997
mandates that the approval of the President is
required in all contracts of the national
government offices, agencies and
instrumentalities, including GOCC’s involving P2
Million and above, awarded thru public bidding or
negotiation.
Though the SBMA Board of Directors, by
resolution, may have declared HPPL as the
winning bidder, said award cannot be said to be
final and unassailable. The SBMA Board of
Directors and other officers are subject to the
control and supervision of the office of the
President. The President may, within his authority,
overturn or reverse any award made by the SBMA
Board of Directors for justifiable reasons. The
discretion to accept or reject any bid, or even
recall the award thereof, is of such wide latitude
that the courts will not generally interfere with the
exercise thereof by the executive department,
unless such exercise is used to shield unfairness or
injustice. When the President issued the
Memorandum setting aside the award previously
declared by SBMA in favor of HPPL and directing
that a re-bidding be conducted, the same was
within the authority of the President and was a
valid exercise of his prerogative