TITLE:

People v. Palma, G.R. No. L-44113, 31 March 1977

FACTS:

Respondent-accused Romulo Intia y Morada, 17 years of age, was charged on February 10, 1976
by the Naga City fiscal’s office with vagrancy (Article 202, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code)
in respondent judge’s court. In an Order dated March 6, 1976, respondent judge dismissed the case
on the ground that her court "has no jurisdiction to continue to take further cognizance of this case"
without prejudice to the refiling thereof in the Juvenile Court.

The prosecution shares the view of the Camarines Sur Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
presided by Judge Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa that jurisdiction over 16-year old up to under 21
years remains with the regular courts and has not been by implication transferred to the Juvenile
Court. Hence, the petition at bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused 16 but under 21 years of age and rules that the issuance of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code (PD 603) which includes such accused within the definition of youthful
offenders (over 9 years but under 21 years at the time of the commission of the offense) did not
transfer jurisdiction over such cases from the regular courts (the City Court in this case) to the
Juvenile Courts.l

PRINCIPLE:

A general law cannot repeal a special law by mere implication. The repeal must be express and
specific. Furthermore, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Camarines Sur is a court of
special and limited jurisdiction and the enlargement or conferment of additional jurisdiction on said
court to include accused persons who are 16 years and under 21 years of age must positively
appear in express terms.chanrobles.com

RULING:

The cited codal articles, it may be stressed, adequately provide as in Article 192 that the courts in
general shall suspend sentence instead of pronouncing a judgment of conviction and commit the
youthful offender "to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training
institution operated by the government, or duly licensed agencies or any other responsible person,
until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem
proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or
the agency or responsible individual under whose care he has been committed."
TITLE:

Bagatsing v. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-41631, 17 December 1976

FACTS:

On June 12, 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, "AN ORDINANCE
REGULATING THE OPERATION OF PUBLIC MARKETS AND PRESCRIBING FEES FOR THE
RENTALS OF STALLS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES." The petitioner City Mayor, Ramon D. Bagatsing, approved the ordinance on
June 15, 1974.

On February 17, 1975, respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. commenced Civil
Case 96787 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by respondent Judge,
seeking the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 for the reason that (a) the publication
requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with; (b) the
Market Committee was not given any participation in the enactment of the ordinance, as envisioned
by Republic Act 6039; (c) Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been
violated; and (d) the ordinance would violate Presidential Decree No. 7 of September 30, 1972
prescribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products.

ISSUE:

What law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila,
the Revised City Charter (R.A. 409, as amended), which requires publication of the ordinance
before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local Tax Code (P.D. No. 231), which only
demands publication after approval?

PRINICPLE:

And the rule commonly said is that a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent
general law. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the
special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the
land, the other as the law of a particular case.  However, the rule readily yields to a situation where
the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular.

RULING:

The exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope
thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing
taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its
continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other
charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a general provision
must give way to a particular provision.  Special provision governs.  This is especially true where
the law containing the particular provision was enacted later than the one containing the general
provision. The City Charter of Manila was promulgated on June 18, 1949 as against the Local Tax
Code which was decreed on June 1, 1973. The law-making power cannot be said to have intended
the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems upon the same subject, or to leave in force
provisions of a prior law by which the new will of the legislating power may be thwarted and
overthrown. Such a result would render legislation a useless and Idle ceremony, and subject the
law to the reproach of uncertainty and unintelligibility.