TAN, ROLAN VINCENT S.

Special Proceedings
Weekday Class

1.) DANILO ALUAD et al vs ZENAIDA ALUAD

G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido
Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and
Crispin Aluad (Crispin).Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot
Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After
Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.
On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled “Deed
of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos” (Deed of Donation) in favor of
petitioners’ mother Maria covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited
from her husband Crispin.
On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos.
674 and 676 were issued in Matilde’s name. On August 26, 1991, Matilde
sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property.

Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and

testament,devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her
“remaining properties” including Lot No. 674 to respondent. Matilde died
on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year.

On August 21, 1995, Maria’s heirs-herein petitioners filed before the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint, for declaration and
recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and
damages against respondent.
The trial court, by Decision of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde
could not have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to
respondent, she having previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of
Donation.
By Decision of August 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court’s decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation was actually a
donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not,
comply with the formalities of a will. Thus, it found that the Deed of
Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and had no attestation clause
which is not in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Donation is a donation mortis causa and
have complied with the formalities of a will.

RULING:
The Deed of Donation which is one of mortis causa. The donation
being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been
observedbut they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or
more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.Further, the
witnesses did not even sign the attestation clausethe execution of which
clause is a requirement separate from the subscription of the will and the
affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of the pages of the wil

2.) UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and

FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA

G.R. No. 149926

CALLEJO, SR., J.

In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after
the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public
requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the
whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than
such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.

Included in the will of the decedent are the three (3) subject tractors. This being
so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint
agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among
themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was
already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will
covering the said tractors.

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is
mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:

This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by
informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him
to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should
be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of
the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the
distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation
and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the
affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the
residue.

As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it
may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said
promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses
Edmund may have as against the petitioner.
3.) UY KIAO ENG vs NIXON LEE
G.R. No. 176831
NACHURA, J.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the
obligation involved here- -the production of the original holographic will--is in the
nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot
be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent
has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for
purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from
instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is
in his possession or not.

FACTS:
Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a
holographic will, which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his
mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed, a petition for mandamus with damages,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel petitioner to produce
the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted.
Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate
the patriarch's estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance,
but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.
In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the
complaint and posited that the same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action, for lack of cause of action, and for non-compliance with a condition
precedent for the filing thereof. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the
original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover,
asserted that photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to his siblings.
The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent's
evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she
had in her custody the original holographic will. Importantly, she asserted that the
pieces of documentary evidence presented, aside from being hearsay, were all
immaterial and irrelevant to the issue involved in the petition--they did not prove
or disprove that she unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the
court to issue the writ of mandamus.
The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence, however, it granted the same
on petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. The CA initially
denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved for reconsideration. The
appellate court, granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ,
and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorney's fees. It ruled
this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his
mother had in her possession the holographic will.
Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court,
contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy
and that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its
ruling is inadmissible.

ISSUE
Whether or not the issuance of the writ of Mandamus was proper in this case?

RULING
The Court cannot sustain the CA's issuance of the writ. Mandamus is a
command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the
state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to
some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ
is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public
character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to
for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no
interest. The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to
the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus
issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial
doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be
disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious.

4.) In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian.
FELIX BALANAY, JR. vs. HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, AVELINA B.
ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN

FACTS:

On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim
M. Santibañez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of ₱128,000.00. The
amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford
6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum
payable in five equal annual amortizations of ₱43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981
and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.

On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan
agreement, this time in the amount of ₱123,156.00. It was intended to pay the
balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-
Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor
Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note
for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they
also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the loan dated December 13,
1980.

Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.

Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of
Iloilo City. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the
special administrator of the estate of the decedent. During the pendency of the
testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence
Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement dated July 22, 1981, wherein
they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3)
tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence.
Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC,
corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.

On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was

executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank,
wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and
liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.

Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union
Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same
and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint
for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence,
before the RTC of Makati City. Summons were issued against both, but the one
intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there
was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines.
Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.

On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer and

alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party
thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother
Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she
was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.

ISSUES

1.Whether the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid.

2.Whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid.

RULING

1. No. At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the
jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether
they should or should not be included in the

5. ALABAN VS.COURTOFAPPEALS
G.R. No.156021

FACTS:
Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the
decision sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have
availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
judgment and other appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA.

ISSUE:
W/N Petitioners were made parties in the proceedings

HELD:
Petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not
become parties to the probate proceedings.

Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem,
such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court’s jurisdiction
extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of
the decedent.
Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate,
they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of
the notice of hearing.

On the other hand, according to the Rules, notice is required to be personally

given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor
testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the
Rules.  Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition
for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.

Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the

purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice.

6.) Octavio Maloles II vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 133359, January 31, 2000

FACTS:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City,
filed a petition for probate of his will 1 in the Regional Trial Court. He alleged that
he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and
devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his
properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that
copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent
Pacita de los Reyes Phillips.

Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the
only child of Alicia de Santos (testator’s sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he
was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He
likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for
the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of
administration in his name.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos,
has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary filed by the respondent

RULING:
No. The petitioner in this case avers that, as the nearest next of kin and creditor
of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. Even if petitioner is
the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an “heir” of the
testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no
compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Article
842 of the Civil Code provides:

“One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any
part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.”

“One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not
contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.”

Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator’s - legitimate children and

descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants; the widow or widower; acknowledged
natural children, and natural children by legal fiction; other illegitimate children
referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have
been preterited in the testator’s will. Nor does he have any right to intervene in
the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the
deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is
incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator. Only if the
appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may
the court appoint other persons to administer the estate. None of these
circumstances is present in this case.

7.) Palaganas vs Palaganas

GR No. 169144
8.) Ancheta vs Guersey-Dalaygon
GR No.
9.

II. Comparative Cases

REMEDIOS NUGUID vs FELIX NUGUID AND PAZ SALONGA NUGUID

G.R. No. L- 23445
SANCHEZ, J.

A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the
question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat
of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the
court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. But petitioner and
oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law,
to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will,
nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for
aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the
will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the
same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that
induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity
of the provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable
controversy crying for solution.
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single,
without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters,
namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all
surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November
17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be
admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be
issued to her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the
legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their
opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the
institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased,
oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending
line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and
objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute
preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to
dismiss.
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a
complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased
Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the court can delved into the intrinsic validity of the will? (YES)
RULING
Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is
for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination
of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof,
the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities by law prescribed, is the questions solely to be presented, and to be
acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is not
called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will,
the legality of any devise or legacy therein.
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the
question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat
of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the
court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. But petitioner and
oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law,
to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will,
nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for
aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the
will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the
same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that
induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity
of the provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable
controversy crying for solution.

5.) On the other hand, according to the Rules, notice is required to be personally
given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.

Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor
testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the
Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition
for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the
purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice.

On the other hand, according to the Rules, notice is required to be personally

given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.

Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor
testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the
Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition
for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.

Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the

purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice.