CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)

LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.

Beltran vs. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585 (1988)

FACTS: Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel

against petitioner Luis D. Beltran.

Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential

immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit".
He contends that if the criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of
the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing
her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would defeat her
privilege of immunity from suit in an indirect way, because, by
testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself
to possible contempt of court or perjury.

ISSUE: WON an accused may raise the defense of the

presidential privilege of immunity from suit to prevent the
criminal action from proceeding.

HELD: NO.

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of

immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential
duties and functions free from any hindrance, distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government
is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time,
also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the

President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by
the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which
the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the

President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege
and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to
exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to

excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public
respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R.
Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status
quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April
7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26,1988 is
LIFTED.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Gloria vs. CA, G.R. No. 119903 (2000)

FACTS: Herein private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was

appointed Schools Division Superintendent at the Division of
City Schools of Quezon City by the then President Corazon C.
Aquino.

Secretary Ricardo Gloria recommended to President Aquino

that Icasiano be reassigned as Superintendent of the Marikina
Institute of Science and Technology, to fill up the vacuum
created by the retirement of its Superintendent.

The President approved the recommendation of Secretary

Gloria. A copy of the recommendation for Icasiano’s
reassignment, as approved by the President, was transmitted
by Secretary Gloria to Director Rosas for implementation.
Subsequently, Director Rosas informed the petitioner of his
reassignment, effective October 17, 1994.

Icasiano requested Secretary Gloria to reconsider the

reassignment, but the latter denied the request. Instead,
Icasiano prepared a letter dated October 18, 1994 to the
President of the Philippines, asking for a reconsideration of his
reassignment. However, he changed his mind and refrained
from filing the letter. Icasiano then filed the instant petition to
question the decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: WON the present petition for prohibition is

improper because the same attacks an act of the President,
in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from
suit.

HELD: NO.

Petitioners’ contention that the present petition for prohibition

is improper is untenable for the simple reason that the petition
is directed against petitioners and not against the President.
The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the
President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be
questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of
discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction.

Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the

MIST to be violative of his security of tenure, the order for his
reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35505 AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
MMDA vs. Jancom, G.R. No. 147465 (2002)

FACTS: A Build-Operate-Transfer Contract for the waste to

energy project was signed between JANCOM and the
Philippine Government. The BOT Contract was submitted to
President Ramos for approval, but was then too close to the
end of his term that his term expired without him signing the
contract. He, however, endorsed the same to incoming
President Estrada.

With the change in administration came changes in policy and

economic environment, thus the BOT contract was not pursued
and implemented.

JANCOM appealed to the President for reconsideration and

despite the pendency of the appeal, MMDA caused the
publication of an invitation to pre-qualify and submit proposals
for solid waste management.

ISSUE: WON decisions by a Supreme Court Division may be

appealed to in the Supreme Court en banc.

HELD: NO.

The Court En Banc is not an appellate court to which decisions

or resolutions of a Division may be appealed. A decision of a
Division of the Court is a decision of the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59021 dated November 13, 2001
AFFIRMED. No costs.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
People vs. Gacott, G.R. No. 116049 (1995)
FACTS: For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the
order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing
a criminal case was annulled by the SC. The respondent judge
was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00
for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment was made by the
Second Division of the SC.
ISSUE: WON the Second Division of the Supreme Court has
the competence to administratively discipline respondent
judge.
the law with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a
similar offense shall merit serious consequences. Atty. Elvira T.
Bermejo is likewise REPRIMANDED AND FINED P10,000.00 for
ignorance of the law and for her failure to observe candor,
fairness and good faith before this Court, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt
with more severely by this Court. Let a copy of this decision be
spread on the personal records of Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr.
and Atty. Elvira T. Bermejo.

HELD: YES.

Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows that there are
actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which
states that “the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts,” is a declaration of the grant
of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the
procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was
not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases
should be heard and decided by the whole Court, since it
would result in an absurdity.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation

contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the
first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en
banc can “order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted therein.” In this instance, the
administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by
the full Court itself.

Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative

disciplinary power to the Court en banc, a decision en banc is
needed only where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal
of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a
lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of
more than 1 year or a fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or both.

To require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate

in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the
sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested
docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the
Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases
involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the
Court en banc.

That guideline or rule in the referral to the Court en banc of

cases assigned to a division thereof rests on the same rationale
and applies with equal force to confute the antithetical theory
of respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of respondent judge

dated March 18, 1994 dismissing Criminal Case No. 11529 is
hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE and the aforesaid criminal
case is REINSTATED. Respondent judge is hereby REPRIMANDED
AND FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Meralco vs. Pasay Trans. Co., 57 Phil. 600 (1932)

FACTS: The question presented by the petition of the Manila

Electric Company relates to the validity of Section 11 of Act No.
1446. Such requested the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which
certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the
Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the
compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by
such transportation companies.

Section 11 of Act No. 1446 provides:

"Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any

other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence,
over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein,
the terms on which said other person or corporation shall
use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to
the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for
said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final."

ISSUE: WON members of the Supreme Court sitting as

board of arbitrators may act on the petition.

HELD: NO.

The Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction as a court and this

jurisdiction does not include the exercise of jurisdiction by the
members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of
arbitrators. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper
sense of the term and possesses none of the jurisdiction which
the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the
Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of

the three divisions of power in the Philippine Government. It is
judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court and its members should
not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to
perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or
connected with the administering of judicial functions.

In this case, the Supreme Court holds that Section 11 of Act No.
1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a
democratic government constitutionally established, and that it
would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the
Manila Electric Company. As a result, the members of the
Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter.

Petition denied.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Garcia vs. Macaraig 39 SCRA 106 (1971) resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and,
worst still, reversal, before 'they can have legal effect, by any
FACTS: Respondent Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme
as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City with station Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the Supreme Court
at Calamba on June 29, 1970. When he was about to perform feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is
his duties as a judge, it was discovered that there was no space discontinued.
yet for him to facilitate his trials, and no pieces of furniture and
equipment necessary for him to conduct his duties. WHEREFORE, the herein administrative complaint is hereby
Local officials offered to furnish him the necessary place and dismissed. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Secretary
facilities for his court, but they failed to provide. Realizing that of Justice.
it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his
court, he applied for an extended leave. The Secretary of
Justice, however, persuade him to forego his leave and instead
assist at the Department of Justice—since Macaraig served in
the DOJ for 16 years—without being extended a formal detail,
whenever he was not busy attending to the needs of his court.

Petitioner Paz M. Garcia filed an administrative complaint

against Macaraig for dishonesty, violation of his oath as a
judge, and incompetence. He alleged that Macaraig has not
submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law and
that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully
aware that he has not been performing the duties of a judge.
Also questioned was the fact that a member of the judiciary is
helping the DOJ, a department of the executive charge of
prosecution of cases.

ISSUE: WON judges may be detailed to assist the DOJ

Secretary in connection with his work of exercising
administrative authority over the courts.

HELD: NO.

The Supreme Court does not look with favor at the practice of
long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the
Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if it were
only in connection with his work of exercising administrative
authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may
do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with
other offices or officers under the other great departments of
the government must always be kept clear and jealously
observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which
our government rests by mandate of the people thru the
Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly
motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public
service.

The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the

independence of said three departments from each other,
limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check
and balance between and among them, have long been
acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any
temporary or passing governmental conveniences or
exigencies.

It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under the present

constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the
lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position
where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Nitafan vs. Comm. of Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284
(1987)

FACTS: Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges

presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC
of NCR, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or
perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from
making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

In a nutshell, petitioners submit that "any tax withheld from

their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers
constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary
to the provision of Sec. 10, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that

‘'(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be

decreased,' even as it is anathema to the ideal of an
independent judiciary envisioned in and by said
Constitution."

ISSUE: WON salaries of Justices and Judges are subject to

income taxation.

HELD: YES.

The clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete

the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of
income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give
substance to equality among the three branches of
Government". In the course of the deliberations, it was further
expressly made clear that the salaries of members of the
Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax applied to
all taxpayers. This intent was somehow and inadvertently not
clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as approved
and ratified in February 1987.

Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure to

include in the General Provisions a proscription against
exemption of any public officer or employee, including
constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the Court
since then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of
the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the
Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other
members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record
that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and
Endencia vs. David that declared the salaries of members of the
Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and
considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries
during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates
that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to a
general income tax law applicable to all income earners and
that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges
does not fall within the constitutional protection against
decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby

dismissed.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
In Re Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771 (1988) It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting
officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges
FACTS: Miguel Cuenco filed a disbarment case against brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a
Justice Marcelo Fernan, which the Supreme Court dismissed for person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment
utter lack of merit. proceedings.
Meanwhile, Tanodbayan/Special Prosecutor Raul M. Gonzalez The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to serve a copy of this
received a letter-complaint. Attached in the letter was an Resolution upon Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Mr. Miguel Cuenco.
anonymous letter by "Concerned Employees of the Supreme
Court" addressed to Gonzalez, referring to charges for
disbarment brought by Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and
asking Gonzalez "to do something about this." Also attached
was a copy of a telegram from Cuenco addressed to Gonzalez,
wherein Cuenco encouraged Gonzalez to file a responsive
pleading to the Supreme Court en banc to comply with the
Petition of Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court asking
Tanodbayan's intervention.

Gonzalez indorsed the letter-complaint to Justice Fernan, who,

in turn, brought the matter to the SC en banc.

ISSUE: WON a Supreme Court Justice may be disbarred

during his term of office.

HELD: NO.

A public officer who, under the Constitution, is required to be a

Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office
held by him, and who may be removed from office only by
impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the
incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer
during his incumbency cannot be charged criminally before the
Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which
carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or
any penalty service of which would amount to removal from
office.

To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court

during the Member's incumbency would in effect be to
circumvent and, hence, to run afoul of the
constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be
removed from office only by impeachment for
and conviction of certain offenses listed in Art. XI (2) of the
Constitution.

The Court is not saying that its Members or the other

constitutional officers are entitled to immunity from liability for
possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court
is saying is that there is a fundamental
procedural requirement that must be observed before
such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of
the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the
constitutional route of impeachment under Sec. 2 and 3 of Art.
XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme
Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then
be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by
disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that
may be proven against him.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Santiago vs. Bautista, 32 SCRA 188 (1970) of the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers
for Public Schools appellees allegedly violated in the
FACTS: Appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a Grade 6 pupil composition of the committee they constituted thereunder,
at Sero Elem. School. Teodoro was adjudged 3rd honors. Three and, in the performance of that committee’s duties.
days before graduation, Teodoro and his parents sought the
invalidation of the ranking of honor students. They instituted a FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment
civil case for certiorari, injunction, and damages in the Court of appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
First Instance of Cotabato against the principal and teachers
who composed the committee on rating honors, contending
that such committee acted with grave abuse of official
discretion.

The respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the

action was improper, and that even assuming it was proper, the
question has become academic (because the graduation
already proceeded). Respondents also argue that there was no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the teachers, since the Committee on
Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial
functions. And under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, an action
for certiorari is a remedy against judicial functions.

ISSUE: WON judicial function may be exercised in the case

at bar.

HELD: NO.

A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial

powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of
something in the nature of the action of the court. The phrase
judicial power is defined as authority to determine the rights of
persons or property. It is the authority vested in some court,
officer, or persons to hear and determine when the rights of
persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the
subject matter of adjudication. Judicial function is the power
exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before
them. It is the construction of laws and the adjudication of
legal rights.

It is evident that the so-called committee on the rating of

students for honor whose actions are questioned in this case
exercised neither judicial nor quasi-judicial functions in the
performance of its assigned task.

Before a tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or

quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives
rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which
adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal,
board, or officer clothed with power and authority to
determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the
respective rights of the contending parties.

As pointed out by appellees, however, there is nothing on

record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers
sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for
purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the
determination of what the law is and that they are therefore
automatically vested with judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Worse still, the Court has not even been appraised by appellant
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Felipe vs. Leuterio, 91 Phil. 482 (1952)

FACTS: In an oratorical contest held in Naga, Camarines Sur,

1st honor was given by the board of five judges to Nestor
Nosce, and 2nd honor to Emma Imperial. Six days later, Emma
asked the Court of First Instance of that province to reverse the
award, alleging that one of the judges had fallen into error in
grading her performance. After a hearing, and over the
objection of the other four judges of the contest, the court
declared Emma Imperial winner of the 1st place.

Hence, this special civil action, challenging the court's power to

modify the board's verdict.

ISSUE: WON the courts have the authority to reverse the

award of the board of judges of an oratorical competition.

HELD: NO.

It is an unwritten law in contests that the board’s decision is

final and unappealable. No rights to the prizes may be asserted
by the contestants because theirs was merely the privilege to
compete for the prize and that privilege did not ripen into a
demandable right unless and until they were proclaimed
winners of the competition by the appointed judges.

In view of all the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion and so

declares that the judiciary has no power to reverse the award of
the board of judges of an oratorical contest. For that matter it
would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and
similar competitions.

Wherefore, the order in controversy is hereby set aside. No costs.

CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Prudential Bank vs. Castro, 158 SCRA 646 (1988) inhibition of Justice Padilla has to be DENIED for being devoid of
any valid reason. SO ORDERED.
FACTS: Prudential Bank instituted an administrative case
seeking for the disbarment of Atty. Benjamin Grecia, in
connection with his actuation in a civil case where the latter
represented the former.

Atty. Grecia filed a petition for Redress and Exoneration and for
Voluntary Inhibition praying that the decision be set aside, and
a new one entered by the Court dismissing the administrative
complaint and exonerating him. He contended that the
decision disbarring him violated the requirement of the
Constitution—that the Chief Justice must certify that the
conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned for the writing of the opinion of the
Court.

ISSUE: WON a constitutional provision has been

disregarded in the Court’s decision.

HELD: NO.

The requirement of a certification of the court's decision by the

Chief Justice refers to decisions in judicial—not
administrative—cases.

The challenge hurled against this Court's decision as violative

of the 1987 Constitution due to lack of certification by the
Chief Justice that the conclusions of the Court were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to a member for the
writing of the opinion of the Court, is bereft of basis. The
certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not
administrative cases. From the very beginning,
resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have
not been accompanied by any formal certification. In fact, such
a certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases,
which by their very nature, have to be deliberated upon
considering the collegiate composition of this Court.

But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond

doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its decision were
arrived at after consultation and deliberation. The signatures of
the members who actually took part in the deliberations and
voted attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam decision, or an
opinion of the Court as a whole, there is no ponente, although
any member of the Court may be assigned to write the draft. In
such cases, a formal certification is obviously not required.

It bears repeating that this is an administrative case so that the

Constitutional mandate that

"no x x x motion for reconsideration of a decision of the

court shall be x x x denied without stating the legal basis
therefor"

is inapplicable.

The "Petition for Voluntary Inhibition" of Chief Justice Claudio

Teehankee and Justice Teodoro R. Padilla is DENIED there being
no legal nor factual basis therefor. Similarly, the plea for the
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Consing vs. Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 14 (1989)

FACTS: A case was decided by the Court of Appeals against

petitioner Consing. The decision did not contain a certification
that the conclusions were reached in consultation for the case
was assigned before the writing of the opinion.

ISSUE: WON decision was void for lack of certification

requirement under Art. VIII, Sec. 13 of the 1987
Constitution.

HELD: NO.

Art. VIII, Sec. 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

Sec. 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case

submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be
reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a
Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A
certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be
issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case
and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part,
or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must
state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be
observed by all lower collegiate courts.

The certification requirement is a new provision introduced by

the framers of the 1987 Constitution. Its purpose is to ensure
the implementation of the constitutional requirement that
decisions of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts,
such as the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax
Appeals, are reached after consultation with the members of
the court sitting en banc or in a division before the case is
assigned to a member thereof for decision-writing. The
decision is thus rendered by the court as a body and not
merely by a member thereof. This is in keeping with the very
nature of a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only
after deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas, and the
concurrence of the required majority vote.

The absence of the certification would not necessarily mean

that the case submitted for decision had not been reached in
consultation before being assigned to one member for the
writing of the opinion of the Court, since the regular
performance of official duty is presumed. The lack of
certification at the end of the decision would only serve as
evidence of failure to observe the certification requirement,
and may be basis for holding the official responsible for the
omission to account therefor. Such absence of certification
would not have the effect of invalidating the decision.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court

of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Cruz vs. DENR, G.R. No. 135385 (2000)

FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Caesar Europa bring suit

as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8731 or the Indigenous
People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations. They contend that the law and regulations
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership
over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the Regalian Doctrine
embodied in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution. Further,
petitioners also contend that the all-encompassing definition
of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” even include
private lands found within said areas.

ISSUE: WON the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: After due deliberation on the petition, the members

of the Court voted as follows: Seven (7) voted to dismiss
the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief
Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join,
sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A.
8371.

Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all

challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section
1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and
Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be
interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of
natural resources and should be read in conjunction with
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other
hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on
the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the

petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and
related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He
reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59,
65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of
specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by
the IPRA.

Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view

that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.
Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join
in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug. As
the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary
majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon.
However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.

Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil

Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Valladolid vs. Inciong, 121 SCRA 205 (1992) was committed by respondent Regional Director in ordering his
reinstatement without backwages.
FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo Valladolid was employed by JRM in
1977 as a telephone switchboard operator. He was WHEREFORE, both Petitions for Certiorari are hereby denied. No
subsequently transferred to the position of clerk collector costs.
because he gives out information to the competitors of the
company.

Valladolid filed a written request for a vacation leave and

stating therein that he would report for work on January 5,
1979. He did not report for work on January 5, but sent a
telegram from Bicol on January 8, 1979, requesting for 15 days
sick leave as he was confined for flu at Dr. Estrellado Clinic.
Valladolid reported for work on February 16, 1979. The
Executive Vice-President, Mr. Daniel Yu, allegedly refused to
admit him and instead asked him to resign. On February 22,
1979, Valladolid filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with
vacation and sick leave pay. The Minister of Labor ordered his
reinstatement. JRM questioned the order and alleging that it
was deprived of due process of a hearing.

ISSUE: WON the constitutional provision requiring that

decisions of court must contain a statement of facts and
the conclusions of law upon which it is based applies only
to courts of record, not to the Ministry of Labor.

HELD: YES.

JRM cannot claim that it was deprived of due process

considering that applications for clearance have to be
summarily investigated and a decision required to be rendered
within ten (10) days from the filing of the opposition.13 As this
Court had occasion to hold there is no violation of due process
where the Regional Director merely required the submission of
position papers and resolved the case summarily thereafter.

Nor is the questioned Order of the Deputy Minister of Labor

violative of Section 9, Article X of the Constitution, which
requires a statement of the facts and the conclusions of law
upon which it is based. That prescription applies to decisions of
Courts of record. The Ministry of Labor is an administrative
body with quasi-judicial functions. Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V,
ibid., states that proceedings in the NLRC shall be non-litigious
and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities
obtaining in courts of law. As the Deputy Minister was in full
accord with the findings of fact and the conclusions of law
drawn from those facts by the Regional Director, there was no
necessity of discussing anew the issues raised therein.

JRM admits that Valladolid requested for leave for 5 days from
December 30, 1978, and thereafter for 15 days, but denies that
he notified the company of his absences subsequent to this.
The Regional Director ruled that the absences of Valladolid
were unauthorized but did not amount to gross neglect of duty
or abandonment of work which requires deliberate refusal to
resume employment or a clear showing in terms of specific
circumstances that the worker does not intend to report for
work. We agree. But as Valladolid had been AWOL, no error
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Nunal vs. COA, 169 SCRA 356 (1989)

FACTS: Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Minute

Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 dismissing the Petition
for certiorari "for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show
that the public respondent had committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding, among others, that the compromise
agreement of the parties is not enforceable against the
Municipality of Isabela, the latter not having been impleaded as
an indispensable party in the case.

ISSUE: WON the Resolution of the Court under date of 11

May 1988 is in accordance with the Constitution.

HELD: YES.

In the first place, the "Resolution" of 11 May 1988 was

not a "Decision" within the meaning of the constitutional
requirement. This mandate is applicable only in cases
"submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after the
filing of Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the
case may be. It is not applicable to an Order or Resolution
refusing due course to a Petition for Certiorari.

In addition, the assailed Resolution does state the legal basis

for the dismissal of the Petition and thus complies with the
constitutional provision.

ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 is

hereby PARTIALLY RECONSIDERED in that the disallowance by
respondent Commission on Audit of the amounts ordered paid
by the Court of First Instance of Basilan, Branch I, in its Decision
dated 12 December 1984, is hereby SET ASIDE, but its
disallowance of petitioner’s claim for separation pay of
P54,092.50, is hereby SUSTAINED. No costs.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
People vs. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 (1996)

FACTS: The accused appellant appealed the decision of RTC,

finding him guilty of four counts of consummated rape and
one count of attempted rape and sentencing him. He assailed
the decision of the trial court as it does not state the facts and
law upon which it was based.

ISSUE: WON a court decision which does not

state the facts and law upon which it was based
is valid.

HELD: NO.

The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing

and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which they are based serves many functions. It is
intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the
reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them
appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the findings of
facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees.
More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties
that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the
processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the
impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding by ipse
dixit.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 11, 1993 of the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is SET ASIDE and another
one is RENDERED finding accused-appellant Marcelino Bugarin
GUILTY of four counts of consummated rape in Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-92-28786, Q-92-31157, Q-92-31158, and Q-92-31159
and SENTENCED to reclusion perpetua and ORDERED to
INDEMNIFY the complainant Maryjane Bugarin in the amount of
P30,000.00 in damages for each count of rape committed; and of
acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28785, for
which he is SENTENCED to suffer imprisonment from 6 months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision
correccional, as maximum.

In Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160, accused-appellant is hereby

ACQUITTED.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 429 (1993)

FACTS: Petitioner Danilo Hernandez was a consistent buyer of

pieces of jewelry of Remedios de Leon. He tends to pay in cash
or postdated checks. However, on the latter part of business
transactions between them, the check issued by him bounced
due to insufficiency of funds and closed account. RTC rendered
a decision convicting him of 9 disctinct offenses, which was
affirmed by the CA, except the one crime charged.

According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals did not make its

own "independent judicial opinion" by such act of adopting the
statement of facts made by the advance party.

ISSUE: WON the decision made by the CA is violative of

Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.

HELD: NO.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals merely stated: "The facts of

the case as summarized in the Appellee's Brief are as follows:"
and then quoted in full the statement of facts of the Solicitor
General. What the Court of Appeals, in effect, said was that it
found the facts as presented by the Solicitor General as
supported by the evidence.

The constitutional mandate only requires that the decision

should state the facts on which it is based. There is no
proscription made in the briefs or memoranda of the parties,
instead of rewriting the same in its own words.
The denial, therefore, was based on the ground that the
Court of Appeals did not find any "cogent reason that
could justify a modification or reversal of the decision
sought to be reconsidered.”

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the

Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Yao vs. CA, G.R. No. 132428 (2000)

FACTS: George Yao was convicted of unfair competition in

MeTC for issuing locally General electric lamp starters. This was
affirmed by the RTC without saying more.

On 4 October 1994, Yao appealed to the Court of Appeals by

filing a notice of appeal. However, on 25 April 1995, the Court
of Appeals promulgated a Resolution declaring that [t]he
decision rendered on July 27, 1994 by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 121, has long become final and executory, and ordering
the records of the case remanded to said court for the proper
execution of judgment.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the decision made by the CA is violative of the

Constitution.

HELD: YES.

Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article

VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component
of due process and fair play. The parties to a litigation should
be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the
court. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the
parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through
the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against
the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding
ipse dixit.

Thus, the Court has struck down as void decisions of lower

courts and even of the Court of Appeals whose careless
disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their sometimes
cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities
but likewise to their avowed fealty to the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition in this case

is GRANTED. The questioned 25 April 1995 resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16893 is hereby SET ASIDE and
the 27 July 1994 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121
of Kalookan City rendered in its appellate jurisdiction is
NULLIFIED. The records are hereby remanded to said Regional
Trial Court for further proceedings and for the rendition of
judgment in accordance with the mandate of Section 14, Article
VII of the Constitution. No costs.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Dizon vs. Judge Lopez, A.M. 96-1338 (1997)

FACTS: On April 22, 1993, judgment was rendered, convicting

complainant Fernando Dizon of falsification of private
documents. The promulgation of the judgment consisted of
reading the dispositive portion of the decision sentencing

him to imprisonment, without serving a copy of the decision on

him. When the Judge finished the decision, she just read the
dispositive portion of the decision to the accused.

ISSUE: WON the failure of respondent judge to furnish a copy

of the decision constitutes a violation of Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the
Constitution

HELD: YES.

The judgment must be read, stating the facts and the law on
which such judgment is based which is very clear in Art. VIII,
Sec 14 of the Constitution. What respondent did in this case
was to render what is known as a sin perjuicio judgment, which
is a judgment without a statement of the facts in support of its
conclusion to be later supplemented by the final judgment.
As early as 1923, this Court already expressed its disapproval of
the practice of rendering sin perjuicio judgments, what with all
the uncertainties entailed because of the implied reservation
that it is subject to modification when the decision is finally
rendered.

In view of the foregoing, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED

with WARNING that repetition of the same acts complained of
will be dealt with more severely.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Asiavest vs. CA, G.R. No. 110263 (2001)

FACTS: The petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is

a corporation organized under the laws of Malaysia while
private respondent Philippine National Construction
Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and existing
under Philippine laws.

In 1983, petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private

respondent, which was favored by the High Court of Malaysia.
But due to unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from
private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated on
September 5, 1988 the complaint before Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya.
The case was dismissed by RTC which decision was affirmed by
the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the CA was wrong in denying recognition and

enforcement of the Malaysian court judgment.

HELD: NO.

Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is

bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, the rules of
comity, utility, and convenience of nations have established a
usage among civilized states by which final judgments of
foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally
respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions
that may vary in different countries.

In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign

tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties
and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it
is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a
full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the
existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment enjoys
presumptive validity.

Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside. Private

respondent ordered to pay petitioner the amounts adjudged.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Tichangco vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 150629 (2004)

FACTS: The petitioners assailed the decisions of the Court of

Appeals which affirmed the findings of the then Land
Registration Authority (LRA) administrator, Alfredo Enriquez,
that there were no legal grounds to initiate appropriate
proceedings to nullify Original Certificates of Title and the
subsequent titles derived therefrom—all covering parcels of
land in Tondo, Manila registered in the names of private
respondents.

The Petitioners attack the validity of the assailed CA Decision

for its failure to mention that a magnetic survey was completed
only on November 15, 1906, a fact that they perceived to be
crucial to the determination of the case. The untenability of
such grasping at straws can easily be demonstrated. Hence, this
petition for review.

ISSUE: WON the CA complied with Section 14 of Article VIII

of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD: NO.

In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the resolution of

LRA Administrator Enriquez. The appellate court deliberated on
the law and the reasons it relied upon in its determination of
the issues presented only after giving a detailed account and
assessment of the factual antecedents found by respondent
administrator.

There is sufficient compliance with the constitutional

requirement when a collegiate appellate court, after
deliberation, decides to deny a motion; states that the
questions raised are factual or have already been passed upon;
or cites some other legal basis. There is no need to explain fully
the courts denial, since the facts and the law have already been
laid out in the assailed Decision.

Petition denied, assailed decision and resolution affirmed.

CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Fr. Martinez vs. CA, G.R. No. 123547 (2001)

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision,

dated September 7, 1995, and resolution, dated January 31,
1996, of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decisions of
the Regional Trial Court, Branches 25[1] and 28,[2] Cabanatuan
City, finding private respondents spouses Reynaldo and Susan
Veneracion owners of the land in dispute, subject to petitioners
rights as a builder in good faith.

Petitioner contends that the resolution of the Court of Appeals

denying his motion for reconsideration was rendered in
violation of the Constitution because it does not state the legal
basis thereof.

ISSUE: WON the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying

petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is contrary to the
constitutional requirement that a denial of a motion for
reconsideration must state the legal reasons on which it is
based.

HELD: NO.

The requirement under Article VIII, Section 14 was fully

complied with when the Court of Appeals, in denying
reconsideration of its decision, stated in its resolution that it
found no reason to change its ruling because petitioner had
not raised anything new.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED

and a new one is RENDERED:

(1) declaring as null and void the deed of sale executed by

private respondents Godofredo and Manuela De la Paz in
favor of private respondents spouses Reynaldo and Susan
Veneracion;
(2) ordering private respondents Godofredo and Manuela De
la Paz to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner
Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez;
(3) ordering private respondents Godofredo and Manuela De
la Paz to reimburse private respondents spouses Veneracion
the amount the latter may have paid to the former;
(4) ordering the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City to
cancel TCT No. T-44612 and issue a new one in the name of
petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez; and
(5) ordering private respondents to pay petitioner jointly and
severally the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and to pay
the costs of the suit. I
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Re: Delays in the Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. 00-8-05-SC (4) To ORDER the Sandiganbayan to comply with Supreme
(2001) Court Administrative Circular 10-94, effective immediately.
(5) To DIRECT the Sandiganbayan en banc to adopt not later
FACTS: On July 31, 2000, the IBP, through its National than December 31, 2001 internal rules to govern the allotment
President, Arthur D. Lim, transmitted to the Court a Resolution of cases among the divisions, the rotation of justices among
them and other matters leading to the internal operation of
addressing the problem of delays in cases pending before the
the court, and thereafter to submit the said internal rules to
Sandiganbayan. It recommended an inquiry into the causes of the Supreme Court for its approval.
delays in the resolution of incidents and motions and in the
decision of cases pending before the Sandiganbayan.
According to IBP, the delays result to incompetence,
inefficiency, gross neglect of duty, and misconduct in office.

ISSUE: WON Art. VIII Sec 15(1) and (2) of the 1987
Constitution includes the Sandiganbayan.

HELD: NO.

Article VIII, Section 15 (1) and (2), of the 1987 Constitution

provision refers to regular courts of lower collegiate level that
in the present hierarchy applies only to the Court of Appeals.

The Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special one.

Under Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (5) of the Constitution Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The law creating the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 is clear on

this issue. It provides:

“..that cases before the Sandiganbayan once commenced

shall be continuous until terminated and the judgment shall
be rendered within three (3) months from the date the case
was submitted for decision.”

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court resolves:

(1) To IMPOSE on Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena a

fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), for inefficiency
and gross neglect of duty.
(2) Effective December 1, 2001, to RELIEVE Presiding Justice
Francis E. Garchitorena of his powers, functions and duties as
the Presiding Justice, Sandiganbayan, and from presiding over
the trial of cases as a justice and Chairman, First Division, so
that he may DEVOTE himself exclusively to DECISION
WRITING, until the backlog of cases assigned to him as well as
cases not assigned to any ponente, of which he shall be
deemed the ponente in the First Division, are finally decided.
There shall be no unloading of cases to other divisions, or to
the First Division inter se. In the interim, Associate Justice
Minita V. Chico-Nazario, as the most senior associate justice,
shall TAKE OVER and exercise the powers, functions, and
duties of the office of the Presiding Justice, Sandiganbayan,
until further orders from this Court.
(3) To DIRECT Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena and
the associate justices of the Sandiganbayan to decide/resolve
the undecided cases submitted for decision as of this date,
within three (3) months from their submission, and to resolve
motions for new trial or reconsiderations and petitions for
review within thirty (30) days from their submission. With
respect to the backlog of cases, as hereinabove enumerated,
the Sandiganbayan shall decide/resolve all pending cases
including incidents therein within six (6) months from notice of
this resolution.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
In re Demetria, A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA (2001)

FACTS: It was alleged that Justice Demetrio Demetria

intervened in the case for the accused drug queen Yu Yuk Lai
when he called and instructed the prosecutor to withdraw the
motion to inhibit of Judge Muro, the judge who handle the
case and was alleged to be partial to YuYuk Lai.

In 2000, national newpapers collectively reported that Justice

Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese
drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and out
of prison to play in a Manila casino.

ISSUE: WON Justice Demetria violated the Code of Judicial

Conduct and is subject to appropriate disciplinary action by
the SC.

HELD: YES.

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an

office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility.

Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed to

live up to this expectation. Through his indiscretions, Justice
Demetria did not only make a mockery of his high office, but
also caused incalculable damage to the entire Judiciary.

Hence, the Court finds Justice Demetrio G. Demetria GUILTY of

violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is
ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or
reappointment to any government office, agency or
instrumentality, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or institution.

Respondent dismissed from the service.

CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
People vs. Pilotin, 65 SCRA 635 (1975)

FACTS: Vincent Crisologo, through counsel, filed a verified

motion praying for the transfer to the New Bilibid Prisons or, to
Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the place of trial of
Criminal Case No. 3949 of the municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos
Sur, wherein he, as sole defendant, is charged with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions. He alleged that his
life would be in jeopardy if he were to be confined in the Vigan
municipal jail during the trial because there are many political
enemies of the Crisologo family in that vicinity. Provincial Fiscal
of Ilocos Sur signified his conformity to the transfer of the
venue of the trial to the New Bilibid Prisons.

ISSUE: WON the change of venue in this case is in

conformity with the Constitution.

HELD: YES.

Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution expressly empowers

this Court to "order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid
a miscarriage of justice". Here, what is involved is not merely a
miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of movant
Crisologo, the accused. It would be absurd to compel him to
undergo trial in a place where his life would be imperilled.

The Court finds Crisologo's motion to be meritorious. The

change of venue involves not merely the change of the place of
hearing but also the transfer of the expediente of Criminal Case
No. 3949 to another court.

WHEREFORE, the municipal court of Vigan is directed to transfer

the record of Criminal Case No. 3949 to the City Court of
Quezon City where it should be re-docketed and raffled to any
Judge thereof. The case may be tried at Camp Crame. The usual
precautions and security measures should be adopted in
bringing defendant Crisologo to Camp Crame on the occasion of
the hearing.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Mondiguing vs. Abad, 68 SCRA 14 (1975)

FACTS: Alipio Mondiguing and Andres Dunuan are two of the

ten defendants accused of double murder, frustrated murder,
and attempted murder. In that incident, they harmed Governor
Gualberto Lumauig of Ifugao.

On September 4, 1975, the petitioners filed a petition to

transfer the venue of the case to Baguio City or Quezon City.
They claimed that they could not expect a fair and impartial
trial in Lagawe, Ifugao, because Judge Francisco Men Abad of
the Court of First Instance of that province is a protege of
Governor Lumauig and his brother, former Congressman
Romulo Lumauig, and because their witnesses would be afraid
to testify for fear of harassment and reprisals.

The Acting Solicitor General interposed no objection to the

change of venue but Judge Abad it is not necessary.

ISSUE: WON Mondiguing's plea for a change of venue is

justified.

HELD: YES.

The Supreme Court is invested with the prerogative of ordering

"a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice" (Sec. 5[4], Art. X of the Constitution).

After a careful consideration of the circumstances recited in

Mondiguing's petition to support his request for a change of
the place of trial, the Court has reached the conclusion that his
petition is meritorious. In the interest of a fair and impartial trial
and to avoid a miscarriage of justice and considering that his
life would be in danger if he were to be tried in Lagawe, Ifugao,
he should be tried by the Circuit Criminal Court in the City of
Baguio.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Alipio Mondiguing for the transfer

of the venue of Criminal Case No. 140 of the Court of First
Instance of Ifugao is granted. The said case should be transferred
to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District so
that it may be heard in Baguio City.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981)

FACTS: On September 23 and October 1, 1980, the Philippine

Constabulary provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed
seven (7) separate complaints for murder against the accused
Pablo Sola and others. While on a temporary release, the
witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of
their fears that if the trial is held at the Court of First Instance
branch in Himamaylan, which is but 10 kilometers from
Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of
the accused are officials with power and influence in
Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. Hence, this
petition to change the venue.

ISSUE: WON the change of venue or place of trial of the

same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice be
considered in this case.

HELD: YES.

The Supreme Court could order a change of venue or place of

trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The exercise by this
Honorable Court of its constitutional power in this case will be
appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives.
They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from
Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of fear,
they may either refuse to testify or testimony falsely to save
their lives. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution
must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be
resolved in favor of a change of venue.

WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya

granting bail to private respondents is nullified, set aside, and
declared to be without force and effect. Executive Judge Alfonso
Baguio of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to
whose sala the cases had been transferred by virtue of the
resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is directed forthwith to
hear the petitions for bail of private respondents, with the
prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not
the evidence of guilt against the respondents is strong. This
decision is immediately executory. No costs.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 (1988)

FACTS: Respondent Raul M. Gonzalez prayed this court that

the motion for reconsideration be reviewed and modified
relating to the per curiam Resolution of the Court dated
October 7, 1988. In the per curiam Resolution, the Court
concluded that "respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of
contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an
officer of the court and member of the bar."

The court sought to convey that it regarded the contumacious

acts or statements (which were made both in a pleading filed
before the Court and in statements given to the media) and the
misconduct of respondent Gonzalez as serious acts flaunted in
the face of the Court and constituting a frontal assault upon
the integrity of the Court and, through the Court, the entire
judicial system.

ISSUE: WON the court is correct in imposing an indefinite

suspension of Gonzales in the practice of law.

HELD: YES.

The Court has two related powers: the inherent power to

discipline attorneys, and the contempt power. The disciplinary
authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader than
the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be
committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out
of court. The indefiniteness of the respondent's suspension is
not cruel, degrading or inhuman. He was given a chance to
restore his rights and privileges by acknowledging such
misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and
demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the
exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every
member of the bar and officer of the courts.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M.

Gonzalez from the practice of law indefinitely and until further
orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
In re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534 (1954)

FACTS: Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar

Flunkers' Act of 1953” was enacted by Congress. It provides
that any bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70%
(1946-1951); 71%(1952); 72%(1953); 73%(1954); 74%(1955) and
without a candidate obtaining a grade 50% in any subject, shall
be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That
for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a
fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the
next whole number.

ISSUE: WON RA No. 972 is unconstitutional.

HELD: YES.

Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional. The Constitution has

not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibility concerning the admission to the practice of law.
The primary power and responsibility which the Constitution
recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress
found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the
matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power
granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the
rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and
responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain
vested in the Supreme Court.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the

candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952
inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per
cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any
subjcet, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed
petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become
final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date
or dates that the Chief Justice may set. So ordered.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Aguirre vs. Rana, Bar Matter No. 1036 (2003)

FACTS: Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among

those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. One day before
the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees,
Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a
Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant
charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer,

appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections
before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of
Mandaon, Masbate.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath but not allowed
him to sign the Roll of Attorneys up to now pending the
resolution of the charge against him.

ISSUE: WON the respondent be admitted to the practice of

law.

HELD: NO.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right

but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified.

A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law

simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed
the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license.

The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is

immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by the
Supreme Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to

the Philippine Bar.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
In re: Edillion, 84 SCRA 554 (1978)

FACTS: Respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed

practicing attorney in the Philippines. On November 29, 1975,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of
Governors unanimously recommended to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to
the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due
notice. The respondent stated that the Court is without power
to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of
freedom to associate.

ISSUE: WON the non-payment of dues is a ground for the

removal of the name from the Roll of Attorneys.

HELD: YES.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not

violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of

which he is not already a member. He became a member of the
Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. The only compulsion
(justified as exercise of Police power of the state) to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court,
in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating
the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by
the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the
lawyers.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of

the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he
is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
In re: IBP Elections, Bar Matter No. 491 (1989)
FACTS: The newly-elected officers were set to take the their
oath of office on July 4,1989, before the Supreme Court en
banc.
Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be
appointed by the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP.
The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are
without prejudice to its adoption in due time of such further
and other measures as are warranted in the premises.

However, reports received that there were intensive SO ORDERED.

electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the
main protagonists for the office of president of the association,
namely, Attorneys Paculdo, Nisce, and Drilon, the alleged use
of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain
public officials to influence the voting, all of which were done
in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities.
The Supreme Court en banc, resolved to suspend the oath-
taking of the IBP officers-elect.

ISSUE: WON the officers violated Art I, Sec 4 of the IBP By-
Laws.

HELD: YES.

It is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates

for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their
campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated
Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea
of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section
4 of the By-Laws. The candidates and many of the participants
in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but
also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all
lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold
the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for
law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed
at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional
Responsibility).

To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the

seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern
disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore
the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely
eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the
organization which, as the recently concluded elections revealed,
spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the
stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a
noble and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:

Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in

the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3) months, after the
promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within
thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet
at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among
themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-
president. In these special elections, the candidates in the
election of the national officers held on June 3,1989,
particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled
"Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those
identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the
irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and
may not present themselves as candidate for any position.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
De La Llana vs. Alba, 122 SCRA 294 (1983)

FACTS: Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing

the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes” was enacted. It includes the reorganization of the
entire Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts, including
the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and
Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners contend that the abolition of the
existing inferior courts collides with the security of tenure
enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X,
Section 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: WON the Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 collides with

security of tenure of Judges and Justices.

HELD: NO.

Congress can abolish the positions in the lower courts but not
the Supreme Court.

The Court is empowered "to discipline judges of inferior courts

and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal."
Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the
Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such
power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can
be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there
is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with
an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that
sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless,
for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is
one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between
removal and the abolition of the office.

WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg.

129 not having been shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs.