CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)

LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.

Hutchison Ports vs. SBMA, G.R. No. 131367 (1998)
FACTS: On February 1996, the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA) advertised an invitation offering to the
private sector the opportunity to develop and operate a
modern marine container terminal within the Subic Bay
Freeport Zone. Out of 7 bidders who responded to the
published invitation, 3 were declared by the SBMA as qualified
bidders after passing the pre-qualification evaluation. The three
qualified bidders were International Container Terminal
Services, Inc. (ICTSI), a consortium consisting of Royal Port
Services, Inc. and HPC Hamburg Port Consulting GMBH (or
RPSI), and petitioner Hutchison Ports Philippines Ltd (HPPL),
RPSI formally protested that ICTSI is legally barred from
operating a second port in the Philippines. RPSI thus requested
that the financial bid of ICTSI should be set aside. HPPL joined
in RPSI’s protest, stating that ICTSI should be disqualified
because it was already operating the Manila International
Container Port (or MICP), which would give rise to inevitable
conflict of interest between the MICP and the Subic Bay
Container Terminal facility.
On August 1996, SBMA issued a resolution rejecting the bid of
ICTSI because “said bid does not comply with the requirements
of the tender documents and the laws of the Philippines.” The
same resolution also declared the winning bid awarded to
petitioner HPPL.
ICTSI filed an appeal with SBMA and the Office of the President
requesting the nullification and reversal of the above-quoted
resolution rejecting ICTSI’s bid while awarding the same to
HPPL.
Notwithstanding the SBMA Board’s recommendations and
action awarding the project to HPPL, then Executive Secretary
Ruben Torres submitted a memorandum to the Office of the
President recommending that another rebidding be conducted.
Consequently, the Office of the President issued a
Memorandum directing the SBMA Board of Directors to refrain
from signing the Concession Contract with HPPL and to
conduct a rebidding of the project.
To the Supreme Court’s mind, petitioner HPPL has not
sufficiently shown that it has a clear and unmistakable right to
be declared the winning bidder with finality. Though the SBMA
Board of Directors, by resolution, may have declared HPPL as
the winning bidder, said award cannot be said to be final and
unassailable. The SBMA Board of Directors and other officers
are subject to the control and supervision of the Office of the
President.
As a chartered institution, the SBMA is always under the direct
control of the Office of the President, particularly when
contracts and/or projects undertaken by the SBMA entail
substantial amounts of money. Specifically, Letter of Instruction
No. 620 mandates that the approval of the President is
required in all contracts of the national government offices,
agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned
or controlled corporations involving two million pesos and
above, awarded through public bidding or negotiation. The
President may, within his authority, overturn or reverse any
award made by the SBMA Board of Directors for justifiable
reasons. It is well-established that the discretion to accept or
reject any bid, or even recall the award thereof, is of such wide
latitude that the courts will not generally interfere with the
exercise thereof by the executive department, unless it is
apparent that such exercise of discretion is used to shield
unfairness or injustice. When the President issued the
memorandum setting aside the award previously declared by
the SBMA in favor of HPPL and directing that a rebidding be
conducted, the same was within the authority of the President
and was a valid exercise of his prerogative. Consequently,
petitioner HPPL acquired no clear and unmistakable right as
the award announced by the SBMA prior to the President’s
revocation thereof was not final and binding.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

ISSUE: WON the SBMA Board of Directors and other

officers are subject to the control and supervision of the
Office of the President.

HELD: YES.

All projects undertaken by SBMA require the approval of the

President of the Philippines under Letter of Instruction No. 620,
which places the SBMA under its ambit as an instrumentality,
defined in Section 10 thereof as an “agency of the national
government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government owned and controlled
corporations.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
NEA vs. COA, 377 SCRA 223 (2002)
FACTS: Petitioner National Electrification Administration (NEA)
is a government-owned and controlled corporation. NEA is
charged with the responsibility of organizing, financing, and
regulating electric cooperatives throughout the country.
On March 1994, Joint Resolution No. 01 entitled “Urging the
President of the Philippines to Revise the Existing
Compensation and Position Classification System in the
Government and to Implement the Same Initially Effective
January 1, 1994” was passed by the Congress. This adjusted the
salary schedule of all officials and employees of the
government. Paragraph 10 provides that “the new salary
schedule shall be implemented within four (4) years” beginning
in 1994.
On Dec. 1996, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued EO 389
entitled “Implementing the Fourth and Final Year Salary
Increases Authorized by Joint Senate and House of
Representatives Resolution No. 01, Series of 1994.” EO 389
directed payment of the fourth and final salary increases
authorized under Joint Resolution No. 01 in two tranches.
In January 1997, NEA implemented the salary increases
prescribed for the year 1997 pursuant to Joint Resolution No.
01. However, NEA did not implement the salary increases in
accordance with the schedule of payment specified in EO 389.
Instead, NEA implemented in one lump sum, beginning January
1, 1997, the salary increases required to be paid in two
tranches. In other words, NEA accelerated the implementation
of the salary increase by paying the second tranche starting
January 1, 1997 instead of November 1, 1997.
to a program of expenditure to be approved by the President
and this approved program of expenditure is the basis for the
fund release.
The Court rejects NEA’s claim The 1997 GAA is not self-
executory so as to serve as outright legal authority for NEA to
spend what had been appropriated for NEA’s “Personal
Services” under the 1997 GAA. Budgetary appropriations under
the GAA do not constitute unbridled authority to government
agencies to spend the appropriated amounts as they may wish.
Clearly, NEA cannot automatically spend its authorized
appropriation for Personal Services under the 1997 GAA.
The mere approval by Congress of the GAA does not instantly
make the funds available for spending by the Executive
Department. The latter must balance carefully economic and
social factors, and to do this it must calibrate government
disbursements to match, as much as possible, receipt of
revenues. This is the rationale behind the rules on National
Government Budgeting.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit
and the Decision of the Commission on Audit dated May 16,
2000 is AFFIRMED in toto.

NEA claims that RA 8250, or the General Appropriations Act of

1997 (1997 GAA), serves as legal basis for the accelerated
implementation of the last phase of the Salary Standardization
Law II. Moreover, NEA contends that it has legal authority to
spend what had been appropriated for NEA’s “Personal
Services” under the 1997 GAA.

ISSUE: WON petitioner NEA may accelerate the

implementation of the salary increases for the year 1997
due to the availability of funds.

HELD: NO.

NEA’s accelerated implementation is not in accordance with

law.

Pursuant to the provisions on National Government Budgeting

found in the Administrative Code, appropriations for Personal
Services are not itemized. There is no itemization of Personal
Services in the 1997 GAA, and nothing is mentioned therein
about the acceleration or full payment of the Salary
Standardization Law II.

The itemization of Personal Services is prepared after the

enactment of the annual GAA and requires the approval of the
President. Further, the execution of the annual GAA is subject
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Pimentel vs. Aguirre G.R. No. 132988 (2000)
FACTS: On December 1997, then President Fidel Ramos issued
Administrative Order 372 (Adoption of Economic Measures in
Government for Fiscal Year 1998).
Section 1 of AO 372 provided that all government departments
and agencies, including state universities and colleges, GOCCs,
and LGUs will identify and implement measures that will
replace total expenditures by at least 25% of authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services items. Section 4 also
provided that, pending assessment by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal
situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the IRA to LGUs
shall be withheld. Subsequently, President Joseph Estrada
issued AO 43, amending Section 4 by reducing to 5% the IRA
to be withheld.
Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was
in effect exercising the power of control over LGUs. The
Constitution vests in the President, however, only the power of
general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of
local autonomy. Petitioner further argues that the directive to
withhold ten percent (10%) of their IRA is in contravention of
Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution, providing for the automatic
release to each of these units its share in the national internal
revenue.
The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims that
AO 372 was issued to alleviate the “economic difficulties
brought about by the peso devaluation” and constituted
merely an exercise of the President’s power of supervision over
LGUs. It allegedly does not violate local fiscal autonomy,
because it merely directs local governments to identify
measures that will reduce their total expenditures for non-
personal services by at least 25 percent.
ISSUE: WON Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it “directs”
LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent; and
Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent
of their internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of
the President’s power of general supervision over local
governments.
HELD: Section 1 is valid; Section 4 is not.
Article X, Sec. 4 of the Constitution confines the President’s
power over local governments to one of general supervision. It
reads as follows:
“Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments, x x x”
This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control.
The Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of
checking whether local governments or their officials were
performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law
and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so
long as they act within the scope of their authority.
It is true that the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather
commanding tone. However, it does not constitute a
mandatory or binding order that interferes with local
autonomy. The language used, while authoritative, does not
amount to a command that emanates from a boss to a
subaltern. Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail
upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint
in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would
do well to heed the President’s call to unity, solidarity and
teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood, however,
that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their
officials who do not follow such advice. It is in this light that the
Court sustains the solicitor general’s contention in regard to
Section 1.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic
feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local
Government Code specifies further that the release shall be
made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after
every quarter of the year and “shall not be subject to any lien
or holdback that may be imposed by the national government
for whatever purpose.” As a rule, the term “shall” is a word of
command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The
provision is, therefore, imperative. Furthermore, Section 4
thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision
effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local
governments. Concededly, the President was well-intentioned
in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs’ IRA, but the rule of
law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out
within the parameters of the Constitution and the law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents and their
successors are hereby permanently PROHIBITED from
implementing Administrative Order Nos. 372 and 43,
respectively dated December 27, 1997 and December 10, 1998,
insofar as local government units are concerned.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Bermudez vs. Torres, G.R. No. 131429 (1999)
FACTS: Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Justice
Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the position of Provincial
Prosecutor. Respondent Conrado Quiaoit had the support of
then Representative Jose Yap of the Second Legislative District
of Tarlac.
On June 1997, Quiaoit emerged the victor when he was
appointed by President Ramos to the coveted office. Quiaoit
took his oath and assumed office. Bermudez refused to vacate.
Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed the duties and functions of
the Office of Provincial Prosecutor.
therefrom that the President can interfere in the exercise of
discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their
recommendations.
In the instant case, the recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice and the appointment of the President are acts of the
Executive Department itself, and there is no sharing of power
to speak of, the latter being deemed for all intents and
purposes as being merely an extension of the personality of the
President.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Petitioner Bermudez filed a petition challenging the

appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the
appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of
1987. Section 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of
the Revised Administrative Code provides that “all provincial
and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by
the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary.”

ISSUE: WON the absence of a recommendation of the

Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to
the appointment of Quiaoit.

HELD: NO.

The phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary, found

in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of
the Revised Administrative Code, should be interpreted, as it is
normally so understood, to be a mere advise, exhortation or
indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character
and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is
made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than
advisory in nature. The President, being the head of the
Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away
with the action of the departments, bureaus, or offices even in
the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he
cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his
authority.

When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the
power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must
be understood as necessarily carrying with it
an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be here
pertinent to state that the President is the head of government
whose authority includes the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices. Control means the
authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even
nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the
performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment
of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be
appropriate. Expressed in another way, the President has the
power to assume directly the functions of an executive
department, bureau and office. It can accordingly be inferred
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Sarmiento vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549 (1987)
FACTS: In 1987, then President Corazon Aquino appointed
Salvador Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
without submitting his nomination to the Commission on
Appointments. Herein petitioners, both of whom happened to
be lawyers and professors of constitutional law, filed the instant
petition for prohibition on the ground that the aforementioned
appointment violated Section 16, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioners argued that the appointment of a
bureau head should be subject to the approval of the
Commission on Appointments.
ISSUE: WON the appointment of bureau heads should be
subject to the approval of the Commission on
Appointments.
HELD: NO.
• officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone.
According to the Court, only the presidential appointments of
the first group of public officers are subject to the confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments. A review of the
deliberations would show that bureau heads have been deleted
from the first group, precisely because they are lower in rank as
compared to other officers enumerated in the same group.
Therefore, Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs need not be confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments.
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be,
as they are, hereby DISMISSED.

Construing Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution would

show that the President is well within her authority to appoint
bureau heads without submitting such nominations before the
Commission on Appointments. The Supreme Court traced the
history of the confirmatory powers of the Commission on
Appointments (which is part of the legislative department) vis-
a-vis the appointment powers of the President.

Under Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution, almost all
presidential appointments required the consent or
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. As a result,
the Commission became very powerful, eventually
transforming into a venue for horse-trading and similar
malpractices. On the other hand, consistent with the
authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by
successive amendments, the 1973 Constitution placed the
absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly
any check on the part of the legislature.

Under the current constitution, the Court held that the framers
intended to strike a "middle ground" in order to reconcile the
extreme set-ups in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. As
such, while the President may make appointments to positions
that require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
the 1987 Constitution also grants her the power to make
appointments on her own without the need for confirmation by
the legislature.

Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution enumerates four

groups of public officers:

• heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,

other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this constitution;
• all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
• those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint; and
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Concepcion-Bautista vs. Salonga, 172 SCRA 160 (1989)

FACTS: The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as

the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to
the second sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, without the
confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers
of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by
law to appoint."

Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the President

to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on
Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim
appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal
to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Appointments.

ISSUE: WON Bautista’s appointment is subject to CoA’s

confirmation, and if it is an ad interim appointment.

HELD: No.

Bautista’s appointment is not subject to CoA’s confirmation,

and such was not an ad interim appointment.

The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions

mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, which provides that the appointments which are
to be made with the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within
the authority of President, vested upon her by the same
provision of the Constitution, that she appoint executive
officials without confirmation of CoA.

The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its

constitutionally delimited power to review presidential
appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments
that the Constitution has reserved to the President alone.

Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do

not apply to appointments solely for the President to make. Ad
interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987
Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of
the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad
interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the
President solely to make, that is, without the participation of
the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim
appointments.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Bautista is

declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights and the lawful incumbent thereof,
entitled to all the benefits, privileges and emoluments of said
office. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by the
Court against respondent Mallillin enjoining him from dismissing
or terminating personnel of the Commission on Human Rights is
made permanent.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Calderon vs. Carale, G.R. No. 91636 (1992)
FACTS: Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso
Law), amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was
approved. Section 13 thereof provides that the Chairman, the
Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners of
NLRC shall all be appointed by the President, subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. President
Aquino appointed respondents as the Chairman and
Commissioners of the NLRC.
Calderon filed a petition for prohibition questioning the
constitutionality and legality of respondents permanent
appointments. Calderon insists that the appointments must be
submitted to the CA for confirmation. He also posits that RA
6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the
executive contained in Section 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution,
as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by
the President additional to those mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA
6715 which amended the Labor Code transgresses Section 16,
Article VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis.
ISSUE: WON Congress may, by law, require confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments of appointments
extended by the President to government officers
additional to those expressly mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution.
HELD: NO.
In the case of Sarmiento III vs. Mison, the Court stated that
there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint. These groups, are: First, the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized
by law to appoint; and Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.
The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other
officers of the government whose appointment are not
otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President
may be authorized by law to appoint.
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within
the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of
appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President
may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the
Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the
officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII
whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715 requires
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the
National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional
because:
1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art.
VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments
requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments;
and
2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16,
Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments on appointments which
are otherwise entrusted only with the President.
It cannot be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
1987 Constitution was deliberately, not unconsciously,
intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a
departure from the system embodied in the
1935 Constitution where the Commission on Appointments
exercised the power of confirmation over almost all presidential
appointments, leading to many cases of abuse of such power
of confirmation.
The deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments over presidential appointments,
embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, has
undoubtedly evoked the displeasure and disapproval of
members of the Congress. The solution to the apparent
problem, if indeed a problem, is not judicial or legislative but
constitutional. A future constitutional convention or Congress
sitting as a constituent (constitutional) assembly may then
consider either a return to the 1935 Constitutional provisions
or the adoption of a hybrid system between the 1935 and 1987
constitutional provisions. Until then, it is the duty of
the Court to apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance with
what it says and not in accordance with how the legislature or
the executive would want it interpreted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor
Code as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of
appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared
unconstitutional and of no legal force and effect.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Manalo vs. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369 (1999)
FACTS: On December 1990, former President Corazon C.
Aquino signed into law RA 6975, creating the Department of
Interior and Local Government. The said Act states that the PNP
Chief, Chief Superintendent, and Director General shall be
appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino,
through Executive Secretary Franklin S. Drilon, promoted 15
police officers to permanent positions in the Philippine
National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to
Director. The said police officers took their oath of office and
assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department
of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador
M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and
other emoluments.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to
assail the legality of subject appointments and disbursements
made therefor. He contends that: (1) RA 6975 requires
confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of
senior superintendent and higher by the CA; (2) The PNP is akin
to the Armed Forces where the Constitution specifically
requires confirmation by the CA, and (3) Respondent Secretary
in allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of
respondent officers despite the unconstitutionality and
illegality of their appointments is acting without or in excess of
his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: WON the appointment of PNP officers need CoA
confirmation.
HELD: NO.
Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four
groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the
President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;
officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Constitution, no less, sets
forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution,
“The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a
citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and
service, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular
force necessary for the security of the State.”
On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the
Constitution ordains that:
“The State shall establish and maintain one police force,
which shall be national in scope and civilian in character to
be administered and controlled by a national police
commission. The authority of local executives over the police
units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”
The police force is different from and independent of the
armed forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to
those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and
chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein
respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category
of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Sections 26 and 31 of RA 6975 which empower the
Commission on Appointments to confirm the appointments of
public officials whose appointments are not required by the
Constitution to be confirmed are unconstitutional. The rest of
Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that when provisions
of law declared void are severable from the main statute and
the removal of the unconstitutional provisions would not affect
the validity and enforceability of the other provisions, the
statute remains valid without its voided sections.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition under consideration
is hereby DISMISSED.

Second, all other officers of the Government whose

appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law

to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the

Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging

to the first group require the confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers
who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of
Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power
of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and
require confirmation of appointments of other government
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Soriano vs. Lista, G.R. No. 153881 (2003) promotions and appointments of respondent officers of the
PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for
FACTS: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed or that matter, do not require confirmation by the CA.
promoted the public respondents to different positions in the
Philippine Coast Guards (PCG) and their subsequent
assumption of office without confirmation by the Commission WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
on Appointments.

Despite the lack of confirmation, respondents assumed their

duties and functions.

Soriano assails the said appointments precisely because of the

failure to undergo the confirmation process by the Commission
on Appointments. Hence, they should be prohibited from
discharging their duties and their functions.

ISSUE: WON the permanent appointments made by the

President require confirmation by the CoA.

HELD: NO.
It is clear from Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution that only
appointed officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain in
the armed forces require confirmation by the CA. The rule is
that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of
the Constitution should be construed as such and should not
be given a construction that changes its meaning.

The enumeration of appointments subject to confirmation by

the CA under Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution is exclusive. The clause officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain refers
to military officers alone. This is clear from the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission on the proposed text of
said Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Since the
promotions and appointments of respondent officers are not
covered by the above-cited provision of the Constitution, the
same need not be confirmed by the CA.

The PCG used to be administered and maintained as a separate

unit of the Philippine Navy under Section 4 of RA 5173. It was
subsequently placed under the direct supervision and control
of the Secretary of the Department of National Defense (DND)
pursuant to Section 4 of PD 601. Eventually, it was integrated
into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as a major
subordinate unit of the Philippine Navy under Section 54
of Chapter 8, Sub-title II, Title VIII, Book IV of EO 292, as
amended.

However, on March 30, 1998, after the aforesaid changes in the

charter of the PCG, then President Fidel V. Ramos, in the
exercise of his statutory authority to reorganize the Office of
the President, issued EO 475 transferring the PCG from the
DND to the Office of the President. He later on again
transferred the PCG from the Office of the President to
the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC).

Now that the PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the
Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Pimentel vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978 (2005)
FACTS: While Congress is in their regular session, President
Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, issued
appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their
respective departments without the consent of the Commission
on Appointments.
After the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad
interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the
departments to which they were previously appointed in an
acting capacity. Petitioners filed a petition to declare
unconstitutional the appointments issued. They assert that
while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments,
whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office
needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
without first having obtained its consent.
Respondent secretaries, on the other hand, maintain that the
President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries without the consent of the Commission
on Appointments even while Congress is in session.
ISSUE: WON President Arroyo’s appointment of
respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of
the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in
session is constitutional.
HELD: YES.
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its
temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an
office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent
occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied
by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a
department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint
an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the
obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or
permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence.
Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,
cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while
Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is
the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office
must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the
very nature of the office of a department secretary, the
President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her
choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or
may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons
may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be
the permanent appointee.
Sec. 17, Chap. 5, Title I, Book III, EO 292 states that
“[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already
in the government service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.”
Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a
person not yet in the government service, as long as the
President deems that person competent.
But does Sec. 17 apply to appointments vested in the President
by the Constitution? Petitioners assert that it only applies to
appointments vested in the President by law. They claim that
the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is
susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting
appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in
Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has
incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of
acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments.
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from
appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective
upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended
only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments
may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-
interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily
filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way
of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments.
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of
abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance
of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon
the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the present petition
for certiorari and prohibition.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
IN RE: Valenzuela, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC (1998)

FACTS: Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments

signed by the President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of
Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively.

These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be

expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution.

The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from

making any appointments two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.

ISSUE: WON the President is nonetheless required to fill

vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of
Art. VIII of the Constitution.

HELD: NO.

During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of

the Constitution “two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the
President is neither required to make appointments to the
courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art.
VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies
in the courts within the time frames provided therein
unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on
appointments comes into effect once every 6 years.

The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were

unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come
within the operation of the prohibition relating to
appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is
undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this
case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the
appointments during the period of the ban.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court Resolved to

DECLARE VOID the appointments signed by His Excellency the
President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A.
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the
Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24,
Cabanatuan City, respectively and to order them, forthwith on
being served with notice of this decision, to forthwith CEASE
AND DESIST from discharging the office of Judge of the Courts to
which they were respectively appointed on March 30, 1998. This
without prejudice to their being considered anew by the Judicial
and Bar Council for re-nomination to the same positions.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
De Rama vs. CA, G.R. No. 131136 (2001)

FACTS: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of

Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter
dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC),
seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14)
municipal employees. Justifying his recall request on the
allegation that the appointments of the said employees were
“midnight” appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S.
Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall
of the appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack of
merit. The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the
ground that they had already been approved by the Head of
the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioner’s failure
to present evidence that would warrant the revocation or recall
of the said appointments.

ISSUE: WON the recall made by petitioner is valid.

HELD: NO.

It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially

approved, but only when such appointment and approval are
proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil
service law and regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus
Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code
specifically provides that “an appointment accepted by the
appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing
authority and shall remain in force and in effect until
disapproved by the Commission.

Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may

only be recalled on the following grounds: (a) Non-compliance
with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit
Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the agency’s
Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing
collective agreement between management and employees
relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil
service law, rules and regulations.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for

review is DENIED and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 42896 affirming CSC Resolutions Nos. 96-2828
and 96-7527 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036 (2002)
FACTS: Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the
COMELEC en banc as “Acting Director IV” of the EID and was
reappointed twice for the same position in a temporary
capacity. Meanwhile, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
also made appointments, ad interim, of herein respondents
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and
Commissioners, respectively. Their appointments were renewed
thrice by President Arroyo, the last one during the pendency of
the case, all due to the failure of the Commission of
Appointments to act upon the confirmation of their
appointments.
Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC
Chairman, issued a memorandum removing petitioner as
Acting Director IV and reassigning her to the Law Department.
Petitioner requested for reconsideration but was denied. Thus,
petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in office of herein
respondents, claiming that their ad interim appointments
violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of
the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary
appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and
members.
ISSUE: WON the ad interim appointments made by
President Arroyo were prohibited under the Constitution.
HELD: NO.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be
independent”, this provision should be harmonized with the
President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold
that the independence of the COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad
interim appointees before the appointees can assume office
will negate the President’s power to make ad
interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory
construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of
the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers
of the Constitution.
of avoiding interruptions in vital government services that
otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies in
government offices, including the three constitutional
commissions.
Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of
her constitutional power to make ad interim appointments
prevented the occurrence of the very evil sought to be avoided
by the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. This power to make ad interim appointments is
lodged in the President to be exercised by her in her sound
judgment. Under the second paragraph of Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution, the President can choose either of two
modes in appointing officials who are subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments. First, while Congress is in
session, the President may nominate the prospective
appointee, and pending consent of the Commission on
Appointments, the nominee cannot qualify and assume office.
Second, during the recess of Congress, the President may
extend an ad interim appointment which allows the appointee
to immediately qualify and assume office.
Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective
appointee or extend an ad interim appointment is a matter
within the prerogative of the President because the
Constitution grants her that power. This Court cannot inquire
into the propriety of the choice made by the President in the
exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her
part, which has not been shown in the instant case.
In fine, the Court rules that the ad interim appointments
extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as
COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not
constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution –

on the nomination of officers subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments – did not provide for ad interim
appointments. The original intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to do away with ad interim appointments
because the plan was for Congress to remain in session
throughout the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory
recess. However, because of the need to avoid disruptions in
essential government services, the framers of the Constitution
thought it wise to reinstate the provisions of the 1935
Constitution on ad interim appointments.

Clearly, the reinstatement in the present Constitution of the ad

interim appointing power of the President was for the purpose
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Larin vs. Exec. Secretary, G.R. No. 112745 (1997)
FACTS: Petitioner Aquilino Larin is the Assistant Commissioner
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and he also appears to be a
co-accused in two criminal cases for violating Sec. 268(4) of the
National Internal Revenue Code and Sec. 3 of RA 3019.
Subsequently, Larin was convicted and this was reported to the
President. Then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary by the
authority of the President issued Memorandum Order 164
creating an executive committee to investigate the
administrative charges.
The committee required that Larin filed a position paper with
regard to the charges against him. Larin complied, but his
statement was that he cannot comment on the merits of the
case for fear of being cited in contempt by the court. He also
alleged that the committee does not have any jurisdiction over
his person, that the case cannot be validly filed without
violating res judicata, his rights against double jeopardy, and
lastly, to proceed with the investigation would be redundant
and oppressive against him.
that criminal cases and administrative cases usually progress
independently. However, in this case, it was proven that the
petitioner never committed any of the alleged acts. Thus, the
case for the administrative case was also terminated, and there
is no longer any valid cause for the removal of the petitioner.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted, and
petitioner is hereby reinstated to his position as Assistant
Commissioner without loss of seniority rights and shall be
entitled to full backwages from the time of his separation from
service until actual reinstatement unless, in the meanwhile, he
would have reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five
years in which case, he shall be deemed to have retired at such
age and entitled thereafter to the corresponding retirement
benefits.

While all this is pending, the President issued an order for the
streamlining of BIR, in which case the office of petitioner was
abolished by the order. His office being abolished, the
petitioner was not reinstated as an assistant commissioner of
BI. Instead, another Administrative Order was issued. It stated
that he is being dismissed for being guilty of grave misconduct
in connection with the criminal cases filed against him.

ISSUE: WON the dismissal of Larin was valid.

HELD: NO.

The Court ruled that the office of the petitioner falls under the
category of Career Executive Service, which is appointed by the
President. Being a Presidential Appointee, it follows that the
President has the power to discipline the petitioner. Despite the
fact that the Constitution grants the President the power to
appoint and the inherent power to remove, such power is not
without limit.

Under the Administrative Code of 1987, career services are

characterized to have security of tenure. Therefore, the
petitioner is protected from being willfully removed by the
President. The only way that the petitioner can be validly
removed is for a valid cause and in accordance with the
procedural due process.

According to the Court, although the procedural due process

was followed and complied with, the petitioner was not
removed for a valid cause. The committee was created to
investigate the administrative aspect of the criminal
cases being faced by the petitioner at that time. Now taking
into consideration that the petitioner was acquitted from
the criminal cases, the Court believes that there is no ground
for the administrative case to continue. It is admitted
CASE DIGESTS (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4) TH 5:30PM-9:30PM)
LAYOG, EMMYLOU SHAYNE L.
Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-1278 (1949)
FACTS: Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto
were charged with the crime of murder. Jimenez
was sentenced to life imprisonment, while Barrioquinto
remained at large.
Before the period for appeal had expired, Jimenez became
aware of the Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor
of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under
the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the
enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy, and committed during the period from December 8,
1941, to the date when particular area of the Philippines where
the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy
control and occupation.
Jimenez decided to apply for amnesty. Barrioquinto, who had
then been already apprehended, did the same. The Amnesty
Commission returned the cases of the petitioners to the Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga, without deciding on the case
saying that since the Barrioquinto and Jimenez deny having
committed the crime, they cannot invoke the benefits of
amnesty.
ISSUE: WON admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.
HELD: NO.
The Court held that, in order to entitle a person to the benefits
of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not
necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua
non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with
which he is charged, and allege the amnesty “as a defense; it is
sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the
accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the
terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to
say that “invocation of the benefits of amnesty is-in the nature
of a plea of confession and avoidance.”
Although the accused does not confess the imputation against
him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty
Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For,
whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the
offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if
necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct
summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants
and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons
aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he
is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be “regarded as a
patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the
nation,” or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty
Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act,
the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby
should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply
the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their
province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the
person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence
presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
To hold that an Amnesty Commission should not proceed to
the investigation and act and decide whether the offense with
which an accused was charged comes within the Amnesty
Proclamation if he does not admit or confess having
committed it, would be to defeat the purpose for which the
Amnesty Proclamation was issued and the Amnesty
Commissions were established. If the courts have to proceed to
the trial or hearing of a case and decide whether the offense
committed by the defendant comes within the terms of the
Amnesty Proclamation although the defendant has pleaded not
guilty, there is no reason why the Amnesty Commissions
cannot do so. Where a defendant to admit or confess having
committed the offense or being responsible therefor before he
can invoke the benefit of amnesty, as there is no law which
makes such admission or confession not admissible as
evidence against him in the courts of justice in case the
Amnesty Commission finds that the offense does not come
within the terms of .the Amnesty Proclamation, nobody or few
would take the risk of submitting their case to said
Commissions.
Besides, in the present case, the allegation of Loreto
Barrioquinto that the offended party or victim was shot and
killed by Agapito Hipolito, does not necessarily bar the
respondents from finding, after the summary hearing of the
witnesses for the complainants and the accused. Directed in the
said Amnesty Proclamation and Administrative Order No. 11,
that the petitioners are responsible for the killing of the victim,
either as principals by cooperation, inducement or
conspiration, or as accessories before as well as after the fact,
but that they are entitled to the benefits of amnesty, because
they were members of the same group of guerrilleros who
killed the victim in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy
or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
WHEREFORE, the respondents are hereby ordered to
immediately proceed to hear and decide the applications for
amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless the
courts have in the meantime already decided, expressly and
finally, the question whether or not they are entitled to the
benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation No. 7 of September 7,
1946.