POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila

[G.R. No. 14355, October 31, 1919]

FACTS:
On December 11, 1916, City of Manila filed a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated
for the purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and
claiming that such expropriation was necessary.

The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila (Chines Community of Manila), answering
the petition of the plaintiff, alleged that it was a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of
the laws of the Philippine Islands, having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese
Community of the City of Manila. Defendant contends that the plaintiff was without right or authority to
expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes; and that expropriation, in fact,
was not necessary as a public improvement.

The City of Manila alleged that the expropriation was necessary. The Chinese Community of
Manila each alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question
was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchers and
monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes.

Upon the issue thus presented, Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, supported by abundance
of authorities, decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in
question, and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint without any
finding as to costs.

ISSUE:
WON the courts may inquire into and hear proof of the necessity of expropriation.

HELD:
YES, the courts may inquire into and hear proof of the necessity of expropriation. The very
foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a
public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the
taking of the land.

The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to
exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and
other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be
questioned by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with
the right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to
exercise the authority conferred; it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The
necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain
is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is
exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a
question which the courts have the right to inquire into.

The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for the exercise of the right
of eminent domain is purely legislative and not judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the
legislature in authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of in the question of the right
to exercise it in a particular case.

NOTES:
 The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and
that necessity must be of public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede
 or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. The exercise of the right of eminent domain,
whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private
rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. 

 When a municipal corporation attempts to expropriate private property and an objection is made
thereto by the owner, the courts have ample authority, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry, and to
hear proof upon an-issue properly presented, concerning the question whether or not the
purpose of the appropriation is, in fact, for some public use. The right of expropriation is not
inherent power in a municipal corporation and before it can exercise the right some law
must exist conferring the power upon it. A municipal corporation in this jurisdiction
cannot expropriate public property. The land to be expropriated must be private, and the
purpose of the expropriation must be public. If the court. upon trial, finds that neither of said
condition exists, or that either one of them fails, the right to expropriate does not exist. If the
property is taken in the ostensible behalf of a public improvement which it can never by any
possibility serve, it is being taken for a use not public, and the owner's constitutional rights call
for protection by the courts.

 Land already devoted to a public use cannot be taken by the public for another use which
is inconsistent with the first without special authority from the Legislature or authority
granted by necessary and reasonable implication.

 Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be
taken for other public uses under a general authority.

 Cemeteries are of two classes: public and private. A public cemetery is one used by the general
community, or neighborhood, or church. A private cemetery is one used only by a family, or a
small portion of a community. In this case, the Chinese Cemetery in the city of Manila is a public
cemetery.

Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co.

[G.R. No. L-18841,January 27, 1969]

FACTS:
The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers
through its branches and instrumentalities, one which is the Bureau of Telecommunications. The
defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), is a public service corporation holding
a legislative franchise to install, operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines and
to carry electrical transmission of messages within the Philippines and between the Philippines and the
telephone systems of other countries.

The RCA Communications, Inc., is an American corporation authorized to transact business in

the Philippines and is the grantee, by assignment, of a legislative franchise to operate a domestic station
for the reception and transmission of long-distance wireless messages and to operate broadcasting and
radio-telephone and radio-telegraphic communications services.

Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT and the RCA Communications entered into an
agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the United States and received by RCA’s
domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls
collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United States. The contracting parties
agreed to divide the tolls, as follows: 25% to PLDT and 75% to RCA. The sharing was amended in 1941
to 30% for PLDT and 70% for RCA, and again amended in 1947 to a 50-50 basis. The arrangement was
later extended to radio-telephone messages to and from European and Asiatic countries. Their contract
contained a stipulation that either party could terminate it on a 24-month notice to the other. 4 On 2
February 1956, PLDT gave notice to RCA to terminate their contract on 2 February 1956.

Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government
Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT
to enable government offices to call private parties. However, its application for these trunk lines
contained a statement whereby it states that it would abide by the rules and regulations of PLDT.

On March 5, 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of Telecommunications, entered into an
agreement with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau
would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCA’s station to and from local residents. 

On April 7, 1958, defendant PLDT complained to the Bureau, contending that the said Bureau
was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is interconnected with the
PLDT’s facilities by using the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve
private persons or the general public. When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines
being rented by the Bureau. The Bureau then proposed to the PLDT that both enter into an
interconnecting agreement.

After failure to negotiate terms, the Bureau filed a suit against defendant in the CFI of Manila
praying that PLDT be commanded to execute a contract with plaintiff for the use of the latter’s telephone
system under such terms as the court would deem just and a preliminary injunction to prevent further
severance or to restore those that had already been severed.

ISSUE:
WON the defendant PLDT may be compelled to enter into a contract with the plaintiff.

HELD: 
YES, PLDT may be compelled to enter into a contract with the Republic. Under Section 6,
Article XIII of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to
public ownership upon payment of just compensation. There is no reason why the State may not
require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid
thereof. The beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so
that the condemnation would be for public use.

In the case at bar, where the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with
it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the
telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the
PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court. 

The power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may
not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of
title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to
an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT’s lines and services to allow inter-service connection
between both telephone systems is not much different. The private property is subjected to a burden
for public use and benefit.

NOTES:
 Generally, all private property capable of ownership may be expropriated. It may include
public utility, such as in the case at bar, the defendant PLDT. The power of eminent domain
results in the taking or appropriation of title to and possession of the expropriated property; but no
cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon
the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession.
  Parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between
them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such
terms and condition is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the
statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation or undue influence.

People vs. Fajardo

[G.R. No. L-12172, August 29, 1958]

FACTS:
             The case is an appeal from the decision of the CFI of Camariner Sur convicting defendants-
appellant Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation for having constructed a building that
destroys the view of the public plaza, without a permit from the municipal mayor.
It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F.
Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance
in question providing as follows:
"SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should,
before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor.

SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and
P1.00 for each repair permit issued.

SEC. 3. PENALTY — Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance,
shall make the violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or
imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion
of the court. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any
public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or
house.

SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY — This ordinance shall take effect on its approval." (Orig.
Recs., P. 3)

4 years later, Fajardo with his son-in-law Babilonia, filed a request to secure a permit from the
mayor to construct a building on a parcel of land in Fajardo’s name, located along the national highway
and separated from the public plaza by a creek. Such request was denied as it would destroy the view of
the public plaza. Fajardo proceeded with the construction without a permit because they needed a place
of residence, their former house being destroyed by a typhoon.

On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace
court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the
Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of P35 each
and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of the public
plaza of Baao, in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to the said public plaza."
From this decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records to
us because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.

ISSUE:
WON the ordinance no. 7 is valid.

HELD:
             No, the ordinance is not valid. First objection is that under it, the mayor has absolute discretion
to issue or deny a permit as it fails to state any policy or to set a guide/limit to the mayor’s
actions. Said ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the
issuance of bldg. permits, and it is a settled rule that such undefined and unlimited delegation of
power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful, is invalid. It gives way to possible arbitrary
discriminations and abuses in its execution.

             While it is contended that the mayor can refuse a building solely in the case that the proposed
building “destroys the view of the public plaza or occupies any public property”, the ordinance is
unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive the appellants of the right
to use their own property. It oversteps the bounds of police power and amounts to the taking of
appellants property without just compensation. The state may not, under the guise of police power,
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to
preserve/assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As it stands, every structure to be
constructed on Fajardo’s land will be condemned under the ordinance, thus they will be constrained to let
their land remain idle and unused. Hence, MO No. 7 was beyond authority and is therefore null and void.
Acquitted.

NOTES:

 A Municipal Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive if it operates to permanently

deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; it then oversteps the bounds of
police power without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to
regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of
residents. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare and, in its
pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to sight, the State may not, under guise of
police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically
confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. To
legally achieve that result, the landowner should be given just compensation and an
opportunity to be heard.

Republic vs. Vda. De Castellvi

[G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974]

FACTS:
             Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, filed, on June 26, 1959, a complaint for
eminent domain against defendant-appellee, Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the
estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi hereinafter referred to as Castellvi), over a parcel of land situated in
the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga.
           
  In its complaint, the Republic alleged, that the fair market value of the subject properties,
according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P 2,000 per
hectare, or a total market value of P 259,669.10. Castellvi, alleged that the subject land, being a
residential land, had a fair market value of P15.00 per square meter, so it had a total market value of P
11,389,485.

The Republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines, particularly the Philippine Air Force,
had been, despite repeated demands, illegally occupying her property since July 1, 1956, thereby
preventing her from using and disposing of it, thus causing her damages by way of unrealized profits.

On July 1, 1947, the Republic entered into a lease agreement with Castellvi on a year-to-year
basis. The republic occupied, erected, and installed facilities for the Ph Air Force in the land of Castellvi.
On June 30, 1956, Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease with the AFP, to which the latter refused,
contending that it was difficult for AFP to vacate because of the permanent installations and other facilities
erected amounting to almost P500k. Castellvi then brought suit to eject AFP on her land. While the
ejectment case was pending, the Republic instituted an expropriation proceeding, and on Aug 10, 1959,
the Republic was placed in possession of the land.
           
  The trial court then appointed 3 commissioners to determine the actual fair market value of lands
sought to be expropriated, they unanimously recommended that the lowest price was P10.00/sqm for
both Castellvi and Toledo land. Defendants contended that AFMV was P15.00 while the Republic averred
that it was P0.20/sqm or at P2k/ha, as the lands in the year 1947 was valued as such.

Atty. Amadeo Yuzon, as commissioner for the court; Atty. Felicisimo Pamandanan for the plaintiff;
and Atty. Leonardo Lansangan for the defendants. After having determined that the lands sought to be
expropriated were residential lands, they recommended unanimously that the lowest price that should be
paid was P 10.00 per square meter, for both lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun. An additional P 5,000
be paid to Toledo-Gozun for improvements found on her land. Legal interest on the compensation,
computed from August 10, 1959, be paid after deducting the amounts already paid to the owners, and
that no consequential damages be awarded.

RTC finds that the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of ten pesos (P10.00) per
square meter for the lots of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun is fair and just. Republic will pay 6% interest per
annum on the total value of the lands to Toledo-Gozun from the time that the provisional value has been
deposited (August 10, 1959) until full payment. Republic will pay 6% interest per annum from July 1, 1956
when Republic commenced its illegal possession of the Castellvi land until July 10, 1959 when the
provisional value thereof was actually deposited in court.

The Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or reconsideration, upon the grounds of newly
discovered evidence, that the decision was not supported by the evidence, and that the decision was
against the law, against which motion defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their respective
oppositions. The motion for new trial and/ or reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:
WON erred in holding the “taking” of property under expropriation commenced with the filing of this action.

HELD:
No. The taking of property cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when Republic
commenced to occupy the property as lessee but rather when it was placed in possession by authority of
court in 1959, when the complaint for eminent domain filed.

Castellvi property had been occupied by Air Force since 1947 under a contract of lease which duly
stipulated that the foregoing contract of lease is similar in terms and conditions, including the date, with
the annual contracts entered into from year to year between said parties. HOWEVER, before the
expiration of contract of lease on June 1956, Republic sought to renew same but Castellvi refused.
That “taking” of property should be deemed as of 1947 by virtue of lease agreement. However,
number of circumstances must be present in “taking” of property for purpose of eminent domain. The
following must be present:
a) Expropriation must enter a private property. It is present in the case.

b) Entrance into private property must be for more than momentary period. This is absent in
this case.
Lease contract was for year-to-year basis, making it temporary and transitory
despite installations of permanent nature by Republic, since it required renewal after every
year.

c) Entry into property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. It is present in this
because Republic entered property as lessee.

d) Property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or

injuriously affected. It is present in the case because property was used by air force.

e) Utilization of property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. It is absent in this case.
 Castellvi remained as owner and continuously recognized as owner by Republic (as
shown by yearly renewal of contract and the provision whereby Republic undertook to return
property when lease terminated). Neither was Castellvi deprived of all beneficial enjoyment of
property. The Republic paid monthly rentals until the time when it filed complaint for eminent
domain in 1959.

Amigable vs. Cuenca

[G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972]

FACTS:
Victoria Amigable, the petitioner is a rightful owner of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City. Without
prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the
Mango and Gorordo Avenues. Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting
payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement.
Petitioner then filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his
capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways, for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot.

Defendants argue that the:

1. that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the
Auditor General;
2. that the right of action for the recovery had already prescribed;
3. that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages,
attorney’s fees and costs had no valid basis since the Government had not given its
consent to be sued; and
4. that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area
involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the
defendants.

The court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s cause of
action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the lot on the ground that the government cannot
be sued without its consent.

ISSUE:
WON Amigable may properly sue the government.

HELD:
         Yes, Amigable may properly sue the government. Considering that no annotation in favor of the
government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of
conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot.
As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in
question at any time because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since
restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time
because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to
make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due
compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.

As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on
the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In
addition, the government should pay for attorney’s fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial
court after hearing.

NOTES:
 Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use
without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved
party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.