CRUZ VS.

SECRETARY OF DENR
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as
the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD: NO.
The provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law
that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership
over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the
IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners
and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs
of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
//ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They
deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was
dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources –
somehow against the regalian doctrine.

REPUBLIC VS CASTELLVI
FACTS: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease
agreement over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to
terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth
almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property. She then instituted an
ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation
proceedings for the land in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the “taking” should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just
compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.
The requisites for taking are:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Only requisites 1, 3, and 4 were present. It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for
purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic
commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.
Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent
to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by
authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining
the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for
eminent domain was filed.

GOVERNMENT OF QC VS ERICTA
FACTS: Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION
THEREOF”. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park
cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents
of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC
justified the law by invoking police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between
the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds
of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to
benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

REPUBLIC VS PLDT
FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of
Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of
PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT.
Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had
between them.
ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a
valid object for expropriation.
HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the
telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject
to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between
the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.

CHURCHILL VS RAFFERTY
In re: Police power of the State, Lawful Subject of police power
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The case involves a dual question
one involving the power of the court to restrain by injunction the collection of the tax in question and the other
relating to the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon
the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.
The focus of this digest is to highlight the cases’ latter aspect as correlated to the police power of the State.
FACTS:
Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the advertising business, particularly in
billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands in the Province of Rizal were removed upon
complaints and by the orders of the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue by virtue of the provisions of
subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339.
Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the of the Collector of Internal Revenue
to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is
otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in question “in no sense constitute a nuisance and are
not deleterious to the health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any persons.” Defendant
Collector of Internal Revenue avers that after due investigation made upon the complaints of the British and
German Consuls, the defendant “decided that the billboard complained of was and still offensive to the sight
and is otherwise a nuisance.”
ISSUE: Was the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the
Government?
HELD: The High Court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards
which are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This is not
establishing a new principle, but carrying a well- recognized principle to further application. Moreover, if the
police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if
the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects, everything which encroaches
upon such territory is amenable to the police power. Judgment reversed.

TAXICAB OPERATORS VS BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION

FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more
than six years old on grounds that it is violative of the constitutional rights of equal protection because it is
only enforced in Manila and directed solely towards the taxi industry.
Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety and comfort of the riding
public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.
ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old is a valid
exercise of police power.
HELD: No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the safety and
general welfare of the people. In addition, there is no infringement of the equal protection clause because it
is common knowledge that taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant
use, creating a substantial distinction from taxicabs of other place

ILOILO COLD STORAGE VS MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

FACTS:
Plaintiff is the owner of an ice and cold storage plant. Nearby residents made complaints regarding the smoke
that the plant emits saying that it was very injurious to their health and comfort. The defendant made
investigations and later on passed a resolution which demands that the smokestacks of the said factory be
elevated or else the factory operations will be closed or suspended. Plaintiff opposed by filing for injunction.
ISSUES: Whether or not the resolution alone issued by the municipal council is sufficient to label and abate
the supposed nuisance in this case?
RULING: NO.
There are two kinds of nuisances: nuisances per se and per accidens. The former are recognized as
nuisances under any and all circumstances. The latter are such only because of the special circumstances
and conditions surrounding them. The former may be abated even by private individuals however the latter
is different; it needs a determination of the facts which is a judicial function.
The question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all legal uses, by the established courts of law or
equity alone, and that the resolution of officers, or of boards organized by force of municipal charters, cannot,
to any degree, control such decision. City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any
particular thing a nuisance which has not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by
judicial determination.
In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate
industry, beneficial to the people and conducive to their health and comfort. The resolution is obviously not
enough to abate the property of the plaintiff.
//FACTS: The plaintiff, upon authority granted by the defendant, constructed an ice and cold storage plant in
the city of Iloilo. After the plant had been completed and was in operation, nearby residents made complaints
to the defendant that the smoke from the plant was very injurious to their health and comfort. An investigation
was conducted and found that the complaints are well-founded. The plaintiff, through a resolution, was given
one month to proceed with elevation of smokestacks and if not done, the current operations will be suspended
or closed.
The plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of First Instance to enjoin the defendant from carrying into
effect the said resolution contending that that the defendants intend and threaten to require compliance with
said resolution administratively and without the intervention of the court, and by force to compel the closing
and suspension of operations of the plaintiff's machinery and consequently of the entire plant, should the
plaintiff failed to follow the mandates of the resolution. A preliminary injunction was issued.
ISSUE: WON the municipal council has the power to declare and abate the nuisance in the present case?
RULING:
A nuisance is anything that worketh hurt, inconvenience, or damages. It has two classes: Nuisances per se,
and nuisances per accidens. To the first belong those which are unquestionably and under all circumstances
nuisances. The other are considered nuisances because of particular facts and circumstances surrounding
The municipal council is, under the Municipal Code, specifically empowered to declare and abate nuisances.
However it is equally clear that they do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance
when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can they authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and
destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation, or use is not such.
Question of nuisance can conclusively be decided by the established courts of law or equity alone. A city
council may not by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not
theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination. The ice factory of
the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry. If it be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of
its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the board. The petitioner is entitled
to a fair and impartial hearing before a judicial tribunal.

FARRALES VS CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO

FACTS: Plaintiff was the holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari goods. When the temporary
building where she had her stall was demolished in order that the city might construct a permanent building,
Plaintiff was ordered to move her goods to another temporary place until the permanent building was
completed. Instead, Plaintiff built a temporary shack at one end of the Rice Section, Baguio City Market
without seeking prior permit from any city official. When the police threatened to demolish the shack, Plaintiff
sought an injunction before the CFI which asked her that she present proper permit. Upon failure of petitioner
to comply with the order, the CFI denied the petition for injunction, and the police then demolished the shack.
ISSUES: (1) WON the shack or temporary stall was a nuisance; (2) WON the police officers are liable for
damages in extrajudicially abating the nuisance.
RULING: Judgment Affirmed.
(1) The SC held that the shack was a nuisance. In the first place she had no permit to put up the temporary
stall in question in the precise place where she did so. In the second place, its location on the cement
passageway at the end of the Rice Section building was such that it constituted an obstruction to the free
movement of people.
(2) According to Article 707 of the CC, a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for
damages in only two cases: (a) if he causes unnecessary injury; or (b) if an alleged nuisance is later declared
by the courts to be not a real nuisance.
In the case at bar, no unnecessary injury was caused to the appellant, and not only was there no judicial
declaration that the alleged nuisance was not really so but the trial court found that it was in fact a nuisance.
Indeed it may be said that the abatement thereof was not summary, but through a judicial proceeding. The
denial of petitioner’s petition for injunction was in effect an authority for the police to carry out the act which
was sought to be enjoined.