Churchill vs.

Rafferty, 32 Phil 580

Facts:
The plaintiffs put up a billboard on private land in Rizal Province stating “quite a distance from the road and
strongly built, but not dangerous to the safety of the people” and held an advertising manner which is filthy,
indecent, or deleterious to the morals of the community. However, Rafferty (respondent) who is a collector of the
Internal Revenue decided to remove the billboards after investigations resulted from the complaints of British and
German Consuls. Act No. 2339 allowed the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove after due investigation any
billboards exposed to public view if it sees that it is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance. Churchill
admitted that the billboards were offensive to the sight.

Issue:
Whether the removal of the billboards which is offensive to the sight valid?

Held:
Ye, there is no doubt that the removal of the billboards which are offensive to the sight is a valid exercise of police
power that belongs to the legislature and is limited to the Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles that lie
at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An act of legislature that is obviously and undoubtedly
foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would,
without a doubt, be held to be invalid. But when the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and one of
public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts. Unsightly advertisements that are found
offensive to the sight are not discounted by the general public.

US vs. Toribio, 15 PHIL 85

Facts:
The defendant, Luis Toribio, slaughtered a carabao for human consumption. With this action, he was brought to
court contending he violated the provision of Sec. 30 and 33 of Act 1147, which is an act regulating registration,
branding, and slaughtering of large cattle. Section 30, states that killing of the animal concern is not allowed without
the issuance of a permit by the municipal treasurer, and Section 33 is for penalizing individuals who violate section
30. However, the defendant did apply for a permit but was denied it wasn’t unfit “for agricultural work or draft
purposes”. Toribio’s counsel argued that penalizing the slaughter of a carabao for human consumption as food
without obtaining a permit which cannot be acquired in the event that the animal isn’t unfit for agricultural work or
draft purposes is unconstitutional and violated section 5 of the Philippine Bill which provides that no law shall be
enacted which shall be deprived away any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

Issue:
Whether Act 1147 unconstitutional and violated section 5 of the Philippine Bill?

Held:
No. Act 1147 is not a taking of the property for public use within the interpretation of the Constitution. It is a
legitimate exercise of the power of the legislative to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as
would be inconsistent with public rights. The Court cited events that occurred where a huge percentage of the
carabao population was wiped out because it does not establish taking the carabao for public use or purpose but it’s
just a mere reputation for the consumption of the animals and to protect the welfare and interest of the public.

People vs. Fajardo, 100 Phil 443

Facts:
Juan F. Fajardo was a mayor of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur. During his incumbency, a municipal
ordinance was passed in which construction or repair of a building must obtain a written permit from the mayor and
if said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies a public property, it shall be removed at the
expense of its owner. Four years later, appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son-in-law (Babilonia)
filed a written request with the current mayor at that time for a permit to construct a building because they needed a
residence, their former house was destroyed by a typhoon and they’re had been living on a leased property.
However, their request was denied due to the reason of that the building would destroy the view or beauty of the
public plaza. Despite the denial, the defendants constructed the building without a permit. They were charged and
convicted by the justice of the peace court for violation of the ordinance. They appealed to the CIF but it affirmed
the conviction. They appealed to CA but it was forwarded to the Supreme Court because the appeal attacks the
constitutionality of the ordinance.

Issue:
Whether the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power in its regulation of property.

Held:
No. It oversteps the bounds of police power and amounts to a taking of appellants' property without just
compensation. The Municipal Ordinance No. 7’s standards are entirely lacking making it unreasonable and
oppressive. An ordinance that permanently restricts the use of property that can’t be used for any reasonable
purposes beyond regulation is recognized as a taking of the property.

Ynot vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 659

Facts:
Restituto Ynot, the petitioner, transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984
when they were confiscated by the police commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for violation of Executive Order No.
626-A. The Executive Order prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos and slaughtering of carabaos
regardless of age, sex, physical condition and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and RTC Iloilo issued a writ of replevin upon his filing pf supersedeas bond. The
court sustained the confiscation and since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond.
He appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which upheld the trial court and now come to file with Supreme
Court for this petition for review on certiorari. He contended that the EO is unconstitutional to the extent that it
authorizes the confiscation of the animal or its meat being transported across provincial boundaries. He also raised
that its penalty is invalid because it is posed without giving its owner his right to be heard before a court as
guaranteed by due process.

Issue:
Whether Executive Order No. 626-A is valid and constitutional.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 626-A is unconstitutional and not valid. The EO violates due
process. The transportation of the carabaos does not means animals will be slaughtered after. The petitioner wasn’t
provided a chance to explain his side on transporting the carabaos. The method employed to conserve the carabaos is
not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and is recognized as unduly oppressive.

US vs. Causby, 328 US 256

Facts:
Causby Family owned a chicken farm in North Carolina near the Greensboro-Highpoint Airport used it for military
purposes. Causby, the respondent, noticed that the increase of noise and vibrations were produced by the military
aircraft. It had negatively affected their chickens. The disturbance caused by the noise and vibrations resulted in
abnormal reactions of the poultry such as smothering themselves, so much stress it led them to die. As a result,
Causby’s livelihood from the farm decreased significantly. The petitioner filed suit against the US government
claiming that its use of the airspace above their property amounted to taking of their property without just
compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

Issue:
Whether the Causby’s property has been taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.

Held:
Yes, the Court rules in favor of the respondents. Holding that the repeated and regular flights of military aircraft over
their property constitute a taking of their property rights. Thus, required just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment.

Republic vs. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620

Facts:
The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation
and equipment by renting trunklines of PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. On their
agreement, one of PLDT’s rules the Bureau must abide by is a prohibition for the public use of the service furnished
by the telephone subscriber for his private use. Unfortunately, the Bureau extended its services to the public with the
use of PLDT’s very own trunklines. PLDT did not penalize them and continued to accept its payment. A few years
later, the Bureau entered into an agreement with RCA, who had a previous engagement with PLDT, for overseas
telephone services. PLDT complained and raised that it was violating the conditions under their Private Branch
Exchange, referring to the Bureau’s use of trunklines not only for the use of the government offices but even to serve
private persons or the general public. PLDT warned the Bureau that it would cut the telephone connections at
midnight if the Bureau didn’t stop what it was doing. The bureau did not reply. Thus, PDLT cut the lines. Republic,
through Bureau, commenced suit to PLDT to execute a contract with the plaintiff for the use of its facilities and
services.

Issue:
Whether PLDT can be forced to execute a contract with the petitioner.

Held:
No, parties cannot be forced to enter into a contract where no agreement occurred between them as to the principal
terms and conditions of the contract. But the court quo has apparently overlooked that while the Republic may not
compel PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, it may exercise sovereign power of eminent domain and require PLDT
to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and of that PLDT, as the need of the government may
require, subject to payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.

Republic vs. Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336

Facts:
Republic, though Philippine Airforce, entered into a lease agreement with the defendants. Castellvi and Toledo-
Gozun decided not to renew the lease. For this reason, plaintiff decided to proceed expropriation proceedings.
During the valuation of just compensation, plaintiff argued that it had taken the property during the commencement
of the lease contract, and not when the suit started. Castellvi insist that the land concern wasn’t taken when the
government begun to occupy the land as lessee because the essential elements of the taking of the property under the
power of eminent domain: 1) entrance and occupation by the condemnor upon the private property for more than
momentary or limited period of time; 2) denting it to a public use in such way as to oust the owner and deprive them
of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Issue:
Whether the compensation of the property be based on the date of suit started or the plaintiff occupied the land?

Held:
Supreme Court ruled that the basis of the compensation should not be based on the date of the occupation. There are
requisites of the “taking”: 1) expropriator must enter the private property; 2) the entry must be more than momentary
period; 3) it must be warrant or color of the authorities; 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Only the three factors of
requisites are present, and taking of property for purposes of eminent domain can’t be taken nor consideration in
1947 (date of occupation). Therefore, just compensation should be determined based on the date of suit.

Bel-Air Association vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719

Facts:
This suit is brought up by the Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) to the Supreme Court for by petition for
review on certiorari. Ayala Corporation issued a Deed of Donation over Jupiter and Orbit Streets to BAVA. BAVA
strongly believed that these streets should be privately use by its residents. However, the Office of the Makati Mayor
opened the streets, Jupiter and Orbit included, to the general public to alleviate traffic congestions along the public
streets adjacent to Bel-Air Village, in which the Ayala claimed that BAVA agreed because of public necessity and in
the exercise of police power. BAVA refuted this claim, and contended that they never agreed in as such. Thus, this
petition. BAVA argued that by virtue of the ownership of the streets, it should not be deprived without due process of
law nor without just compensation.

Issue:
Whether the opening of Jupiter Street and Orbit Street is valid.

Held:
Yes. BAVA cannot rightfully complain that opening of the two streets by the Office of the Mayor issued an
ordinance is acted expeditiously. The Deed of Donation stipulated that general public has equal right to it. Thus, it
cannot be assumed that it is only for the exclusive benefits of BAV residents. There is no taking of property involved
because it doesn’t amount of deprivation of property without due process of law or expropriation without just
compensation. It doesn’t interfere their personal liberty or proper in order to promote the general welfare of the
public.

EPZA vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305

Facts:
The president issued Proclamation No. 1811 reserving land for an export processing zone but some parts of the land
are owned by a private individual. The petitioner filed suit to expropriate the land. The judge determined the the
only issue was the compensation of the land. Judge appointed commissioner to determine the just compensation
which suggested that the fair value of the land is 15.00 per sqm. However, petitioner argued that the judge made an
error and insisted that PD 1533 should be the basis of the compensation. On this decree, the fair market and current
market value decided by the owner of the land sought to be expropriated or market value recommended by the
assessor, whichever is lower shall be the basis and not Rule 67 Section 5-8 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether PD 1533 is the basis of just compensation of the land to be expropriated.

Held:
No, Supreme Court ruled that PD 1533 is unconstitutional and void. It eliminates the court’s decision to appoint
commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. The reason of commissioners appointment is to
evaluate the just compensation of the expropriated properties because the landowners of this properties shall recover
the fair and full value of the lot at the time of the taking. Implementing PD 1533 may result in the deprivation of the
landowners rights due process to enable to prove its claim to just compensation.
 De Knecht vs. Bautista
100 SCRA 660

Facts:
De Knecht alleges that more than ten (10) years ago, the government through the Department of Public
Works and Communications (now MPH) prepared a plan to extend Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to Roxas
Boulevard; that the proposed extension, an adjunct of another road-building program, the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road Project, would pass through Cuneta Avenue up to Roxas Boulevard; that this route would be a straight one,
taking into account the direction of EDSA; that preparatory to the implementation of the plan above, or on
December 13, 1974, then Secretary Baltazar Aquino of the Department of Public Highways directed the City
Engineer of Pasay City not to issue temporary or permanent permits for the construction and/or improvement of
buildings and other structures located within the proposed extension through Cuneta Avenue; that shortly thereafter
the Department of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan
Streets which are lined with old substantial houses; that upon learning of the changed plan, the owners of the
residential houses that would be affected, the herein petitioner being one of them.
The government filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch III, Pasay City presided by the respondent
Judge, a complaint for expropriation against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein and Del Pan
Streets, among them the herein petitioner. The respondent judge issued a writ of possession authorizing the Republic
of the Philippines to take and enter into the possession of the properties sought to be condemned.
Issues:
The choice of properties, petitioner’s property is included, to be expropriated made by the Ministry of Public
Highways was arbitrary and erroneous.
Ruling:
There is no question as to the right of the Republic of the Philippines to take private property for public use upon the
payment of just compensation. Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution of the Philippines provides: "Private
property shall not be taken for public use... without just compensation."
It is recognized, however, that the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private property
should be taken. It’s a fact that the Department of Public Highways originally established the extension of EDSA
along Cuneta Avenue.
From all the preceding, the facts of record, and recommendations of the Human Settlements Commission, it is clear
that the choice of Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets as the line through which the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The respondent judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing the Republic of the Philippines to take immediate possession of
the properties sought to be expropriated.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The order of June 14, 1979, authorizing the Republic of the
Philippines to take or enter upon the possession of the properties sought to be condemned is set aside, and the
respondent judge is permanently enjoined from taking any further action on Civil Case No. 7001-P.

Republic vs. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 141

Facts:
The Republic filed suit in the CFI of Rizal in Pasay City an expropriation proceeding against the owners of the
houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets among them was respondent, Cristina De Knecht. Respondent,
de Knecht, filed an ex-parte urgent motion for the issuance by the trial court of a restraining order to restrain the
Republic from proceeding with the taking of immediate possession and control of the property sought to be
condemned. The Republic filed then answered with a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property
In an order, the lower court issued a writ of possession authorizing the Republic to enter into and take possession of
the properties sought to be condemned.

On July 16, 1979, de Knecht filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. L-51078
(Knecht vs. Bautista).

On August 8, 1981, other defendants moved to dismiss the expropriation action in compliance with the aforesaid
decision of this Court which had become final, and to avoid further damage to the same defendants who were denied
possession of their properties. The Republic had no objection to the said motion to dismiss as it was by the
forestated decision.

However, the Republic filed a motion to dismiss said case due to the enactment of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 340
expropriating the same properties and for the same purpose.

The lower court dismissed the defendant’s case (filed on August 8, 1981) because of the enactment of the said law.
The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the lower court. On appeal before the CA, the order of the
RTC was set aside and the expropriation proceedings were dismissed. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgment of the Court may be the subject
of subsequent legislation for expropriation.

Held:
The petition was granted and the CA's decision and resolution were reversed and set aside. The order of the CFI
Pasay City was reinstated.

While it is true that said final judgment of this Court in G.R. No. L-51078 (Knecht vs.Bautista) becomes the law of
the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the petitioner to take private properties for public use
upon the payment of the just compensation is provided in the Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation
proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by
taking appropriate court action or by legislation.

The Court finds justification in proceeding with the said expropriation proceedings through the Fernando Rein-Del
Pan streets from ESDA to Roxas Boulevard due to the a forestated supervening events after the rendition of the
decision of this Court in De Knecht. B.P. Blg. 340 therefore effectively superseded the aforesaid final and executory
decision of this court. The trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case pending before it
on the ground of the enactment of B.P. Blg. 340.

Manotok vs. NHA, 150 SCRA 89

Facts:
Petitioners are the owners of two large estates known as the Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apogin Tondo, Manila,
both of which were declared expropriated in two decrees issued by President Marcos, PD 1669 and PD 1670. The
petitioners contend that the decrees violate their constitutional right to due process and equal protection since by
their mere passage their properties were automatically expropriated and they were immediately deprived of the
ownership and possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose such expropriation. The government, on
the other hand, contends that the power of eminent domain is inherent in the state and when the legislature or the
President through his law-making powers exercises this power, the public use and public necessity of the
expropriation and the fixing of the just compensation become political and the courts must respect the decision.

Issue:
Whether PD 1669 and PD 1670 are unconstitutional on the basis that there was no proper practice of due process
and unjust compensation.

Held:
Yes. PD 1669 and 1670 are unconstitutional. P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 to be violative of the petitioners' right to due
process of law and therefore failed the test of constitutionality. The decrees don't provide for any form of hearing or
procedure by which the petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the
reasonableness of the just compensation.

Having failed to provide for a hearing, the government should have filed an expropriation case under Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Court but it did not do so. It did not deem it necessary because of the enactment of the questioned
decrees which rendered, by their very passage, any questions concerning the expropriation of the properties, moot
and academic. In effect, the properties, under the decrees were "automatically expropriated." This became more
evident when the NHA wrote the Register of Deeds and requested her to cancel the certificate of titles of the
petitioners, furnishing said Register of Deeds only with copies of the decisions to support its request.

SC elaborated on how to determine just compensation by saying “We have upheld the determination of just
compensation and the rationale behind it either at the time of the actual taking of the government or at the time of
the judgment by the court, whichever came first.” PD 1669 and 1670 go further. There is no mention of any market
value declared by the owner. Section 6 of the two decrees pegs just compensation at the market value determined by
the City Assessor. The City Assessor is warned by the decrees to "consider existing conditions in the area notably,
that no improvement has been undertaken on the land and that the land is squatted upon by resident families which
should considerably depress the expropriation costs."

The market value stated by the city assessor alone cannot substitute for the court's judgment in expropriation
proceedings. It is violative of the due process and the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution to deny a
property owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation made by a local assessor is wrong or prejudiced.

Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators vs. City of Manila, 20 SCRA 849

Facts:
Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and
Go Chiu, the president and general manager of the second petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition against
Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such
charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary
orders for the execution and enforcement of such ordinances. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation
is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen members operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities and regularly paying taxes.
It was alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
approved on June 14, 1963, by the then-acting City Mayor, Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged
grievances against the ordinance were outlined in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of
the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it regulates motels, on the ground that in the revised
charter of the City of Manila or any other law, no reference is made to motels. it also being provided that the
premises and facilities of such hotels, motels, and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City
Mayor, the Chief of Police or their duly authorized representatives. The lower court on July 6, 1963, issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering the respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and
after July 8, 1963.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional and invalid.

Held:
No, Ordinance No. 4760 is constitutional and valid in exercising eminent domain. Liberty is understood to be
regulated by law for the good of the individual and the peace and order of society.

A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court
against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand,
consistently with what has been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and
substantive aspects.

“The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensing fees was intended to
discourage “establishments of the kind from operating for a purpose other than legal” and at the same time, to
increase “the income of the city government.”

Assoc. of Small Landowners vs. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343

Facts:
These are consolidated cases that involve common legal, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of
several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No.
6657.

G.R. No. 79777

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of
powers, due process, equal protection, and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation.

G.R. No. 79310

This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They contend that taking must
be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but
no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of E.O. No. 229.

G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property
shall be taken without due process or just compensation.

G.R. No. 78742

Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the
Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted
decree.

Issue:
Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain.

Held:

There are traditional distinctions between police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the
application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power is
noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished
for public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation
of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires
the payment of just compensation to the owner. The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the
question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe
retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property by the
Constitution. But where to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands
they may own over the maximum area allowed, there is a taking under the power of eminent domain for which
payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land.
What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is an exercise not of the police power but of the power
of eminent domain.

Luz Farms vs. Secretary, 192 SCRA 51

Facts:
On 10 June 1988, RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program) was approved by the president of the
Philippines, which includes, among others, the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage. In the
following year, the secretary of DAR promulgated the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Sections 11,13,
and 32 of the said law. Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, avers that
it would be adversely affected by the enforcement of several sections of the CARP.
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply it:
a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural
Enterprise or Agricultural Activity.
b) Section 11 defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry,
and swine raising . . ."
c)Section 13 which calls upon the petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.
d)Section 16(d) and 17 which vests on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the
just compensation to be paid for lands covered by comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law)
e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13
f)". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty
(60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and
above the compensation they currently receive xxx4.)
On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term
"agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's
International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the following words: Agriculture, Livestock, and Farms
which includes raising of livestock and poultry.

Issue:
Whether or not the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of RA 6657 directing “corporate farms” to execute and
implement “production-sharing plans” is unreasonable for being confiscatory and violative of due process,
concerning livestock and poultry raisers.

Held:
YES. As there is no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform, there is no need
to call upon them to distribute 3% of their gross sales and 10% of their net profits to their workers as additional
compensation.
 Cariday vs. CA (Note: Gutierrez J., dissenting), 176 SCRA 31

Facts:
Cariday is a member of the Forbes Park Association or FPA. He's the owner of a residence there. On the annotation
of the title where the Deed of Restrictions is indicated, it is said that only one residence building per lot is allowed
and not more than that be constructed. Cariday made a repair in its building where additions and deletions were
made. It was then expected by the FPA's civil engineer and observed that the repair made was designed to allow
occupancy by two families which the FPA demanded be corrected and conform with the restrictions. However,
Cariday did not conform and proceeded to lease a portion of his house to a foreigner, and the other half was
occupied by Procter and Gamble's Executive.

When P&G's Executive tried to move in, he was stopped by the security guards on account of the property
restrictions. For this reason, FPA warned to disconnect the water service to Cariday's property.

Cariday filed a complaint for injunction and damages. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
ordering the association to desist from cutting off the water supply to Cariday's building, or to reconnect the service
if it has been cut off, and to desist from preventing the tenants' ingress into egress from its building. FPA filed a
motion for reconsideration which then has been denied.

On the appeal, CA annulled the writ of injunction and upheld the right of the FPA to prohibit the entry of additional
tenants into Cariday's property and to disconnect its water services due to violation of restrictions.

Issue:
Whether the provision in the Deed of Restrictions which binds the owner of the property to use it only for residential
purposes and not more than a single-family building will be constructed thereon tenable?

Held:
Yes. Cariday avers that while it is indeed bound by the restriction to construct only "one residential building" on its
lot, "nowhere in the rules and regulations is there a categorical prohibition and or restriction preventing it from
exercising its rights to let its residential building to two or more tenant.

However, his interpretation of the restriction is unacceptable. The restriction clearly defines not only the type and
number of structures allowed for construction but also the number of families that may use it as a residence. The
purpose of the restriction is to avoid overcrowding in both the house and in the subdivision.

Though, in Filipino culture, the concept of a single-family dwelling may embrace the extended family leasing one's
house in Forbes Park, which the petitioner who is not related to him would be impermissible under the one single-
family restriction recorded on the title of the property.

Dissenting Opinion:
It would not lead to overcrowding and the millions of properties of single-storey residences would make
the spending more. We have to curb the lifestyle of the rich people in Forbes against ostentatious wealth.
 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155

Facts:
The Legislature passed RA 1180 (an Act to Regulated the Retail Business), with the purpose of preventing persons
who aren't citizens of the country from having a stranglehold upon the people's economic life. A prohibition against
aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which is not wholly owned by Filipinos,
from engaging directly in the retail trade. However, the citizens and juridical entities of the US were exempted from
this Act.

Lao Ichong, a Chinese alien, filed an action to declare the unconstitutionality of the Republic Act for the following
reasons: 1) it denies the alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and
property without due process; 2) the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title; 3) the Act violated international
and treaty obligations; and 4) the provisions of the Act against transmission by the aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession.

Issue:
Whether the RA 1189 deprive aliens/foreigners of equal protection of laws?

Held:
No. The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny aliens the equal protection of laws. There are
real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the
legislative classification adopted. The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among
residents but requires that all persons should be treated alike. The difference in status between citizens
and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. The law does
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of
law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege.

Korematsu v. U.S. 323 U.S. 214 (1944)

Facts:
President of the United States Franklin Roosevelt (President Roosevelt) issued an executive order authorizing
military commanders to prescribe military areas from which any or all persons may be excluded. Thereupon, a
military commander ordered all persons of Japanese descent, whether or not they were United States citizens, to
leave their homes on the West Coast and to report to “Assembly Centers.
Fred Korematsu, 23, was a Japanese-American citizen who did not comply with the order to leave his home and job,
despite the fact that his parents had abandoned their home and their flower nursery business in preparation for
reporting to a camp. Korematsu planned to stay behind. He had plastic surgery on his eyes to alter his appearance;
changed his name to Clyde Sarah; and claimed that he was of Spanish and Hawaiian descent.”
On May 30, 1942, about six months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the FBI arrested Korematsu for
failure to report to a relocation center. After his arrest, while waiting in jail, he decided to allow the American Civil
Liberties Union to represent him and make his case a test case to challenge the constitutionality of the government’s
order.

Issue:
Whether the Executive Order violated the petitioner’s right to liberty without due process.

Held:
No. At that time, the purpose of the order was to prevent espionage and sabotage as the US was still in a time of war
so the order was upheld as not being violative of the equal protection clause. It was justified.

In 1983, the case was re-opened providing new evidence. They showed that the government's legal team
intentionally suppressed or destroyed evidence from the government's intelligence agencies that the Japanese
Americans posed no military threat to the US. The district court cleared Korematsu's name but the Supreme Court
decision still stands. In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Robert Jackson contended: "Korematsu ... has been
convicted of an act not commonly thought a crime," he wrote. "It consists merely of being present in the state
whereof he is a citizen, near the place where he was born, and where all his life he has lived." The nation's wartime
security concerns, he contended, were not adequate to strip Korematsu and the other internees of their
constitutionally protected civil rights.

He called the exclusion order "the legalization of racism” that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. He compared the exclusion order to the “abhorrent and despicable treatment of minority
groups by the dictatorial tyrannies which this nation is now pledged to destroy. He concluded that the exclusion
order violated the Fourteenth Amendment by “fall[ing] into the ugly abyss of racism."

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)

Facts:
A Louisiana statute required railroad companies to provide separate, but equal accommodations for its Black and
White passengers. An exception was made for nurses attending to the children of the other race. The plaintiff, who
was seven-eighths white, was prosecuted under the statute after he refused to leave the section of a train reserved for
whites. The alleged purpose of the statute was to preserve public peace and good order and to promote the comfort
of the people.
Issue:
Was the statute requiring separate, but equal accommodations on railroad transportation consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution?

Held:
Yes. The State Supreme Court is affirmed. Justice Henry Brown (J. Brown) stated that although the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution was designed to enforce equality between the races, it was not intended to abolish
distinctions based on color or to enforce a commingling of the races in a way unsatisfactory to either. Laws requiring
the separation of the races do not imply the inferiority of either. If the law “stamps the colored race with a badge of
inferiority,” it is because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. Therefore, the statute constitutes a
valid exercise of the States’ police powers.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution does, however, require that the exercise of a state’s police powers be
reasonable. Laws enacted in good faith, for the promotion of the public good and not for the annoyance or
oppression of another race are reasonable. As such, the statute was reasonable.

Dissent:
Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) said that everyone knows that the purpose of the statute was to exclude colored
people from coaches occupied by whites. The Constitution is color-blind. It neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens.

Brown vs. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)

Facts:
This case is based on a group of cases coming from the states of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia and Delaware. In
each of the cases, black minors seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their
community on a non-segregated basis. In each instance, they had been denied admission to schools attended by
white children under laws requiring or permitting racial segregation. In most cases the lower courts denied relief
relying on the “separate but equal” doctrine announced in Plessy v. Fergusson. Plaintiffs contend that segregated
public schools are not “equal” and cannot be made “equal,” and hence, they are deprived of the equal protection of
the laws.

Issue:
Whether segregated public schools are not “equal” and cannot be made “equal,” thereby making the doctrine of
“separate but equal” in public schools a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Held:
Yes. Judgments of the lower courts reversed. Although the framers’ intent and the circumstances surrounding the
adoption of the 14th Amendment in 1868 cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the issue at hand. The doctrine
of “separate but equal” did not appear until 1896 in Plessy. Here, there are findings below that the black and white
schools involved had been equalized with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications, teacher salaries, and other
“tangible” factors. Therefore, this decision cannot turn on a mere comparison of these “tangible” factors, but rather
the effect of segregation itself on public education. Education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments and must be made available on equal terms. “Segregation of white and colored children in public
schools has a detrimental effect on colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law.”
Therefore, in the field of public education, the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal. Thus, the plaintiffs have been deprived of equal protection.

Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)

Facts:
The University of California, Davis Medical School reserved 16 spots out of the 100 in any given class for
“disadvantaged minorities.” The Respondent, when compared to students admitted under the special admissions
program, had more favorable objective indicia of performance, while his race was the only distinguishing
characteristic. The Respondent sued, alleging that the special admissions program denied him equal protection of
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

Issue:
Is the special admissions program of the University of California constitutional?
Can race be considered as a factor in the admissions process?

Held:
The special admissions program is unconstitutional, but race may be considered as a factor in the admissions
process. Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell), writing for the court, says that the Supreme Court of the United States
(Supreme Court) should not pay attention to past discrimination in reviewing the policies of the University, as this is
tantamount to allowing political trends to dictate constitutional principles.
J. Powell determines that accepting a minimum number of minorities simply to reduce the traditional deficit of such
individuals in the medical profession is facially unconstitutional, as it gives preference to an individual on the basis
of race alone.
The major determination of the Supreme Court is whether or not racial preference may be used to promote diversity
in the student body. J. Powell argues that setting aside a specified number of minority slots is not congruent to the
purported goal – minority students in themselves do not guarantee a diversity of viewpoints in the educational
environment.

Gratz v. Bollinger / Grutter v. Bollinger, 02-516 (23 June 2003)

Facts:
After being denied entry into the University of Michigan’s undergraduate College of Literature, Science, and the
Arts, Gratz and Hamacher, two Caucasians, filed suit against one of the University’s advisors in federal district
court. Both plaintiffs claimed that the University’s current admission policy violated the 14th Amendment’s Equal
Protection clause. The policy ranked applicants based on several factors such as standardized testing scores and
academic achievements, but there was an additional 20 points added to an applicant belonging to an
underrepresented minority. The majority of students were admitted based on the point scale alone.

In a case cited, Grutter v. Bollinger, the expressed view that consideration of race as a factor in admissions might
sometimes serve a compelling government interest. Respondents contended that the LSA is interested in the
education benefits of having a racially and ethnically diverse pool of students and its program is narrowly tailored to
serve that vision. They also asserted that the LSA had a compelling interest in remedying the university’s past and
current discrimination against minorities.

Issue:
Whether racial preference in a university’s admission process violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment?
Held:
Yes. The use of race in the admission process is not narrowly tailored to achieve diversity and as a result, violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
The admission policy set in place by the University giving candidates an extra 20 points based on their race violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. For the University to use race as a justification for
automatically assigning points to each minority applicant, it must be narrowly tailored to achieve its stated purpose,
promoting a diverse student body.

Here, the applicants are not afforded individualized review. The extra 20 points ultimately guarantee admission to
minimally qualified applicants. As a result, it is apparent that race is elevated as the determining factor in the
admissions process. In addition, other factors considered, like extracurricular activities are only awarded five points,
a small measure compared to the 20 points allotted for being a minority

Bollinger claims the policy is useful for managing the volume of applications received, however, the program is
capable of providing individualized consideration and although the volume of applicants may be a challenge, it does
not mean an unconstitutional procedure should be put in place to alleviate the challenge.

Grutter v. Bollinger

Facts:
The University of Michigan Law School (Defendant) receives more than 3,500 applications each year for a class of
350 students. The Law School’s (Defendant) admissions committee tried to achieve diversity in the student body by
requiring admissions officials to evaluate each applicant based on all the information in the file, including a personal
statement, letters of recommendation, a student’s essay, GPA score, LSAT score, as well as so-called soft variables.
Plus, the admissions policy specifically stressed the Law School’s (Defendant) longstanding commitment to racial
and ethical diversity. In this regard, the official admission policy noted that by enrolling a critical mass of
underrepresented minority students, Defendant sought to ensure their ability to make unique contributions to the
character of the Law School. When Barbara Grutter (Plaintiff), a white Michigan resident with a 3.8 grade average
and 161 LSAT score, applied for admission but was denied, she sued the Law School (Defendant) in federal district
court, claiming racial discrimination against her in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following a 15-day
bench trial, the district court upheld Plaintiff’s claim. The court of appeals reversed. Plaintiff appealed

Issue:
Is diversity a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race when public universities select
applicants for admission?

Held:
(O’Connor, J.) Yes. Diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race when public
universities select applicants for admission. In this case, the Law School’s (Defendant) admissions program bears
the hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan. Truly individualized consideration demands that race be used in a
flexible, non-mechanical way. It follows from this mandate that universities cannot establish quotas for members of
certain racial groups or put members of those groups on separate admission tracks. Universities also cannot insulate
applicants who belong to certain racial or ethnic groups from the competition for admission. However, as was done
here, universities can consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a plus factor in the context of individualized
consideration of each and every applicant. The Law School’s (Defendant) goal of attaining a critical mass of
underrepresented minority students does not transform its program into a quota. The evidence indicated that the
Defendant engaged in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to
all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment. In addition, evidence showed that
the Defendant gives substantial weight to diversity factors besides race by frequently accepting nonminority
applicants with grades and test scores lower than underrepresented minority applicants. There was no Law School
(Defendant) policy, either de facto or de jure, of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single soft variable.
Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative. It also does not require a
university to choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide
educational opportunities to members of all racial groups. Affirmed.

Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873)

Facts:
Mrs. Myra Bradwell was denied an application to practice law in the Illinois Supreme Court. Her petition included
the requisite certificate attesting to her good character and qualifications. The United States Supreme Court
affirmed.

Issue:
Does the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provide that one of the privileges and immunities
of women as citizens is to engage in any profession?

Held:
The admission to the bar is a matter reserved to the states and Bradwell’s right to practice law is not protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Bradley concurred, that the Illinois Supreme Court requires a certificate from the
court of some county of his good moral character, and is otherwise left to the discretion of the court. The court found
itself bound by two limitations: to promote the proper administration of justice not to admit any class of persons not
intended by the legislature to be admitted, even though not expressly excluded by statute.
Historically the right to engage in every profession has not been one of the established fundamental privilege and
immunities of the sex. The law has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of
man and women. The harmony of interests and views that belong to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of
a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from her husband.
Historically women had no legal existence and were incapable of making binding contracts without her husband’s
consent. This played heavily in the Supreme Court of Illinois’ decision. The paramount destiny of women is to fulfill
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.

Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (2 Bernas 76)

Facts:

Bar owner Valentine Goesaert and her daughter (plaintiffs) brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of
a Michigan law that forbade women from bartending in any city with over 50,000 residents. The only exception was
for wives or daughters of men who owned bars. Otherwise, women could work as waitresses in bars, but not
bartenders. The trial court upheld the law, and Goesaert appealed.

Issue:
Whether the law violates equal protection; i.e. whether women have a constitutionally protected right to choose to be
a bartender.

Held:
No. Michigan could ban all women from being bartenders if it wished. The Constitution does not require legislatures
to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest
scientific standards. Since there may be a reasonable and valid desire in the legislature to protect female bartenders,
the court can not second-guess the legislature and decide that the real purpose here was for male bartenders to
monopolize the industry.
 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484(1974)

Facts:
California operated a disability insurance system that supplemented workers' compensation, in that it provided for
payments for disabilities not covered by workers' compensation. The list of disabilities paid for by the State of
California was not exhaustive. Among those disabilities not paid for were certain pregnancy-related conditions. A
suit was brought challenging the system as an unconstitutional gender-based classification.

Issue:
Does the exclusion of pregnancy-related conditions violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause?

Held:
No. Appeals Court ruling affirmed. The list of conditions covered by the disability insurance system is not
exclusive. Furthermore, there are conditions not covered by the system that affect both men and women. The
excluded conditions do not affect women alone.
The savings given to the program by the exclusion of such conditions benefit both men and women. That is, the
inclusion of the excluded conditions would result in lesser amounts of funding for all other conditions.

Dissent:
Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) argues that by disallowing payments related to pregnancy, the State inevitably
discriminates against women.
 Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)

Facts:
The Petitioner, Michael M. (Petitioner), a seventeen-and-a-half-year-old male, sought to have California’s statutory rape law
declared unconstitutional, on state and federal grounds, because the law defines statutory rape as “an act of sexual intercourse
accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years,” and thus, unlawfully
discriminates on the basis of gender. The California trial and appellate courts denied the Petitioner’s request for relief. The
Supreme Court of California upheld the judgments of the lower courts. The ruling of the Supreme Court of California was
affirmed.

Issue:
Whether California’s “statutory rape” law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution) because it only holds males criminally liable for sexual intercourse as defined under the statute.

Held:
(J. Rehnquist) No. California’s statutory rape law bears a substantial relationship to important governmental objectives, and thus,
the statute passes constitutional muster. The judgment of the California Supreme Court is affirmed.
The California statute withstands a constitutional challenge because it supports the state’s effort to prevent illegitimate
pregnancies, to prevent “significant social, medical, and economic consequences for both the mother and her child, to prevent
abortions, and to prevent children born, as a result of illegitimate pregnancies, to become wards of the State.”
The California statute protects young women from sexual intercourse that can cause consequences that are “profound[ly]
physical, emotional, and psychological.” Because only women can become pregnant, “the consequences of sexual intercourse and
pregnancy fall more heavily on the female than on the male.”
 Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)

Facts:
Respondent claims that by having a hiring preference for veterans over non-veterans for civil service positions, the
Petitioner is discriminating against women.
The District Court found that this practice has a severe impact on job opportunities for women since most of the
veterans are men.

Issue:
Does the hiring practice that favors veterans violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.

Held:
No. The benefit of this act was offered to any person who was a veteran. The law is a preference for veterans of
either sex over non-veterans of either sex. It was not designed to favor men over women.

Discussion:
This statute was designed to reward and help veterans reenter society after their service. At the time only 1% of the
veterans were women. So, it appeared that this legislation was meant for men only. But, in its application and by
definition a veteran is gender neutral.
 Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 365 (1886)

Facts:

San Francisco enacted an ordinance that made it illegal to operate a laundry that was not constructed of stone or
brick without the consent of the board of supervisors. The supervisors granted whites permission to operate such
laundries but denied permission to Chinese immigrants. Defendant operated a laundry without permission and was
arrested and convicted of violating this ordinance. He appealed his conviction, arguing that the law was being
applied in a discriminatory manner.

Issue:
Is a validly written law made unconstitutional when it is applied in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner?

Held:
(Matthews, J.) Yes. A valid law that is applied in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner is unconstitutional as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The manner in which the law is applied is dispositive in this case, so the
Court does not need to reach the question of whether the law itself is actually valid or not. Assuming its validity
arguendo, the discriminatory way in which the law is being applied in order to prevent Chinese immigrants from
operating laundry businesses violates the Equal Protection Clause. Defendant’s conviction must be vacated.
Reversed and remanded.
 Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 888 F. 2d 591 (1989)

Facts:
In April 1981, Manuel Fragante (plaintiff) moved to Hawaii from the Philippines. Fragante saw an advertisement for
a position as a civil-service clerk for the City and County of Honolulu (Honolulu). One of the primary
responsibilities of a clerk was to verbally provide information to 200 to 300 people per day. Fragante applied for the
position and received the highest score on the written test. Fragante then had an oral interview with two
interviewers. Both interviewers noted that Fragante spoke with a heavy accent, which made it difficult to understand
him. The interviewers gave Fragante a negative recommendation based on Fragante’s oral-communication skills. As
a result, Fragante’s position on the civil-service list of candidates fell from first to third. Honolulu hired the two
candidates who had superior verbal communication skills and had ultimately ranked higher than Fragante. Fragante
sued Honolulu, claiming that he had been discriminated against based on his national origin in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The district court found that effective oral-
communication skills were a legitimate occupational qualification for a clerk position. The district court found that
Fragante’s non-selection was due to his lack of oral-communication skills, not due to his national origin, and
dismissed the complaint. Fragante appealed.

Issue:
Whether Fragante established prima facie of a discrimination case.

Held:

No. It appears that the defendants were motivated exclusively by reasonable business necessity. Fragante failed to
get the job because two competitors had superior qualifications with respect to a relevant task performed by a
government clerk. Insofar as this implicates "the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees...," Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 US 563, 568, 88 S.
Ct. 1731, 1735, 29 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). Under Ward v. Westland Plastics, Inc., "an employer's decision may be
justified by the hired employee's superior qualifications unless the purported justification is a pretext for invidious
discrimination. In this case, Fragante was passed over because of the deleterious effect of his Filipino accent on his
ability to communicate orally, not merely because he has an accent.