VICENTE SALANDANAN,

-versus-
HON. TITO V. TIZON
FACTS:
a complaint for ejectment and recovery of possession filed by respondent Magno against
petitioner in the Court of First Instance. presided by respondent Judge, the alleged cause of action being
predicated on the sale and conveyance of what was denominated petitioner’s “real right, interest and
participation” over a parcel of land located at Bataan, and the sale of one male carabao.
petitioner alleged that he was as far back as 1960 “an agricultural leasehold tenant over the
landholding in question,” the rental being agreed upon at 50 cavans but that previous to the filing of the
action, he had been agitating for the reduction of the annual rentals of the land but failed, private
respondent having warned him that if he persisted, she would get back the land if defendant insisted. The
action was one of harassment and one moreover beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Judge involving
as it did a tenancy dispute.the failure of respondent Judge to accede to the plea of petitioner that a
tenancy dispute is involved, the matter was beyond its jurisdiction, certainly an infirmity attended by fatal
consequence, And even decided the case in favor of private respondent, hearing the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not “due process” was violated by respondent judge.

HELD:
We hold that when the factual question of the existence of a leasehold tenancy relation between
the parties is raised, in an ejectment case, which if true, would vest original and exclusive jurisdiction over
the case in the court of agrarian relations and not in the municipal court. Without holding a hearing then
on the question of jurisdiction respondent Judge allowed the case to proceed and, on the basis of the
evidence submitted by private respondent, without petitioner being heard, rendered the challenged
decision. The due process failing is thus apparent.
If procedural deficiency were taken into account, it appears that respondent Judge had much to
answer for. Nor is it a matter of proceeding according to doctrinal requirements alone that vitiated his
actuation. The due process mandate was likewise aid scant respect, considering the circumstances of the
case, more specifically, petitioner being a pauper litigant.

G.R. No. L-49360 December 14, 1979

FILEMON DAVID vs.

HON. GREGORIO U. AQUILIZAN

FACTS:
David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato. He let Felomeno Jugar and Ricardo Jugar
tend and caretake separate portions of his land in 1971. The land is estimated to be yielding 60-70 cavans
of corn cobs and the share agreed upon is 50-50. In 1973, David withdrew the land from the brothers and
has not allowed them to go back there. The brothers prayed for reinstatement but David refused to do
so. David denied that the brothers were his tenants. He said that Ricardo was his tractor driver before but
he resigned to take care of his dad and to work for DOLE. Fewlomeno on the other hand surrendered the
portion of the land he was tending to continue his faith healing. J Aquilizan handled the case filed by the
brothers against David and after three months he rendered a decision in favor of the brothers without
any hearing. David averred he was denied due process. J Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no
hearing conducted but he said the decision has already become final and executory as the period for
appeal has already lapsed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal.

HELD: (pag mukhaain mong mahaba to ha hihihi)

Yes, David is entitled to an appeal.
. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of David. A decision rendered without a hearing is null and
void and may be attacked directly or collaterally. The decision is null and void for want of due process.
And it has been held that a final and executory judgment may be set aside with a view to the renewal of
the litigation when the judgment is void for lack of due process of law. In legal contemplation, it is as if no
judgment has been rendered at all.

CASE DIGEST : US vs TURIBIO

Facts:
turibio caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, his carabao, without the
permit from the municipal treasure of Carmen, Bohol wherein it was slaughtered, which is in violation of
the provisions of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.
The said act of slaughtering the carabao took place after his application for a permit to slaughter his
carabao was denied to him on the ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work or for
draft purposes."The counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act
No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal
treasure, because there is no slaughter house in the said municipality. but, according to the states the
prohibition refers to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit
duly secured from the municipal treasurer.
Issue:
does Act No. 1147 violate the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill which provides that "no law shall
be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
Held:
No. it is a valid exercise of Police power.
it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under considerationwas required by "the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that
theprohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for
agricultural workor draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to
protect the community from theloss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident
owners, tempted either by greed of momentarygain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food,
even when by so doing the productive power of the communitymay be measurably and dangerously
affected.

Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty 32 Phil. 580 (1915)

In re: Police power of the State, Lawful Subject of police power
Facts
Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the advertising business,
particularly in billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands in the Province of Rizal
were removed upon complaints and by the orders of the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue by virtue
of the provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339.
Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the of the Collector of
Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive
to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in question “in no sense constitute
a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any
persons.” Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue avers that after due investigation made upon the
complaints of the British and German Consuls, the defendant “decided that the billboard complained of
was and still offensive to the sight and is otherwise a nuisance.”

.
ISSUES:
Whether or not portions of section 100 of Act No.
2 3 3 9 i s unconstitutional as it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
HELD:
N o . Offensive noises and smells have been for a long time considered susceptible
of suppression in thickly populated districts. “Ostensibly located on private property, the real and sole
value of
the billboard is its proximity to the public thoroughfares. Hence, we conceive that the regulation of bill
boards and their restriction is not so much a regulation of private property as it is a regulation of the
use of the streets and other public thorough fares.”The inquiry is limited to the question of
whether the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the police
power of the Government, for all property is held subject to that power. The Court
states that the exercise of police power belongs to the Legislature, and that
power i s l i m i t e d o n l y b y t h e A c t s o f C o n g r e s s a n d t h o s e p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h
a r e t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f a l l republican forms of government, and where the Act is
reasonably within the proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort,
it should not be disturbed by the courts.

RUBI et.al vs The Provincial Board of Mindoro

FACTS: Rubi and various other Mangyans in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial
governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves
on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by
imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end
and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were
considered to be of “very low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and
was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas
corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the
resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of
their liberty.

ISSUE:. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.
HELD:
No.The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither
discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty
of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered.
They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal
protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.”